Hi Al,
Here are a set of patches to create a filesystem context prior to setting
up a new mount, populating it with the parsed options/binary data, creating
the superblock and then effecting the mount. This is also used for remount
since much of the parsing stuff is common in many filesystems.
This allows namespaces and other information to be conveyed through the
mount procedure.
This also allows Miklós Szeredi's idea of doing:
fd = fsopen("nfs");
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "option", "val", 0);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0);
mfd = fsmount(fd, MS_NODEV);
move_mount(mfd, "", AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
that he presented at LSF-2017 to be implemented (see the relevant patches
in the series).
I didn't use netlink as that would make the core kernel depend on
CONFIG_NET and CONFIG_NETLINK and would introduce network namespacing
issues.
I've implemented filesystem context handling for procfs, nfs, mqueue,
cpuset, kernfs, sysfs, cgroup and afs filesystems.
Unconverted filesystems are handled by a legacy filesystem wrapper.
====================
WHY DO WE WANT THIS?
====================
Firstly, there's a bunch of problems with the mount(2) syscall:
(1) It's actually six or seven different interfaces rolled into one and
weird combinations of flags make it do different things beyond the
original specification of the syscall.
(2) It produces a particularly large and diverse set of errors, which have
to be mapped back to a small error code. Yes, there's dmesg - if you
have it configured - but you can't necessarily see that if you're
doing a mount inside of a container.
(3) It copies a PAGE_SIZE block of data for each of the type, device name
and options.
(4) The size of the buffers is PAGE_SIZE - and this is arch dependent.
(5) You can't mount into another mount namespace. I could, for example,
build a container without having to be in that container's namespace
if I can do it from outside.
(6) It's not really geared for the specification of multiple sources, but
some filesystems really want that - overlayfs, for example.
and some problems in the internal kernel api:
(1) There's no defined way to supply namespace configuration for the
superblock - so, for instance, I can't say that I want to create a
superblock in a particular network namespace (on automount, say).
NFS hacks around this by creating multiple shadow file_system_types
with different ->mount() ops.
(2) When calling mount internally, unless you have NFS-like hacks, you
have to generate or otherwise provide text config data which then gets
parsed, when some of the time you could bypass the parsing stage
entirely.
(3) The amount of data in the data buffer is not known, but the data
buffer might be on a kernel stack somewhere, leading to the
possibility of tripping the stack underrun guard.
and other issues too:
(1) Superblock remount in some filesystems applies options on an as-parsed
basis, so if there's a parse failure, a partial alteration with no
rollback is effected.
(2) Under some circumstances, the mount data may get copied multiple times
so that it can have multiple parsers applied to it or because it has
to be parsed multiple times - for instance, once to get the
preliminary info required to access the on-disk superblock and then
again to update the superblock record in the kernel.
I want to be able to add support for a bunch of things:
(1) UID, GID and Project ID mapping/translation. I want to be able to
install a translation table of some sort on the superblock to
translate source identifiers (which may be foreign numeric UIDs/GIDs,
text names, GUIDs) into system identifiers. This needs to be done
before the superblock is published[*].
Note that this may, for example, involve using the context and the
superblock held therein to issue an RPC to a server to look up
translations.
[*] By "published" I mean made available through mount so that other
userspace processes can access it by path.
Maybe specifying a translation range element with something like:
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_translate_uid, "<srcuid> <nsuid> <count>", 0, 0);
The translation information also needs to propagate over an automount
in some circumstances.
(2) Namespace configuration. I want to be able to tell the superblock
creation process what namespaces should be applied when it created (in
particular the userns and netns) for containerisation purposes, e.g.:
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_NAMESPACE, "user", 0, userns_fd);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_NAMESPACE, "net", 0, netns_fd);
(3) Namespace propagation. I want to have a properly defined mechanism
for propagating namespace configuration over automounts within the
kernel. This will be particularly useful for network filesystems.
(4) Pre-mount attribute query. A chunk of the changes is actually the
fsinfo() syscall to query attributes of the filesystem beyond what's
available in statx() and statfs(). This will allow a created
superblock to be queried before it is published.
(5) Upcall for configuration. I would like to be able to query
configuration that's stored in userspace when an automount is made.
For instance, to look up network parameters for NFS or to find a cache
selector for fscache.
The internal fs_context could be passed to the upcall process or the
kernel could read a config file directly if named appropriately for the
superblock, perhaps:
[/etc/fscontext.d/afs/example.com/cell.cfg]
realm = EXAMPLE.COM
translation = uid,3000,4000,100
fscache = tag=fred
(6) Event notifications. I want to be able to install a watch on a
superblock before it is published to catch things like quota events
and EIO.
(7) Large and binary parameters. There might be at some point a need to
pass large/binary objects like Microsoft PACs around. If I understand
PACs correctly, you can obtain these from the Kerberos server and then
pass them to the file server when you connect.
Having it possible to pass large or binary objects as individual
fsconfig calls make parsing these trivial. OTOH, some or all of this
can potentially be handled with the use of the keyrings interface - as
the afs filesystem does for passing kerberos tokens around; it's just
that that seems overkill for a parameter you may only need once.
===================
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES
===================
ver #11:
(*) Fixed AppArmor.
(*) Capitalised all the UAPI constants.
(*) Explicitly numbered the FSCONFIG_* UAPI constants.
(*) Removed all the places ANON_INODES is selected.
(*) Fixed a bug whereby the context gets freed twice (which broke mounts of
procfs).
(*) Split fsinfo() off into its own patch series.
ver #10:
(*) Renamed "option" to "parameter" in a number of places.
(*) Replaced the use of write() to drive the configuration with an fsconfig()
syscall. This also allows at-style paths and fds to be presented as typed
object.
(*) Routed the key=value parameter concept all the way through from the
fsconfig() system call to the LSM and filesystem.
(*) Added a parameter-description concept and helper functions to help
interpret a parameter and possibly convert the value.
(*) Made it possible to query the parameter description using the fsinfo()
syscall. Added a test-fs-query sample to dump the parameters used by a
filesystem.
ver #9:
(*) Dropped the fd cookie stuff and the FMODE_*/O_* split stuff.
(*) Al added an open_tree() system call to allow a mount tree to be picked
referenced or cloned into an O_PATH-style fd. This can then be used
with sys_move_mount(). Dropped the O_CLONE_MOUNT and O_NON_RECURSIVE
open() flags.
(*) Brought error logging back in, though only in the fs_context and not
in the task_struct.
(*) Separated MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND handling from MS_REMOUNT handling.
(*) Used anon_inodes for the fd returned by fsopen() and fspick(). This
requires making it unconditional.
(*) Fixed lots of bugs. Especial thanks to Al and Eric Biggers for
finding them and providing patches.
(*) Wrote manual pages, which I'll post separately.
ver #8:
(*) Changed the way fsmount() mounts into the namespace according to some
of Al's ideas.
(*) Put better typing on the fd cookie obtained from __fdget() & co..
(*) Stored the fd cookie in struct nameidata rather than the dfd number.
(*) Changed sys_fsmount() to return an O_PATH-style fd rather than
actually mounting into the mount namespace.
(*) Separated internal FMODE_* handling from O_* handling to free up
certain O_* flag numbers.
(*) Added two new open flags (O_CLONE_MOUNT and O_NON_RECURSIVE) for use
with open(O_PATH) to copy a mount or mount-subtree to an O_PATH fd.
(*) Added a new syscall, sys_move_mount(), to move a mount from an
dfd+path source to a dfd+path destination.
(*) Added a file->f_mode flag (FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT) that indicates that the
vfsmount attached to file->f_path needs 'unmounting' if set.
(*) Made sys_move_mount() clear FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT if successful.
[!] This doesn't work quite right.
(*) Added a new syscall, fsinfo(), to query information about a
filesystem. The idea being that this will, in future, work with the
fd from fsopen() too and permit querying of the parameters and
metadata before fsmount() is called.
ver #7:
(*) Undo an incorrect MS_* -> SB_* conversion.
(*) Pass the mount data buffer size to all the mount-related functions that
take the data pointer. This fixes a problem where someone (say SELinux)
tries to copy the mount data, assuming it to be a page in size, and
overruns the buffer - thereby incurring an oops by hitting a guard page.
(*) Made the AFS filesystem use them as an example. This is a much easier to
deal with than with NFS or Ext4 as there are very few mount options.
ver #6:
(*) Dropped the supplementary error string facility for the moment.
(*) Dropped the NFS patches for the moment.
(*) Dropped the reserved file descriptor argument from fsopen() and
replaced it with three reserved pointers that must be NULL.
ver #5:
(*) Renamed sb_config -> fs_context and adjusted variable names.
(*) Differentiated the flags in sb->s_flags (now named SB_*) from those
passed to mount(2) (named MS_*).
(*) Renamed __vfs_new_fs_context() to vfs_new_fs_context() and made the
caller always provide a struct file_system_type pointer and the
parameters required.
(*) Got rid of vfs_submount_fc() in favour of passing
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT to vfs_new_fs_context(). The purpose is now
used more.
(*) Call ->validate() on the remount path.
(*) Got rid of the inode locking in sys_fsmount().
(*) Call security_sb_mountpoint() in the mount(2) path.
ver #4:
(*) Split the sb_config patch up somewhat.
(*) Made the supplementary error string facility something attached to the
task_struct rather than the sb_config so that error messages can be
obtained from NFS doing a mount-root-and-pathwalk inside the
nfs_get_tree() operation.
Further, made this managed and read by prctl rather than through the
mount fd so that it's more generally available.
ver #3:
(*) Rebased on 4.12-rc1.
(*) Split the NFS patch up somewhat.
ver #2:
(*) Removed the ->fill_super() from sb_config_operations and passed it in
directly to functions that want to call it. NFS now calls
nfs_fill_super() directly rather than jumping through a pointer to it
since there's only the one option at the moment.
(*) Removed ->mnt_ns and ->sb from sb_config and moved ->pid_ns into
proc_sb_config.
(*) Renamed create_super -> get_tree.
(*) Renamed struct mount_context to struct sb_config and amended various
variable names.
(*) sys_fsmount() acquired AT_* flags and MS_* flags (for MNT_* flags)
arguments.
ver #1:
(*) Split the sb_config stuff out into its own header.
(*) Support non-context aware filesystems through a special set of
sb_config operations.
(*) Stored the created superblock and root dentry into the sb_config after
creation rather than directly into a vfsmount. This allows some
arguments to be removed to various NFS functions.
(*) Added an explicit superblock-creation step. This allows a created
superblock to then be mounted multiple times.
(*) Added a flag to say that the sb_config is degraded and cannot have
another go at having a superblock creation whilst getting rid of the
one that says it's already mounted.
Possible further developments:
(*) Implement sb reconfiguration (for now it returns ENOANO).
(*) Implement mount context support in more filesystems, ext4 being next
on my list.
(*) Move the walk-from-root stuff that nfs has to generic code so that you
can do something akin to:
mount /dev/sda1:/foo/bar /mnt
See nfs_follow_remote_path() and mount_subtree(). This is slightly
tricky in NFS as we have to prevent referral loops.
(*) Work out how to get at the error message incurred by submounts
encountered during nfs_follow_remote_path().
Should the error message be moved to task_struct and made more
general, perhaps retrieved with a prctl() function?
(*) Clean up/consolidate the security functions. Possibly add a
validation hook to be called at the same time as the mount context
validate op.
The patches can be found here also:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git
tagged as:
mount-api-20180801
on branch:
mount-api
David
---
Al Viro (2):
vfs: syscall: Add open_tree(2) to reference or clone a mount
teach move_mount(2) to work with OPEN_TREE_CLONE
David Howells (31):
vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around
vfs: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled
vfs: Introduce the basic header for the new mount API's filesystem context
vfs: Introduce logging functions
vfs: Add configuration parser helpers
vfs: Add LSM hooks for the new mount API
selinux: Implement the new mount API LSM hooks
smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks
apparmor: Implement security hooks for the new mount API
tomoyo: Implement security hooks for the new mount API
vfs: Separate changing mount flags full remount
vfs: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context
vfs: Remove unused code after filesystem context changes
procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c
proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
cpuset: Use fs_context
kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
Make anon_inodes unconditional
vfs: syscall: Add fsopen() to prepare for superblock creation
vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
vfs: syscall: Add fsconfig() for configuring and managing a context
vfs: syscall: Add fsmount() to create a mount for a superblock
vfs: syscall: Add fspick() to select a superblock for reconfiguration
afs: Add fs_context support
afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
vfs: Add a sample program for the new mount API
Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt | 706 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arc/kernel/setup.c | 1
arch/arm/kernel/atags_parse.c | 1
arch/arm/kvm/Kconfig | 1
arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 1
arch/mips/kvm/Kconfig | 1
arch/powerpc/kvm/Kconfig | 1
arch/s390/kvm/Kconfig | 1
arch/sh/kernel/setup.c | 1
arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c | 1
arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c | 1
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.h | 15 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c | 184 ++++--
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 1
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 1
drivers/base/Kconfig | 1
drivers/base/devtmpfs.c | 1
drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1
drivers/dma-buf/Kconfig | 1
drivers/gpio/Kconfig | 1
drivers/iio/Kconfig | 1
drivers/infiniband/Kconfig | 1
drivers/vfio/Kconfig | 1
fs/Kconfig | 7
fs/Makefile | 5
fs/afs/internal.h | 9
fs/afs/mntpt.c | 148 +++--
fs/afs/super.c | 470 +++++++++-------
fs/afs/volume.c | 4
fs/f2fs/super.c | 2
fs/file_table.c | 9
fs/filesystems.c | 4
fs/fs_context.c | 779 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/fs_parser.c | 476 ++++++++++++++++
fs/fsopen.c | 491 +++++++++++++++++
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 392 ++++++++------
fs/internal.h | 13
fs/kernfs/mount.c | 87 +--
fs/libfs.c | 19 +
fs/namei.c | 4
fs/namespace.c | 867 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
fs/notify/fanotify/Kconfig | 1
fs/notify/inotify/Kconfig | 1
fs/pnode.c | 1
fs/proc/inode.c | 51 --
fs/proc/internal.h | 6
fs/proc/root.c | 245 ++++++--
fs/super.c | 368 ++++++++++---
fs/sysfs/mount.c | 67 ++
include/linux/cgroup.h | 3
include/linux/fs.h | 21 +
include/linux/fs_context.h | 208 +++++++
include/linux/fs_parser.h | 116 ++++
include/linux/kernfs.h | 39 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 70 ++
include/linux/module.h | 6
include/linux/mount.h | 5
include/linux/security.h | 61 ++
include/linux/syscalls.h | 9
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 2
include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 82 +--
include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 75 +++
init/Kconfig | 10
init/do_mounts.c | 1
init/do_mounts_initrd.c | 1
ipc/mqueue.c | 121 +++-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h | 50 +-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 347 +++++++-----
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 256 ++++++---
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 68 ++
samples/Kconfig | 6
samples/Makefile | 2
samples/mount_api/Makefile | 7
samples/mount_api/test-fsmount.c | 118 ++++
security/apparmor/include/mount.h | 11
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 108 ++++
security/apparmor/mount.c | 47 ++
security/security.c | 51 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 311 ++++++++++-
security/smack/smack.h | 11
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 370 ++++++++++++-
security/tomoyo/common.h | 3
security/tomoyo/mount.c | 46 ++
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 15 +
87 files changed, 6637 insertions(+), 1484 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt
create mode 100644 fs/fs_context.c
create mode 100644 fs/fs_parser.c
create mode 100644 fs/fsopen.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/fs_context.h
create mode 100644 include/linux/fs_parser.h
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/mount.h
create mode 100644 samples/mount_api/Makefile
create mode 100644 samples/mount_api/test-fsmount.c
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
open_tree(dfd, pathname, flags)
Returns an O_PATH-opened file descriptor or an error.
dfd and pathname specify the location to open, in usual
fashion (see e.g. fstatat(2)). flags should be an OR of
some of the following:
* AT_PATH_EMPTY, AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW -
same meanings as usual
* OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC - make the resulting descriptor
close-on-exec
* OPEN_TREE_CLONE or OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE -
instead of opening the location in question, create a detached
mount tree matching the subtree rooted at location specified by
dfd/pathname. With AT_RECURSIVE the entire subtree is cloned,
without it - only the part within in the mount containing the
location in question. In other words, the same as mount --rbind
or mount --bind would've taken. The detached tree will be
dissolved on the final close of obtained file. Creation of such
detached trees requires the same capabilities as doing mount --bind.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1
fs/file_table.c | 9 +-
fs/internal.h | 1
fs/namespace.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
include/linux/fs.h | 3 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 2
include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 10 ++
9 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/mount.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 3cf7b533b3d1..ea1b413afd47 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -398,3 +398,4 @@
384 i386 arch_prctl sys_arch_prctl __ia32_compat_sys_arch_prctl
385 i386 io_pgetevents sys_io_pgetevents __ia32_compat_sys_io_pgetevents
386 i386 rseq sys_rseq __ia32_sys_rseq
+387 i386 open_tree sys_open_tree __ia32_sys_open_tree
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index f0b1709a5ffb..0545bed581dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@
332 common statx __x64_sys_statx
333 common io_pgetevents __x64_sys_io_pgetevents
334 common rseq __x64_sys_rseq
+335 common open_tree __x64_sys_open_tree
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 7ec0b3e5f05d..7480271a0d21 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
+ fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
might_sleep();
@@ -209,14 +210,14 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
security_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL &&
- !(file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
+ !(mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
}
fops_put(file->f_op);
put_pid(file->f_owner.pid);
- if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+ if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_dec(inode);
- if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITER) {
+ if (mode & FMODE_WRITER) {
put_write_access(inode);
__mnt_drop_write(mnt);
}
@@ -224,6 +225,8 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
file->f_path.mnt = NULL;
file->f_inode = NULL;
file_free(file);
+ if (unlikely(mode & FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT))
+ dissolve_on_fput(mnt);
dput(dentry);
mntput(mnt);
}
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index 56533b08532e..383ee4724f77 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ extern void __mnt_drop_write(struct vfsmount *);
extern void __mnt_drop_write_file(struct file *);
extern void mnt_drop_write_file_path(struct file *);
+extern void dissolve_on_fput(struct vfsmount *);
/*
* fs_struct.c
*/
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 03cc3b5bcf00..a4a01ecbcacd 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -20,12 +20,14 @@
#include <linux/init.h> /* init_rootfs */
#include <linux/fs_struct.h> /* get_fs_root et.al. */
#include <linux/fsnotify.h> /* fsnotify_vfsmount_delete */
+#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/task_work.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "pnode.h"
#include "internal.h"
@@ -1840,6 +1842,16 @@ struct vfsmount *collect_mounts(const struct path *path)
return &tree->mnt;
}
+void dissolve_on_fput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+ namespace_lock();
+ lock_mount_hash();
+ mntget(mnt);
+ umount_tree(real_mount(mnt), UMOUNT_SYNC);
+ unlock_mount_hash();
+ namespace_unlock();
+}
+
void drop_collected_mounts(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
namespace_lock();
@@ -2199,6 +2211,30 @@ static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
return false;
}
+static struct mount *__do_loopback(struct path *old_path, int recurse)
+{
+ struct mount *mnt = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL), *old = real_mount(old_path->mnt);
+
+ if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(old))
+ return mnt;
+
+ if (!check_mnt(old) && old_path->dentry->d_op != &ns_dentry_operations)
+ return mnt;
+
+ if (!recurse && has_locked_children(old, old_path->dentry))
+ return mnt;
+
+ if (recurse)
+ mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path->dentry, CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE);
+ else
+ mnt = clone_mnt(old, old_path->dentry, 0);
+
+ if (!IS_ERR(mnt))
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
+
+ return mnt;
+}
+
/*
* do loopback mount.
*/
@@ -2206,7 +2242,7 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
int recurse)
{
struct path old_path;
- struct mount *mnt = NULL, *old, *parent;
+ struct mount *mnt = NULL, *parent;
struct mountpoint *mp;
int err;
if (!old_name || !*old_name)
@@ -2220,38 +2256,21 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
goto out;
mp = lock_mount(path);
- err = PTR_ERR(mp);
- if (IS_ERR(mp))
+ if (IS_ERR(mp)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(mp);
goto out;
+ }
- old = real_mount(old_path.mnt);
parent = real_mount(path->mnt);
-
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(old))
- goto out2;
-
if (!check_mnt(parent))
goto out2;
- if (!check_mnt(old) && old_path.dentry->d_op != &ns_dentry_operations)
- goto out2;
-
- if (!recurse && has_locked_children(old, old_path.dentry))
- goto out2;
-
- if (recurse)
- mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path.dentry, CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE);
- else
- mnt = clone_mnt(old, old_path.dentry, 0);
-
+ mnt = __do_loopback(&old_path, recurse);
if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(mnt);
goto out2;
}
- mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
-
err = graft_tree(mnt, parent, mp);
if (err) {
lock_mount_hash();
@@ -2265,6 +2284,75 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
return err;
}
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open_tree, int, dfd, const char *, filename, unsigned, flags)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ struct path path;
+ int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT | LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ bool detached = flags & OPEN_TREE_CLONE;
+ int error;
+ int fd;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
+
+ if (flags & ~(AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT | AT_RECURSIVE |
+ AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | OPEN_TREE_CLONE |
+ OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((flags & (AT_RECURSIVE | OPEN_TREE_CLONE)) == AT_RECURSIVE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (flags & AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT)
+ lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT;
+ if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+ lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+
+ if (detached && !may_mount())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (detached) {
+ struct mount *mnt = __do_loopback(&path, flags & AT_RECURSIVE);
+ if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(mnt);
+ goto out2;
+ }
+ mntput(path.mnt);
+ path.mnt = &mnt->mnt;
+ }
+
+ file = dentry_open(&path, O_PATH, current_cred());
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(file);
+ goto out3;
+ }
+
+ if (detached)
+ file->f_mode |= FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT;
+ path_put(&path);
+ fd_install(fd, file);
+ return fd;
+
+out3:
+ if (detached)
+ dissolve_on_fput(path.mnt);
+out2:
+ path_put(&path);
+out:
+ put_unused_fd(fd);
+ return error;
+}
+
static int change_mount_flags(struct vfsmount *mnt, int ms_flags)
{
int error = 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index e3a18cddb74e..067f0e31aec7 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -154,6 +154,9 @@ typedef int (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
/* File is capable of returning -EAGAIN if I/O will block */
#define FMODE_NOWAIT ((__force fmode_t)0x8000000)
+/* File represents mount that needs unmounting */
+#define FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT ((__force fmode_t)0x10000000)
+
/*
* Flag for rw_copy_check_uvector and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector
* that indicates that they should check the contents of the iovec are
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 73810808cdf2..3cc6b8f8bd2f 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -900,6 +900,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_statx(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned flags,
unsigned mask, struct statx __user *buffer);
asmlinkage long sys_rseq(struct rseq __user *rseq, uint32_t rseq_len,
int flags, uint32_t sig);
+asmlinkage long sys_open_tree(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned flags);
/*
* Architecture-specific system calls
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
index 6448cdd9a350..594b85f7cb86 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
@@ -90,5 +90,7 @@
#define AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC 0x2000 /* - Force the attributes to be sync'd with the server */
#define AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC 0x4000 /* - Don't sync attributes with the server */
+#define AT_RECURSIVE 0x8000 /* Apply to the entire subtree */
+
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FCNTL_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e8db2911adca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_MOUNT_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_MOUNT_H
+
+/*
+ * open_tree() flags.
+ */
+#define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1 /* Clone the target tree and attach the clone */
+#define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC /* Close the file on execve() */
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_MOUNT_H */
Add a move_mount() system call that will move a mount from one place to
another and, in the next commit, allow to attach an unattached mount tree.
The new system call looks like the following:
int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_path,
int to_dfd, const char *to_path,
unsigned int flags);
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1
fs/namespace.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++
include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 +
include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 11 +++
security/security.c | 5 ++
8 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index ea1b413afd47..76d092b7d1b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -399,3 +399,4 @@
385 i386 io_pgetevents sys_io_pgetevents __ia32_compat_sys_io_pgetevents
386 i386 rseq sys_rseq __ia32_sys_rseq
387 i386 open_tree sys_open_tree __ia32_sys_open_tree
+388 i386 move_mount sys_move_mount __ia32_sys_move_mount
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index 0545bed581dc..37ba4e65eee6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@
333 common io_pgetevents __x64_sys_io_pgetevents
334 common rseq __x64_sys_rseq
335 common open_tree __x64_sys_open_tree
+336 common move_mount __x64_sys_move_mount
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index a4a01ecbcacd..e2934a4f342b 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2447,43 +2447,37 @@ static inline int tree_contains_unbindable(struct mount *mnt)
return 0;
}
-static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
+static int do_move_mount(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
{
- struct path old_path, parent_path;
+ struct path parent_path = {.mnt = NULL, .dentry = NULL};
struct mount *p;
struct mount *old;
struct mountpoint *mp;
int err;
- if (!old_name || !*old_name)
- return -EINVAL;
- err = kern_path(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
- if (err)
- return err;
- mp = lock_mount(path);
+ mp = lock_mount(new_path);
err = PTR_ERR(mp);
if (IS_ERR(mp))
goto out;
- old = real_mount(old_path.mnt);
- p = real_mount(path->mnt);
+ old = real_mount(old_path->mnt);
+ p = real_mount(new_path->mnt);
err = -EINVAL;
if (!check_mnt(p) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out1;
- if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ if (!mnt_has_parent(old))
goto out1;
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (old_path.dentry != old_path.mnt->mnt_root)
+ if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
goto out1;
- if (!mnt_has_parent(old))
+ if (old_path->dentry != old_path->mnt->mnt_root)
goto out1;
- if (d_is_dir(path->dentry) !=
- d_is_dir(old_path.dentry))
+ if (d_is_dir(new_path->dentry) !=
+ d_is_dir(old_path->dentry))
goto out1;
/*
* Don't move a mount residing in a shared parent.
@@ -2501,7 +2495,8 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
if (p == old)
goto out1;
- err = attach_recursive_mnt(old, real_mount(path->mnt), mp, &parent_path);
+ err = attach_recursive_mnt(old, real_mount(new_path->mnt), mp,
+ &parent_path);
if (err)
goto out1;
@@ -2513,6 +2508,22 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
out:
if (!err)
path_put(&parent_path);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int do_move_mount_old(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
+{
+ struct path old_path;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!old_name || !*old_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = kern_path(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = do_move_mount(&old_path, path);
path_put(&old_path);
return err;
}
@@ -2934,7 +2945,7 @@ long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
retval = do_change_type(&path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
- retval = do_move_mount(&path, dev_name);
+ retval = do_move_mount_old(&path, dev_name);
else
retval = do_new_mount(&path, type_page, sb_flags, mnt_flags,
dev_name, data_page, data_size);
@@ -3169,6 +3180,61 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mount, char __user *, dev_name, char __user *, dir_name,
return ksys_mount(dev_name, dir_name, type, flags, data);
}
+/*
+ * Move a mount from one place to another.
+ *
+ * Note the flags value is a combination of MOVE_MOUNT_* flags.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(move_mount,
+ int, from_dfd, const char *, from_pathname,
+ int, to_dfd, const char *, to_pathname,
+ unsigned int, flags)
+{
+ struct path from_path, to_path;
+ unsigned int lflags;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!may_mount())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (flags & ~MOVE_MOUNT__MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* If someone gives a pathname, they aren't permitted to move
+ * from an fd that requires unmount as we can't get at the flag
+ * to clear it afterwards.
+ */
+ lflags = 0;
+ if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_F_SYMLINKS) lflags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_F_AUTOMOUNTS) lflags |= LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT;
+ if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH) lflags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+
+ ret = user_path_at(from_dfd, from_pathname, lflags, &from_path);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ lflags = 0;
+ if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_T_SYMLINKS) lflags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_T_AUTOMOUNTS) lflags |= LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT;
+ if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_T_EMPTY_PATH) lflags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+
+ ret = user_path_at(to_dfd, to_pathname, lflags, &to_path);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_from;
+
+ ret = security_move_mount(&from_path, &to_path);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_to;
+
+ ret = do_move_mount(&from_path, &to_path);
+
+out_to:
+ path_put(&to_path);
+out_from:
+ path_put(&from_path);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Return true if path is reachable from root
*
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b43bbc893074..924424e7be8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@
* Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure
* @options string containing all mount options known by the LSM
* @opts binary data structure usable by the LSM
+ * @move_mount:
+ * Check permission before a mount is moved.
+ * @from_path indicates the mount that is going to be moved.
+ * @to_path indicates the mountpoint that will be mounted upon.
* @dentry_init_security:
* Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
* since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway.
@@ -1480,6 +1484,7 @@ union security_list_options {
unsigned long kern_flags,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
int (*sb_parse_opts_str)(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
+ int (*move_mount)(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path);
int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen);
@@ -1811,6 +1816,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head sb_set_mnt_opts;
struct hlist_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
struct hlist_head sb_parse_opts_str;
+ struct hlist_head move_mount;
struct hlist_head dentry_init_security;
struct hlist_head dentry_create_files_as;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1498b9e0539b..9bb5bc6d596c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
unsigned long kern_flags,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
+int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path);
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen);
@@ -599,6 +600,12 @@ static inline int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
+ const struct path *to_path)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 3cc6b8f8bd2f..3c0855d9b105 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -901,6 +901,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_statx(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned flags,
asmlinkage long sys_rseq(struct rseq __user *rseq, uint32_t rseq_len,
int flags, uint32_t sig);
asmlinkage long sys_open_tree(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_move_mount(int from_dfd, const char __user *from_path,
+ int to_dfd, const char __user *to_path,
+ unsigned int ms_flags);
/*
* Architecture-specific system calls
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
index e8db2911adca..89adf0d731ab 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
@@ -7,4 +7,15 @@
#define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1 /* Clone the target tree and attach the clone */
#define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC /* Close the file on execve() */
+/*
+ * move_mount() flags.
+ */
+#define MOVE_MOUNT_F_SYMLINKS 0x00000001 /* Follow symlinks on from path */
+#define MOVE_MOUNT_F_AUTOMOUNTS 0x00000002 /* Follow automounts on from path */
+#define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004 /* Empty from path permitted */
+#define MOVE_MOUNT_T_SYMLINKS 0x00000010 /* Follow symlinks on to path */
+#define MOVE_MOUNT_T_AUTOMOUNTS 0x00000020 /* Follow automounts on to path */
+#define MOVE_MOUNT_T_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000040 /* Empty to path permitted */
+#define MOVE_MOUNT__MASK 0x00000077
+
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_MOUNT_H */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7cafc1c90d16..5149c2cbe8a7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -439,6 +439,11 @@ int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
+int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
+}
+
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
{
inode->i_security = NULL;
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Allow a detached tree created by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE) to be
attached by move_mount(2).
If by the time of final fput() of OPEN_TREE_CLONE-opened file its tree is
not detached anymore, it won't be dissolved. move_mount(2) is adjusted
to handle detached source.
That gives us equivalents of mount --bind and mount --rbind.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/namespace.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index e2934a4f342b..3981fd7b13f5 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1846,8 +1846,10 @@ void dissolve_on_fput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
namespace_lock();
lock_mount_hash();
- mntget(mnt);
- umount_tree(real_mount(mnt), UMOUNT_SYNC);
+ if (!real_mount(mnt)->mnt_ns) {
+ mntget(mnt);
+ umount_tree(real_mount(mnt), UMOUNT_SYNC);
+ }
unlock_mount_hash();
namespace_unlock();
}
@@ -2454,6 +2456,7 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
struct mount *old;
struct mountpoint *mp;
int err;
+ bool attached;
mp = lock_mount(new_path);
err = PTR_ERR(mp);
@@ -2464,10 +2467,19 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
p = real_mount(new_path->mnt);
err = -EINVAL;
- if (!check_mnt(p) || !check_mnt(old))
+ /* The mountpoint must be in our namespace. */
+ if (!check_mnt(p))
+ goto out1;
+ /* The thing moved should be either ours or completely unattached. */
+ if (old->mnt_ns && !check_mnt(old))
goto out1;
- if (!mnt_has_parent(old))
+ attached = mnt_has_parent(old);
+ /*
+ * We need to allow open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) followed by
+ * move_mount(), but mustn't allow "/" to be moved.
+ */
+ if (old->mnt_ns && !attached)
goto out1;
if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
@@ -2482,7 +2494,7 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
/*
* Don't move a mount residing in a shared parent.
*/
- if (IS_MNT_SHARED(old->mnt_parent))
+ if (attached && IS_MNT_SHARED(old->mnt_parent))
goto out1;
/*
* Don't move a mount tree containing unbindable mounts to a destination
@@ -2496,7 +2508,7 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
goto out1;
err = attach_recursive_mnt(old, real_mount(new_path->mnt), mp,
- &parent_path);
+ attached ? &parent_path : NULL);
if (err)
goto out1;
@@ -3182,6 +3194,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mount, char __user *, dev_name, char __user *, dir_name,
/*
* Move a mount from one place to another.
+ * In combination with open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE [| AT_RECURSIVE]) it can be
+ * used to copy a mount subtree.
*
* Note the flags value is a combination of MOVE_MOUNT_* flags.
*/
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags. Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
arch/arc/kernel/setup.c | 1 +
arch/arm/kernel/atags_parse.c | 1 +
arch/sh/kernel/setup.c | 1 +
arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c | 1 +
arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 1 +
drivers/base/devtmpfs.c | 1 +
fs/f2fs/super.c | 2 +
fs/pnode.c | 1 +
fs/super.c | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 56 ++++-------------------------------------
include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/do_mounts.c | 1 +
init/do_mounts_initrd.c | 1 +
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 +
security/apparmor/mount.c | 1 +
security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
security/tomoyo/mount.c | 1 +
18 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c
index b2cae79a25d7..714dc5c2baf1 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/arcregs.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/atags_parse.c b/arch/arm/kernel/atags_parse.c
index c10a3e8ee998..a8a4333929f5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/atags_parse.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/atags_parse.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/root_dev.h>
#include <linux/screen_info.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/system_info.h>
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c b/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c
index c286cf5da6e7..2c0e0f37a318 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c
index 13664c377196..7df3d704284c 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
index 7944b3ca216a..206bf81eedaf 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 2f86d883dd95..3413f53e0a35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
#include <linux/dma-contiguous.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
diff --git a/drivers/base/devtmpfs.c b/drivers/base/devtmpfs.c
index 9c0126ad7de1..1b87a1e03b45 100644
--- a/drivers/base/devtmpfs.c
+++ b/drivers/base/devtmpfs.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "base.h"
static struct task_struct *thread;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c
index 1c56a9f2598d..3dbf69209fe2 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ static int f2fs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags,
err = dquot_suspend(sb, -1);
if (err < 0)
goto restore_opts;
- } else if (f2fs_readonly(sb) && !(*flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
+ } else if (f2fs_readonly(sb) && !(*flags & SB_RDONLY)) {
/* dquot_resume needs RW */
sb->s_flags &= ~SB_RDONLY;
if (sb_any_quota_suspended(sb)) {
diff --git a/fs/pnode.c b/fs/pnode.c
index 53d411a371ce..1100e810d855 100644
--- a/fs/pnode.c
+++ b/fs/pnode.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "pnode.h"
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index c9333d317b5f..c9d208b7999e 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "internal.h"
static int thaw_super_locked(struct super_block *sb);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
index 73e01918f996..1c982eb44ff4 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@
#include <linux/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+/* Use of MS_* flags within the kernel is restricted to core mount(2) code. */
+#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#endif
+
/*
* It's silly to have NR_OPEN bigger than NR_FILE, but you can change
* the file limit at runtime and only root can increase the per-process
@@ -101,57 +106,6 @@ struct inodes_stat_t {
#define NR_FILE 8192 /* this can well be larger on a larger system */
-
-/*
- * These are the fs-independent mount-flags: up to 32 flags are supported
- */
-#define MS_RDONLY 1 /* Mount read-only */
-#define MS_NOSUID 2 /* Ignore suid and sgid bits */
-#define MS_NODEV 4 /* Disallow access to device special files */
-#define MS_NOEXEC 8 /* Disallow program execution */
-#define MS_SYNCHRONOUS 16 /* Writes are synced at once */
-#define MS_REMOUNT 32 /* Alter flags of a mounted FS */
-#define MS_MANDLOCK 64 /* Allow mandatory locks on an FS */
-#define MS_DIRSYNC 128 /* Directory modifications are synchronous */
-#define MS_NOATIME 1024 /* Do not update access times. */
-#define MS_NODIRATIME 2048 /* Do not update directory access times */
-#define MS_BIND 4096
-#define MS_MOVE 8192
-#define MS_REC 16384
-#define MS_VERBOSE 32768 /* War is peace. Verbosity is silence.
- MS_VERBOSE is deprecated. */
-#define MS_SILENT 32768
-#define MS_POSIXACL (1<<16) /* VFS does not apply the umask */
-#define MS_UNBINDABLE (1<<17) /* change to unbindable */
-#define MS_PRIVATE (1<<18) /* change to private */
-#define MS_SLAVE (1<<19) /* change to slave */
-#define MS_SHARED (1<<20) /* change to shared */
-#define MS_RELATIME (1<<21) /* Update atime relative to mtime/ctime. */
-#define MS_KERNMOUNT (1<<22) /* this is a kern_mount call */
-#define MS_I_VERSION (1<<23) /* Update inode I_version field */
-#define MS_STRICTATIME (1<<24) /* Always perform atime updates */
-#define MS_LAZYTIME (1<<25) /* Update the on-disk [acm]times lazily */
-
-/* These sb flags are internal to the kernel */
-#define MS_SUBMOUNT (1<<26)
-#define MS_NOREMOTELOCK (1<<27)
-#define MS_NOSEC (1<<28)
-#define MS_BORN (1<<29)
-#define MS_ACTIVE (1<<30)
-#define MS_NOUSER (1<<31)
-
-/*
- * Superblock flags that can be altered by MS_REMOUNT
- */
-#define MS_RMT_MASK (MS_RDONLY|MS_SYNCHRONOUS|MS_MANDLOCK|MS_I_VERSION|\
- MS_LAZYTIME)
-
-/*
- * Old magic mount flag and mask
- */
-#define MS_MGC_VAL 0xC0ED0000
-#define MS_MGC_MSK 0xffff0000
-
/*
* Structure for FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR[A] and FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR.
*/
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
index 89adf0d731ab..3634e065836c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
@@ -1,6 +1,60 @@
#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_MOUNT_H
#define _UAPI_LINUX_MOUNT_H
+/*
+ * These are the fs-independent mount-flags: up to 32 flags are supported
+ *
+ * Usage of these is restricted within the kernel to core mount(2) code and
+ * callers of sys_mount() only. Filesystems should be using the SB_*
+ * equivalent instead.
+ */
+#define MS_RDONLY 1 /* Mount read-only */
+#define MS_NOSUID 2 /* Ignore suid and sgid bits */
+#define MS_NODEV 4 /* Disallow access to device special files */
+#define MS_NOEXEC 8 /* Disallow program execution */
+#define MS_SYNCHRONOUS 16 /* Writes are synced at once */
+#define MS_REMOUNT 32 /* Alter flags of a mounted FS */
+#define MS_MANDLOCK 64 /* Allow mandatory locks on an FS */
+#define MS_DIRSYNC 128 /* Directory modifications are synchronous */
+#define MS_NOATIME 1024 /* Do not update access times. */
+#define MS_NODIRATIME 2048 /* Do not update directory access times */
+#define MS_BIND 4096
+#define MS_MOVE 8192
+#define MS_REC 16384
+#define MS_VERBOSE 32768 /* War is peace. Verbosity is silence.
+ MS_VERBOSE is deprecated. */
+#define MS_SILENT 32768
+#define MS_POSIXACL (1<<16) /* VFS does not apply the umask */
+#define MS_UNBINDABLE (1<<17) /* change to unbindable */
+#define MS_PRIVATE (1<<18) /* change to private */
+#define MS_SLAVE (1<<19) /* change to slave */
+#define MS_SHARED (1<<20) /* change to shared */
+#define MS_RELATIME (1<<21) /* Update atime relative to mtime/ctime. */
+#define MS_KERNMOUNT (1<<22) /* this is a kern_mount call */
+#define MS_I_VERSION (1<<23) /* Update inode I_version field */
+#define MS_STRICTATIME (1<<24) /* Always perform atime updates */
+#define MS_LAZYTIME (1<<25) /* Update the on-disk [acm]times lazily */
+
+/* These sb flags are internal to the kernel */
+#define MS_SUBMOUNT (1<<26)
+#define MS_NOREMOTELOCK (1<<27)
+#define MS_NOSEC (1<<28)
+#define MS_BORN (1<<29)
+#define MS_ACTIVE (1<<30)
+#define MS_NOUSER (1<<31)
+
+/*
+ * Superblock flags that can be altered by MS_REMOUNT
+ */
+#define MS_RMT_MASK (MS_RDONLY|MS_SYNCHRONOUS|MS_MANDLOCK|MS_I_VERSION|\
+ MS_LAZYTIME)
+
+/*
+ * Old magic mount flag and mask
+ */
+#define MS_MGC_VAL 0xC0ED0000
+#define MS_MGC_MSK 0xffff0000
+
/*
* open_tree() flags.
*/
diff --git a/init/do_mounts.c b/init/do_mounts.c
index 7e26be00c444..d4fc2a5afdb6 100644
--- a/init/do_mounts.c
+++ b/init/do_mounts.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
#include <linux/nfs_fs_sb.h>
#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "do_mounts.h"
diff --git a/init/do_mounts_initrd.c b/init/do_mounts_initrd.c
index 5a91aefa7305..65de0412f80f 100644
--- a/init/do_mounts_initrd.c
+++ b/init/do_mounts_initrd.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "do_mounts.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index bc3e209d2bd4..84e644ce3583 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
index c1da22482bfb..8c3787399356 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/mount.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f5e5c8a087ae..ef0428311a5c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index 807fd91dbb54..7dc7f59b7dde 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "common.h"
/* String table for special mount operations. */
Introduce a filesystem context concept to be used during superblock
creation for mount and superblock reconfiguration for remount. This is
allocated at the beginning of the mount procedure and into it is placed:
(1) Filesystem type.
(2) Namespaces.
(3) Source/Device names (there may be multiple).
(4) Superblock flags (SB_*).
(5) Security details.
(6) Filesystem-specific data, as set by the mount options.
Also introduce a struct for typed key=value parameter concept with which
configuration data will be passed to filesystems. This will allow not only
for ordinary string values, but also make it possible to pass more exotic
values such as binary blobs, paths and fds with greater ease.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/fs_context.h | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 101 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/linux/fs_context.h
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0ff4969f9d5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/* Filesystem superblock creation and reconfiguration context.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_FS_CONTEXT_H
+#define _LINUX_FS_CONTEXT_H
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+struct cred;
+struct dentry;
+struct file_operations;
+struct file_system_type;
+struct mnt_namespace;
+struct net;
+struct pid_namespace;
+struct super_block;
+struct user_namespace;
+struct vfsmount;
+
+enum fs_context_purpose {
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT, /* New superblock for user-specified mount */
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT, /* New superblock for kernel-internal mount */
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT, /* New superblock for automatic submount */
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE, /* Superblock reconfiguration (remount) */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Type of parameter value.
+ */
+enum fs_value_type {
+ fs_value_is_undefined,
+ fs_value_is_flag, /* Value not given a value */
+ fs_value_is_string, /* Value is a string */
+ fs_value_is_blob, /* Value is a binary blob */
+ fs_value_is_filename, /* Value is a filename* + dirfd */
+ fs_value_is_filename_empty, /* Value is a filename* + dirfd + AT_EMPTY_PATH */
+ fs_value_is_file, /* Value is a file* */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Configuration parameter.
+ */
+struct fs_parameter {
+ const char *key; /* Parameter name */
+ enum fs_value_type type:8; /* The type of value here */
+ union {
+ char *string;
+ void *blob;
+ struct filename *name;
+ struct file *file;
+ };
+ size_t size;
+ int dirfd;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Filesystem context for holding the parameters used in the creation or
+ * reconfiguration of a superblock.
+ *
+ * Superblock creation fills in ->root whereas reconfiguration begins with this
+ * already set.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/filesystems/mounting.txt
+ */
+struct fs_context {
+ const struct fs_context_operations *ops;
+ struct file_system_type *fs_type;
+ void *fs_private; /* The filesystem's context */
+ struct dentry *root; /* The root and superblock */
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* The user namespace for this mount */
+ struct net *net_ns; /* The network namespace for this mount */
+ const struct cred *cred; /* The mounter's credentials */
+ char *source; /* The source name (eg. dev path) */
+ char *subtype; /* The subtype to set on the superblock */
+ void *security; /* The LSM context */
+ void *s_fs_info; /* Proposed s_fs_info */
+ unsigned int sb_flags; /* Proposed superblock flags (SB_*) */
+ enum fs_context_purpose purpose:8;
+ bool sloppy:1; /* T if unrecognised options are okay */
+ bool silent:1; /* T if "o silent" specified */
+};
+
+struct fs_context_operations {
+ void (*free)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*dup)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc);
+ int (*parse_param)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param);
+ int (*parse_monolithic)(struct fs_context *fc, void *data, size_t data_size);
+ int (*validate)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*get_tree)(struct fs_context *fc);
+};
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_FS_CONTEXT_H */
Introduce a set of logging functions through which informational messages,
warnings and error messages incurred by the mount procedure can be logged
and, in a future patch, passed to userspace instead by way of the
filesystem configuration context file descriptor.
There are four functions:
(1) infof(const char *fmt, ...);
Logs an informational message.
(2) warnf(const char *fmt, ...);
Logs a warning message.
(3) errorf(const char *fmt, ...);
Logs an error message.
(4) invalf(const char *fmt, ...);
As errof(), but returns -EINVAL so can be used on a return statement.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/fs_context.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
index 0ff4969f9d5a..a88b54752f86 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
@@ -98,4 +98,46 @@ struct fs_context_operations {
int (*get_tree)(struct fs_context *fc);
};
+#define logfc(FC, FMT, ...) pr_notice(FMT, ## __VA_ARGS__)
+
+/**
+ * infof - Store supplementary informational message
+ * @fc: The context in which to log the informational message
+ * @fmt: The format string
+ *
+ * Store the supplementary informational message for the process if the process
+ * has enabled the facility.
+ */
+#define infof(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
+
+/**
+ * warnf - Store supplementary warning message
+ * @fc: The context in which to log the error message
+ * @fmt: The format string
+ *
+ * Store the supplementary warning message for the process if the process has
+ * enabled the facility.
+ */
+#define warnf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
+
+/**
+ * errorf - Store supplementary error message
+ * @fc: The context in which to log the error message
+ * @fmt: The format string
+ *
+ * Store the supplementary error message for the process if the process has
+ * enabled the facility.
+ */
+#define errorf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
+
+/**
+ * invalf - Store supplementary invalid argument error message
+ * @fc: The context in which to log the error message
+ * @fmt: The format string
+ *
+ * Store the supplementary error message for the process if the process has
+ * enabled the facility and return -EINVAL.
+ */
+#define invalf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ errorf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); -EINVAL; })
+
#endif /* _LINUX_FS_CONTEXT_H */
Implement filesystem context security hooks for the smack LSM.
Question: Should the ->fs_context_parse_source() hook be implemented to
check the labels on any source devices specified?
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
security/smack/smack.h | 11 +
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 337 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 343 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index f7db791fb566..e6d54e829394 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -195,11 +195,12 @@ struct smack_known_list_elem {
enum {
Opt_error = -1,
- Opt_fsdefault = 1,
- Opt_fsfloor = 2,
- Opt_fshat = 3,
- Opt_fsroot = 4,
- Opt_fstransmute = 5,
+ Opt_fsdefault = 0,
+ Opt_fsfloor = 1,
+ Opt_fshat = 2,
+ Opt_fsroot = 3,
+ Opt_fstransmute = 4,
+ nr__smack_params
};
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 9811476c8441..339ac4d42785 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include "smack.h"
#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
@@ -521,6 +523,334 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * Mount context operations
+ */
+
+struct smack_fs_context {
+ union {
+ struct {
+ char *fsdefault;
+ char *fsfloor;
+ char *fshat;
+ char *fsroot;
+ char *fstransmute;
+ };
+ char *ptrs[5];
+
+ };
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ bool transmute;
+};
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_free - Free the security data from a filesystem context
+ * @fc: The filesystem context to be cleaned up.
+ */
+static void smack_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ctx) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->ptrs); i++)
+ kfree(ctx->ptrs[i]);
+ kfree(ctx->isp);
+ kfree(ctx->sbsp);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ fc->security = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_alloc - Allocate security data for a filesystem context
+ * @fc: The filesystem context.
+ * @reference: Reference dentry (automount/reconfigure) or NULL
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct smack_fs_context *ctx;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto nomem;
+ fc->security = ctx;
+
+ sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sbsp)
+ goto nomem_free;
+ ctx->sbsp = sbsp;
+
+ isp = new_inode_smack(NULL);
+ if (!isp)
+ goto nomem_free;
+ ctx->isp = isp;
+
+ if (reference) {
+ if (reference->d_sb->s_security)
+ memcpy(sbsp, reference->d_sb->s_security, sizeof(*sbsp));
+ } else if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ /* Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller. */
+ skp = smk_of_current();
+ sbsp->smk_root = skp;
+ sbsp->smk_default = skp;
+ } else {
+ sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
+ sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
+ sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
+ sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
+ /* SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. */
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+nomem_free:
+ smack_fs_context_free(fc);
+nomem:
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
+ * @fc: The new filesystem context.
+ * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ struct smack_fs_context *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
+ int i;
+
+ dst = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst)
+ goto nomem;
+ fc->security = dst;
+
+ dst->sbsp = kmemdup(src->sbsp, sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst->sbsp)
+ goto nomem_free;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dst->ptrs); i++) {
+ if (src->ptrs[i]) {
+ dst->ptrs[i] = kstrdup(src->ptrs[i], GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dst->ptrs[i])
+ goto nomem_free;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+nomem_free:
+ smack_fs_context_free(fc);
+nomem:
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec smack_param_specs[nr__smack_params] = {
+ [Opt_fsdefault] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_fsfloor] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_fshat] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_fsroot] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_fstransmute] = { fs_param_is_string },
+};
+
+static const struct constant_table smack_param_keys[] = {
+ { SMK_FSDEFAULT, Opt_fsdefault },
+ { SMK_FSFLOOR, Opt_fsfloor },
+ { SMK_FSHAT, Opt_fshat },
+ { SMK_FSROOT, Opt_fsroot },
+ { SMK_FSTRANS, Opt_fstransmute },
+};
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_description smack_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "smack",
+ .nr_params = nr__smack_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(smack_param_keys),
+ .keys = smack_param_keys,
+ .specs = smack_param_specs,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_parse_param - Parse a single mount parameter
+ * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
+ * @param: The parameter.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security;
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values. */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ ret = fs_parse(fc, &smack_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret; /* Note: 0 indicates no match */
+
+ switch (result.key) {
+ case Opt_fsdefault:
+ if (ctx->fsdefault)
+ goto error_dup;
+ ctx->fsdefault = param->string;
+ if (!ctx->fsdefault)
+ goto error;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fsfloor:
+ if (ctx->fsfloor)
+ goto error_dup;
+ ctx->fsfloor = param->string;
+ if (!ctx->fsfloor)
+ goto error;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fshat:
+ if (ctx->fshat)
+ goto error_dup;
+ ctx->fshat = param->string;
+ if (!ctx->fshat)
+ goto error;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fsroot:
+ if (ctx->fsroot)
+ goto error_dup;
+ ctx->fsroot = param->string;
+ if (!ctx->fsroot)
+ goto error;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fstransmute:
+ if (ctx->fstransmute)
+ goto error_dup;
+ ctx->fstransmute = param->string;
+ if (!ctx->fstransmute)
+ goto error;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
+ goto error_inval;
+ }
+
+ param->string = NULL;
+ return 0;
+
+error_dup:
+ warnf(fc, "Smack: duplicate mount option\n");
+error_inval:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_validate - Validate the filesystem context security data
+ * @fc: The filesystem context.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = ctx->sbsp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = ctx->isp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ if (ctx->fsdefault) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fsdefault, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sbsp->smk_default = skp;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->fsfloor) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fsfloor, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sbsp->smk_floor = skp;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->fshat) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fshat, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sbsp->smk_hat = skp;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->fsroot || ctx->fstransmute) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fstransmute ?: ctx->fsroot, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sbsp->smk_root = skp;
+ ctx->transmute = !!ctx->fstransmute;
+ }
+
+ isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_get_tree - Assign the context to a newly created superblock
+ * @fc: The new filesystem context.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = ctx->sbsp;
+ struct dentry *root = fc->root;
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+ struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ bool transmute = ctx->transmute;
+
+ if (sb->s_security)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ /*
+ * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
+ * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
+ * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
+ */
+ if (fc->user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+ sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
+ sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
+ transmute = true;
+ sbsp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sbsp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
+ sb->s_security = sbsp;
+ ctx->sbsp = NULL;
+
+ /* Initialize the root inode. */
+ isp = inode->i_security;
+ if (isp == NULL) {
+ isp = ctx->isp;
+ ctx->isp = NULL;
+ inode->i_security = isp;
+ } else
+ isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+
+ if (transmute)
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
/*
* Superblock Hooks.
@@ -4649,6 +4979,13 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_alloc, smack_fs_context_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_free, smack_fs_context_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_validate, smack_fs_context_validate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_get_tree, smack_sb_get_tree),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
Implement hooks to check the creation of new mountpoints for AppArmor.
Unfortunately, the DFA evaluation puts the option data in last, after the
details of the mountpoint, so we have to cache the mount options in the
fs_context using those hooks till we get to the new mountpoint hook.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
---
security/apparmor/include/mount.h | 11 +++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/mount.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
index 25d6067fa6ef..0441bfae30fa 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include "domain.h"
#include "policy.h"
@@ -27,7 +28,13 @@
#define AA_AUDIT_DATA 0x40
#define AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH 0x40
-#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
+#define AA_SB_IGNORE_MASK (SB_KERNMOUNT | SB_NOSEC | SB_ACTIVE | SB_BORN)
+
+struct apparmor_fs_context {
+ struct fs_context fc;
+ char *saved_options;
+ size_t saved_size;
+};
int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
unsigned long flags, void *data);
@@ -45,6 +52,8 @@ int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
void *data);
+int aa_new_mount_fc(struct aa_label *label, struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct path *mountpoint);
int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 84e644ce3583..5555947aed97 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -520,6 +520,105 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
}
+static int apparmor_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct apparmor_fs_context *afc;
+
+ afc = kzalloc(sizeof(*afc), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!afc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fc->security = afc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ fc->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void apparmor_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct apparmor_fs_context *afc = fc->security;
+
+ if (afc) {
+ kfree(afc->saved_options);
+ kfree(afc);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * As a temporary hack, we buffer all the options. The problem is that we need
+ * to pass them to the DFA evaluator *after* mount point parameters, which
+ * means deferring the entire check to the sb_mountpoint hook.
+ */
+static int apparmor_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct apparmor_fs_context *afc = fc->security;
+ const char *value;
+ size_t space = 0, k_len = strlen(param->key), len = k_len, v_len;
+ char *p, *q;
+
+ if (afc->saved_size > 0)
+ space = 1;
+
+ switch (param->type) {
+ case fs_value_is_string:
+ value = param->string;
+ v_len = param->size;
+ len += 1 + v_len;
+ break;
+ case fs_value_is_filename:
+ case fs_value_is_filename_empty: {
+ value = param->name->name;
+ v_len = param->size;
+ len += 1 + v_len;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ value = NULL;
+ v_len = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ p = krealloc(afc->saved_options, afc->saved_size + space + len + 1,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ q = p + afc->saved_size;
+ if (q != p)
+ *q++ = ' ';
+ memcpy(q, param->key, k_len);
+ q += k_len;
+ if (value) {
+ *q++ = '=';
+ memcpy(q, value, v_len);
+ q += v_len;
+ }
+ *q = 0;
+
+ afc->saved_options = p;
+ afc->saved_size += 1 + len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ if (!unconfined(label))
+ error = aa_new_mount_fc(label, fc, mountpoint);
+ __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags,
void *data, size_t data_size)
@@ -531,7 +630,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
- flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
+ flags &= ~AA_SB_IGNORE_MASK;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!unconfined(label)) {
@@ -1134,6 +1233,12 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_alloc, apparmor_fs_context_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, apparmor_fs_context_dup),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_free, apparmor_fs_context_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, apparmor_fs_context_parse_param),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mountpoint, apparmor_sb_mountpoint),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
index 8c3787399356..3c95fffb76ac 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/mount.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -554,6 +554,52 @@ int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
return error;
}
+int aa_new_mount_fc(struct aa_label *label, struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct path *mountpoint)
+{
+ struct apparmor_fs_context *afc = fc->security;
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
+ bool binary;
+ int error;
+ struct path tmp_path, *dev_path = NULL;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!mountpoint);
+
+ binary = fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+
+ if (fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV) {
+ if (!fc->source)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ error = kern_path(fc->source, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &tmp_path);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ dev_path = &tmp_path;
+ }
+
+ get_buffers(buffer, dev_buffer);
+ if (dev_path) {
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ match_mnt(profile, mountpoint, buffer, dev_path, dev_buffer,
+ fc->fs_type->name,
+ fc->sb_flags & ~AA_SB_IGNORE_MASK,
+ afc->saved_options, binary));
+ } else {
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ match_mnt_path_str(profile, mountpoint, buffer,
+ fc->source, fc->fs_type->name,
+ fc->sb_flags & ~AA_SB_IGNORE_MASK,
+ afc->saved_options, binary, NULL));
+ }
+ put_buffers(buffer, dev_buffer);
+ if (dev_path)
+ path_put(dev_path);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
char *buffer)
{
Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code.
This includes:
(1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security
record attached to a filesystem context.
(2) A hook to snoop source specifications. There may be multiple of these
if the filesystem supports it. They will to be local files/devices if
fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly
remote server specifications, if false.
(3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form.
If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option
being passed to the filesystem. Note that 'val' may include commas
and binary data with the fsopen patch.
(4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration
has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up.
(5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created
superblock.
(6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint.
These are intended to replace:
security_sb_copy_data
security_sb_kern_mount
security_sb_mount
security_sb_set_mnt_opts
security_sb_clone_mnt_opts
security_sb_parse_opts_str
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 924424e7be8f..60a9a40bd46c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -76,6 +76,49 @@
* changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal
* state. This is called immediately after commit_creds().
*
+ * Security hooks for mount using fs_context.
+ * [See also Documentation/filesystems/mounting.txt]
+ *
+ * @fs_context_alloc:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer
+ * is initialised to NULL by the caller.
+ * @fc indicates the new filesystem context.
+ * @reference indicates the source dentry of a submount or start of reconfig.
+ * @fs_context_dup:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer
+ * is initialised to NULL by the caller.
+ * @fc indicates the new filesystem context.
+ * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context.
+ * @fs_context_free:
+ * Clean up a filesystem context.
+ * @fc indicates the filesystem context.
+ * @fs_context_parse_param:
+ * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM may
+ * reject it with an error and may use it for itself, in which case it
+ * should return 1; otherwise it should return 0 to pass it on to the
+ * filesystem.
+ * @fc indicates the filesystem context.
+ * @param The parameter
+ * @fs_context_validate:
+ * Validate the filesystem context preparatory to applying it. This is
+ * done after all the options have been parsed.
+ * @fc indicates the filesystem context.
+ * @sb_get_tree:
+ * Assign the security to a newly created superblock.
