This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.114 release.
There are 74 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed Jan 31 12:38:21 UTC 2018.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.114-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.4.114-rc1
Dan Streetman <[email protected]>
net: tcp: close sock if net namespace is exiting
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
flow_dissector: properly cap thoff field
Jim Westfall <[email protected]>
ipv4: Make neigh lookup keys for loopback/point-to-point devices be INADDR_ANY
Jim Westfall <[email protected]>
net: Allow neigh contructor functions ability to modify the primary_key
Neil Horman <[email protected]>
vmxnet3: repair memory leak
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: return error if the asoc has been peeled off in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: do not allow the v4 socket to bind a v4mapped v6 address
Francois Romieu <[email protected]>
r8169: fix memory corruption on retrieval of hardware statistics.
Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
pppoe: take ->needed_headroom of lower device into account on xmit
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net: qdisc_pkt_len_init() should be more robust
Craig Gallek <[email protected]>
tcp: __tcp_hdrlen() helper
Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
net: igmp: fix source address check for IGMPv3 reports
Yuiko Oshino <[email protected]>
lan78xx: Fix failure in USB Full Speed
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6: ip6_make_skb() needs to clear cork.base.dst
Mike Maloney <[email protected]>
ipv6: fix udpv6 sendmsg crash caused by too small MTU
Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
ipv6: Fix getsockopt() for sockets with default IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL
Alexey Kodanev <[email protected]>
dccp: don't restart ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() if sk in closed state
Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
hrtimer: Reset hrtimer cpu base proper on CPU hotplug
Jia Zhang <[email protected]>
x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading further with LLC size check
Greg KH <[email protected]>
eventpoll.h: add missing epoll event masks
Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
vsyscall: Fix permissions for emulate mode with KAISER/PTI
Thomas Meyer <[email protected]>
um: link vmlinux with -no-pie
Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
usbip: prevent leaking socket pointer address in messages
Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
usbip: fix stub_rx: get_pipe() to validate endpoint number
Andrew Goodbody <[email protected]>
usb: usbip: Fix possible deadlocks reported by lockdep
Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
Input: trackpoint - force 3 buttons if 0 button is reported
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Revert "module: Add retpoline tag to VERMAGIC"
Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
scsi: libiscsi: fix shifting of DID_REQUEUE host byte
Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
fs/fcntl: f_setown, avoid undefined behaviour
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
reiserfs: Don't clear SGID when inheriting ACLs
Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
reiserfs: don't preallocate blocks for extended attributes
Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
reiserfs: fix race in prealloc discard
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext2: Don't clear SGID when inheriting ACLs
Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
netfilter: xt_osf: Add missing permission checks
Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: Add missing permission checks
Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
netfilter: fix IS_ERR_VALUE usage
Pau Espin Pedrol <[email protected]>
netfilter: use fwmark_reflect in nf_send_reset
Ulrich Weber <[email protected]>
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: extend request line validation
Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
netfilter: restart search if moved to other chain
Liping Zhang <[email protected]>
netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: reject verdict request from different portid
Liping Zhang <[email protected]>
netfilter: nf_ct_expect: remove the redundant slash when policy name is empty
Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
netfilter: nf_dup_ipv6: set again FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH at flowi6_flags
Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
netfilter: arp_tables: fix invoking 32bit "iptable -P INPUT ACCEPT" failed in 64bit kernel
Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
netfilter: x_tables: speed up jump target validation
Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
ACPICA: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
ACPI / scan: Prefer devices without _HID/_CID for _ADR matching
Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
ACPI / processor: Avoid reserving IO regions too early
Rui Wang <[email protected]>
x86/ioapic: Fix incorrect pointers in ioapic_setup_resources()
Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
ipc: msg, make msgrcv work with LONG_MIN
Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
mm, page_alloc: fix potential false positive in __zone_watermark_ok
Doug Berger <[email protected]>
cma: fix calculation of aligned offset
Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
hwpoison, memcg: forcibly uncharge LRU pages
Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
mm/mmap.c: do not blow on PROT_NONE MAP_FIXED holes in the stack
Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
fs/select: add vmalloc fallback for select(2)
yangbo lu <[email protected]>
mmc: sdhci-of-esdhc: add/remove some quirks according to vendor version
Minghuan Lian <[email protected]>
PCI: layerscape: Fix MSG TLP drop setting
Yang Shi <[email protected]>
PCI: layerscape: Add "fsl,ls2085a-pcie" compatible ID
Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
drivers: base: cacheinfo: fix boot error message when acpi is enabled
Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
