This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.9.96-rc1
Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
block/mq: fix potential deadlock during cpu hotplug
Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
writeback: safer lock nesting
Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
fanotify: fix logic of events on child
Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
mm/filemap.c: fix NULL pointer in page_cache_tree_insert()
Ian Kent <[email protected]>
autofs: mount point create should honour passed in mode
Al Viro <[email protected]>
Don't leak MNT_INTERNAL away from internal mounts
Al Viro <[email protected]>
rpc_pipefs: fix double-dput()
Al Viro <[email protected]>
orangefs_kill_sb(): deal with allocation failures
Al Viro <[email protected]>
hypfs_kill_super(): deal with failed allocations
Al Viro <[email protected]>
jffs2_kill_sb(): deal with failed allocations
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
udf: Fix leak of UTF-16 surrogates into encoded strings
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/lib: Fix off-by-one in alternate feature patching
Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
powerpc/eeh: Fix enabling bridge MMIO windows
Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
MIPS: memset.S: Fix clobber of v1 in last_fixup
Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
MIPS: memset.S: Fix return of __clear_user from Lpartial_fixup
Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
MIPS: memset.S: EVA & fault support for small_memset
Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
MIPS: uaccess: Add micromips clobbers to bzero invocation
Rodrigo Rivas Costa <[email protected]>
HID: hidraw: Fix crash on HIDIOCGFEATURE with a destroyed device
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: fix crng_ready() test
David Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - New VIA controller suppor no-snoop path
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: rawmidi: Fix missing input substream checks in compat ioctls
Fabián Inostroza <[email protected]>
ALSA: line6: Use correct endpoint type for midi output
Paul Parsons <[email protected]>
drm/radeon: Fix PCIe lane width calculation
Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
drm/rockchip: Clear all interrupts before requesting the IRQ
Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: Fix PCIe lane width calculation
Bas Nieuwenhuizen <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: Fix always_valid bos multiple LRU insertions.
Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: Add an ATPX quirk for hybrid laptop
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: don't allow r/w mounts if metadata blocks overlap the superblock
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcm: Fix endless loop for XRUN recovery in OSS emulation
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcm: Fix mutex unbalance in OSS emulation ioctls
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcm: Return -EBUSY for OSS ioctls changing busy streams
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcm: Avoid potential races between OSS ioctls and read/write
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcm: Use ERESTARTSYS instead of EINTR in OSS emulation
Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
vfio/pci: Virtualize Maximum Read Request Size
Igor Pylypiv <[email protected]>
watchdog: f71808e_wdt: Fix WD_EN register read
Sean Wang <[email protected]>
dt-bindings: clock: mediatek: add binding for fixed-factor clock axisel_d4
Mikhail Lappo <[email protected]>
thermal: imx: Fix race condition in imx_thermal_probe()
Ryo Kodama <[email protected]>
pwm: rcar: Fix a condition to prevent mismatch value setting to duty
Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
clk: bcm2835: De-assert/assert PLL reset signal when appropriate
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
clk: fix false-positive Wmaybe-uninitialized warning
Richard Genoud <[email protected]>
clk: mvebu: armada-38x: add support for missing clocks
Ralph Sennhauser <[email protected]>
clk: mvebu: armada-38x: add support for 1866MHz variants
Alex Smith <[email protected]>
mmc: jz4740: Fix race condition in IRQ mask update
Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: Fix a potential memory leak
Krzysztof Mazur <[email protected]>
um: Use POSIX ucontext_t instead of struct ucontext
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
um: Compile with modern headers
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
nfit, address-range-scrub: fix scrub in-progress reporting
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
libnvdimm, namespace: use a safe lookup for dimm device name
Maxime Jayat <[email protected]>
dmaengine: at_xdmac: fix rare residue corruption
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
IB/srp: Fix completion vector assignment algorithm
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
IB/srp: Fix srp_abort()
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcm: Fix UAF at PCM release via PCM timer access
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
RDMA/rxe: Fix an out-of-bounds read
Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
RDMA/ucma: Don't allow setting RDMA_OPTION_IB_PATH without an RDMA device
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: fail ext4_iget for root directory if unallocated
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: add validity checks for bitmap block numbers
Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
ext4: protect i_disksize update by i_data_sem in direct write path
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: don't update checksum of new initialized bitmaps
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
jbd2: if the journal is aborted then don't allow update of the log tail
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: use a tighter cap in credit_entropy_bits_safe()
Aniruddha Banerjee <[email protected]>
irqchip/gic: Take lock when updating irq type
Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
thunderbolt: Resume control channel after hibernation image is created
James Kelly <[email protected]>
ASoC: ssm2602: Replace reg_default_raw with reg_default
Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
HID: core: Fix size as type u32
Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
HID: Fix hid_report_len usage
Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
powerpc/powernv: Fix OPAL NVRAM driver OPAL_BUSY loops
Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
powerpc/64: Fix smp_wmb barrier definition use use lwsync consistently
Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
powerpc/powernv: Handle unknown OPAL errors in opal_nvram_write()
Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
HID: i2c-hid: fix size check and type usage
Steve French <[email protected]>
smb3: Fix root directory when server returns inode number of zero
Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: pci: Properly cleanup resource
Zhengjun Xing <[email protected]>
USB:fix USB3 devices behind USB3 hubs not resuming at hibernate thaw
Yavuz, Tuba <[email protected]>
USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
ACPI / hotplug / PCI: Check presence of slot itself in get_slot_status()
Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
ACPI / video: Add quirk to force acpi-video backlight on Samsung 670Z5E
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
regmap: Fix reversed bounds check in regmap_raw_write()
Jason Andryuk <[email protected]>
xen-netfront: Fix hang on device removal
Maxime Chevallier <[email protected]>
spi: Fix scatterlist elements size in spi_map_buf
Santiago Esteban <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: at91: sama5d4: fix pinctrl compatible string
Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: exynos: Fix IOMMU support for GScaler devices on Exynos5250
Nicolas Ferre <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: at91: at91sam9g25: fix mux-mask pinctrl property
Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
usb: gadget: udc: core: update usb_ep_queue() documentation
Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
usb: musb: gadget: misplaced out of bounds check
Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
mm, slab: reschedule cache_reap() on the same CPU
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
ipc/shm: fix use-after-free of shm file via remap_file_pages()
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
resource: fix integer overflow at reallocation
Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
fs/reiserfs/journal.c: add missing resierfs_warning() arg
Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
ubi: Reject MLC NAND
Romain Izard <[email protected]>
ubi: Fix error for write access
Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
ubi: fastmap: Don't flush fastmap work on detach
Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
ubifs: Check ubifs_wbuf_sync() return code
Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
tty: make n_tty_read() always abort if hangup is in progress
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi | 2 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250.dtsi | 8 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi | 2 +-
arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 +-
arch/mips/lib/memset.S | 11 +-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h | 3 +-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h | 4 -
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c | 3 +-
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c | 11 +-
arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c | 2 +-
arch/um/os-Linux/file.c | 1 +
arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c | 3 +-
block/blk-mq.c | 4 +-
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 5 +-
drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 9 ++
drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/random.c | 75 +++++----
drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c | 8 +-
drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c | 15 +-
drivers/clk/renesas/clk-sh73a0.c | 6 +-
drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atpx_handler.c | 1 +
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c | 6 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/si_dpm.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c | 23 +--
drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 10 +-
drivers/hid/hid-input.c | 3 +-
drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 5 +-
drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c | 4 +-
drivers/hid/hidraw.c | 5 +
drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c | 13 +-
drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c | 2 +-
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 3 +
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c | 5 +-
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 18 +--
drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c | 1 +
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-common.c | 9 +-
drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c | 2 +-
drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c | 2 +-
drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c | 11 ++
drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c | 1 -
drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 7 +-
drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c | 4 +-
drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c | 23 ++-
drivers/pwm/pwm-rcar.c | 8 +-
drivers/spi/spi.c | 10 +-
drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c | 6 +-
drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c | 1 +
drivers/tty/n_tty.c | 6 +
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 9 ++
drivers/usb/core/generic.c | 9 +-
drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c | 2 +-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c | 3 +-
drivers/usb/gadget/u_f.h | 2 +
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c | 3 +
drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c | 14 +-
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 29 +++-
drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c | 2 +-
fs/autofs4/root.c | 2 +-
fs/cifs/cifsglob.h | 1 +
fs/cifs/inode.c | 33 ++++
fs/ext4/balloc.c | 19 ++-
fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 54 ++-----
fs/ext4/inode.c | 11 +-
fs/ext4/super.c | 6 +
fs/fs-writeback.c | 7 +-
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 5 +-
fs/jffs2/super.c | 2 +-
fs/namespace.c | 3 +-
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 34 ++---
fs/orangefs/super.c | 5 +
fs/reiserfs/journal.c | 2 +-
fs/ubifs/super.c | 14 +-
fs/udf/unicode.c | 6 +
include/dt-bindings/clock/mt2701-clk.h | 3 +-
include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h | 5 +
include/linux/backing-dev.h | 30 ++--
include/linux/hid.h | 6 +-
include/linux/tty.h | 1 +
include/sound/pcm_oss.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/random.h | 3 +
ipc/shm.c | 23 ++-
kernel/resource.c | 3 +-
mm/filemap.c | 9 +-
mm/page-writeback.c | 18 +--
mm/slab.c | 3 +-
net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c | 1 +
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 186 ++++++++++++++++++-----
sound/core/pcm.c | 8 +-
sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c | 18 ++-
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 3 +-
sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c | 19 ++-
sound/usb/line6/midi.c | 2 +-
98 files changed, 694 insertions(+), 322 deletions(-)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
commit af6f8529098aeb0e56a68671b450cf74e7a64fcd upstream.
musb->endpoints[] has array size MUSB_C_NUM_EPS.
We must check array bounds before accessing the array and not afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c | 14 +++++++++-----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c
@@ -114,15 +114,19 @@ static int service_tx_status_request(
}
is_in = epnum & USB_DIR_IN;
- if (is_in) {
- epnum &= 0x0f;
+ epnum &= 0x0f;
+ if (epnum >= MUSB_C_NUM_EPS) {
+ handled = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (is_in)
ep = &musb->endpoints[epnum].ep_in;
- } else {
+ else
ep = &musb->endpoints[epnum].ep_out;
- }
regs = musb->endpoints[epnum].regs;
- if (epnum >= MUSB_C_NUM_EPS || !ep->desc) {
+ if (!ep->desc) {
handled = -EINVAL;
break;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
commit aac17948a7ce01fb60b9ee6cf902967a47b3ce26 upstream.
If ubifs_wbuf_sync() fails we must not write a master node with the
dirty marker cleared.
Otherwise it is possible that in case of an IO error while syncing we
mark the filesystem as clean and UBIFS refuses to recover upon next
mount.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1e51764a3c2a ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ubifs/super.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ubifs/super.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/super.c
@@ -1728,8 +1728,11 @@ static void ubifs_remount_ro(struct ubif
dbg_save_space_info(c);
- for (i = 0; i < c->jhead_cnt; i++)
- ubifs_wbuf_sync(&c->jheads[i].wbuf);
+ for (i = 0; i < c->jhead_cnt; i++) {
+ err = ubifs_wbuf_sync(&c->jheads[i].wbuf);
+ if (err)
+ ubifs_ro_mode(c, err);
+ }
c->mst_node->flags &= ~cpu_to_le32(UBIFS_MST_DIRTY);
c->mst_node->flags |= cpu_to_le32(UBIFS_MST_NO_ORPHS);
@@ -1795,8 +1798,11 @@ static void ubifs_put_super(struct super
int err;
/* Synchronize write-buffers */
- for (i = 0; i < c->jhead_cnt; i++)
- ubifs_wbuf_sync(&c->jheads[i].wbuf);
+ for (i = 0; i < c->jhead_cnt; i++) {
+ err = ubifs_wbuf_sync(&c->jheads[i].wbuf);
+ if (err)
+ ubifs_ro_mode(c, err);
+ }
/*
* We are being cleanly unmounted which means the
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
commit f2a659f7d8d5da803836583aa16df06bdf324252 upstream.
The driver misses implementation of PM hook that undoes what
->freeze_noirq() does after the hibernation image is created. This means
the control channel is not resumed properly and the Thunderbolt bus
becomes useless in later stages of hibernation (when the image is stored
or if the operation fails).
Fix this by pointing ->thaw_noirq to driver nhi_resume_noirq(). This
makes sure the control channel is resumed properly.
Fixes: 23dd5bb49d98 ("thunderbolt: Add suspend/hibernate support")
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c
+++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c
@@ -628,6 +628,7 @@ static const struct dev_pm_ops nhi_pm_op
* we just disable hotplug, the
* pci-tunnels stay alive.
*/
+ .thaw_noirq = nhi_resume_noirq,
.restore_noirq = nhi_resume_noirq,
};
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 85e0c4e89c1b864e763c4e3bb15d0b6d501ad5d9 upstream.
This updates the jbd2 superblock unnecessarily, and on an abort we
shouldn't truncate the log.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
@@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ out:
}
/*
- * This is a variaon of __jbd2_update_log_tail which checks for validity of
+ * This is a variation of __jbd2_update_log_tail which checks for validity of
* provided log tail and locks j_checkpoint_mutex. So it is safe against races
* with other threads updating log tail.
*/
@@ -1394,6 +1394,9 @@ int jbd2_journal_update_sb_log_tail(jour
journal_superblock_t *sb = journal->j_superblock;
int ret;
+ if (is_journal_aborted(journal))
+ return -EIO;
+
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&journal->j_checkpoint_mutex));
jbd_debug(1, "JBD2: updating superblock (start %lu, seq %u)\n",
tail_block, tail_tid);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
commit 73fdad00b208b139cf43f3163fbc0f67e4c6047c upstream.
i_disksize update should be protected by i_data_sem, by either taking
the lock explicitly or by using ext4_update_i_disksize() helper. But the
i_disksize updates in ext4_direct_IO_write() are not protected at all,
which may be racing with i_disksize updates in writeback path in
delalloc buffer write path.
This is found by code inspection, and I didn't hit any i_disksize
corruption due to this bug. Thanks to Jan Kara for catching this bug and
suggesting the fix!
Reported-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/inode.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -3396,7 +3396,6 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO_write(stru
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
- struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
ssize_t ret;
loff_t offset = iocb->ki_pos;
size_t count = iov_iter_count(iter);
@@ -3420,7 +3419,7 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO_write(stru
goto out;
}
orphan = 1;
- ei->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
+ ext4_update_i_disksize(inode, inode->i_size);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
@@ -3548,7 +3547,7 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO_write(stru
if (ret > 0) {
loff_t end = offset + ret;
if (end > inode->i_size) {
- ei->i_disksize = end;
+ ext4_update_i_disksize(inode, end);
i_size_write(inode, end);
/*
* We're going to return a positive `ret'
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Mazur <[email protected]>
commit 4d1a535b8ec5e74b42dfd9dc809142653b2597f6 upstream.
glibc 2.26 removed the 'struct ucontext' to "improve" POSIX compliance
and break programs, including User Mode Linux. Fix User Mode Linux
by using POSIX ucontext_t.
This fixes:
arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c: In function 'hard_handler':
arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c:163:22: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type 'struct ucontext'
mcontext_t *mc = &uc->uc_mcontext;
arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c: In function 'stub_segv_handler':
arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c:16:13: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type 'struct ucontext'
&uc->uc_mcontext);
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Mazur <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c
+++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static void (*handlers[_NSIG])(int sig,
static void hard_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *si, void *p)
{
- struct ucontext *uc = p;
+ ucontext_t *uc = p;
mcontext_t *mc = &uc->uc_mcontext;
unsigned long pending = 1UL << sig;
--- a/arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
void __attribute__ ((__section__ (".__syscall_stub")))
stub_segv_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *p)
{
- struct ucontext *uc = p;
+ ucontext_t *uc = p;
GET_FAULTINFO_FROM_MC(*((struct faultinfo *) STUB_DATA),
&uc->uc_mcontext);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
commit 0bfdf598900fd62869659f360d3387ed80eb71cf upstream.
asm/barrier.h is not always included after asm/synch.h, which meant
it was missing __SUBARCH_HAS_LWSYNC, so in some files smp_wmb() would
be eieio when it should be lwsync. kernel/time/hrtimer.c is one case.
__SUBARCH_HAS_LWSYNC is only used in one place, so just fold it in
to where it's used. Previously with my small simulator config, 377
instances of eieio in the tree. After this patch there are 55.
Fixes: 46d075be585e ("powerpc: Optimise smp_wmb")
Cc: [email protected] # v2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h | 3 ++-
arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h | 4 ----
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@
#define rmb() __asm__ __volatile__ ("sync" : : : "memory")
#define wmb() __asm__ __volatile__ ("sync" : : : "memory")
-#ifdef __SUBARCH_HAS_LWSYNC
+/* The sub-arch has lwsync */
+#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_E500MC)
# define SMPWMB LWSYNC
#else
# define SMPWMB eieio
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h
@@ -5,10 +5,6 @@
#include <linux/stringify.h>
#include <asm/feature-fixups.h>
-#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_E500MC)
-#define __SUBARCH_HAS_LWSYNC
-#endif
-
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
extern unsigned int __start___lwsync_fixup, __stop___lwsync_fixup;
extern void do_lwsync_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start,
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
commit 6de0b13cc0b4ba10e98a9263d7a83b940720b77a upstream.
When size is negative, calling memset will make segment fault.
Declare the size as type u32 to keep memset safe.
size in struct hid_report is unsigned, fix return type of
hid_report_len to u32.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 10 +++++-----
include/linux/hid.h | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
@@ -1370,7 +1370,7 @@ u8 *hid_alloc_report_buf(struct hid_repo
* of implement() working on 8 byte chunks
*/
- int len = hid_report_len(report) + 7;
+ u32 len = hid_report_len(report) + 7;
return kmalloc(len, flags);
}
@@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ void __hid_request(struct hid_device *hi
{
char *buf;
int ret;
- int len;
+ u32 len;
buf = hid_alloc_report_buf(report, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
@@ -1461,14 +1461,14 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__hid_request);
-int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, int size,
+int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size,
int interrupt)
{
struct hid_report_enum *report_enum = hid->report_enum + type;
struct hid_report *report;
struct hid_driver *hdrv;
unsigned int a;
- int rsize, csize = size;
+ u32 rsize, csize = size;
u8 *cdata = data;
int ret = 0;
@@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_report_raw_event);
*
* This is data entry for lower layers.
*/
-int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, int size, int interrupt)
+int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size, int interrupt)
{
struct hid_report_enum *report_enum;
struct hid_driver *hdrv;
--- a/include/linux/hid.h
+++ b/include/linux/hid.h
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ extern int hidinput_connect(struct hid_d
extern void hidinput_disconnect(struct hid_device *);
int hid_set_field(struct hid_field *, unsigned, __s32);
-int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *, int type, u8 *, int, int);
+int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *, int type, u8 *, u32, int);
int hidinput_find_field(struct hid_device *hid, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, struct hid_field **field);
struct hid_field *hidinput_get_led_field(struct hid_device *hid);
unsigned int hidinput_count_leds(struct hid_device *hid);
@@ -1106,13 +1106,13 @@ static inline void hid_hw_wait(struct hi
*
* @report: the report we want to know the length
*/
-static inline int hid_report_len(struct hid_report *report)
+static inline u32 hid_report_len(struct hid_report *report)
{
/* equivalent to DIV_ROUND_UP(report->size, 8) + !!(report->id > 0) */
return ((report->size - 1) >> 3) + 1 + (report->id > 0);
}
-int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, int size,
+int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size,
int interrupt);
/* HID quirks API */
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit c64ed5dd9feba193c76eb460b451225ac2a0d87b upstream.
Fix the last standing EINTR in the whole subsystem. Use more correct
ERESTARTSYS for pending signals.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(str
if (!(mutex_trylock(&runtime->oss.params_lock)))
return -EAGAIN;
} else if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
- return -EINTR;
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
sw_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_params), GFP_KERNEL);
params = kmalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL);
sparams = kmalloc(sizeof(*sparams), GFP_KERNEL);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 0bb29a849a6433b72e249eea7695477b02056e94 upstream.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly...")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.8+
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
unsigned long rv;
if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
}
static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng(void)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
commit daf70d89f80c6e1772233da9e020114b1254e7e0 upstream.
The __clear_user function is defined to return the number of bytes that
could not be cleared. From the underlying memset / bzero implementation
this means setting register a2 to that number on return. Currently if a
page fault is triggered within the memset_partial block, the value
loaded into a2 on return is meaningless.
The label .Lpartial_fixup\@ is jumped to on page fault. In order to work
out how many bytes failed to copy, the exception handler should find how
many bytes left in the partial block (andi a2, STORMASK), add that to
the partial block end address (a2), and subtract the faulting address to
get the remainder. Currently it incorrectly subtracts the partial block
start address (t1), which has additionally been clobbered to generate a
jump target in memset_partial. Fix this by adding the block end address
instead.
This issue was found with the following test code:
int j, k;
for (j = 0; j < 512; j++) {
if ((k = clear_user(NULL, j)) != j) {
pr_err("clear_user (NULL %d) returned %d\n", j, k);
}
}
Which now passes on Creator Ci40 (MIPS32) and Cavium Octeon II (MIPS64).
Suggested-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19108/
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/lib/memset.S | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S
+++ b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
PTR_L t0, TI_TASK($28)
andi a2, STORMASK
LONG_L t0, THREAD_BUADDR(t0)
- LONG_ADDU a2, t1
+ LONG_ADDU a2, a0
jr ra
LONG_SUBU a2, t0
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rodrigo Rivas Costa <[email protected]>
commit a955358d54695e4ad9f7d6489a7ac4d69a8fc711 upstream.
Doing `ioctl(HIDIOCGFEATURE)` in a tight loop on a hidraw device
and then disconnecting the device, or unloading the driver, can
cause a NULL pointer dereference.
When a hidraw device is destroyed it sets 0 to `dev->exist`.
Most functions check 'dev->exist' before doing its work, but
`hidraw_get_report()` was missing that check.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Rivas Costa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hid/hidraw.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/hid/hidraw.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hidraw.c
@@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static ssize_t hidraw_get_report(struct
int ret = 0, len;
unsigned char report_number;
+ if (!hidraw_table[minor] || !hidraw_table[minor]->exist) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
dev = hidraw_table[minor]->hid;
if (!dev->ll_driver->raw_request) {
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 18db4b4e6fc31eda838dd1c1296d67dbcb3dc957 upstream.
If some metadata block, such as an allocation bitmap, overlaps the
superblock, it's very likely that if the file system is mounted
read/write, the results will not be pretty. So disallow r/w mounts
for file systems corrupted in this particular way.
Backport notes:
3.18.y is missing bc98a42c1f7d ("VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)")
and e462ec50cb5f ("VFS: Differentiate mount flags (MS_*) from internal superblock flags")
so we simply use the sb MS_RDONLY check from pre bc98a42c1f7d in place of the sb_rdonly
function used in the upstream variant of the patch.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Harsh Shandilya <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/super.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -2260,6 +2260,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Block bitmap for group %u overlaps "
"superblock", i);
+ if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
+ return 0;
}
if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
@@ -2272,6 +2274,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode bitmap for group %u overlaps "
"superblock", i);
+ if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
+ return 0;
}
if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
@@ -2284,6 +2288,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode table for group %u overlaps "
"superblock", i);
+ if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
+ return 0;
}
if (inode_table < first_block ||
inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) {
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit f6d297df4dd47ef949540e4a201230d0c5308325 upstream.
The previous fix 40cab6e88cb0 ("ALSA: pcm: Return -EBUSY for OSS
ioctls changing busy streams") introduced some mutex unbalance; the
check of runtime->oss.rw_ref was inserted in a wrong place after the
mutex lock.
This patch fixes the inconsistency by rewriting with the helper
functions to lock/unlock parameters with the stream check.