+ * @fc indicates the filesystem context.
+ * @fc->root indicates the root that will be mounted.
+ * @fc->root->d_sb points to the superblock.
+ * @sb_reconfigure:
+ * Apply reconfiguration to the security on a superblock.
+ * @fc indicates the filesystem context.
+ * @fc->root indicates a dentry in the mount.
+ * @fc->root->d_sb points to the superblock.
+ * @sb_mountpoint:
+ * Equivalent of sb_mount, but with an fs_context.
+ * @fc indicates the filesystem context.
+ * @mountpoint indicates the path on which the mount will take place.
+ * @mnt_flags indicates the MNT_* flags specified.
+ *
* Security hooks for filesystem operations.
*
* @sb_alloc_security:
@@ -1462,6 +1505,16 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*bprm_committing_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void (*bprm_committed_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int (*fs_context_alloc)(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference);
+ int (*fs_context_dup)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_sc);
+ void (*fs_context_free)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*fs_context_parse_param)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param);
+ int (*fs_context_validate)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*sb_get_tree)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ void (*sb_reconfigure)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*sb_mountpoint)(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags);
+
int (*sb_alloc_security)(struct super_block *sb);
void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_copy_data)(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy);
@@ -1803,6 +1856,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head bprm_check_security;
struct hlist_head bprm_committing_creds;
struct hlist_head bprm_committed_creds;
+ struct hlist_head fs_context_alloc;
+ struct hlist_head fs_context_dup;
+ struct hlist_head fs_context_free;
+ struct hlist_head fs_context_parse_param;
+ struct hlist_head fs_context_validate;
+ struct hlist_head sb_get_tree;
+ struct hlist_head sb_reconfigure;
+ struct hlist_head sb_mountpoint;
struct hlist_head sb_alloc_security;
struct hlist_head sb_free_security;
struct hlist_head sb_copy_data;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9bb5bc6d596c..a8b1056ed6e4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ struct msg_msg;
struct xattr;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
struct mm_struct;
+struct fs_context;
+struct fs_parameter;
+enum fs_value_type;
/* If capable should audit the security request */
#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0
@@ -225,6 +228,15 @@ int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+int security_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference);
+int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc);
+void security_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc);
+int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param);
+int security_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc);
+int security_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
+void security_sb_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc);
+int security_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags);
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy);
@@ -526,6 +538,41 @@ static inline void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
}
+static inline int security_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline void security_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+}
+static inline int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int security_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int security_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline void security_sb_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+}
+static inline int security_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5149c2cbe8a7..9bdc21ae645c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -358,6 +358,47 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
}
+int security_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(fs_context_alloc, 0, fc, reference);
+}
+
+int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
+}
+
+void security_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ call_void_hook(fs_context_free, fc);
+}
+
+int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(fs_context_parse_param, 0, fc, param);
+}
+
+int security_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(fs_context_validate, 0, fc);
+}
+
+int security_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_get_tree, 0, fc);
+}
+
+void security_sb_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ call_void_hook(sb_reconfigure, fc);
+}
+
+int security_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_mountpoint, 0, fc, mountpoint, mnt_flags);
+}
+
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{
return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
Separate just the changing of mount flags (MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND) from full
remount because the mount data will get parsed with the new fs_context
stuff prior to doing a remount - and this causes the syscall to fail under
some circumstances.
To quote Eric's explanation:
[...] mount(..., MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, ...) now validates the mount options
string, which breaks systemd unit files with ProtectControlGroups=yes
(e.g. systemd-networkd.service) when systemd does the following to
change a cgroup (v1) mount to read-only:
mount(NULL, "/run/systemd/unit-root/sys/fs/cgroup/systemd", NULL,
MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, NULL)
... when the kernel has CONFIG_CGROUPS=y but no cgroup subsystems
enabled, since in that case the error "cgroup1: Need name or subsystem
set" is hit when the mount options string is empty.
Probably it doesn't make sense to validate the mount options string at
all in the MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND case, though maybe you had something else
in mind.
This is also worthwhile doing because we will need to add a mount_setattr()
syscall to take over the remount-bind function.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/namespace.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
include/linux/mount.h | 2 -
2 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 3981fd7b13f5..859dc473e2ad 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -273,13 +273,9 @@ static struct mount *alloc_vfsmnt(const char *name)
* mnt_want/drop_write() will _keep_ the filesystem
* r/w.
*/
-int __mnt_is_readonly(struct vfsmount *mnt)
+bool __mnt_is_readonly(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
- if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)
- return 1;
- if (sb_rdonly(mnt->mnt_sb))
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) || sb_rdonly(mnt->mnt_sb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__mnt_is_readonly);
@@ -594,11 +590,12 @@ static int mnt_make_readonly(struct mount *mnt)
return ret;
}
-static void __mnt_unmake_readonly(struct mount *mnt)
+static int __mnt_unmake_readonly(struct mount *mnt)
{
lock_mount_hash();
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_READONLY;
unlock_mount_hash();
+ return 0;
}
int sb_prepare_remount_readonly(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -2355,21 +2352,91 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open_tree, int, dfd, const char *, filename, unsigned, flags)
return error;
}
-static int change_mount_flags(struct vfsmount *mnt, int ms_flags)
+/*
+ * Don't allow locked mount flags to be cleared.
+ *
+ * No locks need to be held here while testing the various MNT_LOCK
+ * flags because those flags can never be cleared once they are set.
+ */
+static bool can_change_locked_flags(struct mount *mnt, unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ unsigned int fl = mnt->mnt.mnt_flags;
+
+ if ((fl & MNT_LOCK_READONLY) &&
+ !(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY))
+ return false;
+
+ if ((fl & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
+ !(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV))
+ return false;
+
+ if ((fl & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
+ !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID))
+ return false;
+
+ if ((fl & MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC) &&
+ !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC))
+ return false;
+
+ if ((fl & MNT_LOCK_ATIME) &&
+ ((fl & MNT_ATIME_MASK) != (mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK)))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int change_mount_ro_state(struct mount *mnt, unsigned int mnt_flags)
{
- int error = 0;
- int readonly_request = 0;
+ bool readonly_request = (mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY);
- if (ms_flags & MS_RDONLY)
- readonly_request = 1;
- if (readonly_request == __mnt_is_readonly(mnt))
+ if (readonly_request == __mnt_is_readonly(&mnt->mnt))
return 0;
if (readonly_request)
- error = mnt_make_readonly(real_mount(mnt));
- else
- __mnt_unmake_readonly(real_mount(mnt));
- return error;
+ return mnt_make_readonly(mnt);
+
+ return __mnt_unmake_readonly(mnt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the user-settable attributes on a mount. The caller must hold
+ * sb->s_umount for writing.
+ */
+static void set_mount_attributes(struct mount *mnt, unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ lock_mount_hash();
+ mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK;
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
+ touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
+ unlock_mount_hash();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle reconfiguration of the mountpoint only without alteration of the
+ * superblock it refers to. This is triggered by specifying MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND
+ * to mount(2).
+ */
+static int do_reconfigure_mnt(struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
+ struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!check_mnt(mnt))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (path->dentry != mnt->mnt.mnt_root)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!can_change_locked_flags(mnt, mnt_flags))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ down_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ ret = change_mount_ro_state(mnt, mnt_flags);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ set_mount_attributes(mnt, mnt_flags);
+ up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -2390,50 +2457,19 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
return -EINVAL;
- /* Don't allow changing of locked mnt flags.
- *
- * No locks need to be held here while testing the various
- * MNT_LOCK flags because those flags can never be cleared
- * once they are set.
- */
- if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_READONLY) &&
- !(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)) {
- return -EPERM;
- }
- if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
- !(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
- return -EPERM;
- }
- if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
- !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
- return -EPERM;
- }
- if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC) &&
- !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+ if (!can_change_locked_flags(mnt, mnt_flags))
return -EPERM;
- }
- if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_ATIME) &&
- ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK) != (mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK))) {
- return -EPERM;
- }
err = security_sb_remount(sb, data, data_size);
if (err)
return err;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
- if (ms_flags & MS_BIND)
- err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, ms_flags);
- else if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- err = -EPERM;
- else
+ err = -EPERM;
+ if (ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
err = do_remount_sb(sb, sb_flags, data, data_size, 0);
- if (!err) {
- lock_mount_hash();
- mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK;
- mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
- touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
- unlock_mount_hash();
+ if (!err)
+ set_mount_attributes(mnt, mnt_flags);
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return err;
@@ -2949,7 +2985,9 @@ long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
SB_LAZYTIME |
SB_I_VERSION);
- if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ if ((flags & (MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND)) == (MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND))
+ retval = do_reconfigure_mnt(&path, mnt_flags);
+ else if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
retval = do_remount(&path, flags, sb_flags, mnt_flags,
data_page, data_size);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index 8a1031a511c9..c9edd284f0af 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ extern void mnt_drop_write_file(struct file *file);
extern void mntput(struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern struct vfsmount *mntget(struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern struct vfsmount *mnt_clone_internal(const struct path *path);
-extern int __mnt_is_readonly(struct vfsmount *mnt);
+extern bool __mnt_is_readonly(struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt);
struct path;
Implement a filesystem context concept to be used during superblock
creation for mount and superblock reconfiguration for remount.
The mounting procedure then becomes:
(1) Allocate new fs_context context.
(2) Configure the context.
(3) Create superblock.
(4) Query the superblock.
(5) Create a mount for the superblock.
(6) Destroy the context.
Rather than calling fs_type->mount(), an fs_context struct is created and
fs_type->init_fs_context() is called to set it up. Pointers exist for the
filesystem and LSM to hang their private data off.
A set of operations has to be set by ->init_fs_context() to provide
freeing, duplication, option parsing, binary data parsing, validation,
mounting and superblock filling.
Legacy filesystems are supported by the provision of a set of legacy
fs_context operations that build up a list of mount options and then invoke
fs_type->mount() from within the fs_context ->get_tree() operation. This
allows all filesystems to be accessed using fs_context.
It should be noted that, whilst this patch adds a lot of lines of code,
there is quite a bit of duplication with existing code that can be
eliminated should all filesystems be converted over.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/Makefile | 2
fs/filesystems.c | 4
fs/fs_context.c | 668 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/internal.h | 8 -
fs/libfs.c | 19 +
fs/namespace.c | 351 +++++++++++++++--------
fs/super.c | 303 +++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/fs.h | 17 +
include/linux/fs_context.h | 45 +++
include/linux/mount.h | 3
10 files changed, 1278 insertions(+), 142 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 fs/fs_context.c
diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
index 07b894227dce..9a0b8003f069 100644
--- a/fs/Makefile
+++ b/fs/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ obj-y := open.o read_write.o file_table.o super.o \
seq_file.o xattr.o libfs.o fs-writeback.o \
pnode.o splice.o sync.o utimes.o d_path.o \
stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o \
- fs_parser.o
+ fs_context.o fs_parser.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_BLOCK),y)
obj-y += buffer.o block_dev.o direct-io.o mpage.o
diff --git a/fs/filesystems.c b/fs/filesystems.c
index b03f57b1105b..9135646e41ac 100644
--- a/fs/filesystems.c
+++ b/fs/filesystems.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
/*
* Handling of filesystem drivers list.
@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ int register_filesystem(struct file_system_type * fs)
int res = 0;
struct file_system_type ** p;
+ if (fs->parameters && !fs_validate_description(fs->parameters))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
BUG_ON(strchr(fs->name, '.'));
if (fs->next)
return -EBUSY;
diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8f040a20b320
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/fs_context.c
@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
+/* Provide a way to create a superblock configuration context within the kernel
+ * that allows a superblock to be set up prior to mounting.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/bsearch.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "mount.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+enum legacy_fs_param {
+ LEGACY_FS_UNSET_PARAMS,
+ LEGACY_FS_NO_PARAMS,
+ LEGACY_FS_MONOLITHIC_PARAMS,
+ LEGACY_FS_INDIVIDUAL_PARAMS,
+ LEGACY_FS_MAGIC_PARAMS,
+};
+
+struct legacy_fs_context {
+ char *legacy_data; /* Data page for legacy filesystems */
+ char *secdata;
+ size_t data_size;
+ enum legacy_fs_param param_type;
+};
+
+static int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *dentry);
+
+static const struct constant_table common_set_sb_flag[] = {
+ { "dirsync", SB_DIRSYNC },
+ { "lazytime", SB_LAZYTIME },
+ { "mand", SB_MANDLOCK },
+ { "posixacl", SB_POSIXACL },
+ { "ro", SB_RDONLY },
+ { "sync", SB_SYNCHRONOUS },
+};
+
+static const struct constant_table common_clear_sb_flag[] = {
+ { "async", SB_SYNCHRONOUS },
+ { "nolazytime", SB_LAZYTIME },
+ { "nomand", SB_MANDLOCK },
+ { "rw", SB_RDONLY },
+ { "silent", SB_SILENT },
+};
+
+static const char *forbidden_sb_flag[] = {
+ "bind",
+ "dev",
+ "exec",
+ "move",
+ "noatime",
+ "nodev",
+ "nodiratime",
+ "noexec",
+ "norelatime",
+ "nostrictatime",
+ "nosuid",
+ "private",
+ "rec",
+ "relatime",
+ "remount",
+ "shared",
+ "slave",
+ "strictatime",
+ "suid",
+ "unbindable",
+};
+
+static int cmp_flag_name(const void *name, const void *entry)
+{
+ const char **e = (const char **)entry;
+ return strcmp(name, *e);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for a common mount option that manipulates s_flags.
+ */
+static int vfs_parse_sb_flag(struct fs_context *fc, const char *key)
+{
+ unsigned int token;
+
+ if (bsearch(key, forbidden_sb_flag, ARRAY_SIZE(forbidden_sb_flag),
+ sizeof(forbidden_sb_flag[0]), cmp_flag_name))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ token = lookup_constant(common_set_sb_flag, key, 0);
+ if (token) {
+ fc->sb_flags |= token;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ token = lookup_constant(common_clear_sb_flag, key, 0);
+ if (token) {
+ fc->sb_flags &= ~token;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * vfs_parse_fs_param - Add a single parameter to a superblock config
+ * @fc: The filesystem context to modify
+ * @param: The parameter
+ *
+ * A single mount option in string form is applied to the filesystem context
+ * being set up. Certain standard options (for example "ro") are translated
+ * into flag bits without going to the filesystem. The active security module
+ * is allowed to observe and poach options. Any other options are passed over
+ * to the filesystem to parse.
+ *
+ * This may be called multiple times for a context.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and a negative error code on failure. In the event of
+ * failure, supplementary error information may have been set.
+ */
+int vfs_parse_fs_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!param->key) {
+ pr_err("Unnamed parameter\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = vfs_parse_sb_flag(fc, param->key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (ret == 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = security_fs_context_parse_param(fc, param);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (ret == 1)
+ /* Param belongs to the LSM; don't pass to the FS */
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (fc->ops->parse_param)
+ ret = fc->ops->parse_param(fc, param);
+ else if (strcmp(param->key, "source") == 0)
+ ret = 0; /* Ignore the source spec */
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_parse_fs_param);
+
+/**
+ * vfs_parse_fs_string - Convenience function to just parse a string.
+ */
+int vfs_parse_fs_string(struct fs_context *fc, const char *key,
+ const char *value, size_t v_size)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ struct fs_parameter param = {
+ .key = key,
+ .type = fs_value_is_string,
+ .size = v_size,
+ };
+
+ if (v_size > 0) {
+ param.string = kmemdup_nul(value, v_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!param.string)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = vfs_parse_fs_param(fc, ¶m);
+ kfree(param.string);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_parse_fs_string);
+
+/**
+ * generic_parse_monolithic - Parse key[=val][,key[=val]]* mount data
+ * @ctx: The superblock configuration to fill in.
+ * @data: The data to parse
+ * @data_size: The amount of data
+ *
+ * Parse a blob of data that's in key[=val][,key[=val]]* form. This can be
+ * called from the ->monolithic_mount_data() fs_context operation.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or the error returned by the ->parse_option() fs_context
+ * operation on failure.
+ */
+int generic_parse_monolithic(struct fs_context *fc, void *data, size_t data_size)
+{
+ char *options = data, *key;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!options)
+ return 0;
+
+ while ((key = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
+ if (*key) {
+ size_t v_len = 0;
+ char *value = strchr(key, '=');
+
+ if (value) {
+ if (value == key)
+ continue;
+ *value++ = 0;
+ v_len = strlen(value);
+ }
+ ret = vfs_parse_fs_string(fc, key, value, v_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_parse_monolithic);
+
+/**
+ * vfs_new_fs_context - Create a filesystem context.
+ * @fs_type: The filesystem type.
+ * @reference: The dentry from which this one derives (or NULL)
+ * @sb_flags: Filesystem/superblock flags (SB_*)
+ * @purpose: The purpose that this configuration shall be used for.
+ *
+ * Open a filesystem and create a mount context. The mount context is
+ * initialised with the supplied flags and, if a submount/automount from
+ * another superblock (referred to by @reference) is supplied, may have
+ * parameters such as namespaces copied across from that superblock.
+ */
+struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+ struct dentry *reference,
+ unsigned int sb_flags,
+ enum fs_context_purpose purpose)
+{
+ int (*init_fs_context)(struct fs_context *, struct dentry *);
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fc)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ fc->purpose = purpose;
+ fc->sb_flags = sb_flags;
+ fc->fs_type = get_filesystem(fs_type);
+ fc->cred = get_current_cred();
+
+ switch (purpose) {
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT:
+ fc->sb_flags |= SB_KERNMOUNT;
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT:
+ fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(fc->cred->user_ns);
+ fc->net_ns = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
+ break;
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT:
+ fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(reference->d_sb->s_user_ns);
+ fc->net_ns = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
+ break;
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE:
+ /* We don't pin any namespaces as the superblock's
+ * subscriptions cannot be changed at this point.
+ */
+ atomic_inc(&reference->d_sb->s_active);
+ fc->root = dget(reference);
+ break;
+ }
+
+
+ /* TODO: Make all filesystems support this unconditionally */
+ init_fs_context = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context;
+ if (!init_fs_context)
+ init_fs_context = legacy_init_fs_context;
+
+ ret = (*init_fs_context)(fc, reference);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+ fc->need_free = true;
+
+ /* Do the security check last because ->init_fs_context may change the
+ * namespace subscriptions.
+ */
+ ret = security_fs_context_alloc(fc, reference);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ return fc;
+
+err_fc:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_new_fs_context);
+
+/**
+ * vfs_sb_reconfig - Create a filesystem context for remount/reconfiguration
+ * @mountpoint: The mountpoint to open
+ * @sb_flags: Filesystem/superblock flags (SB_*)
+ *
+ * Open a mounted filesystem and create a filesystem context such that a
+ * remount can be effected.
+ */
+struct fs_context *vfs_sb_reconfig(struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int sb_flags)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(mountpoint->dentry->d_sb->s_type,
+ mountpoint->dentry,
+ sb_flags, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return fc;
+
+ return fc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * vfs_dup_fc_config: Duplicate a filesytem context.
+ * @src_fc: The context to copy.
+ */
+struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!src_fc->ops->dup)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+
+ fc = kmemdup(src_fc, sizeof(struct legacy_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fc)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ fc->fs_private = NULL;
+ fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
+ fc->source = NULL;
+ fc->security = NULL;
+ get_filesystem(fc->fs_type);
+ get_net(fc->net_ns);
+ get_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
+ get_cred(fc->cred);
+
+ /* Can't call put until we've called ->dup */
+ ret = fc->ops->dup(fc, src_fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ ret = security_fs_context_dup(fc, src_fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+ return fc;
+
+err_fc:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_dup_fs_context);
+
+/**
+ * put_fs_context - Dispose of a superblock configuration context.
+ * @fc: The context to dispose of.
+ */
+void put_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb;
+
+ if (fc->root) {
+ sb = fc->root->d_sb;
+ dput(fc->root);
+ fc->root = NULL;
+ deactivate_super(sb);
+ }
+
+ if (fc->need_free && fc->ops && fc->ops->free)
+ fc->ops->free(fc);
+
+ security_fs_context_free(fc);
+ if (fc->net_ns)
+ put_net(fc->net_ns);
+ put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
+ if (fc->cred)
+ put_cred(fc->cred);
+ kfree(fc->subtype);
+ put_filesystem(fc->fs_type);
+ kfree(fc->source);
+ kfree(fc);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_fs_context);
+
+/*
+ * Free the config for a filesystem that doesn't support fs_context.
+ */
+static void legacy_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct legacy_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ if (ctx) {
+ free_secdata(ctx->secdata);
+ switch (ctx->param_type) {
+ case LEGACY_FS_UNSET_PARAMS:
+ case LEGACY_FS_NO_PARAMS:
+ break;
+ case LEGACY_FS_MAGIC_PARAMS:
+ break; /* ctx->data is a weird pointer */
+ default:
+ kfree(ctx->legacy_data);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Duplicate a legacy config.
+ */
+static int legacy_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ struct legacy_fs_context *ctx;
+ struct legacy_fs_context *src_ctx = src_fc->fs_private;
+
+ ctx = kmemdup(src_ctx, sizeof(*src_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ switch (ctx->param_type) {
+ case LEGACY_FS_MONOLITHIC_PARAMS:
+ case LEGACY_FS_INDIVIDUAL_PARAMS:
+ ctx->legacy_data = kmemdup(src_ctx->legacy_data,
+ src_ctx->data_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->legacy_data) {
+ kfree(ctx);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ fc->fs_private = ctx;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a parameter to a legacy config. We build up a comma-separated list of
+ * options.
+ */
+static int legacy_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct legacy_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ unsigned int size = ctx->data_size;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(param->key, "source") == 0) {
+ if (param->type != fs_value_is_string)
+ return invalf(fc, "VFS: Legacy: Non-string source");
+ if (fc->source)
+ return invalf(fc, "VFS: Legacy: Multiple sources");
+ fc->source = param->string;
+ param->string = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->param_type != LEGACY_FS_UNSET_PARAMS &&
+ ctx->param_type != LEGACY_FS_INDIVIDUAL_PARAMS)
+ return invalf(fc, "VFS: Legacy: Can't mix monolithic and individual options");
+
+ switch (param->type) {
+ case fs_value_is_string:
+ len = 1 + param->size;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case fs_value_is_flag:
+ len += strlen(param->key);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return invalf(fc, "VFS: Legacy: Parameter type for '%s' not supported",
+ param->key);
+ }
+
+ if (len > PAGE_SIZE - 2 - size)
+ return invalf(fc, "VFS: Legacy: Cumulative options too large");
+ if (strchr(param->key, ',') ||
+ (param->type == fs_value_is_string &&
+ memchr(param->string, ',', param->size)))
+ return invalf(fc, "VFS: Legacy: Option '%s' contained comma",
+ param->key);
+ if (!ctx->legacy_data) {
+ ctx->legacy_data = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->legacy_data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ctx->legacy_data[size++] = ',';
+ len = strlen(param->key);
+ memcpy(ctx->legacy_data + size, param->key, len);
+ size += len;
+ if (param->type == fs_value_is_string) {
+ ctx->legacy_data[size++] = '=';
+ memcpy(ctx->legacy_data + size, param->string, param->size);
+ size += len;
+ }
+ ctx->legacy_data[size] = '\0';
+ ctx->data_size = size;
+ ctx->param_type = LEGACY_FS_INDIVIDUAL_PARAMS;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add monolithic mount data.
+ */
+static int legacy_parse_monolithic(struct fs_context *fc, void *data, size_t data_size)
+{
+ struct legacy_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ if (ctx->param_type != LEGACY_FS_UNSET_PARAMS) {
+ pr_warn("VFS: Can't mix monolithic and individual options\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!data) {
+ ctx->param_type = LEGACY_FS_NO_PARAMS;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ctx->data_size = data_size;
+ if (data_size > 0) {
+ ctx->legacy_data = kmemdup(data, data_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->legacy_data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ctx->param_type = LEGACY_FS_MONOLITHIC_PARAMS;
+ } else {
+ /* Some filesystems pass weird pointers through that we don't
+ * want to copy. They can indicate this by setting data_size
+ * to 0.
+ */
+ ctx->legacy_data = data;
+ ctx->param_type = LEGACY_FS_MAGIC_PARAMS;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the legacy mount validation step to strip out and process security
+ * config options.
+ */
+static int legacy_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct legacy_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ switch (ctx->param_type) {
+ case LEGACY_FS_UNSET_PARAMS:
+ ctx->param_type = LEGACY_FS_NO_PARAMS;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case LEGACY_FS_NO_PARAMS:
+ case LEGACY_FS_MAGIC_PARAMS:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->secdata = alloc_secdata();
+ if (!ctx->secdata)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return security_sb_copy_data(ctx->legacy_data, ctx->data_size,
+ ctx->secdata);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine the superblock subtype.
+ */
+static int legacy_set_subtype(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ const char *subtype = strchr(fc->fs_type->name, '.');
+
+ if (subtype) {
+ subtype++;
+ if (!subtype[0])
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ subtype = "";
+ }
+
+ fc->subtype = kstrdup(subtype, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fc->subtype)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a mountable root with the legacy mount command.
+ */
+static int legacy_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct legacy_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ struct super_block *sb;
+ struct dentry *root;
+ int ret;
+
+ root = fc->fs_type->mount(fc->fs_type, fc->sb_flags,
+ fc->source, ctx->legacy_data,
+ ctx->data_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(root))
+ return PTR_ERR(root);
+
+ sb = root->d_sb;
+ BUG_ON(!sb);
+
+ if ((fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_HAS_SUBTYPE) &&
+ !fc->subtype) {
+ ret = legacy_set_subtype(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_sb;
+ }
+
+ fc->root = root;
+ return 0;
+
+err_sb:
+ dput(root);
+ deactivate_locked_super(sb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops = {
+ .free = legacy_fs_context_free,
+ .dup = legacy_fs_context_dup,
+ .parse_param = legacy_parse_param,
+ .parse_monolithic = legacy_parse_monolithic,
+ .validate = legacy_validate,
+ .get_tree = legacy_get_tree,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a legacy context for a filesystem that doesn't support
+ * fs_context.
+ */
+static int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+
+ fc->fs_private = kzalloc(sizeof(struct legacy_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fc->fs_private)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fc->ops = &legacy_fs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index f11b834ff1e6..546302e98a04 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ extern int __block_write_begin_int(struct page *page, loff_t pos, unsigned len,
*/
extern void __init chrdev_init(void);
+/*
+ * fs_context.c
+ */
+extern const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops;
+
/*
* namei.c
*/
@@ -101,7 +106,8 @@ extern struct file *get_empty_filp(void);
/*
* super.c
*/
-extern int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *, int, void *, size_t, int);
+extern int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *, int, void *, size_t, int,
+ struct fs_context *);
extern bool trylock_super(struct super_block *sb);
extern struct dentry *mount_fs(struct file_system_type *,
int, const char *, void *, size_t);
diff --git a/fs/libfs.c b/fs/libfs.c
index 9f1f4884b7cc..d9a5d883dc3f 100644
--- a/fs/libfs.c
+++ b/fs/libfs.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/vfs.h>
#include <linux/quotaops.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
@@ -574,13 +575,29 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pin_fs_lock);
int simple_pin_fs(struct file_system_type *type, struct vfsmount **mount, int *count)
{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
spin_lock(&pin_fs_lock);
if (unlikely(!*mount)) {
spin_unlock(&pin_fs_lock);
- mnt = vfs_kern_mount(type, SB_KERNMOUNT, type->name, NULL, 0);
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(type, NULL, 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return PTR_ERR(fc);
+
+ ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, 0);
+ put_fs_context(fc);
if (IS_ERR(mnt))
return PTR_ERR(mnt);
+
spin_lock(&pin_fs_lock);
if (!*mount)
*mount = mnt;
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 859dc473e2ad..51a6799c3f61 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/task_work.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include "pnode.h"
#include "internal.h"
@@ -1017,56 +1019,6 @@ static struct mount *skip_mnt_tree(struct mount *p)
return p;
}
-struct vfsmount *
-vfs_kern_mount(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, const char *name,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- struct mount *mnt;
- struct dentry *root;
-
- if (!type)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
-
- mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(name);
- if (!mnt)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
- if (flags & SB_KERNMOUNT)
- mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = MNT_INTERNAL;
-
- root = mount_fs(type, flags, name, data, data_size);
- if (IS_ERR(root)) {
- mnt_free_id(mnt);
- free_vfsmnt(mnt);
- return ERR_CAST(root);
- }
-
- mnt->mnt.mnt_root = root;
- mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = root->d_sb;
- mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
- mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
- lock_mount_hash();
- list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &root->d_sb->s_mounts);
- unlock_mount_hash();
- return &mnt->mnt;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_kern_mount);
-
-struct vfsmount *
-vfs_submount(const struct dentry *mountpoint, struct file_system_type *type,
- const char *name, void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- /* Until it is worked out how to pass the user namespace
- * through from the parent mount to the submount don't support
- * unprivileged mounts with submounts.
- */
- if (mountpoint->d_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
- return vfs_kern_mount(type, SB_SUBMOUNT, name, data, data_size);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_submount);
-
static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
int flag)
{
@@ -1594,7 +1546,7 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
return -EPERM;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
- retval = do_remount_sb(sb, SB_RDONLY, NULL, 0, 0);
+ retval = do_remount_sb(sb, SB_RDONLY, NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return retval;
}
@@ -2439,6 +2391,20 @@ static int do_reconfigure_mnt(struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Parse the monolithic page of mount data given to sys_mount().
+ */
+static int parse_monolithic_mount_data(struct fs_context *fc, void *data, size_t data_size)
+{
+ int (*monolithic_mount_data)(struct fs_context *, void *, size_t);
+
+ monolithic_mount_data = fc->ops->parse_monolithic;
+ if (!monolithic_mount_data)
+ monolithic_mount_data = generic_parse_monolithic;
+
+ return monolithic_mount_data(fc, data, data_size);
+}
+
/*
* change filesystem flags. dir should be a physical root of filesystem.
* If you've mounted a non-root directory somewhere and want to do remount
@@ -2447,9 +2413,11 @@ static int do_reconfigure_mnt(struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
int mnt_flags, void *data, size_t data_size)
{
+ struct fs_context *fc = NULL;
int err;
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
+ struct file_system_type *type = sb->s_type;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2460,18 +2428,41 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
if (!can_change_locked_flags(mnt, mnt_flags))
return -EPERM;
- err = security_sb_remount(sb, data, data_size);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ if (type->init_fs_context) {
+ fc = vfs_sb_reconfig(path, sb_flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return PTR_ERR(fc);
+
+ err = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data, data_size);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ if (fc->ops->validate) {
+ err = fc->ops->validate(fc);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+ }
+
+ err = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ } else {
+ err = security_sb_remount(sb, data, data_size);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
err = -EPERM;
if (ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- err = do_remount_sb(sb, sb_flags, data, data_size, 0);
+ err = do_remount_sb(sb, sb_flags, data, data_size, 0, fc);
if (!err)
set_mount_attributes(mnt, mnt_flags);
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+err_fc:
+ if (fc)
+ put_fs_context(fc);
return err;
}
@@ -2576,29 +2567,6 @@ static int do_move_mount_old(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
return err;
}
-static struct vfsmount *fs_set_subtype(struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *fstype)
-{
- int err;
- const char *subtype = strchr(fstype, '.');
- if (subtype) {
- subtype++;
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (!subtype[0])
- goto err;
- } else
- subtype = "";
-
- mnt->mnt_sb->s_subtype = kstrdup(subtype, GFP_KERNEL);
- err = -ENOMEM;
- if (!mnt->mnt_sb->s_subtype)
- goto err;
- return mnt;
-
- err:
- mntput(mnt);
- return ERR_PTR(err);
-}
-
/*
* add a mount into a namespace's mount tree
*/
@@ -2643,44 +2611,88 @@ static int do_add_mount(struct mount *newmnt, struct path *path, int mnt_flags)
return err;
}
-static bool mount_too_revealing(struct vfsmount *mnt, int *new_mnt_flags);
+static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags);
+
+/*
+ * Create a new mount using a superblock configuration and request it
+ * be added to the namespace tree.
+ */
+static int do_new_mount_fc(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = security_sb_mountpoint(fc, mountpoint,
+ mnt_flags & ~MNT_INTERNAL_FLAGS);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (mount_too_revealing(fc->root->d_sb, &mnt_flags)) {
+ pr_warn("VFS: Mount too revealing\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, mnt_flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(mnt))
+ return PTR_ERR(mnt);
+
+ ret = do_add_mount(real_mount(mnt), mountpoint, mnt_flags);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_mnt;
+ return ret;
+
+err_mnt:
+ mntput(mnt);
+ return ret;
+}
/*
* create a new mount for userspace and request it to be added into the
* namespace's tree
*/
-static int do_new_mount(struct path *path, const char *fstype, int sb_flags,
- int mnt_flags, const char *name,
+static int do_new_mount(struct path *mountpoint, const char *fstype,
+ int sb_flags, int mnt_flags, const char *name,
void *data, size_t data_size)
{
- struct file_system_type *type;
- struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ struct file_system_type *fs_type;
+ struct fs_context *fc;
int err;
if (!fstype)
return -EINVAL;
- type = get_fs_type(fstype);
- if (!type)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- mnt = vfs_kern_mount(type, sb_flags, name, data, data_size);
- if (!IS_ERR(mnt) && (type->fs_flags & FS_HAS_SUBTYPE) &&
- !mnt->mnt_sb->s_subtype)
- mnt = fs_set_subtype(mnt, fstype);
+ err = -ENODEV;
+ fs_type = get_fs_type(fstype);
+ if (!fs_type)
+ goto out;
- put_filesystem(type);
- if (IS_ERR(mnt))
- return PTR_ERR(mnt);
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(fs_type, NULL, sb_flags,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT);
+ put_filesystem(fs_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(fc);
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (mount_too_revealing(mnt, &mnt_flags)) {
- mntput(mnt);
- return -EPERM;
+ if (name) {
+ err = vfs_parse_fs_string(fc, "source", name, strlen(name));
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out_fc;
}
- err = do_add_mount(real_mount(mnt), path, mnt_flags);
- if (err)
- mntput(mnt);
+ err = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data, data_size);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out_fc;
+
+ err = vfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out_fc;
+
+ err = do_new_mount_fc(fc, mountpoint, mnt_flags);
+out_fc:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+out:
return err;
}
@@ -3230,6 +3242,118 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mount, char __user *, dev_name, char __user *, dir_name,
return ksys_mount(dev_name, dir_name, type, flags, data);
}
+/**
+ * vfs_create_mount - Create a mount for a configured superblock
+ * @fc: The configuration context with the superblock attached
+ * @mnt_flags: The mount flags to apply
+ *
+ * Create a mount to an already configured superblock. If necessary, the
+ * caller should invoke vfs_get_tree() before calling this.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not attach the mount to anything.
+ */
+struct vfsmount *vfs_create_mount(struct fs_context *fc, unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ struct mount *mnt;
+
+ if (!fc->root)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(fc->source ?: "none");
+ if (!mnt)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT)
+ /* It's a longterm mount, don't release mnt until we unmount
+ * before file sys is unregistered
+ */
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_INTERNAL;
+
+ atomic_inc(&fc->root->d_sb->s_active);
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = fc->root->d_sb;
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(fc->root);
+ mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
+ mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
+
+ lock_mount_hash();
+ list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_mounts);
+ unlock_mount_hash();
+ return &mnt->mnt;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_create_mount);
+
+struct vfsmount *vfs_kern_mount(struct file_system_type *type,
+ int sb_flags, const char *devname,
+ void *data, size_t data_size)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!type)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(type, NULL, sb_flags,
+ sb_flags & SB_KERNMOUNT ?
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT :
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return ERR_CAST(fc);
+
+ if (devname) {
+ ret = vfs_parse_fs_string(fc, "source",
+ devname, strlen(devname));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+ }
+
+ ret = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data, data_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, 0);
+out:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return mnt;
+err_fc:
+ mnt = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto out;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_kern_mount);
+
+struct vfsmount *
+vfs_submount(const struct dentry *mountpoint, struct file_system_type *type,
+ const char *name, void *data, size_t data_size)
+{
+ /* Until it is worked out how to pass the user namespace
+ * through from the parent mount to the submount don't support
+ * unprivileged mounts with submounts.
+ */
+ if (mountpoint->d_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
+ return vfs_kern_mount(type, MS_SUBMOUNT, name, data, data_size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_submount);
+
+struct vfsmount *kern_mount(struct file_system_type *type)
+{
+ return vfs_kern_mount(type, SB_KERNMOUNT, type->name, NULL, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kern_mount);
+
+struct vfsmount *kern_mount_data(struct file_system_type *type,
+ void *data, size_t data_size)
+{
+ return vfs_kern_mount(type, SB_KERNMOUNT, type->name, data, data_size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kern_mount_data);
+
/*
* Move a mount from one place to another.
* In combination with open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE [| AT_RECURSIVE]) it can be
@@ -3507,22 +3631,6 @@ void put_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns)
free_mnt_ns(ns);
}
-struct vfsmount *kern_mount_data(struct file_system_type *type,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- struct vfsmount *mnt;
- mnt = vfs_kern_mount(type, SB_KERNMOUNT, type->name, data, data_size);
- if (!IS_ERR(mnt)) {
- /*
- * it is a longterm mount, don't release mnt until
- * we unmount before file sys is unregistered
- */
- real_mount(mnt)->mnt_ns = MNT_NS_INTERNAL;
- }
- return mnt;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kern_mount_data);
-
void kern_unmount(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
/* release long term mount so mount point can be released */
@@ -3563,7 +3671,8 @@ bool current_chrooted(void)
return chrooted;
}
-static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, struct vfsmount *new,
+static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns,
+ const struct super_block *sb,
int *new_mnt_flags)
{
int new_flags = *new_mnt_flags;
@@ -3575,7 +3684,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, struct vfsmount *new,
struct mount *child;
int mnt_flags;
- if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type != new->mnt_sb->s_type)
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type != sb->s_type)
continue;
/* This mount is not fully visible if it's root directory
@@ -3626,7 +3735,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, struct vfsmount *new,
return visible;
}
-static bool mount_too_revealing(struct vfsmount *mnt, int *new_mnt_flags)
+static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags)
{
const unsigned long required_iflags = SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
@@ -3636,7 +3745,7 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(struct vfsmount *mnt, int *new_mnt_flags)
return false;
/* Can this filesystem be too revealing? */
- s_iflags = mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags;
+ s_iflags = sb->s_iflags;
if (!(s_iflags & SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE))
return false;
@@ -3646,7 +3755,7 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(struct vfsmount *mnt, int *new_mnt_flags)
return true;
}
- return !mnt_already_visible(ns, mnt, new_mnt_flags);
+ return !mnt_already_visible(ns, sb, new_mnt_flags);
}
bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt)
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index c9d208b7999e..7c5541453081 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include "internal.h"
static int thaw_super_locked(struct super_block *sb);
@@ -184,16 +185,13 @@ static void destroy_unused_super(struct super_block *s)
}
/**
- * alloc_super - create new superblock
- * @type: filesystem type superblock should belong to
- * @flags: the mount flags
- * @user_ns: User namespace for the super_block
+ * alloc_super - Create new superblock
+ * @fc: The filesystem configuration context
*
* Allocates and initializes a new &struct super_block. alloc_super()
* returns a pointer new superblock or %NULL if allocation had failed.
*/
-static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags,
- struct user_namespace *user_ns)
+static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct super_block *s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct super_block), GFP_USER);
static const struct super_operations default_op;
@@ -203,9 +201,9 @@ static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags,
return NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_mounts);
- s->s_user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
+ s->s_user_ns = get_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
init_rwsem(&s->s_umount);
- lockdep_set_class(&s->s_umount, &type->s_umount_key);
+ lockdep_set_class(&s->s_umount, &fc->fs_type->s_umount_key);
/*
* sget() can have s_umount recursion.
*
@@ -229,12 +227,12 @@ static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags,
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++) {
if (__percpu_init_rwsem(&s->s_writers.rw_sem[i],
sb_writers_name[i],
- &type->s_writers_key[i]))
+ &fc->fs_type->s_writers_key[i]))
goto fail;
}
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait_unfrozen);
s->s_bdi = &noop_backing_dev_info;
- s->s_flags = flags;
+ s->s_flags = fc->sb_flags;
if (s->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
s->s_iflags |= SB_I_NODEV;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&s->s_instances);
@@ -252,7 +250,7 @@ static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags,
s->s_count = 1;
atomic_set(&s->s_active, 1);
mutex_init(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
- lockdep_set_class(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex, &type->s_vfs_rename_key);
+ lockdep_set_class(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex, &fc->fs_type->s_vfs_rename_key);
init_rwsem(&s->s_dquot.dqio_sem);
s->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
s->s_op = &default_op;
@@ -472,6 +470,89 @@ void generic_shutdown_super(struct super_block *sb)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_shutdown_super);
+/**
+ * sget_fc - Find or create a superblock
+ * @fc: Filesystem context.
+ * @test: Comparison callback
+ * @set: Setup callback
+ *
+ * Find or create a superblock using the parameters stored in the filesystem
+ * context and the two callback functions.
+ *
+ * If an extant superblock is matched, then that will be returned with an
+ * elevated reference count that the caller must transfer or discard.
+ *
+ * If no match is made, a new superblock will be allocated and basic
+ * initialisation will be performed (s_type, s_fs_info and s_id will be set and
+ * the set() callback will be invoked), the superblock will be published and it
+ * will be returned in a partially constructed state with SB_BORN and SB_ACTIVE
+ * as yet unset.
+ */
+struct super_block *sget_fc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ int (*test)(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *),
+ int (*set)(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *))
+{
+ struct super_block *s = NULL;
+ struct super_block *old;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!(fc->sb_flags & SB_KERNMOUNT) &&
+ fc->purpose != FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT) {
+ /* Don't allow mounting unless the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+ * over the namespace.
+ */
+ if (!(fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ else if (!ns_capable(fc->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ }
+
+retry:
+ spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+ if (test) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(old, &fc->fs_type->fs_supers, s_instances) {
+ if (!test(old, fc))
+ continue;
+ if (fc->user_ns != old->s_user_ns) {
+ spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+ destroy_unused_super(s);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+ }
+ if (!grab_super(old))
+ goto retry;
+ destroy_unused_super(s);
+ return old;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!s) {
+ spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+ s = alloc_super(fc);
+ if (!s)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+
+ s->s_fs_info = fc->s_fs_info;
+ err = set(s, fc);
+ if (err) {
+ s->s_fs_info = NULL;
+ spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+ destroy_unused_super(s);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+ fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
+ s->s_type = fc->fs_type;
+ strlcpy(s->s_id, s->s_type->name, sizeof(s->s_id));
+ list_add_tail(&s->s_list, &super_blocks);
+ hlist_add_head(&s->s_instances, &s->s_type->fs_supers);
+ spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+ get_filesystem(s->s_type);
+ register_shrinker_prepared(&s->s_shrink);
+ return s;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sget_fc);
+
/**
* sget_userns - find or create a superblock
* @type: filesystem type superblock should belong to
@@ -514,7 +595,14 @@ struct super_block *sget_userns(struct file_system_type *type,
}
if (!s) {
spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
- s = alloc_super(type, (flags & ~SB_SUBMOUNT), user_ns);
+ {
+ struct fs_context fc = {
+ .fs_type = type,
+ .sb_flags = flags & ~SB_SUBMOUNT,
+ .user_ns = user_ns,
+ };
+ s = alloc_super(&fc);
+ }
if (!s)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto retry;
@@ -838,11 +926,13 @@ struct super_block *user_get_super(dev_t dev)
* @data: the rest of options
* @data_size: The size of the data
* @force: whether or not to force the change
+ * @fc: the superblock config for filesystems that support it
+ * (NULL if called from emergency or umount)
*
* Alters the mount options of a mounted file system.
*/
int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int sb_flags, void *data,
- size_t data_size, int force)
+ size_t data_size, int force, struct fs_context *fc)
{
int retval;
int remount_ro;
@@ -884,8 +974,17 @@ int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int sb_flags, void *data,
}
}
- if (sb->s_op->remount_fs) {
- retval = sb->s_op->remount_fs(sb, &sb_flags, data, data_size);
+ if (sb->s_op->reconfigure ||
+ sb->s_op->remount_fs) {
+ if (sb->s_op->reconfigure) {
+ retval = sb->s_op->reconfigure(sb, fc);
+ sb_flags = fc->sb_flags;
+ if (retval == 0)
+ security_sb_reconfigure(fc);
+ } else {
+ retval = sb->s_op->remount_fs(sb, &sb_flags,
+ data, data_size);
+ }
if (retval) {
if (!force)
goto cancel_readonly;
@@ -924,7 +1023,7 @@ static void do_emergency_remount_callback(struct super_block *sb)
/*
* What lock protects sb->s_flags??
*/
- do_remount_sb(sb, SB_RDONLY, NULL, 0, 1);
+ do_remount_sb(sb, SB_RDONLY, NULL, 0, 1, NULL);
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
}
@@ -1106,6 +1205,89 @@ struct dentry *mount_ns(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(mount_ns);
+int set_anon_super_fc(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return set_anon_super(sb, NULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_anon_super_fc);
+
+static int test_keyed_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return sb->s_fs_info == fc->s_fs_info;
+}
+
+static int test_single_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * vfs_get_super - Get a superblock with a search key set in s_fs_info.
+ * @fc: The filesystem context holding the parameters
+ * @keying: How to distinguish superblocks
+ * @fill_super: Helper to initialise a new superblock
+ *
+ * Search for a superblock and create a new one if not found. The search
+ * criterion is controlled by @keying. If the search fails, a new superblock
+ * is created and @fill_super() is called to initialise it.
+ *
+ * @keying can take one of a number of values:
+ *
+ * (1) vfs_get_single_super - Only one superblock of this type may exist on the
+ * system. This is typically used for special system filesystems.
+ *
+ * (2) vfs_get_keyed_super - Multiple superblocks may exist, but they must have
+ * distinct keys (where the key is in s_fs_info). Searching for the same
+ * key again will turn up the superblock for that key.
+ *
+ * (3) vfs_get_independent_super - Multiple superblocks may exist and are
+ * unkeyed. Each call will get a new superblock.
+ *
+ * A permissions check is made by sget_fc() unless we're getting a superblock
+ * for a kernel-internal mount or a submount.
+ */
+int vfs_get_super(struct fs_context *fc,
+ enum vfs_get_super_keying keying,
+ int (*fill_super)(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct fs_context *fc))
+{
+ int (*test)(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *);
+ struct super_block *sb;
+
+ switch (keying) {
+ case vfs_get_single_super:
+ test = test_single_super;
+ break;
+ case vfs_get_keyed_super:
+ test = test_keyed_super;
+ break;
+ case vfs_get_independent_super:
+ test = NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ sb = sget_fc(fc, test, set_anon_super_fc);
+ if (IS_ERR(sb))
+ return PTR_ERR(sb);
+
+ if (!sb->s_root) {
+ int err = fill_super(sb, fc);
+ if (err) {
+ deactivate_locked_super(sb);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ sb->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE;
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(fc->root);
+ fc->root = dget(sb->s_root);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_get_super);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
static int set_bdev_super(struct super_block *s, void *data)
{
@@ -1254,7 +1436,7 @@ struct dentry *mount_single(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
}
s->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE;
} else {
- do_remount_sb(s, flags, data, data_size, 0);
+ do_remount_sb(s, flags, data, data_size, 0, NULL);
}
return dget(s->s_root);
}
@@ -1601,3 +1783,90 @@ int thaw_super(struct super_block *sb)
return thaw_super_locked(sb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(thaw_super);
+
+/**
+ * vfs_get_tree - Get the mountable root
+ * @fc: The superblock configuration context.
+ *
+ * The filesystem is invoked to get or create a superblock which can then later
+ * be used for mounting. The filesystem places a pointer to the root to be
+ * used for mounting in @fc->root.
+ */
+int vfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV && !fc->source)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ if (fc->root)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (fc->ops->validate) {
+ ret = fc->ops->validate(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Get the mountable root in fc->root, with a ref on the root and a ref
+ * on the superblock.
+ */
+ ret = fc->ops->get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!fc->root) {
+ pr_err("Filesystem %s get_tree() didn't set fc->root\n",
+ fc->fs_type->name);
+ /* We don't know what the locking state of the superblock is -
+ * if there is a superblock.
+ */
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ sb = fc->root->d_sb;
+ WARN_ON(!sb->s_bdi);
+
+ ret = security_sb_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_sb;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (fc->subtype && !sb->s_subtype) {
+ sb->s_subtype = kstrdup(fc->subtype, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sb->s_subtype)
+ goto err_sb;
+ }
+
+ /* Write barrier is for super_cache_count(). We place it before setting
+ * SB_BORN as the data dependency between the two functions is the
+ * superblock structure contents that we just set up, not the SB_BORN
+ * flag.
+ */
+ smp_wmb();
+ sb->s_flags |= SB_BORN;
+
+ /* Filesystems should never set s_maxbytes larger than MAX_LFS_FILESIZE
+ * but s_maxbytes was an unsigned long long for many releases. Throw
+ * this warning for a little while to try and catch filesystems that
+ * violate this rule.
+ */
+ WARN(sb->s_maxbytes < 0,
+ "%s set sb->s_maxbytes to negative value (%lld)\n",
+ fc->fs_type->name, sb->s_maxbytes);
+
+ up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ return 0;
+
+err_sb:
+ dput(fc->root);
+ fc->root = NULL;
+ deactivate_locked_super(sb);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_get_tree);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 067f0e31aec7..00a24f4b2f0b 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ struct workqueue_struct;
struct iov_iter;
struct fscrypt_info;
struct fscrypt_operations;
+struct fs_context;
+struct fsconfig_parser;
+struct fsconfig_param;
extern void __init inode_init(void);
extern void __init inode_init_early(void);
@@ -723,6 +726,11 @@ static inline void inode_unlock(struct inode *inode)
up_write(&inode->i_rwsem);
}
+static inline int inode_lock_killable(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return down_write_killable(&inode->i_rwsem);
+}
+
static inline void inode_lock_shared(struct inode *inode)
{
down_read(&inode->i_rwsem);
@@ -1842,6 +1850,7 @@ struct super_operations {
int (*unfreeze_fs) (struct super_block *);
int (*statfs) (struct dentry *, struct kstatfs *);
int (*remount_fs) (struct super_block *, int *, char *, size_t);
+ int (*reconfigure) (struct super_block *, struct fs_context *);
void (*umount_begin) (struct super_block *);
int (*show_options)(struct seq_file *, struct dentry *);
@@ -2098,6 +2107,8 @@ struct file_system_type {
#define FS_HAS_SUBTYPE 4
#define FS_USERNS_MOUNT 8 /* Can be mounted by userns root */
#define FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE 32768 /* FS will handle d_move() during rename() internally. */
+ int (*init_fs_context)(struct fs_context *, struct dentry *);
+ const struct fs_parameter_description *parameters;
struct dentry *(*mount) (struct file_system_type *, int,
const char *, void *, size_t);
void (*kill_sb) (struct super_block *);
@@ -2154,8 +2165,12 @@ void kill_litter_super(struct super_block *sb);
void deactivate_super(struct super_block *sb);
void deactivate_locked_super(struct super_block *sb);
int set_anon_super(struct super_block *s, void *data);
+int set_anon_super_fc(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc);
int get_anon_bdev(dev_t *);
void free_anon_bdev(dev_t);
+struct super_block *sget_fc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ int (*test)(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *),
+ int (*set)(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *));
struct super_block *sget_userns(struct file_system_type *type,
int (*test)(struct super_block *,void *),
int (*set)(struct super_block *,void *),
@@ -2198,8 +2213,8 @@ mount_pseudo(struct file_system_type *fs_type, char *name,
extern int register_filesystem(struct file_system_type *);
extern int unregister_filesystem(struct file_system_type *);
+extern struct vfsmount *kern_mount(struct file_system_type *);
extern struct vfsmount *kern_mount_data(struct file_system_type *, void *, size_t);
-#define kern_mount(type) kern_mount_data(type, NULL, 0)
extern void kern_unmount(struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern int may_umount_tree(struct vfsmount *);
extern int may_umount(struct vfsmount *);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
index a88b54752f86..bbb8114f2fdc 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct pid_namespace;
struct super_block;
struct user_namespace;
struct vfsmount;
+struct path;
enum fs_context_purpose {
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT, /* New superblock for user-specified mount */
@@ -33,6 +34,19 @@ enum fs_context_purpose {
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE, /* Superblock reconfiguration (remount) */
};
+/*
+ * Userspace usage phase for fsopen/fspick.
+ */
+enum fs_context_phase {
+ FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS, /* Loading params for sb creation */
+ FS_CONTEXT_CREATING, /* A superblock is being created */
+ FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_MOUNT, /* Superblock created, awaiting fsmount() */
+ FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_RECONF, /* Awaiting initialisation for reconfiguration */
+ FS_CONTEXT_RECONF_PARAMS, /* Loading params for reconfiguration */
+ FS_CONTEXT_RECONFIGURING, /* Reconfiguring the superblock */
+ FS_CONTEXT_FAILED, /* Failed to correctly transition a context */
+};
+
/*
* Type of parameter value.
*/
@@ -85,8 +99,10 @@ struct fs_context {
void *s_fs_info; /* Proposed s_fs_info */
unsigned int sb_flags; /* Proposed superblock flags (SB_*) */
enum fs_context_purpose purpose:8;
+ enum fs_context_phase phase:8; /* The phase the context is in */
bool sloppy:1; /* T if unrecognised options are okay */
bool silent:1; /* T if "o silent" specified */
+ bool need_free:1; /* Need to call ops->free() */
};
struct fs_context_operations {
@@ -98,6 +114,35 @@ struct fs_context_operations {
int (*get_tree)(struct fs_context *fc);
};
+/*
+ * fs_context manipulation functions.
+ */
+extern struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+ struct dentry *reference,
+ unsigned int ms_flags,
+ enum fs_context_purpose purpose);
+extern struct fs_context *vfs_sb_reconfig(struct path *path, unsigned int ms_flags);
+extern struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src);
+extern int vfs_parse_fs_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param);
+extern int vfs_parse_fs_string(struct fs_context *fc, const char *key,
+ const char *value, size_t v_size);
+extern int generic_parse_monolithic(struct fs_context *fc, void *data, size_t data_size);
+extern int vfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
+extern void put_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+/*
+ * sget() wrapper to be called from the ->get_tree() op.
+ */
+enum vfs_get_super_keying {
+ vfs_get_single_super, /* Only one such superblock may exist */
+ vfs_get_keyed_super, /* Superblocks with different s_fs_info keys may exist */
+ vfs_get_independent_super, /* Multiple independent superblocks may exist */
+};
+extern int vfs_get_super(struct fs_context *fc,
+ enum vfs_get_super_keying keying,
+ int (*fill_super)(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct fs_context *fc));
+
#define logfc(FC, FMT, ...) pr_notice(FMT, ## __VA_ARGS__)
/**
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index c9edd284f0af..41b6b080ffd0 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct super_block;
struct vfsmount;
struct dentry;
struct mnt_namespace;
+struct fs_context;
#define MNT_NOSUID 0x01
#define MNT_NODEV 0x02
@@ -88,6 +89,8 @@ struct path;
extern struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(const struct path *path);
struct file_system_type;
+extern struct vfsmount *vfs_create_mount(struct fs_context *fc,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags);
extern struct vfsmount *vfs_kern_mount(struct file_system_type *type,
int flags, const char *name,
void *data, size_t data_size);
Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c as that's where the other
superblock stuff is.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/proc/inode.c | 49 +------------------------------------------------
fs/proc/internal.h | 4 +---
fs/proc/root.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index faf401935fa9..c5e7bbf81e10 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
return 0;
}
-static const struct super_operations proc_sops = {
+const struct super_operations proc_sops = {
.alloc_inode = proc_alloc_inode,
.destroy_inode = proc_destroy_inode,
.drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
@@ -488,49 +487,3 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct proc_dir_entry *de)
pde_put(de);
return inode;
}
-
-int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, size_t data_size,
- int silent)
-{
- struct pid_namespace *ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info);
- struct inode *root_inode;
- int ret;
-
- if (!proc_parse_options(data, ns))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
- s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
- s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOSUID | SB_NOEXEC;
- s->s_blocksize = 1024;
- s->s_blocksize_bits = 10;
- s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC;
- s->s_op = &proc_sops;
- s->s_time_gran = 1;
-
- /*
- * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is
- * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on
- * top of it
- */
- s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
-
- pde_get(&proc_root);
- root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root);
- if (!root_inode) {
- pr_err("proc_fill_super: get root inode failed\n");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- s->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode);
- if (!s->s_root) {
- pr_err("proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed\n");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- ret = proc_setup_self(s);
- if (ret) {
- return ret;
- }
- return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
-}
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 841b4391deb6..bfe2bea2c71d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -208,13 +208,12 @@ struct pde_opener {
struct completion *c;
} __randomize_layout;
extern const struct inode_operations proc_link_inode_operations;
-
extern const struct inode_operations proc_pid_link_inode_operations;
+extern const struct super_operations proc_sops;
void proc_init_kmemcache(void);
void set_proc_pid_nlink(void);
extern struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct super_block *, struct proc_dir_entry *);
-extern int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *, void *, size_t, int);
extern void proc_entry_rundown(struct proc_dir_entry *);
/*
@@ -272,7 +271,6 @@ static inline void proc_tty_init(void) {}
* root.c
*/
extern struct proc_dir_entry proc_root;
-extern int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid);
extern void proc_self_init(void);
extern int proc_remount(struct super_block *, int *, char *, size_t);
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 28fadb0c51ab..15da85cefd3f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
{Opt_err, NULL},
};
-int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
+static int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
{
char *p;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@ -78,6 +79,51 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
return 1;
}
+static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, size_t data_size, int silent)
+{
+ struct pid_namespace *ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info);
+ struct inode *root_inode;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!proc_parse_options(data, ns))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
+ s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
+ s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOSUID | SB_NOEXEC;
+ s->s_blocksize = 1024;
+ s->s_blocksize_bits = 10;
+ s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC;
+ s->s_op = &proc_sops;
+ s->s_time_gran = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is
+ * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on
+ * top of it
+ */
+ s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
+
+ pde_get(&proc_root);
+ root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root);
+ if (!root_inode) {
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: get root inode failed\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ s->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode);
+ if (!s->s_root) {
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = proc_setup_self(s);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
+}
+
int proc_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags,
char *data, size_t data_size)
{
Because the new API passes in key,value parameters, match_token() cannot be
used with it. Instead, provide three new helpers to aid with parsing:
(1) fs_parse(). This takes a parameter and a simple static description of
all the parameters and maps the key name to an ID. It returns 1 on a
match, 0 on no match if unknowns should be ignored and some other
negative error code on a parse error.
The parameter description includes a list of key names to IDs, desired
parameter types and a list of enumeration name -> ID mappings.
[!] Note that for the moment I've required that the key->ID mapping
array is expected to be sorted and unterminated. The size of the
array is noted in the fsconfig_parser struct. This allows me to use
bsearch(), but I'm not sure any performance gain is worth the hassle
of requiring people to keep the array sorted.
The parameter type array is sized according to the number of parameter
IDs and is indexed directly. The optional enum mapping array is an
unterminated, unsorted list and the size goes into the fsconfig_parser
struct.
The function can do some additional things:
(a) If it's not ambiguous and no value is given, the prefix "no" on
a key name is permitted to indicate that the parameter should
be considered negatory.