drivers: base: cacheinfo: fix x86 with CONFIG_OF enabled
Janakarajan Natarajan <[email protected]>
Prevent timer value 0 for MWAITX
Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
timers: Plug locking race vs. timer migration
Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
time: Avoid undefined behaviour in ktime_add_safe()
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
PM / sleep: declare __tracedata symbols as char[] rather than char
Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
can: af_can: canfd_rcv(): replace WARN_ONCE by pr_warn_once
Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
can: af_can: can_rcv(): replace WARN_ONCE by pr_warn_once
Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <[email protected]>
sched/deadline: Use the revised wakeup rule for suspending constrained dl tasks
David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs
Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
x86/cpu/intel: Introduce macros for Intel family numbers
Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
x86/microcode/intel: Fix BDW late-loading revision check
Jonathan Dieter <[email protected]>
usbip: Fix potential format overflow in userspace tools
Jonathan Dieter <[email protected]>
usbip: Fix implicit fallthrough warning
Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
usbip: prevent vhci_hcd driver from leaking a socket pointer address
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/asm/32: Make sync_core() handle missing CPUID on all 32-bit kernels
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/um/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 7 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 38 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 36 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 21 ++++++-
arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 7 +++
arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c | 9 ---
drivers/acpi/acpica/nsutils.c | 23 +++----
drivers/acpi/glue.c | 12 ++--
drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c | 9 +++
drivers/base/cacheinfo.c | 15 +++--
drivers/base/power/trace.c | 4 +-
drivers/input/mouse/trackpoint.c | 3 +
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-esdhc.c | 10 +++
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 9 +--
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 11 ++--
drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 1 +
drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c | 2 +-
drivers/pci/host/pci-layerscape.c | 22 ++++---
drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c | 2 +-
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c | 3 +-
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | 46 +++++++++++---
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 15 ++---
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h | 1 +
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_event.c | 5 +-
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++-----------
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c | 30 +++++----
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 44 ++++++++------
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_tx.c | 14 +++--
fs/ext2/acl.c | 36 ++++++-----
fs/fcntl.c | 4 ++
fs/reiserfs/bitmap.c | 14 ++++-
fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c | 12 ++--
fs/select.c | 14 ++++-
include/linux/cacheinfo.h | 1 +
include/linux/ktime.h | 7 +++
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 10 ++-
include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
include/linux/tcp.h | 7 ++-
include/linux/vermagic.h | 8 +--
include/net/arp.h | 3 +
include/net/ipv6.h | 1 +
include/net/net_namespace.h | 10 +++
include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h | 13 ++++
ipc/msg.c | 5 +-
kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +
kernel/sched/deadline.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
kernel/time/hrtimer.c | 5 +-
kernel/time/timer.c | 9 ++-
mm/cma.c | 15 ++---
mm/memcontrol.c | 2 +-
mm/memory-failure.c | 7 +++
mm/mmap.c | 6 +-
mm/page_alloc.c | 6 +-
net/can/af_can.c | 22 +++----
net/core/dev.c | 19 ++++--
net/core/flow_dissector.c | 3 +-
net/core/neighbour.c | 4 +-
net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c | 3 +
net/ipv4/arp.c | 7 ++-
net/ipv4/igmp.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 57 +++++++++--------
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 51 +++++++++-------
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 2 +
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 3 +
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 15 +++++
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 9 ++-
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 51 +++++++++-------
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_dup_ipv6.c | 1 +
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 3 +
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 7 +++
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 5 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 10 +++
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 6 +-
net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 50 +++++++++++++++
net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 7 +++
net/sctp/socket.c | 30 ++++-----
tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c | 9 ++-
tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_host_driver.c | 27 ++++++--
tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 8 +--
tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip.c | 2 +
91 files changed, 922 insertions(+), 364 deletions(-)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
commit 970442c599b22ccd644ebfe94d1d303bf6f87c05 upstream.
Problem:
We have a boatload of open-coded family-6 model numbers. Half of
them have these model numbers in hex and the other half in
decimal. This makes grepping for them tons of fun, if you were
to try.
Solution:
Consolidate all the magic numbers. Put all the definitions in
one header.
The names here are closely derived from the comments describing
the models from arch/x86/events/intel/core.c. We could easily
make them shorter by doing things like s/SANDYBRIDGE/SNB/, but
they seemed fine even with the longer versions to me.