Fixes: 40cab6e88cb0 ("ALSA: pcm: Return -EBUSY for OSS ioctls changing busy streams")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -834,6 +834,23 @@ static int choose_rate(struct snd_pcm_su
return snd_pcm_hw_param_near(substream, params, SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE, best_rate, NULL);
}
+/* parameter locking: returns immediately if tried during streaming */
+static int lock_params(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime)
+{
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void unlock_params(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime)
+{
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+}
+
/* call with params_lock held */
static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
@@ -1773,6 +1790,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_rate(struct s
for (idx = 1; idx >= 0; --idx) {
struct snd_pcm_substream *substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[idx];
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
+ int err;
+
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
@@ -1780,15 +1799,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_rate(struct s
rate = 1000;
else if (rate > 192000)
rate = 192000;
- if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
- if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
- return -EBUSY;
+ err = lock_params(runtime);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
if (runtime->oss.rate != rate) {
runtime->oss.params = 1;
runtime->oss.rate = rate;
}
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ unlock_params(runtime);
}
return snd_pcm_oss_get_rate(pcm_oss_file);
}
@@ -1813,18 +1831,19 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_channels(stru
for (idx = 1; idx >= 0; --idx) {
struct snd_pcm_substream *substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[idx];
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
+ int err;
+
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
- if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
- if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
- return -EBUSY;
+ err = lock_params(runtime);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
if (runtime->oss.channels != channels) {
runtime->oss.params = 1;
runtime->oss.channels = channels;
}
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ unlock_params(runtime);
}
return snd_pcm_oss_get_channels(pcm_oss_file);
}
@@ -1897,6 +1916,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_get_formats(struc
static int snd_pcm_oss_set_format(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int format)
{
int formats, idx;
+ int err;
if (format != AFMT_QUERY) {
formats = snd_pcm_oss_get_formats(pcm_oss_file);
@@ -1910,15 +1930,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_format(struct
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
- if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
- return -EBUSY;
- if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ err = lock_params(runtime);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
if (runtime->oss.format != format) {
runtime->oss.params = 1;
runtime->oss.format = format;
}
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ unlock_params(runtime);
}
}
return snd_pcm_oss_get_format(pcm_oss_file);
@@ -1966,12 +1985,11 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide(str
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
- if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
- return -EBUSY;
- if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ err = lock_params(runtime);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
err = snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(substream, subdivide);
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ unlock_params(runtime);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
@@ -2006,12 +2024,11 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment(stru
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
- if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
- return -EBUSY;
- if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ err = lock_params(runtime);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
err = snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(substream, val);
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ unlock_params(runtime);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 13b40935cf64f59b93cf1c716a2033488e5a228c upstream.
_PR3 doesn't seem to work properly, use ATPX instead.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104064
Reviewed-by: Huang Rui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atpx_handler.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atpx_handler.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atpx_handler.c
@@ -569,6 +569,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_px_quirk amdg
{ 0x1002, 0x6900, 0x1002, 0x0124, AMDGPU_PX_QUIRK_FORCE_ATPX },
{ 0x1002, 0x6900, 0x1028, 0x0812, AMDGPU_PX_QUIRK_FORCE_ATPX },
{ 0x1002, 0x6900, 0x1028, 0x0813, AMDGPU_PX_QUIRK_FORCE_ATPX },
+ { 0x1002, 0x67DF, 0x1028, 0x0774, AMDGPU_PX_QUIRK_FORCE_ATPX },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
};
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit e15dc99dbb9cf99f6432e8e3c0b3a8f7a3403a86 upstream.
The commit 02a5d6925cd3 ("ALSA: pcm: Avoid potential races between OSS
ioctls and read/write") split the PCM preparation code to a locked
version, and it added a sanity check of runtime->oss.prepare flag
along with the change. This leaded to an endless loop when the stream
gets XRUN: namely, snd_pcm_oss_write3() and co call
snd_pcm_oss_prepare() without setting runtime->oss.prepare flag and
the loop continues until the PCM state reaches to another one.
As the function is supposed to execute the preparation
unconditionally, drop the invalid state check there.
The bug was triggered by syzkaller.
Fixes: 02a5d6925cd3 ("ALSA: pcm: Avoid potential races between OSS ioctls and read/write")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -1139,13 +1139,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_get_active_substr
}
/* call with params_lock held */
+/* NOTE: this always call PREPARE unconditionally no matter whether
+ * runtime->oss.prepare is set or not
+ */
static int snd_pcm_oss_prepare(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
int err;
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
- if (!runtime->oss.prepare)
- return 0;
err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_PREPARE, NULL);
if (err < 0) {
pcm_dbg(substream->pcm,
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
commit 51d638b1f56a0bfd9219800620994794a1a2b219 upstream.
This can be triggered by hot-unplug one cpu.
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
4.11.0+ #17 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
step_after_susp/2640 is trying to acquire lock:
(all_q_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffb33f95b8>] blk_mq_queue_reinit_work+0x18/0x110
but task is already holding lock:
(cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb306d04f>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x7f/0xe0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}:
lock_acquire+0x11c/0x230
__mutex_lock+0x92/0x990
mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
get_online_cpus+0x64/0x80
blk_mq_init_allocated_queue+0x3a0/0x4e0
blk_mq_init_queue+0x3a/0x60
loop_add+0xe5/0x280
loop_init+0x124/0x177
do_one_initcall+0x53/0x1c0
kernel_init_freeable+0x1e3/0x27f
kernel_init+0xe/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40
-> #0 (all_q_mutex){+.+...}:
__lock_acquire+0x189a/0x18a0
lock_acquire+0x11c/0x230
__mutex_lock+0x92/0x990
mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
blk_mq_queue_reinit_work+0x18/0x110
blk_mq_queue_reinit_dead+0x1c/0x20
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1f2/0x810
cpuhp_down_callbacks+0x42/0x80
_cpu_down+0xb2/0xe0
freeze_secondary_cpus+0xb6/0x390
suspend_devices_and_enter+0x3b3/0xa40
pm_suspend+0x129/0x490
state_store+0x82/0xf0
kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20
sysfs_kf_write+0x45/0x60
kernfs_fop_write+0x135/0x1c0
__vfs_write+0x37/0x160
vfs_write+0xcd/0x1d0
SyS_write+0x58/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x8f/0x710
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(cpu_hotplug.lock);
lock(all_q_mutex);
lock(cpu_hotplug.lock);
lock(all_q_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
8 locks held by step_after_susp/2640:
#0: (sb_writers#6){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffffb3244aed>] vfs_write+0x1ad/0x1d0
#1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb32d3a51>] kernfs_fop_write+0x101/0x1c0
#2: (s_active#166){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffffb32d3a59>] kernfs_fop_write+0x109/0x1c0
#3: (pm_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffb30d2ecd>] pm_suspend+0x21d/0x490
#4: (acpi_scan_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb34dc3d7>] acpi_scan_lock_acquire+0x17/0x20
#5: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb306d6d7>] freeze_secondary_cpus+0x27/0x390
#6: (cpu_hotplug.dep_map){++++++}, at: [<ffffffffb306cfd5>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x5/0xe0
#7: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffb306d04f>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x7f/0xe0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 2640 Comm: step_after_susp Not tainted 4.11.0+ #17
Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 7040/0JCTF8, BIOS 1.4.9 09/12/2016
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x99/0xce
print_circular_bug+0x1fa/0x270
__lock_acquire+0x189a/0x18a0
lock_acquire+0x11c/0x230
? lock_acquire+0x11c/0x230
? blk_mq_queue_reinit_work+0x18/0x110
? blk_mq_queue_reinit_work+0x18/0x110
__mutex_lock+0x92/0x990
? blk_mq_queue_reinit_work+0x18/0x110
? kmem_cache_free+0x2cb/0x330
? anon_transport_class_unregister+0x20/0x20
? blk_mq_queue_reinit_work+0x110/0x110
mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
blk_mq_queue_reinit_work+0x18/0x110
blk_mq_queue_reinit_dead+0x1c/0x20
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1f2/0x810
? __flow_cache_shrink+0x160/0x160
cpuhp_down_callbacks+0x42/0x80
_cpu_down+0xb2/0xe0
freeze_secondary_cpus+0xb6/0x390
suspend_devices_and_enter+0x3b3/0xa40
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x79/0x80
pm_suspend+0x129/0x490
state_store+0x82/0xf0
kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20
sysfs_kf_write+0x45/0x60
kernfs_fop_write+0x135/0x1c0
__vfs_write+0x37/0x160
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x79/0x80
? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2f/0x60
? __sb_start_write+0xd9/0x1c0
? vfs_write+0x1ad/0x1d0
vfs_write+0xcd/0x1d0
SyS_write+0x58/0xc0
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x79/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x8f/0x710
? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
The cpu hotplug path will hold cpu_hotplug.lock and then reinit all exiting
queues for blk mq w/ all_q_mutex, however, blk_mq_init_allocated_queue() will
contend these two locks in the inversion order. This is due to commit eabe06595d62
(blk/mq: Cure cpu hotplug lock inversion), it fixes a cpu hotplug lock inversion
issue because of hotplug rework, however the hotplug rework is still work-in-progress
and lives in a -tip branch and mainline cannot yet trigger that splat. The commit
breaks the linus's tree in the merge window, so this patch reverts the lock order
and avoids to splat linus's tree.
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Thierry Escande <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
block/blk-mq.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/block/blk-mq.c
+++ b/block/blk-mq.c
@@ -2019,15 +2019,15 @@ struct request_queue *blk_mq_init_alloca
blk_mq_init_cpu_queues(q, set->nr_hw_queues);
- mutex_lock(&all_q_mutex);
get_online_cpus();
+ mutex_lock(&all_q_mutex);
list_add_tail(&q->all_q_node, &all_q_list);
blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set(set, q);
blk_mq_map_swqueue(q, cpu_online_mask);
- put_online_cpus();
mutex_unlock(&all_q_mutex);
+ put_online_cpus();
return q;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
commit cf0d53ba4947aad6e471491d5b20a567cbe92e56 upstream.
MRRS defines the maximum read request size a device is allowed to
make. Drivers will often increase this to allow more data transfer
with a single request. Completions to this request are bound by the
MPS setting for the bus. Aside from device quirks (none known), it
doesn't seem to make sense to set an MRRS value less than MPS, yet
this is a likely scenario given that user drivers do not have a
system-wide view of the PCI topology. Virtualize MRRS such that the
user can set MRRS >= MPS, but use MPS as the floor value that we'll
write to hardware.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c
+++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c
@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ static int vfio_exp_config_write(struct
{
__le16 *ctrl = (__le16 *)(vdev->vconfig + pos -
offset + PCI_EXP_DEVCTL);
+ int readrq = le16_to_cpu(*ctrl) & PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ;
count = vfio_default_config_write(vdev, pos, count, perm, offset, val);
if (count < 0)
@@ -835,6 +836,27 @@ static int vfio_exp_config_write(struct
pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev);
}
+ /*
+ * MPS is virtualized to the user, writes do not change the physical
+ * register since determining a proper MPS value requires a system wide
+ * device view. The MRRS is largely independent of MPS, but since the
+ * user does not have that system-wide view, they might set a safe, but
+ * inefficiently low value. Here we allow writes through to hardware,
+ * but we set the floor to the physical device MPS setting, so that
+ * we can at least use full TLPs, as defined by the MPS value.
+ *
+ * NB, if any devices actually depend on an artificially low MRRS
+ * setting, this will need to be revisited, perhaps with a quirk
+ * though pcie_set_readrq().
+ */
+ if (readrq != (le16_to_cpu(*ctrl) & PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ)) {
+ readrq = 128 <<
+ ((le16_to_cpu(*ctrl) & PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ) >> 12);
+ readrq = max(readrq, pcie_get_mps(vdev->pdev));
+
+ pcie_set_readrq(vdev->pdev, readrq);
+ }
+
return count;
}
@@ -853,11 +875,12 @@ static int __init init_pci_cap_exp_perm(
* Allow writes to device control fields, except devctl_phantom,
* which could confuse IOMMU, MPS, which can break communication
* with other physical devices, and the ARI bit in devctl2, which
- * is set at probe time. FLR gets virtualized via our writefn.
+ * is set at probe time. FLR and MRRS get virtualized via our
+ * writefn.
*/
p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL,
- PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR | PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD,
- ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PHANTOM);
+ PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR | PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD |
+ PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PHANTOM);
p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2, NO_VIRT, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ARI);
return 0;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
commit 54a307ba8d3cd00a3902337ffaae28f436eeb1a4 upstream.
When event on child inodes are sent to the parent inode mark and
parent inode mark was not marked with FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD, the event
will not be delivered to the listener process. However, if the same
process also has a mount mark, the event to the parent inode will be
delivered regadless of the mount mark mask.
This behavior is incorrect in the case where the mount mark mask does
not contain the specific event type. For example, the process adds
a mark on a directory with mask FAN_MODIFY (without FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD)
and a mount mark with mask FAN_CLOSE_NOWRITE (without FAN_ONDIR).
A modify event on a file inside that directory (and inside that mount)
should not create a FAN_MODIFY event, because neither of the marks
requested to get that event on the file.
Fixes: 1968f5eed54c ("fanotify: use both marks when possible")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
[natechancellor: Fix small conflict due to lack of 3cd5eca8d7a2f]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 34 +++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static bool fanotify_should_send_event(s
u32 event_mask,
void *data, int data_type)
{
- __u32 marks_mask, marks_ignored_mask;
+ __u32 marks_mask = 0, marks_ignored_mask = 0;
struct path *path = data;
pr_debug("%s: inode_mark=%p vfsmnt_mark=%p mask=%x data=%p"
@@ -108,24 +108,20 @@ static bool fanotify_should_send_event(s
!d_can_lookup(path->dentry))
return false;
- if (inode_mark && vfsmnt_mark) {
- marks_mask = (vfsmnt_mark->mask | inode_mark->mask);
- marks_ignored_mask = (vfsmnt_mark->ignored_mask | inode_mark->ignored_mask);
- } else if (inode_mark) {
- /*
- * if the event is for a child and this inode doesn't care about
- * events on the child, don't send it!
- */
- if ((event_mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD) &&
- !(inode_mark->mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD))
- return false;
- marks_mask = inode_mark->mask;
- marks_ignored_mask = inode_mark->ignored_mask;
- } else if (vfsmnt_mark) {
- marks_mask = vfsmnt_mark->mask;
- marks_ignored_mask = vfsmnt_mark->ignored_mask;
- } else {
- BUG();
+ /*
+ * if the event is for a child and this inode doesn't care about
+ * events on the child, don't send it!
+ */
+ if (inode_mark &&
+ (!(event_mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD) ||
+ (inode_mark->mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD))) {
+ marks_mask |= inode_mark->mask;
+ marks_ignored_mask |= inode_mark->ignored_mask;
+ }
+
+ if (vfsmnt_mark) {
+ marks_mask |= vfsmnt_mark->mask;
+ marks_ignored_mask |= vfsmnt_mark->ignored_mask;
}
if (d_is_dir(path->dentry) &&
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
commit 2e898e4c0a3897ccd434adac5abb8330194f527b upstream.
lock_page_memcg()/unlock_page_memcg() use spin_lock_irqsave/restore() if
the page's memcg is undergoing move accounting, which occurs when a
process leaves its memcg for a new one that has
memory.move_charge_at_immigrate set.
unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin,end() use spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq() if
the given inode is switching writeback domains. Switches occur when
enough writes are issued from a new domain.
This existing pattern is thus suspicious:
lock_page_memcg(page);
unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked);
...
unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked);
unlock_page_memcg(page);
If both inode switch and process memcg migration are both in-flight then
unlocked_inode_to_wb_end() will unconditionally enable interrupts while
still holding the lock_page_memcg() irq spinlock. This suggests the
possibility of deadlock if an interrupt occurs before unlock_page_memcg().
truncate
__cancel_dirty_page
lock_page_memcg
unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin
unlocked_inode_to_wb_end
<interrupts mistakenly enabled>
<interrupt>
end_page_writeback
test_clear_page_writeback
lock_page_memcg
<deadlock>
unlock_page_memcg
Due to configuration limitations this deadlock is not currently possible
because we don't mix cgroup writeback (a cgroupv2 feature) and
memory.move_charge_at_immigrate (a cgroupv1 feature).
If the kernel is hacked to always claim inode switching and memcg
moving_account, then this script triggers lockup in less than a minute:
cd /mnt/cgroup/memory
mkdir a b
echo 1 > a/memory.move_charge_at_immigrate
echo 1 > b/memory.move_charge_at_immigrate
(
echo $BASHPID > a/cgroup.procs
while true; do
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/big bs=1M count=256
done
) &
while true; do
sync
done &
sleep 1h &
SLEEP=$!
while true; do
echo $SLEEP > a/cgroup.procs
echo $SLEEP > b/cgroup.procs
done
The deadlock does not seem possible, so it's debatable if there's any
reason to modify the kernel. I suggest we should to prevent future
surprises. And Wang Long said "this deadlock occurs three times in our
environment", so there's more reason to apply this, even to stable.
Stable 4.4 has minor conflicts applying this patch. For a clean 4.4 patch
see "[PATCH for-4.4] writeback: safer lock nesting"
https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/11/146
Wang Long said "this deadlock occurs three times in our environment"
[[email protected]: v4]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: comment tweaks, struct initialization simplification]
Change-Id: Ibb773e8045852978f6207074491d262f1b3fb613
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 682aa8e1a6a1 ("writeback: implement unlocked_inode_to_wb transaction and use it for stat updates")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Wang Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Wang Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [v4.2+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
[natechancellor: Adjust context due to lack of b93b016313b3b]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/fs-writeback.c | 7 ++++---
include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h | 5 +++++
include/linux/backing-dev.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++--------------
mm/page-writeback.c | 18 +++++++++---------
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/fs-writeback.c
+++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c
@@ -745,11 +745,12 @@ int inode_congested(struct inode *inode,
*/
if (inode && inode_to_wb_is_valid(inode)) {
struct bdi_writeback *wb;
- bool locked, congested;
+ struct wb_lock_cookie lock_cookie = {};
+ bool congested;
- wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked);
+ wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &lock_cookie);
congested = wb_congested(wb, cong_bits);
- unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked);
+ unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, &lock_cookie);
return congested;
}
--- a/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h
@@ -191,6 +191,11 @@ static inline void set_bdi_congested(str
set_wb_congested(bdi->wb.congested, sync);
}
+struct wb_lock_cookie {
+ bool locked;
+ unsigned long flags;
+};
+
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK
/**
--- a/include/linux/backing-dev.h
+++ b/include/linux/backing-dev.h
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static inline struct bdi_writeback *inod
/**
* unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin - begin unlocked inode wb access transaction
* @inode: target inode
- * @lockedp: temp bool output param, to be passed to the end function
+ * @cookie: output param, to be passed to the end function
*
* The caller wants to access the wb associated with @inode but isn't
* holding inode->i_lock, mapping->tree_lock or wb->list_lock. This
@@ -374,12 +374,12 @@ static inline struct bdi_writeback *inod
* association doesn't change until the transaction is finished with
* unlocked_inode_to_wb_end().
*
- * The caller must call unlocked_inode_to_wb_end() with *@lockdep
- * afterwards and can't sleep during transaction. IRQ may or may not be
- * disabled on return.
+ * The caller must call unlocked_inode_to_wb_end() with *@cookie afterwards and
+ * can't sleep during the transaction. IRQs may or may not be disabled on
+ * return.
*/
static inline struct bdi_writeback *
-unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, bool *lockedp)
+unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, struct wb_lock_cookie *cookie)
{
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -387,10 +387,10 @@ unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode
* Paired with store_release in inode_switch_wb_work_fn() and
* ensures that we see the new wb if we see cleared I_WB_SWITCH.
*/
- *lockedp = smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_state) & I_WB_SWITCH;
+ cookie->locked = smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_state) & I_WB_SWITCH;
- if (unlikely(*lockedp))
- spin_lock_irq(&inode->i_mapping->tree_lock);
+ if (unlikely(cookie->locked))
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&inode->i_mapping->tree_lock, cookie->flags);
/*
* Protected by either !I_WB_SWITCH + rcu_read_lock() or tree_lock.
@@ -402,12 +402,13 @@ unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode
/**
* unlocked_inode_to_wb_end - end inode wb access transaction
* @inode: target inode
- * @locked: *@lockedp from unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin()
+ * @cookie: @cookie from unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin()
*/
-static inline void unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(struct inode *inode, bool locked)
+static inline void unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(struct inode *inode,
+ struct wb_lock_cookie *cookie)
{
- if (unlikely(locked))
- spin_unlock_irq(&inode->i_mapping->tree_lock);
+ if (unlikely(cookie->locked))
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&inode->i_mapping->tree_lock, cookie->flags);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -454,12 +455,13 @@ static inline struct bdi_writeback *inod
}
static inline struct bdi_writeback *
-unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, bool *lockedp)
+unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, struct wb_lock_cookie *cookie)
{
return inode_to_wb(inode);
}
-static inline void unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(struct inode *inode, bool locked)
+static inline void unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(struct inode *inode,
+ struct wb_lock_cookie *cookie)
{
}
--- a/mm/page-writeback.c
+++ b/mm/page-writeback.c
@@ -2506,13 +2506,13 @@ void account_page_redirty(struct page *p
if (mapping && mapping_cap_account_dirty(mapping)) {
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct bdi_writeback *wb;
- bool locked;
+ struct wb_lock_cookie cookie = {};
- wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked);
+ wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &cookie);
current->nr_dirtied--;
dec_node_page_state(page, NR_DIRTIED);
dec_wb_stat(wb, WB_DIRTIED);
- unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked);
+ unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, &cookie);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(account_page_redirty);
@@ -2618,15 +2618,15 @@ void cancel_dirty_page(struct page *page
if (mapping_cap_account_dirty(mapping)) {
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct bdi_writeback *wb;
- bool locked;
+ struct wb_lock_cookie cookie = {};
lock_page_memcg(page);
- wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked);
+ wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &cookie);
if (TestClearPageDirty(page))
account_page_cleaned(page, mapping, wb);
- unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked);
+ unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, &cookie);
unlock_page_memcg(page);
} else {
ClearPageDirty(page);
@@ -2658,7 +2658,7 @@ int clear_page_dirty_for_io(struct page
if (mapping && mapping_cap_account_dirty(mapping)) {
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct bdi_writeback *wb;
- bool locked;
+ struct wb_lock_cookie cookie = {};
/*
* Yes, Virginia, this is indeed insane.
@@ -2695,7 +2695,7 @@ int clear_page_dirty_for_io(struct page
* always locked coming in here, so we get the desired
* exclusion.
*/
- wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked);
+ wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &cookie);
if (TestClearPageDirty(page)) {
mem_cgroup_dec_page_stat(page, MEM_CGROUP_STAT_DIRTY);
dec_node_page_state(page, NR_FILE_DIRTY);
@@ -2703,7 +2703,7 @@ int clear_page_dirty_for_io(struct page
dec_wb_stat(wb, WB_RECLAIMABLE);
ret = 1;
}
- unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked);
+ unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, &cookie);
return ret;
}
return TestClearPageDirty(page);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 40cab6e88cb0b6c56d3f30b7491a20e803f948f6 upstream.
OSS PCM stream management isn't modal but it allows ioctls issued at
any time for changing the parameters. In the previous hardening
patch ("ALSA: pcm: Avoid potential races between OSS ioctls and
read/write"), we covered these races and prevent the corruption by
protecting the concurrent accesses via params_lock mutex. However,
this means that some ioctls that try to change the stream parameter
(e.g. channels or format) would be blocked until the read/write
finishes, and it may take really long.
Basically changing the parameter while reading/writing is an invalid
operation, hence it's even more user-friendly from the API POV if it
returns -EBUSY in such a situation.