(b) If the desired type is a single simple integer, it will perform
an appropriate conversion and store the result in a union in
the parse result.
(c) If the desired type is an enumeration, {key ID, name} will be
looked up in the enumeration list and the matching value will
be stored in the parse result union.
(d) Optionally generate an error if the key is unrecognised.
This is called something like:
enum rdt_param {
Opt_cdp,
Opt_cdpl2,
Opt_mba_mpbs,
nr__rdt_params
};
const struct fs_parameter_spec rdt_param_specs[nr__rdt_params] = {
[Opt_cdp] = { fs_param_is_bool },
[Opt_cdpl2] = { fs_param_is_bool },
[Opt_mba_mpbs] = { fs_param_is_bool },
};
const struct constant_table rdt_param_keys[] = {
{ "cdp", Opt_cdp },
{ "cdpl2", Opt_cdpl2 },
{ "mba_mbps", Opt_mba_mpbs },
};
const struct fs_parameter_description rdt_parser = {
.name = "rdt",
.nr_params = nr__rdt_params,
.nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(rdt_param_keys),
.keys = rdt_param_keys,
.specs = rdt_param_specs,
.no_source = true,
};
int rdt_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
struct fs_parameter *param)
{
struct fs_parse_result parse;
struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
int ret;
ret = fs_parse(fc, &rdt_parser, param, &parse);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
switch (parse.key) {
case Opt_cdp:
ctx->enable_cdpl3 = true;
return 0;
case Opt_cdpl2:
ctx->enable_cdpl2 = true;
return 0;
case Opt_mba_mpbs:
ctx->enable_mba_mbps = true;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
(2) fs_lookup_param(). This takes a { dirfd, path, LOOKUP_EMPTY? } or
string value and performs an appropriate path lookup to convert it
into a path object, which it will then return.
If the desired type was a blockdev, the type of the looked up inode
will be checked to make sure it is one.
This can be used like:
enum foo_param {
Opt_source,
nr__foo_params
};
const struct fs_parameter_spec foo_param_specs[nr__foo_params] = {
[Opt_source] = { fs_param_is_blockdev },
};
const struct constant_table foo_param_keys[] = {
{ "source", Opt_source },
};
const struct fs_parameter_description foo_parser = {
.name = "foo",
.nr_params = nr__foo_params,
.nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(foo_param_keys),
.keys = foo_param_keys,
.specs = foo_param_specs,
};
int foo_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
struct fs_parameter *param)
{
struct fs_parse_result parse;
struct foo_fs_context *ctx = foo_fc2context(fc);
int ret;
ret = fs_parse(fc, &foo_parser, param, &parse);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
switch (parse.key) {
case Opt_source:
return fs_lookup_param(fc, &foo_parser, param,
&parse, &ctx->source);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
(3) lookup_constant(). This takes a table of named constants and looks up
the given name within it. The table is expected to be sorted such
that bsearch() be used upon it.
Possibly I should require the table be terminated and just use a
for-loop to scan it instead of using bsearch() to reduce hassle.
Tables look something like:
static const struct constant_table bool_names[] = {
{ "0", false },
{ "1", true },
{ "false", false },
{ "no", false },
{ "true", true },
{ "yes", true },
};
and a lookup is done with something like:
b = lookup_constant(bool_names, param->string, -1);
Additionally, optional validation routines for the parameter description
are provided that can be enabled at compile time. A later patch will
invoke these when a filesystem is registered.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/Kconfig | 7 +
fs/Makefile | 3
fs/fs_parser.c | 476 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/internal.h | 2
fs/namei.c | 4
include/linux/fs_parser.h | 116 +++++++++++
6 files changed, 605 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 fs/fs_parser.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/fs_parser.h
diff --git a/fs/Kconfig b/fs/Kconfig
index ac474a61be37..25700b152c75 100644
--- a/fs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/Kconfig
@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@ menu "File systems"
config DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS
bool
+config VALIDATE_FS_PARSER
+ bool "Validate filesystem parameter description"
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable this to perform validation of the parameter description for a
+ filesystem when it is registered.
+
if BLOCK
config FS_IOMAP
diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
index 293733f61594..07b894227dce 100644
--- a/fs/Makefile
+++ b/fs/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ obj-y := open.o read_write.o file_table.o super.o \
attr.o bad_inode.o file.o filesystems.o namespace.o \
seq_file.o xattr.o libfs.o fs-writeback.o \
pnode.o splice.o sync.o utimes.o d_path.o \
- stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o
+ stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o \
+ fs_parser.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_BLOCK),y)
obj-y += buffer.o block_dev.o direct-io.o mpage.o
diff --git a/fs/fs_parser.c b/fs/fs_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..12401b38cd51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/fs_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+/* Filesystem parameter parser.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/bsearch.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static const struct constant_table bool_names[] = {
+ { "0", false },
+ { "1", true },
+ { "false", false },
+ { "no", false },
+ { "true", true },
+ { "yes", true },
+};
+
+static int cmp_constant(const void *name, const void *entry)
+{
+ const struct constant_table *e = entry;
+ return strcmp(name, e->name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lookup_constant - Look up a constant by name in an ordered table
+ * @tbl: The table of constants to search.
+ * @tbl_size: The size of the table.
+ * @name: The name to look up.
+ * @not_found: The value to return if the name is not found.
+ */
+int __lookup_constant(const struct constant_table *tbl, size_t tbl_size,
+ const char *name, int not_found)
+{
+ const struct constant_table *e;
+
+ e = bsearch(name, tbl, tbl_size, sizeof(tbl[0]), cmp_constant);
+ if (!e)
+ return not_found;
+ return e->value;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__lookup_constant);
+
+/*
+ * fs_parse - Parse a filesystem configuration parameter
+ * @fc: The filesystem context to log errors through.
+ * @desc: The parameter description to use.
+ * @param: The parameter.
+ * @result: Where to place the result of the parse
+ *
+ * Parse a filesystem configuration parameter and attempt a conversion for a
+ * simple parameter for which this is requested. If successful, the determined
+ * parameter ID is placed into @result->key, the desired type is indicated in
+ * @result->t and any converted value is placed into an appropriate member of
+ * the union in @result.
+ *
+ * The function returns 1 if the parameter was matched, 0 if it wasn't matched
+ * and @desc->ignore_unknown indicated that unknown parameters are okay and
+ * -EINVAL if there was a conversion issue or the parameter wasn't recognised
+ * and unknowns aren't okay.
+ */
+int fs_parse(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct fs_parameter_description *desc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param,
+ struct fs_parse_result *result)
+{
+ int ret, k, i, b;
+
+ k = __lookup_constant(desc->keys, desc->nr_keys, param->key,
+ -EAGAIN);
+ if (k == -EAGAIN) {
+ /* If we didn't find something that looks like "noxxx", see if
+ * "xxx" takes the "no"-form negative - but only if there
+ * wasn't an value.
+ */
+ if (param->string || param->size > 0)
+ goto unknown_parameter;
+ if (param->key[0] != 'n' || param->key[1] != 'o' || !param->key[2])
+ goto unknown_parameter;
+
+ k = __lookup_constant(desc->keys, desc->nr_keys,
+ param->key + 2, -EAGAIN);
+ if (k == -EAGAIN)
+ goto unknown_parameter;
+ if (!(desc->specs[k].flags & fs_param_neg_with_no))
+ goto unknown_parameter;
+ result->key = k;
+ result->uint_32 = 0;
+ result->negated = true;
+ goto okay;
+ }
+
+ result->key = k;
+ result->negated = false;
+ if (result->key == fsconfig_key_removed)
+ return invalf(fc, "%s: Unsupported parameter name '%s'",
+ desc->name, param->key);
+
+ result->t = desc->specs[result->key];
+ if (result->t.flags & fs_param_deprecated)
+ warnf(fc, "%s: Deprecated parameter '%s'",
+ desc->name, param->key);
+
+ /* Certain parameter types only take a string and convert it. */
+ switch (result->t.type) {
+ case __fs_param_wasnt_defined:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ case fs_param_is_u32:
+ case fs_param_is_u32_octal:
+ case fs_param_is_u32_hex:
+ case fs_param_is_s32:
+ case fs_param_is_enum:
+ case fs_param_is_string:
+ if (param->type != fs_value_is_string)
+ goto bad_value;
+ /* Fall through */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to turn the type we were given into the type desired by the
+ * parameter and give an error if we can't.
+ */
+ switch (result->t.type) {
+ case fs_param_takes_no_value:
+ if (param->type != fs_value_is_flag &&
+ (param->type != fs_value_is_string || param->size > 0))
+ return invalf(fc, "%s: Unexpected value for '%s'",
+ desc->name, param->key);
+ result->boolean = true;
+ goto okay;
+
+ case fs_param_is_bool:
+ switch (param->type) {
+ case fs_value_is_flag:
+ result->boolean = true;
+ goto okay;
+ case fs_value_is_string:
+ if (param->size == 0) {
+ result->boolean = true;
+ goto okay;
+ }
+ b = lookup_constant(bool_names, param->string, -1);
+ if (b == -1)
+ goto bad_value;
+ result->boolean = b;
+ goto okay;
+ default:
+ goto bad_value;
+ }
+
+ case fs_param_is_u32:
+ ret = kstrtouint(param->string, 0, &result->uint_32);
+ goto maybe_okay;
+ case fs_param_is_u32_octal:
+ ret = kstrtouint(param->string, 8, &result->uint_32);
+ goto maybe_okay;
+ case fs_param_is_u32_hex:
+ ret = kstrtouint(param->string, 16, &result->uint_32);
+ goto maybe_okay;
+ case fs_param_is_s32:
+ ret = kstrtoint(param->string, 0, &result->int_32);
+ goto maybe_okay;
+
+ case fs_param_is_enum:
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->nr_enums; i++) {
+ if (desc->enums[i].param_id == result->key &&
+ strcmp(desc->enums[i].name, param->string) == 0) {
+ result->uint_32 = desc->enums[i].value;
+ goto okay;
+ }
+ }
+ goto bad_value;
+
+ case fs_param_is_string:
+ goto okay;
+ case fs_param_is_blob:
+ if (param->type != fs_value_is_blob)
+ goto bad_value;
+ goto okay;
+
+ case fs_param_is_fd: {
+ if (param->type != fs_value_is_file)
+ goto bad_value;
+ goto okay;
+ }
+
+ case fs_param_is_blockdev:
+ case fs_param_is_path:
+ goto okay;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+maybe_okay:
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto bad_value;
+okay:
+ return 1;
+
+bad_value:
+ return invalf(fc, "%s: Bad value for '%s'", desc->name, param->key);
+unknown_parameter:
+ if (desc->ignore_unknown)
+ return 0;
+ if (desc->no_source && strcmp(param->key, "source") == 0)
+ return 0; /* The source parameter is special */
+ return invalf(fc, "%s: Unknown parameter '%s'", desc->name, param->key);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_parse);
+
+/**
+ * fs_lookup_param - Look up a path referred to by a parameter
+ * @fc: The filesystem context to log errors through.
+ * @desc: The parameter description that was used
+ * @key: The name of the parameter.
+ * @value: The supplied value for the parameter
+ * @result: The result of the parse from a previous call to fs_parse()
+ * @_path: The result of the lookup
+ */
+int fs_lookup_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct fs_parameter_description *desc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param,
+ struct fs_parse_result *result,
+ struct path *_path)
+{
+ struct filename *f;
+ unsigned int flags = 0;
+ bool put_f;
+ int ret;
+
+ switch (param->type) {
+ case fs_value_is_string:
+ f = getname_kernel(param->string);
+ if (IS_ERR(f))
+ return PTR_ERR(f);
+ put_f = true;
+ break;
+ case fs_value_is_filename_empty:
+ flags = LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case fs_value_is_filename:
+ f = param->name;
+ put_f = false;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return invalf(fc, "%s: '%s' not usable as path",
+ desc->name, param->key);
+ }
+
+ ret = filename_lookup(param->dirfd, f, flags, _path, NULL);
+ if (put_f)
+ putname(f);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ errorf(fc, "%s: Lookup failure for '%s'",
+ desc->name, param->key);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (result->t.type == fs_param_is_blockdev &&
+ !S_ISBLK(d_real_inode(_path->dentry)->i_mode)) {
+ path_put(_path);
+ _path->dentry = NULL;
+ _path->mnt = NULL;
+ errorf(fc, "%s: Non-blockdev passed to '%s'",
+ desc->name, param->key);
+ return -ENOTBLK;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_lookup_param);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_VALIDATE_FS_PARSER
+/**
+ * validate_constant_table - Validate a constant table
+ * @tbl: The constant table to validate.
+ * @tbl_size: The size of the table.
+ * @low: The lowest permissible value.
+ * @high: The highest permissible value.
+ * @special: One special permissible value outside of the range.
+ */
+bool validate_constant_table(const struct constant_table *tbl, size_t tbl_size,
+ int low, int high, int special)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ bool good = true;
+
+ if (tbl_size == 0) {
+ pr_warn("VALIDATE C-TBL: Empty\n");
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tbl_size; i++) {
+ if (!tbl[i].name) {
+ pr_err("VALIDATE C-TBL[%zu]: Null\n", i);
+ good = false;
+ } else if (i > 0 && tbl[i - 1].name) {
+ int c = strcmp(tbl[i-1].name, tbl[i].name);
+
+ if (c == 0) {
+ pr_err("VALIDATE C-TBL[%zu]: Duplicate %s\n",
+ i, tbl[i].name);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ if (c > 0) {
+ pr_err("VALIDATE C-TBL[%zu]: Missorted %s>=%s\n",
+ i, tbl[i-1].name, tbl[i].name);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (tbl[i].value != special &&
+ (tbl[i].value < low || tbl[i].value > high)) {
+ pr_err("VALIDATE C-TBL[%zu]: %s->%d const out of range (%d-%d)\n",
+ i, tbl[i].name, tbl[i].value, low, high);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!good)
+ dump_stack();
+ return good;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fs_validate_description - Validate a parameter description
+ * @desc: The parameter description to validate.
+ */
+bool fs_validate_description(const struct fs_parameter_description *desc)
+{
+ const char *name = desc->name;
+ bool good = true, dump = true, enums = false;
+ int i, j;
+
+ if (!name[0]) {
+ pr_err("Parser: No name\n");
+ name = "Unknown";
+ good = false;
+ }
+
+ if (desc->nr_params) {
+ if (!desc->specs) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: Missing types table\n", name);
+ good = false;
+ goto no_specs;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->nr_params; i++) {
+ enum fs_parameter_type t = desc->specs[i].type;
+ if (t == __fs_param_wasnt_defined) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: [%u] Undefined type\n",
+ name, i);
+ good = false;
+ } else if (t >= nr__fs_parameter_type) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: [%u] Bad type %u\n",
+ name, i, t);
+ good = false;
+ } else if (t == fs_param_is_enum) {
+ enums = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+no_specs:
+ if (desc->nr_keys) {
+ if (!desc->nr_params) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: %u keys but 0 params\n",
+ name, desc->nr_keys);
+ good = false;
+ goto no_keys;
+ }
+ if (!desc->keys) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: Missing keys table\n", name);
+ good = false;
+ goto no_keys;
+ }
+
+ if (!validate_constant_table(desc->keys, desc->nr_keys,
+ 0, desc->nr_params - 1,
+ fsconfig_key_removed)) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: Bad keys table\n", name);
+ good = false;
+ dump = false;
+ }
+
+ /* The "source" key is used to convey the device/source
+ * information.
+ */
+ if (__lookup_constant(desc->keys, desc->nr_keys,
+ "source", -1234) == -1234) {
+ if (!desc->no_source) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: Source key, but marked no_source\n",
+ name);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (desc->no_source) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: Marked no_source, but no source key\n",
+ name);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+no_keys:
+ if (desc->nr_enums) {
+ if (!enums) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: Enum table but no enum-type values\n",
+ name);
+ good = false;
+ goto no_enums;
+ }
+ if (!desc->enums) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: Missing enums table\n", name);
+ good = false;
+ goto no_enums;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < desc->nr_enums; j++) {
+ const struct fs_parameter_enum *e = &desc->enums[j];
+
+ if (!e->name[0]) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: e[%u] no name\n", name, j);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ if (e->param_id >= desc->nr_params) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: e[%u] bad param %u\n",
+ name, j, e->param_id);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ if (desc->specs[e->param_id].type != fs_param_is_enum) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: e[%u] enum val for non-enum type %u\n",
+ name, j, e->param_id);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < desc->nr_params; i++) {
+ if (desc->specs[i].type != fs_param_is_enum)
+ continue;
+ for (j = 0; j < desc->nr_enums; j++)
+ if (desc->enums[j].param_id == i)
+ break;
+ if (j == desc->nr_enums) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: t[%u] enum with no vals\n",
+ name, i);
+ good = false;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (enums) {
+ pr_err("%s: Parser: enum-type values, but no enum table\n",
+ name);
+ good = false;
+ goto no_enums;
+ }
+ }
+
+no_enums:
+ if (!good && dump)
+ dump_stack();
+ return good;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_VALIDATE_FS_PARSER */
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index 383ee4724f77..f11b834ff1e6 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ extern void __init chrdev_init(void);
/*
* namei.c
*/
+extern int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
+ struct path *path, struct path *root);
extern int user_path_mountpoint_at(int, const char __user *, unsigned int, struct path *);
extern int vfs_path_lookup(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *,
const char *, unsigned int, struct path *);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 734cef54fdf8..097f6ec1ae0e 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -2306,8 +2306,8 @@ static int path_lookupat(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags, struct path *path
return err;
}
-static int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
- struct path *path, struct path *root)
+int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
+ struct path *path, struct path *root)
{
int retval;
struct nameidata nd;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_parser.h b/include/linux/fs_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a5ba9b1d87c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/fs_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/* Filesystem parameter description and parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_FS_PARSER_H
+#define _LINUX_FS_PARSER_H
+
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+
+struct path;
+
+struct constant_table {
+ const char *name;
+ int value;
+};
+
+#define fsconfig_key_removed -5678 /* Parameter name is no longer valid */
+
+/*
+ * The type of parameter expected.
+ */
+enum fs_parameter_type {
+ __fs_param_wasnt_defined,
+ fs_param_takes_no_value,
+ fs_param_is_bool,
+ fs_param_is_u32,
+ fs_param_is_u32_octal,
+ fs_param_is_u32_hex,
+ fs_param_is_s32,
+ fs_param_is_enum,
+ fs_param_is_string,
+ fs_param_is_blob,
+ fs_param_is_blockdev,
+ fs_param_is_path,
+ fs_param_is_fd,
+ nr__fs_parameter_type,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Specification of the type of value a parameter wants.
+ */
+struct fs_parameter_spec {
+ enum fs_parameter_type type:8; /* The desired parameter type */
+ u8 flags;
+#define fs_param_v_optional 0x01 /* The value is optional */
+#define fs_param_neg_with_no 0x02 /* "noxxx" is negative param */
+#define fs_param_neg_with_empty 0x04 /* "xxx=" is negative param */
+#define fs_param_deprecated 0x08 /* The param is deprecated */
+};
+
+struct fs_parameter_enum {
+ u8 param_id;
+ char name[14];
+ u8 value;
+};
+
+struct fs_parameter_description {
+ const char name[16]; /* Name for logging purposes */
+ u8 nr_params; /* Number of parameter IDs */
+ u8 nr_keys; /* Number of key names */
+ u8 nr_enums; /* Number of enum value names */
+ bool ignore_unknown; /* Set to ignore unknown parameters */
+ bool no_source; /* Set if no source is expected */
+ const struct constant_table *keys; /* List of key names */
+ const struct fs_parameter_spec *specs; /* List of param specifications */
+ const struct fs_parameter_enum *enums; /* Enum values */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Result of parse.
+ */
+struct fs_parse_result {
+ struct fs_parameter_spec t;
+ u8 key; /* Looked up key ID */
+ bool negated; /* T if param was "noxxx" */
+ union {
+ bool boolean; /* For spec_bool */
+ int int_32; /* For spec_s32/spec_enum */
+ unsigned int uint_32; /* For spec_u32{,_octal,_hex}/spec_enum */
+ };
+};
+
+extern int fs_parse(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct fs_parameter_description *desc,
+ struct fs_parameter *value,
+ struct fs_parse_result *result);
+extern int fs_lookup_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct fs_parameter_description *desc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param,
+ struct fs_parse_result *result,
+ struct path *_path);
+
+extern int __lookup_constant(const struct constant_table tbl[], size_t tbl_size,
+ const char *name, int not_found);
+#define lookup_constant(t, n, nf) __lookup_constant(t, ARRAY_SIZE(t), (n), (nf))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_VALIDATE_FS_PARSER
+extern bool validate_constant_table(const struct constant_table *tbl, size_t tbl_size,
+ int low, int high, int special);
+extern bool fs_validate_description(const struct fs_parameter_description *desc);
+#else
+static inline bool validate_constant_table(const struct constant_table *tbl, size_t tbl_size,
+ int low, int high, int special)
+{ return true; }
+static inline bool fs_validate_description(const struct fs_parameter_description *desc)
+{ return true; }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_FS_PARSER_H */
Make the cpuset filesystem use the filesystem context. This is potentially
tricky as the cpuset fs is almost an alias for the cgroup filesystem, but
with some special parameters.
This can, however, be handled by setting up an appropriate cgroup
filesystem and returning the root directory of that as the root dir of this
one.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
---
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
index 6d9f1a709af9..e6582b2f5144 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
@@ -315,26 +315,64 @@ static inline bool is_in_v2_mode(void)
* users. If someone tries to mount the "cpuset" filesystem, we
* silently switch it to mount "cgroup" instead
*/
-static struct dentry *cpuset_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *unused_dev_name,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
+static int cpuset_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct file_system_type *cgroup_fs = get_fs_type("cgroup");
- struct dentry *ret = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
+ static const char opts[] = "cpuset,noprefix,release_agent=/sbin/cpuset_release_agent";
+ struct file_system_type *cgroup_fs;
+ struct fs_context *cg_fc;
+ char *p;
+ int ret = -ENODEV;
+
+ cgroup_fs = get_fs_type("cgroup");
if (cgroup_fs) {
- char mountopts[] =
- "cpuset,noprefix,"
- "release_agent=/sbin/cpuset_release_agent";
- ret = cgroup_fs->mount(cgroup_fs, flags, unused_dev_name,
- mountopts, data_size);
- put_filesystem(cgroup_fs);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(cgroup_fs);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ cg_fc = vfs_new_fs_context(cgroup_fs, NULL, fc->sb_flags, fc->purpose);
+ put_filesystem(cgroup_fs);
+ if (IS_ERR(cg_fc)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(cg_fc);
+ goto out;
}
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ p = kstrdup(opts, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ goto out_fc;
+
+ ret = generic_parse_monolithic(fc, p, sizeof(opts) - 1);
+ kfree(p);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_fc;
+
+ ret = vfs_get_tree(cg_fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_fc;
+
+ fc->root = dget(cg_fc->root);
+ ret = 0;
+
+out_fc:
+ put_fs_context(cg_fc);
+out:
return ret;
}
+static const struct fs_context_operations cpuset_fs_context_ops = {
+ .get_tree = cpuset_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int cpuset_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ fc->ops = &cpuset_fs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static struct file_system_type cpuset_fs_type = {
- .name = "cpuset",
- .mount = cpuset_mount,
+ .name = "cpuset",
+ .init_fs_context = cpuset_init_fs_context,
};
/*
Implement the security hook to check the creation of a new mountpoint for
Tomoyo.
As far as I can tell, Tomoyo doesn't make use of the mount data or parse
any mount options, so I haven't implemented any of the fs_context hooks for
it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
---
security/tomoyo/common.h | 3 +++
security/tomoyo/mount.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 539bcdd30bb8..e637ce73f7f9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -971,6 +971,9 @@ int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
const u8 index);
int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev);
+int tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags);
int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags,
void *data_page);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index 7dc7f59b7dde..9ec84ab6f5e1 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "common.h"
@@ -236,3 +237,47 @@ int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
return error;
}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mount_permission_fc - Check permission to create a new mount.
+ * @fc: Context describing the object to be mounted.
+ * @mountpoint: The target object to mount on.
+ * @mnt: The MNT_* flags to be set on the mountpoint.
+ *
+ * Check the permission to create a mount of the object described in @fc. Note
+ * that the source object may be a newly created superblock or may be an
+ * existing one picked from the filesystem (bind mount).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+ unsigned int ms_flags = 0;
+ int error;
+ int idx;
+
+ if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT) ==
+ TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Convert MNT_* flags to MS_* equivalents. */
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ms_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) ms_flags |= MS_NODEV;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) ms_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOATIME) ms_flags |= MS_NOATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NODIRATIME) ms_flags |= MS_NODIRATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_RELATIME) ms_flags |= MS_RELATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) ms_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
+
+ idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+ /* TODO: There may be multiple sources; for the moment, just pick the
+ * first if there is one.
+ */
+ error = tomoyo_mount_acl(&r, fc->source, mountpoint, fc->fs_type->name,
+ ms_flags);
+ tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index e5e349392e7b..c3a0ae4fa7ce 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -391,6 +391,20 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT, path, NULL);
}
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sb_mount - Target for security_sb_mountpoint().
+ * @fc: Context describing the object to be mounted.
+ * @mountpoint: The target object to mount on.
+ * @mnt_flags: Mountpoint specific options (as MNT_* flags).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ return tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(fc, mountpoint, mnt_flags);
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_sb_mount - Target for security_sb_mount().
*
@@ -521,6 +535,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, tomoyo_path_chmod),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, tomoyo_path_chown),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chroot, tomoyo_path_chroot),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mountpoint, tomoyo_sb_mountpoint),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, tomoyo_sb_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, tomoyo_sb_umount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, tomoyo_sb_pivotroot),
Convert the hugetlbfs to use the fs_context during mount.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 392 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 232 insertions(+), 160 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
index 76fb8eb2bea8..28f6c28e55dc 100644
--- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/pagevec.h>
-#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/dnotify.h>
@@ -45,11 +45,17 @@ const struct file_operations hugetlbfs_file_operations;
static const struct inode_operations hugetlbfs_dir_inode_operations;
static const struct inode_operations hugetlbfs_inode_operations;
-struct hugetlbfs_config {
+enum hugetlbfs_size_type { NO_SIZE, SIZE_STD, SIZE_PERCENT };
+
+struct hugetlbfs_fs_context {
struct hstate *hstate;
+ unsigned long long max_size_opt;
+ unsigned long long min_size_opt;
long max_hpages;
long nr_inodes;
long min_hpages;
+ enum hugetlbfs_size_type max_val_type;
+ enum hugetlbfs_size_type min_val_type;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
@@ -57,22 +63,44 @@ struct hugetlbfs_config {
int sysctl_hugetlb_shm_group;
-enum {
- Opt_size, Opt_nr_inodes,
- Opt_mode, Opt_uid, Opt_gid,
- Opt_pagesize, Opt_min_size,
- Opt_err,
+enum hugetlb_param {
+ Opt_gid,
+ Opt_min_size,
+ Opt_mode,
+ Opt_nr_inodes,
+ Opt_pagesize,
+ Opt_size,
+ Opt_uid,
+ nr__hugetlb_params
+};
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec hugetlb_param_specs[nr__hugetlb_params] = {
+ [Opt_gid] = { fs_param_is_u32 },
+ [Opt_min_size] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_mode] = { fs_param_is_u32 },
+ [Opt_nr_inodes] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_pagesize] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_size] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_uid] = { fs_param_is_u32 },
+};
+
+static const struct constant_table hugetlb_param_keys[] = {
+ { "gid", Opt_gid },
+ { "min_size", Opt_min_size },
+ { "mode", Opt_mode },
+ { "nr_inodes", Opt_nr_inodes },
+ { "pagesize", Opt_pagesize },
+ { "size", Opt_size },
+ { "uid", Opt_uid },
};
-static const match_table_t tokens = {
- {Opt_size, "size=%s"},
- {Opt_nr_inodes, "nr_inodes=%s"},
- {Opt_mode, "mode=%o"},
- {Opt_uid, "uid=%u"},
- {Opt_gid, "gid=%u"},
- {Opt_pagesize, "pagesize=%s"},
- {Opt_min_size, "min_size=%s"},
- {Opt_err, NULL},
+static const struct fs_parameter_description hugetlb_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "hugetlbfs",
+ .nr_params = nr__hugetlb_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(hugetlb_param_keys),
+ .keys = hugetlb_param_keys,
+ .specs = hugetlb_param_specs,
+ .no_source = true,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
@@ -708,16 +736,16 @@ static int hugetlbfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
}
static struct inode *hugetlbfs_get_root(struct super_block *sb,
- struct hugetlbfs_config *config)
+ struct hugetlbfs_fs_context *ctx)
{
struct inode *inode;
inode = new_inode(sb);
if (inode) {
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
- inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | config->mode;
- inode->i_uid = config->uid;
- inode->i_gid = config->gid;
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | ctx->mode;
+ inode->i_uid = ctx->uid;
+ inode->i_gid = ctx->gid;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
inode->i_op = &hugetlbfs_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
@@ -1081,8 +1109,6 @@ static const struct super_operations hugetlbfs_ops = {
.show_options = hugetlbfs_show_options,
};
-enum hugetlbfs_size_type { NO_SIZE, SIZE_STD, SIZE_PERCENT };
-
/*
* Convert size option passed from command line to number of huge pages
* in the pool specified by hstate. Size option could be in bytes
@@ -1105,171 +1131,153 @@ hugetlbfs_size_to_hpages(struct hstate *h, unsigned long long size_opt,
return size_opt;
}
-static int
-hugetlbfs_parse_options(char *options, struct hugetlbfs_config *pconfig)
+/*
+ * Parse one mount parameter.
+ */
+static int hugetlbfs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
{
- char *p, *rest;
- substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
- int option;
- unsigned long long max_size_opt = 0, min_size_opt = 0;
- enum hugetlbfs_size_type max_val_type = NO_SIZE, min_val_type = NO_SIZE;
+ struct hugetlbfs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ char *rest;
+ unsigned long ps;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fs_parse(fc, &hugetlb_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
- if (!options)
+ switch (result.key) {
+ case Opt_uid:
+ ctx->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), result.uint_32);
+ if (!uid_valid(ctx->uid))
+ goto bad_val;
return 0;
- while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
- int token;
- if (!*p)
- continue;
+ case Opt_gid:
+ ctx->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), result.uint_32);
+ if (!gid_valid(ctx->gid))
+ goto bad_val;
+ return 0;
- token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
- switch (token) {
- case Opt_uid:
- if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
- goto bad_val;
- pconfig->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), option);
- if (!uid_valid(pconfig->uid))
- goto bad_val;
- break;
+ case Opt_mode:
+ ctx->mode = result.uint_32 & 01777U;
+ return 0;
- case Opt_gid:
- if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
- goto bad_val;
- pconfig->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), option);
- if (!gid_valid(pconfig->gid))
- goto bad_val;
- break;
+ case Opt_size:
+ /* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
+ if (!isdigit(param->string[0]))
+ goto bad_val;
+ ctx->max_size_opt = memparse(param->string, &rest);
+ ctx->max_val_type = SIZE_STD;
+ if (*rest == '%')
+ ctx->max_val_type = SIZE_PERCENT;
+ return 0;
- case Opt_mode:
- if (match_octal(&args[0], &option))
- goto bad_val;
- pconfig->mode = option & 01777U;
- break;
+ case Opt_nr_inodes:
+ /* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
+ if (!isdigit(param->string[0]))
+ goto bad_val;
+ ctx->nr_inodes = memparse(param->string, &rest);
+ return 0;
- case Opt_size: {
- /* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
- if (!isdigit(*args[0].from))
- goto bad_val;
- max_size_opt = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
- max_val_type = SIZE_STD;
- if (*rest == '%')
- max_val_type = SIZE_PERCENT;
- break;
+ case Opt_pagesize:
+ ps = memparse(param->string, &rest);
+ ctx->hstate = size_to_hstate(ps);
+ if (!ctx->hstate) {
+ pr_err("Unsupported page size %lu MB\n", ps >> 20);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
+ return 0;
- case Opt_nr_inodes:
- /* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
- if (!isdigit(*args[0].from))
- goto bad_val;
- pconfig->nr_inodes = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
- break;
+ case Opt_min_size:
+ /* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
+ if (!isdigit(param->string[0]))
+ goto bad_val;
+ ctx->min_size_opt = memparse(param->string, &rest);
+ ctx->min_val_type = SIZE_STD;
+ if (*rest == '%')
+ ctx->min_val_type = SIZE_PERCENT;
+ return 0;
- case Opt_pagesize: {
- unsigned long ps;
- ps = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
- pconfig->hstate = size_to_hstate(ps);
- if (!pconfig->hstate) {
- pr_err("Unsupported page size %lu MB\n",
- ps >> 20);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- break;
- }
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- case Opt_min_size: {
- /* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
- if (!isdigit(*args[0].from))
- goto bad_val;
- min_size_opt = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
- min_val_type = SIZE_STD;
- if (*rest == '%')
- min_val_type = SIZE_PERCENT;
- break;
- }
+bad_val:
+ invalf(fc, "hugetlbfs: Bad value '%s' for mount option '%s'\n",
+ param->string, param->key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
- default:
- pr_err("Bad mount option: \"%s\"\n", p);
- return -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
- }
+/*
+ * Validate the parsed options.
+ */
+static int hugetlbfs_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct hugetlbfs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
/*
* Use huge page pool size (in hstate) to convert the size
* options to number of huge pages. If NO_SIZE, -1 is returned.
*/
- pconfig->max_hpages = hugetlbfs_size_to_hpages(pconfig->hstate,
- max_size_opt, max_val_type);
- pconfig->min_hpages = hugetlbfs_size_to_hpages(pconfig->hstate,
- min_size_opt, min_val_type);
+ ctx->max_hpages = hugetlbfs_size_to_hpages(ctx->hstate,
+ ctx->max_size_opt,
+ ctx->max_val_type);
+ ctx->min_hpages = hugetlbfs_size_to_hpages(ctx->hstate,
+ ctx->min_size_opt,
+ ctx->min_val_type);
/*
* If max_size was specified, then min_size must be smaller
*/
- if (max_val_type > NO_SIZE &&
- pconfig->min_hpages > pconfig->max_hpages) {
- pr_err("minimum size can not be greater than maximum size\n");
+ if (ctx->max_val_type > NO_SIZE &&
+ ctx->min_hpages > ctx->max_hpages) {
+ pr_err("Minimum size can not be greater than maximum size\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
-
-bad_val:
- pr_err("Bad value '%s' for mount option '%s'\n", args[0].from, p);
- return -EINVAL;
}
static int
-hugetlbfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size,
- int silent)
+hugetlbfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
- int ret;
- struct hugetlbfs_config config;
+ struct hugetlbfs_fs_context *ctx =
+ fc->fs_private;
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbinfo;
- config.max_hpages = -1; /* No limit on size by default */
- config.nr_inodes = -1; /* No limit on number of inodes by default */
- config.uid = current_fsuid();
- config.gid = current_fsgid();
- config.mode = 0755;
- config.hstate = &default_hstate;
- config.min_hpages = -1; /* No default minimum size */
- ret = hugetlbfs_parse_options(data, &config);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
sbinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hugetlbfs_sb_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
sb->s_fs_info = sbinfo;
- sbinfo->hstate = config.hstate;
spin_lock_init(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
- sbinfo->max_inodes = config.nr_inodes;
- sbinfo->free_inodes = config.nr_inodes;
- sbinfo->spool = NULL;
- sbinfo->uid = config.uid;
- sbinfo->gid = config.gid;
- sbinfo->mode = config.mode;
+ sbinfo->hstate = ctx->hstate;
+ sbinfo->max_inodes = ctx->nr_inodes;
+ sbinfo->free_inodes = ctx->nr_inodes;
+ sbinfo->spool = NULL;
+ sbinfo->uid = ctx->uid;
+ sbinfo->gid = ctx->gid;
+ sbinfo->mode = ctx->mode;
/*
* Allocate and initialize subpool if maximum or minimum size is
* specified. Any needed reservations (for minimim size) are taken
* taken when the subpool is created.
*/
- if (config.max_hpages != -1 || config.min_hpages != -1) {
- sbinfo->spool = hugepage_new_subpool(config.hstate,
- config.max_hpages,
- config.min_hpages);
+ if (ctx->max_hpages != -1 || ctx->min_hpages != -1) {
+ sbinfo->spool = hugepage_new_subpool(ctx->hstate,
+ ctx->max_hpages,
+ ctx->min_hpages);
if (!sbinfo->spool)
goto out_free;
}
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
- sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(config.hstate);
- sb->s_blocksize_bits = huge_page_shift(config.hstate);
+ sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(ctx->hstate);
+ sb->s_blocksize_bits = huge_page_shift(ctx->hstate);
sb->s_magic = HUGETLBFS_MAGIC;
sb->s_op = &hugetlbfs_ops;
sb->s_time_gran = 1;
- sb->s_root = d_make_root(hugetlbfs_get_root(sb, &config));
+ sb->s_root = d_make_root(hugetlbfs_get_root(sb, ctx));
if (!sb->s_root)
goto out_free;
return 0;
@@ -1279,17 +1287,51 @@ hugetlbfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size,
return -ENOMEM;
}
-static struct dentry *hugetlbfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data, size_t data_size)
+static int hugetlbfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ return vfs_get_super(fc, vfs_get_independent_super, hugetlbfs_fill_super);
+}
+
+static void hugetlbfs_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ kfree(fc->fs_private);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations hugetlbfs_fs_context_ops = {
+ .free = hugetlbfs_fs_context_free,
+ .parse_param = hugetlbfs_parse_param,
+ .validate = hugetlbfs_validate,
+ .get_tree = hugetlbfs_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int hugetlbfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct dentry *reference)
{
- return mount_nodev(fs_type, flags, data, data_size,
- hugetlbfs_fill_super);
+ struct hugetlbfs_fs_context *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct hugetlbfs_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->max_hpages = -1; /* No limit on size by default */
+ ctx->nr_inodes = -1; /* No limit on number of inodes by default */
+ ctx->uid = current_fsuid();
+ ctx->gid = current_fsgid();
+ ctx->mode = 0755;
+ ctx->hstate = &default_hstate;
+ ctx->min_hpages = -1; /* No default minimum size */
+ ctx->max_val_type = NO_SIZE;
+ ctx->min_val_type = NO_SIZE;
+ fc->fs_private = ctx;
+ fc->ops = &hugetlbfs_fs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
}
static struct file_system_type hugetlbfs_fs_type = {
- .name = "hugetlbfs",
- .mount = hugetlbfs_mount,
- .kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
+ .name = "hugetlbfs",
+ .init_fs_context = hugetlbfs_init_fs_context,
+ .parameters = &hugetlb_fs_parameters,
+ .kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
};
static struct vfsmount *hugetlbfs_vfsmount[HUGE_MAX_HSTATE];
@@ -1396,8 +1438,47 @@ struct file *hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size,
return file;
}
+static struct vfsmount *__init mount_one_hugetlbfs(struct hstate *h)
+{
+ struct hugetlbfs_fs_context *ctx;
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ int ret;
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&hugetlbfs_fs_type, NULL, 0,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(fc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ ctx->hstate = h;
+
+ ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(mnt);
+ goto err_fc;
+ }
+
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return mnt;
+
+err_fc:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+err:
+ pr_err("Cannot mount internal hugetlbfs for page size %uK",
+ 1U << (h->order + PAGE_SHIFT - 10));
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+
static int __init init_hugetlbfs_fs(void)
{
+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
struct hstate *h;
int error;
int i;
@@ -1420,25 +1501,16 @@ static int __init init_hugetlbfs_fs(void)
i = 0;
for_each_hstate(h) {
- char buf[50];
- unsigned ps_kb = 1U << (h->order + PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
- int n;
-
- n = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "pagesize=%uK", ps_kb);
- hugetlbfs_vfsmount[i] = kern_mount_data(&hugetlbfs_fs_type,
- buf, n + 1);
-
- if (IS_ERR(hugetlbfs_vfsmount[i])) {
- pr_err("Cannot mount internal hugetlbfs for "
- "page size %uK", ps_kb);
- error = PTR_ERR(hugetlbfs_vfsmount[i]);
- hugetlbfs_vfsmount[i] = NULL;
+ mnt = mount_one_hugetlbfs(h);
+ if (IS_ERR(mnt) && i == 0) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(mnt);
+ goto out;
}
+ hugetlbfs_vfsmount[i] = mnt;
i++;
}
- /* Non default hstates are optional */
- if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(hugetlbfs_vfsmount[default_hstate_idx]))
- return 0;
+
+ return 0;
out:
kmem_cache_destroy(hugetlbfs_inode_cachep);
The kern_mount_data() isn't used any more so remove it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/namespace.c | 7 -------
include/linux/fs.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 51a6799c3f61..ea07066a2731 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -3347,13 +3347,6 @@ struct vfsmount *kern_mount(struct file_system_type *type)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kern_mount);
-struct vfsmount *kern_mount_data(struct file_system_type *type,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- return vfs_kern_mount(type, SB_KERNMOUNT, type->name, data, data_size);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kern_mount_data);
-
/*
* Move a mount from one place to another.
* In combination with open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE [| AT_RECURSIVE]) it can be
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 00a24f4b2f0b..3e661d033163 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2214,7 +2214,6 @@ mount_pseudo(struct file_system_type *fs_type, char *name,
extern int register_filesystem(struct file_system_type *);
extern int unregister_filesystem(struct file_system_type *);
extern struct vfsmount *kern_mount(struct file_system_type *);
-extern struct vfsmount *kern_mount_data(struct file_system_type *, void *, size_t);
extern void kern_unmount(struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern int may_umount_tree(struct vfsmount *);
extern int may_umount(struct vfsmount *);
Convert the mqueue filesystem to use the filesystem context stuff.
Notes:
(1) The relevant ipc namespace is selected in when the context is
initialised (and it defaults to the current task's ipc namespace).
The caller can override this before calling vfs_get_tree().
(2) Rather than simply calling kern_mount_data(), mq_init_ns() and
mq_internal_mount() create a context, adjust it and then do the rest
of the mount procedure.
(3) The lazy mqueue mounting on creation of a new namespace is retained
from a previous patch, but the avoidance of sget() if no superblock
yet exists is reverted and the superblock is again keyed on the
namespace pointer.
Yes, there was a performance gain in not searching the superblock
hash, but it's only paid once per ipc namespace - and only if someone
uses mqueue within that namespace, so I'm not sure it's worth it,
especially as calling sget() allows avoidance of recursion.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
ipc/mqueue.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 99 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
index 4671d215cb84..0f102210f89e 100644
--- a/ipc/mqueue.c
+++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
@@ -42,6 +43,10 @@
#include <net/sock.h>
#include "util.h"
+struct mqueue_fs_context {
+ struct ipc_namespace *ipc_ns;
+};
+
#define MQUEUE_MAGIC 0x19800202
#define DIRENT_SIZE 20
#define FILENT_SIZE 80
@@ -87,9 +92,11 @@ struct mqueue_inode_info {
unsigned long qsize; /* size of queue in memory (sum of all msgs) */
};
+static struct file_system_type mqueue_fs_type;
static const struct inode_operations mqueue_dir_inode_operations;
static const struct file_operations mqueue_file_operations;
static const struct super_operations mqueue_super_ops;
+static const struct fs_context_operations mqueue_fs_context_ops;
static void remove_notification(struct mqueue_inode_info *info);
static struct kmem_cache *mqueue_inode_cachep;
@@ -322,7 +329,7 @@ static struct inode *mqueue_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
-static int mqueue_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size, int silent)
+static int mqueue_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct ipc_namespace *ns = sb->s_fs_info;
@@ -343,19 +350,84 @@ static int mqueue_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_siz
return 0;
}
-static struct dentry *mqueue_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *dev_name,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
+static int mqueue_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct ipc_namespace *ns;
- if (flags & SB_KERNMOUNT) {
- ns = data;
- data = NULL;
- } else {
- ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
+ struct mqueue_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ /* As a shortcut, if the namespace already has a superblock created,
+ * use the root from that directly rather than invoking sget() again.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&mq_lock);
+ if (ctx->ipc_ns->mq_mnt) {
+ fc->root = dget(ctx->ipc_ns->mq_mnt->mnt_sb->s_root);
+ atomic_inc(&fc->root->d_sb->s_active);
}
- return mount_ns(fs_type, flags, data, data_size, ns, ns->user_ns,
- mqueue_fill_super);
+ spin_unlock(&mq_lock);
+ if (fc->root) {
+ down_write(&fc->root->d_sb->s_umount);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ fc->s_fs_info = ctx->ipc_ns;
+ return vfs_get_super(fc, vfs_get_keyed_super, mqueue_fill_super);
+}
+
+static void mqueue_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct mqueue_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ if (ctx->ipc_ns)
+ put_ipc_ns(ctx->ipc_ns);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static int mqueue_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct mqueue_fs_context *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mqueue_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->ipc_ns = get_ipc_ns(current->nsproxy->ipc_ns);
+ fc->fs_private = ctx;
+ fc->ops = &mqueue_fs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct vfsmount *mq_create_mount(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct mqueue_fs_context *ctx;
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ int ret;
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&mqueue_fs_type, NULL, 0,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return ERR_CAST(fc);
+
+ ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ put_ipc_ns(ctx->ipc_ns);
+ ctx->ipc_ns = get_ipc_ns(ns);
+
+ ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(mnt);
+ goto err_fc;
+ }
+
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return mnt;
+
+err_fc:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
static void init_once(void *foo)
@@ -1523,15 +1595,22 @@ static const struct super_operations mqueue_super_ops = {
.statfs = simple_statfs,
};
+static const struct fs_context_operations mqueue_fs_context_ops = {
+ .free = mqueue_fs_context_free,
+ .get_tree = mqueue_get_tree,
+};
+
static struct file_system_type mqueue_fs_type = {
- .name = "mqueue",
- .mount = mqueue_mount,
- .kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
- .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
+ .name = "mqueue",
+ .init_fs_context = mqueue_init_fs_context,
+ .kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
+ .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
};
int mq_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
{
+ struct vfsmount *m;
+
ns->mq_queues_count = 0;
ns->mq_queues_max = DFLT_QUEUESMAX;
ns->mq_msg_max = DFLT_MSGMAX;
@@ -1539,12 +1618,10 @@ int mq_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
ns->mq_msg_default = DFLT_MSG;
ns->mq_msgsize_default = DFLT_MSGSIZE;
- ns->mq_mnt = kern_mount_data(&mqueue_fs_type, ns, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(ns->mq_mnt)) {
- int err = PTR_ERR(ns->mq_mnt);
- ns->mq_mnt = NULL;
- return err;
- }
+ m = mq_create_mount(&init_ipc_ns);
+ if (IS_ERR(m))
+ return PTR_ERR(m);
+ ns->mq_mnt = m;
return 0;
}
Provide an fsopen() system call that starts the process of preparing to
create a superblock that will then be mountable, using an fd as a context
handle. fsopen() is given the name of the filesystem that will be used:
int mfd = fsopen(const char *fsname, unsigned int flags);
where flags can be 0 or FSOPEN_CLOEXEC.
For example:
sfd = fsopen("ext4", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_SET_PATH, "source", "/dev/sda1", AT_FDCWD);
fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "noatime", NULL, 0);
fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "acl", NULL, 0);
fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "user_xattr", NULL, 0);
fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "sb", "1", 0);
fsconfig(sfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0);
fsinfo(sfd, NULL, ...); // query new superblock attributes
mfd = fsmount(sfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, MS_RELATIME);
move_mount(mfd, "", sfd, AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
sfd = fsopen("afs", -1);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "source",
"#grand.central.org:root.cell", 0);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0);
mfd = fsmount(sfd, 0, MS_NODEV);
move_mount(mfd, "", sfd, AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
If an error is reported at any step, an error message may be available to be
read() back (ENODATA will be reported if there isn't an error available) in
the form:
"e <subsys>:<problem>"
"e SELinux:Mount on mountpoint not permitted"
Once fsmount() has been called, further fsconfig() calls will incur EBUSY,
even if the fsmount() fails. read() is still possible to retrieve error
information.
The fsopen() syscall creates a mount context and hangs it of the fd that it
returns.
Netlink is not used because it is optional and would make the core VFS
dependent on the networking layer and also potentially add network
namespace issues.
Note that, for the moment, the caller must have SYS_CAP_ADMIN to use
fsopen().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1
fs/Makefile | 2 -
fs/fs_context.c | 4 +
fs/fsopen.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/fs_context.h | 4 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1
include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 5 ++
8 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 fs/fsopen.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 76d092b7d1b0..1647fefd2969 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -400,3 +400,4 @@
386 i386 rseq sys_rseq __ia32_sys_rseq
387 i386 open_tree sys_open_tree __ia32_sys_open_tree
388 i386 move_mount sys_move_mount __ia32_sys_move_mount
+389 i386 fsopen sys_fsopen __ia32_sys_fsopen
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index 37ba4e65eee6..235d33dbccb2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@
334 common rseq __x64_sys_rseq
335 common open_tree __x64_sys_open_tree
336 common move_mount __x64_sys_move_mount
+337 common fsopen __x64_sys_fsopen
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
index ae681523b4b1..e3ea8093b178 100644
--- a/fs/Makefile
+++ b/fs/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ obj-y := open.o read_write.o file_table.o super.o \
seq_file.o xattr.o libfs.o fs-writeback.o \
pnode.o splice.o sync.o utimes.o d_path.o \
stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o \
- fs_context.o fs_parser.o
+ fs_context.o fs_parser.o fsopen.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_BLOCK),y)
obj-y += buffer.o block_dev.o direct-io.o mpage.o
diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
index 8f040a20b320..90db81d7008c 100644
--- a/fs/fs_context.c
+++ b/fs/fs_context.c
@@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
fc->fs_type = get_filesystem(fs_type);
fc->cred = get_current_cred();
+ mutex_init(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+
switch (purpose) {
case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT:
fc->sb_flags |= SB_KERNMOUNT;
@@ -348,6 +350,8 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src_fc)
if (!fc)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ mutex_init(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+
fc->fs_private = NULL;
fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
fc->source = NULL;
diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f30080e1ebc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/fsopen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/* Filesystem access-by-fd.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include "mount.h"
+
+static int fscontext_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc = file->private_data;
+
+ if (fc) {
+ file->private_data = NULL;
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const struct file_operations fscontext_fops = {
+ .release = fscontext_release,
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Attach a filesystem context to a file and an fd.
+ */
+static int fscontext_create_fd(struct fs_context *fc, unsigned int o_flags)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = anon_inode_getfd("fscontext", &fscontext_fops, fc,
+ O_RDWR | o_flags);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Open a filesystem by name so that it can be configured for mounting.
+ *
+ * We are allowed to specify a container in which the filesystem will be
+ * opened, thereby indicating which namespaces will be used (notably, which
+ * network namespace will be used for network filesystems).
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fsopen, const char __user *, _fs_name, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+ struct file_system_type *fs_type;
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ const char *fs_name;
+
+ if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (flags & ~FSOPEN_CLOEXEC)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ fs_name = strndup_user(_fs_name, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(fs_name))
+ return PTR_ERR(fs_name);
+
+ fs_type = get_fs_type(fs_name);
+ kfree(fs_name);
+ if (!fs_type)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(fs_type, NULL, 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT);
+ put_filesystem(fs_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return PTR_ERR(fc);
+
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS;
+ return fscontext_create_fd(fc, flags & FSOPEN_CLOEXEC ? O_CLOEXEC : 0);
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
index bbb8114f2fdc..5445889f705b 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
struct cred;
struct dentry;
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ struct fs_parameter {
*/
struct fs_context {
const struct fs_context_operations *ops;
+ struct mutex uapi_mutex; /* Userspace access mutex */
struct file_system_type *fs_type;
void *fs_private; /* The filesystem's context */
struct dentry *root; /* The root and superblock */
@@ -143,6 +145,8 @@ extern int vfs_get_super(struct fs_context *fc,
int (*fill_super)(struct super_block *sb,
struct fs_context *fc));
+extern const struct file_operations fscontext_fops;
+
#define logfc(FC, FMT, ...) pr_notice(FMT, ## __VA_ARGS__)
/**
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 3c0855d9b105..ad6c7ff33c01 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -904,6 +904,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_open_tree(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned flags);
asmlinkage long sys_move_mount(int from_dfd, const char __user *from_path,
int to_dfd, const char __user *to_path,
unsigned int ms_flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_fsopen(const char __user *fs_name, unsigned int flags);
/*
* Architecture-specific system calls
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
index 1c982eb44ff4..f8818e6cddd6 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
@@ -344,4 +344,9 @@ typedef int __bitwise __kernel_rwf_t;
#define RWF_SUPPORTED (RWF_HIPRI | RWF_DSYNC | RWF_SYNC | RWF_NOWAIT |\
RWF_APPEND)
+/*
+ * Flags for fsopen() and co.
+ */
+#define FSOPEN_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
+
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FS_H */
Add fs_context support to procfs.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/proc/inode.c | 2
fs/proc/internal.h | 2
fs/proc/root.c | 209 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
3 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index c5e7bbf81e10..38155bec4a54 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ const struct super_operations proc_sops = {
.drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
.evict_inode = proc_evict_inode,
.statfs = simple_statfs,
- .remount_fs = proc_remount,
+ .reconfigure = proc_reconfigure,
.show_options = proc_show_options,
};
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index bfe2bea2c71d..ea8c5468eafc 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static inline void proc_tty_init(void) {}
extern struct proc_dir_entry proc_root;
extern void proc_self_init(void);
-extern int proc_remount(struct super_block *, int *, char *, size_t);
+extern int proc_reconfigure(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *);
/*
* task_[no]mmu.c
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 15da85cefd3f..1d6e5bfa30cc 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -19,74 +19,98 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
-#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "internal.h"
-enum {
- Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_err,
+struct proc_fs_context {
+ struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
+ unsigned long mask;
+ int hidepid;
+ int gid;
};
-static const match_table_t tokens = {
- {Opt_hidepid, "hidepid=%u"},
- {Opt_gid, "gid=%u"},
- {Opt_err, NULL},
+enum proc_param {
+ Opt_gid,
+ Opt_hidepid,
+ nr__proc_params
};
-static int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec proc_param_specs[nr__proc_params] = {
+ [Opt_gid] = { fs_param_is_u32 },
+ [Opt_hidepid] = { fs_param_is_u32 },
+};
+
+static const struct constant_table proc_param_keys[] = {
+ { "gid", Opt_gid },
+ { "hidepid", Opt_hidepid },
+};
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_description proc_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "proc",
+ .nr_params = nr__proc_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(proc_param_keys),
+ .keys = proc_param_keys,
+ .specs = proc_param_specs,
+ .no_source = true,
+};
+
+static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
{
- char *p;
- substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
- int option;
-
- if (!options)
- return 1;
-
- while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
- int token;
- if (!*p)
- continue;
-
- args[0].to = args[0].from = NULL;
- token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
- switch (token) {
- case Opt_gid:
- if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
- return 0;
- pid->pid_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), option);
- break;
- case Opt_hidepid:
- if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
- return 0;
- if (option < HIDEPID_OFF ||
- option > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
- pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
- return 0;
- }
- pid->hide_pid = option;
- break;
- default:
- pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" "
- "or missing value\n", p);
- return 0;
- }
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fs_parse(fc, &proc_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (result.key) {
+ case Opt_gid:
+ ctx->gid = result.uint_32;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_hidepid:
+ ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32;
+ if (ctx->hidepid < HIDEPID_OFF ||
+ ctx->hidepid > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)
+ return invalf(fc, "proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- return 1;
+ ctx->mask |= 1 << result.key;
+ return 0;
}
-static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, size_t data_size, int silent)
+static void proc_apply_options(struct super_block *s,
+ struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct pid_namespace *pid_ns,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
- struct pid_namespace *ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info);
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_gid))
+ pid_ns->pid_gid = make_kgid(user_ns, ctx->gid);
+ if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_hidepid))
+ pid_ns->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid;
+}
+
+static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info);
struct inode *root_inode;
int ret;
- if (!proc_parse_options(data, ns))
- return -EINVAL;
+ proc_apply_options(s, fc, pid_ns, current_user_ns());
/* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
@@ -103,7 +127,7 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, size_t data_size,
* top of it
*/
s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
-
+
pde_get(&proc_root);
root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root);
if (!root_inode) {
@@ -124,30 +148,52 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, size_t data_size,
return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
}
-int proc_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags,
- char *data, size_t data_size)
+int proc_reconfigure(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
sync_filesystem(sb);
- return !proc_parse_options(data, pid);
+
+ if (fc)
+ proc_apply_options(sb, fc, pid, current_user_ns());
+ return 0;
}
-static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *dev_name,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
+static int proc_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct pid_namespace *ns;
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
- if (flags & SB_KERNMOUNT) {
- ns = data;
- data = NULL;
- } else {
- ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
- }
+ fc->s_fs_info = ctx->pid_ns;
+ return vfs_get_super(fc, vfs_get_keyed_super, proc_fill_super);
+}
- return mount_ns(fs_type, flags, data, data_size, ns, ns->user_ns,
- proc_fill_super);
+static void proc_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ if (ctx->pid_ns)
+ put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations proc_fs_context_ops = {
+ .free = proc_fs_context_free,
+ .parse_param = proc_parse_param,
+ .get_tree = proc_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int proc_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct proc_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(task_active_pid_ns(current));
+ fc->fs_private = ctx;
+ fc->ops = &proc_fs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
}
static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -164,10 +210,11 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
}
static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = {
- .name = "proc",
- .mount = proc_mount,
- .kill_sb = proc_kill_sb,
- .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
+ .name = "proc",
+ .init_fs_context = proc_init_fs_context,
+ .parameters = &proc_fs_parameters,
+ .kill_sb = proc_kill_sb,
+ .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
};
void __init proc_root_init(void)
@@ -205,7 +252,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentr
{
if (!proc_pid_lookup(dir, dentry, flags))
return NULL;
-
+
return proc_lookup(dir, dentry, flags);
}
@@ -258,9 +305,31 @@ struct proc_dir_entry proc_root = {
int pid_ns_prepare_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx;
+ struct fs_context *fc;
struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ int ret;
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&proc_fs_type, NULL, 0,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return PTR_ERR(fc);
+
+ ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ if (ctx->pid_ns != ns) {
+ put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
+ get_pid_ns(ns);
+ ctx->pid_ns = ns;
+ }
+
+ ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return ret;
+ }
- mnt = kern_mount_data(&proc_fs_type, ns, 0);
+ mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, 0);
+ put_fs_context(fc);
if (IS_ERR(mnt))
return PTR_ERR(mnt);
Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log so that
information can be extracted from them as to the reason for failure.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/super.c | 4 +++-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index bbef5a5057c0..3fe5d12b7697 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -1735,8 +1735,10 @@ int vfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
struct super_block *sb;
int ret;
- if (fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV && !fc->source)
+ if (fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV && !fc->source) {
+ errorf(fc, "Filesystem requires source device");
return -ENOENT;
+ }
if (fc->root)
return -EBUSY;
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
index 4238a89ca721..fb721aa20aa0 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
#include <trace/events/cgroup.h>
-#define cg_invalf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ pr_err(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); -EINVAL; })
+#define cg_invalf(fc, fmt, ...) invalf(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__)
/*
* pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal
Add a syscall for configuring a filesystem creation context and triggering
actions upon it, to be used in conjunction with fsopen, fspick and fsmount.
long fsconfig(int fs_fd, unsigned int cmd, const char *key,
const void *value, int aux);
Where fs_fd indicates the context, cmd indicates the action to take, key
indicates the parameter name for parameter-setting actions and, if needed,
value points to a buffer containing the value and aux can give more
information for the value.
