Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features.
No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports
if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for
VIRTIO.
I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access,
the config option to ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS,
and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM to VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
Regards,
Pierre
Pierre Morel (2):
virtio: let arch advertise guest's memory access restrictions
s390: virtio: PV needs VIRTIO I/O device protection
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/s390/mm/init.c | 10 ++++++++++
drivers/virtio/Kconfig | 6 ++++++
drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
include/linux/virtio_config.h | 10 ++++++++++
5 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
--
2.17.1
Changelog
to v11:
- replaced VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM with VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM
to v10:
- removed virtio_config.h unnecessary include
- wording
(Connie)
to v9:
- move virtio tests back to virtio_finalize_features
(Connie)
- remove virtio device argument
to v8:
- refactoring by using an optional callback
(Connie)
to v7:
- typo in warning message
(Connie)
to v6:
- rewording warning messages
(Connie, Halil)
to v5:
- return directly from S390 arch_validate_virtio_features()
when the guest is not protected.
(Connie)
- Somme rewording
(Connie, Michael)
- moved back code from arch/s390/ ...kernel/uv.c to ...mm/init.c
(Christian)
to v4:
- separate virtio and arch code
(Pierre)
- moved code from arch/s390/mm/init.c to arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
(as interpreted from Heiko's comment)
- moved validation inside the arch code
(Connie)
- moved the call to arch validation before VIRTIO_F_1 test
(Michael)
to v3:
- add warning
(Connie, Christian)
- add comment
(Connie)
- change hook name
(Halil, Connie)
to v2:
- put the test in virtio_finalize_features()
(Connie)
- put the test inside VIRTIO core
(Jason)
- pass a virtio device as parameter
(Halil)
If protected virtualization is active on s390, VIRTIO has only retricted
access to the guest memory.
Define CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS and export
arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access to advertize VIRTIO if that's
the case, preventing a host error on access attempt.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/s390/mm/init.c | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index b29fcc66ec39..938246200d39 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -820,6 +820,7 @@ menu "Virtualization"
config PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST
def_bool n
prompt "Protected virtualization guest support"
+ select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
help
Select this option, if you want to be able to run this
kernel as a protected virtualization KVM guest.
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/init.c b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
index 0d282081dc1f..f40b9b63d3d6 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
@@ -160,6 +160,16 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
return is_prot_virt_guest();
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
+
+int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
+{
+ return is_prot_virt_guest();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access);
+
+#endif
+
/* protected virtualization */
static void pv_init(void)
{
--
2.17.1
An architecture may restrict host access to guest memory,
e.g. IBM s390 Secure Execution or AMD SEV.
Provide a new Kconfig entry the architecture can select,
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS, when it provides
the arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access callback to advertise
to VIRTIO common code when the architecture restricts memory access
from the host.
The common code can then fail the probe for any device where
VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is required, but not set.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
---
drivers/virtio/Kconfig | 6 ++++++
drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
include/linux/virtio_config.h | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/Kconfig b/drivers/virtio/Kconfig
index 5c92e4a50882..3999b411624c 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/virtio/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ config VIRTIO
bus, such as CONFIG_VIRTIO_PCI, CONFIG_VIRTIO_MMIO, CONFIG_RPMSG
or CONFIG_S390_GUEST.
+config ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
+ bool
+ help
+ This option is selected if the architecture may need to enforce
+ VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
+
menuconfig VIRTIO_MENU
bool "Virtio drivers"
default y
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
index a977e32a88f2..a2b3f12e10a2 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
@@ -176,6 +176,21 @@ int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
if (ret)
return ret;
+ ret = arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+ if (ret) {
+ if (!virtio_has_feature(dev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1)) {
+ dev_warn(&dev->dev,
+ "device must provide VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ if (!virtio_has_feature(dev, VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM)) {
+ dev_warn(&dev->dev,
+ "device must provide VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ }
+
if (!virtio_has_feature(dev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1))
return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_config.h b/include/linux/virtio_config.h
index 8fe857e27ef3..3f697c8c8205 100644
--- a/include/linux/virtio_config.h
+++ b/include/linux/virtio_config.h
@@ -540,4 +540,14 @@ static inline void virtio_cwrite64(struct virtio_device *vdev,
virtio_cread_le((vdev), structname, member, ptr); \
_r; \
})
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
+int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void);
+#else
+static inline int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS */
+
#endif /* _LINUX_VIRTIO_CONFIG_H */
--
2.17.1
On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 11:39:06 +0200
Pierre Morel <[email protected]> wrote:
> An architecture may restrict host access to guest memory,
> e.g. IBM s390 Secure Execution or AMD SEV.
>
> Provide a new Kconfig entry the architecture can select,
> CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS, when it provides
> the arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access callback to advertise
> to VIRTIO common code when the architecture restricts memory access
> from the host.
>
> The common code can then fail the probe for any device where
> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is required, but not set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Halil Pasic <[email protected]>
[..]
>
> +config ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
> + bool
> + help
> + This option is selected if the architecture may need to enforce
> + VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
> +
A small nit: you use F_ACCESS_PLATFORM everywhere but here.
Regards,
Halil
On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 11:39:07 +0200
Pierre Morel <[email protected]> wrote:
> If protected virtualization is active on s390, VIRTIO has only retricted
> access to the guest memory.
> Define CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS and export
> arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access to advertize VIRTIO if that's
> the case, preventing a host error on access attempt.
The description is a little inaccurate, but I don't care hence the r-b.
The function arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access() returning true
can not prevent the host from attempting to access memory if it decides
to do so. And as far as I know there was no host error on access attempt.
The page gets exported, and the host will operate on the encrypted
page. But in the end we do run into trouble, which is usually fatal for
the guest (not the host).
What we actually do here is the following. If we detect
an ill configured device we fail it (device status field), because
attempting to drive it is a recipe for disaster.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Halil Pasic <[email protected]>
On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 11:39:05 +0200
Pierre Morel <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
> to validate VIRTIO device features.
Michael, is this going in via your tree?
On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 00:39:51 +0200
Halil Pasic <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 11:39:05 +0200
> Pierre Morel <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > Hi all,
> >
> > The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
> > to validate VIRTIO device features.
>
> Michael, is this going in via your tree?
>
I believe Michael's tree is the right place for this, but I can also
queue it if I get an ack on patch 1.
On Tue, Sep 08, 2020 at 12:39:51AM +0200, Halil Pasic wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 11:39:05 +0200
> Pierre Morel <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > Hi all,
> >
> > The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
> > to validate VIRTIO device features.
>
> Michael, is this going in via your tree?
I guess so. Still not really happy about second-guessing
the hypervisor, but this got acks from others
so maybe I'm wrong in this instance. Won't be the first time.
--
MST
On Tue, Sep 08, 2020 at 08:55:21AM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 00:39:51 +0200
> Halil Pasic <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 11:39:05 +0200
> > Pierre Morel <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
> > > to validate VIRTIO device features.
> >
> > Michael, is this going in via your tree?
> >
>
> I believe Michael's tree is the right place for this, but I can also
> queue it if I get an ack on patch 1.
I think Halil pointed out some minor issues, so a new version is in
order.
--
MST