This patch adds such checks in the relevant ioctls with the addition
of read/write access refcount.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/sound/pcm_oss.h | 1 +
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/include/sound/pcm_oss.h
+++ b/include/sound/pcm_oss.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct snd_pcm_oss_runtime {
char *buffer; /* vmallocated period */
size_t buffer_used; /* used length from period buffer */
struct mutex params_lock;
+ atomic_t rw_ref; /* concurrent read/write accesses */
#ifdef CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS_PLUGINS
struct snd_pcm_plugin *plugin_first;
struct snd_pcm_plugin *plugin_last;
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -1405,6 +1405,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count))
return -ENXIO;
+ atomic_inc(&runtime->oss.rw_ref);
while (bytes > 0) {
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
@@ -1468,6 +1469,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
}
tmp = 0;
}
+ atomic_dec(&runtime->oss.rw_ref);
return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : tmp;
}
@@ -1513,6 +1515,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count))
return -ENXIO;
+ atomic_inc(&runtime->oss.rw_ref);
while (bytes > 0) {
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
@@ -1561,6 +1564,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
}
tmp = 0;
}
+ atomic_dec(&runtime->oss.rw_ref);
return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : tmp;
}
@@ -1667,8 +1671,11 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_p
goto __direct;
if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0)
return err;
- if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ atomic_inc(&runtime->oss.rw_ref);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
+ atomic_dec(&runtime->oss.rw_ref);
return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ }
format = snd_pcm_oss_format_from(runtime->oss.format);
width = snd_pcm_format_physical_width(format);
if (runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) {
@@ -1680,10 +1687,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_p
runtime->oss.buffer + runtime->oss.buffer_used,
size);
err = snd_pcm_oss_sync1(substream, runtime->oss.period_bytes);
- if (err < 0) {
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
- return err;
- }
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto unlock;
} else if (runtime->oss.period_ptr > 0) {
#ifdef OSS_DEBUG
pcm_dbg(substream->pcm, "sync: period_ptr\n");
@@ -1693,10 +1698,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_p
runtime->oss.buffer,
size * 8 / width);
err = snd_pcm_oss_sync1(substream, size);
- if (err < 0) {
- mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
- return err;
- }
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto unlock;
}
/*
* The ALSA's period might be a bit large than OSS one.
@@ -1727,7 +1730,11 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_p
snd_pcm_lib_writev(substream, buffers, size);
}
}
+unlock:
mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ atomic_dec(&runtime->oss.rw_ref);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
/*
* finish sync: drain the buffer
*/
@@ -1775,6 +1782,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_rate(struct s
rate = 192000;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
+ return -EBUSY;
if (runtime->oss.rate != rate) {
runtime->oss.params = 1;
runtime->oss.rate = rate;
@@ -1809,6 +1818,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_channels(stru
runtime = substream->runtime;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
+ return -EBUSY;
if (runtime->oss.channels != channels) {
runtime->oss.params = 1;
runtime->oss.channels = channels;
@@ -1899,6 +1910,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_format(struct
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
+ return -EBUSY;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (runtime->oss.format != format) {
@@ -1953,6 +1966,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide(str
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
+ return -EBUSY;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
err = snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(substream, subdivide);
@@ -1991,6 +2006,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment(stru
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref))
+ return -EBUSY;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
err = snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(substream, val);
@@ -2385,6 +2402,7 @@ static void snd_pcm_oss_init_substream(s
runtime->oss.maxfrags = 0;
runtime->oss.subdivision = 0;
substream->pcm_release = snd_pcm_oss_release_substream;
+ atomic_set(&runtime->oss.rw_ref, 0);
}
static int snd_pcm_oss_release_file(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
commit abc1be13fd113ddef5e2d807a466286b864caed3 upstream.
f2fs specifies the __GFP_ZERO flag for allocating some of its pages.
Unfortunately, the page cache also uses the mapping's GFP flags for
allocating radix tree nodes. It always masked off the __GFP_HIGHMEM
flag, and masks off __GFP_ZERO in some paths, but not all. That causes
radix tree nodes to be allocated with a NULL list_head, which causes
backtraces like:
__list_del_entry+0x30/0xd0
list_lru_del+0xac/0x1ac
page_cache_tree_insert+0xd8/0x110
The __GFP_DMA and __GFP_DMA32 flags would also be able to sneak through
if they are ever used. Fix them all by using GFP_RECLAIM_MASK at the
innermost location, and remove it from earlier in the callchain.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 449dd6984d0e ("mm: keep page cache radix tree nodes in check")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Chris Fries <[email protected]>
Debugged-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/filemap.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/filemap.c
+++ b/mm/filemap.c
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ int replace_page_cache_page(struct page
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(new), new);
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(new->mapping, new);
- error = radix_tree_preload(gfp_mask & ~__GFP_HIGHMEM);
+ error = radix_tree_preload(gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK);
if (!error) {
struct address_space *mapping = old->mapping;
void (*freepage)(struct page *);
@@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ static int __add_to_page_cache_locked(st
return error;
}
- error = radix_tree_maybe_preload(gfp_mask & ~__GFP_HIGHMEM);
+ error = radix_tree_maybe_preload(gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK);
if (error) {
if (!huge)
mem_cgroup_cancel_charge(page, memcg, false);
@@ -1247,8 +1247,7 @@ no_page:
if (fgp_flags & FGP_ACCESSED)
__SetPageReferenced(page);
- err = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset,
- gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK);
+ err = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp_mask);
if (unlikely(err)) {
put_page(page);
page = NULL;
@@ -1996,7 +1995,7 @@ static int page_cache_read(struct file *
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
- ret = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp_mask & GFP_KERNEL);
+ ret = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp_mask);
if (ret == 0)
ret = mapping->a_ops->readpage(file, page);
else if (ret == -EEXIST)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 4a3877c4cedd95543f8726b0a98743ed8db0c0fb upstream.
if we ever hit rpc_gssd_dummy_depopulate() dentry passed to
it has refcount equal to 1. __rpc_rmpipe() drops it and
dput() done after that hits an already freed dentry.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c
@@ -1375,6 +1375,7 @@ rpc_gssd_dummy_depopulate(struct dentry
struct dentry *clnt_dir = pipe_dentry->d_parent;
struct dentry *gssd_dir = clnt_dir->d_parent;
+ dget(pipe_dentry);
__rpc_rmpipe(d_inode(clnt_dir), pipe_dentry);
__rpc_depopulate(clnt_dir, gssd_dummy_info_file, 0, 1);
__rpc_depopulate(gssd_dir, gssd_dummy_clnt_dir, 0, 1);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
commit 1e6306652ba18723015d1b4967fe9de55f042499 upstream.
The autofs file system mkdir inode operation blindly sets the created
directory mode to S_IFDIR | 0555, ingoring the passed in mode, which can
cause selinux dac_override denials.
But the function also checks if the caller is the daemon (as no-one else
should be able to do anything here) so there's no point in not honouring
the passed in mode, allowing the daemon to set appropriate mode when
required.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/autofs4/root.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/autofs4/root.c
+++ b/fs/autofs4/root.c
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ static int autofs4_dir_mkdir(struct inod
autofs4_del_active(dentry);
- inode = autofs4_get_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | 0555);
+ inode = autofs4_get_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | mode);
if (!inode)
return -ENOMEM;
d_add(dentry, inode);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
commit c96eebf07692e53bf4dd5987510d8b550e793598 upstream.
The label .Llast_fixup\@ is jumped to on page fault within the final
byte set loop of memset (on < MIPSR6 architectures). For some reason, in
this fault handler, the v1 register is randomly set to a2 & STORMASK.
This clobbers v1 for the calling function. This can be observed with the
following test code:
static int __init __attribute__((optimize("O0"))) test_clear_user(void)
{
register int t asm("v1");
char *test;
int j, k;
pr_info("\n\n\nTesting clear_user\n");
test = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
for (j = 256; j < 512; j++) {
t = 0xa5a5a5a5;
if ((k = clear_user(test + PAGE_SIZE - 256, j)) != j - 256) {
pr_err("clear_user (%px %d) returned %d\n", test + PAGE_SIZE - 256, j, k);
}
if (t != 0xa5a5a5a5) {
pr_err("v1 was clobbered to 0x%x!\n", t);
}
}
return 0;
}
late_initcall(test_clear_user);
Which demonstrates that v1 is indeed clobbered (MIPS64):
Testing clear_user
v1 was clobbered to 0x1!
v1 was clobbered to 0x2!
v1 was clobbered to 0x3!
v1 was clobbered to 0x4!
v1 was clobbered to 0x5!
v1 was clobbered to 0x6!
v1 was clobbered to 0x7!
Since the number of bytes that could not be set is already contained in
a2, the andi placing a value in v1 is not necessary and actively
harmful in clobbering v1.
Reported-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19109/
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/lib/memset.S | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S
+++ b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@
.Llast_fixup\@:
jr ra
- andi v1, a2, STORMASK
+ nop
.Lsmall_fixup\@:
PTR_SUBU a2, t1, a0
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit c66b23c2840446a82c389e4cb1a12eb2a71fa2e4 upstream.
jffs2_fill_super() might fail to allocate jffs2_sb_info;
jffs2_kill_sb() must survive that.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/jffs2/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/jffs2/super.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/super.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static void jffs2_put_super (struct supe
static void jffs2_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct jffs2_sb_info *c = JFFS2_SB_INFO(sb);
- if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
+ if (c && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
jffs2_stop_garbage_collect_thread(c);
kill_mtd_super(sb);
kfree(c);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 659038428cb43a66e3eff71e2c845c9de3611a98 upstream.
orangefs_fill_sb() might've failed to allocate ORANGEFS_SB(s); don't
oops in that case.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/orangefs/super.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/orangefs/super.c
+++ b/fs/orangefs/super.c
@@ -559,6 +559,11 @@ void orangefs_kill_sb(struct super_block
/* provided sb cleanup */
kill_anon_super(sb);
+ if (!ORANGEFS_SB(sb)) {
+ mutex_lock(&orangefs_request_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&orangefs_request_mutex);
+ return;
+ }
/*
* issue the unmount to userspace to tell it to remove the
* dynamic mount info it has for this superblock
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 16a34adb9392b2fe4195267475ab5b472e55292c upstream.
We want it only for the stuff created by SB_KERNMOUNT mounts, *not* for
their copies. As it is, creating a deep stack of bindings of /proc/*/ns/*
somewhere in a new namespace and exiting yields a stack overflow.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Alexander Aring <[email protected]>
Bisected-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexander Aring <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/namespace.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mo
goto out_free;
}
- mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~(MNT_WRITE_HOLD|MNT_MARKED);
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags;
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_WRITE_HOLD|MNT_MARKED|MNT_INTERNAL);
/* Don't allow unprivileged users to change mount flags */
if (flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) {
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_ATIME;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit a24cd490739586a7d2da3549a1844e1d7c4f4fc4 upstream.
hypfs_fill_super() might fail to allocate sbi; hypfs_kill_super()
should not oops on that.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c
+++ b/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static void hypfs_kill_super(struct supe
if (sb->s_root)
hypfs_delete_tree(sb->s_root);
- if (sb_info->update_file)
+ if (sb_info && sb_info->update_file)
hypfs_remove(sb_info->update_file);
kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
commit 13a83eac373c49c0a081cbcd137e79210fe78acd upstream.
On boot we save the configuration space of PCIe bridges. We do this so
when we get an EEH event and everything gets reset that we can restore
them.
Unfortunately we save this state before we've enabled the MMIO space
on the bridges. Hence if we have to reset the bridge when we come back
MMIO is not enabled and we end up taking an PE freeze when the driver
starts accessing again.
This patch forces the memory/MMIO and bus mastering on when restoring
bridges on EEH. Ideally we'd do this correctly by saving the
configuration space writes later, but that will have to come later in
a larger EEH rewrite. For now we have this simple fix.
The original bug can be triggered on a boston machine by doing:
echo 0x8000000000000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/PCI0001/err_injct_outbound
On boston, this PHB has a PCIe switch on it. Without this patch,
you'll see two EEH events, 1 expected and 1 the failure we are fixing
here. The second EEH event causes the anything under the PHB to
disappear (i.e. the i40e eth).
With this patch, only 1 EEH event occurs and devices properly recover.
Fixes: 652defed4875 ("powerpc/eeh: Check PCIe link after reset")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.11+
Reported-by: Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Russell Currey <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c
@@ -795,7 +795,8 @@ static void eeh_restore_bridge_bars(stru
eeh_ops->write_config(pdn, 15*4, 4, edev->config_space[15]);
/* PCI Command: 0x4 */
- eeh_ops->write_config(pdn, PCI_COMMAND, 4, edev->config_space[1]);
+ eeh_ops->write_config(pdn, PCI_COMMAND, 4, edev->config_space[1] |
+ PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY | PCI_COMMAND_MASTER);
/* Check the PCIe link is ready */
eeh_bridge_check_link(edev);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit b8858581febb050688e276b956796bc4a78299ed upstream.
When we patch an alternate feature section, we have to adjust any
relative branches that branch out of the alternate section.
But currently we have a bug if we have a branch that points to past
the last instruction of the alternate section, eg:
FTR_SECTION_ELSE
1: b 2f
or 6,6,6
2:
ALT_FTR_SECTION_END(...)
nop
This will result in a relative branch at 1 with a target that equals
the end of the alternate section.
That branch does not need adjusting when it's moved to the non-else
location. Currently we do adjust it, resulting in a branch that goes
off into the link-time location of the else section, which is junk.
The fix is to not patch branches that have a target == end of the
alternate section.
Fixes: d20fe50a7b3c ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Branch inside feature section")
Fixes: 9b1a735de64c ("powerpc: Add logic to patch alternative feature sections")
Cc: [email protected] # v2.6.27+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int patch_alt_instruction(unsigne
unsigned int *target = (unsigned int *)branch_target(src);
/* Branch within the section doesn't need translating */
- if (target < alt_start || target >= alt_end) {
+ if (target < alt_start || target > alt_end) {
instr = translate_branch(dest, src);
if (!instr)
return 1;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
commit b3d7e55c3f886493235bfee08e1e5a4a27cbcce8 upstream.
The micromips implementation of bzero additionally clobbers registers t7
& t8. Specify this in the clobbers list when invoking bzero.
Fixes: 26c5e07d1478 ("MIPS: microMIPS: Optimise 'memset' core library function.")
Reported-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.10+
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19110/
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -1257,6 +1257,13 @@ __clear_user(void __user *addr, __kernel
{
__kernel_size_t res;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_MICROMIPS
+/* micromips memset / bzero also clobbers t7 & t8 */
+#define bzero_clobbers "$4", "$5", "$6", __UA_t0, __UA_t1, "$15", "$24", "$31"
+#else
+#define bzero_clobbers "$4", "$5", "$6", __UA_t0, __UA_t1, "$31"
+#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_MICROMIPS */
+
if (eva_kernel_access()) {
__asm__ __volatile__(
"move\t$4, %1\n\t"
@@ -1266,7 +1273,7 @@ __clear_user(void __user *addr, __kernel
"move\t%0, $6"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "r" (size)
- : "$4", "$5", "$6", __UA_t0, __UA_t1, "$31");
+ : bzero_clobbers);
} else {
might_fault();
__asm__ __volatile__(
@@ -1277,7 +1284,7 @@ __clear_user(void __user *addr, __kernel
"move\t%0, $6"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "r" (size)
- : "$4", "$5", "$6", __UA_t0, __UA_t1, "$31");
+ : bzero_clobbers);
}
return res;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
commit 8a8158c85e1e774a44fbe81106fa41138580dfd1 upstream.
The MIPS kernel memset / bzero implementation includes a small_memset
branch which is used when the region to be set is smaller than a long (4
bytes on 32bit, 8 bytes on 64bit). The current small_memset
implementation uses a simple store byte loop to write the destination.
There are 2 issues with this implementation:
1. When EVA mode is active, user and kernel address spaces may overlap.
Currently the use of the sb instruction means kernel mode addressing is
always used and an intended write to userspace may actually overwrite
some critical kernel data.
2. If the write triggers a page fault, for example by calling
__clear_user(NULL, 2), instead of gracefully handling the fault, an OOPS
is triggered.
Fix these issues by replacing the sb instruction with the EX() macro,
which will emit EVA compatible instuctions as required. Additionally
implement a fault fixup for small_memset which sets a2 to the number of
bytes that could not be cleared (as defined by __clear_user).
Reported-by: Chuanhua Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/18975/
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/lib/memset.S | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S
+++ b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
1: PTR_ADDIU a0, 1 /* fill bytewise */
R10KCBARRIER(0(ra))
bne t1, a0, 1b
- sb a1, -1(a0)
+ EX(sb, a1, -1(a0), .Lsmall_fixup\@)
2: jr ra /* done */
move a2, zero
@@ -259,6 +259,11 @@
jr ra
andi v1, a2, STORMASK
+.Lsmall_fixup\@:
+ PTR_SUBU a2, t1, a0
+ jr ra
+ PTR_ADDIU a2, 1
+
.endm
/*
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 44f06ba8297c7e9dfd0e49b40cbe119113cca094 upstream.
OSTA UDF specification does not mention whether the CS0 charset in case
of two bytes per character encoding should be treated in UTF-16 or
UCS-2. The sample code in the standard does not treat UTF-16 surrogates
in any special way but on systems such as Windows which work in UTF-16
internally, filenames would be treated as being in UTF-16 effectively.
In Linux it is more difficult to handle characters outside of Base
Multilingual plane (beyond 0xffff) as NLS framework works with 2-byte
characters only. Just make sure we don't leak UTF-16 surrogates into the
resulting string when loading names from the filesystem for now.
CC: [email protected] # >= v4.6
Reported-by: Mingye Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/udf/unicode.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/udf/unicode.c
+++ b/fs/udf/unicode.c
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
#include "udf_sb.h"
+#define SURROGATE_MASK 0xfffff800
+#define SURROGATE_PAIR 0x0000d800
+
static int udf_uni2char_utf8(wchar_t uni,
unsigned char *out,
int boundlen)
@@ -37,6 +40,9 @@ static int udf_uni2char_utf8(wchar_t uni
if (boundlen <= 0)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if ((uni & SURROGATE_MASK) == SURROGATE_PAIR)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (uni < 0x80) {
out[u_len++] = (unsigned char)uni;
} else if (uni < 0x800) {
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 02a5d6925cd34c3b774bdb8eefb057c40a30e870 upstream.
Although we apply the params_lock mutex to the whole read and write
operations as well as snd_pcm_oss_change_params(), we may still face
some races.
First off, the params_lock is taken inside the read and write loop.
This is intentional for avoiding the too long locking, but it allows
the in-between parameter change, which might lead to invalid
pointers. We check the readiness of the stream and set up via
snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() at the beginning of read and write, but it's
called only once, by assuming that it remains ready in the rest.
Second, many ioctls that may change the actual parameters
(i.e. setting runtime->oss.params=1) aren't protected, hence they can
be processed in a half-baked state.
This patch is an attempt to plug these holes. The stream readiness
check is moved inside the read/write inner loop, so that the stream is
always set up in a proper state before further processing. Also, each
ioctl that may change the parameter is wrapped with the params_lock
for avoiding the races.
The issues were triggered by syzkaller in a few different scenarios,
particularly the one below appearing as GPF in loopback_pos_update.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 134 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 106 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -834,8 +834,8 @@ static int choose_rate(struct snd_pcm_su
return snd_pcm_hw_param_near(substream, params, SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE, best_rate, NULL);
}
-static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
- bool trylock)
+/* call with params_lock held */
+static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params, *sparams;
@@ -849,11 +849,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(str
struct snd_mask sformat_mask;
struct snd_mask mask;
- if (trylock) {
- if (!(mutex_trylock(&runtime->oss.params_lock)))
- return -EAGAIN;
- } else if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ if (!runtime->oss.params)
+ return 0;
sw_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_params), GFP_KERNEL);
params = kmalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL);
sparams = kmalloc(sizeof(*sparams), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1079,6 +1076,23 @@ failure:
kfree(sw_params);
kfree(params);
kfree(sparams);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* this one takes the lock by itself */
+static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
+ bool trylock)
+{
+ struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
+ int err;
+
+ if (trylock) {
+ if (!(mutex_trylock(&runtime->oss.params_lock)))
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ } else if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+ err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(substream);
mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
return err;
}
@@ -1107,11 +1121,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_get_active_substr
return 0;
}
+/* call with params_lock held */
static int snd_pcm_oss_prepare(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
int err;
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (!runtime->oss.prepare)
+ return 0;
err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_PREPARE, NULL);
if (err < 0) {
pcm_dbg(substream->pcm,
@@ -1131,8 +1148,6 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(struct
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
int err;
- if (substream == NULL)
- return 0;
runtime = substream->runtime;
if (runtime->oss.params) {
err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream, false);
@@ -1140,6 +1155,29 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(struct
return err;
}
if (runtime->oss.prepare) {
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ err = snd_pcm_oss_prepare(substream);
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* call with params_lock held */
+static int snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
+{
+ struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
+ int err;
+
+ runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (runtime->oss.params) {
+ err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(substream);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (runtime->oss.prepare) {
err = snd_pcm_oss_prepare(substream);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -1367,13 +1405,14 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count))
return -ENXIO;
- if ((tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0)
- return tmp;
while (bytes > 0) {
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
+ tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked(substream);
+ if (tmp < 0)
+ goto err;
if (bytes < runtime->oss.period_bytes || runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) {
tmp = bytes;
if (tmp + runtime->oss.buffer_used > runtime->oss.period_bytes)
@@ -1474,13 +1513,14 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count))
return -ENXIO;
- if ((tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0)
- return tmp;
while (bytes > 0) {
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
+ tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked(substream);
+ if (tmp < 0)
+ goto err;
if (bytes < runtime->oss.period_bytes || runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) {
if (runtime->oss.buffer_used == 0) {
tmp = snd_pcm_oss_read2(substream, runtime->oss.buffer, runtime->oss.period_bytes, 1);
@@ -1536,10 +1576,12 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_reset(struct snd_
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP, NULL);
+ mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
runtime->oss.prepare = 1;
runtime->oss.buffer_used = 0;
runtime->oss.prev_hw_ptr_period = 0;
runtime->oss.period_ptr = 0;
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -1625,9 +1667,10 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_p
goto __direct;
if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0)
return err;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
format = snd_pcm_oss_format_from(runtime->oss.format);
width = snd_pcm_format_physical_width(format);
- mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
if (runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) {
#ifdef OSS_DEBUG
pcm_dbg(substream->pcm, "sync: buffer_used\n");
@@ -1695,7 +1738,9 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_p
substream->f_flags = saved_f_flags;
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
runtime->oss.prepare = 1;
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
}
substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE];
@@ -1706,8 +1751,10 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_p
err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
runtime->oss.buffer_used = 0;
runtime->oss.prepare = 1;
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -1726,10 +1773,13 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_rate(struct s
rate = 1000;
else if (rate > 192000)
rate = 192000;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (runtime->oss.rate != rate) {
runtime->oss.params = 1;
runtime->oss.rate = rate;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
}
return snd_pcm_oss_get_rate(pcm_oss_file);
}
@@ -1757,10 +1807,13 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_channels(stru
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (runtime->oss.channels != channels) {
runtime->oss.params = 1;
runtime->oss.channels = channels;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
}
return snd_pcm_oss_get_channels(pcm_oss_file);
}
@@ -1846,10 +1899,13 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_format(struct
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (runtime->oss.format != format) {
runtime->oss.params = 1;
runtime->oss.format = format;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
}
}
return snd_pcm_oss_get_format(pcm_oss_file);
@@ -1869,8 +1925,6 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(st
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
- if (substream == NULL)
- return 0;
runtime = substream->runtime;
if (subdivide == 0) {
subdivide = runtime->oss.subdivision;
@@ -1894,9 +1948,16 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide(str
for (idx = 1; idx >= 0; --idx) {
struct snd_pcm_substream *substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[idx];
+ struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
+
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
- if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(substream, subdivide)) < 0)
+ runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ err = snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(substream, subdivide);
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return err;
@@ -1906,8 +1967,6 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(str
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
- if (substream == NULL)
- return 0;
runtime = substream->runtime;
if (runtime->oss.subdivision || runtime->oss.fragshift)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1927,9 +1986,16 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment(stru
for (idx = 1; idx >= 0; --idx) {
struct snd_pcm_substream *substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[idx];
+ struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
+
if (substream == NULL)
continue;
- if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(substream, val)) < 0)
+ runtime = substream->runtime;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ err = snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(substream, val);
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return err;
@@ -2013,6 +2079,9 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger(struc
}
if (psubstream) {
runtime = psubstream->runtime;
+ cmd = 0;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (trigger & PCM_ENABLE_OUTPUT) {
if (runtime->oss.trigger)
goto _skip1;
@@ -2030,13 +2099,19 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger(struc
cmd = SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP;
runtime->oss.prepare = 1;
}
- err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(psubstream, cmd, NULL);
- if (err < 0)
- return err;
- }
_skip1:
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ if (cmd) {
+ err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(psubstream, cmd, NULL);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
if (csubstream) {
runtime = csubstream->runtime;
+ cmd = 0;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (trigger & PCM_ENABLE_INPUT) {
if (runtime->oss.trigger)
goto _skip2;
@@ -2051,11 +2126,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger(struc
cmd = SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP;
runtime->oss.prepare = 1;
}
- err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(csubstream, cmd, NULL);
- if (err < 0)
- return err;
- }
_skip2:
+ mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+ if (cmd) {
+ err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(csubstream, cmd, NULL);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
return 0;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit d848e5f8e1ebdb227d045db55fe4f825e82965fa upstream.