The following command IDs are proposed:
(*) FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG: No value is specified. The parameter must be
boolean in nature. The key may be prefixed with "no" to invert the
setting. value must be NULL and aux must be 0.
(*) FSCONFIG_SET_STRING: A string value is specified. The parameter can
be expecting boolean, integer, string or take a path. A conversion to
an appropriate type will be attempted (which may include looking up as
a path). value points to a NUL-terminated string and aux must be 0.
(*) FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY: A binary blob is specified. value points to
the blob and aux indicates its size. The parameter must be expecting
a blob.
(*) FSCONFIG_SET_PATH: A non-empty path is specified. The parameter must
be expecting a path object. value points to a NUL-terminated string
that is the path and aux is a file descriptor at which to start a
relative lookup or AT_FDCWD.
(*) FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY: As fsconfig_set_path, but with AT_EMPTY_PATH
implied.
(*) FSCONFIG_SET_FD: An open file descriptor is specified. value must
be NULL and aux indicates the file descriptor.
(*) FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE: Trigger superblock creation.
(*) FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE: Trigger superblock reconfiguration.
For the "set" command IDs, the idea is that the file_system_type will point
to a list of parameters and the types of value that those parameters expect
to take. The core code can then do the parse and argument conversion and
then give the LSM and FS a cooked option or array of options to use.
Source specification is also done the same way same way, using special keys
"source", "source1", "source2", etc..
[!] Note that, for the moment, the key and value are just glued back
together and handed to the filesystem. Every filesystem that uses options
uses match_token() and co. to do this, and this will need to be changed -
but not all at once.
Example usage:
fd = fsopen("ext4", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_path, "source", "/dev/sda1", AT_FDCWD);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_path_empty, "journal_path", "", journal_fd);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_fd, "journal_fd", "", journal_fd);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_flag, "user_xattr", NULL, 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_flag, "noacl", NULL, 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_string, "sb", "1", 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_string, "errors", "continue", 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_string, "data", "journal", 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_string, "context", "unconfined_u:...", 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_cmd_create, NULL, NULL, 0);
mfd = fsmount(fd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, MS_NOEXEC);
or:
fd = fsopen("ext4", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_string, "source", "/dev/sda1", 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_cmd_create, NULL, NULL, 0);
mfd = fsmount(fd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, MS_NOEXEC);
or:
fd = fsopen("afs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_string, "source", "#grand.central.org:root.cell", 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_cmd_create, NULL, NULL, 0);
mfd = fsmount(fd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, MS_NOEXEC);
or:
fd = fsopen("jffs2", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_set_string, "source", "mtd0", 0);
fsconfig(fd, fsconfig_cmd_create, NULL, NULL, 0);
mfd = fsmount(fd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, MS_NOEXEC);
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1
fs/fsopen.c | 279 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/syscalls.h | 2
include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 14 ++
5 files changed, 297 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 1647fefd2969..f9970310c126 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -401,3 +401,4 @@
387 i386 open_tree sys_open_tree __ia32_sys_open_tree
388 i386 move_mount sys_move_mount __ia32_sys_move_mount
389 i386 fsopen sys_fsopen __ia32_sys_fsopen
+390 i386 fsconfig sys_fsconfig __ia32_sys_fsconfig
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index 235d33dbccb2..4185d36e03bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@
335 common open_tree __x64_sys_open_tree
336 common move_mount __x64_sys_move_mount
337 common fsopen __x64_sys_fsopen
+338 common fsconfig __x64_sys_fsconfig
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c
index 7a25b4c3bc18..5d8560e78ce1 100644
--- a/fs/fsopen.c
+++ b/fs/fsopen.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include "internal.h"
#include "mount.h"
/*
@@ -152,3 +154,280 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fsopen, const char __user *, _fs_name, unsigned int, flags)
put_fs_context(fc);
return ret;
}
+
+/*
+ * Check the state and apply the configuration. Note that this function is
+ * allowed to 'steal' the value by setting param->xxx to NULL before returning.
+ */
+static int vfs_fsconfig(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* We need to reinitialise the context if we have reconfiguration
+ * pending after creation or a previous reconfiguration.
+ */
+ if (fc->phase == FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_RECONF) {
+ if (fc->fs_type->init_fs_context) {
+ ret = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context(fc, fc->root);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ fc->need_free = true;
+ } else {
+ /* Leave legacy context ops in place */
+ }
+
+ /* Do the security check last because ->init_fs_context may
+ * change the namespace subscriptions.
+ */
+ ret = security_fs_context_alloc(fc, fc->root);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_RECONF_PARAMS;
+ }
+
+ if (fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS &&
+ fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_RECONF_PARAMS)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ return vfs_parse_fs_param(fc, param);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform an action on a context.
+ */
+static int vfs_fsconfig_action(struct fs_context *fc, enum fsconfig_command cmd)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE:
+ if (fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS)
+ return -EBUSY;
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_CREATING;
+ ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_MOUNT;
+ else
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
+ return ret;
+
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_fsconfig - Set parameters and trigger actions on a context
+ * @fd: The filesystem context to act upon
+ * @cmd: The action to take
+ * @_key: Where appropriate, the parameter key to set
+ * @_value: Where appropriate, the parameter value to set
+ * @aux: Additional information for the value
+ *
+ * This system call is used to set parameters on a context, including
+ * superblock settings, data source and security labelling.
+ *
+ * Actions include triggering the creation of a superblock and the
+ * reconfiguration of the superblock attached to the specified context.
+ *
+ * When setting a parameter, @cmd indicates the type of value being proposed
+ * and @_key indicates the parameter to be altered.
+ *
+ * @_value and @aux are used to specify the value, should a value be required:
+ *
+ * (*) fsconfig_set_flag: No value is specified. The parameter must be boolean
+ * in nature. The key may be prefixed with "no" to invert the
+ * setting. @_value must be NULL and @aux must be 0.
+ *
+ * (*) fsconfig_set_string: A string value is specified. The parameter can be
+ * expecting boolean, integer, string or take a path. A conversion to an
+ * appropriate type will be attempted (which may include looking up as a
+ * path). @_value points to a NUL-terminated string and @aux must be 0.
+ *
+ * (*) fsconfig_set_binary: A binary blob is specified. @_value points to the
+ * blob and @aux indicates its size. The parameter must be expecting a
+ * blob.
+ *
+ * (*) fsconfig_set_path: A non-empty path is specified. The parameter must be
+ * expecting a path object. @_value points to a NUL-terminated string that
+ * is the path and @aux is a file descriptor at which to start a relative
+ * lookup or AT_FDCWD.
+ *
+ * (*) fsconfig_set_path_empty: As fsconfig_set_path, but with AT_EMPTY_PATH
+ * implied.
+ *
+ * (*) fsconfig_set_fd: An open file descriptor is specified. @_value must be
+ * NULL and @aux indicates the file descriptor.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fsconfig,
+ int, fd,
+ unsigned int, cmd,
+ const char __user *, _key,
+ const void __user *, _value,
+ int, aux)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ struct fd f;
+ int ret;
+
+ struct fs_parameter param = {
+ .type = fs_value_is_undefined,
+ };
+
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG:
+ if (!_key || _value || aux)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_STRING:
+ if (!_key || !_value || aux)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY:
+ if (!_key || !_value || aux <= 0 || aux > 1024 * 1024)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_PATH:
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY:
+ if (!_key || !_value || (aux != AT_FDCWD && aux < 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_FD:
+ if (!_key || _value || aux < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE:
+ case FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE:
+ if (_key || _value || aux)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ f = fdget(fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (f.file->f_op != &fscontext_fops)
+ goto out_f;
+
+ fc = f.file->private_data;
+ if (fc->ops == &legacy_fs_context_ops) {
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY:
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_PATH:
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY:
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_FD:
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_f;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (_key) {
+ param.key = strndup_user(_key, 256);
+ if (IS_ERR(param.key)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(param.key);
+ goto out_f;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_STRING:
+ param.type = fs_value_is_string;
+ param.string = strndup_user(_value, 256);
+ if (IS_ERR(param.string)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(param.string);
+ goto out_key;
+ }
+ param.size = strlen(param.string);
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY:
+ param.type = fs_value_is_blob;
+ param.size = aux;
+ param.blob = memdup_user_nul(_value, aux);
+ if (IS_ERR(param.blob)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(param.blob);
+ goto out_key;
+ }
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_PATH:
+ param.type = fs_value_is_filename;
+ param.name = getname_flags(_value, 0, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(param.name)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(param.name);
+ goto out_key;
+ }
+ param.dirfd = aux;
+ param.size = strlen(param.name->name);
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY:
+ param.type = fs_value_is_filename_empty;
+ param.name = getname_flags(_value, LOOKUP_EMPTY, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(param.name)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(param.name);
+ goto out_key;
+ }
+ param.dirfd = aux;
+ param.size = strlen(param.name->name);
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_FD:
+ param.type = fs_value_is_file;
+ ret = -EBADF;
+ param.file = fget(aux);
+ if (!param.file)
+ goto out_key;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE:
+ case FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE:
+ ret = vfs_fsconfig_action(fc, cmd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = vfs_fsconfig(fc, ¶m);
+ break;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+ }
+
+ /* Clean up the our record of any value that we obtained from
+ * userspace. Note that the value may have been stolen by the LSM or
+ * filesystem, in which case the value pointer will have been cleared.
+ */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_STRING:
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY:
+ kfree(param.string);
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_PATH:
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY:
+ if (param.name)
+ putname(param.name);
+ break;
+ case FSCONFIG_SET_FD:
+ if (param.file)
+ fput(param.file);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+out_key:
+ kfree(param.key);
+out_f:
+ fdput(f);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index ad6c7ff33c01..9628d14a7ede 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -905,6 +905,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_move_mount(int from_dfd, const char __user *from_path,
int to_dfd, const char __user *to_path,
unsigned int ms_flags);
asmlinkage long sys_fsopen(const char __user *fs_name, unsigned int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_fsconfig(int fs_fd, unsigned int cmd, const char __user *key,
+ const void __user *value, int aux);
/*
* Architecture-specific system calls
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
index f8818e6cddd6..fecbae30a30d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
@@ -349,4 +349,18 @@ typedef int __bitwise __kernel_rwf_t;
*/
#define FSOPEN_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
+/*
+ * The type of fsconfig() call made.
+ */
+enum fsconfig_command {
+ FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG = 0, /* Set parameter, supplying no value */
+ FSCONFIG_SET_STRING = 1, /* Set parameter, supplying a string value */
+ FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY = 2, /* Set parameter, supplying a binary blob value */
+ FSCONFIG_SET_PATH = 3, /* Set parameter, supplying an object by path */
+ FSCONFIG_SET_PATH_EMPTY = 4, /* Set parameter, supplying an object by (empty) path */
+ FSCONFIG_SET_FD = 5, /* Set parameter, supplying an object by fd */
+ FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE = 6, /* Invoke superblock creation */
+ FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE = 7, /* Invoke superblock reconfiguration */
+};
+
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FS_H */
Provide documentation for the new mount API.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt | 706 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 706 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5fec78eed4f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@
+ ====================
+ FILESYSTEM MOUNT API
+ ====================
+
+CONTENTS
+
+ (1) Overview.
+
+ (2) The filesystem context.
+
+ (3) The filesystem context operations.
+
+ (4) Filesystem context security.
+
+ (5) VFS filesystem context operations.
+
+ (6) Parameter description.
+
+ (7) Parameter helper functions.
+
+
+========
+OVERVIEW
+========
+
+The creation of new mounts is now to be done in a multistep process:
+
+ (1) Create a filesystem context.
+
+ (2) Parse the parameters and attach them to the context. Parameters are
+ expected to be passed individually from userspace, though legacy binary
+ parameters can also be handled.
+
+ (3) Validate and pre-process the context.
+
+ (4) Get or create a superblock and mountable root.
+
+ (5) Perform the mount.
+
+ (6) Return an error message attached to the context.
+
+ (7) Destroy the context.
+
+To support this, the file_system_type struct gains a new field:
+
+ int (*init_fs_context)(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference);
+
+which is invoked to set up the filesystem-specific parts of a filesystem
+context, including the additional space. The reference parameter is used to
+convey a superblock and an automount point or a point to reconfigure from which
+the filesystem may draw extra information (such as namespaces) for submount
+(FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT) or reconfiguration (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE)
+purposes - otherwise it will be NULL.
+
+Note that security initialisation is done *after* the filesystem is called so
+that the namespaces may be adjusted first.
+
+And the super_operations struct gains one field:
+
+ int (*reconfigure)(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *);
+
+This shadows the ->reconfigure() operation and takes a prepared filesystem
+context instead of the mount flags and data page. It may modify the sb_flags
+in the context for the caller to pick up.
+
+[NOTE] reconfigure is intended as a replacement for remount_fs.
+
+
+======================
+THE FILESYSTEM CONTEXT
+======================
+
+The creation and reconfiguration of a superblock is governed by a filesystem
+context. This is represented by the fs_context structure:
+
+ struct fs_context {
+ const struct fs_context_operations *ops;
+ struct file_system_type *fs_type;
+ void *fs_private;
+ struct dentry *root;
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+ struct net *net_ns;
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ char *source;
+ char *subtype;
+ void *security;
+ void *s_fs_info;
+ unsigned int sb_flags;
+ enum fs_context_purpose purpose:8;
+ bool sloppy:1;
+ bool silent:1;
+ ...
+ };
+
+The fs_context fields are as follows:
+
+ (*) const struct fs_context_operations *ops
+
+ These are operations that can be done on a filesystem context (see
+ below). This must be set by the ->init_fs_context() file_system_type
+ operation.
+
+ (*) struct file_system_type *fs_type
+
+ A pointer to the file_system_type of the filesystem that is being
+ constructed or reconfigured. This retains a reference on the type owner.
+
+ (*) void *fs_private
+
+ A pointer to the file system's private data. This is where the filesystem
+ will need to store any options it parses.
+
+ (*) struct dentry *root
+
+ A pointer to the root of the mountable tree (and indirectly, the
+ superblock thereof). This is filled in by the ->get_tree() op. If this
+ is set, an active reference on root->d_sb must also be held.
+
+ (*) struct user_namespace *user_ns
+ (*) struct net *net_ns
+
+ There are a subset of the namespaces in use by the invoking process. They
+ retain references on each namespace. The subscribed namespaces may be
+ replaced by the filesystem to reflect other sources, such as the parent
+ mount superblock on an automount.
+
+ (*) const struct cred *cred
+
+ The mounter's credentials. This retains a reference on the credentials.
+
+ (*) char *source
+
+ This specifies the source. It may be a block device (e.g. /dev/sda1) or
+ something more exotic, such as the "host:/path" that NFS desires.
+
+ (*) char *subtype
+
+ This is a string to be added to the type displayed in /proc/mounts to
+ qualify it (used by FUSE). This is available for the filesystem to set if
+ desired.
+
+ (*) void *security
+
+ A place for the LSMs to hang their security data for the superblock. The
+ relevant security operations are described below.
+
+ (*) void *s_fs_info
+
+ The proposed s_fs_info for a new superblock, set in the superblock by
+ sget_fc(). This can be used to distinguish superblocks.
+
+ (*) unsigned int sb_flags
+
+ This holds the SB_* flags to be set in super_block::s_flags.
+
+ (*) enum fs_context_purpose
+
+ This indicates the purpose for which the context is intended. The
+ available values are:
+
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT, -- New superblock for user-specified mount
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT, -- New superblock for kernel-internal mount
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT -- New automatic submount of extant mount
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE -- Change an existing mount
+
+ (*) bool sloppy
+ (*) bool silent
+
+ These are set if the sloppy or silent mount options are given.
+
+ [NOTE] sloppy is probably unnecessary when userspace passes over one
+ option at a time since the error can just be ignored if userspace deems it
+ to be unimportant.
+
+ [NOTE] silent is probably redundant with sb_flags & SB_SILENT.
+
+The mount context is created by calling vfs_new_fs_context(), vfs_sb_reconfig()
+or vfs_dup_fs_context() and is destroyed with put_fs_context(). Note that the
+structure is not refcounted.
+
+VFS, security and filesystem mount options are set individually with
+vfs_parse_mount_option(). Options provided by the old mount(2) system call as
+a page of data can be parsed with generic_parse_monolithic().
+
+When mounting, the filesystem is allowed to take data from any of the pointers
+and attach it to the superblock (or whatever), provided it clears the pointer
+in the mount context.
+
+The filesystem is also allowed to allocate resources and pin them with the
+mount context. For instance, NFS might pin the appropriate protocol version
+module.
+
+
+=================================
+THE FILESYSTEM CONTEXT OPERATIONS
+=================================
+
+The filesystem context points to a table of operations:
+
+ struct fs_context_operations {
+ void (*free)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*dup)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc);
+ int (*parse_param)(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct struct fs_parameter *param);
+ int (*parse_monolithic)(struct fs_context *fc, void *data,
+ size_t data_size);
+ int (*validate)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*get_tree)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ };
+
+These operations are invoked by the various stages of the mount procedure to
+manage the filesystem context. They are as follows:
+
+ (*) void (*free)(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Called to clean up the filesystem-specific part of the filesystem context
+ when the context is destroyed. It should be aware that parts of the
+ context may have been removed and NULL'd out by ->get_tree().
+
+ (*) int (*dup)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc);
+
+ Called when a filesystem context has been duplicated to duplicate the
+ filesystem-private data. An error may be returned to indicate failure to
+ do this.
+
+ [!] Note that even if this fails, put_fs_context() will be called
+ immediately thereafter, so ->dup() *must* make the
+ filesystem-private data safe for ->free().
+
+ (*) int (*parse_param)(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct struct fs_parameter *param);
+
+ Called when a parameter is being added to the filesystem context. param
+ points to the key name and maybe a value object. VFS-specific options
+ will have been weeded out and fc->sb_flags updated in the context.
+ Security options will also have been weeded out and fc->security updated.
+
+ The parameter can be parsed with fs_parse() and fs_lookup_param(). Note
+ that the source(s) are presented as parameters named "source".
+
+ If successful, 0 should be returned or a negative error code otherwise.
+
+ (*) int (*parse_monolithic)(struct fs_context *fc,
+ void *data, size_t data_size);
+
+ Called when the mount(2) system call is invoked to pass the entire data
+ page in one go. If this is expected to be just a list of "key[=val]"
+ items separated by commas, then this may be set to NULL.
+
+ The return value is as for ->parse_param().
+
+ If the filesystem (e.g. NFS) needs to examine the data first and then
+ finds it's the standard key-val list then it may pass it off to
+ generic_parse_monolithic().
+
+ (*) int (*validate)(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Called when all the options have been applied and the mount is about to
+ take place. It is should check for inconsistencies from mount options and
+ it is also allowed to do preliminary resource acquisition. For instance,
+ the core NFS module could load the NFS protocol module here.
+
+ Note that if fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE, some of the
+ options necessary for a new mount may not be set.
+
+ The return value is as for ->parse_option().
+
+ (*) int (*get_tree)(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Called to get or create the mountable root and superblock, using the
+ information stored in the filesystem context (reconfiguration goes via a
+ different vector). It may detach any resources it desires from the
+ filesystem context and transfer them to the superblock it creates.
+
+ On success it should set fc->root to the mountable root and return 0. In
+ the case of an error, it should return a negative error code.
+
+ The phase on a userspace-driven context will be set to only allow this to
+ be called once on any particular context.
+
+
+===========================
+FILESYSTEM CONTEXT SECURITY
+===========================
+
+The filesystem context contains a security pointer that the LSMs can use for
+building up a security context for the superblock to be mounted. There are a
+number of operations used by the new mount code for this purpose:
+
+ (*) int security_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct dentry *reference);
+
+ Called to initialise fc->security (which is preset to NULL) and allocate
+ any resources needed. It should return 0 on success or a negative error
+ code on failure.
+
+ reference will be non-NULL if the context is being created for superblock
+ reconfiguration (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE) in which case it indicates
+ the root dentry of the superblock to be reconfigured. It will also be
+ non-NULL in the case of a submount (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT) in which case
+ it indicates the automount point.
+
+ (*) int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_context *src_fc);
+
+ Called to initialise fc->security (which is preset to NULL) and allocate
+ any resources needed. The original filesystem context is pointed to by
+ src_fc and may be used for reference. It should return 0 on success or a
+ negative error code on failure.
+
+ (*) void security_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Called to clean up anything attached to fc->security. Note that the
+ contents may have been transferred to a superblock and the pointer cleared
+ during get_tree.
+
+ (*) int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param);
+
+ Called for each mount parameter, including the source. The arguments are
+ as for the ->parse_param() method. It should return 0 to indicate that
+ the parameter should be passed on to the filesystem, 1 to indicate that
+ the parameter should be discarded or an error to indicate that the
+ parameter should be rejected.
+
+ The value pointed to by param may be modified (if a string) or stolen
+ (provided the value pointer is NULL'd out). If it is stolen, 1 must be
+ returned to prevent it being passed to the filesystem.
+
+ (*) int security_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Called after all the options have been parsed to validate the collection
+ as a whole and to do any necessary allocation so that
+ security_sb_get_tree() is less likely to fail. It should return 0 or a
+ negative error code.
+
+ (*) int security_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Called during the mount procedure to verify that the specified superblock
+ is allowed to be mounted and to transfer the security data there. It
+ should return 0 or a negative error code.
+
+ (*) int security_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags);
+
+ Called during the mount procedure to verify that the root dentry attached
+ to the context is permitted to be attached to the specified mountpoint.
+ It should return 0 on success or a negative error code on failure.
+
+
+=================================
+VFS FILESYSTEM CONTEXT OPERATIONS
+=================================
+
+There are four operations for creating a filesystem context and
+one for destroying a context:
+
+ (*) struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+ struct dentry *reference,
+ unsigned int sb_flags,
+ enum fs_context_purpose purpose);
+
+ Create a filesystem context for a given filesystem type and purpose. This
+ allocates the filesystem context, sets the flags, initialises the security
+ and calls fs_type->init_fs_context() to initialise the filesystem private
+ data.
+
+ reference can be NULL or it may indicate the root dentry of a superblock
+ that is going to be reconfigured (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE) or the
+ automount point that triggered a submount (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT). This
+ is provided as a source of namespace information.
+
+ (*) struct fs_context *vfs_sb_reconfig(struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ unsigned int sb_flags);
+
+ Create a filesystem context from the same filesystem as an extant mount
+ and initialise the mount parameters from the superblock underlying that
+ mount. This is for use by superblock parameter reconfiguration.
+
+ (*) struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src_fc);
+
+ Duplicate a filesystem context, copying any options noted and duplicating
+ or additionally referencing any resources held therein. This is available
+ for use where a filesystem has to get a mount within a mount, such as NFS4
+ does by internally mounting the root of the target server and then doing a
+ private pathwalk to the target directory.
+
+ (*) void put_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Destroy a filesystem context, releasing any resources it holds. This
+ calls the ->free() operation. This is intended to be called by anyone who
+ created a filesystem context.
+
+ [!] filesystem contexts are not refcounted, so this causes unconditional
+ destruction.
+
+In all the above operations, apart from the put op, the return is a mount
+context pointer or a negative error code.
+
+For the remaining operations, if an error occurs, a negative error code will be
+returned.
+
+ (*) int vfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Get or create the mountable root and superblock, using the parameters in
+ the filesystem context to select/configure the superblock. This invokes
+ the ->validate() op and then the ->get_tree() op.
+
+ [NOTE] ->validate() could perhaps be rolled into ->get_tree() and
+ ->reconfigure().
+
+ (*) struct vfsmount *vfs_create_mount(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Create a mount given the parameters in the specified filesystem context.
+ Note that this does not attach the mount to anything.
+
+ (*) int vfs_parse_fs_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param);
+
+ Supply a single mount parameter to the filesystem context. This include
+ the specification of the source/device which is specified as the "source"
+ parameter (which may be specified multiple times if the filesystem
+ supports that).
+
+ param specifies the parameter key name and the value. The parameter is
+ first checked to see if it corresponds to a standard mount flag (in which
+ case it is used to set an SB_xxx flag and consumed) or a security option
+ (in which case the LSM consumes it) before it is passed on to the
+ filesystem.
+
+ The parameter value is typed and can be one of:
+
+ fs_value_is_flag, Parameter not given a value.
+ fs_value_is_string, Value is a string
+ fs_value_is_blob, Value is a binary blob
+ fs_value_is_filename, Value is a filename* + dirfd
+ fs_value_is_filename_empty, Value is a filename* + dirfd + AT_EMPTY_PATH
+ fs_value_is_file, Value is an open file (file*)
+
+ If there is a value, that value is stored in a union in the struct in one
+ of param->{string,blob,name,file}. Note that the function may steal and
+ clear the pointer, but then becomes responsible for disposing of the
+ object.
+
+ (*) int vfs_parse_fs_string(struct fs_context *fc, char *key,
+ const char *value, size_t v_size);
+
+ A wrapper around vfs_parse_fs_param() that just passes a constant string.
+
+ (*) int generic_parse_monolithic(struct fs_context *fc,
+ void *data, size_t data_len);
+
+ Parse a sys_mount() data page, assuming the form to be a text list
+ consisting of key[=val] options separated by commas. Each item in the
+ list is passed to vfs_mount_option(). This is the default when the
+ ->parse_monolithic() operation is NULL.
+
+
+=====================
+PARAMETER DESCRIPTION
+=====================
+
+Parameters are described using structures defined in linux/fs_parser.h.
+There's a core description struct that links everything together:
+
+ struct fs_parameter_description {
+ const char name[16];
+ u8 nr_params;
+ u8 nr_keys;
+ u8 nr_enums;
+ bool ignore_unknown;
+ bool no_source;
+ const struct constant_table *keys;
+ const struct fs_parameter_spec *specs;
+ const struct fs_parameter_enum *enums;
+ };
+
+For example:
+
+ enum afs_param {
+ Opt_autocell,
+ Opt_bar,
+ Opt_dyn,
+ Opt_foo,
+ Opt_source,
+ nr__afs_params
+ };
+
+ static const struct fs_parameter_description afs_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "kAFS",
+ .nr_params = nr__afs_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(afs_param_keys),
+ .nr_enums = ARRAY_SIZE(afs_param_enums),
+ .keys = afs_param_keys,
+ .specs = afs_param_specs,
+ .enums = afs_param_enums,
+ };
+
+The members are as follows:
+
+ (1) const char name[16];
+
+ The name to be used in error messages generated by the parse helper
+ functions.
+
+ (2) u8 nr_params;
+
+ The number of discrete parameter identifiers. This indicates the number
+ of elements in the ->types[] array and also limits the values that may be
+ used in the values that the ->keys[] array maps to.
+
+ It is expected that, for example, two parameters that are related, say
+ "acl" and "noacl" with have the same ID, but will be flagged to indicate
+ that one is the inverse of the other. The value can then be picked out
+ from the parse result.
+
+ (3) const struct fs_parameter_specification *specs;
+
+ Table of parameter specifications, where the entries are of type:
+
+ struct fs_parameter_type {
+ enum fs_parameter_spec type:8;
+ u8 flags;
+ };
+
+ and the parameter identifier is the index to the array. 'type' indicates
+ the desired value type and must be one of:
+
+ TYPE NAME EXPECTED VALUE RESULT IN
+ ======================= ======================= =====================
+ fs_param_takes_no_value No value n/a
+ fs_param_is_bool Boolean value result->boolean
+ fs_param_is_u32 32-bit unsigned int result->uint_32
+ fs_param_is_u32_octal 32-bit octal int result->uint_32
+ fs_param_is_u32_hex 32-bit hex int result->uint_32
+ fs_param_is_s32 32-bit signed int result->int_32
+ fs_param_is_enum Enum value name result->uint_32
+ fs_param_is_string Arbitrary string param->string
+ fs_param_is_blob Binary blob param->blob
+ fs_param_is_blockdev Blockdev path * Needs lookup
+ fs_param_is_path Path * Needs lookup
+ fs_param_is_fd File descriptor param->file
+
+ And each parameter can be qualified with 'flags':
+
+ fs_param_v_optional The value is optional
+ fs_param_neg_with_no If key name is prefixed with "no", it is false
+ fs_param_neg_with_empty If value is "", it is false
+ fs_param_deprecated The parameter is deprecated.
+
+ For example:
+
+ static const struct fs_parameter_spec afs_param_specs[nr__afs_params] = {
+ [Opt_autocell] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_bar] = { fs_param_is_enum },
+ [Opt_dyn] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_foo] = { fs_param_is_bool, fs_param_neg_with_no },
+ [Opt_source] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ };
+
+ Note that if the value is of fs_param_is_bool type, fs_parse() will try
+ to match any string value against "0", "1", "no", "yes", "false", "true".
+
+ (4) const struct constant_table *keys;
+ u8 nr_keys;
+
+ Table of key name to parameter ID mappings and the number of elements in
+ the table. This is optional if ->nr_params is 0. The table is just an
+ array of { name, integer } pairs, e.g.:
+
+ static const struct constant_table afs_param_keys[] = {
+ { "autocell", Opt_autocell },
+ { "bar", Opt_bar },
+ { "dyn", Opt_dyn },
+ { "foo", Opt_foo },
+ { "source", Opt_source },
+ };
+
+ [!] NOTE that the table must be sorted for bsearch() to use strcmp() to
+ compare the entries.
+
+ The parameter ID can also be fs_param_key_removed to indicate that a
+ deprecated parameter has been removed and that an error will be given.
+ This differs from fs_param_deprecated where the parameter may still have
+ an effect.
+
+ (5) const struct fs_parameter_enum *enums;
+ u8 nr_enums;
+
+ Table of enum value names to integer mappings and the number of elements
+ stored therein. This is of type:
+
+ struct fs_parameter_enum {
+ u8 param_id;
+ char name[14];
+ u8 value;
+ };
+
+ Where the array is an unsorted list of { parameter ID, name }-keyed
+ elements that indicate the value to map to, e.g.:
+
+ static const struct fs_parameter_enum afs_param_enums[] = {
+ { Opt_bar, "x", 1},
+ { Opt_bar, "y", 23},
+ { Opt_bar, "z", 42},
+ };
+
+ If a parameter of type fs_param_is_enum is encountered, fs_parse() will
+ try to look the value up in the enum table and the result will be stored
+ in the parse result.
+
+ (6) bool ignore_unknown;
+
+ If this is set, fs_parse() will not generate an error for unknown
+ parameters, but will rather return 0.
+
+ (7) bool no_source;
+
+ If this is set, fs_parse() will ignore any "source" parameter and not
+ pass it to the filesystem.
+
+The parser should be pointed to by the parser pointer in the file_system_type
+struct as this will provide validation on registration (if
+CONFIG_VALIDATE_FS_PARSER=y) and will allow the description to be queried from
+userspace using the fsinfo() syscall.
+
+
+==========================
+PARAMETER HELPER FUNCTIONS
+==========================
+
+A number of helper functions are provided to help a filesystem or an LSM
+process the parameters it is given.
+
+ (*) int lookup_constant(const struct constant_table tbl[],
+ const char *name, int not_found);
+
+ Look up a constant by name in a table of name -> integer mappings. The
+ table is an array of elements of the following type:
+
+ struct constant_table {
+ const char *name;
+ int value;
+ };
+
+ and it must be sorted such that it can be searched using bsearch() using
+ strcmp(). If a match is found, the corresponding value is returned. If a
+ match isn't found, the not_found value is returned instead.
+
+ (*) bool validate_constant_table(const struct constant_table *tbl,
+ size_t tbl_size,
+ int low, int high, int special);
+
+ Validate a constant table. Checks that all the elements are appropriately
+ ordered, that there are no duplicates and that the values are between low
+ and high inclusive, though provision is made for one allowable special
+ value outside of that range. If no special value is required, special
+ should just be set to lie inside the low-to-high range.
+
+ If all is good, true is returned. If the table is invalid, errors are
+ logged to dmesg, the stack is dumped and false is returned.
+
+ (*) int fs_parse(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct fs_param_parser *parser,
+ struct fs_parameter *param,
+ struct fs_param_parse_result *result);
+
+ This is the main interpreter of parameters. It uses the parameter
+ description (parser) to look up the name of the parameter to use and to
+ convert that to a parameter ID (stored in result->key).
+
+ If successful, and if the parameter type indicates the result is a
+ boolean, integer or enum type, the value is converted by this function and
+ the result stored in result->{boolean,int_32,uint_32}.
+
+ If a match isn't initially made, the key is prefixed with "no" and no
+ value is present then an attempt will be made to look up the key with the
+ prefix removed. If this matches a parameter for which the type has flag
+ fs_param_neg_with_no set, then a match will be made and the value will be
+ set to false/0/NULL.
+
+ If the parameter is successfully matched and, optionally, parsed
+ correctly, 1 is returned. If the parameter isn't matched and
+ parser->ignore_unknown is set, then 0 is returned. Otherwise -EINVAL is
+ returned.
+
+ (*) bool fs_validate_parser(const char *name,
+ const struct fs_param_parser *parser);
+
+ This is validates the parameter description. 'name' is used to illuminate
+ any error messages that are logged. It returns true if the description is
+ good and false if it is not.
+
+ (*) int fs_lookup_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct fs_param_parser *parser,
+ struct fs_parameter *value,
+ struct fs_parse_result *result,
+ struct path *_path);
+
+ This takes the result of fs_parse() for string and filename type
+ parameters and attemps to do a path lookup on them. If the parameter
+ expects a blockdev, a check is made that the inode actually represents
+ one.
+
+ Returns 0 if successful and *_path will be set; returns a negative error
+ code if not.
Make the anon_inodes facility unconditional so that it can be used by core
VFS code.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/kvm/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/mips/kvm/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/powerpc/kvm/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/s390/kvm/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 1 -
drivers/base/Kconfig | 1 -
drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 -
drivers/dma-buf/Kconfig | 1 -
drivers/gpio/Kconfig | 1 -
drivers/iio/Kconfig | 1 -
drivers/infiniband/Kconfig | 1 -
drivers/vfio/Kconfig | 1 -
fs/Makefile | 2 +-
fs/notify/fanotify/Kconfig | 1 -
fs/notify/inotify/Kconfig | 1 -
init/Kconfig | 10 ----------
18 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/kvm/Kconfig
index e2bd35b6780c..c09fcc092a54 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ config KVM
bool "Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support"
depends on MMU && OF
select PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
- select ANON_INODES
select ARM_GIC
select ARM_GIC_V3
select ARM_GIC_V3_ITS
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
index 47b23bf617c7..86fe9b3e3ff8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ config KVM
depends on OF
select MMU_NOTIFIER
select PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
- select ANON_INODES
select HAVE_KVM_CPU_RELAX_INTERCEPT
select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_TLB_FLUSH_ALL
select KVM_MMIO
diff --git a/arch/mips/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/mips/kvm/Kconfig
index 76b93a9c8c9b..4d06a29bc13b 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ config KVM
depends on HAVE_KVM
select EXPORT_UASM
select PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
- select ANON_INODES
select KVM_GENERIC_DIRTYLOG_READ_PROTECT
select HAVE_KVM_VCPU_ASYNC_IOCTL
select KVM_MMIO
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/kvm/Kconfig
index 68a0e9d5b440..e058d02ee819 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ if VIRTUALIZATION
config KVM
bool
select PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
- select ANON_INODES
select HAVE_KVM_EVENTFD
select HAVE_KVM_VCPU_ASYNC_IOCTL
select SRCU
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/s390/kvm/Kconfig
index a3dbd459cce9..600e4fd11a67 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ config KVM
prompt "Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support"
depends on HAVE_KVM
select PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
- select ANON_INODES
select HAVE_KVM_CPU_RELAX_INTERCEPT
select HAVE_KVM_VCPU_ASYNC_IOCTL
select HAVE_KVM_EVENTFD
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f1dbb4ee19d7..f01345302d7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ config X86
#
select ACPI_LEGACY_TABLES_LOOKUP if ACPI
select ACPI_SYSTEM_POWER_STATES_SUPPORT if ACPI
- select ANON_INODES
select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA
select ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK
select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 92fd433c50b9..baf0070c7fac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ config KVM
depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC
select PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
select MMU_NOTIFIER
- select ANON_INODES
select HAVE_KVM_IRQCHIP
select HAVE_KVM_IRQFD
select IRQ_BYPASS_MANAGER
diff --git a/drivers/base/Kconfig b/drivers/base/Kconfig
index 3e63a900b330..ae213ed2a7c8 100644
--- a/drivers/base/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/base/Kconfig
@@ -174,7 +174,6 @@ source "drivers/base/regmap/Kconfig"
config DMA_SHARED_BUFFER
bool
default n
- select ANON_INODES
select IRQ_WORK
help
This option enables the framework for buffer-sharing between
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index 18c81cbe4704..4819874b5523 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -157,7 +157,6 @@ config TCG_CRB
config TCG_VTPM_PROXY
tristate "VTPM Proxy Interface"
depends on TCG_TPM
- select ANON_INODES
---help---
This driver proxies for an emulated TPM (vTPM) running in userspace.
A device /dev/vtpmx is provided that creates a device pair
diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/Kconfig b/drivers/dma-buf/Kconfig
index ed3b785bae37..b0194c8c251c 100644
--- a/drivers/dma-buf/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/dma-buf/Kconfig
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ menu "DMABUF options"
config SYNC_FILE
bool "Explicit Synchronization Framework"
default n
- select ANON_INODES
select DMA_SHARED_BUFFER
---help---
The Sync File Framework adds explicit syncronization via
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/Kconfig b/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
index 71c0ab46f216..13d7693e85ca 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/gpio/Kconfig
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ config ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
menuconfig GPIOLIB
bool "GPIO Support"
- select ANON_INODES
help
This enables GPIO support through the generic GPIO library.
You only need to enable this, if you also want to enable
diff --git a/drivers/iio/Kconfig b/drivers/iio/Kconfig
index d08aeb41cd07..1dec0fecb6ef 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/iio/Kconfig
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
menuconfig IIO
tristate "Industrial I/O support"
- select ANON_INODES
help
The industrial I/O subsystem provides a unified framework for
drivers for many different types of embedded sensors using a
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/Kconfig b/drivers/infiniband/Kconfig
index b03af54367c0..c1969ddfffea 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/Kconfig
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ config INFINIBAND_USER_MAD
config INFINIBAND_USER_ACCESS
tristate "InfiniBand userspace access (verbs and CM)"
- select ANON_INODES
---help---
Userspace InfiniBand access support. This enables the
kernel side of userspace verbs and the userspace
diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
index c84333eb5eb5..9aa91e736023 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ menuconfig VFIO
tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
depends on IOMMU_API
select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if (X86 || S390 || ARM_SMMU || ARM_SMMU_V3)
- select ANON_INODES
help
VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
index 9a0b8003f069..ae681523b4b1 100644
--- a/fs/Makefile
+++ b/fs/Makefile
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc_namespace.o
obj-y += notify/
obj-$(CONFIG_EPOLL) += eventpoll.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ANON_INODES) += anon_inodes.o
+obj-y += anon_inodes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNALFD) += signalfd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TIMERFD) += timerfd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EVENTFD) += eventfd.o
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/Kconfig b/fs/notify/fanotify/Kconfig
index 41355ce74ac0..f5b0b3af32dd 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/Kconfig
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
config FANOTIFY
bool "Filesystem wide access notification"
select FSNOTIFY
- select ANON_INODES
default n
---help---
Say Y here to enable fanotify support. fanotify is a file access
diff --git a/fs/notify/inotify/Kconfig b/fs/notify/inotify/Kconfig
index b981fc0c8379..0161c74e76e2 100644
--- a/fs/notify/inotify/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/notify/inotify/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
config INOTIFY_USER
bool "Inotify support for userspace"
- select ANON_INODES
select FSNOTIFY
default y
---help---
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 5a52f07259a2..d8303f4af5d2 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1066,9 +1066,6 @@ config LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
config SYSCTL
bool
-config ANON_INODES
- bool
-
config HAVE_UID16
bool
@@ -1273,14 +1270,12 @@ config HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
config EPOLL
bool "Enable eventpoll support" if EXPERT
default y
- select ANON_INODES
help
Disabling this option will cause the kernel to be built without
support for epoll family of system calls.
config SIGNALFD
bool "Enable signalfd() system call" if EXPERT
- select ANON_INODES
default y
help
Enable the signalfd() system call that allows to receive signals
@@ -1290,7 +1285,6 @@ config SIGNALFD
config TIMERFD
bool "Enable timerfd() system call" if EXPERT
- select ANON_INODES
default y
help
Enable the timerfd() system call that allows to receive timer
@@ -1300,7 +1294,6 @@ config TIMERFD
config EVENTFD
bool "Enable eventfd() system call" if EXPERT
- select ANON_INODES
default y
help
Enable the eventfd() system call that allows to receive both
@@ -1414,7 +1407,6 @@ config KALLSYMS_BASE_RELATIVE
# syscall, maps, verifier
config BPF_SYSCALL
bool "Enable bpf() system call"
- select ANON_INODES
select BPF
select IRQ_WORK
default n
@@ -1431,7 +1423,6 @@ config BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
config USERFAULTFD
bool "Enable userfaultfd() system call"
- select ANON_INODES
depends on MMU
help
Enable the userfaultfd() system call that allows to intercept and
@@ -1498,7 +1489,6 @@ config PERF_EVENTS
bool "Kernel performance events and counters"
default y if PROFILING
depends on HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
- select ANON_INODES
select IRQ_WORK
select SRCU
help
Implement the ability for filesystems to log error, warning and
informational messages through the fs_context. These can be extracted by
userspace by reading from an fd created by fsopen().
Error messages are prefixed with "e ", warnings with "w " and informational
messages with "i ".
Inside the kernel, formatted messages are malloc'd but unformatted messages
are not copied if they're either in the core .rodata section or in the
.rodata section of the filesystem module pinned by fs_context::fs_type.
The messages are only good till the fs_type is released.
Note that the logging object is shared between duplicated fs_context
structures. This is so that such as NFS which do a mount within a mount
can get at least some of the errors from the inner mount.
Five logging functions are provided for this:
(1) void logfc(struct fs_context *fc, const char *fmt, ...);
This logs a message into the context. If the buffer is full, the
earliest message is discarded.
(2) void errorf(fc, fmt, ...);
This wraps logfc() to log an error.
(3) void invalf(fc, fmt, ...);
This wraps errorf() and returns -EINVAL for convenience.
(4) void warnf(fc, fmt, ...);
This wraps logfc() to log a warning.
(5) void infof(fc, fmt, ...);
This wraps logfc() to log an informational message.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/fs_context.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/fsopen.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/fs_context.h | 24 ++++++++--
include/linux/module.h | 6 ++
4 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
index 90db81d7008c..90338ef7bb92 100644
--- a/fs/fs_context.c
+++ b/fs/fs_context.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
#include "mount.h"
#include "internal.h"
@@ -360,6 +362,8 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src_fc)
get_net(fc->net_ns);
get_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
get_cred(fc->cred);
+ if (fc->log)
+ refcount_inc(&fc->log->usage);
/* Can't call put until we've called ->dup */
ret = fc->ops->dup(fc, src_fc);
@@ -377,6 +381,108 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src_fc)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_dup_fs_context);
+/**
+ * logfc - Log a message to a filesystem context
+ * @fc: The filesystem context to log to.
+ * @fmt: The format of the buffer.
+ */
+void logfc(struct fs_context *fc, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ static const char store_failure[] = "OOM: Can't store error string";
+ struct fc_log *log = fc->log;
+ const char *p;
+ va_list va;
+ char *q;
+ u8 freeable;
+
+ va_start(va, fmt);
+ if (!strchr(fmt, '%')) {
+ p = fmt;
+ goto unformatted_string;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(fmt, "%s") == 0) {
+ p = va_arg(va, const char *);
+ goto unformatted_string;
+ }
+
+ q = kvasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, fmt, va);
+copied_string:
+ if (!q)
+ goto store_failure;
+ freeable = 1;
+ goto store_string;
+
+unformatted_string:
+ if ((unsigned long)p >= (unsigned long)__start_rodata &&
+ (unsigned long)p < (unsigned long)__end_rodata)
+ goto const_string;
+ if (within_module_core((unsigned long)p, log->owner))
+ goto const_string;
+ q = kstrdup(p, GFP_KERNEL);
+ goto copied_string;
+
+store_failure:
+ p = store_failure;
+const_string:
+ q = (char *)p;
+ freeable = 0;
+store_string:
+ if (!log) {
+ switch (fmt[0]) {
+ case 'w':
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s\n", q + 2);
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s\n", q + 2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s\n", q + 2);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (freeable)
+ kfree(q);
+ } else {
+ unsigned int logsize = ARRAY_SIZE(log->buffer);
+ u8 index;
+
+ index = log->head & (logsize - 1);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(log->head) != sizeof(u8) ||
+ sizeof(log->tail) != sizeof(u8));
+ if ((u8)(log->head - log->tail) == logsize) {
+ /* The buffer is full, discard the oldest message */
+ if (log->need_free & (1 << index))
+ kfree(log->buffer[index]);
+ log->tail++;
+ }
+
+ log->buffer[index] = q;
+ log->need_free &= ~(1 << index);
+ log->need_free |= freeable << index;
+ log->head++;
+ }
+ va_end(va);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(logfc);
+
+/*
+ * Free a logging structure.
+ */
+static void put_fc_log(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct fc_log *log = fc->log;
+ int i;
+
+ if (log) {
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&log->usage)) {
+ fc->log = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i <= 7; i++)
+ if (log->need_free & (1 << i))
+ kfree(log->buffer[i]);
+ kfree(log);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/**
* put_fs_context - Dispose of a superblock configuration context.
* @fc: The context to dispose of.
@@ -402,6 +508,7 @@ void put_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
if (fc->cred)
put_cred(fc->cred);
kfree(fc->subtype);
+ put_fc_log(fc);
put_filesystem(fc->fs_type);
kfree(fc->source);
kfree(fc);
diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c
index f30080e1ebc4..7a25b4c3bc18 100644
--- a/fs/fsopen.c
+++ b/fs/fsopen.c
@@ -19,6 +19,52 @@
#include <linux/file.h>
#include "mount.h"
+/*
+ * Allow the user to read back any error, warning or informational messages.
+ */
+static ssize_t fscontext_read(struct file *file,
+ char __user *_buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc = file->private_data;
+ struct fc_log *log = fc->log;
+ unsigned int logsize = ARRAY_SIZE(log->buffer);
+ ssize_t ret;
+ char *p;
+ bool need_free;
+ int index, n;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (log->head == log->tail) {
+ mutex_unlock(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+ return -ENODATA;
+ }
+
+ index = log->tail & (logsize - 1);
+ p = log->buffer[index];
+ need_free = log->need_free & (1 << index);
+ log->buffer[index] = NULL;
+ log->need_free &= ~(1 << index);
+ log->tail++;
+ mutex_unlock(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+
+ ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+ n = strlen(p);
+ if (n > len)
+ goto err_free;
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(_buf, p, n) != 0)
+ goto err_free;
+ ret = n;
+
+err_free:
+ if (need_free)
+ kfree(p);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int fscontext_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fs_context *fc = file->private_data;
@@ -31,6 +77,7 @@ static int fscontext_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
}
const struct file_operations fscontext_fops = {
+ .read = fscontext_read,
.release = fscontext_release,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
@@ -49,6 +96,16 @@ static int fscontext_create_fd(struct fs_context *fc, unsigned int o_flags)
return fd;
}
+static int fscontext_alloc_log(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ fc->log = kzalloc(sizeof(*fc->log), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fc->log)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ refcount_set(&fc->log->usage, 1);
+ fc->log->owner = fc->fs_type->owner;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Open a filesystem by name so that it can be configured for mounting.
*
@@ -61,6 +118,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fsopen, const char __user *, _fs_name, unsigned int, flags)
struct file_system_type *fs_type;
struct fs_context *fc;
const char *fs_name;
+ int ret;
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
@@ -83,5 +141,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fsopen, const char __user *, _fs_name, unsigned int, flags)
return PTR_ERR(fc);
fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS;
+
+ ret = fscontext_alloc_log(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
return fscontext_create_fd(fc, flags & FSOPEN_CLOEXEC ? O_CLOEXEC : 0);
+
+err_fc:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return ret;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
index 5445889f705b..9a6aa6bcf745 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#define _LINUX_FS_CONTEXT_H
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ struct fs_context {
struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* The user namespace for this mount */
struct net *net_ns; /* The network namespace for this mount */
const struct cred *cred; /* The mounter's credentials */
+ struct fc_log *log; /* Logging buffer */
char *source; /* The source name (eg. dev path) */
char *subtype; /* The subtype to set on the superblock */
void *security; /* The LSM context */
@@ -147,7 +149,21 @@ extern int vfs_get_super(struct fs_context *fc,
extern const struct file_operations fscontext_fops;
-#define logfc(FC, FMT, ...) pr_notice(FMT, ## __VA_ARGS__)
+/*
+ * Mount error, warning and informational message logging. This structure is
+ * shareable between a mount and a subordinate mount.
+ */
+struct fc_log {
+ refcount_t usage;
+ u8 head; /* Insertion index in buffer[] */
+ u8 tail; /* Removal index in buffer[] */
+ u8 need_free; /* Mask of kfree'able items in buffer[] */
+ struct module *owner; /* Owner module for strings that don't then need freeing */
+ char *buffer[8];
+};
+
+extern __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)))
+void logfc(struct fs_context *fc, const char *fmt, ...);
/**
* infof - Store supplementary informational message
@@ -157,7 +173,7 @@ extern const struct file_operations fscontext_fops;
* Store the supplementary informational message for the process if the process
* has enabled the facility.
*/
-#define infof(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
+#define infof(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, "i "fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
/**
* warnf - Store supplementary warning message
@@ -167,7 +183,7 @@ extern const struct file_operations fscontext_fops;
* Store the supplementary warning message for the process if the process has
* enabled the facility.
*/
-#define warnf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
+#define warnf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, "w "fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
/**
* errorf - Store supplementary error message
@@ -177,7 +193,7 @@ extern const struct file_operations fscontext_fops;
* Store the supplementary error message for the process if the process has
* enabled the facility.
*/
-#define errorf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
+#define errorf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ logfc(fc, "e "fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); })
/**
* invalf - Store supplementary invalid argument error message
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index d44df9b2c131..a5892fd68f5a 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -682,6 +682,12 @@ static inline bool is_module_text_address(unsigned long addr)
return false;
}
+static inline bool within_module_core(unsigned long addr,
+ const struct module *mod)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
/* Get/put a kernel symbol (calls should be symmetric) */
#define symbol_get(x) ({ extern typeof(x) x __attribute__((weak)); &(x); })
#define symbol_put(x) do { } while (0)
Make kernfs support superblock creation/mount/remount with fs_context.
This requires that sysfs, cgroup and intel_rdt, which are built on kernfs,
be made to support fs_context also.
Notes:
(1) A kernfs_fs_context struct is created to wrap fs_context and the
kernfs mount parameters are moved in here (or are in fs_context).
(2) kernfs_mount{,_ns}() are made into kernfs_get_tree(). The extra
namespace tag parameter is passed in the context if desired
(3) kernfs_free_fs_context() is provided as a destructor for the
kernfs_fs_context struct, but for the moment it does nothing except
get called in the right places.
(4) sysfs doesn't wrap kernfs_fs_context since it has no parameters to
pass, but possibly this should be done anyway in case someone wants to
add a parameter in future.
(5) A cgroup_fs_context struct is created to wrap kernfs_fs_context and
the cgroup v1 and v2 mount parameters are all moved there.
(6) cgroup1 parameter parsing error messages are now handled by invalf(),
which allows userspace to collect them directly.
(7) cgroup1 parameter cleanup is now done in the context destructor rather
than in the mount/get_tree and remount functions.
Weirdies:
(*) cgroup_do_get_tree() calls cset_cgroup_from_root() with locks held,
but then uses the resulting pointer after dropping the locks. I'm
told this is okay and needs commenting.
(*) The cgroup refcount web. This really needs documenting.
(*) cgroup2 only has one root?
Add a suggestion from Thomas Gleixner in which the RDT enablement code is
placed into its own function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
cc: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.h | 15 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c | 184 ++++++++++------
fs/kernfs/mount.c | 87 ++++----
fs/sysfs/mount.c | 67 ++++--
include/linux/cgroup.h | 3
include/linux/kernfs.h | 39 ++-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h | 50 +++-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 347 +++++++++++++++++-------------
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 256 ++++++++++++++--------
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 4
10 files changed, 635 insertions(+), 417 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.h
index be152b3b2543..82dda4daec7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.h
@@ -33,6 +33,21 @@
#define RMID_VAL_ERROR BIT_ULL(63)
#define RMID_VAL_UNAVAIL BIT_ULL(62)
+
+struct rdt_fs_context {
+ struct kernfs_fs_context kfc;
+ bool enable_cdpl2;
+ bool enable_cdpl3;
+ bool enable_mba_mbps;
+};
+
+static inline struct rdt_fs_context *rdt_fc2context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc = fc->fs_private;
+
+ return container_of(kfc, struct rdt_fs_context, kfc);
+}
+
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_enable_key);
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c
index c74365b78253..b11d81dafa9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <linux/kernfs.h>
#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
@@ -1131,43 +1132,6 @@ static void cdp_disable_all(void)
cdpl2_disable();
}
-static int parse_rdtgroupfs_options(char *data)
-{
- char *token, *o = data;
- int ret = 0;
-
- while ((token = strsep(&o, ",")) != NULL) {
- if (!*token) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!strcmp(token, "cdp")) {
- ret = cdpl3_enable();
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- } else if (!strcmp(token, "cdpl2")) {
- ret = cdpl2_enable();
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- } else if (!strcmp(token, "mba_MBps")) {
- ret = set_mba_sc(true);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- } else {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-out:
- pr_err("Invalid mount option \"%s\"\n", token);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
/*
* We don't allow rdtgroup directories to be created anywhere
* except the root directory. Thus when looking for the rdtgroup
@@ -1236,13 +1200,27 @@ static int mkdir_mondata_all(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
struct rdtgroup *prgrp,
struct kernfs_node **mon_data_kn);
-static struct dentry *rdt_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *unused_dev_name,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
+static int rdt_enable_ctx(struct rdt_fs_context *ctx)
{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->enable_cdpl2)
+ ret = cdpl2_enable();
+
+ if (!ret && ctx->enable_cdpl3)
+ ret = cdpl3_enable();
+
+ if (!ret && ctx->enable_mba_mbps)
+ ret = set_mba_sc(true);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
struct rdt_domain *dom;
struct rdt_resource *r;
- struct dentry *dentry;
int ret;
cpus_read_lock();
@@ -1251,53 +1229,42 @@ static struct dentry *rdt_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
* resctrl file system can only be mounted once.
*/
if (static_branch_unlikely(&rdt_enable_key)) {
- dentry = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+ ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
- ret = parse_rdtgroupfs_options(data);
- if (ret) {
- dentry = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ ret = rdt_enable_ctx(ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out_cdp;
- }
closid_init();
ret = rdtgroup_create_info_dir(rdtgroup_default.kn);
- if (ret) {
- dentry = ERR_PTR(ret);
- goto out_cdp;
- }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_mba;
if (rdt_mon_capable) {
ret = mongroup_create_dir(rdtgroup_default.kn,
NULL, "mon_groups",
&kn_mongrp);
- if (ret) {
- dentry = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out_info;
- }
kernfs_get(kn_mongrp);
ret = mkdir_mondata_all(rdtgroup_default.kn,
&rdtgroup_default, &kn_mondata);
- if (ret) {
- dentry = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out_mongrp;
- }
kernfs_get(kn_mondata);
rdtgroup_default.mon.mon_data_kn = kn_mondata;
}
ret = rdt_pseudo_lock_init();
- if (ret) {
- dentry = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ if (ret)
goto out_mondata;
- }
- dentry = kernfs_mount(fs_type, flags, rdt_root,
- RDTGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out_psl;
if (rdt_alloc_capable)
@@ -1326,14 +1293,98 @@ static struct dentry *rdt_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
kernfs_remove(kn_mongrp);
out_info:
kernfs_remove(kn_info);
+out_mba:
+ if (ctx->enable_mba_mbps)
+ set_mba_sc(false);
out_cdp:
cdp_disable_all();
out:
rdt_last_cmd_clear();
mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
cpus_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum rdt_param {
+ Opt_cdp,
+ Opt_cdpl2,
+ Opt_mba_mpbs,
+ nr__rdt_params
+};
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec rdt_param_specs[nr__rdt_params] = {
+ [Opt_cdp] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_cdpl2] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_mba_mpbs] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+};
+
+static const struct constant_table rdt_param_keys[] = {
+ { "cdp", Opt_cdp },
+ { "cdpl2", Opt_cdpl2 },
+ { "mba_mbps", Opt_mba_mpbs },
+};
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_description rdt_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "rdt",
+ .nr_params = nr__rdt_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(rdt_param_keys),
+ .keys = rdt_param_keys,
+ .specs = rdt_param_specs,
+ .no_source = true,
+};
+
+static int rdt_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fs_parse(fc, &rdt_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (result.key) {
+ case Opt_cdp:
+ ctx->enable_cdpl3 = true;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_cdpl2:
+ ctx->enable_cdpl2 = true;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_mba_mpbs:
+ ctx->enable_mba_mbps = true;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static void rdt_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
- return dentry;
+ kernfs_free_fs_context(fc);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations rdt_fs_context_ops = {
+ .free = rdt_fs_context_free,
+ .parse_param = rdt_parse_param,
+ .get_tree = rdt_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int rdt_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct rdt_fs_context *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rdt_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->kfc.root = rdt_root;
+ ctx->kfc.magic = RDTGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC;
+ fc->fs_private = &ctx->kfc;
+ fc->ops = &rdt_fs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
}
static int reset_all_ctrls(struct rdt_resource *r)
@@ -1500,9 +1551,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
}
static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
- .name = "resctrl",
- .mount = rdt_mount,
- .kill_sb = rdt_kill_sb,
+ .name = "resctrl",
+ .init_fs_context = rdt_init_fs_context,
+ .parameters = &rdt_fs_parameters,
+ .kill_sb = rdt_kill_sb,
};
static int mon_addfile(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, const char *name,
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/mount.c b/fs/kernfs/mount.c
index f70e0b69e714..188c683eab14 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/mount.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/mount.c
@@ -22,14 +22,13 @@
struct kmem_cache *kernfs_node_cache;
-static int kernfs_sop_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags,
- char *data, size_t data_size)
+static int kernfs_sop_reconfigure(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct kernfs_root *root = kernfs_info(sb)->root;
struct kernfs_syscall_ops *scops = root->syscall_ops;
- if (scops && scops->remount_fs)
- return scops->remount_fs(root, flags, data);
+ if (scops && scops->reconfigure)
+ return scops->reconfigure(root, fc);
return 0;
}
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ const struct super_operations kernfs_sops = {
.drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
.evict_inode = kernfs_evict_inode,
- .remount_fs = kernfs_sop_remount_fs,
+ .reconfigure = kernfs_sop_reconfigure,
.show_options = kernfs_sop_show_options,
.show_path = kernfs_sop_show_path,
};
@@ -219,7 +218,7 @@ struct dentry *kernfs_node_dentry(struct kernfs_node *kn,
} while (true);
}
-static int kernfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long magic)
+static int kernfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc)
{
struct kernfs_super_info *info = kernfs_info(sb);
struct inode *inode;
@@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ static int kernfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long magic)
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
sb->s_blocksize = PAGE_SIZE;
sb->s_blocksize_bits = PAGE_SHIFT;
- sb->s_magic = magic;
+ sb->s_magic = kfc->magic;
sb->s_op = &kernfs_sops;
sb->s_xattr = kernfs_xattr_handlers;
if (info->root->flags & KERNFS_ROOT_SUPPORT_EXPORTOP)
@@ -257,21 +256,20 @@ static int kernfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long magic)
return 0;
}
-static int kernfs_test_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int kernfs_test_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct kernfs_super_info *sb_info = kernfs_info(sb);
- struct kernfs_super_info *info = data;
+ struct kernfs_super_info *info = fc->s_fs_info;
return sb_info->root == info->root && sb_info->ns == info->ns;
}
-static int kernfs_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int kernfs_set_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
- int error;
- error = set_anon_super(sb, data);
- if (!error)
- sb->s_fs_info = data;
- return error;
+ struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc = fc->fs_private;
+
+ kfc->ns_tag = NULL;
+ return set_anon_super_fc(sb, fc);
}
/**
@@ -288,63 +286,60 @@ const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb)
}
/**
- * kernfs_mount_ns - kernfs mount helper
- * @fs_type: file_system_type of the fs being mounted
- * @flags: mount flags specified for the mount
- * @root: kernfs_root of the hierarchy being mounted
- * @magic: file system specific magic number
- * @new_sb_created: tell the caller if we allocated a new superblock
- * @ns: optional namespace tag of the mount
- *
- * This is to be called from each kernfs user's file_system_type->mount()
- * implementation, which should pass through the specified @fs_type and
- * @flags, and specify the hierarchy and namespace tag to mount via @root
- * and @ns, respectively.