Do not take any of these names too literally, like "DESKTOP"
or "MOBILE". These are all colloquial names and not precise
descriptions of everywhere a given model will show up.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Doug Thompson <[email protected]>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Len Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Cc: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <[email protected]>
Cc: Souvik Kumar Chakravarty <[email protected]>
Cc: Srinivas Pandruvada <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>
Cc: Vishwanath Somayaji <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_INTEL_FAMILY_H
+#define _ASM_X86_INTEL_FAMILY_H
+
+/*
+ * "Big Core" Processors (Branded as Core, Xeon, etc...)
+ *
+ * The "_X" parts are generally the EP and EX Xeons, or the
+ * "Extreme" ones, like Broadwell-E.
+ *
+ * Things ending in "2" are usually because we have no better
+ * name for them. There's no processor called "WESTMERE2".
+ */
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E
+#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM 0x0F
+#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L 0x16
+#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN 0x17
+#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON 0x1D
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM 0x1E
+#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP 0x1A
+#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX 0x2E
+#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE 0x25
+#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE2 0x1F
+#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP 0x2C
+#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX 0x2F
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE 0x2A
+#define INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X 0x2D
+#define INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE 0x3A
+#define INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X 0x3E
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE 0x3C
+#define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X 0x3F
+#define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT 0x45
+#define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E 0x46
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE 0x3D
+#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56
+#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E 0x47
+#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X 0x4F
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE 0x4E
+#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x5E
+#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X 0x55
+#define INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE 0x8E
+#define INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x9E
+
+/* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW 0x1C
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT 0x26
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL 0x27
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW 0x35
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW 0x36
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 0x37 /* BayTrail/BYT / Valleyview */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT 0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD1 0x4A /* Tangier */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD2 0x5A /* Annidale */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON 0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */
+
+/* Xeon Phi */
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL 0x57 /* Knights Landing */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_INTEL_FAMILY_H */
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ulrich Weber <[email protected]>
commit 444f901742d054a4cd5ff045871eac5131646cfb upstream.
on SIP requests, so a fragmented TCP SIP packet from an allow header starting with
INVITE,NOTIFY,OPTIONS,REFER,REGISTER,UPDATE,SUBSCRIBE
Content-Length: 0
will not bet interpreted as an INVITE request. Also Request-URI must start with an alphabetic character.
Confirm with RFC 3261
Request-Line = Method SP Request-URI SP SIP-Version CRLF
Fixes: 30f33e6dee80 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_sip: support method specific request/response handling")
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marco Angaroni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c
@@ -1434,9 +1434,12 @@ static int process_sip_request(struct sk
handler = &sip_handlers[i];
if (handler->request == NULL)
continue;
- if (*datalen < handler->len ||
+ if (*datalen < handler->len + 2 ||
strncasecmp(*dptr, handler->method, handler->len))
continue;
+ if ((*dptr)[handler->len] != ' ' ||
+ !isalpha((*dptr)[handler->len+1]))
+ continue;
if (ct_sip_get_header(ct, *dptr, 0, *datalen, SIP_HDR_CSEQ,
&matchoff, &matchlen) <= 0) {
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexey Kodanev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dd5684ecae3bd8e44b644f50e2c12c7e57fdfef5 ]
ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() timer callback always restarts the timer
again and can run indefinitely (unless it is stopped outside), and after
commit 120e9dabaf55 ("dccp: defer ccid_hc_tx_delete() at dismantle time"),
which moved ccid_hc_tx_delete() (also includes sk_stop_timer()) from
dccp_destroy_sock() to sk_destruct(), this started to happen quite often.
The timer prevents releasing the socket, as a result, sk_destruct() won't
be called.
Found with LTP/dccp_ipsec tests running on the bonding device,
which later couldn't be unloaded after the tests were completed:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for bond0 to become free. Usage count = 148
Fixes: 2a91aa396739 ("[DCCP] CCID2: Initial CCID2 (TCP-Like) implementation")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ static void ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire(unsig
ccid2_pr_debug("RTO_EXPIRE\n");
+ if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_CLOSED)
+ goto out;
+
/* back-off timer */
hc->tx_rto <<= 1;
if (hc->tx_rto > DCCP_RTO_MAX)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
commit 999898355e08ae3b92dfd0a08db706e0c6703d30 upstream.
When LONG_MIN is passed to msgrcv, one would expect to recieve any
message. But convert_mode does *msgtyp = -*msgtyp and -LONG_MIN is
undefined. In particular, with my gcc -LONG_MIN produces -LONG_MIN
again.