Add a new ioctl which forces the the crng to be reseeded.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
include/uapi/linux/random.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ struct crng_state primary_crng = {
static int crng_init = 0;
#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
+static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
@@ -900,7 +901,8 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st
unsigned long v, flags;
if (crng_ready() &&
- time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
+ (time_after(crng_global_init_time, crng->init_time) ||
+ time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)))
crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL);
spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
@@ -1689,6 +1691,7 @@ static int rand_initialize(void)
init_std_data(&input_pool);
init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
+ crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
return 0;
}
early_initcall(rand_initialize);
@@ -1862,6 +1865,14 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0;
return 0;
+ case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (crng_init < 2)
+ return -ENODATA;
+ crng_reseed(&primary_crng, NULL);
+ crng_global_init_time = jiffies - 1;
+ return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
--- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
/* Clear the entropy pool and associated counters. (Superuser only.) */
#define RNDCLEARPOOL _IO( 'R', 0x06 )
+/* Reseed CRNG. (Superuser only.) */
+#define RNDRESEEDCRNG _IO( 'R', 0x07 )
+
struct rand_pool_info {
int entropy_count;
int buf_size;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 43838a23a05fbd13e47d750d3dfd77001536dd33 upstream.
The crng_init variable has three states:
0: The CRNG is not initialized at all
1: The CRNG has a small amount of entropy, hopefully good enough for
early-boot, non-cryptographical use cases
2: The CRNG is fully initialized and we are sure it is safe for
cryptographic use cases.
The crng_ready() function should only return true once we are in the
last state. This addresses CVE-2018-1108.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Fixes: e192be9d9a30 ("random: replace non-blocking pool...")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.8+
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ struct crng_state primary_crng = {
* its value (from 0->1->2).
*/
static int crng_init = 0;
-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 0))
+#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
return 0;
- if (crng_ready()) {
+ if (crng_init != 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st
{
unsigned long v, flags;
- if (crng_init > 1 &&
+ if (crng_ready() &&
time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL);
spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, i
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
@@ -2148,7 +2148,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch
{
struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
- if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
return;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 8a56ef4f3ffba9ebf4967b61ef600b0a7ba10f11 upstream.
Some rawmidi compat ioctls lack of the input substream checks
(although they do check only for rfile->output). This many eventually
lead to an Oops as NULL substream is passed to the rawmidi core
functions.
Fix it by adding the proper checks before each function call.
The bug was spotted by syzkaller.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c
+++ b/sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c
@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ static int snd_rawmidi_ioctl_params_comp
struct snd_rawmidi_params params;
unsigned int val;
- if (rfile->output == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(params.stream, &src->stream) ||
get_user(params.buffer_size, &src->buffer_size) ||
get_user(params.avail_min, &src->avail_min) ||
@@ -46,8 +44,12 @@ static int snd_rawmidi_ioctl_params_comp
params.no_active_sensing = val;
switch (params.stream) {
case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_OUTPUT:
+ if (!rfile->output)
+ return -EINVAL;
return snd_rawmidi_output_params(rfile->output, ¶ms);
case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_INPUT:
+ if (!rfile->input)
+ return -EINVAL;
return snd_rawmidi_input_params(rfile->input, ¶ms);
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -67,16 +69,18 @@ static int snd_rawmidi_ioctl_status_comp
int err;
struct snd_rawmidi_status status;
- if (rfile->output == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(status.stream, &src->stream))
return -EFAULT;
switch (status.stream) {
case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_OUTPUT:
+ if (!rfile->output)
+ return -EINVAL;
err = snd_rawmidi_output_status(rfile->output, &status);
break;
case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_INPUT:
+ if (!rfile->input)
+ return -EINVAL;
err = snd_rawmidi_input_status(rfile->input, &status);
break;
default:
@@ -112,16 +116,18 @@ static int snd_rawmidi_ioctl_status_x32(
int err;
struct snd_rawmidi_status status;
- if (rfile->output == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(status.stream, &src->stream))
return -EFAULT;
switch (status.stream) {
case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_OUTPUT:
+ if (!rfile->output)
+ return -EINVAL;
err = snd_rawmidi_output_status(rfile->output, &status);
break;
case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_INPUT:
+ if (!rfile->input)
+ return -EINVAL;
err = snd_rawmidi_input_status(rfile->input, &status);
break;
default:
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: James Kelly <[email protected]>
commit a01df75ce737951ad13a08d101306e88c3f57cb2 upstream.
SSM2602 driver is broken on recent kernels (at least
since 4.9). User space applications such as amixer or
alsamixer get EIO when attempting to access codec
controls via the relevant IOCTLs.
Root cause of these failures is the regcache_hw_init
function in drivers/base/regmap/regcache.c, which
prevents regmap cache initalization from the
reg_defaults_raw element of the regmap_config structure
when registers are write only. It also disables the
regmap cache entirely when all registers are write only
or volatile as is the case for the SSM2602 driver.
Using the reg_defaults element of the regmap_config
structure rather than the reg_defaults_raw element to
initalize the regmap cache avoids the logic in the
regcache_hw_init function entirely. It also makes this
driver consistent with other ASoC codec drivers, as
this driver was the ONLY codec driver that used the
reg_defaults_raw element to initalize the cache.
Tested on Digilent Zybo Z7 development board which has
a SSM2603 codec chip connected to a Xilinx Zynq SoC.
Signed-off-by: James Kelly <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c
@@ -54,10 +54,17 @@ struct ssm2602_priv {
* using 2 wire for device control, so we cache them instead.
* There is no point in caching the reset register
*/
-static const u16 ssm2602_reg[SSM2602_CACHEREGNUM] = {
- 0x0097, 0x0097, 0x0079, 0x0079,
- 0x000a, 0x0008, 0x009f, 0x000a,
- 0x0000, 0x0000
+static const struct reg_default ssm2602_reg[SSM2602_CACHEREGNUM] = {
+ { .reg = 0x00, .def = 0x0097 },
+ { .reg = 0x01, .def = 0x0097 },
+ { .reg = 0x02, .def = 0x0079 },
+ { .reg = 0x03, .def = 0x0079 },
+ { .reg = 0x04, .def = 0x000a },
+ { .reg = 0x05, .def = 0x0008 },
+ { .reg = 0x06, .def = 0x009f },
+ { .reg = 0x07, .def = 0x000a },
+ { .reg = 0x08, .def = 0x0000 },
+ { .reg = 0x09, .def = 0x0000 }
};
@@ -620,8 +627,8 @@ const struct regmap_config ssm2602_regma
.volatile_reg = ssm2602_register_volatile,
.cache_type = REGCACHE_RBTREE,
- .reg_defaults_raw = ssm2602_reg,
- .num_reg_defaults_raw = ARRAY_SIZE(ssm2602_reg),
+ .reg_defaults = ssm2602_reg,
+ .num_reg_defaults = ARRAY_SIZE(ssm2602_reg),
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ssm2602_regmap_config);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 8ef35c866f8862df074a49a93b0309725812dea8 upstream.
Until the primary_crng is fully initialized, don't initialize the NUMA
crng nodes. Otherwise users of /dev/urandom on NUMA systems before
the CRNG is fully initialized can get very bad quality randomness. Of
course everyone should move to getrandom(2) where this won't be an
issue, but there's a lot of legacy code out there. This related to
CVE-2018-1108.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly...")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.8+
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -818,6 +818,32 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp
return 1;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+static void numa_crng_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct crng_state *crng;
+ struct crng_state **pool;
+
+ pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+ for_each_online_node(i) {
+ crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
+ spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
+ crng_initialize(crng);
+ pool[i] = crng;
+ }
+ mb();
+ if (cmpxchg(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool)) {
+ for_each_node(i)
+ kfree(pool[i]);
+ kfree(pool);
+ }
+}
+#else
+static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
+#endif
+
static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -847,6 +873,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
crng->init_time = jiffies;
if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
+ numa_crng_init();
crng_init = 2;
process_random_ready_list();
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
@@ -1659,28 +1686,9 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy
*/
static int rand_initialize(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-#endif
-
init_std_data(&input_pool);
init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- mb();
- crng_node_pool = pool;
-#endif
return 0;
}
early_initcall(rand_initialize);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
commit 3064a03b94e60388f0955fcc29f3e8a978d28f75 upstream.
Follow the change of return type u32 of hid_report_len,
fix all the types of variables those get the return value of
hid_report_len to u32, and all other code already uses u32.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hid/hid-input.c | 3 ++-
drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 5 +++--
drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c | 4 ++--
drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c
@@ -1279,7 +1279,8 @@ static void hidinput_led_worker(struct w
led_work);
struct hid_field *field;
struct hid_report *report;
- int len, ret;
+ int ret;
+ u32 len;
__u8 *buf;
field = hidinput_get_led_field(hid);
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
@@ -315,7 +315,8 @@ static struct attribute_group mt_attribu
static void mt_get_feature(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_report *report)
{
struct mt_device *td = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
- int ret, size = hid_report_len(report);
+ int ret;
+ u32 size = hid_report_len(report);
u8 *buf;
/*
@@ -919,7 +920,7 @@ static void mt_set_input_mode(struct hid
struct hid_report_enum *re;
struct mt_class *cls = &td->mtclass;
char *buf;
- int report_len;
+ u32 report_len;
if (td->inputmode < 0)
return;
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ struct rmi_data {
u8 *writeReport;
u8 *readReport;
- int input_report_size;
- int output_report_size;
+ u32 input_report_size;
+ u32 output_report_size;
unsigned long flags;
--- a/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static int wacom_set_device_mode(struct
u8 *rep_data;
struct hid_report *r;
struct hid_report_enum *re;
- int length;
+ u32 length;
int error = -ENOMEM, limit = 0;
if (wacom_wac->mode_report < 0)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Wang <[email protected]>
commit 55a5fcafe3a94e8a0777bb993d09107d362258d2 upstream.
Just add binding for a fixed-factor clock axisel_d4, which would be
referenced by PWM devices on MT7623 or MT2701 SoC.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 1de9b21633d6 ("clk: mediatek: Add dt-bindings for MT2701 clocks")
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/dt-bindings/clock/mt2701-clk.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/dt-bindings/clock/mt2701-clk.h
+++ b/include/dt-bindings/clock/mt2701-clk.h
@@ -176,7 +176,8 @@
#define CLK_TOP_AUD_EXT1 156
#define CLK_TOP_AUD_EXT2 157
#define CLK_TOP_NFI1X_PAD 158
-#define CLK_TOP_NR 159
+#define CLK_TOP_AXISEL_D4 159
+#define CLK_TOP_NR 160
/* APMIXEDSYS */
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Wang <[email protected]>
commit af52f9982e410edac21ca4b49563053ffc9da1eb upstream.
This patch is used to tell kernel that new VIA HDAC controller also
support no-snoop path.
[ minor coding style fix by tiwai ]
Signed-off-by: David Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
@@ -1514,7 +1514,8 @@ static void azx_check_snoop_available(st
*/
u8 val;
pci_read_config_byte(chip->pci, 0x42, &val);
- if (!(val & 0x80) && chip->pci->revision == 0x30)
+ if (!(val & 0x80) && (chip->pci->revision == 0x30 ||
+ chip->pci->revision == 0x20))
snoop = false;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
commit 3b8070335f751aac9f1526ae2e012e6f5b8b0f21 upstream.
The OPAL NVRAM driver does not sleep in case it gets OPAL_BUSY or
OPAL_BUSY_EVENT from firmware, which causes large scheduling
latencies, and various lockup errors to trigger (again, BMC reboot
can cause it).
Fix this by converting it to the standard form OPAL_BUSY loop that
sleeps.
Fixes: 628daa8d5abf ("powerpc/powernv: Add RTC and NVRAM support plus RTAS fallbacks")
Depends-on: 34dd25de9fe3 ("powerpc/powernv: define a standard delay for OPAL_BUSY type retry loops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.2+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#define DEBUG
+#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
@@ -56,8 +57,12 @@ static ssize_t opal_nvram_write(char *bu
while (rc == OPAL_BUSY || rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) {
rc = opal_write_nvram(__pa(buf), count, off);
- if (rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT)
+ if (rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) {
+ msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
opal_poll_events(NULL);
+ } else if (rc == OPAL_BUSY) {
+ msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+ }
}
if (rc)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
commit 5f9e93fed4d45e9a8f84728aff1a8f2ab8922902 upstream.
Calling request_irq() followed by disable_irq() is usually a bad idea,
specially if the interrupt can be pending, and you're not yet in a
position to handle it.
This is exactly what happens on my kevin system when rebooting in a
second kernel using kexec: Some interrupt is left pending from
the previous kernel, and we take it too early, before disable_irq()
could do anything.
Let's clear the pending interrupts as we initialize the HW, and move
the interrupt request after that point. This ensures that we're in
a sane state when the interrupt is requested.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
[adapted to recent rockchip-drm changes]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c
@@ -1386,6 +1386,9 @@ static int vop_initial(struct vop *vop)
usleep_range(10, 20);
reset_control_deassert(ahb_rst);
+ VOP_INTR_SET_TYPE(vop, clear, INTR_MASK, 1);
+ VOP_INTR_SET_TYPE(vop, enable, INTR_MASK, 0);
+
memcpy(vop->regsbak, vop->regs, vop->len);
for (i = 0; i < vop_data->table_size; i++)
@@ -1541,17 +1544,9 @@ static int vop_bind(struct device *dev,
mutex_init(&vop->vsync_mutex);
- ret = devm_request_irq(dev, vop->irq, vop_isr,
- IRQF_SHARED, dev_name(dev), vop);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- /* IRQ is initially disabled; it gets enabled in power_on */
- disable_irq(vop->irq);
-
ret = vop_create_crtc(vop);
if (ret)
- goto err_enable_irq;
+ return ret;
pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
@@ -1561,13 +1556,19 @@ static int vop_bind(struct device *dev,
goto err_disable_pm_runtime;
}
+ ret = devm_request_irq(dev, vop->irq, vop_isr,
+ IRQF_SHARED, dev_name(dev), vop);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_disable_pm_runtime;
+
+ /* IRQ is initially disabled; it gets enabled in power_on */
+ disable_irq(vop->irq);
+
return 0;
err_disable_pm_runtime:
pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
vop_destroy_crtc(vop);
-err_enable_irq:
- enable_irq(vop->irq); /* To balance out the disable_irq above */
return ret;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ryo Kodama <[email protected]>
commit 6225f9c64b40bc8a22503e9cda70f55d7a9dd3c6 upstream.
This patch fixes an issue that is possible to set mismatch value to duty
for R-Car PWM if we input the following commands:
# cd /sys/class/pwm/<pwmchip>/
# echo 0 > export
# cd pwm0
# echo 30 > period
# echo 30 > duty_cycle
# echo 0 > duty_cycle
# cat duty_cycle
0
# echo 1 > enable
--> Then, the actual duty_cycle is 30, not 0.
So, this patch adds a condition into rcar_pwm_config() to fix this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Ryo Kodama <[email protected]>
[shimoda: revise the commit log and add Fixes and Cc tags]
Fixes: ed6c1476bf7f ("pwm: Add support for R-Car PWM Timer")
Cc: Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pwm/pwm-rcar.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/pwm/pwm-rcar.c
+++ b/drivers/pwm/pwm-rcar.c
@@ -156,8 +156,12 @@ static int rcar_pwm_config(struct pwm_ch
if (div < 0)
return div;
- /* Let the core driver set pwm->period if disabled and duty_ns == 0 */
- if (!pwm_is_enabled(pwm) && !duty_ns)
+ /*
+ * Let the core driver set pwm->period if disabled and duty_ns == 0.
+ * But, this driver should prevent to set the new duty_ns if current
+ * duty_cycle is not set
+ */
+ if (!pwm_is_enabled(pwm) && !duty_ns && !pwm->state.duty_cycle)
return 0;
rcar_pwm_update(rp, RCAR_PWMCR_SYNC, RCAR_PWMCR_SYNC, RCAR_PWMCR);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Igor Pylypiv <[email protected]>
commit 977f6f68331f94bb72ad84ee96b7b87ce737d89d upstream.
F71808FG_FLAG_WD_EN defines bit position, not a bitmask
Signed-off-by: Igor Pylypiv <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c
+++ b/drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static bool watchdog_is_running(void)
is_running = (superio_inb(watchdog.sioaddr, SIO_REG_ENABLE) & BIT(0))
&& (superio_inb(watchdog.sioaddr, F71808FG_REG_WDT_CONF)
- & F71808FG_FLAG_WD_EN);
+ & BIT(F71808FG_FLAG_WD_EN));
superio_exit(watchdog.sioaddr);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit ce33f284935e08229046b30635e6aadcbab02b53 upstream.
When we build this driver with on x86-32, gcc produces a false-positive warning:
drivers/clk/renesas/clk-sh73a0.c: In function 'sh73a0_cpg_clocks_init':
drivers/clk/renesas/clk-sh73a0.c:155:10: error: 'parent_name' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
return clk_register_fixed_factor(NULL, name, parent_name, 0,
We can work around that warning by adding a fake initialization, I tried
and failed to come up with any better workaround. This is currently one
of few remaining warnings for a 4.14.y randconfig build, so it would be
good to also have it backported at least to that version. Older versions
have more randconfig warnings, so we might not care.
I had not noticed this earlier, because one patch in my randconfig test
tree removes the '-ffreestanding' option on x86-32, and that avoids
the warning. The -ffreestanding flag was originally global but moved
into arch/i386 by Andi Kleen in commit 6edfba1b33c7 ("[PATCH] x86_64:
Don't define string functions to builtin") as a 'temporary workaround'.
Like many temporary hacks, this turned out to be rather long-lived, from
all I can tell we still need a simple fix to asm/string_32.h before it
can be removed, but I'm not sure about how to best do that.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/clk/renesas/clk-sh73a0.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/clk/renesas/clk-sh73a0.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/renesas/clk-sh73a0.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct div4_clk {
unsigned int shift;
};
-static struct div4_clk div4_clks[] = {
+static const struct div4_clk div4_clks[] = {
{ "zg", "pll0", CPG_FRQCRA, 16 },
{ "m3", "pll1", CPG_FRQCRA, 12 },
{ "b", "pll1", CPG_FRQCRA, 8 },
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ sh73a0_cpg_register_clock(struct device_
{
const struct clk_div_table *table = NULL;
unsigned int shift, reg, width;
- const char *parent_name;
+ const char *parent_name = NULL;
unsigned int mult = 1;
unsigned int div = 1;
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ sh73a0_cpg_register_clock(struct device_
shift = 24;
width = 5;
} else {
- struct div4_clk *c;
+ const struct div4_clk *c;
for (c = div4_clks; c->name; c++) {
if (!strcmp(name, c->name)) {
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikhail Lappo <[email protected]>
commit cf1ba1d73a33944d8c1a75370a35434bf146b8a7 upstream.
When device boots with T > T_trip_1 and requests interrupt,
the race condition takes place. The interrupt comes before
THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED is set. This leads to an attempt to
reading sensor value from irq and disabling the sensor, based on
the data->mode field, which expected to be THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED,
but still stays as THERMAL_DEVICE_DISABLED. Afher this issue
sensor is never re-enabled, as the driver state is wrong.
Fix this problem by setting the 'data' members prior to
requesting the interrupts.
Fixes: 37713a1e8e4c ("thermal: imx: implement thermal alarm interrupt handling")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Lappo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dong Aisheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c
+++ b/drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c
@@ -587,6 +587,9 @@ static int imx_thermal_probe(struct plat
regmap_write(map, TEMPSENSE0 + REG_CLR, TEMPSENSE0_POWER_DOWN);
regmap_write(map, TEMPSENSE0 + REG_SET, TEMPSENSE0_MEASURE_TEMP);
+ data->irq_enabled = true;
+ data->mode = THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED;
+
ret = devm_request_threaded_irq(&pdev->dev, data->irq,
imx_thermal_alarm_irq, imx_thermal_alarm_irq_thread,
0, "imx_thermal", data);
@@ -598,9 +601,6 @@ static int imx_thermal_probe(struct plat
return ret;
}
- data->irq_enabled = true;
- data->mode = THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED;
-
return 0;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Genoud <[email protected]>
commit 6a4a4595804548e173f0763a0e7274a3521c59a9 upstream.
Clearfog boards can come with a CPU clocked at 1600MHz (commercial)
or 1333MHz (industrial).
They have also some dip-switches to select a different clock (666, 800,
1066, 1200).
The funny thing is that the recovery button is on the MPP34 fq selector.
So, when booting an industrial board with this button down, the frequency
666MHz is selected (and the kernel didn't boot).
This patch add all the missing clocks.
The only mode I didn't test is 2GHz (uboot found 4294MHz instead :/ ).
Fixes: 0e85aeced4d6 ("clk: mvebu: add clock support for Armada 380/385")
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.16.x: 9593f4f56cf5: clk: mvebu: armada-38x: add support for 1866MHz variants
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.16.x
Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Gregory CLEMENT <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c | 14 +++++++-------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c
@@ -46,11 +46,11 @@ static u32 __init armada_38x_get_tclk_fr
}
static const u32 armada_38x_cpu_frequencies[] __initconst = {
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 1066 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0,
+ 666 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 800 * 1000 * 1000, 0,
+ 1066 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 1200 * 1000 * 1000, 0,
1332 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0,
1600 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0,
- 1866 * 1000 * 1000,
+ 1866 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 2000 * 1000 * 1000,
};
static u32 __init armada_38x_get_cpu_freq(void __iomem *sar)
@@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ static const struct coreclk_ratio armada
};
static const int armada_38x_cpu_l2_ratios[32][2] __initconst = {
- {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
- {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
- {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
+ {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1},
+ {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
+ {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static const int armada_38x_cpu_ddr_rati
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
- {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
+ {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {7, 15},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
commit 741de617661794246f84a21a02fc5e327bffc9ad upstream.
opal_nvram_write currently just assumes success if it encounters an
error other than OPAL_BUSY or OPAL_BUSY_EVENT. Have it return -EIO
on other errors instead.