+ * kernfs_get_tree - kernfs filesystem access/retrieval helper
+ * @fc: The filesystem context.
*
- * The return value can be passed to the vfs layer verbatim.
+ * This is to be called from each kernfs user's fs_context->ops->get_tree()
+ * implementation, which should set the specified ->@fs_type and ->@flags, and
+ * specify the hierarchy and namespace tag to mount via ->@root and ->@ns,
+ * respectively.
*/
-struct dentry *kernfs_mount_ns(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- struct kernfs_root *root, unsigned long magic,
- bool *new_sb_created, const void *ns)
+int kernfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
+ struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc = fc->fs_private;
struct super_block *sb;
struct kernfs_super_info *info;
int error;
info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ return -ENOMEM;
- info->root = root;
- info->ns = ns;
+ info->root = kfc->root;
+ info->ns = kfc->ns_tag;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->node);
- sb = sget_userns(fs_type, kernfs_test_super, kernfs_set_super, flags,
- &init_user_ns, info);
- if (IS_ERR(sb) || sb->s_fs_info != info)
- kfree(info);
+ fc->s_fs_info = info;
+ sb = sget_fc(fc, kernfs_test_super, kernfs_set_super);
if (IS_ERR(sb))
- return ERR_CAST(sb);
-
- if (new_sb_created)
- *new_sb_created = !sb->s_root;
+ return PTR_ERR(sb);
if (!sb->s_root) {
struct kernfs_super_info *info = kernfs_info(sb);
- error = kernfs_fill_super(sb, magic);
+ kfc->new_sb_created = true;
+
+ error = kernfs_fill_super(sb, kfc);
if (error) {
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
- return ERR_PTR(error);
+ return error;
}
sb->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE;
mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
- list_add(&info->node, &root->supers);
+ list_add(&info->node, &info->root->supers);
mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
}
- return dget(sb->s_root);
+ fc->root = dget(sb->s_root);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void kernfs_free_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ /* Note that we don't deal with kfc->ns_tag here. */
+ kfree(fc->s_fs_info);
+ fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
}
/**
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/mount.c b/fs/sysfs/mount.c
index 77302c35b0ff..1e1c0ccc6a36 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/mount.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/mount.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include "sysfs.h"
@@ -20,27 +21,55 @@
static struct kernfs_root *sysfs_root;
struct kernfs_node *sysfs_root_kn;
-static struct dentry *sysfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data, size_t data_size)
+static int sysfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct dentry *root;
- void *ns;
- bool new_sb = false;
+ struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc = fc->fs_private;
+ int ret;
- if (!(flags & SB_KERNMOUNT)) {
+ ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (kfc->new_sb_created)
+ fc->root->d_sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void sysfs_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc = fc->fs_private;
+
+ if (kfc->ns_tag)
+ kobj_ns_drop(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET, kfc->ns_tag);
+ kernfs_free_fs_context(fc);
+ kfree(kfc);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations sysfs_fs_context_ops = {
+ .free = sysfs_fs_context_free,
+ .get_tree = sysfs_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int sysfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc;
+
+ if (!(fc->sb_flags & SB_KERNMOUNT)) {
if (!kobj_ns_current_may_mount(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET))
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ return -EPERM;
}
- ns = kobj_ns_grab_current(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET);
- root = kernfs_mount_ns(fs_type, flags, sysfs_root,
- SYSFS_MAGIC, &new_sb, ns);
- if (!new_sb)
- kobj_ns_drop(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET, ns);
- else if (!IS_ERR(root))
- root->d_sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE;
+ kfc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kernfs_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kfc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- return root;
+ kfc->ns_tag = kobj_ns_grab_current(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET);
+ kfc->root = sysfs_root;
+ kfc->magic = SYSFS_MAGIC;
+ fc->fs_private = kfc;
+ fc->ops = &sysfs_fs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
}
static void sysfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -52,10 +81,10 @@ static void sysfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
}
static struct file_system_type sysfs_fs_type = {
- .name = "sysfs",
- .mount = sysfs_mount,
- .kill_sb = sysfs_kill_sb,
- .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
+ .name = "sysfs",
+ .init_fs_context = sysfs_init_fs_context,
+ .kill_sb = sysfs_kill_sb,
+ .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
};
int __init sysfs_init(void)
diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
index c9fdf6f57913..ac198f0c466f 100644
--- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
+++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
@@ -829,10 +829,11 @@ copy_cgroup_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
#endif /* !CONFIG_CGROUPS */
-static inline void get_cgroup_ns(struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
+static inline struct cgroup_namespace *get_cgroup_ns(struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
{
if (ns)
refcount_inc(&ns->count);
+ return ns;
}
static inline void put_cgroup_ns(struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
diff --git a/include/linux/kernfs.h b/include/linux/kernfs.h
index ab25c8b6d9e3..627fa3956146 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernfs.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernfs.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
struct file;
struct dentry;
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
struct super_block;
struct file_system_type;
+struct kernfs_fs_context;
struct kernfs_open_node;
struct kernfs_iattrs;
@@ -166,7 +168,7 @@ struct kernfs_node {
* kernfs_node parameter.
*/
struct kernfs_syscall_ops {
- int (*remount_fs)(struct kernfs_root *root, int *flags, char *data);
+ int (*reconfigure)(struct kernfs_root *root, struct fs_context *fc);
int (*show_options)(struct seq_file *sf, struct kernfs_root *root);
int (*mkdir)(struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name,
@@ -267,6 +269,18 @@ struct kernfs_ops {
#endif
};
+/*
+ * The kernfs superblock creation/mount parameter context.
+ */
+struct kernfs_fs_context {
+ struct kernfs_root *root; /* Root of the hierarchy being mounted */
+ void *ns_tag; /* Namespace tag of the mount (or NULL) */
+ unsigned long magic; /* File system specific magic number */
+
+ /* The following are set/used by kernfs_mount() */
+ bool new_sb_created; /* Set to T if we allocated a new sb */
+};
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KERNFS
static inline enum kernfs_node_type kernfs_type(struct kernfs_node *kn)
@@ -350,9 +364,8 @@ int kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, const struct iattr *iattr);
void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn);
const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb);
-struct dentry *kernfs_mount_ns(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- struct kernfs_root *root, unsigned long magic,
- bool *new_sb_created, const void *ns);
+int kernfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
+void kernfs_free_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc);
void kernfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb);
struct super_block *kernfs_pin_sb(struct kernfs_root *root, const void *ns);
@@ -454,11 +467,10 @@ static inline void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn) { }
static inline const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb)
{ return NULL; }
-static inline struct dentry *
-kernfs_mount_ns(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- struct kernfs_root *root, unsigned long magic,
- bool *new_sb_created, const void *ns)
-{ return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS); }
+static inline int kernfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{ return -ENOSYS; }
+
+static inline void kernfs_free_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) { }
static inline void kernfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb) { }
@@ -535,13 +547,4 @@ static inline int kernfs_rename(struct kernfs_node *kn,
return kernfs_rename_ns(kn, new_parent, new_name, NULL);
}
-static inline struct dentry *
-kernfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- struct kernfs_root *root, unsigned long magic,
- bool *new_sb_created)
-{
- return kernfs_mount_ns(fs_type, flags, root,
- magic, new_sb_created, NULL);
-}
-
#endif /* __LINUX_KERNFS_H */
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h
index 77ff1cd6a252..19da314b3405 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h
@@ -8,6 +8,33 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
+/*
+ * The cgroup filesystem superblock creation/mount context.
+ */
+struct cgroup_fs_context {
+ struct kernfs_fs_context kfc;
+ struct cgroup_root *root;
+ struct cgroup_namespace *ns;
+ u8 version; /* cgroups version */
+ unsigned int flags; /* CGRP_ROOT_* flags */
+
+ /* cgroup1 bits */
+ bool cpuset_clone_children;
+ bool none; /* User explicitly requested empty subsystem */
+ bool all_ss; /* Seen 'all' option */
+ bool one_ss; /* Seen 'none' option */
+ u16 subsys_mask; /* Selected subsystems */
+ char *name; /* Hierarchy name */
+ char *release_agent; /* Path for release notifications */
+};
+
+static inline struct cgroup_fs_context *cgroup_fc2context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc = fc->fs_private;
+
+ return container_of(kfc, struct cgroup_fs_context, kfc);
+}
+
/*
* A cgroup can be associated with multiple css_sets as different tasks may
* belong to different cgroups on different hierarchies. In the other
@@ -89,16 +116,6 @@ struct cgroup_mgctx {
#define DEFINE_CGROUP_MGCTX(name) \
struct cgroup_mgctx name = CGROUP_MGCTX_INIT(name)
-struct cgroup_sb_opts {
- u16 subsys_mask;
- unsigned int flags;
- char *release_agent;
- bool cpuset_clone_children;
- char *name;
- /* User explicitly requested empty subsystem */
- bool none;
-};
-
extern struct mutex cgroup_mutex;
extern spinlock_t css_set_lock;
extern struct cgroup_subsys *cgroup_subsys[];
@@ -169,12 +186,10 @@ int cgroup_path_ns_locked(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen,
struct cgroup_namespace *ns);
void cgroup_free_root(struct cgroup_root *root);
-void init_cgroup_root(struct cgroup_root *root, struct cgroup_sb_opts *opts);
+void init_cgroup_root(struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx);
int cgroup_setup_root(struct cgroup_root *root, u16 ss_mask, int ref_flags);
int rebind_subsystems(struct cgroup_root *dst_root, u16 ss_mask);
-struct dentry *cgroup_do_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- struct cgroup_root *root, unsigned long magic,
- struct cgroup_namespace *ns);
+int cgroup_do_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
int cgroup_migrate_vet_dst(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp);
void cgroup_migrate_finish(struct cgroup_mgctx *mgctx);
@@ -218,14 +233,15 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations cgroupns_operations;
*/
extern struct cftype cgroup1_base_files[];
extern struct kernfs_syscall_ops cgroup1_kf_syscall_ops;
+extern const struct fs_parameter_description cgroup1_fs_parameters;
int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
bool cgroup1_ssid_disabled(int ssid);
void cgroup1_pidlist_destroy_all(struct cgroup *cgrp);
void cgroup1_release_agent(struct work_struct *work);
void cgroup1_check_for_release(struct cgroup *cgrp);
-struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- void *data, unsigned long magic,
- struct cgroup_namespace *ns);
+int cgroup1_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param);
+int cgroup1_validate(struct fs_context *fc);
+int cgroup1_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
#endif /* __CGROUP_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
index 8b4f0768efd6..4238a89ca721 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
@@ -13,9 +13,12 @@
#include <linux/delayacct.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/cgroupstats.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <trace/events/cgroup.h>
+#define cg_invalf(fc, fmt, ...) ({ pr_err(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); -EINVAL; })
+
/*
* pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal
* is avoiding frequent destruction in the middle of consecutive read calls
@@ -903,92 +906,65 @@ static int cgroup1_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct kernfs_root *kf_roo
return 0;
}
-static int parse_cgroupfs_options(char *data, struct cgroup_sb_opts *opts)
-{
- char *token, *o = data;
- bool all_ss = false, one_ss = false;
- u16 mask = U16_MAX;
- struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
- int nr_opts = 0;
- int i;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPUSETS
- mask = ~((u16)1 << cpuset_cgrp_id);
-#endif
+enum cgroup1_param {
+ Opt_none,
+ Opt_all,
+ Opt_noprefix,
+ Opt_clone_children,
+ Opt_xattr,
+ Opt_release_agent,
+ Opt_name,
+ Opt_cpuset_v2_mode,
+ nr__cgroup1_params
+};
- memset(opts, 0, sizeof(*opts));
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec cgroup1_param_specs[nr__cgroup1_params] = {
+ [Opt_all] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_clone_children] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_cpuset_v2_mode] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_name] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_none] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_noprefix] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_release_agent] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_xattr] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+};
- while ((token = strsep(&o, ",")) != NULL) {
- nr_opts++;
+static const struct constant_table cgroup1_param_keys[] = {
+ { "all", Opt_all },
+ { "clone_children", Opt_clone_children },
+ { "cpuset_v2_mode", Opt_cpuset_v2_mode },
+ { "name", Opt_name },
+ { "none", Opt_none },
+ { "noprefix", Opt_noprefix },
+ { "release_agent", Opt_release_agent },
+ { "xattr", Opt_xattr },
+};
- if (!*token)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (!strcmp(token, "none")) {
- /* Explicitly have no subsystems */
- opts->none = true;
- continue;
- }
- if (!strcmp(token, "all")) {
- /* Mutually exclusive option 'all' + subsystem name */
- if (one_ss)
- return -EINVAL;
- all_ss = true;
- continue;
- }
- if (!strcmp(token, "noprefix")) {
- opts->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NOPREFIX;
- continue;
- }
- if (!strcmp(token, "clone_children")) {
- opts->cpuset_clone_children = true;
- continue;
- }
- if (!strcmp(token, "cpuset_v2_mode")) {
- opts->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_CPUSET_V2_MODE;
- continue;
- }
- if (!strcmp(token, "xattr")) {
- opts->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_XATTR;
- continue;
- }
- if (!strncmp(token, "release_agent=", 14)) {
- /* Specifying two release agents is forbidden */
- if (opts->release_agent)
- return -EINVAL;
- opts->release_agent =
- kstrndup(token + 14, PATH_MAX - 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->release_agent)
- return -ENOMEM;
- continue;
- }
- if (!strncmp(token, "name=", 5)) {
- const char *name = token + 5;
- /* Can't specify an empty name */
- if (!strlen(name))
- return -EINVAL;
- /* Must match [\w.-]+ */
- for (i = 0; i < strlen(name); i++) {
- char c = name[i];
- if (isalnum(c))
- continue;
- if ((c == '.') || (c == '-') || (c == '_'))
- continue;
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- /* Specifying two names is forbidden */
- if (opts->name)
- return -EINVAL;
- opts->name = kstrndup(name,
- MAX_CGROUP_ROOT_NAMELEN - 1,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->name)
- return -ENOMEM;
+const struct fs_parameter_description cgroup1_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "cgroup1",
+ .nr_params = nr__cgroup1_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(cgroup1_param_keys),
+ .keys = cgroup1_param_keys,
+ .specs = cgroup1_param_specs,
+ .ignore_unknown = true,
+ .no_source = true,
+};
- continue;
- }
+int cgroup1_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
+ struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ int ret, i;
+ ret = fs_parse(fc, &cgroup1_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(param->key, "source") == 0)
+ return 0;
for_each_subsys(ss, i) {
- if (strcmp(token, ss->legacy_name))
+ if (strcmp(param->key, ss->legacy_name) != 0)
continue;
if (!cgroup_ssid_enabled(i))
continue;
@@ -996,75 +972,142 @@ static int parse_cgroupfs_options(char *data, struct cgroup_sb_opts *opts)
continue;
/* Mutually exclusive option 'all' + subsystem name */
- if (all_ss)
- return -EINVAL;
- opts->subsys_mask |= (1 << i);
- one_ss = true;
+ if (ctx->all_ss)
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: subsys name conflicts with all");
+ ctx->subsys_mask |= (1 << i);
+ ctx->one_ss = true;
+ return 0;
+ }
- break;
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: Unknown subsys name '%s'", param->key);
+ }
+
+ switch (result.key) {
+ case Opt_none:
+ /* Explicitly have no subsystems */
+ ctx->none = true;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_all:
+ /* Mutually exclusive option 'all' + subsystem name */
+ if (ctx->one_ss)
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: all conflicts with subsys name");
+ ctx->all_ss = true;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_noprefix:
+ ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NOPREFIX;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_clone_children:
+ ctx->cpuset_clone_children = true;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_cpuset_v2_mode:
+ ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_CPUSET_V2_MODE;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_xattr:
+ ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_XATTR;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_release_agent:
+ /* Specifying two release agents is forbidden */
+ if (ctx->release_agent)
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: release_agent respecified");
+ ctx->release_agent = param->string;
+ param->string = NULL;
+ if (!ctx->release_agent)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+
+ case Opt_name:
+ /* Can't specify an empty name */
+ if (!param->size)
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: Empty name");
+ if (param->size > MAX_CGROUP_ROOT_NAMELEN - 1)
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: Name too long");
+ /* Must match [\w.-]+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < param->size; i++) {
+ char c = param->string[i];
+ if (isalnum(c))
+ continue;
+ if ((c == '.') || (c == '-') || (c == '_'))
+ continue;
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: Invalid name");
}
- if (i == CGROUP_SUBSYS_COUNT)
- return -ENOENT;
+ /* Specifying two names is forbidden */
+ if (ctx->name)
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: name respecified");
+ ctx->name = param->string;
+ param->string = NULL;
+ return 0;
}
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate the options that have been parsed.
+ */
+int cgroup1_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
+ struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
+ u16 mask = U16_MAX;
+ int i;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPUSETS
+ mask = ~((u16)1 << cpuset_cgrp_id);
+#endif
+
/*
* If the 'all' option was specified select all the subsystems,
* otherwise if 'none', 'name=' and a subsystem name options were
* not specified, let's default to 'all'
*/
- if (all_ss || (!one_ss && !opts->none && !opts->name))
+ if (ctx->all_ss || (!ctx->one_ss && !ctx->none && !ctx->name))
for_each_subsys(ss, i)
if (cgroup_ssid_enabled(i) && !cgroup1_ssid_disabled(i))
- opts->subsys_mask |= (1 << i);
+ ctx->subsys_mask |= (1 << i);
/*
* We either have to specify by name or by subsystems. (So all
* empty hierarchies must have a name).
*/
- if (!opts->subsys_mask && !opts->name)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!ctx->subsys_mask && !ctx->name)
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: Need name or subsystem set");
/*
* Option noprefix was introduced just for backward compatibility
* with the old cpuset, so we allow noprefix only if mounting just
* the cpuset subsystem.
*/
- if ((opts->flags & CGRP_ROOT_NOPREFIX) && (opts->subsys_mask & mask))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if ((ctx->flags & CGRP_ROOT_NOPREFIX) && (ctx->subsys_mask & mask))
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: noprefix used incorrectly");
/* Can't specify "none" and some subsystems */
- if (opts->subsys_mask && opts->none)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (ctx->subsys_mask && ctx->none)
+ return cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: none used incorrectly");
return 0;
}
-static int cgroup1_remount(struct kernfs_root *kf_root, int *flags, char *data)
+static int cgroup1_reconfigure(struct kernfs_root *kf_root, struct fs_context *fc)
{
- int ret = 0;
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
struct cgroup_root *root = cgroup_root_from_kf(kf_root);
- struct cgroup_sb_opts opts;
u16 added_mask, removed_mask;
+ int ret = 0;
cgroup_lock_and_drain_offline(&cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp);
- /* See what subsystems are wanted */
- ret = parse_cgroupfs_options(data, &opts);
- if (ret)
- goto out_unlock;
-
- if (opts.subsys_mask != root->subsys_mask || opts.release_agent)
+ if (ctx->subsys_mask != root->subsys_mask || ctx->release_agent)
pr_warn("option changes via remount are deprecated (pid=%d comm=%s)\n",
task_tgid_nr(current), current->comm);
- added_mask = opts.subsys_mask & ~root->subsys_mask;
- removed_mask = root->subsys_mask & ~opts.subsys_mask;
+ added_mask = ctx->subsys_mask & ~root->subsys_mask;
+ removed_mask = root->subsys_mask & ~ctx->subsys_mask;
/* Don't allow flags or name to change at remount */
- if ((opts.flags ^ root->flags) ||
- (opts.name && strcmp(opts.name, root->name))) {
- pr_err("option or name mismatch, new: 0x%x \"%s\", old: 0x%x \"%s\"\n",
- opts.flags, opts.name ?: "", root->flags, root->name);
+ if ((ctx->flags ^ root->flags) ||
+ (ctx->name && strcmp(ctx->name, root->name))) {
+ cg_invalf(fc, "option or name mismatch, new: 0x%x \"%s\", old: 0x%x \"%s\"",
+ ctx->flags, ctx->name ?: "", root->flags, root->name);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -1081,17 +1124,15 @@ static int cgroup1_remount(struct kernfs_root *kf_root, int *flags, char *data)
WARN_ON(rebind_subsystems(&cgrp_dfl_root, removed_mask));
- if (opts.release_agent) {
+ if (ctx->release_agent) {
spin_lock(&release_agent_path_lock);
- strcpy(root->release_agent_path, opts.release_agent);
+ strcpy(root->release_agent_path, ctx->release_agent);
spin_unlock(&release_agent_path_lock);
}
trace_cgroup_remount(root);
out_unlock:
- kfree(opts.release_agent);
- kfree(opts.name);
mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -1099,31 +1140,26 @@ static int cgroup1_remount(struct kernfs_root *kf_root, int *flags, char *data)
struct kernfs_syscall_ops cgroup1_kf_syscall_ops = {
.rename = cgroup1_rename,
.show_options = cgroup1_show_options,
- .remount_fs = cgroup1_remount,
+ .reconfigure = cgroup1_reconfigure,
.mkdir = cgroup_mkdir,
.rmdir = cgroup_rmdir,
.show_path = cgroup_show_path,
};
-struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- void *data, unsigned long magic,
- struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
+/*
+ * Find or create a v1 cgroups superblock.
+ */
+int cgroup1_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
struct super_block *pinned_sb = NULL;
- struct cgroup_sb_opts opts;
struct cgroup_root *root;
struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
- struct dentry *dentry;
int i, ret;
bool new_root = false;
cgroup_lock_and_drain_offline(&cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp);
- /* First find the desired set of subsystems */
- ret = parse_cgroupfs_options(data, &opts);
- if (ret)
- goto out_unlock;
-
/*
* Destruction of cgroup root is asynchronous, so subsystems may
* still be dying after the previous unmount. Let's drain the
@@ -1132,15 +1168,13 @@ struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
* starting. Testing ref liveliness is good enough.
*/
for_each_subsys(ss, i) {
- if (!(opts.subsys_mask & (1 << i)) ||
+ if (!(ctx->subsys_mask & (1 << i)) ||
ss->root == &cgrp_dfl_root)
continue;
if (!percpu_ref_tryget_live(&ss->root->cgrp.self.refcnt)) {
mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
- msleep(10);
- ret = restart_syscall();
- goto out_free;
+ goto err_restart;
}
cgroup_put(&ss->root->cgrp);
}
@@ -1156,8 +1190,8 @@ struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
* name matches but sybsys_mask doesn't, we should fail.
* Remember whether name matched.
*/
- if (opts.name) {
- if (strcmp(opts.name, root->name))
+ if (ctx->name) {
+ if (strcmp(ctx->name, root->name))
continue;
name_match = true;
}
@@ -1166,15 +1200,15 @@ struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
* If we asked for subsystems (or explicitly for no
* subsystems) then they must match.
*/
- if ((opts.subsys_mask || opts.none) &&
- (opts.subsys_mask != root->subsys_mask)) {
+ if ((ctx->subsys_mask || ctx->none) &&
+ (ctx->subsys_mask != root->subsys_mask)) {
if (!name_match)
continue;
ret = -EBUSY;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto err_unlock;
}
- if (root->flags ^ opts.flags)
+ if (root->flags ^ ctx->flags)
pr_warn("new mount options do not match the existing superblock, will be ignored\n");
/*
@@ -1195,11 +1229,10 @@ struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_sb))
deactivate_super(pinned_sb);
- msleep(10);
- ret = restart_syscall();
- goto out_free;
+ goto err_restart;
}
+ ctx->root = root;
ret = 0;
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -1209,41 +1242,35 @@ struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
* specification is allowed for already existing hierarchies but we
* can't create new one without subsys specification.
*/
- if (!opts.subsys_mask && !opts.none) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (!ctx->subsys_mask && !ctx->none) {
+ ret = cg_invalf(fc, "cgroup1: No subsys list or none specified");
+ goto err_unlock;
}
/* Hierarchies may only be created in the initial cgroup namespace. */
- if (ns != &init_cgroup_ns) {
+ if (ctx->ns != &init_cgroup_ns) {
ret = -EPERM;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto err_unlock;
}
root = kzalloc(sizeof(*root), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto err_unlock;
}
new_root = true;
+ ctx->root = root;
- init_cgroup_root(root, &opts);
+ init_cgroup_root(ctx);
- ret = cgroup_setup_root(root, opts.subsys_mask, PERCPU_REF_INIT_DEAD);
+ ret = cgroup_setup_root(root, ctx->subsys_mask, PERCPU_REF_INIT_DEAD);
if (ret)
- cgroup_free_root(root);
+ goto err_unlock;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
-out_free:
- kfree(opts.release_agent);
- kfree(opts.name);
-
- if (ret)
- return ERR_PTR(ret);
- dentry = cgroup_do_mount(&cgroup_fs_type, flags, root,
- CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, ns);
+ ret = cgroup_do_get_tree(fc);
/*
* There's a race window after we release cgroup_mutex and before
@@ -1256,6 +1283,7 @@ struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
percpu_ref_reinit(&root->cgrp.self.refcnt);
mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
}
+ cgroup_get(&root->cgrp);
/*
* If @pinned_sb, we're reusing an existing root and holding an
@@ -1264,7 +1292,14 @@ struct dentry *cgroup1_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
if (pinned_sb)
deactivate_super(pinned_sb);
- return dentry;
+ return ret;
+
+err_restart:
+ msleep(10);
+ return restart_syscall();
+err_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
+ return ret;
}
static int __init cgroup1_wq_init(void)
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
index ddb1a60ae3c0..f3238f38d152 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/sched/cputime.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
@@ -1734,25 +1735,52 @@ int cgroup_show_path(struct seq_file *sf, struct kernfs_node *kf_node,
return len;
}
-static int parse_cgroup_root_flags(char *data, unsigned int *root_flags)
-{
- char *token;
+enum cgroup2_param {
+ Opt_nsdelegate,
+ nr__cgroup2_params
+};
- *root_flags = 0;
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec cgroup2_param_specs[nr__cgroup2_params] = {
+ [Opt_nsdelegate] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+};
- if (!data)
- return 0;
+static const struct constant_table cgroup2_param_keys[] = {
+ { "nsdelegate", Opt_nsdelegate },
+};
- while ((token = strsep(&data, ",")) != NULL) {
- if (!strcmp(token, "nsdelegate")) {
- *root_flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE;
- continue;
- }
+static const struct fs_parameter_description cgroup2_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "cgroup2",
+ .nr_params = nr__cgroup2_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(cgroup2_param_keys),
+ .keys = cgroup2_param_keys,
+ .specs = cgroup2_param_specs,
+ .no_source = true,
+};
- pr_err("cgroup2: unknown option \"%s\"\n", token);
- return -EINVAL;
+static int cgroup2_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fs_parse(fc, &cgroup2_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (result.key) {
+ case Opt_nsdelegate:
+ ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE;
+ return 0;
}
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int cgroup_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct kernfs_root *kf_root)
+{
+ if (current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns == &init_cgroup_ns &&
+ cgrp_dfl_root.flags & CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE)
+ seq_puts(seq, ",nsdelegate");
return 0;
}
@@ -1766,23 +1794,11 @@ static void apply_cgroup_root_flags(unsigned int root_flags)
}
}
-static int cgroup_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct kernfs_root *kf_root)
-{
- if (cgrp_dfl_root.flags & CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE)
- seq_puts(seq, ",nsdelegate");
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cgroup_remount(struct kernfs_root *kf_root, int *flags, char *data)
+static int cgroup_reconfigure(struct kernfs_root *kf_root, struct fs_context *fc)
{
- unsigned int root_flags;
- int ret;
-
- ret = parse_cgroup_root_flags(data, &root_flags);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
- apply_cgroup_root_flags(root_flags);
+ apply_cgroup_root_flags(ctx->flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -1870,8 +1886,9 @@ static void init_cgroup_housekeeping(struct cgroup *cgrp)
INIT_WORK(&cgrp->release_agent_work, cgroup1_release_agent);
}
-void init_cgroup_root(struct cgroup_root *root, struct cgroup_sb_opts *opts)
+void init_cgroup_root(struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx)
{
+ struct cgroup_root *root = ctx->root;
struct cgroup *cgrp = &root->cgrp;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root->root_list);
@@ -1880,12 +1897,12 @@ void init_cgroup_root(struct cgroup_root *root, struct cgroup_sb_opts *opts)
init_cgroup_housekeeping(cgrp);
idr_init(&root->cgroup_idr);
- root->flags = opts->flags;
- if (opts->release_agent)
- strscpy(root->release_agent_path, opts->release_agent, PATH_MAX);
- if (opts->name)
- strscpy(root->name, opts->name, MAX_CGROUP_ROOT_NAMELEN);
- if (opts->cpuset_clone_children)
+ root->flags = ctx->flags;
+ if (ctx->release_agent)
+ strscpy(root->release_agent_path, ctx->release_agent, PATH_MAX);
+ if (ctx->name)
+ strscpy(root->name, ctx->name, MAX_CGROUP_ROOT_NAMELEN);
+ if (ctx->cpuset_clone_children)
set_bit(CGRP_CPUSET_CLONE_CHILDREN, &root->cgrp.flags);
}
@@ -1990,57 +2007,53 @@ int cgroup_setup_root(struct cgroup_root *root, u16 ss_mask, int ref_flags)
return ret;
}
-struct dentry *cgroup_do_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- struct cgroup_root *root, unsigned long magic,
- struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
+int cgroup_do_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct dentry *dentry;
- bool new_sb;
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
+ int ret;
- dentry = kernfs_mount(fs_type, flags, root->kf_root, magic, &new_sb);
+ ctx->kfc.root = ctx->root->kf_root;
+
+ ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_cgrp;
/*
* In non-init cgroup namespace, instead of root cgroup's dentry,
* we return the dentry corresponding to the cgroupns->root_cgrp.
*/
- if (!IS_ERR(dentry) && ns != &init_cgroup_ns) {
+ if (ctx->ns != &init_cgroup_ns) {
struct dentry *nsdentry;
struct cgroup *cgrp;
mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex);
spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock);
- cgrp = cset_cgroup_from_root(ns->root_cset, root);
+ cgrp = cset_cgroup_from_root(ctx->ns->root_cset, ctx->root);
spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
- nsdentry = kernfs_node_dentry(cgrp->kn, dentry->d_sb);
- dput(dentry);
- dentry = nsdentry;
+ nsdentry = kernfs_node_dentry(cgrp->kn, fc->root->d_sb);
+ if (IS_ERR(nsdentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(nsdentry);
+ dput(fc->root);
+ fc->root = nsdentry;
}
- if (IS_ERR(dentry) || !new_sb)
- cgroup_put(&root->cgrp);
+ ret = 0;
+ if (ctx->kfc.new_sb_created)
+ goto out_cgrp;
+ apply_cgroup_root_flags(ctx->flags);
+ return 0;
- return dentry;
+out_cgrp:
+ return ret;
}
-static struct dentry *cgroup_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *unused_dev_name,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
+static int cgroup_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct cgroup_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns;
- struct dentry *dentry;
- int ret;
-
- get_cgroup_ns(ns);
-
- /* Check if the caller has permission to mount. */
- if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- put_cgroup_ns(ns);
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- }
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
/*
* The first time anyone tries to mount a cgroup, enable the list
@@ -2049,29 +2062,87 @@ static struct dentry *cgroup_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
if (!use_task_css_set_links)
cgroup_enable_task_cg_lists();
- if (fs_type == &cgroup2_fs_type) {
- unsigned int root_flags;
-
- ret = parse_cgroup_root_flags(data, &root_flags);
- if (ret) {
- put_cgroup_ns(ns);
- return ERR_PTR(ret);
- }
+ switch (ctx->version) {
+ case 1:
+ return cgroup1_get_tree(fc);
+ case 2:
cgrp_dfl_visible = true;
cgroup_get_live(&cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp);
- dentry = cgroup_do_mount(&cgroup2_fs_type, flags, &cgrp_dfl_root,
- CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, ns);
- if (!IS_ERR(dentry))
- apply_cgroup_root_flags(root_flags);
- } else {
- dentry = cgroup1_mount(&cgroup_fs_type, flags, data,
- CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, ns);
+ ctx->root = &cgrp_dfl_root;
+ return cgroup_do_get_tree(fc);
+
+ default:
+ BUG();
}
+}
+
+static int cgroup_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
+
+ if (ctx->version == 1)
+ return cgroup1_parse_param(fc, param);
+
+ return cgroup2_parse_param(fc, param);
+}
+
+static int cgroup_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
+
+ if (ctx->version == 1)
+ return cgroup1_validate(fc);
+ return 0;
+}
- put_cgroup_ns(ns);
- return dentry;
+/*
+ * Destroy a cgroup filesystem context.
+ */
+static void cgroup_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
+
+ kfree(ctx->name);
+ kfree(ctx->release_agent);
+ if (ctx->root)
+ cgroup_put(&ctx->root->cgrp);
+ put_cgroup_ns(ctx->ns);
+ kernfs_free_fs_context(fc);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations cgroup_fs_context_ops = {
+ .free = cgroup_fs_context_free,
+ .parse_param = cgroup_parse_param,
+ .validate = cgroup_validate,
+ .get_tree = cgroup_get_tree,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialise the cgroup filesystem creation/reconfiguration context. Notably,
+ * we select the namespace we're going to use.
+ */
+static int cgroup_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx;
+ struct cgroup_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns;
+
+ /* Check if the caller has permission to mount. */
+ if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cgroup_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->ns = get_cgroup_ns(ns);
+ ctx->version = (fc->fs_type == &cgroup2_fs_type) ? 2 : 1;
+ ctx->kfc.magic = (ctx->version == 2) ? CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC : CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC;
+ fc->fs_private = &ctx->kfc;
+ fc->ops = &cgroup_fs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
}
static void cgroup_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
@@ -2096,17 +2167,19 @@ static void cgroup_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
}
struct file_system_type cgroup_fs_type = {
- .name = "cgroup",
- .mount = cgroup_mount,
- .kill_sb = cgroup_kill_sb,
- .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
+ .name = "cgroup",
+ .init_fs_context = cgroup_init_fs_context,
+ .parameters = &cgroup1_fs_parameters,
+ .kill_sb = cgroup_kill_sb,
+ .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
};
static struct file_system_type cgroup2_fs_type = {
- .name = "cgroup2",
- .mount = cgroup_mount,
- .kill_sb = cgroup_kill_sb,
- .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
+ .name = "cgroup2",
+ .init_fs_context = cgroup_init_fs_context,
+ .parameters = &cgroup2_fs_parameters,
+ .kill_sb = cgroup_kill_sb,
+ .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
};
int cgroup_path_ns_locked(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen,
@@ -5175,7 +5248,7 @@ int cgroup_rmdir(struct kernfs_node *kn)
static struct kernfs_syscall_ops cgroup_kf_syscall_ops = {
.show_options = cgroup_show_options,
- .remount_fs = cgroup_remount,
+ .reconfigure = cgroup_reconfigure,
.mkdir = cgroup_mkdir,
.rmdir = cgroup_rmdir,
.show_path = cgroup_show_path,
@@ -5242,11 +5315,12 @@ static void __init cgroup_init_subsys(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, bool early)
*/
int __init cgroup_init_early(void)
{
- static struct cgroup_sb_opts __initdata opts;
+ static struct cgroup_fs_context __initdata ctx;
struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
int i;
- init_cgroup_root(&cgrp_dfl_root, &opts);
+ ctx.root = &cgrp_dfl_root;
+ init_cgroup_root(&ctx);
cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp.self.flags |= CSS_NO_REF;
RCU_INIT_POINTER(init_task.cgroups, &init_css_set);
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
index e6582b2f5144..b02161a41d5a 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
@@ -324,10 +324,8 @@ static int cpuset_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
int ret = -ENODEV;
cgroup_fs = get_fs_type("cgroup");
- if (cgroup_fs) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(cgroup_fs);
+ if (!cgroup_fs)
goto out;
- }
cg_fc = vfs_new_fs_context(cgroup_fs, NULL, fc->sb_flags, fc->purpose);
put_filesystem(cgroup_fs);
Add fs_context support to the AFS filesystem, converting the parameter
parsing to store options there.
This will form the basis for namespace propagation over mountpoints within
the AFS model, thereby allowing AFS to be used in containers more easily.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/afs/internal.h | 8 -
fs/afs/super.c | 504 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
fs/afs/volume.c | 4
3 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/afs/internal.h b/fs/afs/internal.h
index 9778df135717..d54aab35a1ca 100644
--- a/fs/afs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/afs/internal.h
@@ -34,15 +34,15 @@
struct pagevec;
struct afs_call;
-struct afs_mount_params {
+struct afs_fs_context {
bool rwpath; /* T if the parent should be considered R/W */
bool force; /* T to force cell type */
bool autocell; /* T if set auto mount operation */
bool dyn_root; /* T if dynamic root */
+ bool no_cell; /* T if the source is "none" (for dynroot) */
afs_voltype_t type; /* type of volume requested */
- int volnamesz; /* size of volume name */
+ unsigned int volnamesz; /* size of volume name */
const char *volname; /* name of volume to mount */
- struct net *net_ns; /* Network namespace in effect */
struct afs_net *net; /* the AFS net namespace stuff */
struct afs_cell *cell; /* cell in which to find volume */
struct afs_volume *volume; /* volume record */
@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ static inline struct afs_volume *__afs_get_volume(struct afs_volume *volume)
return volume;
}
-extern struct afs_volume *afs_create_volume(struct afs_mount_params *);
+extern struct afs_volume *afs_create_volume(struct afs_fs_context *);
extern void afs_activate_volume(struct afs_volume *);
extern void afs_deactivate_volume(struct afs_volume *);
extern void afs_put_volume(struct afs_cell *, struct afs_volume *);
diff --git a/fs/afs/super.c b/fs/afs/super.c
index b85f5e993539..62e43890f156 100644
--- a/fs/afs/super.c
+++ b/fs/afs/super.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* AFS superblock handling
*
- * Copyright (c) 2002, 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, 2007, 2018 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This software may be freely redistributed under the terms of the
* GNU General Public License.
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
-#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/statfs.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
@@ -30,22 +30,22 @@
#include "internal.h"
static void afs_i_init_once(void *foo);
-static struct dentry *afs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *dev_name,
- void *data, size_t data_size);
static void afs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb);
static struct inode *afs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb);
static void afs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode);
static int afs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf);
static int afs_show_devname(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root);
static int afs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root);
+static int afs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference);
+static const struct fs_parameter_description afs_fs_parameters;
struct file_system_type afs_fs_type = {
- .owner = THIS_MODULE,
- .name = "afs",
- .mount = afs_mount,
- .kill_sb = afs_kill_super,
- .fs_flags = 0,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .name = "afs",
+ .init_fs_context = afs_init_fs_context,
+ .parameters = &afs_fs_parameters,
+ .kill_sb = afs_kill_super,
+ .fs_flags = 0,
};
MODULE_ALIAS_FS("afs");
@@ -64,22 +64,40 @@ static const struct super_operations afs_super_ops = {
static struct kmem_cache *afs_inode_cachep;
static atomic_t afs_count_active_inodes;
-enum {
- afs_no_opt,
- afs_opt_cell,
- afs_opt_dyn,
- afs_opt_rwpath,
- afs_opt_vol,
- afs_opt_autocell,
+enum afs_param {
+ Opt_autocell,
+ Opt_cell,
+ Opt_dyn,
+ Opt_rwpath,
+ Opt_source,
+ Opt_vol,
+ nr__afs_params
};
-static const match_table_t afs_options_list = {
- { afs_opt_cell, "cell=%s" },
- { afs_opt_dyn, "dyn" },
- { afs_opt_rwpath, "rwpath" },
- { afs_opt_vol, "vol=%s" },
- { afs_opt_autocell, "autocell" },
- { afs_no_opt, NULL },
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec afs_param_specs[nr__afs_params] = {
+ [Opt_autocell] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_cell] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_dyn] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_rwpath] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_source] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_vol] = { fs_param_is_string },
+};
+
+static const struct constant_table afs_param_keys[] = {
+ { "autocell", Opt_autocell },
+ { "cell", Opt_cell },
+ { "dyn", Opt_dyn },
+ { "rwpath", Opt_rwpath },
+ { "source", Opt_source },
+ { "vol", Opt_vol },
+};
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_description afs_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "kAFS",
+ .nr_params = nr__afs_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(afs_param_keys),
+ .keys = afs_param_keys,
+ .specs = afs_param_specs,
};
/*
@@ -191,71 +209,10 @@ static int afs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
}
/*
- * parse the mount options
- * - this function has been shamelessly adapted from the ext3 fs which
- * shamelessly adapted it from the msdos fs
- */
-static int afs_parse_options(struct afs_mount_params *params,
- char *options, const char **devname)
-{
- struct afs_cell *cell;
- substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
- char *p;
- int token;
-
- _enter("%s", options);
-
- options[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;
-
- while ((p = strsep(&options, ","))) {
- if (!*p)
- continue;
-
- token = match_token(p, afs_options_list, args);
- switch (token) {
- case afs_opt_cell:
- rcu_read_lock();
- cell = afs_lookup_cell_rcu(params->net,
- args[0].from,
- args[0].to - args[0].from);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- if (IS_ERR(cell))
- return PTR_ERR(cell);
- afs_put_cell(params->net, params->cell);
- params->cell = cell;
- break;
-
- case afs_opt_rwpath:
- params->rwpath = true;
- break;
-
- case afs_opt_vol:
- *devname = args[0].from;
- break;
-
- case afs_opt_autocell:
- params->autocell = true;
- break;
-
- case afs_opt_dyn:
- params->dyn_root = true;
- break;
-
- default:
- printk(KERN_ERR "kAFS:"
- " Unknown or invalid mount option: '%s'\n", p);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- }
-
- _leave(" = 0");
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * parse a device name to get cell name, volume name, volume type and R/W
- * selector
- * - this can be one of the following:
+ * Parse the source name to get cell name, volume name, volume type and R/W
+ * selector.
+ *
+ * This can be one of the following:
* "%[cell:]volume[.]" R/W volume
* "#[cell:]volume[.]" R/O or R/W volume (rwpath=0),
* or R/W (rwpath=1) volume
@@ -264,11 +221,11 @@ static int afs_parse_options(struct afs_mount_params *params,
* "%[cell:]volume.backup" Backup volume
* "#[cell:]volume.backup" Backup volume
*/
-static int afs_parse_device_name(struct afs_mount_params *params,
- const char *name)
+static int afs_parse_source(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
{
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
struct afs_cell *cell;
- const char *cellname, *suffix;
+ const char *cellname, *suffix, *name = param->string;
int cellnamesz;
_enter(",%s", name);
@@ -279,69 +236,175 @@ static int afs_parse_device_name(struct afs_mount_params *params,
}
if ((name[0] != '%' && name[0] != '#') || !name[1]) {
+ /* To use dynroot, we don't want to have to provide a source */
+ if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ ctx->no_cell = true;
+ return 0;
+ }
printk(KERN_ERR "kAFS: unparsable volume name\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* determine the type of volume we're looking for */
- params->type = AFSVL_ROVOL;
- params->force = false;
- if (params->rwpath || name[0] == '%') {
- params->type = AFSVL_RWVOL;
- params->force = true;
+ ctx->type = AFSVL_ROVOL;
+ ctx->force = false;
+ if (ctx->rwpath || name[0] == '%') {
+ ctx->type = AFSVL_RWVOL;
+ ctx->force = true;
}
name++;
/* split the cell name out if there is one */
- params->volname = strchr(name, ':');
- if (params->volname) {
+ ctx->volname = strchr(name, ':');
+ if (ctx->volname) {
cellname = name;
- cellnamesz = params->volname - name;
- params->volname++;
+ cellnamesz = ctx->volname - name;
+ ctx->volname++;
} else {
- params->volname = name;
+ ctx->volname = name;
cellname = NULL;
cellnamesz = 0;
}
/* the volume type is further affected by a possible suffix */
- suffix = strrchr(params->volname, '.');
+ suffix = strrchr(ctx->volname, '.');
if (suffix) {
if (strcmp(suffix, ".readonly") == 0) {
- params->type = AFSVL_ROVOL;
- params->force = true;
+ ctx->type = AFSVL_ROVOL;
+ ctx->force = true;
} else if (strcmp(suffix, ".backup") == 0) {
- params->type = AFSVL_BACKVOL;
- params->force = true;
+ ctx->type = AFSVL_BACKVOL;
+ ctx->force = true;
} else if (suffix[1] == 0) {
} else {
suffix = NULL;
}
}
- params->volnamesz = suffix ?
- suffix - params->volname : strlen(params->volname);
+ ctx->volnamesz = suffix ?
+ suffix - ctx->volname : strlen(ctx->volname);
_debug("cell %*.*s [%p]",
- cellnamesz, cellnamesz, cellname ?: "", params->cell);
+ cellnamesz, cellnamesz, cellname ?: "", ctx->cell);
/* lookup the cell record */
- if (cellname || !params->cell) {
- cell = afs_lookup_cell(params->net, cellname, cellnamesz,
+ if (cellname) {
+ cell = afs_lookup_cell(ctx->net, cellname, cellnamesz,
NULL, false);
if (IS_ERR(cell)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "kAFS: unable to lookup cell '%*.*s'\n",
+ pr_err("kAFS: unable to lookup cell '%*.*s'\n",
cellnamesz, cellnamesz, cellname ?: "");
return PTR_ERR(cell);
}
- afs_put_cell(params->net, params->cell);
- params->cell = cell;
+ afs_put_cell(ctx->net, ctx->cell);
+ ctx->cell = cell;
}
_debug("CELL:%s [%p] VOLUME:%*.*s SUFFIX:%s TYPE:%d%s",
- params->cell->name, params->cell,
- params->volnamesz, params->volnamesz, params->volname,
- suffix ?: "-", params->type, params->force ? " FORCE" : "");
+ ctx->cell->name, ctx->cell,
+ ctx->volnamesz, ctx->volnamesz, ctx->volname,
+ suffix ?: "-", ctx->type, ctx->force ? " FORCE" : "");
+
+ fc->source = param->string;
+ param->string = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a single mount parameter.
+ */
+static int afs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ struct afs_cell *cell;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fs_parse(fc, &afs_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (result.key) {
+ case Opt_cell:
+ if (param->size <= 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (param->size > AFS_MAXCELLNAME)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ cell = afs_lookup_cell_rcu(ctx->net, param->string, param->size);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (IS_ERR(cell))
+ return PTR_ERR(cell);
+ afs_put_cell(ctx->net, ctx->cell);
+ ctx->cell = cell;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_source:
+ return afs_parse_source(fc, param);
+
+ case Opt_autocell:
+ ctx->autocell = true;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_dyn:
+ ctx->dyn_root = true;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_rwpath:
+ ctx->rwpath = true;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_vol:
+ return invalf(fc, "'vol' param is obsolete");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ _leave(" = 0");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate the options, get the cell key and look up the volume.
+ */
+static int afs_validate_fc(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ struct afs_volume *volume;
+ struct key *key;
+
+ if (!ctx->dyn_root) {
+ if (ctx->no_cell) {
+ pr_warn("kAFS: Can only specify source 'none' with -o dyn\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx->cell) {
+ pr_warn("kAFS: No cell specified\n");
+ return -EDESTADDRREQ;
+ }
+
+ /* We try to do the mount securely. */
+ key = afs_request_key(ctx->cell);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+ ctx->key = key;
+
+ if (ctx->volume) {
+ afs_put_volume(ctx->cell, ctx->volume);
+ ctx->volume = NULL;
+ }
+
+ volume = afs_create_volume(ctx);
+ if (IS_ERR(volume))
+ return PTR_ERR(volume);
+
+ ctx->volume = volume;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -349,39 +412,34 @@ static int afs_parse_device_name(struct afs_mount_params *params,
/*
* check a superblock to see if it's the one we're looking for
*/
-static int afs_test_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int afs_test_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct afs_super_info *as1 = data;
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
struct afs_super_info *as = AFS_FS_S(sb);
- return (as->net_ns == as1->net_ns &&
+ return (as->net_ns == fc->net_ns &&
as->volume &&
- as->volume->vid == as1->volume->vid &&
+ as->volume->vid == ctx->volume->vid &&
!as->dyn_root);
}
-static int afs_dynroot_test_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int afs_dynroot_test_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct afs_super_info *as1 = data;
struct afs_super_info *as = AFS_FS_S(sb);
- return (as->net_ns == as1->net_ns &&
+ return (as->net_ns == fc->net_ns &&
as->dyn_root);
}
-static int afs_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int afs_set_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct afs_super_info *as = data;
-
- sb->s_fs_info = as;
return set_anon_super(sb, NULL);
}
/*
* fill in the superblock
*/
-static int afs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb,
- struct afs_mount_params *params)
+static int afs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct afs_fs_context *ctx)
{
struct afs_super_info *as = AFS_FS_S(sb);
struct afs_fid fid;
@@ -412,13 +470,13 @@ static int afs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb,
fid.vid = as->volume->vid;
fid.vnode = 1;
fid.unique = 1;
- inode = afs_iget(sb, params->key, &fid, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ inode = afs_iget(sb, ctx->key, &fid, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return PTR_ERR(inode);
- if (params->autocell || params->dyn_root)
+ if (ctx->autocell || as->dyn_root)
set_bit(AFS_VNODE_AUTOCELL, &AFS_FS_I(inode)->flags);
ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -443,17 +501,20 @@ static int afs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb,
return ret;
}
-static struct afs_super_info *afs_alloc_sbi(struct afs_mount_params *params)
+static struct afs_super_info *afs_alloc_sbi(struct fs_context *fc)
{
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
struct afs_super_info *as;
as = kzalloc(sizeof(struct afs_super_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (as) {
- as->net_ns = get_net(params->net_ns);
- if (params->dyn_root)
+ as->net_ns = get_net(fc->net_ns);
+ if (ctx->dyn_root) {
as->dyn_root = true;
- else
- as->cell = afs_get_cell(params->cell);
+ } else {
+ as->cell = afs_get_cell(ctx->cell);
+ as->volume = __afs_get_volume(ctx->volume);
+ }
}
return as;
}
@@ -475,7 +536,7 @@ static void afs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb)
if (as->dyn_root)
afs_dynroot_depopulate(sb);
-
+
/* Clear the callback interests (which will do ilookup5) before
* deactivating the superblock.
*/
@@ -488,112 +549,131 @@ static void afs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb)
}
/*
- * get an AFS superblock
+ * Get an AFS superblock and root directory.
*/
-static struct dentry *afs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
- int flags, const char *dev_name,
- void *options, size_t data_size)
+static int afs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct afs_mount_params params;
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
struct super_block *sb;
- struct afs_volume *candidate;
- struct key *key;
struct afs_super_info *as;
int ret;
- _enter(",,%s,%p", dev_name, options);
-
- memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (current->nsproxy->net_ns != &init_net)
- goto error;
- params.net_ns = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
- params.net = afs_net(params.net_ns);
-
- /* parse the options and device name */
- if (options) {
- ret = afs_parse_options(¶ms, options, &dev_name);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (!params.dyn_root) {
- ret = afs_parse_device_name(¶ms, dev_name);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- /* try and do the mount securely */
- key = afs_request_key(params.cell);
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- _leave(" = %ld [key]", PTR_ERR(key));
- ret = PTR_ERR(key);
- goto error;
- }
- params.key = key;
- }
+ _enter("");
/* allocate a superblock info record */
ret = -ENOMEM;
- as = afs_alloc_sbi(¶ms);
+ as = afs_alloc_sbi(fc);
if (!as)
- goto error_key;
-
- if (!params.dyn_root) {
- /* Assume we're going to need a volume record; at the very
- * least we can use it to update the volume record if we have
- * one already. This checks that the volume exists within the
- * cell.
- */
- candidate = afs_create_volume(¶ms);
- if (IS_ERR(candidate)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(candidate);
- goto error_as;
- }
-
- as->volume = candidate;
- }
+ goto error;
+ fc->s_fs_info = as;
/* allocate a deviceless superblock */
- sb = sget(fs_type,
- as->dyn_root ? afs_dynroot_test_super : afs_test_super,
- afs_set_super, flags, as);
+ sb = sget_fc(fc,
+ as->dyn_root ? afs_dynroot_test_super : afs_test_super,
+ afs_set_super);
if (IS_ERR(sb)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sb);
- goto error_as;
+ goto error;
}
if (!sb->s_root) {
/* initial superblock/root creation */
_debug("create");
- ret = afs_fill_super(sb, ¶ms);
+ ret = afs_fill_super(sb, ctx);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_sb;
- as = NULL;
sb->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE;
} else {
_debug("reuse");
ASSERTCMP(sb->s_flags, &, SB_ACTIVE);
- afs_destroy_sbi(as);
- as = NULL;
}
- afs_put_cell(params.net, params.cell);
- key_put(params.key);
+ fc->root = dget(sb->s_root);
_leave(" = 0 [%p]", sb);
- return dget(sb->s_root);
+ return 0;
error_sb:
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
- goto error_key;
-error_as:
- afs_destroy_sbi(as);
-error_key:
- key_put(params.key);
error:
- afs_put_cell(params.net, params.cell);
_leave(" = %d", ret);
- return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void afs_free_fc(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ afs_destroy_sbi(fc->s_fs_info);
+ afs_put_volume(ctx->cell, ctx->volume);
+ afs_put_cell(ctx->net, ctx->cell);
+ key_put(ctx->key);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations afs_context_ops = {
+ .free = afs_free_fc,
+ .parse_param = afs_parse_param,
+ .validate = afs_validate_fc,
+ .get_tree = afs_get_tree,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Set up the filesystem mount context.
+ */
+static int afs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx;
+ struct afs_super_info *src_as;
+ struct afs_cell *cell;
+
+ if (current->nsproxy->net_ns != &init_net)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct afs_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->type = AFSVL_ROVOL;
+
+ switch (fc->purpose) {
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT:
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT:
+ ctx->net = afs_net(fc->net_ns);
+
+ /* Default to the workstation cell. */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ cell = afs_lookup_cell_rcu(ctx->net, NULL, 0);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (IS_ERR(cell))
+ cell = NULL;
+ ctx->cell = cell;
+ break;
+
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT:
+ if (!reference) {
+ kfree(ctx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ src_as = AFS_FS_S(reference->d_sb);
+ ASSERT(src_as);
+
+ ctx->net = afs_net(fc->net_ns);
+ if (src_as->cell)
+ ctx->cell = afs_get_cell(src_as->cell);
+ if (src_as->volume && src_as->volume->type == AFSVL_RWVOL) {
+ ctx->type = AFSVL_RWVOL;
+ ctx->force = true;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ fc->fs_private = ctx;
+ fc->ops = &afs_context_ops;
+ return 0;
}
/*
diff --git a/fs/afs/volume.c b/fs/afs/volume.c
index 3037bd01f617..7adcddf02e66 100644
--- a/fs/afs/volume.c
+++ b/fs/afs/volume.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static const char *const afs_voltypes[] = { "R/W", "R/O", "BAK" };
/*
* Allocate a volume record and load it up from a vldb record.
*/
-static struct afs_volume *afs_alloc_volume(struct afs_mount_params *params,
+static struct afs_volume *afs_alloc_volume(struct afs_fs_context *params,
struct afs_vldb_entry *vldb,
unsigned long type_mask)
{
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static struct afs_vldb_entry *afs_vl_lookup_vldb(struct afs_cell *cell,
* - Rule 3: If parent volume is R/W, then only mount R/W volume unless
* explicitly told otherwise
*/
-struct afs_volume *afs_create_volume(struct afs_mount_params *params)
+struct afs_volume *afs_create_volume(struct afs_fs_context *params)
{
struct afs_vldb_entry *vldb;
struct afs_volume *volume;
Alter the AFS automounting code to create and modify an fs_context struct
when parameterising a new mount triggered by an AFS mountpoint rather than
constructing device name and option strings.
Also remove the cell=, vol= and rwpath options as they are then redundant.
The reason they existed is because the 'device name' may be derived
literally from a mountpoint object in the filesystem, so default cell and
parent-type information needed to be passed in by some other method from
the automount routines. The vol= option didn't end up being used.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
---
fs/afs/internal.h | 1
fs/afs/mntpt.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
fs/afs/super.c | 44 +---------------
3 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/afs/internal.h b/fs/afs/internal.h
index d54aab35a1ca..e35d59761d47 100644
--- a/fs/afs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/afs/internal.h
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ struct pagevec;
struct afs_call;
struct afs_fs_context {
- bool rwpath; /* T if the parent should be considered R/W */
bool force; /* T to force cell type */
bool autocell; /* T if set auto mount operation */
bool dyn_root; /* T if dynamic root */
diff --git a/fs/afs/mntpt.c b/fs/afs/mntpt.c
index c45aa1776591..c8a7f05b9f12 100644
--- a/fs/afs/mntpt.c
+++ b/fs/afs/mntpt.c
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(afs_mntpt_expiry_timer, afs_mntpt_expiry_timed_out);
static unsigned long afs_mntpt_expiry_timeout = 10 * 60;
+static const char afs_root_volume[] = "root.cell";
+
/*
* no valid lookup procedure on this sort of dir
*/
@@ -68,107 +70,107 @@ static int afs_mntpt_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
}
/*
- * create a vfsmount to be automounted
+ * Set the parameters for the proposed superblock.