Fixes: 628daa8d5abf ("powerpc/powernv: Add RTC and NVRAM support plus RTAS fallbacks")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.2+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stewart Smith <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ static ssize_t opal_nvram_write(char *bu
if (rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT)
opal_poll_events(NULL);
}
+
+ if (rc)
+ return -EIO;
+
*index += count;
return count;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
commit ac75a041048b8c1f7418e27621ca5efda8571043 upstream.
When convert char array with signed int, if the inbuf[x] is negative then
upper bits will be set to 1. Fix this by using u8 instead of char.
ret_size has to be at least 3, hid_input_report use it after minus 2 bytes.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c | 13 +++++++------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c
@@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ struct i2c_hid {
* register of the HID
* descriptor. */
unsigned int bufsize; /* i2c buffer size */
- char *inbuf; /* Input buffer */
- char *rawbuf; /* Raw Input buffer */
- char *cmdbuf; /* Command buffer */
- char *argsbuf; /* Command arguments buffer */
+ u8 *inbuf; /* Input buffer */
+ u8 *rawbuf; /* Raw Input buffer */
+ u8 *cmdbuf; /* Command buffer */
+ u8 *argsbuf; /* Command arguments buffer */
unsigned long flags; /* device flags */
unsigned long quirks; /* Various quirks */
@@ -451,7 +451,8 @@ out_unlock:
static void i2c_hid_get_input(struct i2c_hid *ihid)
{
- int ret, ret_size;
+ int ret;
+ u32 ret_size;
int size = le16_to_cpu(ihid->hdesc.wMaxInputLength);
if (size > ihid->bufsize)
@@ -476,7 +477,7 @@ static void i2c_hid_get_input(struct i2c
return;
}
- if (ret_size > size) {
+ if ((ret_size > size) || (ret_size <= 2)) {
dev_err(&ihid->client->dev, "%s: incomplete report (%d/%d)\n",
__func__, size, ret_size);
return;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ralph Sennhauser <[email protected]>
commit 9593f4f56cf5d1c443f66660a0c7f01de38f979d upstream.
The Linksys WRT3200ACM CPU is clocked at 1866MHz. Add 1866MHz to the
list of supported CPU frequencies. Also update multiplier and divisor
for the l2clk and ddrclk.
Noticed by the following warning:
[ 0.000000] Selected CPU frequency (16) unsupported
Signed-off-by: Ralph Sennhauser <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gregory CLEMENT <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ static const u32 armada_38x_cpu_frequenc
0, 0, 0, 0,
1066 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0,
1332 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0,
- 1600 * 1000 * 1000,
+ 1600 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0,
+ 1866 * 1000 * 1000,
};
static u32 __init armada_38x_get_cpu_freq(void __iomem *sar)
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ static const int armada_38x_cpu_l2_ratio
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
- {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
+ {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ static const int armada_38x_cpu_ddr_rati
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
- {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
+ {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
{0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1},
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Smith <[email protected]>
commit a04f0017c22453613d5f423326b190c61e3b4f98 upstream.
A spinlock is held while updating the internal copy of the IRQ mask,
but not while writing it to the actual IMASK register. After the lock
is released, an IRQ can occur before the IMASK register is written.
If handling this IRQ causes the mask to be changed, when the handler
returns back to the middle of the first mask update, a stale value
will be written to the mask register.
If this causes an IRQ to become unmasked that cannot have its status
cleared by writing a 1 to it in the IREG register, e.g. the SDIO IRQ,
then we can end up stuck with the same IRQ repeatedly being fired but
not handled. Normally the MMC IRQ handler attempts to clear any
unexpected IRQs by writing IREG, but for those that cannot be cleared
in this way then the IRQ will just repeatedly fire.
This was resulting in lockups after a while of using Wi-Fi on the
CI20 (GitHub issue #19).
Resolve by holding the spinlock until after the IMASK register has
been updated.
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://github.com/MIPS/CI20_linux/issues/19
Fixes: 61bfbdb85687 ("MMC: Add support for the controller on JZ4740 SoCs.")
Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Smith <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c
@@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ static void jz4740_mmc_set_irq_enabled(s
host->irq_mask &= ~irq;
else
host->irq_mask |= irq;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&host->lock, flags);
writew(host->irq_mask, host->base + JZ_REG_MMC_IMASK);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&host->lock, flags);
}
static void jz4740_mmc_clock_enable(struct jz4740_mmc_host *host,
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
commit 530ba6c7cb3c22435a4d26de47037bb6f86a5329 upstream.
Recent libcs have gotten a bit more strict, so we actually need to
include the right headers and use the right types. This enables UML to
compile again.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/um/os-Linux/file.c | 1 +
arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c | 1 +
arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/um/os-Linux/file.c
+++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/file.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <os.h>
--- a/arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c
+++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <os.h>
#include <sysdep/mcontext.h>
#include <um_malloc.h>
+#include <sys/ucontext.h>
void (*sig_info[NSIG])(int, struct siginfo *, struct uml_pt_regs *) = {
[SIGTRAP] = relay_signal,
--- a/arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <sysdep/stub.h>
#include <sysdep/faultinfo.h>
#include <sysdep/mcontext.h>
+#include <sys/ucontext.h>
void __attribute__ ((__section__ (".__syscall_stub")))
stub_segv_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *p)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
commit 753872373b599384ac7df809aa61ea12d1c4d5d1 upstream.
In order to enable a PLL, not only the PLL has to be powered up and
locked, but you also have to de-assert the reset signal. The last part
was missing. Add it so PLLs that were not enabled by the FW/bootloader
can be enabled from Linux.
Fixes: 41691b8862e2 ("clk: bcm2835: Add support for programming the audio domain clocks")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Anholt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c
@@ -545,9 +545,7 @@ static void bcm2835_pll_off(struct clk_h
const struct bcm2835_pll_data *data = pll->data;
spin_lock(&cprman->regs_lock);
- cprman_write(cprman, data->cm_ctrl_reg,
- cprman_read(cprman, data->cm_ctrl_reg) |
- CM_PLL_ANARST);
+ cprman_write(cprman, data->cm_ctrl_reg, CM_PLL_ANARST);
cprman_write(cprman, data->a2w_ctrl_reg,
cprman_read(cprman, data->a2w_ctrl_reg) |
A2W_PLL_CTRL_PWRDN);
@@ -583,6 +581,10 @@ static int bcm2835_pll_on(struct clk_hw
cpu_relax();
}
+ cprman_write(cprman, data->a2w_ctrl_reg,
+ cprman_read(cprman, data->a2w_ctrl_reg) |
+ A2W_PLL_CTRL_PRST_DISABLE);
+
return 0;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
commit bbe4b3af9d9e3172fb9aa1f8dcdfaedcb381fc64 upstream.
A memory block was allocated in intel_svm_bind_mm() but never freed
in a failure path. This patch fixes this by free it to avoid memory
leakage.
Cc: Ashok Raj <[email protected]>
Cc: Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Fixes: 2f26e0a9c9860 ('iommu/vt-d: Add basic SVM PASID support')
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_mm(struct device *dev
pasid_max - 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(svm);
+ kfree(sdev);
goto out;
}
svm->pasid = ret;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 8e4b5eae5decd9dfe5a4ee369c22028f90ab4c44 upstream.
If the root directory has an i_links_count of zero, then when the file
system is mounted, then when ext4_fill_super() notices the problem and
tries to call iput() the root directory in the error return path,
ext4_evict_inode() will try to free the inode on disk, before all of
the file system structures are set up, and this will result in an OOPS
caused by a NULL pointer dereference.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1092.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199179
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560777
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/inode.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -4493,6 +4493,12 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_blo
goto bad_inode;
raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc);
+ if ((ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO) && (raw_inode->i_links_count == 0)) {
+ EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "root inode unallocated");
+ ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bad_inode;
+ }
+
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
ei->i_extra_isize = le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_extra_isize);
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + ei->i_extra_isize >
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit 4f8672201b7e7ed4f5f6c3cf6dcd080648580582 upstream.
The following NULL dereference results from incorrectly assuming that
ndd is valid in this print:
struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd = to_ndd(&nd_region->mapping[i]);
/*
* Give up if we don't find an instance of a uuid at each
* position (from 0 to nd_region->ndr_mappings - 1), or if we
* find a dimm with two instances of the same uuid.
*/
dev_err(&nd_region->dev, "%s missing label for %pUb\n",
dev_name(ndd->dev), nd_label->uuid);
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
IP: nd_region_register_namespaces+0xd67/0x13c0 [libnvdimm]
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 43 PID: 673 Comm: kworker/u609:10 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #1
[..]
RIP: 0010:nd_region_register_namespaces+0xd67/0x13c0 [libnvdimm]
[..]
Call Trace:
? devres_add+0x2f/0x40
? devm_kmalloc+0x52/0x60
? nd_region_activate+0x9c/0x320 [libnvdimm]
nd_region_probe+0x94/0x260 [libnvdimm]
? kernfs_add_one+0xe4/0x130
nvdimm_bus_probe+0x63/0x100 [libnvdimm]
Switch to using the nvdimm device directly.
Fixes: 0e3b0d123c8f ("libnvdimm, namespace: allow multiple pmem...")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c
+++ b/drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c
@@ -1747,7 +1747,7 @@ struct device *create_namespace_pmem(str
}
if (i < nd_region->ndr_mappings) {
- struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd = to_ndd(&nd_region->mapping[i]);
+ struct nvdimm *nvdimm = nd_region->mapping[i].nvdimm;
/*
* Give up if we don't find an instance of a uuid at each
@@ -1755,7 +1755,7 @@ struct device *create_namespace_pmem(str
* find a dimm with two instances of the same uuid.
*/
dev_err(&nd_region->dev, "%s missing label for %pUb\n",
- dev_name(ndd->dev), nd_label->uuid);
+ nvdimm_name(nvdimm), nd_label->uuid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit a6544a624c3ff92a64e4aca3931fa064607bd3da upstream.
This patch avoids that KASAN reports the following when the SRP initiator
calls srp_post_send():
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rxe_post_send+0x5c4/0x980 [rdma_rxe]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff880066606e30 by task 02-mq/1074
CPU: 2 PID: 1074 Comm: 02-mq Not tainted 4.16.0-rc3-dbg+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x85/0xc7
print_address_description+0x65/0x270
kasan_report+0x231/0x350
rxe_post_send+0x5c4/0x980 [rdma_rxe]
srp_post_send.isra.16+0x149/0x190 [ib_srp]
srp_queuecommand+0x94d/0x1670 [ib_srp]
scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x1c2/0x550 [scsi_mod]
scsi_queue_rq+0x843/0xa70 [scsi_mod]
blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x143/0xac0
blk_mq_do_dispatch_ctx+0x1c5/0x260
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x2bf/0x2f0
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xdb/0x160
__blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0xba/0x100
blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xf2/0x190
blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x163/0x2f0
blk_execute_rq+0xb0/0x130
scsi_execute+0x14e/0x260 [scsi_mod]
scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x366/0x13d0 [scsi_mod]
__scsi_scan_target+0x18a/0x810 [scsi_mod]
scsi_scan_target+0x11e/0x130 [scsi_mod]
srp_create_target+0x1522/0x19e0 [ib_srp]
kernfs_fop_write+0x180/0x210
__vfs_write+0xb1/0x2e0
vfs_write+0xf6/0x250
SyS_write+0x99/0x110
do_syscall_64+0xee/0x2b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0001998180 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x4000000000000000()
raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880066606d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1
ffff880066606d80: f1 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
>ffff880066606e00: f2 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00
^
ffff880066606e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff880066606f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c
@@ -747,9 +747,8 @@ static int init_send_wqe(struct rxe_qp *
memcpy(wqe->dma.sge, ibwr->sg_list,
num_sge * sizeof(struct ib_sge));
- wqe->iova = (mask & WR_ATOMIC_MASK) ?
- atomic_wr(ibwr)->remote_addr :
- rdma_wr(ibwr)->remote_addr;
+ wqe->iova = mask & WR_ATOMIC_MASK ? atomic_wr(ibwr)->remote_addr :
+ mask & WR_READ_OR_WRITE_MASK ? rdma_wr(ibwr)->remote_addr : 0;
wqe->mask = mask;
wqe->dma.length = length;
wqe->dma.resid = length;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit 78727137fdf49edf9f731bde79d7189067b4047a upstream.
There is a small window whereby ARS scan requests can schedule work that
userspace will miss when polling scrub_show. Hold the init_mutex lock
over calls to report the status to close this potential escape. Also,
make sure that requests to cancel the ARS workqueue are treated as an
idle event.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Fixes: 37b137ff8c83 ("nfit, libnvdimm: allow an ARS scrub...")
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c
@@ -967,8 +967,11 @@ static ssize_t scrub_show(struct device
if (nd_desc) {
struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc = to_acpi_desc(nd_desc);
+ mutex_lock(&acpi_desc->init_mutex);
rc = sprintf(buf, "%d%s", acpi_desc->scrub_count,
- (work_busy(&acpi_desc->work)) ? "+\n" : "\n");
+ work_busy(&acpi_desc->work)
+ && !acpi_desc->cancel ? "+\n" : "\n");
+ mutex_unlock(&acpi_desc->init_mutex);
}
device_unlock(dev);
return rc;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maxime Jayat <[email protected]>
commit c5637476bbf9bb86c7f0413b8f4822a73d8d2d07 upstream.
Despite the efforts made to correctly read the NDA and CUBC registers,
the order in which the registers are read could sometimes lead to an
inconsistent state.
Re-using the timeline from the comments, this following timing of
registers reads could lead to reading NDA with value "@desc2" and
CUBC with value "MAX desc1":
INITD -------- ------------
|____________________|
_______________________ _______________
NDA @desc2 \/ @desc3
_______________________/\_______________
__________ ___________ _______________
CUBC 0 \/ MAX desc1 \/ MAX desc2
__________/\___________/\_______________
| | | |
Events:(1)(2) (3)(4)
(1) check_nda = @desc2
(2) initd = 1
(3) cur_ubc = MAX desc1
(4) cur_nda = @desc2
This is allowed by the condition ((check_nda == cur_nda) && initd),
despite cur_ubc and cur_nda being in the precise state we don't want.
This error leads to incorrect residue computation.
Fix it by inversing the order in which CUBC and INITD are read. This
makes sure that NDA and CUBC are always read together either _before_
INITD goes to 0 or _after_ it is back at 1.
The case where NDA is read before INITD is at 0 and CUBC is read after
INITD is back at 1 will be rejected by check_nda and cur_nda being
different.
Fixes: 53398f488821 ("dmaengine: at_xdmac: fix residue corruption")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Maxime Jayat <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c
@@ -1473,10 +1473,10 @@ at_xdmac_tx_status(struct dma_chan *chan
for (retry = 0; retry < AT_XDMAC_RESIDUE_MAX_RETRIES; retry++) {
check_nda = at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CNDA) & 0xfffffffc;
rmb();
- initd = !!(at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CC) & AT_XDMAC_CC_INITD);
- rmb();
cur_ubc = at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CUBC);
rmb();
+ initd = !!(at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CC) & AT_XDMAC_CC_INITD);
+ rmb();
cur_nda = at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CNDA) & 0xfffffffc;
rmb();
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit a820ccbe21e8ce8e86c39cd1d3bc8c7d1cbb949b upstream.
The PCM runtime object is created and freed dynamically at PCM stream
open / close time. This is tracked via substream->runtime, and it's
cleared at snd_pcm_detach_substream().
The runtime object assignment is protected by PCM open_mutex, so for
all PCM operations, it's safely handled. However, each PCM substream
provides also an ALSA timer interface, and user-space can access to
this while closing a PCM substream. This may eventually lead to a
UAF, as snd_pcm_timer_resolution() tries to access the runtime while
clearing it in other side.
Fortunately, it's the only concurrent access from the PCM timer, and
it merely reads runtime->timer_resolution field. So, we can avoid the
race by reordering kfree() and wrapping the substream->runtime
clearance with the corresponding timer lock.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/core/pcm.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/core/pcm.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <sound/core.h>
#include <sound/minors.h>
#include <sound/pcm.h>
+#include <sound/timer.h>
#include <sound/control.h>
#include <sound/info.h>
@@ -1025,8 +1026,13 @@ void snd_pcm_detach_substream(struct snd
snd_free_pages((void*)runtime->control,
PAGE_ALIGN(sizeof(struct snd_pcm_mmap_control)));
kfree(runtime->hw_constraints.rules);
- kfree(runtime);
+ /* Avoid concurrent access to runtime via PCM timer interface */
+ if (substream->timer)
+ spin_lock_irq(&substream->timer->lock);
substream->runtime = NULL;
+ if (substream->timer)
+ spin_unlock_irq(&substream->timer->lock);
+ kfree(runtime);
put_pid(substream->pid);
substream->pid = NULL;
substream->pstr->substream_opened--;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 7dac4a1726a9c64a517d595c40e95e2d0d135f6f upstream.
An privileged attacker can cause a crash by mounting a crafted ext4
image which triggers a out-of-bounds read in the function
ext4_valid_block_bitmap() in fs/ext4/balloc.c.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1093.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199181
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560782
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/balloc.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c
@@ -337,20 +337,25 @@ static ext4_fsblk_t ext4_valid_block_bit
/* check whether block bitmap block number is set */
blk = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, desc);
offset = blk - group_first_block;
- if (!ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
+ if (offset < 0 || EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset) >= sb->s_blocksize ||
+ !ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
/* bad block bitmap */
return blk;
/* check whether the inode bitmap block number is set */
blk = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, desc);
offset = blk - group_first_block;
- if (!ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
+ if (offset < 0 || EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset) >= sb->s_blocksize ||
+ !ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
/* bad block bitmap */
return blk;
/* check whether the inode table block number is set */
blk = ext4_inode_table(sb, desc);
offset = blk - group_first_block;
+ if (offset < 0 || EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset) >= sb->s_blocksize ||
+ EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset + sbi->s_itb_per_group) >= sb->s_blocksize)
+ return blk;
next_zero_bit = ext4_find_next_zero_bit(bh->b_data,
EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset + EXT4_SB(sb)->s_itb_per_group),
EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset));
@@ -416,6 +421,7 @@ struct buffer_head *
ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t block_group)
{
struct ext4_group_desc *desc;
+ struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_fsblk_t bitmap_blk;
int err;
@@ -424,6 +430,12 @@ ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait(struct sup
if (!desc)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
bitmap_blk = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, desc);
+ if ((bitmap_blk <= le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block)) ||
+ (bitmap_blk >= ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es))) {
+ ext4_error(sb, "Invalid block bitmap block %llu in "
+ "block_group %u", bitmap_blk, block_group);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
+ }
bh = sb_getblk(sb, bitmap_blk);
if (unlikely(!bh)) {
ext4_error(sb, "Cannot get buffer for block bitmap - "
--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static struct buffer_head *
ext4_read_inode_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t block_group)
{
struct ext4_group_desc *desc;
+ struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
ext4_fsblk_t bitmap_blk;
int err;
@@ -128,6 +129,12 @@ ext4_read_inode_bitmap(struct super_bloc
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
bitmap_blk = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, desc);
+ if ((bitmap_blk <= le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block)) ||
+ (bitmap_blk >= ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es))) {
+ ext4_error(sb, "Invalid inode bitmap blk %llu in "
+ "block_group %u", bitmap_blk, block_group);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
+ }
bh = sb_getblk(sb, bitmap_blk);
if (unlikely(!bh)) {
ext4_error(sb, "Cannot read inode bitmap - "
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit 3a148896b24adf8688dc0c59af54531931677a40 upstream.
Ensure that cv_end is equal to ibdev->num_comp_vectors for the
NUMA node with the highest index. This patch improves spreading
of RDMA channels over completion vectors and thereby improves
performance, especially on systems with only a single NUMA node.
This patch drops support for the comp_vector login parameter by
ignoring the value of that parameter since I have not found a
good way to combine support for that parameter and automatic
spreading of RDMA channels over completion vectors.
Fixes: d92c0da71a35 ("IB/srp: Add multichannel support")
Reported-by: Alexander Schmid <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Schmid <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 10 ++++------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c
@@ -3397,12 +3397,10 @@ static ssize_t srp_create_target(struct
num_online_nodes());
const int ch_end = ((node_idx + 1) * target->ch_count /
num_online_nodes());
- const int cv_start = (node_idx * ibdev->num_comp_vectors /
- num_online_nodes() + target->comp_vector)
- % ibdev->num_comp_vectors;
- const int cv_end = ((node_idx + 1) * ibdev->num_comp_vectors /
- num_online_nodes() + target->comp_vector)
- % ibdev->num_comp_vectors;
+ const int cv_start = node_idx * ibdev->num_comp_vectors /
+ num_online_nodes();
+ const int cv_end = (node_idx + 1) * ibdev->num_comp_vectors /
+ num_online_nodes();
int cpu_idx = 0;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit e68088e78d82920632eba112b968e49d588d02a2 upstream.
Before commit e494f6a72839 ("[SCSI] improved eh timeout handler") it
did not really matter whether or not abort handlers like srp_abort()
called .scsi_done() when returning another value than SUCCESS. Since
that commit however this matters. Hence only call .scsi_done() when
returning SUCCESS.
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c
@@ -2626,9 +2626,11 @@ static int srp_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *s
ret = FAST_IO_FAIL;
else
ret = FAILED;
- srp_free_req(ch, req, scmnd, 0);
- scmnd->result = DID_ABORT << 16;
- scmnd->scsi_done(scmnd);
+ if (ret == SUCCESS) {
+ srp_free_req(ch, req, scmnd, 0);
+ scmnd->result = DID_ABORT << 16;
+ scmnd->scsi_done(scmnd);
+ }
return ret;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
commit 8435168d50e66fa5eae01852769d20a36f9e5e83 upstream.
Check to make sure that ctx->cm_id->device is set before we use it.
Otherwise userspace can trigger a NULL dereference by doing
RDMA_USER_CM_CMD_SET_OPTION on an ID that is not bound to a device.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c
@@ -1231,6 +1231,9 @@ static int ucma_set_ib_path(struct ucma_
if (!optlen)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (!ctx->cm_id->device)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
memset(&sa_path, 0, sizeof(sa_path));
ib_sa_unpack_path(path_data->path_rec, &sa_path);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aniruddha Banerjee <[email protected]>
commit aa08192a254d362a4d5317647a81de6996961aef upstream.
Most MMIO GIC register accesses use a 1-hot bit scheme that
avoids requiring any form of locking. This isn't true for the
GICD_ICFGRn registers, which require a RMW sequence.
Unfortunately, we seem to be missing a lock for these particular
accesses, which could result in a race condition if changing the
trigger type on any two interrupts within the same set of 16
interrupts (and thus controlled by the same CFGR register).
Introduce a private lock in the GIC common comde for this
particular case, making it cover both GIC implementations
in one go.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Aniruddha Banerjee <[email protected]>
[maz: updated changelog]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-common.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-common.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-common.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
#include "irq-gic-common.h"
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(irq_controller_lock);
+
static const struct gic_kvm_info *gic_kvm_info;
const struct gic_kvm_info *gic_get_kvm_info(void)
@@ -52,11 +54,13 @@ int gic_configure_irq(unsigned int irq,
u32 confoff = (irq / 16) * 4;
u32 val, oldval;
int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
/*
* Read current configuration register, and insert the config
* for "irq", depending on "type".
*/
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&irq_controller_lock, flags);
val = oldval = readl_relaxed(base + GIC_DIST_CONFIG + confoff);
if (type & IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_MASK)
val &= ~confmask;
@@ -64,8 +68,10 @@ int gic_configure_irq(unsigned int irq,
val |= confmask;
/* If the current configuration is the same, then we are done */
- if (val == oldval)
+ if (val == oldval) {
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&irq_controller_lock, flags);
return 0;
+ }
/*
* Write back the new configuration, and possibly re-enable
@@ -83,6 +89,7 @@ int gic_configure_irq(unsigned int irq,
pr_warn("GIC: PPI%d is secure or misconfigured\n",
irq - 16);
}
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&irq_controller_lock, flags);
if (sync_access)
sync_access();
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 9f886f4d1d292442b2f22a0a33321eae821bde40 upstream.