*/
-static struct vfsmount *afs_mntpt_do_automount(struct dentry *mntpt)
+static int afs_mntpt_set_params(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *mntpt)
{
- struct afs_super_info *as;
- struct vfsmount *mnt;
- struct afs_vnode *vnode;
- struct page *page;
- char *devname, *options;
- bool rwpath = false;
+ struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ struct afs_vnode *vnode = AFS_FS_I(d_inode(mntpt));
+ struct afs_cell *cell;
+ const char *p;
int ret;
- _enter("{%pd}", mntpt);
-
- BUG_ON(!d_inode(mntpt));
-
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- devname = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!devname)
- goto error_no_devname;
-
- options = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!options)
- goto error_no_options;
-
- vnode = AFS_FS_I(d_inode(mntpt));
if (test_bit(AFS_VNODE_PSEUDODIR, &vnode->flags)) {
/* if the directory is a pseudo directory, use the d_name */
- static const char afs_root_cell[] = ":root.cell.";
unsigned size = mntpt->d_name.len;
- ret = -ENOENT;
- if (size < 2 || size > AFS_MAXCELLNAME)
- goto error_no_page;
+ if (size < 2)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ p = mntpt->d_name.name;
if (mntpt->d_name.name[0] == '.') {
- devname[0] = '%';
- memcpy(devname + 1, mntpt->d_name.name + 1, size - 1);
- memcpy(devname + size, afs_root_cell,
- sizeof(afs_root_cell));
- rwpath = true;
- } else {
- devname[0] = '#';
- memcpy(devname + 1, mntpt->d_name.name, size);
- memcpy(devname + size + 1, afs_root_cell,
- sizeof(afs_root_cell));
+ size--;
+ p++;
+ ctx->type = AFSVL_RWVOL;
+ ctx->force = true;
+ }
+ if (size > AFS_MAXCELLNAME)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+ cell = afs_lookup_cell(ctx->net, p, size, NULL, false);
+ if (IS_ERR(cell)) {
+ pr_err("kAFS: unable to lookup cell '%pd'\n", mntpt);
+ return PTR_ERR(cell);
}
+ afs_put_cell(ctx->net, ctx->cell);
+ ctx->cell = cell;
+
+ ctx->volname = afs_root_volume;
+ ctx->volnamesz = sizeof(afs_root_volume) - 1;
} else {
/* read the contents of the AFS special symlink */
+ struct page *page;
loff_t size = i_size_read(d_inode(mntpt));
char *buf;
- ret = -EINVAL;
if (size > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
- goto error_no_page;
+ return -EINVAL;
page = read_mapping_page(d_inode(mntpt)->i_mapping, 0, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(page)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(page);
- goto error_no_page;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
- ret = -EIO;
- if (PageError(page))
- goto error;
+ if (PageError(page)) {
+ put_page(page);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
- buf = kmap_atomic(page);
- memcpy(devname, buf, size);
- kunmap_atomic(buf);
+ buf = kmap(page);
+ ret = vfs_parse_fs_string(fc, "source", buf, size);
+ kunmap(page);
put_page(page);
- page = NULL;
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
}
- /* work out what options we want */
- as = AFS_FS_S(mntpt->d_sb);
- if (as->cell) {
- memcpy(options, "cell=", 5);
- strcpy(options + 5, as->cell->name);
- if ((as->volume && as->volume->type == AFSVL_RWVOL) || rwpath)
- strcat(options, ",rwpath");
- }
+ return 0;
+}
- /* try and do the mount */
- _debug("--- attempting mount %s -o %s ---", devname, options);
- mnt = vfs_submount(mntpt, &afs_fs_type, devname,
- options, strlen(options) + 1);
- _debug("--- mount result %p ---", mnt);
+/*
+ * create a vfsmount to be automounted
+ */
+static struct vfsmount *afs_mntpt_do_automount(struct dentry *mntpt)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ int ret;
+
+ BUG_ON(!d_inode(mntpt));
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&afs_fs_type, mntpt, 0,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return ERR_CAST(fc);
+
+ ret = afs_mntpt_set_params(fc, mntpt);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_fc;
+
+ ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_fc;
+
+ mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(mnt);
+ goto error_fc;
+ }
- free_page((unsigned long) devname);
- free_page((unsigned long) options);
- _leave(" = %p", mnt);
+ put_fs_context(fc);
return mnt;
-error:
- put_page(page);
-error_no_page:
- free_page((unsigned long) options);
-error_no_options:
- free_page((unsigned long) devname);
-error_no_devname:
- _leave(" = %d", ret);
+error_fc:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
diff --git a/fs/afs/super.c b/fs/afs/super.c
index 62e43890f156..56eab3433aba 100644
--- a/fs/afs/super.c
+++ b/fs/afs/super.c
@@ -66,30 +66,21 @@ static atomic_t afs_count_active_inodes;
enum afs_param {
Opt_autocell,
- Opt_cell,
Opt_dyn,
- Opt_rwpath,
Opt_source,
- Opt_vol,
nr__afs_params
};
static const struct fs_parameter_spec afs_param_specs[nr__afs_params] = {
[Opt_autocell] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
- [Opt_cell] = { fs_param_is_string },
[Opt_dyn] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
- [Opt_rwpath] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
[Opt_source] = { fs_param_is_string },
- [Opt_vol] = { fs_param_is_string },
};
static const struct constant_table afs_param_keys[] = {
{ "autocell", Opt_autocell },
- { "cell", Opt_cell },
{ "dyn", Opt_dyn },
- { "rwpath", Opt_rwpath },
{ "source", Opt_source },
- { "vol", Opt_vol },
};
static const struct fs_parameter_description afs_fs_parameters = {
@@ -214,8 +205,8 @@ static int afs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
*
* This can be one of the following:
* "%[cell:]volume[.]" R/W volume
- * "#[cell:]volume[.]" R/O or R/W volume (rwpath=0),
- * or R/W (rwpath=1) volume
+ * "#[cell:]volume[.]" R/O or R/W volume (R/O parent),
+ * or R/W (R/W parent) volume
* "%[cell:]volume.readonly" R/O volume
* "#[cell:]volume.readonly" R/O volume
* "%[cell:]volume.backup" Backup volume
@@ -246,9 +237,7 @@ static int afs_parse_source(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
}
/* determine the type of volume we're looking for */
- ctx->type = AFSVL_ROVOL;
- ctx->force = false;
- if (ctx->rwpath || name[0] == '%') {
+ if (name[0] == '%') {
ctx->type = AFSVL_RWVOL;
ctx->force = true;
}
@@ -317,7 +306,6 @@ static int afs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
{
struct fs_parse_result result;
struct afs_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
- struct afs_cell *cell;
int ret;
ret = fs_parse(fc, &afs_fs_parameters, param, &result);
@@ -325,21 +313,6 @@ static int afs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
return ret;
switch (result.key) {
- case Opt_cell:
- if (param->size <= 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (param->size > AFS_MAXCELLNAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- cell = afs_lookup_cell_rcu(ctx->net, param->string, param->size);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- if (IS_ERR(cell))
- return PTR_ERR(cell);
- afs_put_cell(ctx->net, ctx->cell);
- ctx->cell = cell;
- break;
-
case Opt_source:
return afs_parse_source(fc, param);
@@ -351,14 +324,6 @@ static int afs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
ctx->dyn_root = true;
break;
- case Opt_rwpath:
- ctx->rwpath = true;
- break;
-
- case Opt_vol:
- return invalf(fc, "'vol' param is obsolete");
- break;
-
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -626,9 +591,6 @@ static int afs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
struct afs_super_info *src_as;
struct afs_cell *cell;
- if (current->nsproxy->net_ns != &init_net)
- return -EINVAL;
-
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct afs_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
Implement the new mount API LSM hooks for SELinux. At some point the old
hooks will need to be removed.
Question: Should the ->fs_context_parse_source() hook be implemented to
check the labels on any source devices specified?
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
cc: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 290 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 290 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ef0428311a5c..9774d1f0e99f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -446,6 +448,7 @@ enum {
Opt_rootcontext = 4,
Opt_labelsupport = 5,
Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
+ nr__selinux_params
};
#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
@@ -2974,6 +2977,285 @@ static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
}
+/* fsopen mount context operations */
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct dentry *reference)
+{
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts;
+
+ opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fc->security = opts;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ const struct security_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts;
+ int i, n;
+
+ opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ fc->security = opts;
+
+ if (!src || !src->num_mnt_opts)
+ return 0;
+ n = opts->num_mnt_opts = src->num_mnt_opts;
+
+ if (src->mnt_opts) {
+ opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(n, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (src->mnt_opts[i]) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[i] = kstrdup(src->mnt_opts[i],
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts->mnt_opts[i])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (src->mnt_opts_flags) {
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags = kmemdup(src->mnt_opts_flags,
+ n * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts = fc->security;
+
+ if (opts) {
+ security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
+ fc->security = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_param_specs[nr__selinux_params] = {
+ [Opt_context] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_defcontext] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_fscontext] = { fs_param_is_string },
+ [Opt_labelsupport] = { fs_param_takes_no_value },
+ [Opt_rootcontext] = { fs_param_is_string },
+};
+
+static const struct constant_table selinux_param_keys[] = {
+ { CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context },
+ { DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext },
+ { FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext },
+ { ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext },
+ { LABELSUPP_STR, Opt_labelsupport },
+};
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_description selinux_fs_parameters = {
+ .name = "SELinux",
+ .nr_params = nr__selinux_params,
+ .nr_keys = ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_param_keys),
+ .keys = selinux_param_keys,
+ .specs = selinux_param_specs,
+ .ignore_unknown = true,
+};
+
+static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts = fc->security;
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ unsigned int have;
+ char **oo;
+ int ret, ctx, i, *of;
+
+ ret = fs_parse(fc, &selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret; /* Note: 0 indicates no match */
+
+ have = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++)
+ have |= 1 << opts->mnt_opts_flags[i];
+ if (have & (1 << result.key))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (result.key) {
+ case Opt_context:
+ if (have & (1 << Opt_defcontext))
+ goto incompatible;
+ ctx = CONTEXT_MNT;
+ goto copy_context_string;
+
+ case Opt_fscontext:
+ ctx = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
+ goto copy_context_string;
+
+ case Opt_rootcontext:
+ ctx = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+ goto copy_context_string;
+
+ case Opt_defcontext:
+ if (have & (1 << Opt_context))
+ goto incompatible;
+ ctx = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+ goto copy_context_string;
+
+ case Opt_labelsupport:
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+copy_context_string:
+ if (opts->num_mnt_opts > 3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ of = krealloc(opts->mnt_opts_flags,
+ (opts->num_mnt_opts + 1) * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!of)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ of[opts->num_mnt_opts] = 0;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags = of;
+
+ oo = krealloc(opts->mnt_opts,
+ (opts->num_mnt_opts + 1) * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!oo)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ oo[opts->num_mnt_opts] = NULL;
+ opts->mnt_opts = oo;
+
+ opts->mnt_opts[opts->num_mnt_opts] = param->string;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[opts->num_mnt_opts] = ctx;
+ opts->num_mnt_opts++;
+ param->string = NULL;
+ return 1;
+
+incompatible:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate the security parameters supplied for a reconfiguration/remount
+ * event.
+ */
+static int selinux_validate_for_sb_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts = fc->security;
+ int rc, i, *flags;
+ char **mount_options;
+
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ return 0;
+
+ mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
+ flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+ u32 sid;
+
+ if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
+ continue;
+
+ rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, mount_options[i],
+ &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+ goto inval;
+ }
+
+ switch (flags[i]) {
+ case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+ goto bad_option;
+ break;
+ case CONTEXT_MNT:
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+ goto bad_option;
+ break;
+ case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
+ struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+ root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+ goto bad_option;
+ break;
+ }
+ case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+ goto bad_option;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto inval;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+bad_option:
+ pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
+ "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+inval:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate the security context assembled from the option data supplied to
+ * mount.
+ */
+static int selinux_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE)
+ return selinux_validate_for_sb_reconfigure(fc);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the security context on a superblock.
+ */
+static int selinux_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(fc->root->d_sb, fc->security, 0, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
+ if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT)
+ return 0;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = fc->root;
+ return superblock_has_perm(cred, fc->root->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ return path_has_perm(cred, mountpoint, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
/* inode security operations */
static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
@@ -6906,6 +7188,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_alloc, selinux_fs_context_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_free, selinux_fs_context_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_validate, selinux_fs_context_validate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_get_tree, selinux_sb_get_tree),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mountpoint, selinux_sb_mountpoint),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
Provide an fspick() system call that can be used to pick an existing
mountpoint into an fs_context which can thereafter be used to reconfigure a
superblock (equivalent of the superblock side of -o remount).
This looks like:
int fd = fspick(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt",
FSPICK_CLOEXEC | FSPICK_NO_AUTOMOUNT);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "intr", NULL, 0);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "noac", NULL, 0);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE, NULL, NULL, 0);
At the point of fspick being called, the file descriptor referring to the
filesystem context is in exactly the same state as the one that was created
by fsopen() after fsmount() has been successfully called.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
fs/fsopen.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 5 +++
5 files changed, 66 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index c78b68256f8a..d1eb6c815790 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -403,3 +403,4 @@
389 i386 fsopen sys_fsopen __ia32_sys_fsopen
390 i386 fsconfig sys_fsconfig __ia32_sys_fsconfig
391 i386 fsmount sys_fsmount __ia32_sys_fsmount
+392 i386 fspick sys_fspick __ia32_sys_fspick
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index d44ead5d4368..d3ab703c02bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@
337 common fsopen __x64_sys_fsopen
338 common fsconfig __x64_sys_fsconfig
339 common fsmount __x64_sys_fsmount
+340 common fspick __x64_sys_fspick
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c
index 5d8560e78ce1..e79bb5b085d6 100644
--- a/fs/fsopen.c
+++ b/fs/fsopen.c
@@ -155,6 +155,64 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fsopen, const char __user *, _fs_name, unsigned int, flags)
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Pick a superblock into a context for reconfiguration.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fspick, int, dfd, const char __user *, path, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ struct path target;
+ unsigned int lookup_flags;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if ((flags & ~(FSPICK_CLOEXEC |
+ FSPICK_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW |
+ FSPICK_NO_AUTOMOUNT |
+ FSPICK_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT;
+ if (flags & FSPICK_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+ lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flags & FSPICK_NO_AUTOMOUNT)
+ lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT;
+ if (flags & FSPICK_EMPTY_PATH)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+ ret = user_path_at(dfd, path, lookup_flags, &target);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!target.dentry->d_sb->s_op->reconfigure)
+ goto err_path;
+
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(target.dentry->d_sb->s_type, target.dentry,
+ 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(fc);
+ goto err_path;
+ }
+
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_RECONF_PARAMS;
+
+ ret = fscontext_alloc_log(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ path_put(&target);
+ return fscontext_create_fd(fc, flags & FSPICK_CLOEXEC ? O_CLOEXEC : 0);
+
+err_fc:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+err_path:
+ path_put(&target);
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Check the state and apply the configuration. Note that this function is
* allowed to 'steal' the value by setting param->xxx to NULL before returning.
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 65db661cc2da..701522957a12 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -908,6 +908,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fsopen(const char __user *fs_name, unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_fsconfig(int fs_fd, unsigned int cmd, const char __user *key,
const void __user *value, int aux);
asmlinkage long sys_fsmount(int fs_fd, unsigned int flags, unsigned int ms_flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_fspick(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned int flags);
/*
* Architecture-specific system calls
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
index 10281d582e28..7f01503a9e9b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
@@ -351,6 +351,11 @@ typedef int __bitwise __kernel_rwf_t;
#define FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
+#define FSPICK_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
+#define FSPICK_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x00000002
+#define FSPICK_NO_AUTOMOUNT 0x00000004
+#define FSPICK_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000008
+
/*
* The type of fsconfig() call made.
*/
Remove code that is now unused after the filesystem context changes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
fs/internal.h | 2 -
fs/super.c | 62 --------------------------------------------
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 --
include/linux/security.h | 7 -----
security/security.c | 5 ----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 --------------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 -----------------------
7 files changed, 132 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index 546302e98a04..e5bdfc52b9a1 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -109,8 +109,6 @@ extern struct file *get_empty_filp(void);
extern int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *, int, void *, size_t, int,
struct fs_context *);
extern bool trylock_super(struct super_block *sb);
-extern struct dentry *mount_fs(struct file_system_type *,
- int, const char *, void *, size_t);
extern struct super_block *user_get_super(dev_t);
/*
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 7c5541453081..bbef5a5057c0 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -1442,68 +1442,6 @@ struct dentry *mount_single(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(mount_single);
-struct dentry *
-mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, const char *name,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- struct dentry *root;
- struct super_block *sb;
- char *secdata = NULL;
- int error = -ENOMEM;
-
- if (data && !(type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)) {
- secdata = alloc_secdata();
- if (!secdata)
- goto out;
-
- error = security_sb_copy_data(data, data_size, secdata);
- if (error)
- goto out_free_secdata;
- }
-
- root = type->mount(type, flags, name, data, data_size);
- if (IS_ERR(root)) {
- error = PTR_ERR(root);
- goto out_free_secdata;
- }
- sb = root->d_sb;
- BUG_ON(!sb);
- WARN_ON(!sb->s_bdi);
-
- /*
- * Write barrier is for super_cache_count(). We place it before setting
- * SB_BORN as the data dependency between the two functions is the
- * superblock structure contents that we just set up, not the SB_BORN
- * flag.
- */
- smp_wmb();
- sb->s_flags |= SB_BORN;
-
- error = security_sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, secdata, data_size);
- if (error)
- goto out_sb;
-
- /*
- * filesystems should never set s_maxbytes larger than MAX_LFS_FILESIZE
- * but s_maxbytes was an unsigned long long for many releases. Throw
- * this warning for a little while to try and catch filesystems that
- * violate this rule.
- */
- WARN((sb->s_maxbytes < 0), "%s set sb->s_maxbytes to "
- "negative value (%lld)\n", type->name, sb->s_maxbytes);
-
- up_write(&sb->s_umount);
- free_secdata(secdata);
- return root;
-out_sb:
- dput(root);
- deactivate_locked_super(sb);
-out_free_secdata:
- free_secdata(secdata);
-out:
- return ERR_PTR(error);
-}
-
/*
* Setup private BDI for given superblock. It gets automatically cleaned up
* in generic_shutdown_super().
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 60a9a40bd46c..b1a62dc0b8d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1519,8 +1519,6 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_copy_data)(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy);
int (*sb_remount)(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size);
- int (*sb_kern_mount)(struct super_block *sb, int flags,
- void *data, size_t data_size);
int (*sb_show_options)(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_statfs)(struct dentry *dentry);
int (*sb_mount)(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
@@ -1868,7 +1866,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head sb_free_security;
struct hlist_head sb_copy_data;
struct hlist_head sb_remount;
- struct hlist_head sb_kern_mount;
struct hlist_head sb_show_options;
struct hlist_head sb_statfs;
struct hlist_head sb_mount;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a8b1056ed6e4..c73d9ba863bc 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -241,7 +241,6 @@ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy);
int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size);
-int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, size_t data_size);
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
@@ -591,12 +590,6 @@ static inline int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m,
struct super_block *sb)
{
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9bdc21ae645c..2439a5613813 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -420,11 +420,6 @@ int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size)
return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, data, data_size);
}
-int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb, flags, data, data_size);
-}
-
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9774d1f0e99f..3d5b09c256c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2924,25 +2924,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_si
goto out_free_opts;
}
-static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct common_audit_data ad;
- int rc;
-
- rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
- if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
- return 0;
-
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
- ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
- return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
-}
-
static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -7200,7 +7181,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 339ac4d42785..5f2938325ddf 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1178,38 +1178,6 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
- * @sb: the file system superblock
- * @flags: the mount flags
- * @data: the smack mount options
- *
- * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
- */
-static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- int rc = 0;
- char *options = data;
- struct security_mnt_opts opts;
-
- security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
-
- if (!options)
- goto out;
-
- rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
- if (rc)
- goto out_err;
-
-out:
- rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
-
-out_err:
- security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
- return rc;
-}
-
/**
* smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
* @dentry: identifies the file system in question
@@ -4989,7 +4957,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
Add a sample program to demonstrate fsopen/fsmount/move_mount to mount
something.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
samples/Kconfig | 6 ++
samples/Makefile | 2 -
samples/mount_api/Makefile | 7 ++
samples/mount_api/test-fsmount.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 samples/mount_api/Makefile
create mode 100644 samples/mount_api/test-fsmount.c
diff --git a/samples/Kconfig b/samples/Kconfig
index bd133efc1a56..daa17e9f3197 100644
--- a/samples/Kconfig
+++ b/samples/Kconfig
@@ -152,4 +152,10 @@ config SAMPLE_STATX
help
Build example userspace program to use the new extended-stat syscall.
+config SAMPLE_MOUNT_API
+ bool "Build example code using the new mount API"
+ depends on BROKEN
+ help
+ Build example userspace program(s) that use the new mount API.
+
endif # SAMPLES
diff --git a/samples/Makefile b/samples/Makefile
index bd601c038b86..31d08cc71a5c 100644
--- a/samples/Makefile
+++ b/samples/Makefile
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLES) += kobject/ kprobes/ trace_events/ livepatch/ \
hw_breakpoint/ kfifo/ kdb/ hidraw/ rpmsg/ seccomp/ \
configfs/ connector/ v4l/ trace_printk/ \
- vfio-mdev/ statx/ qmi/
+ vfio-mdev/ statx/ qmi/ mount_api/
diff --git a/samples/mount_api/Makefile b/samples/mount_api/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6856df236dbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/mount_api/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# List of programs to build
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_MOUNT_API) := test-fsmount
+
+# Tell kbuild to always build the programs
+always := $(hostprogs-y)
+
+HOSTCFLAGS_test-fsmount.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
diff --git a/samples/mount_api/test-fsmount.c b/samples/mount_api/test-fsmount.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..74124025ade0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/mount_api/test-fsmount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* fd-based mount test.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+
+#define E(x) do { if ((x) == -1) { perror(#x); exit(1); } } while(0)
+
+static void check_messages(int fd)
+{
+ char buf[4096];
+ int err, n;
+
+ err = errno;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (n < 0)
+ break;
+ n -= 2;
+
+ switch (buf[0]) {
+ case 'e':
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: %*.*s\n", n, n, buf + 2);
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: %*.*s\n", n, n, buf + 2);
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info: %*.*s\n", n, n, buf + 2);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ errno = err;
+}
+
+static __attribute__((noreturn))
+void mount_error(int fd, const char *s)
+{
+ check_messages(fd);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %m\n", s);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static inline int fsopen(const char *fs_name, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_fsopen, fs_name, flags);
+}
+
+static inline int fsmount(int fsfd, unsigned int flags, unsigned int ms_flags)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_fsmount, fsfd, flags, ms_flags);
+}
+
+static inline int fsconfig(int fsfd, unsigned int cmd,
+ const char *key, const void *val, int aux)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_fsconfig, fsfd, cmd, key, val, aux);
+}
+
+static inline int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_pathname,
+ int to_dfd, const char *to_pathname,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_move_mount,
+ from_dfd, from_pathname,
+ to_dfd, to_pathname, flags);
+}
+
+#define E_fsconfig(fd, cmd, key, val, aux) \
+ do { \
+ if (fsconfig(fd, cmd, key, val, aux) == -1) \
+ mount_error(fd, key ?: "create"); \
+ } while (0)
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ int fsfd, mfd;
+
+ /* Mount a publically available AFS filesystem */
+ fsfd = fsopen("afs", 0);
+ if (fsfd == -1) {
+ perror("fsopen");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ E_fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "source", "#grand.central.org:root.cell.", 0);
+ E_fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+ mfd = fsmount(fsfd, 0, MS_RDONLY);
+ if (mfd < 0)
+ mount_error(fsfd, "fsmount");
+ E(close(fsfd));
+
+ if (move_mount(mfd, "", AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH) < 0) {
+ perror("move_mount");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ E(close(mfd));
+ exit(0);
+}
Provide a system call by which a filesystem opened with fsopen() and
configured by a series of fsconfig() calls can have a detached mount object
created for it. This mount object can then be attached to the VFS mount
hierarchy using move_mount() by passing the returned file descriptor as the
from directory fd.
The system call looks like:
int mfd = fsmount(int fsfd, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int ms_flags);
where fsfd is the file descriptor returned by fsopen(). flags can be 0 or
FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC. ms_flags is a bitwise-OR of the following flags:
MS_RDONLY
MS_NOSUID
MS_NODEV
MS_NOEXEC
MS_NOATIME
MS_NODIRATIME
MS_RELATIME
MS_STRICTATIME
MS_UNBINDABLE
MS_PRIVATE
MS_SLAVE
MS_SHARED
In the event that fsmount() fails, it may be possible to get an error
message by calling read() on fsfd. If no message is available, ENODATA
will be reported.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1
fs/namespace.c | 141 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1
include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 2
5 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index f9970310c126..c78b68256f8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -402,3 +402,4 @@
388 i386 move_mount sys_move_mount __ia32_sys_move_mount
389 i386 fsopen sys_fsopen __ia32_sys_fsopen
390 i386 fsconfig sys_fsconfig __ia32_sys_fsconfig
+391 i386 fsmount sys_fsmount __ia32_sys_fsmount
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index 4185d36e03bb..d44ead5d4368 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@
336 common move_mount __x64_sys_move_mount
337 common fsopen __x64_sys_fsopen
338 common fsconfig __x64_sys_fsconfig
+339 common fsmount __x64_sys_fsmount
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ea07066a2731..7e131b7fc098 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2503,7 +2503,7 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
attached = mnt_has_parent(old);
/*
- * We need to allow open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) followed by
+ * We need to allow open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) or fsmount() followed by
* move_mount(), but mustn't allow "/" to be moved.
*/
if (old->mnt_ns && !attached)
@@ -3348,9 +3348,142 @@ struct vfsmount *kern_mount(struct file_system_type *type)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kern_mount);
/*
- * Move a mount from one place to another.
- * In combination with open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE [| AT_RECURSIVE]) it can be
- * used to copy a mount subtree.
+ * Create a kernel mount representation for a new, prepared superblock
+ * (specified by fs_fd) and attach to an open_tree-like file descriptor.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fsmount, int, fs_fd, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, ms_flags)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ struct file *file;
+ struct path newmount;
+ struct fd f;
+ unsigned int mnt_flags = 0;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (!may_mount())
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if ((flags & ~(FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC)) != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ms_flags & ~(MS_RDONLY | MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC |
+ MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME |
+ MS_STRICTATIME))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ms_flags & MS_RDONLY)
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
+ if (ms_flags & MS_NOSUID)
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
+ if (ms_flags & MS_NODEV)
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
+ if (ms_flags & MS_NOEXEC)
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
+ if (ms_flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_NODIRATIME;
+
+ if (ms_flags & MS_STRICTATIME) {
+ if (ms_flags & MS_NOATIME)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (ms_flags & MS_NOATIME) {
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_NOATIME;
+ } else {
+ mnt_flags |= MNT_RELATIME;
+ }
+
+ f = fdget(fs_fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (f.file->f_op != &fscontext_fops)
+ goto err_fsfd;
+
+ fc = f.file->private_data;
+
+ /* There must be a valid superblock or we can't mount it */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (!fc->root)
+ goto err_fsfd;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (mount_too_revealing(fc->root->d_sb, &mnt_flags)) {
+ pr_warn("VFS: Mount too revealing\n");
+ goto err_fsfd;
+ }
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_fsfd;
+
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ if (fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_MOUNT)
+ goto err_unlock;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ((fc->sb_flags & SB_MANDLOCK) && !may_mandlock())
+ goto err_unlock;
+
+ newmount.mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, mnt_flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(newmount.mnt)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(newmount.mnt);
+ goto err_unlock;
+ }
+ newmount.dentry = dget(fc->root);
+
+ /* We've done the mount bit - now move the file context into more or
+ * less the same state as if we'd done an fspick(). We don't want to
+ * do any memory allocation or anything like that at this point as we
+ * don't want to have to handle any errors incurred.
+ */
+ if (fc->ops && fc->ops->free)
+ fc->ops->free(fc);
+ fc->need_free = false;
+ fc->fs_private = NULL;
+ fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
+ fc->sb_flags = 0;
+ fc->sloppy = false;
+ fc->silent = false;
+ security_fs_context_free(fc);
+ fc->security = NULL;
+ kfree(fc->subtype);
+ fc->subtype = NULL;
+ kfree(fc->source);
+ fc->source = NULL;
+
+ fc->purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE;
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_RECONF;
+
+ /* Attach to an apparent O_PATH fd with a note that we need to unmount
+ * it, not just simply put it.
+ */
+ file = dentry_open(&newmount, O_PATH, fc->cred);
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(file);
+ goto err_path;
+ }
+ file->f_mode |= FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT;
+
+ ret = get_unused_fd_flags((flags & FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ fd_install(ret, file);
+ else
+ fput(file);
+
+err_path:
+ path_put(&newmount);
+err_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&fc->uapi_mutex);
+err_fsfd:
+ fdput(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Move a mount from one place to another. In combination with
+ * fsopen()/fsmount() this is used to install a new mount and in combination
+ * with open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE [| AT_RECURSIVE]) it can be used to copy
+ * a mount subtree.
*
* Note the flags value is a combination of MOVE_MOUNT_* flags.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 9628d14a7ede..65db661cc2da 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -907,6 +907,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_move_mount(int from_dfd, const char __user *from_path,
asmlinkage long sys_fsopen(const char __user *fs_name, unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_fsconfig(int fs_fd, unsigned int cmd, const char __user *key,
const void __user *value, int aux);
+asmlinkage long sys_fsmount(int fs_fd, unsigned int flags, unsigned int ms_flags);
/*
* Architecture-specific system calls
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
index fecbae30a30d..10281d582e28 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
@@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ typedef int __bitwise __kernel_rwf_t;
*/
#define FSOPEN_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
+#define FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
+
/*
* The type of fsconfig() call made.
*/
On Wed, 1 Aug 2018, David Howells wrote:
> (2) A hook to snoop source specifications.
What are source specifications?
--
James Morris
<[email protected]>
James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:
> > (2) A hook to snoop source specifications.
>
>
> What are source specifications?
"/dev/sda1" or "my.nfs.server:/foo/bar".
Actually, this hook is now gone. Source specification is done by way of a
parameter with key of "source" and this can be specified multiple times if the
filesystem supports it (bcachefs for example).
David
Hi
I found this interesting, though I don't entirely follow the kernel
mount/unmount code. I had one puzzle about the code, and two questions
which I was largely able to answer.
On 01/08/18 16:24, David Howells wrote:
> +void dissolve_on_fput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> +{
> + namespace_lock();
> + lock_mount_hash();
> + mntget(mnt);
> + umount_tree(real_mount(mnt), UMOUNT_SYNC);
> + unlock_mount_hash();
> + namespace_unlock();
> +}
Can I ask why UMOUNT_SYNC is used here? I feel like I must have missed
something, but doesn't it skip the IS_MNT_LOCKED() check in
disconnect_mount() ?
UMOUNT_SYNC seems used for non-lazy unmounts, and in internal cleanups
where userspace wouldn't be able to see. But I think userspace can keep
watching in this case, e.g. by `fd2 = openat(fd, ".", O_PATH)` (or `fd2
= open_tree(fd, ".", 0)` ?). I would think this function should avoid
using UMOUNT_SYNC, like lazy unmount avoids it.
> From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
>
> open_tree(dfd, pathname, flags)
>
> Returns an O_PATH-opened file descriptor or an error.
> dfd and pathname specify the location to open, in usual
> fashion (see e.g. fstatat(2)). flags should be an OR of
> some of the following:
> * AT_PATH_EMPTY, AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW -
> same meanings as usual
> * OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC - make the resulting descriptor
> close-on-exec
> * OPEN_TREE_CLONE or OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE -
> instead of opening the location in question, create a detached
> mount tree matching the subtree rooted at location specified by
> dfd/pathname. With AT_RECURSIVE the entire subtree is cloned,
> without it - only the part within in the mount containing the
> location in question. In other words, the same as mount --rbind
> or mount --bind would've taken.
One of the limitations documented for `mount --bind`, is that `mount -o
bind,ro` is not atomic. There's a workaround if you need it, it's just
a bit clunky. I wondered if it was possible to improve `mount` by
changing the mount flags between OPEN_TREE_CLONE and move_mount().
fd = open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE);
fchdir(fd);
mount(NULL, ".", NULL, MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | newbindflags, NULL);
move_mount(fd, ...);
Another closely-related limitation of `mount`, is that it can't
atomically set the propagation type at mount time.
My conclusion was the above doesn't quite work yet. do_remount() still
uses check_mnt(), so it doesn't accept detached mounts. I wonder if it
can be changed in future.
> The detached tree will be
> dissolved on the final close of obtained file.
My last question turned out very dull, feel free to ignore.
It seems the only way to use MNT_FORCE[1], is to first attach the
filesystem somewhere (and close the file descriptor). I wondered if
there was a way to make things more regular. close_and_umount() feels
too obscure to live though...
[1] "Ask the filesystem to abort pending requests before attempting
theunmount. This may allow the unmount to complete without waitingfor an
inaccessible server. If, after aborting requests, someprocesses still
have active references to the filesystem, theunmount will still fail."
...and I suppose it's much less useful than I thought. The point of
MNT_FORCE is to kick out processes that were blocked _trying to access a
file by name_, e.g. open() or stat(). But if we're considering a
detached mount, then it's impossible to access it by name alone. You
need an fd (or cwd or root), which would stop the filesystem being
unmounted anyway. close_and_umount(fd, MNT_FORCE) is pointless unless
your process has other threads accessing the filesystem through the same
fd, but that's a really bad idea anyway.
It could prevent someone else getting stuck indefinitely on
/proc/$PID/fd, but that's still very obscure.
Regards
Alan
On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 06:31:06PM +0100, Alan Jenkins wrote:
> Hi
>
> I found this interesting, though I don't entirely follow the kernel
> mount/unmount code.? I had one puzzle about the code, and two questions
> which I was largely able to answer.
>
> On 01/08/18 16:24, David Howells wrote:
> > +void dissolve_on_fput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> > +{
> > + namespace_lock();
> > + lock_mount_hash();
> > + mntget(mnt);
> > + umount_tree(real_mount(mnt), UMOUNT_SYNC);
> > + unlock_mount_hash();
> > + namespace_unlock();
> > +}
>
> Can I ask why? UMOUNT_SYNC is used here?? I feel like I must have missed
> something, but doesn't it skip the IS_MNT_LOCKED() check in
> disconnect_mount() ?
>
> UMOUNT_SYNC seems used for non-lazy unmounts, and in internal cleanups where
> userspace wouldn't be able to see.? But I think userspace can keep watching
> in this case, e.g. by `fd2 = openat(fd, ".", O_PATH)` (or `fd2 =
> open_tree(fd, ".", 0)` ?).? I would think this function should avoid using
> UMOUNT_SYNC, like lazy unmount avoids it.
FWIW, I suspect that UMOUNT_CONNECTED might be the right thing here...
Alan Jenkins <[email protected]> wrote:
> Another closely-related limitation of `mount`, is that it can't atomically set
> the propagation type at mount time.
I want to add a mount_setattr() too at some point:
fd = open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE);
mount_setattr(fd, ...);
move_mount(fd, ...);
I'm not sure whether you should be able to fchdir into the cloned tree since
it isn't attached to any mount namespace.
David
On 02/08/18 22:51, David Howells wrote:
> Alan Jenkins <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Another closely-related limitation of `mount`, is that it can't atomically set
>> the propagation type at mount time.
> I want to add a mount_setattr() too at some point:
>
> fd = open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE);
> mount_setattr(fd, ...);
> move_mount(fd, ...);
Cool. Not having to mess with fchdir() sounds nice. (And as a bonus,
being able to avoid the existing multiplexed mount() call, which looks
ugly from all the NULL arguments if nothing else).
> I'm not sure whether you should be able to fchdir into the cloned tree since
> it isn't attached to any mount namespace.
>
> David
I don't see a check prohibiting it :-). I don't think it's a problem.
You can already chdir/chroot into a different mount namespace, you just
can't do any mount operations on it. (You said you want to be able to,
but so far move_mount() still prohibits it, I guess that's for the future).
And you can already do the same into a mount that has been detached,
which will have `mount->mnt_ns = NULL` if I'm reading correctly.
Hmm, there is something that's been nagging at me though. I'm
suspicious about what happens in this series, when you move_mount() from
a victim of MNT_DETACH. I think umount2(MNT_DETACH) sets a flag
MNT_UMOUNT. It's a flag that was added to help correctly handle
MNT_LOCKED in the face of umount2(MNT_DETACH). It's also the point
where my understanding of the kernel mount/unmount code breaks down
:-). But it seems to override both IS_MNT_LOCKED() and UMOUNT_CONNECTED
in disconnect_mount(). That would give another chance to defeat locked
mounts.
Regards
Alan
David Howells <[email protected]> writes:
>
> (*) FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE: Trigger superblock creation.
>
> (*) FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE: Trigger superblock reconfiguration.
>
First let me thank you for adding both FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE and
FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE. Unfortunately the implementation is currently
broken. So this patch gets my:
This is broken in two specific ways.
1) FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE always returns -EOPNOTSUPPORTED.
So it is useless.
2) FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE will succeed even if the superblock already
exists and it can not use all of the superblock parameters.
This happens because vfs_get_super will only call fill_super
if the super block is created. Which is reasonable on the face
of it. But it in practice this introduces security problems.
a) Either through reconfiguring a shared super block you did not
realize was shared (as we saw with devpts).
b) Mounting a super block and not honoring it's mount options
because something has already mounted it. As we see today
with proc. Leaving userspace to think the filesystem will behave
one way when in fact it behaves another.
I have already explained this several times, and apparently I have been
ignored. This fundamental usability issue that leads to security
problems.
The only feedback I have had from previous time is that it is ``racy''
to fix the code. But it is only racy in the way that O_EXCL is racy.
You might have to retry in userspace if the mount you want isn't in the
state you expect.
Until this security issue is fixed this entire patchset has my:
Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
> +/*
> + * Perform an action on a context.
> + */
> +static int vfs_fsconfig_action(struct fs_context *fc, enum fsconfig_command cmd)
> +{
> + int ret = -EINVAL;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE:
> + if (fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS)
> + return -EBUSY;
> + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_CREATING;
> + ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
> + if (ret == 0)
> + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_MOUNT;
> + else
> + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
> + return ret;
> +
> + default:
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +}
See no support for FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE, and no checks to see if
the superblock has already been mounted.
> + ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&fc->uapi_mutex);
> + if (ret == 0) {
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE:
> + case FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE:
> + ret = vfs_fsconfig_action(fc, cmd);
> + break;
> + default:
> + ret = vfs_fsconfig(fc, ¶m);
> + break;
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&fc->uapi_mutex);
> + }
> +
Eric
Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
> First let me thank you for adding both FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE and
> FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE. Unfortunately the implementation is currently
> broken. So this patch gets my:
>
> This is broken in two specific ways.
> 1) FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE always returns -EOPNOTSUPPORTED.
> So it is useless.
This isn't broken, just not completely implemented. I would like to get the
core VFS framework upstream so that filesystems can start being converted.
However, since you asked nicely, here's a patch that adds the reconfiguration
bit.
David
---
vfs: Use fs_context for reconfig and implement FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE
Implement fs_context-based reconfiguration by the following means:
(1) Provide two more internal fs_context purposes: umount that actually
reconfigures to R/O and emergency reconfiguration to R/O. This tells
the filesystem if it the context hasn't been fully initialised.
(2) Track which bits in sb_mask have been changed in addition to what
they've been changed to.
(3) Move ->reconfigure() from the superblock ops to the fs_context ops.
This makes (4) possible. The ->remount_fs() superblock op is
obsolete.
(4) Provide a legacy wrapper for ->reconfigure().
(5) Make a do_umount() that's unmounting a root allocate an fs_context on
the stack and use that to reconfigure to R/O.
(6) Make do_emergency_remount_callback() allocate an fs_context on the
stack and use that to reconfigurate to R/O.
(6) Make do_remount() unconditionally use an fs_context to invoke
do_remount_sb().
(7) Only pass in a filesystem context to do_remount_sb(). This, along
with (4), allows the function to be simplified.
(8) Pass errors back from mount_single() if reconfiguration fails. We
might want this behaviour to be conditional, depending on which mount
API was used.
(9) Delete security_sb_remount().
(10) Rename do_remount_sb() to reconfigure_super().
Notes:
(1) do_remount() can't make use of vfs_reconfigure_sb() if the former
changes the mount attributes atomically or if the latter doesn't do so
at all.
However, since I think Al wants us to move towards separating
superblock reconfiguration from mountpoint reconfiguration, there may
not be a need to do this atomically.
(2) mount_single() probably shouldn't reconfigure an already existing
superblock if it's supposed to be creating a new one, but rather it
(or, rather, the filesystem) should compare the parameters and either
return the live superblock if the params are the same or return an
error if not.
However, this probably needs to be contingent on the mount API or
something so as not to break userspace.
(3) I should add something like an FSOPEN_EXCL flag to tell sget_fc() to
fail if the superblock already exists at all and an
FSOPEN_FAIL_ON_MISMATCH flag to explicitly say that we *don't* want a
superblock with different parameters. The implication of providing
neither flag is that we are happy to accept a superblock from the same
source but with different parameters.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt | 56 +++++++-------
fs/afs/mntpt.c | 2
fs/afs/super.c | 2
fs/fs_context.c | 46 ++++++-----
fs/fsopen.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++--
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 2
fs/internal.h | 9 +-
fs/kernfs/mount.c | 5 -
fs/libfs.c | 3
fs/namespace.c | 87 +++++++++-------------
fs/nfs/super.c | 2
fs/proc/inode.c | 1
fs/proc/internal.h | 1
fs/proc/root.c | 6 +
fs/super.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
include/linux/fs.h | 1
include/linux/fs_context.h | 8 +-
include/linux/kernfs.h | 1
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 9 --
include/linux/security.h | 6 -
ipc/mqueue.c | 2
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 2
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 3
security/security.c | 5 -
security/selinux/hooks.c | 1
25 files changed, 283 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt
index 5fec78eed4f4..35cc5c7a5008 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt
@@ -55,16 +55,6 @@ purposes - otherwise it will be NULL.
Note that security initialisation is done *after* the filesystem is called so
that the namespaces may be adjusted first.
-And the super_operations struct gains one field:
-
- int (*reconfigure)(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *);
-
-This shadows the ->reconfigure() operation and takes a prepared filesystem
-context instead of the mount flags and data page. It may modify the sb_flags
-in the context for the caller to pick up.
-
-[NOTE] reconfigure is intended as a replacement for remount_fs.
-
======================
THE FILESYSTEM CONTEXT
@@ -86,6 +76,7 @@ context. This is represented by the fs_context structure:
void *security;
void *s_fs_info;
unsigned int sb_flags;
+ unsigned int sb_flags_mask;
enum fs_context_purpose purpose:8;
bool sloppy:1;
bool silent:1;
@@ -150,8 +141,9 @@ The fs_context fields are as follows:
sget_fc(). This can be used to distinguish superblocks.
(*) unsigned int sb_flags
+ (*) unsigned int sb_flags_mask
- This holds the SB_* flags to be set in super_block::s_flags.
+ Which bits SB_* flags are to be set/cleared in super_block::s_flags.
(*) enum fs_context_purpose
@@ -162,6 +154,10 @@ The fs_context fields are as follows:
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT, -- New superblock for kernel-internal mount
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT -- New automatic submount of extant mount
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE -- Change an existing mount
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT -- Reconfigure to R/O for umount()
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO -- Emergency reconfigure to R/O
+
+ In the last two cases, ->init_fs_context() will not have been called.
(*) bool sloppy
(*) bool silent
@@ -174,8 +170,8 @@ The fs_context fields are as follows:
[NOTE] silent is probably redundant with sb_flags & SB_SILENT.
-The mount context is created by calling vfs_new_fs_context(), vfs_sb_reconfig()
-or vfs_dup_fs_context() and is destroyed with put_fs_context(). Note that the
+The mount context is created by calling vfs_new_fs_context() or
+vfs_dup_fs_context() and is destroyed with put_fs_context(). Note that the
structure is not refcounted.
VFS, security and filesystem mount options are set individually with
@@ -206,6 +202,7 @@ The filesystem context points to a table of operations:
size_t data_size);
int (*validate)(struct fs_context *fc);
int (*get_tree)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*reconfigure)(struct fs_context *fc);
};
These operations are invoked by the various stages of the mount procedure to
@@ -278,6 +275,18 @@ manage the filesystem context. They are as follows:
The phase on a userspace-driven context will be set to only allow this to
be called once on any particular context.
+ (*) int (*reconfigure)(struct fs_context *fc);
+
+ Called to effect reconfiguration of a superblock using information stored
+ in the filesystem context. It may detach any resources it desires from
+ the filesystem context and transfer them to the superblock. The
+ superblock can be found from fc->root->d_sb.
+
+ On success it should return 0. In the case of an error, it should return
+ a negative error code.
+
+ [NOTE] reconfigure is intended as a replacement for remount_fs.
+
===========================
FILESYSTEM CONTEXT SECURITY
@@ -358,24 +367,19 @@ one for destroying a context:
(*) struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
struct dentry *reference,
unsigned int sb_flags,
+ unsigned int sb_flags_mask,
enum fs_context_purpose purpose);
Create a filesystem context for a given filesystem type and purpose. This
- allocates the filesystem context, sets the flags, initialises the security
- and calls fs_type->init_fs_context() to initialise the filesystem private
- data.
+ allocates the filesystem context, sets the superblock flags, initialises
+ the security and calls fs_type->init_fs_context() to initialise the
+ filesystem private data.
reference can be NULL or it may indicate the root dentry of a superblock
- that is going to be reconfigured (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE) or the
- automount point that triggered a submount (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT). This
- is provided as a source of namespace information.
-
- (*) struct fs_context *vfs_sb_reconfig(struct vfsmount *mnt,
- unsigned int sb_flags);
-
- Create a filesystem context from the same filesystem as an extant mount
- and initialise the mount parameters from the superblock underlying that
- mount. This is for use by superblock parameter reconfiguration.
+ that is going to be reconfigured (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT or FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO) or the automount
+ point that triggered a submount (FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT). This is
+ provided as a source of namespace information.
(*) struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src_fc);
diff --git a/fs/afs/mntpt.c b/fs/afs/mntpt.c
index c8a7f05b9f12..16ee515b51c9 100644
--- a/fs/afs/mntpt.c
+++ b/fs/afs/mntpt.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *afs_mntpt_do_automount(struct dentry *mntpt)
BUG_ON(!d_inode(mntpt));
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&afs_fs_type, mntpt, 0,
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&afs_fs_type, mntpt, 0, 0,
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT);
if (IS_ERR(fc))
return ERR_CAST(fc);
diff --git a/fs/afs/super.c b/fs/afs/super.c
index 7c97836e7937..43cf1a6a4bf7 100644
--- a/fs/afs/super.c
+++ b/fs/afs/super.c
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static int afs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
}
break;
- case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE:
+ default:
break;
}
diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
index a6597a2fbf2b..2e9a88f41071 100644
--- a/fs/fs_context.c
+++ b/fs/fs_context.c
@@ -106,12 +106,14 @@ static int vfs_parse_sb_flag(struct fs_context *fc, const char *key)
token = lookup_constant(common_set_sb_flag, key, 0);
if (token) {
fc->sb_flags |= token;
+ fc->sb_flags_mask |= token;
return 1;
}
token = lookup_constant(common_clear_sb_flag, key, 0);
if (token) {
fc->sb_flags &= ~token;
+ fc->sb_flags_mask |= token;
return 1;
}
@@ -240,6 +242,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_parse_monolithic);
* @fs_type: The filesystem type.
* @reference: The dentry from which this one derives (or NULL)
* @sb_flags: Filesystem/superblock flags (SB_*)
+ * @sb_flags_mask: Applicable members of @sb_flags
* @purpose: The purpose that this configuration shall be used for.
*
* Open a filesystem and create a mount context. The mount context is
@@ -250,6 +253,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_parse_monolithic);
struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
struct dentry *reference,
unsigned int sb_flags,
+ unsigned int sb_flags_mask,
enum fs_context_purpose purpose)
{
int (*init_fs_context)(struct fs_context *, struct dentry *);
@@ -262,6 +266,7 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
fc->purpose = purpose;
fc->sb_flags = sb_flags;
+ fc->sb_flags_mask = sb_flags_mask;
fc->fs_type = get_filesystem(fs_type);
fc->cred = get_current_cred();
@@ -280,6 +285,8 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
fc->net_ns = get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
break;
case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE:
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT:
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO:
/* We don't pin any namespaces as the superblock's
* subscriptions cannot be changed at this point.
*/
@@ -314,28 +321,6 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_new_fs_context);
-/**
- * vfs_sb_reconfig - Create a filesystem context for remount/reconfiguration
- * @mountpoint: The mountpoint to open
- * @sb_flags: Filesystem/superblock flags (SB_*)
- *
- * Open a mounted filesystem and create a filesystem context such that a
- * remount can be effected.
- */
-struct fs_context *vfs_sb_reconfig(struct path *mountpoint,
- unsigned int sb_flags)
-{
- struct fs_context *fc;
-
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(mountpoint->dentry->d_sb->s_type,
- mountpoint->dentry,
- sb_flags, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE);
- if (IS_ERR(fc))
- return fc;
-
- return fc;
-}
-
/**
* vfs_dup_fc_config: Duplicate a filesytem context.
* @src_fc: The context to copy.
@@ -754,6 +739,22 @@ static int legacy_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Handle remount.
+ */
+static int legacy_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct legacy_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+ struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
+
+ if (!sb->s_op->remount_fs)
+ return 0;
+
+ return sb->s_op->remount_fs(sb, &fc->sb_flags,
+ ctx ? ctx->legacy_data : NULL,
+ ctx ? ctx->data_size : 0);
+}
+
const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops = {
.free = legacy_fs_context_free,
.dup = legacy_fs_context_dup,
@@ -761,6 +762,7 @@ const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops = {
.parse_monolithic = legacy_parse_monolithic,
.validate = legacy_validate,
.get_tree = legacy_get_tree,
+ .reconfigure = legacy_reconfigure,
};
/*
diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c
index e79bb5b085d6..9ead9220e2cb 100644
--- a/fs/fsopen.c
+++ b/fs/fsopen.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fsopen, const char __user *, _fs_name, unsigned int, flags)
if (!fs_type)
return -ENODEV;
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(fs_type, NULL, 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT);
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(fs_type, NULL, 0, 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT);
put_filesystem(fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(fc))
return PTR_ERR(fc);
@@ -185,12 +185,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fspick, int, dfd, const char __user *, path, unsigned int, flags
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (!target.dentry->d_sb->s_op->reconfigure)
- goto err_path;
-
fc = vfs_new_fs_context(target.dentry->d_sb->s_type, target.dentry,
- 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE);
+ 0, 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE);
if (IS_ERR(fc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(fc);
goto err_path;
@@ -255,6 +251,58 @@ static int vfs_fsconfig(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
return vfs_parse_fs_param(fc, param);
}
+/*
+ * Reconfigure a superblock.
+ */
+int vfs_reconfigure_sb(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (fc->ops->validate) {
+ ret = fc->ops->validate(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ down_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ ret = reconfigure_super(fc);
+ up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up a context after performing an action on it and put it into a state
+ * from where it can be used to reconfigure a superblock.
+ */
+void vfs_clean_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ if (fc->ops && fc->ops->free)
+ fc->ops->free(fc);
+ fc->need_free = false;
+ fc->fs_private = NULL;
+ fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
+ fc->sb_flags = 0;
+ fc->sloppy = false;
+ fc->silent = false;
+ security_fs_context_free(fc);
+ fc->security = NULL;
+ kfree(fc->subtype);
+ fc->subtype = NULL;
+ kfree(fc->source);
+ fc->source = NULL;
+
+ fc->purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE;
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_RECONF;
+}
+
/*
* Perform an action on a context.
*/
@@ -274,6 +322,30 @@ static int vfs_fsconfig_action(struct fs_context *fc, enum fsconfig_command cmd)
fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
return ret;
+ case FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE:
+ if (fc->phase == FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_RECONF) {
+ /* This is probably pointless, since no changes have
+ * been proposed.
+ */
+ if (fc->fs_type->init_fs_context) {
+ ret = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context(fc, fc->root);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ fc->need_free = true;
+ }
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_RECONF_PARAMS;
+ }
+
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_RECONFIGURING;
+ ret = vfs_reconfigure_sb(fc);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ vfs_clean_context(fc);
+ else
+ fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
+ return ret;
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
index e2378c8ce7e0..c09a1cd4fa5a 100644
--- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *__init mount_one_hugetlbfs(struct hstate *h)
struct vfsmount *mnt;
int ret;
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&hugetlbfs_fs_type, NULL, 0,
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&hugetlbfs_fs_type, NULL, 0, 0,
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
if (IS_ERR(fc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(fc);
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index e5bdfc52b9a1..9c7dd6f12f35 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ extern void __init chrdev_init(void);
*/
extern const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops;
+/*
+ * fsopen.c
+ */
+extern void vfs_clean_context(struct fs_context *fc);
+
/*
* namei.c
*/
@@ -77,6 +82,7 @@ int do_linkat(int olddfd, const char __user *oldname, int newdfd,
*/
extern void *copy_mount_options(const void __user *);
extern char *copy_mount_string(const void __user *);
+extern int parse_monolithic_mount_data(struct fs_context *, void *, size_t);
extern struct vfsmount *lookup_mnt(const struct path *);
extern int finish_automount(struct vfsmount *, struct path *);
@@ -106,8 +112,7 @@ extern struct file *get_empty_filp(void);
/*
* super.c
*/
-extern int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *, int, void *, size_t, int,
- struct fs_context *);
+extern int reconfigure_super(struct fs_context *);
extern bool trylock_super(struct super_block *sb);
extern struct super_block *user_get_super(dev_t);
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/mount.c b/fs/kernfs/mount.c
index b568e6c5e063..ec14dc76fe89 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/mount.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/mount.c
@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@
struct kmem_cache *kernfs_node_cache;
-static int kernfs_sop_reconfigure(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+int kernfs_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
{
- struct kernfs_root *root = kernfs_info(sb)->root;
+ struct kernfs_root *root = kernfs_info(fc->root->d_sb)->root;
struct kernfs_syscall_ops *scops = root->syscall_ops;
if (scops && scops->reconfigure)
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ const struct super_operations kernfs_sops = {
.drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
.evict_inode = kernfs_evict_inode,
- .reconfigure = kernfs_sop_reconfigure,
.show_options = kernfs_sop_show_options,
.show_path = kernfs_sop_show_path,
.get_fsinfo = kernfs_sop_get_fsinfo,
diff --git a/fs/libfs.c b/fs/libfs.c
index d9a5d883dc3f..b1744c071ab0 100644
--- a/fs/libfs.c
+++ b/fs/libfs.c
@@ -583,7 +583,8 @@ int simple_pin_fs(struct file_system_type *type, struct vfsmount **mount, int *c
if (unlikely(!*mount)) {
spin_unlock(&pin_fs_lock);
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(type, NULL, 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(type, NULL, 0, 0,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
if (IS_ERR(fc))
return PTR_ERR(fc);
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index e34e3fd064b0..47aea9542bf1 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1479,6 +1479,25 @@ static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
static void shrink_submounts(struct mount *mnt);
+static int do_umount_root(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct fs_context fc = {
+ .purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT,
+ .fs_type = sb->s_type,
+ .root = sb->s_root,
+ .sb_flags = SB_RDONLY,
+ .sb_flags_mask = SB_RDONLY,
+ };
+
+ down_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
+ /* Might want to call ->init_fs_context(). */
+ ret = reconfigure_super(&fc);
+ up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
{
struct super_block *sb = mnt->mnt.mnt_sb;
@@ -1544,11 +1563,7 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
*/
if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- down_write(&sb->s_umount);
- if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
- retval = do_remount_sb(sb, SB_RDONLY, NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
- up_write(&sb->s_umount);
- return retval;
+ return do_umount_root(sb);
}
namespace_lock();
@@ -2394,7 +2409,7 @@ static int do_reconfigure_mnt(struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
/*
* Parse the monolithic page of mount data given to sys_mount().
*/
-static int parse_monolithic_mount_data(struct fs_context *fc, void *data, size_t data_size)
+int parse_monolithic_mount_data(struct fs_context *fc, void *data, size_t data_size)
{
int (*monolithic_mount_data)(struct fs_context *, void *, size_t);
@@ -2417,7 +2432,6 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
int err;
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
- struct file_system_type *type = sb->s_type;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2428,41 +2442,34 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
if (!can_change_locked_flags(mnt, mnt_flags))
return -EPERM;
- if (type->init_fs_context) {
- fc = vfs_sb_reconfig(path, sb_flags);
- if (IS_ERR(fc))
- return PTR_ERR(fc);
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(path->dentry->d_sb->s_type,
+ path->dentry, sb_flags, MS_RMT_MASK,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE);
- err = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data, data_size);
+ err = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data, data_size);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto err_fc;
+
+ if (fc->ops->validate) {
+ err = fc->ops->validate(fc);
if (err < 0)
goto err_fc;
-
- if (fc->ops->validate) {
- err = fc->ops->validate(fc);
- if (err < 0)
- goto err_fc;
- }
-
- err = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
- if (err)
- return err;
- } else {
- err = security_sb_remount(sb, data, data_size);
- if (err)
- return err;
}
+ err = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
err = -EPERM;
if (ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- err = do_remount_sb(sb, sb_flags, data, data_size, 0, fc);
+ err = reconfigure_super(fc);
if (!err)
set_mount_attributes(mnt, mnt_flags);
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
err_fc:
- if (fc)
- put_fs_context(fc);
+ put_fs_context(fc);
return err;
}
@@ -2667,7 +2674,7 @@ static int do_new_mount(struct path *mountpoint, const char *fstype,
if (!fs_type)
goto out;
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(fs_type, NULL, sb_flags,
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(fs_type, NULL, sb_flags, sb_flags,
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT);
put_filesystem(fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(fc)) {
@@ -3294,7 +3301,7 @@ struct vfsmount *vfs_kern_mount(struct file_system_type *type,
if (!type)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(type, NULL, sb_flags,
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(type, NULL, sb_flags, sb_flags,
sb_flags & SB_KERNMOUNT ?
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT :
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT);
@@ -3436,23 +3443,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fsmount, int, fs_fd, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, ms_flags
* do any memory allocation or anything like that at this point as we
* don't want to have to handle any errors incurred.
*/
- if (fc->ops && fc->ops->free)
- fc->ops->free(fc);
- fc->need_free = false;
- fc->fs_private = NULL;
- fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
- fc->sb_flags = 0;
- fc->sloppy = false;
- fc->silent = false;
- security_fs_context_free(fc);
- fc->security = NULL;
- kfree(fc->subtype);
- fc->subtype = NULL;
- kfree(fc->source);
- fc->source = NULL;
-
- fc->purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE;
- fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_RECONF;
+ vfs_clean_context(fc);
/* Attach to an apparent O_PATH fd with a note that we need to unmount
* it, not just simply put it.
diff --git a/fs/nfs/super.c b/fs/nfs/super.c
index b5f27d6999e5..9a4eec0ef20a 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/super.c
@@ -2296,7 +2296,7 @@ nfs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *raw_data, size_t data_size
/*
* noac is a special case. It implies -o sync, but that's not
- * necessarily reflected in the mtab options. do_remount_sb
+ * necessarily reflected in the mtab options. reconfigure_super
* will clear SB_SYNCHRONOUS if -o sync wasn't specified in the
* remount options, so we have to explicitly reset it.