This fixes a harmless UBSAN where root could potentially end up
causing an overflow while bumping the entropy_total field (which is
ignored once the entropy pool has been initialized, and this generally
is completed during the boot sequence).
This is marginal for the stable kernel series, but it's a really
trivial patch, and it fixes UBSAN warning that might cause security
folks to get overly excited for no reason.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Chen Feng <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ retry:
static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
{
- const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1));
+ const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32;
if (nbits < 0)
return -EINVAL;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 044e6e3d74a3d7103a0c8a9305dfd94d64000660 upstream.
When reading the inode or block allocation bitmap, if the bitmap needs
to be initialized, do not update the checksum in the block group
descriptor. That's because we're not set up to journal those changes.
Instead, just set the verified bit on the bitmap block, so that it's
not necessary to validate the checksum.
When a block or inode allocation actually happens, at that point the
checksum will be calculated, and update of the bg descriptor block
will be properly journalled.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/balloc.c | 3 +--
fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 47 +++--------------------------------------------
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c
@@ -242,8 +242,6 @@ static int ext4_init_block_bitmap(struct
*/
ext4_mark_bitmap_end(num_clusters_in_group(sb, block_group),
sb->s_blocksize * 8, bh->b_data);
- ext4_block_bitmap_csum_set(sb, block_group, gdp, bh);
- ext4_group_desc_csum_set(sb, block_group, gdp);
return 0;
}
@@ -447,6 +445,7 @@ ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait(struct sup
err = ext4_init_block_bitmap(sb, bh, block_group, desc);
set_bitmap_uptodate(bh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
+ set_buffer_verified(bh);
ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group);
unlock_buffer(bh);
if (err) {
--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
@@ -63,44 +63,6 @@ void ext4_mark_bitmap_end(int start_bit,
memset(bitmap + (i >> 3), 0xff, (end_bit - i) >> 3);
}
-/* Initializes an uninitialized inode bitmap */
-static int ext4_init_inode_bitmap(struct super_block *sb,
- struct buffer_head *bh,
- ext4_group_t block_group,
- struct ext4_group_desc *gdp)
-{
- struct ext4_group_info *grp;
- struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
- J_ASSERT_BH(bh, buffer_locked(bh));
-
- /* If checksum is bad mark all blocks and inodes use to prevent
- * allocation, essentially implementing a per-group read-only flag. */
- if (!ext4_group_desc_csum_verify(sb, block_group, gdp)) {
- grp = ext4_get_group_info(sb, block_group);
- if (!EXT4_MB_GRP_BBITMAP_CORRUPT(grp))
- percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter,
- grp->bb_free);
- set_bit(EXT4_GROUP_INFO_BBITMAP_CORRUPT_BIT, &grp->bb_state);
- if (!EXT4_MB_GRP_IBITMAP_CORRUPT(grp)) {
- int count;
- count = ext4_free_inodes_count(sb, gdp);
- percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
- count);
- }
- set_bit(EXT4_GROUP_INFO_IBITMAP_CORRUPT_BIT, &grp->bb_state);
- return -EFSBADCRC;
- }
-
- memset(bh->b_data, 0, (EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) + 7) / 8);
- ext4_mark_bitmap_end(EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb), sb->s_blocksize * 8,
- bh->b_data);
- ext4_inode_bitmap_csum_set(sb, block_group, gdp, bh,
- EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) / 8);
- ext4_group_desc_csum_set(sb, block_group, gdp);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
void ext4_end_bitmap_read(struct buffer_head *bh, int uptodate)
{
if (uptodate) {
@@ -184,17 +146,14 @@ ext4_read_inode_bitmap(struct super_bloc
ext4_lock_group(sb, block_group);
if (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_UNINIT)) {
- err = ext4_init_inode_bitmap(sb, bh, block_group, desc);
+ memset(bh->b_data, 0, (EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) + 7) / 8);
+ ext4_mark_bitmap_end(EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb),
+ sb->s_blocksize * 8, bh->b_data);
set_bitmap_uptodate(bh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
set_buffer_verified(bh);
ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group);
unlock_buffer(bh);
- if (err) {
- ext4_error(sb, "Failed to init inode bitmap for group "
- "%u: %d", block_group, err);
- goto out;
- }
return bh;
}
ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steve French <[email protected]>
commit 7ea884c77e5c97f1e0a1a422d961d27f78ca2745 upstream.
Some servers return inode number zero for the root directory, which
causes ls to display incorrect data (missing "." and "..").
If the server returns zero for the inode number of the root directory,
fake an inode number for it.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CC: Stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/cifs/cifsglob.h | 1 +
fs/cifs/inode.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
@@ -1412,6 +1412,7 @@ struct dfs_info3_param {
#define CIFS_FATTR_NEED_REVAL 0x4
#define CIFS_FATTR_INO_COLLISION 0x8
#define CIFS_FATTR_UNKNOWN_NLINK 0x10
+#define CIFS_FATTR_FAKE_ROOT_INO 0x20
struct cifs_fattr {
u32 cf_flags;
--- a/fs/cifs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/inode.c
@@ -701,6 +701,18 @@ cgfi_exit:
return rc;
}
+/* Simple function to return a 64 bit hash of string. Rarely called */
+static __u64 simple_hashstr(const char *str)
+{
+ const __u64 hash_mult = 1125899906842597L; /* a big enough prime */
+ __u64 hash = 0;
+
+ while (*str)
+ hash = (hash + (__u64) *str++) * hash_mult;
+
+ return hash;
+}
+
int
cifs_get_inode_info(struct inode **inode, const char *full_path,
FILE_ALL_INFO *data, struct super_block *sb, int xid,
@@ -810,6 +822,14 @@ cifs_get_inode_info(struct inode **inode
tmprc);
fattr.cf_uniqueid = iunique(sb, ROOT_I);
cifs_autodisable_serverino(cifs_sb);
+ } else if ((fattr.cf_uniqueid == 0) &&
+ strlen(full_path) == 0) {
+ /* some servers ret bad root ino ie 0 */
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "Invalid (0) inodenum\n");
+ fattr.cf_flags |=
+ CIFS_FATTR_FAKE_ROOT_INO;
+ fattr.cf_uniqueid =
+ simple_hashstr(tcon->treeName);
}
}
} else
@@ -826,6 +846,16 @@ cifs_get_inode_info(struct inode **inode
&fattr.cf_uniqueid, data);
if (tmprc)
fattr.cf_uniqueid = CIFS_I(*inode)->uniqueid;
+ else if ((fattr.cf_uniqueid == 0) &&
+ strlen(full_path) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Reuse existing root inode num since
+ * inum zero for root causes ls of . and .. to
+ * not be returned
+ */
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "Srv ret 0 inode num for root\n");
+ fattr.cf_uniqueid = CIFS_I(*inode)->uniqueid;
+ }
} else
fattr.cf_uniqueid = CIFS_I(*inode)->uniqueid;
}
@@ -887,6 +917,9 @@ cifs_get_inode_info(struct inode **inode
}
cgii_exit:
+ if ((*inode) && ((*inode)->i_ino == 0))
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "inode number of zero returned\n");
+
kfree(buf);
cifs_put_tlink(tlink);
return rc;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
commit cabdf83dadfb3d83eec31e0f0638a92dbd716435 upstream.
Platform device is allocated before adding resources. Make sure to
properly cleanup on error case.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: f1c7e7108109 ("usb: dwc3: convert to pcim_enable_device()")
Signed-off-by: Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static int dwc3_pci_probe(struct pci_dev
ret = platform_device_add_resources(dwc3, res, ARRAY_SIZE(res));
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "couldn't add resources to dwc3 device\n");
- return ret;
+ goto err;
}
dwc3->dev.parent = dev;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 60bb83b81169820c691fbfa33a6a4aef32aa4b0b upstream.
We've got a bug report indicating a kernel panic at booting on an x86-32
system, and it turned out to be the invalid PCI resource assigned after
reallocation. __find_resource() first aligns the resource start address
and resets the end address with start+size-1 accordingly, then checks
whether it's contained. Here the end address may overflow the integer,
although resource_contains() still returns true because the function
validates only start and end address. So this ends up with returning an
invalid resource (start > end).
There was already an attempt to cover such a problem in the commit
47ea91b4052d ("Resource: fix wrong resource window calculation"), but
this case is an overseen one.
This patch adds the validity check of the newly calculated resource for
avoiding the integer overflow problem.
Bugzilla: http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1086739
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 23c570a67448 ("resource: ability to resize an allocated resource")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Michael Henders <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Henders <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Ram Pai <[email protected]>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/resource.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/resource.c
+++ b/kernel/resource.c
@@ -633,7 +633,8 @@ static int __find_resource(struct resour
alloc.start = constraint->alignf(constraint->alignf_data, &avail,
size, constraint->align);
alloc.end = alloc.start + size - 1;
- if (resource_contains(&avail, &alloc)) {
+ if (alloc.start <= alloc.end &&
+ resource_contains(&avail, &alloc)) {
new->start = alloc.start;
new->end = alloc.end;
return 0;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 3f05317d9889ab75c7190dcd39491d2a97921984 upstream.
syzbot reported a use-after-free of shm_file_data(file)->file->f_op in
shm_get_unmapped_area(), called via sys_remap_file_pages().
Unfortunately it couldn't generate a reproducer, but I found a bug which
I think caused it. When remap_file_pages() is passed a full System V
shared memory segment, the memory is first unmapped, then a new map is
created using the ->vm_file. Between these steps, the shm ID can be
removed and reused for a new shm segment. But, shm_mmap() only checks
whether the ID is currently valid before calling the underlying file's
->mmap(); it doesn't check whether it was reused. Thus it can use the
wrong underlying file, one that was already freed.
Fix this by making the "outer" shm file (the one that gets put in
->vm_file) hold a reference to the real shm file, and by making
__shm_open() require that the file associated with the shm ID matches
the one associated with the "outer" file.
Taking the reference to the real shm file is needed to fully solve the
problem, since otherwise sfd->file could point to a freed file, which
then could be reallocated for the reused shm ID, causing the wrong shm
segment to be mapped (and without the required permission checks).
Commit 1ac0b6dec656 ("ipc/shm: handle removed segments gracefully in
shm_mmap()") almost fixed this bug, but it didn't go far enough because
it didn't consider the case where the shm ID is reused.
The following program usually reproduces this bug:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int is_parent = (fork() != 0);
srand(getpid());
for (;;) {
int id = shmget(0xF00F, 4096, IPC_CREAT|0700);
if (is_parent) {
void *addr = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
usleep(rand() % 50);
while (!syscall(__NR_remap_file_pages, addr, 4096, 0, 0, 0));
} else {
usleep(rand() % 50);
shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
}
}
}
It causes the following NULL pointer dereference due to a 'struct file'
being used while it's being freed. (I couldn't actually get a KASAN
use-after-free splat like in the syzbot report. But I think it's
possible with this bug; it would just take a more extraordinary race...)
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 9 PID: 258 Comm: syz_ipc Not tainted 4.16.0-05140-gf8cf2f16a7c95 #189
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:d_inode include/linux/dcache.h:519 [inline]
RIP: 0010:touch_atime+0x25/0xd0 fs/inode.c:1724
[...]
Call Trace:
file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2063 [inline]
shmem_mmap+0x25/0x40 mm/shmem.c:2149
call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
shm_mmap+0x34/0x80 ipc/shm.c:465
call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
mmap_region+0x309/0x5b0 mm/mmap.c:1712
do_mmap+0x294/0x4a0 mm/mmap.c:1483
do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2235 [inline]
SYSC_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:2853 [inline]
SyS_remap_file_pages+0x232/0x310 mm/mmap.c:2769
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
[[email protected]: add comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reported-by: syzbot+d11f321e7f1923157eac80aa990b446596f46439@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c8d78c1823f4 ("mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
ipc/shm.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -198,6 +198,12 @@ static int __shm_open(struct vm_area_str
if (IS_ERR(shp))
return PTR_ERR(shp);
+ if (shp->shm_file != sfd->file) {
+ /* ID was reused */
+ shm_unlock(shp);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
shp->shm_atim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_lprid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
shp->shm_nattch++;
@@ -425,8 +431,9 @@ static int shm_mmap(struct file *file, s
int ret;
/*
- * In case of remap_file_pages() emulation, the file can represent
- * removed IPC ID: propogate shm_lock() error to caller.
+ * In case of remap_file_pages() emulation, the file can represent an
+ * IPC ID that was removed, and possibly even reused by another shm
+ * segment already. Propagate this case as an error to caller.
*/
ret =__shm_open(vma);
if (ret)
@@ -450,6 +457,7 @@ static int shm_release(struct inode *ino
struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
put_ipc_ns(sfd->ns);
+ fput(sfd->file);
shm_file_data(file) = NULL;
kfree(sfd);
return 0;
@@ -1212,7 +1220,16 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh
file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping;
sfd->id = shp->shm_perm.id;
sfd->ns = get_ipc_ns(ns);
- sfd->file = shp->shm_file;
+ /*
+ * We need to take a reference to the real shm file to prevent the
+ * pointer from becoming stale in cases where the lifetime of the outer
+ * file extends beyond that of the shm segment. It's not usually
+ * possible, but it can happen during remap_file_pages() emulation as
+ * that unmaps the memory, then does ->mmap() via file reference only.
+ * We'll deny the ->mmap() if the shm segment was since removed, but to
+ * detect shm ID reuse we need to compare the file pointers.
+ */
+ sfd->file = get_file(shp->shm_file);
sfd->vm_ops = NULL;
err = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
commit b5094b7f135be34630e3ea8a98fa215715d0f29d upstream.
While UBI and UBIFS seem to work at first sight with MLC NAND, you will
most likely lose all your data upon a power-cut or due to read/write
disturb.
In order to protect users from bad surprises, refuse to attach to MLC
NAND.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Artem Bityutskiy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c
@@ -894,6 +894,17 @@ int ubi_attach_mtd_dev(struct mtd_info *
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /*
+ * Both UBI and UBIFS have been designed for SLC NAND and NOR flashes.
+ * MLC NAND is different and needs special care, otherwise UBI or UBIFS
+ * will die soon and you will lose all your data.
+ */
+ if (mtd->type == MTD_MLCNANDFLASH) {
+ pr_err("ubi: refuse attaching mtd%d - MLC NAND is not supported\n",
+ mtd->index);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (ubi_num == UBI_DEV_NUM_AUTO) {
/* Search for an empty slot in the @ubi_devices array */
for (ubi_num = 0; ubi_num < UBI_MAX_DEVICES; ubi_num++)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
commit 29b7a6fa1ec07e8480b0d9caf635a4498a438bf4 upstream.
At this point UBI volumes have already been free()'ed and fastmap can no
longer access these data structures.
Reported-by: Martin Townsend <[email protected]>
Fixes: 74cdaf24004a ("UBI: Fastmap: Fix memory leaks while closing the WL sub-system")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c
@@ -362,7 +362,6 @@ static void ubi_fastmap_close(struct ubi
{
int i;
- flush_work(&ubi->fm_work);
return_unused_pool_pebs(ubi, &ubi->fm_pool);
return_unused_pool_pebs(ubi, &ubi->fm_wl_pool);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
commit 9ad553abe66f8be3f4755e9fa0a6ba137ce76341 upstream.
One use of the reiserfs_warning() macro in journal_init_dev() is missing
a parameter, causing the following warning:
REISERFS warning (device loop0): journal_init_dev: Cannot open '%s': %i journal_init_dev:
This also causes a WARN_ONCE() warning in the vsprintf code, and then a
panic if panic_on_warn is set.
Please remove unsupported %/ in format string
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4480 at lib/vsprintf.c:2138 format_decode+0x77f/0x830 lib/vsprintf.c:2138
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
Just add another string argument to the macro invocation.
Addresses https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0627d4551fdc39bf1ef5d82cd9eef587047f7718
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Reported-by: <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/reiserfs/journal.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/reiserfs/journal.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/journal.c
@@ -2640,7 +2640,7 @@ static int journal_init_dev(struct super
if (IS_ERR(journal->j_dev_bd)) {
result = PTR_ERR(journal->j_dev_bd);
journal->j_dev_bd = NULL;
- reiserfs_warning(super,
+ reiserfs_warning(super, "sh-457",
"journal_init_dev: Cannot open '%s': %i",
jdev_name, result);
return result;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Romain Izard <[email protected]>
commit 78a8dfbabbece22bee58ac4cb26cab10e7a19c5d upstream.
When opening a device with write access, ubiblock_open returns an error
code. Currently, this error code is -EPERM, but this is not the right
value.
The open function for other block devices returns -EROFS when opening
read-only devices with FMODE_WRITE set. When used with dm-verity, the
veritysetup userspace tool is expecting EROFS, and refuses to use the
ubiblock device.
Use -EROFS for ubiblock as well. As a result, veritysetup accepts the
ubiblock device as valid.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 9d54c8a33eec (UBI: R/O block driver on top of UBI volumes)
Signed-off-by: Romain Izard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static int ubiblock_open(struct block_de
* in any case.
*/
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
- ret = -EPERM;
+ ret = -EROFS;
goto out_unlock;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
commit a9f2a846f0503e7d729f552e3ccfe2279010fe94 upstream.
cache_reap() is initially scheduled in start_cpu_timer() via
schedule_delayed_work_on(). But then the next iterations are scheduled
via schedule_delayed_work(), i.e. using WORK_CPU_UNBOUND.
Thus since commit ef557180447f ("workqueue: schedule WORK_CPU_UNBOUND
work on wq_unbound_cpumask CPUs") there is no guarantee the future
iterations will run on the originally intended cpu, although it's still
preferred. I was able to demonstrate this with
/sys/module/workqueue/parameters/debug_force_rr_cpu. IIUC, it may also
happen due to migrating timers in nohz context. As a result, some cpu's
would be calling cache_reap() more frequently and others never.
This patch uses schedule_delayed_work_on() with the current cpu when
scheduling the next iteration.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: ef557180447f ("workqueue: schedule WORK_CPU_UNBOUND work on wq_unbound_cpumask CPUs")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/slab.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -4096,7 +4096,8 @@ next:
next_reap_node();
out:
/* Set up the next iteration */
- schedule_delayed_work(work, round_jiffies_relative(REAPTIMEOUT_AC));
+ schedule_delayed_work_on(smp_processor_id(), work,
+ round_jiffies_relative(REAPTIMEOUT_AC));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SLABINFO
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit f00e71091ab92eba52122332586c6ecaa9cd1a56 upstream.
We're supposed to be checking that "val_len" is not too large but
instead we check if it is smaller than the max.
The only function affected would be regmap_i2c_smbus_i2c_write() in
drivers/base/regmap/regmap-i2c.c. Strangely that function has its own
limit check which returns an error if (count >= I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX) so
it doesn't look like it has ever been able to do anything except return
an error.
Fixes: c335931ed9d2 ("regmap: Add raw_write/read checks for max_raw_write/read sizes")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c
+++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c
@@ -1736,7 +1736,7 @@ int regmap_raw_write(struct regmap *map,
return -EINVAL;
if (val_len % map->format.val_bytes)
return -EINVAL;
- if (map->max_raw_write && map->max_raw_write > val_len)
+ if (map->max_raw_write && map->max_raw_write < val_len)
return -E2BIG;
map->lock(map->lock_arg);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yavuz, Tuba <[email protected]>
commit 7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f upstream.
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <[email protected]>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c | 3 ++-
drivers/usb/gadget/u_f.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c
@@ -389,7 +389,8 @@ static int f_midi_set_alt(struct usb_fun
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
- free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req);
+ if (req->buf != NULL)
+ free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req);
return err;
}
}
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/u_f.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/u_f.h
@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ struct usb_request *alloc_ep_req(struct
/* Frees a usb_request previously allocated by alloc_ep_req() */
static inline void free_ep_req(struct usb_ep *ep, struct usb_request *req)
{
+ WARN_ON(req->buf == NULL);
kfree(req->buf);
+ req->buf = NULL;
usb_ep_free_request(ep, req);
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
commit 13d3047c81505cc0fb9bdae7810676e70523c8bf upstream.
Mike Lothian reported that plugging in a USB-C device does not work
properly in his Dell Alienware system. This system has an Intel Alpine
Ridge Thunderbolt controller providing USB-C functionality. In these
systems the USB controller (xHCI) is hotplugged whenever a device is
connected to the port using ACPI-based hotplug.
The ACPI description of the root port in question is as follows:
Device (RP01)
{
Name (_ADR, 0x001C0000)
Device (PXSX)
{
Name (_ADR, 0x02)
Method (_RMV, 0, NotSerialized)
{
// ...
}
}
Here _ADR 0x02 means device 0, function 2 on the bus under root port (RP01)
but that seems to be incorrect because device 0 is the upstream port of the
Alpine Ridge PCIe switch and it has no functions other than 0 (the bridge
itself). When we get ACPI Notify() to the root port resulting from
connecting a USB-C device, Linux tries to read PCI_VENDOR_ID from device 0,
function 2 which of course always returns 0xffffffff because there is no
such function and we never find the device.
In Windows this works fine.
Now, since we get ACPI Notify() to the root port and not to the PXSX device
we should actually start our scan from there as well and not from the
non-existent PXSX device. Fix this by checking presence of the slot itself
(function 0) if we fail to do that otherwise.
While there use pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id() in get_slot_status(), which is
the recommended way to read Device and Vendor IDs of devices on PCI buses.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198557
Reported-by: Mike Lothian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c
@@ -587,6 +587,7 @@ static unsigned int get_slot_status(stru
{
unsigned long long sta = 0;
struct acpiphp_func *func;
+ u32 dvid;
list_for_each_entry(func, &slot->funcs, sibling) {
if (func->flags & FUNC_HAS_STA) {
@@ -597,19 +598,27 @@ static unsigned int get_slot_status(stru
if (ACPI_SUCCESS(status) && sta)
break;
} else {
- u32 dvid;
-
- pci_bus_read_config_dword(slot->bus,
- PCI_DEVFN(slot->device,
- func->function),
- PCI_VENDOR_ID, &dvid);
- if (dvid != 0xffffffff) {
+ if (pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id(slot->bus,
+ PCI_DEVFN(slot->device, func->function),
+ &dvid, 0)) {
sta = ACPI_STA_ALL;
break;
}
}
}
+ if (!sta) {
+ /*
+ * Check for the slot itself since it may be that the
+ * ACPI slot is a device below PCIe upstream port so in
+ * that case it may not even be reachable yet.
+ */
+ if (pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id(slot->bus,
+ PCI_DEVFN(slot->device, 0), &dvid, 0)) {
+ sta = ACPI_STA_ALL;
+ }
+ }
+
return (unsigned int)sta;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Andryuk <[email protected]>
commit c2d2e6738a209f0f9dffa2dc8e7292fc45360d61 upstream.
A toolstack may delete the vif frontend and backend xenstore entries
while xen-netfront is in the removal code path. In that case, the
checks for xenbus_read_driver_state would return XenbusStateUnknown, and
xennet_remove would hang indefinitely. This hang prevents system
shutdown.
xennet_remove must be able to handle XenbusStateUnknown, and
netback_changed must also wake up the wake_queue for that state as well.
Fixes: 5b5971df3bc2 ("xen-netfront: remove warning when unloading module")
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <[email protected]>
Cc: Eduardo Otubo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -2038,7 +2038,10 @@ static void netback_changed(struct xenbu
case XenbusStateInitialised:
case XenbusStateReconfiguring:
case XenbusStateReconfigured:
+ break;
+
case XenbusStateUnknown:
+ wake_up_all(&module_unload_q);
break;
case XenbusStateInitWait:
@@ -2169,7 +2172,9 @@ static int xennet_remove(struct xenbus_d
xenbus_switch_state(dev, XenbusStateClosing);
wait_event(module_unload_q,
xenbus_read_driver_state(dev->otherend) ==
- XenbusStateClosing);
+ XenbusStateClosing ||
+ xenbus_read_driver_state(dev->otherend) ==
+ XenbusStateUnknown);
xenbus_switch_state(dev, XenbusStateClosed);
wait_event(module_unload_q,
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maxime Chevallier <[email protected]>
commit ce99319a182fe766be67f96338386f3ec73e321c upstream.
When SPI transfers can be offloaded using DMA, the SPI core need to
build a scatterlist to make sure that the buffer to be transferred is
dma-able.
This patch fixes the scatterlist entry size computation in the case
where the maximum acceptable scatterlist entry supported by the DMA
controller is less than PAGE_SIZE, when the buffer is vmalloced.
For each entry, the actual size is given by the minimum between the
desc_len (which is the max buffer size supported by the DMA controller)
and the remaining buffer length until we cross a page boundary.
Fixes: 65598c13fd66 ("spi: Fix per-page mapping of unaligned vmalloc-ed buffer")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Chevallier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/spi/spi.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/spi/spi.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi.c
@@ -743,8 +743,14 @@ static int spi_map_buf(struct spi_master
for (i = 0; i < sgs; i++) {
if (vmalloced_buf || kmap_buf) {
- min = min_t(size_t,
- len, desc_len - offset_in_page(buf));
+ /*
+ * Next scatterlist entry size is the minimum between
+ * the desc_len and the remaining buffer length that
+ * fits in a page.
+ */
+ min = min_t(size_t, desc_len,
+ min_t(size_t, len,
+ PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(buf)));
if (vmalloced_buf)
vm_page = vmalloc_to_page(buf);
else
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
commit bbf038618a24d72e2efc19146ef421bb1e1eda1a upstream.
Just like many other Samsung models, the 670Z5E needs to use the acpi-video
backlight interface rather then the native one for backlight control to
work, add a quirk for this.
Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1557060
Cc: All applicable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
@@ -214,6 +214,15 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_
},
},
{
+ /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1557060 */
+ .callback = video_detect_force_video,
+ .ident = "SAMSUNG 670Z5E",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD."),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "670Z5E"),
+ },
+ },
+ {
/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1094948 */
.callback = video_detect_force_video,
.ident = "SAMSUNG 730U3E/740U3E",
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Santiago Esteban <[email protected]>
commit 9a06757dcc8509c162ac00488c8c82fc98e04227 upstream.
The compatible string is incorrect. Add atmel,sama5d3-pinctrl since
it's the appropriate compatible string. Remove the
atmel,at91rm9200-pinctrl compatible string, this fallback is
useless, there are too many changes.
Signed-off-by: Santiago Esteban <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Desroches <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] #v3.18
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi
@@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@
pinctrl@fc06a000 {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;
- compatible = "atmel,at91sam9x5-pinctrl", "atmel,at91rm9200-pinctrl", "simple-bus";
+ compatible = "atmel,sama5d3-pinctrl", "atmel,at91sam9x5-pinctrl", "simple-bus";
ranges = <0xfc068000 0xfc068000 0x100
0xfc06a000 0xfc06a000 0x4000>;
/* WARNING: revisit as pin spec has changed */
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
commit 6f4870753f29edf7dc39444246f9e39987b8b158 upstream.
The proper name for the property, which assign given device to IOMMU is
'iommus', not 'iommu'. Fix incorrect name and let all GScaler devices
to be properly handled when IOMMU support is enabled.
Reported-by: Andrzej Hajda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6cbfdd73a94f ("ARM: dts: add sysmmu nodes for exynos5250")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250.dtsi | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250.dtsi
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@
power-domains = <&pd_gsc>;
clocks = <&clock CLK_GSCL0>;
clock-names = "gscl";
- iommu = <&sysmmu_gsc0>;
+ iommus = <&sysmmu_gsc0>;
};
gsc_1: gsc@13e10000 {
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@
power-domains = <&pd_gsc>;
clocks = <&clock CLK_GSCL1>;
clock-names = "gscl";
- iommu = <&sysmmu_gsc1>;
+ iommus = <&sysmmu_gsc1>;
};
gsc_2: gsc@13e20000 {
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@
power-domains = <&pd_gsc>;
clocks = <&clock CLK_GSCL2>;
clock-names = "gscl";
- iommu = <&sysmmu_gsc2>;
+ iommus = <&sysmmu_gsc2>;
};
gsc_3: gsc@13e30000 {
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@
power-domains = <&pd_gsc>;
clocks = <&clock CLK_GSCL3>;
clock-names = "gscl";
- iommu = <&sysmmu_gsc3>;
+ iommus = <&sysmmu_gsc3>;
};
hdmi: hdmi@14530000 {
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicolas Ferre <[email protected]>
commit e8fd0adf105e132fd84545997bbef3d5edc2c9c1 upstream.
There are only 19 PIOB pins having primary names PB0-PB18. Not all of them
have a 'C' function. So the pinctrl property mask ends up being the same as the
other SoC of the at91sam9x5 series.
Reported-by: Marek Sieranski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.8+
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
atmel,mux-mask = <
/* A B C */
0xffffffff 0xffe0399f 0xc000001c /* pioA */
- 0x0007ffff 0x8000fe3f 0x00000000 /* pioB */
+ 0x0007ffff 0x00047e3f 0x00000000 /* pioB */
0x80000000 0x07c0ffff 0xb83fffff /* pioC */
0x003fffff 0x003f8000 0x00000000 /* pioD */
>;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
commit eaa358c7790338d83bb6a31258bdc077de120414 upstream.
Mention that ->complete() should never be called from within
usb_ep_queue().
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
@@ -248,6 +248,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_ep_free_request);
* arranges to poll once per interval, and the gadget driver usually will
* have queued some data to transfer at that time.
*
+ * Note that @req's ->complete() callback must never be called from
+ * within usb_ep_queue() as that can create deadlock situations.
+ *
* Returns zero, or a negative error code. Endpoints that are not enabled
* report errors; errors will also be
* reported when the usb peripheral is disconnected.
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 28b0f8a6962a24ed21737578f3b1b07424635c9e upstream.
A tty is hung up by __tty_hangup() setting file->f_op to
hung_up_tty_fops, which is skipped on ttys whose write operation isn't
tty_write(). This means that, for example, /dev/console whose write
op is redirected_tty_write() is never actually marked hung up.
Because n_tty_read() uses the hung up status to decide whether to
abort the waiting readers, the lack of hung-up marking can lead to the
following scenario.
1. A session contains two processes. The leader and its child. The
child ignores SIGHUP.
2. The leader exits and starts disassociating from the controlling
terminal (/dev/console).
3. __tty_hangup() skips setting f_op to hung_up_tty_fops.
4. SIGHUP is delivered and ignored.
5. tty_ldisc_hangup() is invoked. It wakes up the waits which should
clear the read lockers of tty->ldisc_sem.
6. The reader wakes up but because tty_hung_up_p() is false, it
doesn't abort and goes back to sleep while read-holding
tty->ldisc_sem.
7. The leader progresses to tty_ldisc_lock() in tty_ldisc_hangup()
and is now stuck in D sleep indefinitely waiting for
tty->ldisc_sem.
The following is Alan's explanation on why some ttys aren't hung up.
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171101170908.6ad08580@alans-desktop
1. It broke the serial consoles because they would hang up and close
down the hardware. With tty_port that *should* be fixable properly
for any cases remaining.
2. The console layer was (and still is) completely broken and doens't
refcount properly. So if you turn on console hangups it breaks (as
indeed does freeing consoles and half a dozen other things).
As neither can be fixed quickly, this patch works around the problem
by introducing a new flag, TTY_HUPPING, which is used solely to tell
n_tty_read() that hang-up is in progress for the console and the
readers should be aborted regardless of the hung-up status of the
device.
The following is a sample hung task warning caused by this issue.
INFO: task agetty:2662 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Not tainted 4.11.3-dbg-tty-lockup-02478-gfd6c7ee-dirty #28
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
0 2662 1 0x00000086
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x267/0x890
schedule+0x36/0x80
schedule_timeout+0x23c/0x2e0
ldsem_down_write+0xce/0x1f6
tty_ldisc_lock+0x16/0x30
tty_ldisc_hangup+0xb3/0x1b0
__tty_hangup+0x300/0x410
disassociate_ctty+0x6c/0x290
do_exit+0x7ef/0xb00
do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0
get_signal+0x1b3/0x5d0
do_signal+0x28/0x660
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x46/0x86
do_syscall_64+0x9c/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
The following is the repro. Run "$PROG /dev/console". The parent
process hangs in D state.
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <termios.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct sigaction sact = { .sa_handler = SIG_IGN };
struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 };
pid_t pid;
int fd;
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "test-hung-tty /dev/$TTY\n");
return 1;
}
/* fork a child to ensure that it isn't already the session leader */
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) {
perror("fork");
return 1;
}
if (pid > 0) {
/* top parent, wait for everyone */
while (waitpid(-1, NULL, 0) >= 0)
;
if (errno != ECHILD)
perror("waitpid");
return 0;
}
/* new session, start a new session and set the controlling tty */
if (setsid() < 0) {
perror("setsid");
return 1;
}
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open");
return 1;
}
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSCTTY, 1) < 0) {
perror("ioctl");
return 1;
}
/* fork a child, sleep a bit and exit */
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) {
perror("fork");
return 1;
}
if (pid > 0) {
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
printf("Session leader exiting\n");
exit(0);
}
/*
* The child ignores SIGHUP and keeps reading from the controlling
* tty. Because SIGHUP is ignored, the child doesn't get killed on
* parent exit and the bug in n_tty makes the read(2) block the
* parent's control terminal hangup attempt. The parent ends up in
* D sleep until the child is explicitly killed.
*/
sigaction(SIGHUP, &sact, NULL);
printf("Child reading tty\n");
while (1) {
char buf[1024];
if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
perror("read");
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/n_tty.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 9 +++++++++
include/linux/tty.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
@@ -2182,6 +2182,12 @@ static ssize_t n_tty_read(struct tty_str
}
if (tty_hung_up_p(file))
break;
+ /*
+ * Abort readers for ttys which never actually
+ * get hung up. See __tty_hangup().
+ */
+ if (test_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags))
+ break;
if (!timeout)
break;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -709,6 +709,14 @@ static void __tty_hangup(struct tty_stru
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Some console devices aren't actually hung up for technical and
+ * historical reasons, which can lead to indefinite interruptible
+ * sleep in n_tty_read(). The following explicitly tells
+ * n_tty_read() to abort readers.
+ */
+ set_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags);
+
/* inuse_filps is protected by the single tty lock,
this really needs to change if we want to flush the
workqueue with the lock held */
@@ -763,6 +771,7 @@ static void __tty_hangup(struct tty_stru
* from the ldisc side, which is now guaranteed.
*/
set_bit(TTY_HUPPED, &tty->flags);
+ clear_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags);
tty_unlock(tty);
if (f)
--- a/include/linux/tty.h
+++ b/include/linux/tty.h
@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ struct tty_file_private {
#define TTY_PTY_LOCK 16 /* pty private */
#define TTY_NO_WRITE_SPLIT 17 /* Preserve write boundaries to driver */
#define TTY_HUPPED 18 /* Post driver->hangup() */
+#define TTY_HUPPING 19 /* Hangup in progress */
#define TTY_LDISC_HALTED 22 /* Line discipline is halted */
/* Values for tty->flow_change */
On Sun, 2018-04-22 at 15:53 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
>
> commit 7dac4a1726a9c64a517d595c40e95e2d0d135f6f upstream.
>
> An privileged attacker can cause a crash by mounting a crafted ext4
> image which triggers a out-of-bounds read in the function
> ext4_valid_block_bitmap() in fs/ext4/balloc.c.
>
> This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1093.
>
> BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199181
> BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560782
> Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>
> ---
> fs/ext4/balloc.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
> fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 7 +++++++
> 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c
> @@ -337,20 +337,25 @@ static ext4_fsblk_t ext4_valid_block_bit
> /* check whether block bitmap block number is set */
> blk = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, desc);
> offset = blk - group_first_block;
> - if (!ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
> + if (offset < 0 || EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset) >= sb->s_blocksize ||
> + !ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
Isn't sb->s_blocksize a count of bytes? If so, doesn't that mean that
we should be comparing with sb->s_blocksize * 8?
Ben.
> /* bad block bitmap */
> return blk;
>
> /* check whether the inode bitmap block number is set */
> blk = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, desc);
> offset = blk - group_first_block;
> - if (!ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
> + if (offset < 0 || EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset) >= sb->s_blocksize ||
> + !ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
> /* bad block bitmap */
> return blk;
>
> /* check whether the inode table block number is set */
> blk = ext4_inode_table(sb, desc);
> offset = blk - group_first_block;
> + if (offset < 0 || EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset) >= sb->s_blocksize ||
> + EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset + sbi->s_itb_per_group) >= sb->s_blocksize)
> + return blk;
> next_zero_bit = ext4_find_next_zero_bit(bh->b_data,
> EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset + EXT4_SB(sb)->s_itb_per_group),
> EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset));
> @@ -416,6 +421,7 @@ struct buffer_head *
> ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t block_group)
> {
> struct ext4_group_desc *desc;
> + struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
> struct buffer_head *bh;
> ext4_fsblk_t bitmap_blk;
> int err;
> @@ -424,6 +430,12 @@ ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait(struct sup
> if (!desc)
> return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
> bitmap_blk = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, desc);
> + if ((bitmap_blk <= le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block)) ||
> + (bitmap_blk >= ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es))) {
> + ext4_error(sb, "Invalid block bitmap block %llu in "
> + "block_group %u", bitmap_blk, block_group);
> + return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
> + }
> bh = sb_getblk(sb, bitmap_blk);
> if (unlikely(!bh)) {
> ext4_error(sb, "Cannot get buffer for block bitmap - "
> --- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
> @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static struct buffer_head *
> ext4_read_inode_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t block_group)
> {
> struct ext4_group_desc *desc;
> + struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
> struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
> ext4_fsblk_t bitmap_blk;
> int err;
> @@ -128,6 +129,12 @@ ext4_read_inode_bitmap(struct super_bloc
> return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
>
> bitmap_blk = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, desc);
> + if ((bitmap_blk <= le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block)) ||
> + (bitmap_blk >= ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es))) {
> + ext4_error(sb, "Invalid inode bitmap blk %llu in "
> + "block_group %u", bitmap_blk, block_group);
> + return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
> + }
> bh = sb_getblk(sb, bitmap_blk);
> if (unlikely(!bh)) {
> ext4_error(sb, "Cannot read inode bitmap - "
>
>
--
Ben Hutchings
It is easier to write an incorrect program
than to understand a correct one.
On Sun, 2018-04-22 at 15:53 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
>
> commit 8ef35c866f8862df074a49a93b0309725812dea8 upstream.
>
> Until the primary_crng is fully initialized, don't initialize the NUMA
> crng nodes. Otherwise users of /dev/urandom on NUMA systems before
> the CRNG is fully initialized can get very bad quality randomness. Of
> course everyone should move to getrandom(2) where this won't be an
> issue, but there's a lot of legacy code out there. This related to
> CVE-2018-1108.
>
> Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
> Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly...")
> Cc: [email protected] # 4.8+
> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
In 4.9 (and probably older branches too) this leads to a deadlock:
crng_reseed(primary_crng, ...) takes primary_crng.lock
-> numa_rcng_init()
-> crng_initialize()
-> get_random_bytes()
-> extract_crng()
-> _extract_crng(primary_crng, ...) tries to take primary_crng.lock
I think this can be fixed by backporting commit 4a072c71f49b
"random: silence compiler warnings and fix race" but I'm not sure
whether that depends on other changes.
Ben.
> ---
> drivers/char/random.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -818,6 +818,32 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp
> return 1;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
> +static void numa_crng_init(void)
> +{
> + int i;
> + struct crng_state *crng;
> + struct crng_state **pool;
> +
> + pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
> + for_each_online_node(i) {
> + crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
> + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
> + spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
> + crng_initialize(crng);
> + pool[i] = crng;
> + }
> + mb();
> + if (cmpxchg(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool)) {
> + for_each_node(i)
> + kfree(pool[i]);
> + kfree(pool);
> + }
> +}
> +#else
> +static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
> +#endif
> +
> static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
> {
> unsigned long flags;
> @@ -847,6 +873,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
> memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
> crng->init_time = jiffies;
> if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
> + numa_crng_init();
> crng_init = 2;
> process_random_ready_list();
> wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
> @@ -1659,28 +1686,9 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy
> */
> static int rand_initialize(void)
> {
> -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
> - int i;
> - struct crng_state *crng;
> - struct crng_state **pool;
> -#endif
> -
> init_std_data(&input_pool);
> init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
> crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
> -
> -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
> - pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
> - for_each_online_node(i) {
> - crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
> - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
> - spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
> - crng_initialize(crng);
> - pool[i] = crng;
> - }
> - mb();
> - crng_node_pool = pool;
> -#endif
> return 0;
> }
> early_initcall(rand_initialize);
>
>
--
Ben Hutchings
It is easier to write an incorrect program
than to understand a correct one.
On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 10:54:23PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > offset = blk - group_first_block;
> > - if (!ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
> > + if (offset < 0 || EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset) >= sb->s_blocksize ||
> > + !ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
>
> Isn't sb->s_blocksize a count of bytes? If so, doesn't that mean that
> we should be comparing with sb->s_blocksize * 8?
Yes, nice catch, Ben! Can we temporarily drop this patch from the
stable queue until I can get a fix in?
In practice this shouldn't be a problem because of the default ext4
layout with flex_bg. But we should definitely get this fixed before
we let this flow into the stable kernel.
- Ted
On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 11:28:52PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> On Sun, 2018-04-22 at 15:53 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> >
> > commit 8ef35c866f8862df074a49a93b0309725812dea8 upstream.
> >
> > Until the primary_crng is fully initialized, don't initialize the NUMA
> > crng nodes. Otherwise users of /dev/urandom on NUMA systems before
> > the CRNG is fully initialized can get very bad quality randomness. Of
> > course everyone should move to getrandom(2) where this won't be an
> > issue, but there's a lot of legacy code out there. This related to
> > CVE-2018-1108.
> >
> > Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
> > Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly...")
> > Cc: [email protected] # 4.8+
> > Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>
> In 4.9 (and probably older branches too) this leads to a deadlock:
>
> crng_reseed(primary_crng, ...) takes primary_crng.lock
> -> numa_rcng_init()
> -> crng_initialize()
> -> get_random_bytes()
> -> extract_crng()
> -> _extract_crng(primary_crng, ...) tries to take primary_crng.lock
>
> I think this can be fixed by backporting commit 4a072c71f49b
> "random: silence compiler warnings and fix race" but I'm not sure
> whether that depends on other changes.
According to Tetsuo Handa, it's also causing problems in mainline :(
Ted, any thoughts as to what to do here?
thanks,
greg k-h
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 02:03:52AM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 10:54:23PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > > offset = blk - group_first_block;
> > > - if (!ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
> > > + if (offset < 0 || EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset) >= sb->s_blocksize ||
> > > + !ext4_test_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, offset), bh->b_data))
> >
> > Isn't sb->s_blocksize a count of bytes? If so, doesn't that mean that
> > we should be comparing with sb->s_blocksize * 8?
>
> Yes, nice catch, Ben! Can we temporarily drop this patch from the
> stable queue until I can get a fix in?
>
> In practice this shouldn't be a problem because of the default ext4
> layout with flex_bg. But we should definitely get this fixed before
> we let this flow into the stable kernel.
Now dropped from all queues. When you submit the fix, can you also tag
it for stable so I know to pick this one back up?
thanks,
greg k-h
Hi
On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 11:28:52PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> On Sun, 2018-04-22 at 15:53 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> >
> > commit 8ef35c866f8862df074a49a93b0309725812dea8 upstream.
> >
> > Until the primary_crng is fully initialized, don't initialize the NUMA
> > crng nodes. Otherwise users of /dev/urandom on NUMA systems before
> > the CRNG is fully initialized can get very bad quality randomness. Of
> > course everyone should move to getrandom(2) where this won't be an
> > issue, but there's a lot of legacy code out there. This related to
> > CVE-2018-1108.
> >
> > Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
> > Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly...")
> > Cc: [email protected] # 4.8+
> > Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>
> In 4.9 (and probably older branches too) this leads to a deadlock:
>
> crng_reseed(primary_crng, ...) takes primary_crng.lock
> -> numa_rcng_init()
> -> crng_initialize()
> -> get_random_bytes()
> -> extract_crng()
> -> _extract_crng(primary_crng, ...) tries to take primary_crng.lock
>
> I think this can be fixed by backporting commit 4a072c71f49b
> "random: silence compiler warnings and fix race" but I'm not sure
> whether that depends on other changes.
That is, the following test patch on top of the 4.9-stable review
queue seem to resolve the issue. The commit message of the original
commit 4a072c71f49b0a0e495ea13423bdb850da73c58c would though not match
anymore.
Regards,
Salvatore
On 22 April 2018 at 19:22, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
> There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Regression detected on arm64 devices Hikey and Juno.
Boot pass on arm64 dragonboard 410c board and qemu arm64.
I have started bisecting this problem.
Boot log:
------------
[ 5.521472] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(irqs_disabled_flags(flags))
[ 5.526923] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 5.526940] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1331 at /srv/oe/build/tmp-rpb-glibc/
work-shared/hikey/kernel-source/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2879
lockdep_trace_alloc+0xc0/0xc8
[ 5.526943] Modules linked in:
[ 5.526946] fuse
[ 5.526958] CPU: 0 PID: 1331 Comm: systemd-cgroups Not tainted 4.9.96-rc1 #1
[ 5.526960] Hardware name: HiKey Development Board (DT)
[ 5.526963] task: ffff800074241600 task.stack: ffff8000739e8000
[ 5.526968] PC is at lockdep_trace_alloc+0xc0/0xc8
[ 5.526973] LR is at lockdep_trace_alloc+0xc0/0xc8
Details log can be found at,
https://lkft.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/job/192779#L3095
and
4.9.96-rc2
https://lkft.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/job/193871
Best regards
Naresh Kamboju
Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > I think this can be fixed by backporting commit 4a072c71f49b
> > "random: silence compiler warnings and fix race" but I'm not sure
> > whether that depends on other changes.
>
> According to Tetsuo Handa, it's also causing problems in mainline :(
>
> Ted, any thoughts as to what to do here?
(Resending because Webmail post was rejected by both stable ML and linux-kernel ML.)
Subject: random: GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL allocation from IRQ context
Hello.
Commit 8ef35c866f8862df ("random: set up the NUMA crng instances after
the CRNG is fully initialized") is causing sleep inside atomic warning
due to GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL allocation from IRQ context. Though it
unlikely sleeps because there will be enough free memory at boot up...
Please don't backport that patch now.