*/
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index 38155bec4a54..8d6f46558fa4 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ const struct super_operations proc_sops = {
.drop_inode = generic_delete_inode,
.evict_inode = proc_evict_inode,
.statfs = simple_statfs,
- .reconfigure = proc_reconfigure,
.show_options = proc_show_options,
};
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index ea8c5468eafc..75a225688a4c 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -273,7 +273,6 @@ static inline void proc_tty_init(void) {}
extern struct proc_dir_entry proc_root;
extern void proc_self_init(void);
-extern int proc_reconfigure(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *);
/*
* task_[no]mmu.c
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 1d6e5bfa30cc..64aa32155432 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -148,8 +148,9 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
}
-int proc_reconfigure(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+static int proc_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
{
+ struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
sync_filesystem(sb);
@@ -180,6 +181,7 @@ static const struct fs_context_operations proc_fs_context_ops = {
.free = proc_fs_context_free,
.parse_param = proc_parse_param,
.get_tree = proc_get_tree,
+ .reconfigure = proc_reconfigure,
};
static int proc_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
@@ -310,7 +312,7 @@ int pid_ns_prepare_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
struct vfsmount *mnt;
int ret;
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&proc_fs_type, NULL, 0,
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&proc_fs_type, NULL, 0, 0,
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
if (IS_ERR(fc))
return PTR_ERR(fc);
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 321fbc244570..3f3389e94344 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -920,32 +920,30 @@ struct super_block *user_get_super(dev_t dev)
}
/**
- * do_remount_sb - asks filesystem to change mount options.
- * @sb: superblock in question
- * @sb_flags: revised superblock flags
- * @data: the rest of options
- * @data_size: The size of the data
- * @force: whether or not to force the change
- * @fc: the superblock config for filesystems that support it
- * (NULL if called from emergency or umount)
+ * reconfigure_super - asks filesystem to change superblock parameters
+ * @fc: the superblock and configuration
*
- * Alters the mount options of a mounted file system.
+ * Alters the configuration parameters of a live superblock.
*/
-int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int sb_flags, void *data,
- size_t data_size, int force, struct fs_context *fc)
+int reconfigure_super(struct fs_context *fc)
{
+ struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
int retval;
- int remount_ro;
+ int remount_ro = false;
+ if (fc->sb_flags_mask & ~MS_RMT_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
if (sb->s_writers.frozen != SB_UNFROZEN)
return -EBUSY;
+ if (fc->sb_flags_mask & SB_RDONLY) {
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
- if (!(sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) && bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev))
- return -EACCES;
+ if (!(fc->sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) && bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev))
+ return -EACCES;
#endif
- remount_ro = (sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) && !sb_rdonly(sb);
+ remount_ro = (fc->sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) && !sb_rdonly(sb);
+ }
if (remount_ro) {
if (!hlist_empty(&sb->s_pins)) {
@@ -956,15 +954,16 @@ int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int sb_flags, void *data,
return 0;
if (sb->s_writers.frozen != SB_UNFROZEN)
return -EBUSY;
- remount_ro = (sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) && !sb_rdonly(sb);
+ remount_ro = !sb_rdonly(sb);
}
}
shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
- /* If we are remounting RDONLY and current sb is read/write,
- make sure there are no rw files opened */
+ /* If we are reconfiguring to RDONLY and current sb is read/write,
+ * make sure there are no files open for writing.
+ */
if (remount_ro) {
- if (force) {
+ if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO) {
sb->s_readonly_remount = 1;
smp_wmb();
} else {
@@ -974,29 +973,21 @@ int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int sb_flags, void *data,
}
}
- if (sb->s_op->reconfigure ||
- sb->s_op->remount_fs) {
- if (sb->s_op->reconfigure) {
- retval = sb->s_op->reconfigure(sb, fc);
- if (fc)
- sb_flags = fc->sb_flags;
- else
- sb_flags = sb->s_flags;
- if (retval == 0)
- security_sb_reconfigure(fc);
+ if (fc->ops->reconfigure) {
+ retval = fc->ops->reconfigure(fc);
+ if (retval == 0) {
+ security_sb_reconfigure(fc);
} else {
- retval = sb->s_op->remount_fs(sb, &sb_flags,
- data, data_size);
- }
- if (retval) {
- if (!force)
+ if (fc->purpose != FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO)
goto cancel_readonly;
/* If forced remount, go ahead despite any errors */
WARN(1, "forced remount of a %s fs returned %i\n",
sb->s_type->name, retval);
}
}
- sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_RMT_MASK) | (sb_flags & MS_RMT_MASK);
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(sb->s_flags, ((sb->s_flags & ~fc->sb_flags_mask) |
+ (fc->sb_flags & fc->sb_flags_mask)));
/* Needs to be ordered wrt mnt_is_readonly() */
smp_wmb();
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
@@ -1020,14 +1011,22 @@ int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int sb_flags, void *data,
static void do_emergency_remount_callback(struct super_block *sb)
{
+ struct fs_context fc = {
+ .purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO,
+ .fs_type = sb->s_type,
+ .root = sb->s_root,
+ .sb_flags = SB_RDONLY,
+ .sb_flags_mask = SB_RDONLY,
+ };
+
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (sb->s_root && sb->s_bdev && (sb->s_flags & SB_BORN) &&
- !sb_rdonly(sb)) {
+ !sb_rdonly(sb))
+ /* Might want to call ->init_fs_context(). */
/*
* What lock protects sb->s_flags??
*/
- do_remount_sb(sb, SB_RDONLY, NULL, 0, 1, NULL);
- }
+ reconfigure_super(&fc);
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
}
@@ -1416,6 +1415,42 @@ struct dentry *mount_nodev(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(mount_nodev);
+static int reconfigure_single(struct super_block *s,
+ int flags, void *data, size_t data_size)
+{
+ struct fs_context *fc;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* The caller really need to be passing fc down into mount_single(),
+ * then a chunk of this can be removed. Better yet, reconfiguration
+ * shouldn't happen, but rather the second mount should be rejected if
+ * the parameters are not compatible.
+ */
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(s->s_type, s->s_root, flags, MS_RMT_MASK,
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE);
+ if (IS_ERR(fc))
+ return PTR_ERR(fc);
+
+ ret = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data, data_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (fc->ops->validate) {
+ ret = fc->ops->validate(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = reconfigure_super(fc);
+out:
+ put_fs_context(fc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int compare_single(struct super_block *s, void *p)
{
return 1;
@@ -1433,15 +1468,19 @@ struct dentry *mount_single(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
return ERR_CAST(s);
if (!s->s_root) {
error = fill_super(s, data, data_size, flags & SB_SILENT ? 1 : 0);
- if (error) {
- deactivate_locked_super(s);
- return ERR_PTR(error);
- }
+ if (error)
+ goto error;
s->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE;
} else {
- do_remount_sb(s, flags, data, data_size, 0, NULL);
+ error = reconfigure_single(s, flags, data, data_size);
+ if (error)
+ goto error;
}
return dget(s->s_root);
+
+error:
+ deactivate_locked_super(s);
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(mount_single);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 053d53861995..1300d77efe96 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1853,7 +1853,6 @@ struct super_operations {
int (*statfs) (struct dentry *, struct kstatfs *);
int (*get_fsinfo) (struct dentry *, struct fsinfo_kparams *);
int (*remount_fs) (struct super_block *, int *, char *, size_t);
- int (*reconfigure) (struct super_block *, struct fs_context *);
void (*umount_begin) (struct super_block *);
int (*show_options)(struct seq_file *, struct dentry *);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
index 9a6aa6bcf745..5e79c33ade7d 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ enum fs_context_purpose {
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT, /* New superblock for kernel-internal mount */
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT, /* New superblock for automatic submount */
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE, /* Superblock reconfiguration (remount) */
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT, /* Reconfiguration to R/O for unmount */
+ FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO, /* Emergency reconfiguration to R/O */
};
/*
@@ -102,6 +104,7 @@ struct fs_context {
void *security; /* The LSM context */
void *s_fs_info; /* Proposed s_fs_info */
unsigned int sb_flags; /* Proposed superblock flags (SB_*) */
+ unsigned int sb_flags_mask; /* Superblock flags that were changed */
enum fs_context_purpose purpose:8;
enum fs_context_phase phase:8; /* The phase the context is in */
bool sloppy:1; /* T if unrecognised options are okay */
@@ -116,6 +119,7 @@ struct fs_context_operations {
int (*parse_monolithic)(struct fs_context *fc, void *data, size_t data_size);
int (*validate)(struct fs_context *fc);
int (*get_tree)(struct fs_context *fc);
+ int (*reconfigure)(struct fs_context *fc);
};
/*
@@ -123,9 +127,9 @@ struct fs_context_operations {
*/
extern struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
struct dentry *reference,
- unsigned int ms_flags,
+ unsigned int sb_flags,
+ unsigned int sb_flags_mask,
enum fs_context_purpose purpose);
-extern struct fs_context *vfs_sb_reconfig(struct path *path, unsigned int ms_flags);
extern struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src);
extern int vfs_parse_fs_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param);
extern int vfs_parse_fs_string(struct fs_context *fc, const char *key,
diff --git a/include/linux/kernfs.h b/include/linux/kernfs.h
index 9fdcdbbb67e9..a6da692792a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernfs.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernfs.h
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ int kernfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
void kernfs_free_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc);
void kernfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb);
struct super_block *kernfs_pin_sb(struct kernfs_root *root, const void *ns);
+int kernfs_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc);
void kernfs_init(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b1a62dc0b8d9..3cfa89f41bad 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -160,13 +160,6 @@
* @orig_data is the size of the original data
* @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
* Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
- * @sb_remount:
- * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes
- * are being made to those options.
- * @sb superblock being remounted
- * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
- * @data_size contains the size of the data.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @sb_umount:
* Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
* @mnt contains the mounted file system.
@@ -1518,7 +1511,6 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*sb_alloc_security)(struct super_block *sb);
void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_copy_data)(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy);
- int (*sb_remount)(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size);
int (*sb_show_options)(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_statfs)(struct dentry *dentry);
int (*sb_mount)(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
@@ -1865,7 +1857,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head sb_alloc_security;
struct hlist_head sb_free_security;
struct hlist_head sb_copy_data;
- struct hlist_head sb_remount;
struct hlist_head sb_show_options;
struct hlist_head sb_statfs;
struct hlist_head sb_mount;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c73d9ba863bc..047b2cff1209 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -240,7 +240,6 @@ int security_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy);
-int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size);
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
@@ -585,11 +584,6 @@ static inline int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m,
struct super_block *sb)
{
diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
index 0f102210f89e..0ac430f48800 100644
--- a/ipc/mqueue.c
+++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *mq_create_mount(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
struct vfsmount *mnt;
int ret;
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&mqueue_fs_type, NULL, 0,
+ fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&mqueue_fs_type, NULL, 0, 0,
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
if (IS_ERR(fc))
return ERR_CAST(fc);
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
index 958b3fd81c56..6542c0c3e32f 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
@@ -2150,6 +2150,7 @@ static const struct fs_context_operations cgroup_fs_context_ops = {
.parse_param = cgroup_parse_param,
.validate = cgroup_validate,
.get_tree = cgroup_get_tree,
+ .reconfigure = kernfs_reconfigure,
};
/*
@@ -5281,7 +5282,6 @@ int cgroup_rmdir(struct kernfs_node *kn)
static struct kernfs_syscall_ops cgroup_kf_syscall_ops = {
.show_options = cgroup_show_options,
.fsinfo = cgroup_fsinfo,
- .reconfigure = cgroup_reconfigure,
.mkdir = cgroup_mkdir,
.rmdir = cgroup_rmdir,
.show_path = cgroup_show_path,
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
index b02161a41d5a..b4ad1a52f006 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
@@ -327,7 +327,8 @@ static int cpuset_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
if (!cgroup_fs)
goto out;
- cg_fc = vfs_new_fs_context(cgroup_fs, NULL, fc->sb_flags, fc->purpose);
+ cg_fc = vfs_new_fs_context(cgroup_fs, NULL, fc->sb_flags, fc->sb_flags,
+ fc->purpose);
put_filesystem(cgroup_fs);
if (IS_ERR(cg_fc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(cg_fc);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2439a5613813..95b348484c5a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -415,11 +415,6 @@ int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, size_t data_size, char *copy)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
-int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, data, data_size);
-}
-
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3d5b09c256c1..d9cfb8b2fca4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7180,7 +7180,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
> First let me thank you for adding both FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE and
> FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE. Unfortunately the implementation is currently
> broken. So this patch gets my:
>
> This is broken in two specific ways.
> ...
> 2) FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE will succeed even if the superblock already
> exists and it can not use all of the superblock parameters.
>
> This happens because vfs_get_super will only call fill_super
> if the super block is created. Which is reasonable on the face
> of it. But it in practice this introduces security problems.
>
> a) Either through reconfiguring a shared super block you did not
> realize was shared (as we saw with devpts).
>
> b) Mounting a super block and not honoring it's mount options
> because something has already mounted it. As we see today
> with proc. Leaving userspace to think the filesystem will behave
> one way when in fact it behaves another.
>
> I have already explained this several times, and apparently I have been
> ignored. This fundamental usability issue that leads to security
> problems.
I've also explained why you're wrong or at least only partially right. I *do*
*not* want to implement sget() in userspace with the ability for userspace to
lock out other mount requests - which is what it appears that you've been
asking for.
However, as I have said, I *am* willing to add one of more flags to help with
this, but I can't make any "legacy" fs honour them as this requires the
fs_context to be passed down to sget_fc() and the filesystem - which is why I
was considering leaving it for later.
(1) An FSOPEN_EXCL flag to tell sget_fc() to fail if the superblock already
exists at all.
(2) An FSOPEN_FAIL_ON_MISMATCH flag to explicitly say that we *don't* want a
superblock with different parameters.
The implication of providing neither flag is that we are happy to accept a
superblock from the same source but with different parameters.
But it doesn't seem to be an absolute imperative to roll this out immediately,
since what I have exactly mirrors what the kernel currently does - and forcing
a change in that behaviour risks breaking userspace. If it keeps you happy,
however, I can try and work one up.
David
On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 4:24 PM, David Howells <[email protected]> wrote:
> Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> First let me thank you for adding both FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE and
>> FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE. Unfortunately the implementation is currently
>> broken. So this patch gets my:
>>
>> This is broken in two specific ways.
>> ...
>> 2) FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE will succeed even if the superblock already
>> exists and it can not use all of the superblock parameters.
>>
>> This happens because vfs_get_super will only call fill_super
>> if the super block is created. Which is reasonable on the face
>> of it. But it in practice this introduces security problems.
>>
>> a) Either through reconfiguring a shared super block you did not
>> realize was shared (as we saw with devpts).
>>
>> b) Mounting a super block and not honoring it's mount options
>> because something has already mounted it. As we see today
>> with proc. Leaving userspace to think the filesystem will behave
>> one way when in fact it behaves another.
>>
>> I have already explained this several times, and apparently I have been
>> ignored. This fundamental usability issue that leads to security
>> problems.
>
> I've also explained why you're wrong or at least only partially right. I *do*
> *not* want to implement sget() in userspace with the ability for userspace to
> lock out other mount requests - which is what it appears that you've been
> asking for.
>
> However, as I have said, I *am* willing to add one of more flags to help with
> this, but I can't make any "legacy" fs honour them as this requires the
> fs_context to be passed down to sget_fc() and the filesystem - which is why I
> was considering leaving it for later.
You can determine at fsopen() time whether the filesystem is able to
support the O_EXCL behavior? If so, then it's trivial to enable this
conditionally. I think that's what Eric is asking for, it's obviously
not fair to ask for a change in behavior of the legacy interface.
Thanks,
Miklos
David Howells <[email protected]> writes:
> Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> First let me thank you for adding both FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE and
>> FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE. Unfortunately the implementation is currently
>> broken. So this patch gets my:
>>
>> This is broken in two specific ways.
>> ...
>> 2) FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE will succeed even if the superblock already
>> exists and it can not use all of the superblock parameters.
>>
>> This happens because vfs_get_super will only call fill_super
>> if the super block is created. Which is reasonable on the face
>> of it. But it in practice this introduces security problems.
>>
>> a) Either through reconfiguring a shared super block you did not
>> realize was shared (as we saw with devpts).
>>
>> b) Mounting a super block and not honoring it's mount options
>> because something has already mounted it. As we see today
>> with proc. Leaving userspace to think the filesystem will behave
>> one way when in fact it behaves another.
>>
>> I have already explained this several times, and apparently I have been
>> ignored. This fundamental usability issue that leads to security
>> problems.
>
> I've also explained why you're wrong or at least only partially right. I *do*
> *not* want to implement sget() in userspace with the ability for userspace to
> lock out other mount requests - which is what it appears that you've been
> asking for.
All I really care about is that when you ask for a set of paramaters
that you get a filesystem with that set of parameters. Not the same
filsystem mounted a different way.
That has gone wrong twice badly. There is no common case I know of that
requires returning the same filesystem twice. AKA the pain of the
existing semantics seems much much worse than any benefit. So I am
asking that we not propagate the existing semantics into the new API.
You are cleaning up dealing with mount options and this is one of the
places where they need cleaning up.
> However, as I have said, I *am* willing to add one of more flags to help with
> this, but I can't make any "legacy" fs honour them as this requires the
> fs_context to be passed down to sget_fc() and the filesystem - which is why I
> was considering leaving it for later.
>
> (1) An FSOPEN_EXCL flag to tell sget_fc() to fail if the superblock already
> exists at all.
>
> (2) An FSOPEN_FAIL_ON_MISMATCH flag to explicitly say that we *don't* want a
> superblock with different parameters.
>
> The implication of providing neither flag is that we are happy to accept a
> superblock from the same source but with different parameters.
>
> But it doesn't seem to be an absolute imperative to roll this out immediately,
> since what I have exactly mirrors what the kernel currently does - and forcing
> a change in that behaviour risks breaking userspace. If it keeps you happy,
> however, I can try and work one up.
What I am asking is that the default behavior for the new API when using
FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE is to call sget_fc with either FSOPEN_EXCL or
FSOPEN_FAIL_ON_MISMATCH. I know FSOPEN_EXCL is trivial to implement. I
don't know if there are any hidden gotcha's with
FSOPEN_FAIL_ON_MISMATCH.
This change in default behavior for your patch needs to be implemented
before this hits a released kernel. Returning a filesystem with
different than the requested parameters has resulted in at least two
major issues, that are very hard to clean up after the fact. A chroot
system changing the parameters on /dev/pts resulting in some
distributions keeping the suid pt_chown binary long past it's best buy
date, and other distributions instead choosing to break userspace. Then
there is the current issue where in practice proc does not any of it's
mount paramaters which breaks the android security model.
The fact that these things happen silently and you have to be on your
toes to catch them is fundamentally a bug in the API. If the mount
request had simply failed people would have noticed the issues much
sooner and silently b0rkend configuration would not have propagated. As
such I do not believe we should propagate this misfeature from the old
API into the new API.
Conceptually I like FSOPEN_FAIL_ON_MISMATH as it looks like it is
sufficient to the needs, and with a little luck we could even change
the old API to those semantics.
Ultimately I want to close a giant mental model mismatch.
User: I am creating the data structures to read filesystem X
with parameters Y.
Kernel: He wants filesystem X. If it is a slow day use parameters Y.
Given that historically the reuse of a superblock did not exist, and
that in practice it almost never happens. It is quite reqsonable for
users to not expect the kernel to completely ignore the mount parameters
they pass to the kernel.
So please let's fix that now when it is easy.
Eric
Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> wrote:
> > However, as I have said, I *am* willing to add one of more flags to help
> > with this, but I can't make any "legacy" fs honour them as this requires
> > the fs_context to be passed down to sget_fc() and the filesystem - which
> > is why I was considering leaving it for later.
>
> You can determine at fsopen() time whether the filesystem is able to
> support the O_EXCL behavior? If so, then it's trivial to enable this
> conditionally. I think that's what Eric is asking for, it's obviously
> not fair to ask for a change in behavior of the legacy interface.
What do you mean by "enable it conditionally"? It cannot be enabled for
filesystems that don't pass fs_context down to sget().
mount(2) mustn't enable it lest it break userspace.
fsopen(2) can let userspace set a flag to enable it.
David
There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
pattern.
The script below demonstrates this bug. Showing this bug can cause the
ext4 "acl" "quota" and "user_xattr" options to be silently ignored.
fsopen has my nack until it addresses this issue.
I don't know if we can fix this in the context of sys_mount. But we if
we are redoing the option parsing of how we mount filesystems this needs
to be fixed before we start worrying about bug compatibility.
Hopefully this report is simple and clear enough that we can at least
agree on the problem.
Eric
# cat ~/bin/bdev-loop0.sh
#!/bin/sh
set -x
set -e
LOOP=loop0
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1024 count=1048576 of=$LOOP-file
losetup /dev/$LOOP $LOOP-file
mkfs.ext4 /dev/$LOOP
mkdir $LOOP-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr
mount -t ext4 /dev/$LOOP -o "noacl,noquota,nouser_xattr" $LOOP-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr
mkdir $LOOP-acl-quota-user_xattr
mount -t ext4 /dev/$LOOP -o "acl,quota,user_xattr" $LOOP-acl-quota-user_xattr
cat /proc/mounts | grep loop0
root@finagle:~# ~/bin/bdev-loop0.sh
+ set -e
+ LOOP=loop0
+ dd if=/dev/zero bs=1024 count=1048576 of=loop0-file
1048576+0 records in
1048576+0 records out
1073741824 bytes (1.1 GB) copied, 4.37645 s, 245 MB/s
+ losetup /dev/loop0 loop0-file
+ mkfs.ext4 /dev/loop0
mke2fs 1.41.12 (17-May-2010)
Filesystem label=
OS type: Linux
Block size=4096 (log=2)
Fragment size=4096 (log=2)
Stride=0 blocks, Stripe width=0 blocks
65536 inodes, 262144 blocks
13107 blocks (5.00%) reserved for the super user
First data block=0
Maximum filesystem blocks=268435456
8 block groups
32768 blocks per group, 32768 fragments per group
8192 inodes per group
Superblock backups stored on blocks:
32768, 98304, 163840, 229376
Writing inode tables: done
Creating journal (8192 blocks): done
Writing superblocks and filesystem accounting information: done
This filesystem will be automatically checked every 29 mounts or
180 days, whichever comes first. Use tune2fs -c or -i to override.
+ mkdir loop0-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr
+ mount -t ext4 /dev/loop0 -o noacl,noquota,nouser_xattr loop0-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr
+ mkdir loop0-acl-quota-user_xattr
+ mount -t ext4 /dev/loop0 -o acl,quota,user_xattr loop0-acl-quota-user_xattr
+ + grep loop0
cat /proc/mounts
/dev/loop0 /root/loop0-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
/dev/loop0 /root/loop0-acl-quota-user_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 09:05:22AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
> address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
> filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
> pattern.
>
> The script below demonstrates this bug. Showing this bug can cause the
> ext4 "acl" "quota" and "user_xattr" options to be silently ignored.
>
> fsopen has my nack until it addresses this issue.
>
> I don't know if we can fix this in the context of sys_mount. But we if
> we are redoing the option parsing of how we mount filesystems this needs
> to be fixed before we start worrying about bug compatibility.
>
> Hopefully this report is simple and clear enough that we can at least
> agree on the problem.
Sure, it is simple. So's the solution: MNT_USERNS_SPECIAL_SEMANTICS that
would get passed to filesystems, so that Eric would be able to implement
his mount(2)-incompatible behaviour at leisure, without worrying about
compatibility issues.
Does that address your complaint? Because one thing we are not going
to do is changing mount(2) behaviour. Reason: userland-visible
behaviour of hell knows how many local scripts. Another thing that
is flat-out not feasible is some kind of blanket "compare options"
stuff; it *can* be done as helpers to be used by filesystem when
it sees that new flag, but it's simply not going to work at the
fs-independent level. Trivial example with the same ext4:
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/a -o bsddf vs. mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/b
ext4 can tell that these are the same. syscall itself has no
clue. What's more, it's not just explicitly spelled default
options - it's the stuff that has more than one form. And while
we are at it, the things like two NFS mounts of different trees
from the same server; they might or might not get the same superblock.
Depending upon the options.
Convenience helper that would allow ext4 to compare options and reject
the incompatible mount? Not sure how much ext4-specific knowledge
would have to go in it, but if you can come up with one - more power
to you. But the decision to use it *must* be ext4-specific. Because
for e.g. NFS such thing as -o fsid=..., while certainly a part of
options, has a very different meaning - it's "use a separate fs instance"
(and let the server deal with coherency issues on its end).
Decision to use sget() (and the way it's used) is up to filesystem.
We *can't* lift that into syscall. Not without breaking the fuck out
of existing behaviour.
Having something like a second callback for mount_bdev() that would
be called when we'd found an existing instance for the same block
device? Sure, no problem. Having a helper for doing such comparison
that would work in enough cases to bother, so that different fs
could avoid boilerplate in that callback? Again, more power to you.
But I don't see what the hell does that have to the syscall interface.
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 07:36:17AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
>
> > On Aug 10, 2018, at 7:05 AM, Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
> > address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
> > filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
> > pattern.
> >
>
> > /dev/loop0 /root/loop0-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
> > /dev/loop0 /root/loop0-acl-quota-user_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
>
> To make sure I understand correctly: the problem is that the second mount ignored the options because the device was already mounted, right?
>
> For the new API, I think the only remotely sane approach is to refuse to mount or init or whatever you call it an already mounted bdev. If user code genuinely needs to bind-mount an existing mount that is known only by its bdev, we can add a specific API just for that.
First of all, that does NOT belong anywhere other than fs itself.
Example: NFS. Not every attempt to mount something leads to creation
of new fs instance; moreover, whether it will or not can't be predicted
in general.
PS: for pity sake, fix your MUA; 270-character lines are way over the
top.
> On Aug 10, 2018, at 7:05 AM, Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
> address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
> filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
> pattern.
>
> /dev/loop0 /root/loop0-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
> /dev/loop0 /root/loop0-acl-quota-user_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
To make sure I understand correctly: the problem is that the second mount ignored the options because the device was already mounted, right?
For the new API, I think the only remotely sane approach is to refuse to mount or init or whatever you call it an already mounted bdev. If user code genuinely needs to bind-mount an existing mount that is known only by its bdev, we can add a specific API just for that.
Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
> There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
> address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
> filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
> pattern.
Yes. Since you *absolutely* *insist* on this being fixed *right* *now* *or*
*else*, I'm working up a set of additional patches to give userspace the
option of whether they want no sharing; sharing, but only with exactly the
same parameters; or to ignore the parameter differences and just accept
sharing of what's already already mounted (ie. the current behaviour).
The second option, however, is not trivial as it needs to compare the fs
contexts, including the LSM parameters. To make that work, I really need to
remove the old security_mnt_opts stuff - which means I need to port btrfs to
the new context stuff.
We discussed this yesterday, and I proposed a solution, and I'm working on it.
Yes, I agree it would be nice to have, but it *doesn't* really need supporting
right this minute, since what I have now oughtn't to break the current
behaviour.
David
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> writes:
>> On Aug 10, 2018, at 7:05 AM, Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
>> address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
>> filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
>> pattern.
>>
>
>> /dev/loop0 /root/loop0-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
>> /dev/loop0 /root/loop0-acl-quota-user_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
>
> To make sure I understand correctly: the problem is that the second
> mount ignored the options because the device was already mounted,
> right?
Yes.
> For the new API, I think the only remotely sane approach is to refuse
> to mount or init or whatever you call it an already mounted bdev. If
> user code genuinely needs to bind-mount an existing mount that is
> known only by its bdev, we can add a specific API just for that.
Eric
Theodore Y. Ts'o <[email protected]> wrote:
> Even *with* file system support, there's no way today for the VFS to
> keep track of whether a pathname resolution came through one
> mountpoint or another, so I can't do something like this:
Ummm... Isn't that encoded in the vfsmount pointer in struct path?
However, the case folding stuff - is that a superblockism of a mountpointism?
> So if the file system has been mounted with one set of mount options,
> and you want to try to mount it with a conflicting set of mount
> options and you don't want it to silently ignore the mount options,
> the *only* thing we can today is to refuse the mount and return an
> error.
With fsopen() there is the option to have the filesystem and the LSM attempt
to compare the non-key[*] mount options and reject the attempt to share if
they differ in any way.
David
[*] sget lookup keys, that is.
On 8/10/2018 8:39 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 04:11:31PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>> Yes. Since you *absolutely* *insist* on this being fixed *right* *now* *or*
>> *else*, I'm working up a set of additional patches to give userspace the
>> option of whether they want no sharing; sharing, but only with exactly the
>> same parameters; or to ignore the parameter differences and just accept
>> sharing of what's already already mounted (ie. the current behaviour).
> But there's no way to support "no sharing", at least not in the
> general case. A file system can only be mounted once, and without
> file system support, there's no way for a file system to be mounted
> with the bsddf or minixdf mount simultaneously.
>
> Even *with* file system support, there's no way today for the VFS to
> keep track of whether a pathname resolution came through one
> mountpoint or another, so I can't do something like this:
>
> mount /dev/sdXX -o casefold /android-data
> mount /dev/sdXX -o nocasefold /android-data-2
>
> Which is a pity, since if we could we could much more easily get rid
> of the horror which is Android's wrapfs...
>
> So if the file system has been mounted with one set of mount options,
> and you want to try to mount it with a conflicting set of mount
> options and you don't want it to silently ignore the mount options,
> the *only* thing we can today is to refuse the mount and return an
> error.
>
> I'm not sure Eric would really consider that an improvement for the
> container use case....
>
> - Ted
>
> P.S. And as Al has pointed out, this would require special, per-file
> system support to determine whether the mount options are conflicting
> or not....
This extends to LSMs that support mount options (SELinux and Smack)
as well.
On 2018/08/10 23:05, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
> address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
> filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
> pattern.
>
> The script below demonstrates this bug. Showing this bug can cause the
> ext4 "acl" "quota" and "user_xattr" options to be silently ignored.
>
> fsopen has my nack until it addresses this issue.
>
> I don't know if we can fix this in the context of sys_mount. But we if
> we are redoing the option parsing of how we mount filesystems this needs
> to be fixed before we start worrying about bug compatibility.
>
> Hopefully this report is simple and clear enough that we can at least
> agree on the problem.
>
> Eric
This might be related to a problem that syzbot is failing to reproduce a problem.
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/syzkaller-bugs/R03vI7RCVco/0PijCTrcCgAJ
syzbot found a reproducer, and the reproducer was working until next-20180803.
But the reproducer is failing to reproduce this problem in next-20180806 despite
there is no mm related change between next-20180803 and next-20180806.
Therefore, I suspect that the reproducer is no longer working as intended. And
there was parser change (David Howells' patch) between next-20180803 and next-20180806.
I'm waiting for response from David Howells...
Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
> > P.S. And as Al has pointed out, this would require special, per-file
> > system support to determine whether the mount options are conflicting
> > or not....
>
> This extends to LSMs that support mount options (SELinux and Smack)
> as well.
Yes. I'm doing that.
David
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 04:53:58PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Theodore Y. Ts'o <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > Even *with* file system support, there's no way today for the VFS to
> > keep track of whether a pathname resolution came through one
> > mountpoint or another, so I can't do something like this:
>
> Ummm... Isn't that encoded in the vfsmount pointer in struct path?
Well, yes, and we do use this as a hack to make read-only bind mounts
work. But that's done as a special case, and it's for permissions
checking only.
The big problem is that there is single dentry cache object regardless
of which mount point was used to access it. So that makes it
impossible to support case folding as a mount-pointism.
>
> However, the case folding stuff - is that a superblockism of a mountpointism?
It's a superblock-ism. As far as I know the *only* thing that we can
support as a mount-pointism is the ro flag, and that's handled as a
special case, and only if the original superblock was mounted
read/write. ey That was my point; aside from the ro flag, we can't
support any other mount options as a per-mount point thing, so the
only thing we can do is to fail the mount if there are conflicting
mount options. And I'm not really sure it helps the container use
case, since the whole point is they want their "guest" to be able to
blithely run "mount /dev/sda1 -o noxattr /mnt" and not worry about the
fact that in some other container, someone had run "mount /dev/sda1 -o
xattr /mnt". But having the second mount fail because of conflicting
mount option breaks the illusion that containers are functionally as
rich as VM's.
So before you put in lots of work to support rejecting the attmpted
mount if the mount options conflict, are we sure people will actually
find this to be useful? Because it's not only fsopen() work for you,
but each file system is going to have to implement new functions to
answer the question "are these mount options conflicting or not?".
Are we sure it's worth the effort?
- Ted
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> wrote:
> > /dev/loop0 /root/loop0-noacl-noquota-nouser_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
> > /dev/loop0 /root/loop0-acl-quota-user_xattr ext4 rw,relatime,nouser_xattr,noacl 0 0
>
> To make sure I understand correctly: the problem is that the second mount
> ignored the options because the device was already mounted, right?
>
> For the new API, I think the only remotely sane approach is to refuse to
> mount or init or whatever you call it an already mounted bdev. If user code
> genuinely needs to bind-mount an existing mount that is known only by its
> bdev, we can add a specific API just for that.
I'm adding some flags to fsopen() to allow userspace to say whether it wants
no sharing, same parameters-only sharing or anything-goes sharing (as now).
I'm also adding a flag whereby userspace can forbid anyone else from sharing a
new superblock it has just set up.
David
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 04:11:31PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>
> Yes. Since you *absolutely* *insist* on this being fixed *right* *now* *or*
> *else*, I'm working up a set of additional patches to give userspace the
> option of whether they want no sharing; sharing, but only with exactly the
> same parameters; or to ignore the parameter differences and just accept
> sharing of what's already already mounted (ie. the current behaviour).
But there's no way to support "no sharing", at least not in the
general case. A file system can only be mounted once, and without
file system support, there's no way for a file system to be mounted
with the bsddf or minixdf mount simultaneously.
Even *with* file system support, there's no way today for the VFS to
keep track of whether a pathname resolution came through one
mountpoint or another, so I can't do something like this:
mount /dev/sdXX -o casefold /android-data
mount /dev/sdXX -o nocasefold /android-data-2
Which is a pity, since if we could we could much more easily get rid
of the horror which is Android's wrapfs...
So if the file system has been mounted with one set of mount options,
and you want to try to mount it with a conflicting set of mount
options and you don't want it to silently ignore the mount options,
the *only* thing we can today is to refuse the mount and return an
error.
I'm not sure Eric would really consider that an improvement for the
container use case....
- Ted
P.S. And as Al has pointed out, this would require special, per-file
system support to determine whether the mount options are conflicting
or not....
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <[email protected]> writes:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 04:11:31PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>>
>> Yes. Since you *absolutely* *insist* on this being fixed *right* *now* *or*
>> *else*, I'm working up a set of additional patches to give userspace the
>> option of whether they want no sharing; sharing, but only with exactly the
>> same parameters; or to ignore the parameter differences and just accept
>> sharing of what's already already mounted (ie. the current behaviour).
>
> But there's no way to support "no sharing", at least not in the
> general case. A file system can only be mounted once, and without
> file system support, there's no way for a file system to be mounted
> with the bsddf or minixdf mount simultaneously.
>
> Even *with* file system support, there's no way today for the VFS to
> keep track of whether a pathname resolution came through one
> mountpoint or another, so I can't do something like this:
>
> mount /dev/sdXX -o casefold /android-data
> mount /dev/sdXX -o nocasefold /android-data-2
>
> Which is a pity, since if we could we could much more easily get rid
> of the horror which is Android's wrapfs...
>
> So if the file system has been mounted with one set of mount options,
> and you want to try to mount it with a conflicting set of mount
> options and you don't want it to silently ignore the mount options,
> the *only* thing we can today is to refuse the mount and return an
> error.
>
> I'm not sure Eric would really consider that an improvement for the
> container use case....
I think I would consider it an improvement. I keep running into cases
where the mount options differed and something was done silently and
that causes problems.
Eric
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 9:14 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <[email protected]> wrote:
> And I'm not really sure it helps the container use
> case, since the whole point is they want their "guest" to be able to
> blithely run "mount /dev/sda1 -o noxattr /mnt" and not worry about the
> fact that in some other container, someone had run "mount /dev/sda1 -o
> xattr /mnt". But having the second mount fail because of conflicting
> mount option breaks the illusion that containers are functionally as
> rich as VM's.
If the same block device is visible, with rw access, in two different
containers, I don't see any anything good can happen. Sure, with the
current somewhat erratic semantics of mount(2), something kind of sort
of reasonable happens if they both mount it. But if one or both of
them try to use, say, tune2fs or fsck, it's not going to go well. And
a situation where they mount with different options and the result
depends on the order of the mounts is just plain bad.
I see four sane ways to deal with this:
1. Don't put the block device in the container at all. The container
manager mounts it.
2. Use seccomp or a similar mechanism to intercept and emulate the
mount request.
3. Teach the filesystem driver to do something sensible. This will
inherently be per-fs, and probably involves some serious magic or
allowing filesystem-specific vfsmount options.
4. Introduce a concept of a special kind of fake block device that
refers to an existing superblock, doesn't allow direct read or write,
and does the right thing when mounted. Not obviously worth the
effort.
It seems to me that the current approach mostly involves crossing our fingers.
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 01:06:54PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> If the same block device is visible, with rw access, in two different
> containers, I don't see any anything good can happen.
It's worse than that. I've fixed a lot of bugs which cause the kernel
to crash, and a few that might be levered into a privilege escalationh
attack, when you mount a maliciously corrupted file system using ext4.
I'm told told the security researcher filed similar reports with the
XFS community, and he was told, "that's what metadata checksums are
for; go away". Given how much time it takes to work with these
security researchers, I don't blame them.
But in light of that, I'd make a somewhat stronger statement. If you
let an untrusted container mount arbitrary block devices where they
have rw acccess to the underlying block device, nothing good can
happen. Period. :-)
Which is why I don't think the lack of being able to reject
"conflicting mount options" is really all that important. It
certainly shouldn't block the fsopen patch series. #1, it's a problem
we have today, and #2, I'm really not all sure supporting bind mounts
via specifying block device was ever a good idea to begin with. And
#3, while I've been fixing ext4 against security issues caused by
maliciously corrupted file system images, I'm still sure that allowing
untrusted containers access to mount *any* file system via a block
device for which they have r/w access is a Really Bad Idea.
> It seems to me that the current approach mostly involves crossing our fingers.
Agreed!
- Ted
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 04:46:39PM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 01:06:54PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > If the same block device is visible, with rw access, in two different
> > containers, I don't see any anything good can happen.
>
> It's worse than that. I've fixed a lot of bugs which cause the kernel
> to crash, and a few that might be levered into a privilege escalationh
> attack, when you mount a maliciously corrupted file system using ext4.
> I'm told told the security researcher filed similar reports with the
> XFS community, and he was told, "that's what metadata checksums are
> for; go away".
Hey now, there was a little more nuance to it than that[1][2]. The
complaint in the first instance had much more to do with breaking
existing V4 filesystems by adding format requirements that mkfs didn't
know about when the filesystem was created. Yes, you can create V4
filesystems that will hang the system if the log was totally unformatted
and metadata updates are made, but OTOH it's fairly obvious when that
happens, you have to be root to mount a disk filesystem, and we try to
avoid breaking existing users.
XFS developers have been and will continue to examine security problems
when they are brought to our attention and strengthen validation as
needed to minimize the risk of incorrect behaviors, but filesystems are
complex machines, complex machinery is risky, and we arbitrate some of
that risk by requiring administrators to elect to mount an XFS.
> Given how much time it takes to work with these security researchers,
> I don't blame them.
>
> But in light of that, I'd make a somewhat stronger statement. If you
> let an untrusted container mount arbitrary block devices where they
> have rw acccess to the underlying block device, nothing good can
> happen. Period. :-)
>
> Which is why I don't think the lack of being able to reject
> "conflicting mount options" is really all that important. It
> certainly shouldn't block the fsopen patch series. #1, it's a problem
> we have today, and #2, I'm really not all sure supporting bind mounts
> via specifying block device was ever a good idea to begin with. And
> #3, while I've been fixing ext4 against security issues caused by
> maliciously corrupted file system images, I'm still sure that allowing
> untrusted containers access to mount *any* file system via a block
> device for which they have r/w access is a Really Bad Idea.
>
> > It seems to me that the current approach mostly involves crossing our fingers.
>
> Agreed!
Crossing our fingers and demanding administrator intentionality when
mounting filesystems off some piece of storage.
--D
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/5/21/649
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/2/572
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 03:12:34PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> Hey now, there was a little more nuance to it than that[1][2]. The
> complaint in the first instance had much more to do with breaking
> existing V4 filesystems by adding format requirements that mkfs didn't
> know about when the filesystem was created. Yes, you can create V4
> filesystems that will hang the system if the log was totally unformatted
> and metadata updates are made, but OTOH it's fairly obvious when that
> happens, you have to be root to mount a disk filesystem, and we try to
> avoid breaking existing users.
I wasn't thinking about syzbot reports; I've largely written them off
as far as file system testing is concerned, but rather Wen Xu at
Georgia Tech, who is much more reasonable than Dmitry, and has helpeyd
me out a lot; and has complained that the XFS folks haven't been
engaging with him.
In either case, both security researchers are fuzzing file system
images, and then fixing the checksums, and discovering that this can
lead to kernel crashes, and in a few cases, buffer overruns that can
lead to potential privilege escalations. Wen can generate reports
faster than syzbot, but at least he gives me file system images (as
opposed to having to dig them out of syzbot repro C files) and he
actually does some analysis and explains what he thinks is going on.
I don't think anyone was claiming that format requirements should be
added to ext4 or xfs file systems. But rather, that kernel code
should be made more robust against maliciously corrupted file system
images that have valid checksums. I've been more willing to work with
Wen; Dave has expressed the opinion that these are not realistic bug
reports, and since only root can mount file systems, it's not high
priority.
The reason why I bring this up here is that in container land, there
are those who believe that "container root" should be able to mount
file systems, and if the "container root" isn't trusted, the fact that
the "container root" can crash the host kernel, or worse, corrupt the
host kernel and break out of the container as a result, that would be
sad.
I was pretty sure most file system developers are on the same page
that allowing untrusted "container roots" the ability to mount
arbitrary block device file systems is insanity. Whether or not we
try to fix these sorts of bugs submitted by security researchers. :-)
- Ted
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <[email protected]> writes:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 04:53:58PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>> Theodore Y. Ts'o <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> > Even *with* file system support, there's no way today for the VFS to
>> > keep track of whether a pathname resolution came through one
>> > mountpoint or another, so I can't do something like this:
>>
>> However, the case folding stuff - is that a superblockism of a mountpointism?
>
> It's a superblock-ism. As far as I know the *only* thing that we can
> support as a mount-pointism is the ro flag, and that's handled as a
> special case, and only if the original superblock was mounted
> read/write. ey That was my point; aside from the ro flag, we can't
> support any other mount options as a per-mount point thing, so the
> only thing we can do is to fail the mount if there are conflicting
> mount options. And I'm not really sure it helps the container use
> case, since the whole point is they want their "guest" to be able to
> blithely run "mount /dev/sda1 -o noxattr /mnt" and not worry about the
> fact that in some other container, someone had run "mount /dev/sda1 -o
> xattr /mnt". But having the second mount fail because of conflicting
> mount option breaks the illusion that containers are functionally as
> rich as VM's.
Ted this isn't about some container case.
It about the fact that practically every filesystem in the kernel has
the behavior I have described and it means that if root is not super
careful root will shoot himself in the foot with the shotgun we have
pointed there.
It really is about loosing acls or some other filesystem option.
Eric
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 07:54:47PM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 03:12:34PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > Hey now, there was a little more nuance to it than that[1][2]. The
> > complaint in the first instance had much more to do with breaking
> > existing V4 filesystems by adding format requirements that mkfs didn't
> > know about when the filesystem was created. Yes, you can create V4
> > filesystems that will hang the system if the log was totally unformatted
> > and metadata updates are made, but OTOH it's fairly obvious when that
> > happens, you have to be root to mount a disk filesystem, and we try to
> > avoid breaking existing users.
>
> I wasn't thinking about syzbot reports; I've largely written them off
> as far as file system testing is concerned, but rather Wen Xu at
> Georgia Tech, who is much more reasonable than Dmitry, and has helpeyd
> me out a lot; and has complained that the XFS folks haven't been
> engaging with him.
Ahh, ok. Yes, Wen has been easier to work with, and gives out
filesystem images. Hm, I'll go comb the bugzilla again...
> In either case, both security researchers are fuzzing file system
> images, and then fixing the checksums, and discovering that this can
> lead to kernel crashes, and in a few cases, buffer overruns that can
> lead to potential privilege escalations. Wen can generate reports
> faster than syzbot, but at least he gives me file system images (as
> opposed to having to dig them out of syzbot repro C files) and he
> actually does some analysis and explains what he thinks is going on.
(FWIW I tried to figure out how to add fs image dumping to syzbot and
whoah that was horrifying.
> I don't think anyone was claiming that format requirements should be
> added to ext4 or xfs file systems. But rather, that kernel code
> should be made more robust against maliciously corrupted file system
> images that have valid checksums. I've been more willing to work with
> Wen; Dave has expressed the opinion that these are not realistic bug
> reports, and since only root can mount file systems, it's not high
> priority.
I don't think they're high priority either, but they're at least worth
/some/ attention.
> The reason why I bring this up here is that in container land, there
> are those who believe that "container root" should be able to mount
> file systems, and if the "container root" isn't trusted, the fact that
> the "container root" can crash the host kernel, or worse, corrupt the
> host kernel and break out of the container as a result, that would be
> sad.
>
> I was pretty sure most file system developers are on the same page
> that allowing untrusted "container roots" the ability to mount
> arbitrary block device file systems is insanity.
Agreed.
> Whether or not we try to fix these sorts of bugs submitted by security
> researchers. :-)
and agreed. :)
--D
> - Ted
Al Viro <[email protected]> writes:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 09:05:22AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>
>> There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
>> address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
>> filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
>> pattern.
>>
>> The script below demonstrates this bug. Showing this bug can cause the
>> ext4 "acl" "quota" and "user_xattr" options to be silently ignored.
>>
>> fsopen has my nack until it addresses this issue.
>>
>> I don't know if we can fix this in the context of sys_mount. But we if
>> we are redoing the option parsing of how we mount filesystems this needs
>> to be fixed before we start worrying about bug compatibility.
>>
>> Hopefully this report is simple and clear enough that we can at least
>> agree on the problem.
>
> Sure, it is simple. So's the solution: MNT_USERNS_SPECIAL_SEMANTICS that
> would get passed to filesystems, so that Eric would be able to implement
> his mount(2)-incompatible behaviour at leisure, without worrying about
> compatibility issues.
>
> Does that address your complaint?
Absolutely not.
My complaint is that the current implemented behavior of practically
every filesystem in the kernel, is that it will ignore mount options
when mounted a second time.
It is not some weird special case.
It is not some container thing.
It is that the behavior of mount(2) with practically every filesystem
type when that filesystem is already mounted somewhere else behaves
in ways no one would expect.
With the new fsopen api the easy thing to do is simply have CMD_CREATE
CMD_BIND_INTERNAL and be done with it. CMD_CREATE guarantee that a new
superblock is created. CMD_BIND_INTERNAL would only work with an
existing superblock. Then root would at least know that he is
connecting to an already mounted filesystem and could look at the
options etc and fail if he didn't like what he saw. No surprises, no
muss, no fuss simple.
But I have been told the simple solution above is somehow unacceptable.
And an option to compare the mount options and see if they are the same
was offered. That would will work to.
I just care that we define the semantics in such a way that it is not
easy for root to get confused and do something stupid that will bite
later, and that we build the infrastructure so that all filesystems
can implement it easily.
So yes this is 100% a question about how filesystems should behave with
respect to their option when mounted for a second time. That is what
Dave Howells patchset is addressing.
> Because one thing we are not going to do is changing mount(2)
> behaviour.
I have not asked for that. I have asked that we get it right for
fsopen.
> Reason: userland-visible behaviour of hell knows how many local scripts.
> Another thing that
> is flat-out not feasible is some kind of blanket "compare options"
> stuff; it *can* be done as helpers to be used by filesystem when
> it sees that new flag, but it's simply not going to work at the
> fs-independent level.
>
> Trivial example with the same ext4:
> mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/a -o bsddf vs. mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/b
> ext4 can tell that these are the same. syscall itself has no
> clue. What's more, it's not just explicitly spelled default
> options - it's the stuff that has more than one form. And while
> we are at it, the things like two NFS mounts of different trees
> from the same server; they might or might not get the same superblock.
> Depending upon the options.
>
> Convenience helper that would allow ext4 to compare options and reject
> the incompatible mount? Not sure how much ext4-specific knowledge
> would have to go in it, but if you can come up with one - more power
> to you. But the decision to use it *must* be ext4-specific. Because
> for e.g. NFS such thing as -o fsid=..., while certainly a part of
> options, has a very different meaning - it's "use a separate fs instance"
> (and let the server deal with coherency issues on its end).
>
> Decision to use sget() (and the way it's used) is up to filesystem.
> We *can't* lift that into syscall. Not without breaking the fuck out
> of existing behaviour.
I have never proposed that. See above. I may have talked in terms
of what sget does and muddied the waters. If so I apologize.
All I proposed was that we distinguish between a first mount and an
additional mount so that userspace knows the options will be ignored.
Then the code to replicate the current behavior can look like:
fd = fsopen(...);
fsconfig(fd, ...);
fsconfig(fd, ...);
fsconfig(fd, ...);
fsconfig(fd, ...);
fsconfig(fd, ...);
fsconfig(fd, ...);
fsconfig(fd, ...);
if (fsconfig(fd, CMD_CREATE) == -EBUSY) {
fsconfig(fd, CMD_BIND_INTERNAL);
}
But userspace would then be free to issue a warning or do something
else if CMD_CREATE returns -EBUSY.
I don't know how the above wound up being construed as asking that the
code call sget directly but that is what has happened.
> Having something like a second callback for mount_bdev() that would
> be called when we'd found an existing instance for the same block
> device? Sure, no problem. Having a helper for doing such comparison
> that would work in enough cases to bother, so that different fs
> could avoid boilerplate in that callback? Again, more power to you.
Normal forms etc. If we want to do that it just requires a wee bit of
discipline. And if all of the option parsing is being rewritten and
retested anyway I don't see why we can't do something like that as well.
So it does not sound unreasonable to me.
It does sound like more work than what I was proposing.
Eric
David Howells <[email protected]> writes:
> Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> There is a serious problem with mount options today that fsopen does not
>> address. The problem is that mount options are ignored for block based
>> filesystems, and any other type of filesystem that follows the same
>> pattern.
>
> Yes. Since you *absolutely* *insist* on this being fixed *right* *now* *or*
> *else*, I'm working up a set of additional patches to give userspace the
> option of whether they want no sharing; sharing, but only with exactly the
> same parameters; or to ignore the parameter differences and just accept
> sharing of what's already already mounted (ie. the current behaviour).
>
> The second option, however, is not trivial as it needs to compare the fs
> contexts, including the LSM parameters. To make that work, I really need to
> remove the old security_mnt_opts stuff - which means I need to port btrfs to
> the new context stuff.
>
> We discussed this yesterday, and I proposed a solution, and I'm working on it.
I repeated this because after some comments from Al on IRC yesterday
and Miklos's email replay. It appeared clear that I had not specified
why my issue was clearly enough for people reading the thread to
understand the problem that I see.
> Yes, I agree it would be nice to have, but it *doesn't* really need supporting
> right this minute, since what I have now oughtn't to break the current
> behaviour.
I am really reluctant to endorse anything that propagates the issues of
the current interface in the new mount interface.
Eric
"Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]> writes:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 07:54:47PM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
>> The reason why I bring this up here is that in container land, there
>> are those who believe that "container root" should be able to mount
>> file systems, and if the "container root" isn't trusted, the fact that
>> the "container root" can crash the host kernel, or worse, corrupt the
>> host kernel and break out of the container as a result, that would be
>> sad.
>>
>> I was pretty sure most file system developers are on the same page
>> that allowing untrusted "container roots" the ability to mount
>> arbitrary block device file systems is insanity.
>
> Agreed.
For me I am happy with fuse. That is sufficient to cover any container
use cases people have. If anyone comes bugging you for more I will be
happy to push back.
The only thing that containers have to do with this is I wind up
touching a lot of the kernel/user boundary so I get to see a lot of it
and sometimes see weird things.
Eric
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 08:05:44PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> My complaint is that the current implemented behavior of practically
> every filesystem in the kernel, is that it will ignore mount options
> when mounted a second time.
The file system is ***not*** mounted a second time.
The design bug is that we allow bind mounts to be specified via a
block device. A bind mount is not "a second mount" of the file
system. Bind mounts != mounts.
I had assumed we had allowed bind mounts to be specified via the block
device because of container use cases. If the container folks don't
want it, I would be pushing to simply not allow bind mounts to be
specified via block device at all.
The only reason why we should support it is because we don't want to
break scripts; and if the goal is not to break scripts, then we have
to keep to the current semantics, however broken you think it is.
- Ted
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 08:05:44PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> All I proposed was that we distinguish between a first mount and an
> additional mount so that userspace knows the options will be ignored.
For pity sake, just what does it take to explain to you that your
notions of "first mount" and "additional mount" ARE HEAVILY FS-DEPENDENT
and may depend upon the pieces of state userland (especially in container)
simply does not have?
One more time, slowly:
mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/foo/bar /mnt/a
mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/baz/barf /mnt/b
yield the same superblock. Is anyone who mounts something over NFS
required to know if anybody else has mounted something from the same
server, and if so how the hell are they supposed to find that out,
so that they could decide whether they are creating the "first" or
"additional" mount, whatever that might mean in this situation?
And how, kernel-side, is that supposed to be handled by generic code
of any description?
While we are at it,
mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/foo/bar -o wsize=16384 /mnt/c
is *NOT* the same superblock as the previous two.
> I don't know how the above wound up being construed as asking that the
> code call sget directly but that is what has happened.
Not by me. What I'm saying is that the entire superblock-creating
machinery - all of it - is nothing but library helpers. With the
decision of when/how/if they are to be used being down to filesystem
driver. Your "first mount"/"additional mount" simply do not map
to anything universally applicable.
> > Having something like a second callback for mount_bdev() that would
> > be called when we'd found an existing instance for the same block
> > device? Sure, no problem. Having a helper for doing such comparison
> > that would work in enough cases to bother, so that different fs
> > could avoid boilerplate in that callback? Again, more power to you.
>
> Normal forms etc. If we want to do that it just requires a wee bit of
> discipline. And if all of the option parsing is being rewritten and
> retested anyway I don't see why we can't do something like that as well.
> So it does not sound unreasonable to me.
See above.
On Sat, Aug 11, 2018 at 02:58:15AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 08:05:44PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> > All I proposed was that we distinguish between a first mount and an
> > additional mount so that userspace knows the options will be ignored.
>
> For pity sake, just what does it take to explain to you that your
> notions of "first mount" and "additional mount" ARE HEAVILY FS-DEPENDENT
> and may depend upon the pieces of state userland (especially in container)
> simply does not have?
>
> One more time, slowly:
>
> mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/foo/bar /mnt/a
> mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/baz/barf /mnt/b
>
> yield the same superblock. Is anyone who mounts something over NFS
> required to know if anybody else has mounted something from the same
> server, and if so how the hell are they supposed to find that out,
> so that they could decide whether they are creating the "first" or
> "additional" mount, whatever that might mean in this situation?
>
> And how, kernel-side, is that supposed to be handled by generic code
> of any description?
>
> While we are at it,
> mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/foo/bar -o wsize=16384 /mnt/c
> is *NOT* the same superblock as the previous two.
s/as the previous two/as in the previous two cases/, that is - the first two
examples yield one superblock, this one - another.
Al Viro <[email protected]> writes:
> On Sat, Aug 11, 2018 at 02:58:15AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
>> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 08:05:44PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>
>> > All I proposed was that we distinguish between a first mount and an
>> > additional mount so that userspace knows the options will be ignored.
>>
>> For pity sake, just what does it take to explain to you that your
>> notions of "first mount" and "additional mount" ARE HEAVILY FS-DEPENDENT
>> and may depend upon the pieces of state userland (especially in container)
>> simply does not have?
>>
>> One more time, slowly:
>>
>> mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/foo/bar /mnt/a
>> mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/baz/barf /mnt/b
>>
>> yield the same superblock. Is anyone who mounts something over NFS
>> required to know if anybody else has mounted something from the same
>> server, and if so how the hell are they supposed to find that out,
>> so that they could decide whether they are creating the "first" or
>> "additional" mount, whatever that might mean in this situation?
>>
>> And how, kernel-side, is that supposed to be handled by generic code
>> of any description?
>>
>> While we are at it,
>> mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/foo/bar -o wsize=16384 /mnt/c
>> is *NOT* the same superblock as the previous two.
>
> s/as the previous two/as in the previous two cases/, that is - the first two
> examples yield one superblock, this one - another.
Exactly because the mount options differ.
I don't have a problem if we have something sophisticated like nfs that
handles all of the hairy details and does not reuse a superblock unless the
mount options match.
What I have a problem with is the helper for ordinary filesystems that
are not as sophisticated as nfs that don't handle all of the option
magic and give userspace something different from what userspace asked
for.
It may take a little generalization of the definitions I proposed but it
still remains simple and straight forward.
CMD_THESE_MOUNT_OPTIONS_NO_SURPRISES
CMD_WHATEVER_ALREADY_EXISTS
Or we can make the filesystems more sophisticated when we move
them to the new API and perform the comparisons there. I think
that is what David Howells is working on.
Eric
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <[email protected]> writes:
> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 08:05:44PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>
>> My complaint is that the current implemented behavior of practically
>> every filesystem in the kernel, is that it will ignore mount options
>> when mounted a second time.
>
> The file system is ***not*** mounted a second time.
>
> The design bug is that we allow bind mounts to be specified via a
> block device. A bind mount is not "a second mount" of the file
> system. Bind mounts != mounts.
>
> I had assumed we had allowed bind mounts to be specified via the block
> device because of container use cases. If the container folks don't
> want it, I would be pushing to simply not allow bind mounts to be
> specified via block device at all.
No it is not a container thing.
> The only reason why we should support it is because we don't want to
> break scripts; and if the goal is not to break scripts, then we have
> to keep to the current semantics, however broken you think it is.
But we don't have to support returning filesystems with mismatched mount
options in the new fsopen api. That is my concern. Confusing
userspace this way has been shown to be harmful let's not keep doing it.
Eric
Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Yes, I agree it would be nice to have, but it *doesn't* really need
> > supporting right this minute, since what I have now oughtn't to break the
> > current behaviour.
>
> I am really reluctant to endorse anything that propagates the issues of
> the current interface in the new mount interface.
Do realise that your problem cannot be solved through fsopen() until every
filesystem is converted to the new fs_context-based sget() since the flag has
to make it from the VFS through the filesystem to sget().
I'm reluctant to add this flag till that point until that time unless we error
out if the flag is set against a legacy filesystem.
David
> On Aug 11, 2018, at 12:29 AM, David Howells <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>> Yes, I agree it would be nice to have, but it *doesn't* really need
>>> supporting right this minute, since what I have now oughtn't to break the
>>> current behaviour.
>>
>> I am really reluctant to endorse anything that propagates the issues of
>> the current interface in the new mount interface.
>
> Do realise that your problem cannot be solved through fsopen() until every
> filesystem is converted to the new fs_context-based sget() since the flag has
> to make it from the VFS through the filesystem to sget().
>
> I'm reluctant to add this flag till that point until that time unless we error
> out if the flag is set against a legacy filesystem.
>
>
I don’t see why we need all this fancy “do the options match” stuff. For the handful of filesystems (like NFS) that do something intelligent when multiple non-bind mount requests against the same underlying storage happen, we can keep that behavior in the new API. For other filesystems that don’t have this feature, we should simply fail the request.
IOW I see so compelling reason to call sget() at all from the new API. The only sort-of-legit use case I can think of is mounting more than one btrfs subvolume. But even that should probably not be done by asking the kernel to separately instantiate the filesystem.