[ 9.712722] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:421
[ 9.715231] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/2
[ 9.717396] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 9.718717] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #480
[ 9.720857] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
[ 9.724328] Call Trace:
[ 9.725176] <IRQ>
[ 9.725880] dump_stack+0xb1/0xfc
[ 9.727003] ___might_sleep+0x23e/0x270
[ 9.728285] __might_sleep+0x45/0x80
[ 9.729479] __kmalloc+0x284/0x3e0
[ 9.730642] ? crng_reseed+0x122/0x320
[ 9.731876] crng_reseed+0x122/0x320
[ 9.733078] credit_entropy_bits+0x2f6/0x370
[ 9.734503] ? add_timer_randomness+0xb8/0xd0
[ 9.735880] add_timer_randomness+0xb8/0xd0
[ 9.737201] add_disk_randomness+0x32/0x170
[ 9.738666] scsi_end_request+0x182/0x210
[ 9.740004] scsi_io_completion+0x2cd/0x620
[ 9.741448] scsi_finish_command+0xf3/0x170
[ 9.742844] scsi_softirq_done+0x12b/0x170
[ 9.744209] blk_done_softirq+0xb2/0xd0
[ 9.745501] __do_softirq+0xcf/0x49b
[ 9.746726] irq_exit+0xbc/0xd0
[ 9.747785] smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x17a/0x270
[ 9.749603] call_function_single_interrupt+0xf/0x20
[ 9.751240] </IRQ>
[ 9.751970] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10
[ 9.753467] RSP: 0018:ffff88011963fe78 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff04
[ 9.755922] RAX: ffff880119626380 RBX: ffff880119626380 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 9.758362] RDX: ffff880119626380 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880119626380
[ 9.760743] RBP: ffff88011963fe78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 9.763068] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88011a4a3693 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 9.765382] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880119626380
[ 9.767709] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 9.769044] default_idle+0x2c/0x1a0
[ 9.770333] arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x20
[ 9.771526] default_idle_call+0x1e/0x40
[ 9.772833] do_idle+0x196/0x2a0
[ 9.773923] ? complete+0x48/0x50
[ 9.775068] cpu_startup_entry+0x5f/0x62
[ 9.776392] start_secondary+0x1a3/0x1f0
[ 9.777697] secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0
[ 9.779101] random: crng init done
# ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux crng_reseed+0x122/0x320
crng_reseed+0x122/0x320:
kmalloc_array at include/linux/slab.h:631
626 {
627 if (size != 0 && n > SIZE_MAX / size)
628 return NULL;
629 if (__builtin_constant_p(n) && __builtin_constant_p(size))
630 return kmalloc(n * size, flags);
631 return __kmalloc(n * size, flags);
632 }
633
634 /**
635 * kcalloc - allocate memory for an array. The memory is set to zero.
636 * @n: number of elements.
(inlined by) kcalloc at include/linux/slab.h:642
637 * @size: element size.
638 * @flags: the type of memory to allocate (see kmalloc).
639 */
640 static inline void *kcalloc(size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
641 {
642 return kmalloc_array(n, size, flags | __GFP_ZERO);
643 }
644
645 /*
646 * kmalloc_track_caller is a special version of kmalloc that records the
647 * calling function of the routine calling it for slab leak tracking instead
(inlined by) numa_crng_init at drivers/char/random.c:798
793 {
794 int i;
795 struct crng_state *crng;
796 struct crng_state **pool;
797
798 pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
799 for_each_online_node(i) {
800 crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
801 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
802 spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
803 crng_initialize(crng);
(inlined by) crng_reseed at drivers/char/random.c:923
918 memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
919 crng->init_time = jiffies;
920 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
921 if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
922 invalidate_batched_entropy();
923 numa_crng_init();
924 crng_init = 2;
925 process_random_ready_list();
926 wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
927 pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
928 }
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 07:21:10PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > I think this can be fixed by backporting commit 4a072c71f49b
> > > "random: silence compiler warnings and fix race" but I'm not sure
> > > whether that depends on other changes.
> >
> > According to Tetsuo Handa, it's also causing problems in mainline :(
> >
> > Ted, any thoughts as to what to do here?
>
> (Resending because Webmail post was rejected by both stable ML and linux-kernel ML.)
>
> Subject: random: GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL allocation from IRQ context
>
> Hello.
>
> Commit 8ef35c866f8862df ("random: set up the NUMA crng instances after
> the CRNG is fully initialized") is causing sleep inside atomic warning
> due to GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL allocation from IRQ context. Though it
> unlikely sleeps because there will be enough free memory at boot up...
>
> Please don't backport that patch now.
Yes, please hold off on this in the stable queues as well. What we'll
probably need to do is call defer the processing to a workqueue in the
CONFIG_NUMA case.
- Ted
On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 03:52:29PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
> There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
For v4.9.95-96-g54c571b:
Build results:
total: 146 pass: 146 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 137 pass: 137 fail: 0
Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.
Guenter
On 22 April 2018 at 19:22, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
> There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Regression detected on arm64 devices Hikey and Juno.
Here is the list of bad commit patches to be reverted.
git bisect found first bad commit as "3"
but reverting 3 patch failed.
so i have to revert all four patches and boot test and the boot PASS on hikey.
1)
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG
2)
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying
3)
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
4)
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: fix crng_ready() test
Additional details,
------------------------
Boot failed log details log can be found at,
https://lkft.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/job/193871#L3120
[ 5.789114] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(irqs_disabled_flags(flags))
[ 5.794551] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 5.799216] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at /srv/oe/build/tmp-rpb-glibc/
work-shared/hikey/kernel-source/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2879
lockdep_trace_alloc+0xc0/0xc8
[ 5.813339] Modules linked in: fuse
[ 5.816850]
[ 5.818351] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.96-rc2 #1
[ 5.824630] Hardware name: HiKey Development Board (DT)
[ 5.829866] task: ffff000009104680 task.stack: ffff0000090f0000
[ 5.835803] PC is at lockdep_trace_alloc+0xc0/0xc8
[ 5.840605] LR is at lockdep_trace_alloc+0xc0/0xc8
[ 5.845405] pc : [<ffff000008133778>] lr : [<ffff000008133778>]
pstate: 600001c5
[ 5.852820] sp : ffff800077f02d60
[ 5.856141] x29: ffff800077f02d60 x28: 0000000000007ffe
[ 5.861472] x27: 0000000000004000 x26: ffff0000090fa508
[ 5.866804] x25: 00000000000001c0 x24: ffff0000091ed000
[ 5.872136] x23: ffff800005f03c80 x22: ffff00000867d864
[ 5.877467] x21: 0000000000000008 x20: 00000000024088c0
[ 5.882798] x19: 00000000000001c0 x18: 0000000000000010
[ 5.888129] x17: 0000000000000007 x16: 0000000000000001
[ 5.893460] x15: 0000000000000006 x14: ffff000089ebb12f
[ 5.898791] x13: ffff000009ebb13d x12: ffff000009cb9930
[ 5.904122] x11: ffff800077f02b40 x10: 000000000000017f
[ 5.909454] x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 x8 : 0000000000000002
[ 5.914785] x7 : ffff0000090f0000 x6 : ffff00000813de38
[ 5.920117] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001
[ 5.925449] x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : 000000000000000
Best regards
Naresh Kamboju
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:23:49PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On 22 April 2018 at 19:22, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
> > There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
>
> Regression detected on arm64 devices Hikey and Juno.
>
> Here is the list of bad commit patches to be reverted.
> git bisect found first bad commit as "3"
> but reverting 3 patch failed.
> so i have to revert all four patches and boot test and the boot PASS on hikey.
>
> 1)
> Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG
> 2)
> Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying
> 3)
> Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
This is the one I need to revert anyway.
Let me see if I can just drop that one and do a -rc3. Give me a few
hours...
greg k-h
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 06:57:50PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:23:49PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > On 22 April 2018 at 19:22, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
> > > There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > let me know.
> > >
> > > Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
> > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > >
> > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
> > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > >
> > > thanks,
> > >
> > > greg k-h
> >
> > Regression detected on arm64 devices Hikey and Juno.
> >
> > Here is the list of bad commit patches to be reverted.
> > git bisect found first bad commit as "3"
> > but reverting 3 patch failed.
> > so i have to revert all four patches and boot test and the boot PASS on hikey.
> >
> > 1)
> > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG
> > 2)
> > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying
> > 3)
> > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
>
> This is the one I need to revert anyway.
>
> Let me see if I can just drop that one and do a -rc3. Give me a few
> hours...
Ok, I've dropped just patch 3 from 4.16.y, 4.14.y and 4.9.y and pushed
out -rc3 versions of all of these. Let me know if that works or not for
you.
thanks,
greg k-h
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 11:56:37AM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 07:21:10PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > > I think this can be fixed by backporting commit 4a072c71f49b
> > > > "random: silence compiler warnings and fix race" but I'm not sure
> > > > whether that depends on other changes.
> > >
> > > According to Tetsuo Handa, it's also causing problems in mainline :(
> > >
> > > Ted, any thoughts as to what to do here?
> >
> > (Resending because Webmail post was rejected by both stable ML and linux-kernel ML.)
> >
> > Subject: random: GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL allocation from IRQ context
> >
> > Hello.
> >
> > Commit 8ef35c866f8862df ("random: set up the NUMA crng instances after
> > the CRNG is fully initialized") is causing sleep inside atomic warning
> > due to GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL allocation from IRQ context. Though it
> > unlikely sleeps because there will be enough free memory at boot up...
> >
> > Please don't backport that patch now.
>
> Yes, please hold off on this in the stable queues as well. What we'll
> probably need to do is call defer the processing to a workqueue in the
> CONFIG_NUMA case.
I've dropped this patch from 4.16.y, 4.14.y, and 4.9.y for now.
thanks,
greg k-h
On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 03:52:29PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
> There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
And there is a -rc3 for this tree as well now out:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc3.gz
thanks,
greg k-h
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 09:21:48AM +0200, Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote:
> Hi
>
> On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 11:28:52PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > On Sun, 2018-04-22 at 15:53 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> > >
> > > ------------------
> > >
> > > From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > commit 8ef35c866f8862df074a49a93b0309725812dea8 upstream.
> > >
> > > Until the primary_crng is fully initialized, don't initialize the NUMA
> > > crng nodes. Otherwise users of /dev/urandom on NUMA systems before
> > > the CRNG is fully initialized can get very bad quality randomness. Of
> > > course everyone should move to getrandom(2) where this won't be an
> > > issue, but there's a lot of legacy code out there. This related to
> > > CVE-2018-1108.
> > >
> > > Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
> > > Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly...")
> > > Cc: [email protected] # 4.8+
> > > Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
> >
> > In 4.9 (and probably older branches too) this leads to a deadlock:
> >
> > crng_reseed(primary_crng, ...) takes primary_crng.lock
> > -> numa_rcng_init()
> > -> crng_initialize()
> > -> get_random_bytes()
> > -> extract_crng()
> > -> _extract_crng(primary_crng, ...) tries to take primary_crng.lock
> >
> > I think this can be fixed by backporting commit 4a072c71f49b
> > "random: silence compiler warnings and fix race" but I'm not sure
> > whether that depends on other changes.
>
> That is, the following test patch on top of the 4.9-stable review
> queue seem to resolve the issue. The commit message of the original
> commit 4a072c71f49b0a0e495ea13423bdb850da73c58c would though not match
> anymore.
>
> Regards,
> Salvatore
> From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
> Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 00:45:26 +0200
> Subject: random: silence compiler warnings and fix race
> Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/4a072c71f49b0a0e495ea13423bdb850da73c58c
>
> Odd versions of gcc for the sh4 architecture will actually warn about
> flags being used while uninitialized, so we set them to zero. Non crazy
> gccs will optimize that out again, so it doesn't make a difference.
>
> Next, over aggressive gccs could inline the expression that defines
> use_lock, which could then introduce a race resulting in a lock
> imbalance. By using READ_ONCE, we prevent that fate. Finally, we make
> that assignment const, so that gcc can still optimize a nice amount.
>
> Finally, we fix a potential deadlock between primary_crng.lock and
> batched_entropy_reset_lock, where they could be called in opposite
> order. Moving the call to invalidate_batched_entropy to outside the lock
> rectifies this issue.
>
> Fixes: b169c13de473a85b3c859bb36216a4cb5f00a54a
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> [Salvatore Bonaccorso: backport to 4.9: context changes, only apply change to
> address potential deadlock]
> ---
> drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++------
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> Index: linux-stable/drivers/char/random.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-stable.orig/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ linux-stable/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -810,12 +810,12 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp
> p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
> cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--;
> }
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
> if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
> crng_init = 1;
> wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
> pr_notice("random: fast init done\n");
> }
> - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
> return 1;
> }
>
> @@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
> }
> memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
> crng->init_time = jiffies;
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
> if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
> numa_crng_init();
> crng_init = 2;
> @@ -880,7 +881,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
> wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
> pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
> }
> - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
> }
>
> static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng(void)
As this depends on other patches, that are not in 4.9, I don't think
this will solve the problem correctly. I've dropped the offending patch
for now, hopefully that should be good for the moment.
thanks,
greg k-h
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 08:01:37PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 06:57:50PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:23:49PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > > On 22 April 2018 at 19:22, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
> > > > There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > > let me know.
> > > >
> > > > Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
> > > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > > >
> > > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > > > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
> > > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > > >
> > > > thanks,
> > > >
> > > > greg k-h
> > >
> > > Regression detected on arm64 devices Hikey and Juno.
> > >
> > > Here is the list of bad commit patches to be reverted.
> > > git bisect found first bad commit as "3"
> > > but reverting 3 patch failed.
> > > so i have to revert all four patches and boot test and the boot PASS on hikey.
> > >
> > > 1)
> > > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > > random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG
> > > 2)
> > > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > > random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying
> > > 3)
> > > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > > random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
> >
> > This is the one I need to revert anyway.
> >
> > Let me see if I can just drop that one and do a -rc3. Give me a few
> > hours...
>
> Ok, I've dropped just patch 3 from 4.16.y, 4.14.y and 4.9.y and pushed
> out -rc3 versions of all of these. Let me know if that works or not for
> you.
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.
I made a few comments inline regarding the reported failures. Also, as
this report is pushing 200 lines now with all of our tests and
environments (about 8*22 test runs), I'm planning on making some changes
in the next few weeks to make it more concise and useful. Any
suggestions or feature requests are most welcome.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.9.96-rc3
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: 8617c15e22fdfa0451d34bc07fb3f0fc85fbb310
git describe: v4.9.94-164-g8617c15e22fd
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.94-164-g8617c15e22fd
No regressions (compared to build v4.9.94-165-g54c571bb567c)
Boards, architectures and test suites:
-------------------------------------
dragonboard-410c
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 27, pass: 35, fail: 4
^ kselftest failures caused by kselftest upgrade to 4.16 (in all cases
in this report)
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 1, pass: 19, fail: 2
^ this one is an intermittent failure specific to db410c.
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 14,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 135, pass: 1015,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,
hi6220-hikey - arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 24, pass: 38, fail: 4
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 1, pass: 21,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 4, pass: 10,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 136, pass: 1014,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,
juno-r2 - arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 24, pass: 38, fail: 4
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 4, pass: 10,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 135, pass: 1015,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,
qemu_arm
* boot - pass: 10, fail: 10
^ infrastructure issues
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 5, pass: 58,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,
qemu_arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 27, pass: 37, fail: 4
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,
qemu_x86_64
* boot - pass: 22,
* kselftest - skip: 13, pass: 4, fail: 2
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native - skip: 27, pass: 49, fail: 4
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none - skip: 27, pass: 49, fail: 4
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 1, pass: 13,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 147, pass: 1003,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,
x15 - arm
* boot - pass: 19, fail: 1
* kselftest - skip: 24, pass: 37, fail: 4
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 87,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 5, pass: 58,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 2, pass: 20,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 1, pass: 13,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 75, pass: 1075,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,
x86_64
* boot - pass: 22,
* kselftest - skip: 25, pass: 51, fail: 4
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native - skip: 25, pass: 50, fail: 5
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none - skip: 25, pass: 51, fail: 4
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 5, pass: 58,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 5, pass: 9,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 116, pass: 1034,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,
--
Linaro QA (BETA)
https://qa-reports.linaro.org
On 04/23/2018 12:04 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 03:52:29PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
>> There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
>> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
>> let me know.
>>
>> Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
>> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>>
>> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
>> or in the git tree and branch at:
>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
>> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> And there is a -rc3 for this tree as well now out:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc3.gz
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
rc3 looks good. Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 05:25:53PM -0500, Dan Rue wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 08:01:37PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 06:57:50PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:23:49PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > > > On 22 April 2018 at 19:22, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > > > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.96 release.
> > > > > There are 95 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > > > let me know.
> > > > >
> > > > > Responses should be made by Tue Apr 24 13:51:53 UTC 2018.
> > > > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > > > >
> > > > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > > > > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.96-rc1.gz
> > > > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > > > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > > > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > > > >
> > > > > thanks,
> > > > >
> > > > > greg k-h
> > > >
> > > > Regression detected on arm64 devices Hikey and Juno.
> > > >
> > > > Here is the list of bad commit patches to be reverted.
> > > > git bisect found first bad commit as "3"
> > > > but reverting 3 patch failed.
> > > > so i have to revert all four patches and boot test and the boot PASS on hikey.
> > > >
> > > > 1)
> > > > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > > > random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG
> > > > 2)
> > > > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > > > random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying
> > > > 3)
> > > > Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
> > > > random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
> > >
> > > This is the one I need to revert anyway.
> > >
> > > Let me see if I can just drop that one and do a -rc3. Give me a few
> > > hours...
> >
> > Ok, I've dropped just patch 3 from 4.16.y, 4.14.y and 4.9.y and pushed
> > out -rc3 versions of all of these. Let me know if that works or not for
> > you.
>
> Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.
Great!
> I made a few comments inline regarding the reported failures. Also, as
> this report is pushing 200 lines now with all of our tests and
> environments (about 8*22 test runs), I'm planning on making some changes
> in the next few weeks to make it more concise and useful. Any
> suggestions or feature requests are most welcome.
How about only reporting problems? Having tests "pass" is the norm and
should always happen, right? That would make the reports smaller.
thanks,
greg k-h
On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 09:26:35AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 05:25:53PM -0500, Dan Rue wrote:
> > I made a few comments inline regarding the reported failures. Also, as
> > this report is pushing 200 lines now with all of our tests and
> > environments (about 8*22 test runs), I'm planning on making some changes
> > in the next few weeks to make it more concise and useful. Any
> > suggestions or feature requests are most welcome.
>
> How about only reporting problems? Having tests "pass" is the norm and
> should always happen, right? That would make the reports smaller.
I agree, though I would like to provide a bit of context so that people
new to the process have some idea about testing breadth and depth - but
it should be a few lines, rather than the hundreds that we have now.
Dan
On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 12:23:11PM -0500, Dan Rue wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 09:26:35AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > How about only reporting problems? Having tests "pass" is the norm and
> > should always happen, right? That would make the reports smaller.
> I agree, though I would like to provide a bit of context so that people
> new to the process have some idea about testing breadth and depth - but
> it should be a few lines, rather than the hundreds that we have now.
If you link to the web site people can in theory look there (obviously
there's some work going on with the website to make it more readily
digestible) for more context.
On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 12:23:11PM -0500, Dan Rue wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 09:26:35AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 05:25:53PM -0500, Dan Rue wrote:
> > > I made a few comments inline regarding the reported failures. Also, as
> > > this report is pushing 200 lines now with all of our tests and
> > > environments (about 8*22 test runs), I'm planning on making some changes
> > > in the next few weeks to make it more concise and useful. Any
> > > suggestions or feature requests are most welcome.
> >
> > How about only reporting problems? Having tests "pass" is the norm and
> > should always happen, right? That would make the reports smaller.
>
> I agree, though I would like to provide a bit of context so that people
> new to the process have some idea about testing breadth and depth - but
I did that initially, but found that it is only confusing. Sure, there
should be a means to look up the actual tests, but for the notification e-mail
only pass/fail is relevant.
I found that even "skipped" is confusing, because people started asking why
tests are being skipped.
Guenter
* Theodore Y. Ts'o <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 07:21:10PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > > I think this can be fixed by backporting commit 4a072c71f49b
> > > > "random: silence compiler warnings and fix race" but I'm not sure
> > > > whether that depends on other changes.
> > >
> > > According to Tetsuo Handa, it's also causing problems in mainline :(
> > >
> > > Ted, any thoughts as to what to do here?
> >
> > (Resending because Webmail post was rejected by both stable ML and linux-kernel ML.)
> >
> > Subject: random: GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL allocation from IRQ context
> >
> > Hello.
> >
> > Commit 8ef35c866f8862df ("random: set up the NUMA crng instances after
> > the CRNG is fully initialized") is causing sleep inside atomic warning
> > due to GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL allocation from IRQ context. Though it
> > unlikely sleeps because there will be enough free memory at boot up...
> >
> > Please don't backport that patch now.
>
> Yes, please hold off on this in the stable queues as well. What we'll
> probably need to do is call defer the processing to a workqueue in the
> CONFIG_NUMA case.
What's the resolution here? It's still triggering upstream as well, as of
69bfd470f462:
[ 8.881634] dracut: Switching root
[ 8.994899] ================================
[ 8.999338] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[ 9.003760] 4.17.0-rc2-00151-g43ae031-dirty #1 Not tainted
[ 9.009389] --------------------------------
[ 9.013803] inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage.
[ 9.019956] swapper/2/0 [HC1[1]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
[ 9.025244] (ptrval) (fs_reclaim){?.+.}, at: fs_reclaim_acquire.part.87+0x5/0x30
[ 9.033598] {HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
[ 9.038628] fs_reclaim_acquire.part.87+0x29/0x30
[ 9.043568] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c/0x240
[ 9.048248] alloc_workqueue_attrs+0x29/0x60
[ 9.052755] workqueue_init+0x4a/0x2e4
[ 9.056741] kernel_init_freeable+0x108/0x286
[ 9.061335] kernel_init+0xa/0x110
[ 9.064974] ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
....
Is there a fix or a revert that can be tested?
Thanks,
Ingo
Ingo Molnar wrote:
> What\'s the resolution here? It\'s still triggering upstream as well, as of
> 69bfd470f462:
>
> [ 8.881634] dracut: Switching root
>
> [ 8.994899] ================================
> [ 8.999338] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
> [ 9.003760] 4.17.0-rc2-00151-g43ae031-dirty #1 Not tainted
> [ 9.009389] --------------------------------
> [ 9.013803] inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage.
> [ 9.019956] swapper/2/0 [HC1[1]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
> [ 9.025244] (ptrval) (fs_reclaim){?.+.}, at: fs_reclaim_acquire.part.87+0x5/0x30
> [ 9.033598] {HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
> [ 9.038628] fs_reclaim_acquire.part.87+0x29/0x30
> [ 9.043568] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c/0x240
> [ 9.048248] alloc_workqueue_attrs+0x29/0x60
> [ 9.052755] workqueue_init+0x4a/0x2e4
> [ 9.056741] kernel_init_freeable+0x108/0x286
> [ 9.061335] kernel_init+0xa/0x110
> [ 9.064974] ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
>
> ....
>
> Is there a fix or a revert that can be tested?
Yes, you can test a fix at http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] .
I thought that that fix still causes a problem. But it seems that I made a quick judgment.
I can no longer reproduce the problem with that fix.
Oh, pull request was already sent. Should be merged shortly.
https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152472466201090&w=2
On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 03:53:58PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Oh, pull request was already sent. Should be merged shortly.
>
> https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152472466201090&w=2
More testing, either before or after merging, would be greatly
appreciated. One of the challenges is that there are a lot of systems
out there with different amounts of boot entropy available. So this
pull request was needed to help deal with issues on crazy big machines
(CONFIG_NUMA) and crazy small laptops (old/small chromebooks
repurposed to support Ubuntu and small ARM systems) --- neither of
which I had access to when I was putting together the fixes to the
random driver.
So any feedback before 4.17 gets released would be really helpful!
Thanks!!
- Ted
* Theodore Y. Ts'o <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 03:53:58PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > Oh, pull request was already sent. Should be merged shortly.
> >
> > https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152472466201090&w=2
>
> More testing, either before or after merging, would be greatly
> appreciated. One of the challenges is that there are a lot of systems
> out there with different amounts of boot entropy available. So this
> pull request was needed to help deal with issues on crazy big machines
> (CONFIG_NUMA) and crazy small laptops (old/small chromebooks
> repurposed to support Ubuntu and small ARM systems) --- neither of
> which I had access to when I was putting together the fixes to the
> random driver.
>
> So any feedback before 4.17 gets released would be really helpful!
>
> Thanks!!
I tested this upstream commit:
665fa0000aed: Merge tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
... and the bug is fixed here too, my test machine is back to 'perfect'.
Thanks!
Ingo