As another way of looking at it: for a network filesystem, mounting the same target ip and path from two different Linux machines works, so mounting it twice from the same machine should also work. But mounting the same underlying ext4 block device from two different Linux machines (using nbd, iscsi, etc) would be a catastrophe, so I see no reason that it needs to be supported if it’s two mounts from one machine.
The case folding example is interesting, and I think it should probably have a slightly different API. A program could open_tree a nocasefold mount and then make a request to create what is functionally a bind mount but with different options.
mount(8) will presumably just keep using mount(2).
On 8/10/2018 9:48 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <[email protected]> writes:
>
>> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 08:05:44PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> My complaint is that the current implemented behavior of practically
>>> every filesystem in the kernel, is that it will ignore mount options
>>> when mounted a second time.
>> The file system is ***not*** mounted a second time.
>>
>> The design bug is that we allow bind mounts to be specified via a
>> block device. A bind mount is not "a second mount" of the file
>> system. Bind mounts != mounts.
>>
>> I had assumed we had allowed bind mounts to be specified via the block
>> device because of container use cases. If the container folks don't
>> want it, I would be pushing to simply not allow bind mounts to be
>> specified via block device at all.
> No it is not a container thing.
Inigo: "Hello. My name is Inigo Montoya. You killed my father. Prepare to die."
Rugen: "Stop saying that!"
Eric: "It is not a container thing."
Casey: "Stop saying that!"
Yes, Virginia, it *is* a container thing. Your container manager expects all
filesystems to be server-client based. It makes bad assumptions. It is doing
things that we would fire a sysadmin for doing. Don't blame the filesystems
for behaving as documented. Export the filesystem using NFS and mount them
using the NFS mechanism, which is designed to do what you're asking for. The
problem is not in the mount mechanism, it's in the way you want to abuse it.
>> The only reason why we should support it is because we don't want to
>> break scripts; and if the goal is not to break scripts, then we have
>> to keep to the current semantics, however broken you think it is.
> But we don't have to support returning filesystems with mismatched mount
> options in the new fsopen api. That is my concern. Confusing
> userspace this way has been shown to be harmful let's not keep doing it.
It's not "userspace" that's confused. Developers of userspace code
implementing system behavior (e.g. systemd, container managers) need to
understand how the system works. The container manager needs to know
that it can't mount filesystems with different options. That's the kind
of thing "managers" do. If it has to go to the mount table and check
on how the device is already mounted before doing a mount, so be it.
Unless, of course, you want the concept of "container" introduced into
the kernel. There's a whole lot of feldercarb that container managers
have to deal with that would be lots easier to deal with down below.
I'm not advocating that, and I understand the arguments against it.
On the other hand, if you want a platform that is optimized for a
container environment ...
> Eric
Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> wrote:
> You can determine at fsopen() time whether the filesystem is able to
> support the O_EXCL behavior? If so, then it's trivial to enable this
> conditionally. I think that's what Eric is asking for, it's obviously
> not fair to ask for a change in behavior of the legacy interface.
It's not trivial, see btrfs and nfs :-/
David
On Sat, Aug 11, 2018 at 09:31:29AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I don’t see why we need all this fancy “do the options match” stuff. For the handful of filesystems (like NFS) that do something intelligent when multiple non-bind mount requests against the same underlying storage happen, we can keep that behavior in the new API. For other filesystems that don’t have this feature, we should simply fail the request.
> IOW I see so compelling reason to call sget() at all from the new API. The only sort-of-legit use case I can think of is mounting more than one btrfs subvolume. But even that should probably not be done by asking the kernel to separately instantiate the filesystem.
May I politely suggest the esteemed participants of that conversation
to RTFS? Yes, I know that it's less fun that talking about your
rather vague ideas of how the things (surely) work, but it just might
avoid the feats of idiocy like the above.
Andy, I don't know how to put it more plainly: read the fucking source.
Even grep would do. The same NFS you've granted (among the "handful"
of filesystems) an exception, *DOES* *CALL* *THE* *FUCKING* sget().
Yes, really. And in some obscure[1] cases (including the one mentioned
upthread) it does reuse a pre-existing superblock. For a very good
reason.
[1] such as, oh, mounting two filesystems from the same server with
default options - who would've ever thought of doing something so
perverted?
On Sat, Aug 11, 2018 at 1:20 PM, David Howells <[email protected]> wrote:
> Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> You can determine at fsopen() time whether the filesystem is able to
>> support the O_EXCL behavior? If so, then it's trivial to enable this
>> conditionally. I think that's what Eric is asking for, it's obviously
>> not fair to ask for a change in behavior of the legacy interface.
>
> It's not trivial, see btrfs and nfs :-/
>
I'm not convinced that btrfs and nfs are the same situation. As far
as I can tell, in NFS's case, NFS shares superblocks as an
implementation detail. With Al's example, someone can do:
mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/foo/bar /mnt/a
mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/baz/barf /mnt/b
mount -t nfs4 wank.example.org:/foo/bar -o wsize=16384 /mnt/c
or equivalently create three fscontexts and FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE all of
them, and the kernel creates one superblock for /mnt/a and /mnt/b and
a second one for /mnt/c. That seems like a good optimization, but I
think it really is just an optimization. In any sane implementation,
all three calls should succeed, and it should in general be possible
to create as many totally fresh mounts of the same network file system
as anyone wants.
Given this example, I think that it may be important to give
FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE a very clear definition, and possibly a
definition that doesn't use the word superblock. After all, if
someone does FSCONFIG_CMD_RECONFIGURE on /mnt/a, if it really
reconfigures a *superblock*, then it will change /mnt/b as a side
effect but will not change /mnt/c. This seems like a mistake.
But I think that btrfs is quite a bit different. With btrfs, I can do:
mount -t btrfs /dev/sda1 -o subvol=a /mnt/a
mount -t btrfs /dev/sda1 -o subvol=b /mnt/b
and I get two mounts, each pointing at a different subvolume, that
(I'm pretty sure) share a superblock
mount -t btrfs /dev/sda1 -o subvol=c,foo=bar /mnt/c
where foo is a per-superblock option, it probably gets ignored. If I
set up /dev/mapper/foo as a linear alias for /dev/sda1 and I do:
mount -t btrfs /dev/mapper/foo -o subvol=d /mnt/d
then I get a fresh superblock. If /dev/sda1 is still mounted and the
various O_EXCL-like checks don'e catch it, then I get massive
corruption.
The btrfs case seems quite fragile to me, and it seems like a bit of
an abuse of mount(2). (Of course, basically everything anyone does
with mount(2) is a bit of an abuse.)
I would hope that the new fs mounting API would clean this up. The
NFS case seems just fine, but for btrfs, it seems like maybe the whole
CMD_CREATE operation should be more fine grained. There seem to be
*two* actions going on in a btrfs mount. First there's the act of
instantiating the filesystem driver backed by the device (I think this
is open_ctree()), and *then* there's the act of instantiating a dentry
tree pointing at some subvolume, etc.
ZFS seems to handle this quite nicely. First you fire up a zpool, and
then you start mounting its volumes.
On Sat, Aug 11, 2018 at 3:58 AM, Al Viro <[email protected]> wrote:
> What I'm saying is that the entire superblock-creating
> machinery - all of it - is nothing but library helpers. With the
> decision of when/how/if they are to be used being down to filesystem
> driver. Your "first mount"/"additional mount" simply do not map
> to anything universally applicable.
Why so? (Note: using the "mount" terminology here is fundamentally
broken to start with, mounts have nothing to do with this...
Filesystem instance is better word.)
You bring up NFS as an example, but creating and/or reusing an nfs
client instance connected to a certain server is certainly a clear and
well defined concept.
The question becomes: does it make sense to generalize this concept
and export it to userspace with the new API?
You know the Plan 9 fs interface much better, but to me it looks like
there's a separate namespace for filesystem instances, and the mount
command just refers to such an instance. So there's no comparing of
options or any such horror, just the need to explicitly instantiate a
new instance when necessary. Doesn't sound very difficult to
implement in the new API.
Thanks,
Miklos
On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 9:35 AM, Alan Cox <[email protected]> wrote:
>> If the same block device is visible, with rw access, in two different
>> containers, I don't see any anything good can happen. Sure, with the
>
> At the raw level there are lots of use cases involving high performance
> data capture, media streaming and the like.
>
> At the file system layer you can use GFS2 for example.
Ugh. I even thought of this case, and I should have been a bit more precise:
I would consider the GFS2 case to be essentially equivalent to the NFS
case. I think we can probably divide all the filesystems into three
or four types:
pseudo file systems: Multiple instantiations of the same fs driver
pointing at the same backing store give separate filesystems. (Same
backing store includes the case where there isn't any backing store.)
tmpfs is an example. This isn't particularly interesting.
network-like file systems: Multiple instantiations of the same fs
driver pointing at the same backing store are expected. This includes
NFS, GFS2, AFS, CIFS, etc. This is only really interesting to the
extent that, if the fs driver internally wants to share state between
multiple instantiations, it should be smart enough to make sure the
options are compatible or that it can otherwise handle mismatched
options correctly. NFS does this right.
non-network-like filesystems: There are complicated ones like btrfs
and ZFS and simple ones like ext4. In either case, multiple totally
separate instantiations of the driver sharing the backing store will
lead to corruption. In cases like ext4, we seem to support it for
legacy reasons, because we're afraid that there are scripts that try
to mount the same block device more than once, and I think the new API
has no need to support this. In cases like btrfs, we also seem to
support multiple user requests for "mounts" with the same underlying
block devices because we need it for full functionality. But I think
this is because our API is wrong.
Are there cases I'm missing? It sounds like the API could be improved
to fully model the last case, and everything will work nicely.
> If the same block device is visible, with rw access, in two different
> containers, I don't see any anything good can happen. Sure, with the
At the raw level there are lots of use cases involving high performance
data capture, media streaming and the like.
At the file system layer you can use GFS2 for example.
So there are cases where it's possible. There are even cases where it's
actually useful at the filesystem level although not many I agree.
Alan
On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 09:48:53AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I would consider the GFS2 case to be essentially equivalent to the NFS
> case. I think we can probably divide all the filesystems into three
> or four types:
>
> pseudo file systems: Multiple instantiations of the same fs driver
> pointing at the same backing store give separate filesystems. (Same
> backing store includes the case where there isn't any backing store.)
> tmpfs is an example. This isn't particularly interesting.
>
> network-like file systems: Multiple instantiations of the same fs
> driver pointing at the same backing store are expected. This includes
> NFS, GFS2, AFS, CIFS, etc. This is only really interesting to the
> extent that, if the fs driver internally wants to share state between
> multiple instantiations, it should be smart enough to make sure the
> options are compatible or that it can otherwise handle mismatched
> options correctly. NFS does this right.
>
> non-network-like filesystems: There are complicated ones like btrfs
> and ZFS and simple ones like ext4. In either case, multiple totally
> separate instantiations of the driver sharing the backing store will
> lead to corruption. In cases like ext4, we seem to support it for
> legacy reasons, because we're afraid that there are scripts that try
> to mount the same block device more than once, and I think the new API
> has no need to support this. In cases like btrfs, we also seem to
> support multiple user requests for "mounts" with the same underlying
> block devices because we need it for full functionality. But I think
> this is because our API is wrong.
>
> Are there cases I'm missing? It sounds like the API could be improved
> to fully model the last case, and everything will work nicely.
You know, that's starting to remind of this little gem of Borges:
http://www.alamut.com/subj/artiface/language/johnWilkins.html
Especially the delightful (fake) quote contained in there:
[...] it is written that the animals are divided into:
(a) belonging to the emperor,
(b) embalmed,
(c) tame,
(d) sucking pigs,
(e) sirens,
(f) fabulous,
(g) stray dogs,
(h) included in the present classification,
(i) frenzied,
(j) innumerable,
(k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,
(l) et cetera,
(m) having just broken the water pitcher,
(n) that from a long way off look like flies.
On Mon, 13 Aug 2018, Al Viro wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 09:48:53AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > Are there cases I'm missing? It sounds like the API could be improved
> > to fully model the last case, and everything will work nicely.
>
> You know, that's starting to remind of this little gem of Borges:
> http://www.alamut.com/subj/artiface/language/johnWilkins.html
> Especially the delightful (fake) quote contained in there:
> [...] it is written that the animals are divided into:
> (a) belonging to the emperor,
> (b) embalmed,
> (c) tame,
> (d) sucking pigs,
> (e) sirens,
> (f) fabulous,
> (g) stray dogs,
> (h) included in the present classification,
> (i) frenzied,
> (j) innumerable,
> (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,
> (l) et cetera,
> (m) having just broken the water pitcher,
> (n) that from a long way off look like flies.
Coincidentally, this was also the model for Linux capabilities.
--
James Morris
<[email protected]>
On 8/13/2018 12:00 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Mon, 13 Aug 2018, Al Viro wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 09:48:53AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> Are there cases I'm missing? It sounds like the API could be improved
>>> to fully model the last case, and everything will work nicely.
>> You know, that's starting to remind of this little gem of Borges:
>> http://www.alamut.com/subj/artiface/language/johnWilkins.html
>> Especially the delightful (fake) quote contained in there:
>> [...] it is written that the animals are divided into:
>> (a) belonging to the emperor,
>> (b) embalmed,
>> (c) tame,
>> (d) sucking pigs,
>> (e) sirens,
>> (f) fabulous,
>> (g) stray dogs,
>> (h) included in the present classification,
>> (i) frenzied,
>> (j) innumerable,
>> (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,
>> (l) et cetera,
>> (m) having just broken the water pitcher,
>> (n) that from a long way off look like flies.
>
> Coincidentally, this was also the model for Linux capabilities.
Linux capabilities are POSIX capabilities which are modeled closely
to accommodate the historical behavior manifest in the P1003.1 specification.
So except for (c), (f) and (k) you can use this characterization.
On a slightly more serious note, there's a lot of Linux, mount semantics
included, that have grow organically and that aren't quite up to the
usage models they are being applied to. I applaud David's work in part
because it may make it possible to accommodate more of those cases going
forward.
Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> writes:
> Don't blame the filesystems for behaving as documented.
No. This behavior is not documented. At least I certainly don't see a
word about this in any of the man pages. Where does it say mounting a
filesystem will not honor it's mount options?
It is also rare enough in practice it is something it is reasonable to
expect people to be surprised by.
> The problem is not in the mount mechanism, it's in the way you want to
> abuse it.
I am not asking for this behavior. I am pointing out this behavior
exists. I am pointing out this behavior is harmful. I am asking we
stop doing this harmful thing in the new API where we don't have a
chance of breaking anything.
The place where this has bitten the hardest is someone wrote a script to
do something for Xen in a chroot. That script involved a chroot that
mounted devpts and in doing so happend to change the options of the main
/dev/pts. Which resulted in ptys created with /dev/ptmx outside the
chroot with the wrong permissions. That in turn caused several distros
to retain the ancient suid pt_chown binary from libc that the devpts
filesystem was built to make obsolete. As the world turned that
pt_chown binary could be confused into chowning the wrong pty if a pty
from a container was used.
The fix was to mount a new instance of devpts every time mount of devpts
is called. That simplified the code, and allowed pt_chown to be removed
permanently. The tricky bit was figuring out how keep /dev/ptmx
working. I wound up testing on every distribution I could think of to
ensure no one would notice the slightly changed behavior of the devpts
filesystem.
The behavior in other filesystems of ignoring the options instead of
changing them on the filesystem isn't quite as bad. But it still has
the potential for a lot of mischief.
Eric
Having just re-ported NFS on top of the new mount API stuff, I find that I
don't really like the idea of superblocks being separated by communication
parameters - especially when it might seem reasonable to be able to adjust
those parameters.
Does it make sense to abstract out the remote peer and allow (a) that to be
configured separately from any superblocks using it and (b) that to be used to
create superblocks?
Note that what a 'remote peer' is would be different for different
filesystems:
(*) For NFS, it would probably be a named server, with address(es) attached
to the name. In lieu of actually having a name, the initial IP address
could be used.
(*) For CIFS, it would probably be a named server. I'm not sure if CIFS
allows an abstraction for a share that can move about inside a domain.
(*) For AFS, it would be a cell, I think, where the actual fileserver(s) used
are a matter of direction from the Volume Location server.
(*) For 9P and Ceph, I don't really know.
What could be configured? Well, addresses, ports, timeouts. Maybe protocol
level negotiation - though not being able to explicitly specify, say, the
particular version and minorversion on an NFS share would be problematic for
backward compatibility.
One advantage it could give us is that it might make it easier if someone asks
for server X to query userspace in some way for the default parameters for X
are.
What might this look like in terms of userspace? Well, we could overload the
new mount API:
peer1 = fsopen("nfs", FSOPEN_CREATE_PEER);
fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_NS, "net", NULL, netns_fd);
fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "peer_name", "server.home");
fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "vers", "4.2");
fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "address", "tcp:192.168.1.1");
fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "address", "tcp:192.168.1.2");
fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "timeo", "122");
fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_CMD_SET_UP_PEER, NULL, NULL, 0);
peer2 = fsopen("nfs", FSOPEN_CREATE_PEER);
fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_NS, "net", NULL, netns_fd);
fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "peer_name", "server2.home");
fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "vers", "3");
fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "address", "tcp:192.168.1.3");
fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "address", "udp:192.168.1.4+6001");
fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_CMD_SET_UP_PEER, NULL, NULL, 0);
fs = fsopen("nfs", 0);
fsconfig(fs, FSCONFIG_SET_PEER, "peer.1", NULL, peer1);
fsconfig(fs, FSCONFIG_SET_PEER, "peer.2", NULL, peer2);
fsconfig(fs, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "source", "/home/dhowells", 0);
m = fsmount(fs, 0, 0);
[Note that Eric's oft-repeated point about the 'creation' operation altering
established parameters still stands here.]
You could also then reopen it for configuration, maybe by:
peer = fspick(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", FSPICK_PEER);
or:
peer = fspick(AT_FDCWD, "nfs:server.home", FSPICK_PEER_BY_NAME);
though it might be better to give it its own syscall:
peer = fspeer("nfs", "server.home", O_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(peer, FSCONFIG_SET_NS, "net", NULL, netns_fd);
...
fsconfig(peer, FSCONFIG_CMD_SET_UP_PEER, NULL, NULL, 0);
In terms of alternative interfaces, I'm not sure how easy it would be to make
it like cgroups where you go and create a dir in a special filesystem, say,
"/sys/peers/nfs", because the peers records and names would have to be network
namespaced. Also, it might make it more difficult to use to create a root fs.
On the other hand, being able to adjust the peer configuration by:
echo 71 >/sys/peers/nfs/server.home/timeo
does have a certain appeal.
Also, netlink might be the right option, but I'm not sure how you'd pin the
resultant object whilst you make use of it.
A further thought is that is it worth making this idea more general and
encompassing non-network devices also? This would run into issues of some
logical sources being visible across namespaces and but not others.
David
> On Aug 15, 2018, at 9:31 AM, David Howells <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Having just re-ported NFS on top of the new mount API stuff, I find that I
> don't really like the idea of superblocks being separated by communication
> parameters - especially when it might seem reasonable to be able to adjust
> those parameters.
>
> Does it make sense to abstract out the remote peer and allow (a) that to be
> configured separately from any superblocks using it and (b) that to be used to
> create superblocks?
>
> Note that what a 'remote peer' is would be different for different
> filesystems:
...
I think this looks rather nice. But maybe you should generalize the concept of “peer” so that it works for btrfs too. In the case where you mount two different subvolumes, you’re creating a *something*, and you’re then creating a filesystem that references it. It’s almost the same thing.
>
>
>
> fs = fsopen("nfs", 0);
> fsconfig(fs, FSCONFIG_SET_PEER, "peer.1", NULL, peer1);
As you mention below, this seems like it might have namespacing issues.
>
> In terms of alternative interfaces, I'm not sure how easy it would be to make
> it like cgroups where you go and create a dir in a special filesystem, say,
> "/sys/peers/nfs", because the peers records and names would have to be network
> namespaced. Also, it might make it more difficult to use to create a root fs.
>
> On the other hand, being able to adjust the peer configuration by:
>
> echo 71 >/sys/peers/nfs/server.home/timeo
>
> does have a certain appeal.
>
> Also, netlink might be the right option, but I'm not sure how you'd pin the
> resultant object whilst you make use of it.
>
My suggestion would be to avoid giving these things names at all. I think that referring to them by fd should be sufficient, especially if you allow them to be reopened based on a mount that uses them and allow them to get bind-mounted somewhere a la namespaces to make them permanent if needed.
> A further thought is that is it worth making this idea more general and
> encompassing non-network devices also? This would run into issues of some
> logical sources being visible across namespaces and but not others.
Indeed :)
It probably pays to rope a btrfs person into this discussion.
Quoting James Morris ([email protected]):
> On Mon, 13 Aug 2018, Al Viro wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 09:48:53AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> > > Are there cases I'm missing? It sounds like the API could be improved
> > > to fully model the last case, and everything will work nicely.
> >
> > You know, that's starting to remind of this little gem of Borges:
> > http://www.alamut.com/subj/artiface/language/johnWilkins.html
> > Especially the delightful (fake) quote contained in there:
> > [...] it is written that the animals are divided into:
> > (a) belonging to the emperor,
> > (b) embalmed,
> > (c) tame,
> > (d) sucking pigs,
> > (e) sirens,
> > (f) fabulous,
> > (g) stray dogs,
> > (h) included in the present classification,
> > (i) frenzied,
> > (j) innumerable,
> > (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,
> > (l) et cetera,
> > (m) having just broken the water pitcher,
> > (n) that from a long way off look like flies.
>
>
> Coincidentally, this was also the model for Linux capabilities.
But maybe we want to split the stray dogs up by breed.
This is worth further detailed discussion re:SMB3 as there are some fascinating
protocol features that might help here, but my first thought is just the obvious
one - this could help 'DFS' (the global name space feature almost all modern
CIFS/SMB3 implement) work a little better in the client. A share can
be represented by an array of \\server\share\path targets although typically
only one except in the DFS case (and server can be an ipv4 or
ipv6 address or host name (which could have multiple addresses).
It could be over RDMA, TCP, and even other protocols (as the transport).
There are various examples of DFS referrals in
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc227066.aspx section 4.
But since SMB3 also supports transparent failover, and "share move"
and "server move" features, as well as multichannel - I would like
to better understand the patch set to see if it helps/hurts.
But until I dive into the patch set more and try it, hard for me to speculate.
Has anyone looked at the CIFS/SMB3 changes needed?
On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 11:32 AM David Howells <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Having just re-ported NFS on top of the new mount API stuff, I find that I
> don't really like the idea of superblocks being separated by communication
> parameters - especially when it might seem reasonable to be able to adjust
> those parameters.
>
> Does it make sense to abstract out the remote peer and allow (a) that to be
> configured separately from any superblocks using it and (b) that to be used to
> create superblocks?
>
> Note that what a 'remote peer' is would be different for different
> filesystems:
>
> (*) For NFS, it would probably be a named server, with address(es) attached
> to the name. In lieu of actually having a name, the initial IP address
> could be used.
>
> (*) For CIFS, it would probably be a named server. I'm not sure if CIFS
> allows an abstraction for a share that can move about inside a domain.
CIFS/SMB3 has fairly mature support (in the protocol) for various types
of share redirection (not just 'DFS' that is supported by most every
NAS server, and Macs, Windows, Linux clients etc). There are also
very interesting features introduced with SMB 3.1.1 allowing 'tree
connect contexts"
which some important servers in the last few years implement.
This is worth more discussion - SMB3 (in particular the SMB3.1.1 dialect) has
a lot of interesting features here.
--
Thanks,
Steve
David Howells <[email protected]> writes:
> Having just re-ported NFS on top of the new mount API stuff, I find that I
> don't really like the idea of superblocks being separated by communication
> parameters - especially when it might seem reasonable to be able to adjust
> those parameters.
>
> Does it make sense to abstract out the remote peer and allow (a) that to be
> configured separately from any superblocks using it and (b) that to be used to
> create superblocks?
>
> Note that what a 'remote peer' is would be different for different
> filesystems:
>
> (*) For NFS, it would probably be a named server, with address(es) attached
> to the name. In lieu of actually having a name, the initial IP address
> could be used.
>
> (*) For CIFS, it would probably be a named server. I'm not sure if CIFS
> allows an abstraction for a share that can move about inside a domain.
>
> (*) For AFS, it would be a cell, I think, where the actual fileserver(s) used
> are a matter of direction from the Volume Location server.
>
> (*) For 9P and Ceph, I don't really know.
>
> What could be configured? Well, addresses, ports, timeouts. Maybe protocol
> level negotiation - though not being able to explicitly specify, say, the
> particular version and minorversion on an NFS share would be problematic for
> backward compatibility.
>
> One advantage it could give us is that it might make it easier if someone asks
> for server X to query userspace in some way for the default parameters for X
> are.
>
> What might this look like in terms of userspace? Well, we could overload the
> new mount API:
>
> peer1 = fsopen("nfs", FSOPEN_CREATE_PEER);
> fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_NS, "net", NULL, netns_fd);
> fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "peer_name", "server.home");
> fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "vers", "4.2");
> fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "address", "tcp:192.168.1.1");
> fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "address", "tcp:192.168.1.2");
> fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "timeo", "122");
> fsconfig(peer1, FSCONFIG_CMD_SET_UP_PEER, NULL, NULL, 0);
>
> peer2 = fsopen("nfs", FSOPEN_CREATE_PEER);
> fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_NS, "net", NULL, netns_fd);
> fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "peer_name", "server2.home");
> fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "vers", "3");
> fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "address", "tcp:192.168.1.3");
> fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "address", "udp:192.168.1.4+6001");
> fsconfig(peer2, FSCONFIG_CMD_SET_UP_PEER, NULL, NULL, 0);
>
> fs = fsopen("nfs", 0);
> fsconfig(fs, FSCONFIG_SET_PEER, "peer.1", NULL, peer1);
> fsconfig(fs, FSCONFIG_SET_PEER, "peer.2", NULL, peer2);
> fsconfig(fs, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "source", "/home/dhowells", 0);
> m = fsmount(fs, 0, 0);
>
> [Note that Eric's oft-repeated point about the 'creation' operation altering
> established parameters still stands here.]
>
> You could also then reopen it for configuration, maybe by:
>
> peer = fspick(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", FSPICK_PEER);
>
> or:
>
> peer = fspick(AT_FDCWD, "nfs:server.home", FSPICK_PEER_BY_NAME);
>
> though it might be better to give it its own syscall:
>
> peer = fspeer("nfs", "server.home", O_CLOEXEC);
> fsconfig(peer, FSCONFIG_SET_NS, "net", NULL, netns_fd);
> ...
> fsconfig(peer, FSCONFIG_CMD_SET_UP_PEER, NULL, NULL, 0);
>
> In terms of alternative interfaces, I'm not sure how easy it would be to make
> it like cgroups where you go and create a dir in a special filesystem, say,
> "/sys/peers/nfs", because the peers records and names would have to be network
> namespaced. Also, it might make it more difficult to use to create a root fs.
>
> On the other hand, being able to adjust the peer configuration by:
>
> echo 71 >/sys/peers/nfs/server.home/timeo
>
> does have a certain appeal.
>
> Also, netlink might be the right option, but I'm not sure how you'd pin the
> resultant object whilst you make use of it.
>
> A further thought is that is it worth making this idea more general and
> encompassing non-network devices also? This would run into issues of some
> logical sources being visible across namespaces and but not others.
Even network filesystems are going to have challenges of filesystems
being visible in some network namespaces and not others. As some
filesystems will be visible on the internet and some filesystems will
only be visible on the appropriate local network. Network namespaces
are sometimes used to deal with the case of local networks with
overlapping ip addresses.
I think you are proposing a model for network filesystems that is
essentially the same situation where we are with most block devices
filesystems today. Where some parameters identitify the local
filesystem instance and some parameters identify how the kernel
interacts with that filesystem instance.
For system efficiency there is a strong argument for having the fewest
number of filesystem instances we can. Otherwise we will be caching the
same data twice and wasting space in RAM etc.
So I like the idea.
At least for devpts we always create a new filesystem instance every
time mount(2) is called. NFS seems to have the option to create a new
filesystem instance every time mount(2) is called as well, (even if the
filesystem parameters are the same). And depending on the case I can
see the attraction for other filesystems as well.
So I don't think we can completely abandon the option for filesystems
to always create a new filesystem instance when mount(8) is called.
I most definitely support thinking this through and figuring out how it
best make sense for the new filesystem API to create new filesystem
instances or fail to create new filesystems instances.
Eric
On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 2:56 AM Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> David Howells <[email protected]> writes:
>
> > Having just re-ported NFS on top of the new mount API stuff, I find that I
> > don't really like the idea of superblocks being separated by communication
> > parameters - especially when it might seem reasonable to be able to adjust
> > those parameters.
> >
> > Does it make sense to abstract out the remote peer and allow (a) that to be
> > configured separately from any superblocks using it and (b) that to be used to
> > create superblocks?
<snip>
> At least for devpts we always create a new filesystem instance every
> time mount(2) is called. NFS seems to have the option to create a new
> filesystem instance every time mount(2) is called as well, (even if the
> filesystem parameters are the same). And depending on the case I can
> see the attraction for other filesystems as well.
>
> So I don't think we can completely abandon the option for filesystems
> to always create a new filesystem instance when mount(8) is called.
In cifs we attempt to match new mounts to existing tree connections
(instances of connections to a \\server\share) from other mount(s)
based first on whether security settings match (e.g. are both
Kerberos) and then on whether encryption is on/off and whether this is
a snapshot mount (smb3 previous versions feature). If neither is
mounted with a snaphsot and the encryption settings match then
we will use the same tree id to talk with the server as the other
mounts use. Interesting idea to allow mount to force a new
tree id.
What was the NFS mount option you were talking about?
Looking at the nfs man page the only one that looked similar
was "nosharecache"
> I most definitely support thinking this through and figuring out how it
> best make sense for the new filesystem API to create new filesystem
> instances or fail to create new filesystems instances.
Yes - it is an interesting question.
--
Thanks,
Steve
Steve French <[email protected]> writes:
> In cifs we attempt to match new mounts to existing tree connections
> (instances of connections to a \\server\share) from other mount(s)
> based first on whether security settings match (e.g. are both
> Kerberos) and then on whether encryption is on/off and whether this is
> a snapshot mount (smb3 previous versions feature). If neither is
> mounted with a snaphsot and the encryption settings match then
> we will use the same tree id to talk with the server as the other
> mounts use. Interesting idea to allow mount to force a new
> tree id.
We actually already have this mount option in cifs.ko, it's "nosharesock".
> What was the NFS mount option you were talking about?
> Looking at the nfs man page the only one that looked similar
> was "nosharecache"
Cheers,
--
Aurélien Aptel / SUSE Labs Samba Team
GPG: 1839 CB5F 9F5B FB9B AA97 8C99 03C8 A49B 521B D5D3
SUSE Linux GmbH, Maxfeldstraße 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany
GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
Steve French <[email protected]> writes:
> On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 2:56 AM Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> David Howells <[email protected]> writes:
>>
>> > Having just re-ported NFS on top of the new mount API stuff, I find that I
>> > don't really like the idea of superblocks being separated by communication
>> > parameters - especially when it might seem reasonable to be able to adjust
>> > those parameters.
>> >
>> > Does it make sense to abstract out the remote peer and allow (a) that to be
>> > configured separately from any superblocks using it and (b) that to be used to
>> > create superblocks?
> <snip>
>> At least for devpts we always create a new filesystem instance every
>> time mount(2) is called. NFS seems to have the option to create a new
>> filesystem instance every time mount(2) is called as well, (even if the
>> filesystem parameters are the same). And depending on the case I can
>> see the attraction for other filesystems as well.
>>
>> So I don't think we can completely abandon the option for filesystems
>> to always create a new filesystem instance when mount(8) is called.
>
> In cifs we attempt to match new mounts to existing tree connections
> (instances of connections to a \\server\share) from other mount(s)
> based first on whether security settings match (e.g. are both
> Kerberos) and then on whether encryption is on/off and whether this is
> a snapshot mount (smb3 previous versions feature). If neither is
> mounted with a snaphsot and the encryption settings match then
> we will use the same tree id to talk with the server as the other
> mounts use. Interesting idea to allow mount to force a new
> tree id.
>
> What was the NFS mount option you were talking about?
> Looking at the nfs man page the only one that looked similar
> was "nosharecache"
I was remembering this from reading the nfs mount code:
static int nfs_compare_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
{
...
if (!nfs_compare_super_address(old, server))
return 0;
/* Note: NFS_MOUNT_UNSHARED == NFS4_MOUNT_UNSHARED */
if (old->flags & NFS_MOUNT_UNSHARED)
return 0;
...
}
If a filesystem has NFS_MOUNT_UNSHARED set it does not serve as a
candidate for new mount requests. Skimming the code it looks like
nosharecache is what sets NFS_MOUNT_UNSHARED.
Another interesting and common case is tmpfs which always creates a new
filesystem instance whenever it is mounted.
Eric
On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 12:23 PM Aurélien Aptel <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Steve French <[email protected]> writes:
> > In cifs we attempt to match new mounts to existing tree connections
> > (instances of connections to a \\server\share) from other mount(s)
> > based first on whether security settings match (e.g. are both
> > Kerberos) and then on whether encryption is on/off and whether this is
> > a snapshot mount (smb3 previous versions feature). If neither is
> > mounted with a snaphsot and the encryption settings match then
> > we will use the same tree id to talk with the server as the other
> > mounts use. Interesting idea to allow mount to force a new
> > tree id.
>
> We actually already have this mount option in cifs.ko, it's "nosharesock".
Yes - good point. It is very easy to do on cifs. I mainly use that to simulate
multiple clients for testing servers (so each mount to the same server
whether or not the share matched, looks like a different client, coming
from a different socket and thus with different session ids and tree
ids as well).
It is very useful when trying to simulate multiple clients running to the same
server while using only one client machine (or VM).
> > What was the NFS mount option you were talking about?
> > Looking at the nfs man page the only one that looked similar
> > was "nosharecache"
The nfs man page apparently discourages its use:
"As of kernel 2.6.18, the behavior specified by nosharecache is legacy
caching behavior. This is considered a data risk"
--
Thanks,
Steve
On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 12:06:06AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> So I don't think we can completely abandon the option for filesystems
> to always create a new filesystem instance when mount(8) is called.
Huh? If filesystem wants to create a new instance on each ->mount(),
it can bloody well do so. Quite a few do - if that fs can handle
that, more power to it.
The problem is what to do with filesystems that *can't* do that.
You really, really can't have two ext4 (or xfs, etc.) instances over
the same device at the same time. Cache coherency, locking, etc.
will kill you.
And that's not to mention the joy of defining the semantics of
having the same ext4 mounted with two logs at the same time ;-)
I've seen "reject unless the options are compatible/identical/whatever",
but that ignores the real problem with existing policy. It's *NOT*
"I've mounted this and got an existing instance with non-matching
options". That's a minor annoyance (and back when that decision
had been made, mount(2) was very definitly root-only). The real
problem is different and much worse - it's remount.
I have asked to mount something and it had already been mounted,
with identical options. OK, so what happens if I do mount -o remount
on my instance? *IF* we are operating in the "only sysadmin can
mount new filesystems", it's not a big deal - there are already
lots of ways you can shoot yourself in the foot and mount(2) is
certainly a powerful one. But if we get to "Joe R. Luser can do
it in his container", we have a big problem.
Decision back then had been mostly for usability reasons - it was
back in 2001 (well before the containermania, userns or anything
of that sort) and it was more about "how many hoops does one have
to jump through to get something mounted, assuming the sanity of
sysadmin doing that?". If *anything* like userns had been a concern
back then, it probably would've been different. However, it's
17 years too late and if anyone has a functional TARDIS, I can
easily think of better uses for it...
On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 5:29 PM David Howells <[email protected]> wrote:
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
> @@ -351,6 +351,11 @@ typedef int __bitwise __kernel_rwf_t;
>
> #define FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
>
> +#define FSPICK_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
> +#define FSPICK_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x00000002
> +#define FSPICK_NO_AUTOMOUNT 0x00000004
> +#define FSPICK_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000008
This caught my eye: why aren't we using the AT_ constants? Adding an
AT_CLOEXEC sounds less horrible than duplicating all the lookup
related flags for FSPICK...
Thanks,
Miklos
> +
> /*
> * The type of fsconfig() call made.
> */
>
> On Aug 24, 2018, at 7:51 AM, Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Aug 1, 2018 at 5:29 PM David Howells <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
>> @@ -351,6 +351,11 @@ typedef int __bitwise __kernel_rwf_t;
>>
>> #define FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
>>
>> +#define FSPICK_CLOEXEC 0x00000001
>> +#define FSPICK_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x00000002
>> +#define FSPICK_NO_AUTOMOUNT 0x00000004
>> +#define FSPICK_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000008
>
> This caught my eye: why aren't we using the AT_ constants? Adding an
> AT_CLOEXEC sounds less horrible than duplicating all the lookup
> related flags for FSPICK...
For a totally new API, is there any need to support !CLOEXEC? A caller can safely remove the CLOEXEC bit without races.
On Wed, Aug 01, 2018 at 04:25:41PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Implement a filesystem context concept to be used during superblock
> creation for mount and superblock reconfiguration for remount.
>
> The mounting procedure then becomes:
>
> (1) Allocate new fs_context context.
>
> (2) Configure the context.
>
> (3) Create superblock.
>
> (4) Query the superblock.
>
> (5) Create a mount for the superblock.
>
> (6) Destroy the context.
>
> Rather than calling fs_type->mount(), an fs_context struct is created and
> fs_type->init_fs_context() is called to set it up. Pointers exist for the
> filesystem and LSM to hang their private data off.
>
> A set of operations has to be set by ->init_fs_context() to provide
> freeing, duplication, option parsing, binary data parsing, validation,
> mounting and superblock filling.
>
> Legacy filesystems are supported by the provision of a set of legacy
> fs_context operations that build up a list of mount options and then invoke
> fs_type->mount() from within the fs_context ->get_tree() operation. This
> allows all filesystems to be accessed using fs_context.
>
> It should be noted that, whilst this patch adds a lot of lines of code,
> there is quite a bit of duplication with existing code that can be
> eliminated should all filesystems be converted over.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
I don't find a more recent version of this patch in patchwork on kernel.org,
so I am replying to this one. My apologies if there are more recent versions.
This patch is causing widespread crashes in next-20180910 and next-20180911.
Example and bisect log (for x86_64) attached.
Guenter
---
Rebooting.
[ 4.894299] random: dd: uninitialized urandom read (512 bytes read)
[ 5.055206] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030
[ 5.055518] PGD 800000000c025067 P4D 800000000c025067 PUD c7a3067 PMD 0
[ 5.055941] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 5.056191] CPU: 0 PID: 1208 Comm: umount Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3-next-20180911 #1
[ 5.056367] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[ 5.057003] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
[ 5.057214] Code: d4 01 00 00 44 8b a3 30 02 00 00 45 85 e4 0f 85 9d 01 00 00 a8 01 48 89 fd 75 4f 48 89 df 45 31 ed e8 ad 4f 01 00 48 8b 45 00 <48> 8b 40 30 48 85 c0 0f 84 d3 00 00 00 48 89 ef ff d0 85 c0 0f 84
[ 5.057573] RSP: 0018:ffffa8560011bdd0 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 5.057709] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa2cd4c72c000 RCX: ffffa2cd4c72c0b8
[ 5.057850] RDX: ffffa2cd4c72c048 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff98b49e28
[ 5.057991] RBP: ffffa8560011be00 R08: 000000000000019b R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5.058132] R10: ffffa856000bfd08 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 5.058274] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffa2cd4f38f920 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 5.058451] FS: 00007fa2f1a15500(0000) GS:ffffa2cd4f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5.059178] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5.059302] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000000c7b4000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
[ 5.059496] Call Trace:
[ 5.060118] do_umount_root+0x7b/0xb0
[ 5.060244] ksys_umount+0x250/0x3e0
[ 5.060345] ? vfs_write+0x13f/0x190
[ 5.060439] __x64_sys_umount+0xd/0x10
[ 5.060537] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xe0
[ 5.060635] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 5.060874] RIP: 0033:0x7fa2f1534b47
[ 5.060970] Code: 73 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 f6 e9 09 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 11 73 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 5.061311] RSP: 002b:00007ffeb7926e68 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 5.061478] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000d078e0 RCX: 00007fa2f1534b47
[ 5.061612] RDX: 00007ffeb7927050 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000d078e0
[ 5.061744] RBP: 0000000000d07b40 R08: 0000000000d07920 R09: 00007fa2f15726c0
[ 5.061875] R10: 000000000000089e R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000d078a0
[ 5.062006] R13: 0000000000d07ba0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffeb7927050
[ 5.062188] Modules linked in:
[ 5.062375] CR2: 0000000000000030
[ 5.062675] ---[ end trace c42a74534e5e2f3f ]---
[ 5.062816] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
[ 5.062924] Code: d4 01 00 00 44 8b a3 30 02 00 00 45 85 e4 0f 85 9d 01 00 00 a8 01 48 89 fd 75 4f 48 89 df 45 31 ed e8 ad 4f 01 00 48 8b 45 00 <48> 8b 40 30 48 85 c0 0f 84 d3 00 00 00 48 89 ef ff d0 85 c0 0f 84
[ 5.063263] RSP: 0018:ffffa8560011bdd0 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 5.063372] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa2cd4c72c000 RCX: ffffa2cd4c72c0b8
[ 5.063526] RDX: ffffa2cd4c72c048 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff98b49e28
[ 5.063665] RBP: ffffa8560011be00 R08: 000000000000019b R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5.063797] R10: ffffa856000bfd08 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 5.063928] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffa2cd4f38f920 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 5.064060] FS: 00007fa2f1a15500(0000) GS:ffffa2cd4f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5.064224] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5.064337] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000000c7b4000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
---
# bad: [09c0888767529cdb382f34452819e42d1a66a114] Add linux-next specific files for 20180911
# good: [11da3a7f84f19c26da6f86af878298694ede0804] Linux 4.19-rc3
git bisect start 'HEAD' 'v4.19-rc3'
# bad: [a2ebc71cf97bed9b453318418e4a281434565e8b] Merge remote-tracking branch 'nfc-next/master'
git bisect bad a2ebc71cf97bed9b453318418e4a281434565e8b
# good: [6fde463b32bf4105c28c0a297a5b66aca5d6ecd4] Merge remote-tracking branch 's390/features'
git bisect good 6fde463b32bf4105c28c0a297a5b66aca5d6ecd4
# bad: [136fd6d530a3ae0dd003984f683345cfe88c01f3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'v4l-dvb/master'
git bisect bad 136fd6d530a3ae0dd003984f683345cfe88c01f3
# good: [c7ae95368af43c08f5f615b00f2f7bf2e9c45788] Merge remote-tracking branch 'v9fs/9p-next'
git bisect good c7ae95368af43c08f5f615b00f2f7bf2e9c45788
# good: [4c640c41381e47b328c6507bcf534812761256cd] Merge branch 'for-4.19/fixes' into for-next
git bisect good 4c640c41381e47b328c6507bcf534812761256cd
# bad: [5bc91f70c5ecc2bc5967b98ce7fa4e55ad230d99] Merge remote-tracking branch 'hid/for-next'
git bisect bad 5bc91f70c5ecc2bc5967b98ce7fa4e55ad230d99
# bad: [88abb54c46648cf25930133fbdeb145bf8537673] vfs: syscall: Add fsconfig() for configuring and managing a context
git bisect bad 88abb54c46648cf25930133fbdeb145bf8537673
# good: [b2bbd433151748c5268769f560c926343dece319] vfs: Separate changing mount flags full remount
git bisect good b2bbd433151748c5268769f560c926343dece319
# bad: [b348b6230aac28ffe555000831966d45529ab3b0] kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
git bisect bad b348b6230aac28ffe555000831966d45529ab3b0
# bad: [bf090f3c0282903ad55bca27a482180c70627bd5] procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c
git bisect bad bf090f3c0282903ad55bca27a482180c70627bd5
# bad: [d3f3eaba540acf5b521865dec5634e3a1e138f1d] vfs: Remove unused code after filesystem context changes
git bisect bad d3f3eaba540acf5b521865dec5634e3a1e138f1d
# bad: [5d5eb529715b5a7a4caf10825e2a330608dcd1ef] vfs: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context
git bisect bad 5d5eb529715b5a7a4caf10825e2a330608dcd1ef
# first bad commit: [5d5eb529715b5a7a4caf10825e2a330608dcd1ef] vfs: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context
> [ 5.057003] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
Can you tell me what file and line this is?
Also, do you know which filesystem was involved?
> I don't find a more recent version of this patch in patchwork on kernel.org,
> so I am replying to this one. My apologies if there are more recent versions.
I've just updated my tree with some fixes. Can you try:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/
branch "fsinfo"?
Thanks,
David
On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 10:52:26PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> > [ 5.057003] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
>
> Can you tell me what file and line this is?
>
> Also, do you know which filesystem was involved?
>
> > I don't find a more recent version of this patch in patchwork on kernel.org,
> > so I am replying to this one. My apologies if there are more recent versions.
>
> I've just updated my tree with some fixes. Can you try:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/
>
> branch "fsinfo"?
>
Unfortunately, that does not work either.
With v4.19-rc3-40-g09f0a401de37:
[ 8.505130] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030
[ 8.506237] PGD 800000001d81e067 P4D 800000001d81e067 PUD 1dfb1067 PMD 0
[ 8.506669] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 8.506915] CPU: 0 PID: 1180 Comm: umount Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #1
[ 8.507052] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[ 8.507672] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
[ 8.507877] Code: d4 01 00 00 44 8b a3 30 02 00 00 45 85 e4 0f 85 9d 01 00 00 a8 01 48 89 fd 75 4f 48 89 df 45 31 ed e8 ad 4f 01 00 48 8b 45 00 <48> 4
[ 8.508222] RSP: 0018:ffffb3794015bdd0 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 8.508345] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d855df27800 RCX: ffff9d855df278b8
[ 8.508479] RDX: ffff9d855df27848 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8d54a9a8
[ 8.508617] RBP: ffffb3794015be00 R08: 00000000000000d8 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 8.508752] R10: ffffb3794011fce8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 8.508885] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9d855effc920 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 8.509056] FS: 00007f6712967500(0000) GS:ffff9d855f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8.509217] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8.509332] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000001dfe0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 8.509516] Call Trace:
[ 8.510121] do_umount_root+0x7b/0xb0
[ 8.510244] ksys_umount+0x250/0x3e0
[ 8.510535] ? vfs_write+0x13f/0x190
[ 8.510629] __x64_sys_umount+0xd/0x10
[ 8.510722] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xe0
[ 8.510810] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Guenter
Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> wrote:
> [ 8.507672] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
Can you tell me the file and line this corresponds to?
Thanks,
David
On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 12:17:35AM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > [ 8.507672] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
>
> Can you tell me the file and line this corresponds to?
>
I don't know, but some debugging shows that fc->ops == NULL.
Guenter
Hi,
On (09/11/18 16:54), Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 12:17:35AM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> > Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > > [ 8.507672] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
> >
> > Can you tell me the file and line this corresponds to?
> >
> I don't know, but some debugging shows that fc->ops == NULL.
This NULL derefs linux-next.
Emergency (sysrq remount/reboot):
emergency_remount()
do_emergency_remount()
do_emergency_remount_callback()
reconfigure_super()
At fc->ops dereference:
981 if (fc->ops->reconfigure) {
^^^^^^^^^
982 retval = fc->ops->reconfigure(fc);
983 if (retval == 0) {
984 security_sb_reconfigure(fc);
So the check either better be
if (fc->ops && fc->ops->reconfigure)
Or, we need to set ->ops properly. But I'm not sure if invoking
->init_fs_context() from emergency-reboot path is going to work
well all the time.
---
fs/super.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index efb0567c8389..e2e03c47c817 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -1017,6 +1017,7 @@ int reconfigure_super(struct fs_context *fc)
static void do_emergency_remount_callback(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct fs_context fc = {
+ .ops = &legacy_fs_context_ops,
.purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO,
.fs_type = sb->s_type,
.root = sb->s_root,
---
-ss
On (09/18/18 18:07), Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> emergency_remount()
> do_emergency_remount()
> do_emergency_remount_callback()
> reconfigure_super()
>
> At fc->ops dereference:
>
> 981 if (fc->ops->reconfigure) {
> ^^^^^^^^^
> 982 retval = fc->ops->reconfigure(fc);
> 983 if (retval == 0) {
> 984 security_sb_reconfigure(fc);
>
>
> So the check either better be
>
> if (fc->ops && fc->ops->reconfigure)
I guess I was pretty lucky to have leading zeroes in that fc.
David, do you want to add a macro which would make `struct fs_context fc'
misuse less possible? There are 3 users right now who don't use
vfs_new_fs_context(), and none of them appear to properly set all of
`struct fs_context fc' members. This can cause problems in the future,
right?
fs/namespace.c: struct fs_context fc = {
fs/super.c: struct fs_context fc = {
fs/super.c: struct fs_context fc = {
-ss
On (08/01/18 16:25), David Howells wrote:
[..]
> @@ -2460,18 +2428,41 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
> if (!can_change_locked_flags(mnt, mnt_flags))
> return -EPERM;
>
> - err = security_sb_remount(sb, data, data_size);
> - if (err)
> - return err;
> + if (type->init_fs_context) {
> + fc = vfs_sb_reconfig(path, sb_flags);
> + if (IS_ERR(fc))
> + return PTR_ERR(fc);
> +
> + err = parse_monolithic_mount_data(fc, data, data_size);
> + if (err < 0)
> + goto err_fc;
> +
> + if (fc->ops->validate) {
> + err = fc->ops->validate(fc);
> + if (err < 0)
> + goto err_fc;
> + }
> +
> + err = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
goto err_fc?
> + } else {
> + err = security_sb_remount(sb, data, data_size);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> + }
goto err_fc?
-ss
On 09/18/2018 02:07 AM, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On (09/11/18 16:54), Guenter Roeck wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 12:17:35AM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>>> Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> [ 8.507672] RIP: 0010:reconfigure_super+0x47/0x210
>>>
>>> Can you tell me the file and line this corresponds to?
>>>
>> I don't know, but some debugging shows that fc->ops == NULL.
>
> This NULL derefs linux-next.
>
> Emergency (sysrq remount/reboot):
>
> emergency_remount()
> do_emergency_remount()
> do_emergency_remount_callback()
> reconfigure_super()
>
> At fc->ops dereference:
>
> 981 if (fc->ops->reconfigure) {
> ^^^^^^^^^
> 982 retval = fc->ops->reconfigure(fc);
> 983 if (retval == 0) {
> 984 security_sb_reconfigure(fc);
>
>
> So the check either better be
>
> if (fc->ops && fc->ops->reconfigure)
>
Since there are multiple instances of fs_context where fc->ops isn't set,
this check would be needed wherever fc->ops is dereferenced.
Guenter
> Or, we need to set ->ops properly. But I'm not sure if invoking
> ->init_fs_context() from emergency-reboot path is going to work
> well all the time.
>
> ---
>
> fs/super.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
> index efb0567c8389..e2e03c47c817 100644
> --- a/fs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/super.c
> @@ -1017,6 +1017,7 @@ int reconfigure_super(struct fs_context *fc)
> static void do_emergency_remount_callback(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> struct fs_context fc = {
> + .ops = &legacy_fs_context_ops,
> .purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO,
> .fs_type = sb->s_type,
> .root = sb->s_root,
>
> ---
>
> -ss
>
Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> wrote:
> > + err = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
>
> goto err_fc?
Fixed thanks.
> > + } else {
> > + err = security_sb_remount(sb, data, data_size);
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > + }
>
> goto err_fc?
This no longer exists. I need to repost my patchset. I was hoping to fix the
mqueue bug there first, though, but maybe I should just post anyway.
David
Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> wrote:
> static void do_emergency_remount_callback(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> struct fs_context fc = {
> + .ops = &legacy_fs_context_ops,
> .purpose = FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO,
> .fs_type = sb->s_type,
> .root = sb->s_root,
Actually, we do need to call ->init_fs_context() or legacy_init_fs_context()
to set the ops pointer.
David
I think I need to include something like the attached change in this patch.
Changes also need to be made to proc and cgroup.
David
---
commit 1a336480a0f664b3e1988a581bccd4fa10d98764
Author: David Howells <[email protected]>
Date: Tue Sep 18 17:25:23 2018 +0100
fix remount
diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
index a82679441031..1f36b72e3ee9 100644
--- a/fs/fs_context.c
+++ b/fs/fs_context.c
@@ -42,8 +42,6 @@ struct legacy_fs_context {
enum legacy_fs_param param_type;
};
-static int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *dentry);
-
static const struct constant_table common_set_sb_flag[] = {
{ "dirsync", SB_DIRSYNC },
{ "lazytime", SB_LAZYTIME },
@@ -293,7 +291,6 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_new_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
break;
}
-
/* TODO: Make all filesystems support this unconditionally */
init_fs_context = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context;
if (!init_fs_context)
@@ -662,12 +659,20 @@ const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops = {
* Initialise a legacy context for a filesystem that doesn't support
* fs_context.
*/
-static int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *dentry)
+int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *dentry)
{
+ switch (fc->purpose) {
+ default:
+ fc->fs_private = kzalloc(sizeof(struct legacy_fs_context),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fc->fs_private)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ break;
- fc->fs_private = kzalloc(sizeof(struct legacy_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!fc->fs_private)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT:
+ case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO:
+ break;
+ }
fc->ops = &legacy_fs_context_ops;
return 0;
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index d25cb82af69d..fc2da60abbcd 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ extern void __init chrdev_init(void);
* fs_context.c
*/
extern const struct fs_context_operations legacy_fs_context_ops;
+extern int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *dentry);
/*
* fsopen.c
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ddb2c3b88cd6..86b60566fcdf 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1429,9 +1429,19 @@ static int do_umount_root(struct super_block *sb)
};
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
- if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
- /* Might want to call ->init_fs_context(). */
- ret = reconfigure_super(&fc);
+ if (!sb_rdonly(sb)) {
+ int ret;
+
+ if (fc.fs_type->init_fs_context)
+ ret = fc.fs_type->init_fs_context(&fc, NULL);
+ else
+ ret = legacy_init_fs_context(&fc, NULL);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = reconfigure_super(&fc);
+ fc.ops->free(&fc);
+ }
+ }
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return ret;
}
@@ -2396,7 +2406,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
err = security_fs_context_validate(fc);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto err_fc;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
err = -EPERM;
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index e00b03249bfa..df8c4cebd000 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -1026,12 +1026,20 @@ static void do_emergency_remount_callback(struct super_block *sb)
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (sb->s_root && sb->s_bdev && (sb->s_flags & SB_BORN) &&
- !sb_rdonly(sb))
- /* Might want to call ->init_fs_context(). */
+ !sb_rdonly(sb)) {
+ int ret;
+
+ if (fc.fs_type->init_fs_context)
+ ret = fc.fs_type->init_fs_context(&fc, NULL);
+ else
+ ret = legacy_init_fs_context(&fc, NULL);
+
/*
* What lock protects sb->s_flags??
*/
- reconfigure_super(&fc);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ reconfigure_super(&fc);
+ }
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
}
Actually, I can do better and allow ->init_fs_context() to return -EOPNOTSUPP
in the FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT and FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO cases if the
filesystem has no interest in them.
David
On (09/18/18 07:06), Guenter Roeck wrote:
> > So the check either better be
> >
> > if (fc->ops && fc->ops->reconfigure)
> >
>
> Since there are multiple instances of fs_context where fc->ops isn't set,
> this check would be needed wherever fc->ops is dereferenced.
Right. If fc is always guaranteed to be properly zeroed-out. This is
true for kzalloc-ed fc's, but not necessarily so in any other case.
-ss
On (09/18/18 17:39), David Howells wrote:
[..]
> -static int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *dentry)
> +int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> + switch (fc->purpose) {
> + default:
> + fc->fs_private = kzalloc(sizeof(struct legacy_fs_context),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!fc->fs_private)
> + return -ENOMEM;
ops->reconfigure() invoked for FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT or
FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO will never access fc->fs_private?
> + break;
>
> - fc->fs_private = kzalloc(sizeof(struct legacy_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!fc->fs_private)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_UMOUNT:
> + case FS_CONTEXT_FOR_EMERGENCY_RO:
> + break;
> + }
So `fc' can either be zeroed-out, when it comes from fc = kzalloc(),
or contain some garbage otherwise. Would it make sense to zero-out `fc'
regardless of its origin?
> down_write(&sb->s_umount);
> - if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
> - /* Might want to call ->init_fs_context(). */
> - ret = reconfigure_super(&fc);
> + if (!sb_rdonly(sb)) {
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (fc.fs_type->init_fs_context)
> + ret = fc.fs_type->init_fs_context(&fc, NULL);
> + else
> + ret = legacy_init_fs_context(&fc, NULL);
> +
> + if (ret == 0) {
> + ret = reconfigure_super(&fc);
> + fc.ops->free(&fc);
^^^^^^^
Is ops->free() always !NULL?
-ss
On (09/19/18 10:12), Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> On (09/18/18 07:06), Guenter Roeck wrote:
> > > So the check either better be
> > >
> > > if (fc->ops && fc->ops->reconfigure)
> > >
> >
> > Since there are multiple instances of fs_context where fc->ops isn't set,
> > this check would be needed wherever fc->ops is dereferenced.
>
> Right. If fc is always guaranteed to be properly zeroed-out. This is
> true for kzalloc-ed fc's, but not necessarily so in any other case.
What I mean was something like this
void foo(void)
{
struct fs_context fc;
fc.purpose = ...;
fc.fs_type = ...;
fc.root = ...;
fc.sb_flags = ...;
reconfigure_super(&fc);
}
-ss
On 01/08/2018 16:24, David Howells wrote:
> From: Al Viro<[email protected]>
>
> Allow a detached tree created by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE) to be
> attached by move_mount(2).
>
> If by the time of final fput() of OPEN_TREE_CLONE-opened file its tree is
> not detached anymore, it won't be dissolved. move_mount(2) is adjusted
> to handle detached source.
>
> That gives us equivalents of mount --bind and mount --rbind.
>
> Signed-off-by: Al Viro<[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells<[email protected]>
> ---
>
> fs/namespace.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index e2934a4f342b..3981fd7b13f5 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -2464,10 +2467,19 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
> p = real_mount(new_path->mnt);
>
> err = -EINVAL;
> - if (!check_mnt(p) || !check_mnt(old))
> + /* The mountpoint must be in our namespace. */
> + if (!check_mnt(p))
> + goto out1;
> + /* The thing moved should be either ours or completely unattached. */
> + if (old->mnt_ns && !check_mnt(old))
> goto out1;
>
> - if (!mnt_has_parent(old))
> + attached = mnt_has_parent(old);
> + /*
> + * We need to allow open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) followed by
> + * move_mount(), but mustn't allow "/" to be moved.
> + */
> + if (old->mnt_ns && !attached)
> goto out1;
Technically, I think the comment should say "mustn't allow rootfs to be
moved". "rootfs", as in
Documentation/filesystems/ramfs-rootfs-initramfs.txt. Moving "/" is allowed.
# unshare -m
# cd /mnt
# mount -ttmpfs none /
# mount --move --no-canonicalize /.. /mnt
#
(Or if you want to quibble about "/.." v.s. "/" -
# unshare -m
# cd /mnt
# mount --rbind / /
# chroot --skip-chdir /..
# mount --move --no-canonicalize / .