So handle this case properly by assigning LONG_MAX to *msgtyp if
LONG_MIN was specified as msgtyp to msgrcv.
This code:
long msg[] = { 100, 200 };
int m = msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT | 0644);
msgsnd(m, &msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
msgrcv(m, &msg, sizeof(msg), LONG_MIN, 0);
produces currently nothing:
msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT|0644) = 65538
msgsnd(65538, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, 0) = 0
msgrcv(65538, ...
Except a UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ipc/msg.c:745:13
negation of -9223372036854775808 cannot be represented in type 'long int':
With the patch, I see what I expect:
msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT|0644) = 0
msgsnd(0, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, 0) = 0
msgrcv(0, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, -9223372036854775808, 0) = 16
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
ipc/msg.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -742,7 +742,10 @@ static inline int convert_mode(long *msg
if (*msgtyp == 0)
return SEARCH_ANY;
if (*msgtyp < 0) {
- *msgtyp = -*msgtyp;
+ if (*msgtyp == LONG_MIN) /* -LONG_MIN is undefined */
+ *msgtyp = LONG_MAX;
+ else
+ *msgtyp = -*msgtyp;
return SEARCH_LESSEQUAL;
}
if (msgflg & MSG_EXCEPT)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 95ef498d977bf44ac094778fd448b98af158a3e6 ]
In my last patch, I missed fact that cork.base.dst was not initialized
in ip6_make_skb() :
If ip6_setup_cork() returns an error, we might attempt a dst_release()
on some random pointer.
Fixes: 862c03ee1deb ("ipv6: fix possible mem leaks in ipv6_make_skb()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1785,6 +1785,7 @@ struct sk_buff *ip6_make_skb(struct sock
cork.base.flags = 0;
cork.base.addr = 0;
cork.base.opt = NULL;
+ cork.base.dst = NULL;
v6_cork.opt = NULL;
err = ip6_setup_cork(sk, &cork, &v6_cork, hlimit, tclass, opt, rt, fl6);
if (err) {
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
commit 1c52d859cb2d417e7216d3e56bb7fea88444cec9 upstream.
We support various non-Intel CPUs that don't have the CPUID
instruction, so the M486 test was wrong. For now, fix it with a big
hammer: handle missing CPUID on all 32-bit CPUs.
Reported-by: One Thousand Gnomes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Whitehead <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: xen-devel <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/685bd083a7c036f7769510b6846315b17d6ba71f.1481307769.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: "Zhang, Ning A" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static inline void sync_core(void)
{
int tmp;
-#ifdef CONFIG_M486
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Do a CPUID if available, otherwise do a jump. The jump
* can conveniently enough be the jump around CPUID.
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jonathan Dieter <[email protected]>
commit cfd6ed4537a9e938fa76facecd4b9cd65b6d1563 upstream.
GCC 7 now warns when switch statements fall through implicitly, and with
-Werror enabled in configure.ac, that makes these tools unbuildable.
We fix this by notifying the compiler that this particular case statement
is meant to fall through.
Reviewed-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Dieter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip.c
+++ b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip.c
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
break;
case '?':
printf("usbip: invalid option\n");
+ /* Terminate after printing error */
+ /* FALLTHRU */
default:
usbip_usage();
goto out;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuiko Oshino <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a5b1379afbfabf91e3a689e82ac619a7157336b3 ]
Fix initialize the uninitialized tx_qlen to an appropriate value when USB
Full Speed is used.
Fixes: 55d7de9de6c3 ("Microchip's LAN7800 family USB 2/3 to 10/100/1000 Ethernet device driver")
Signed-off-by: Yuiko Oshino <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
@@ -1859,6 +1859,7 @@ static int lan78xx_reset(struct lan78xx_
buf = DEFAULT_BURST_CAP_SIZE / FS_USB_PKT_SIZE;
dev->rx_urb_size = DEFAULT_BURST_CAP_SIZE;
dev->rx_qlen = 4;
+ dev->tx_qlen = 4;
}
ret = lan78xx_write_reg(dev, BURST_CAP, buf);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
commit c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 upstream.
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations. Validate early in get_pipe() and return
failure.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -338,11 +338,13 @@ static struct stub_priv *stub_priv_alloc
return priv;
}
-static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
+static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, struct usbip_header *pdu)
{
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
+ int epnum = pdu->base.ep;
+ int dir = pdu->base.direction;
if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
goto err_ret;
@@ -355,6 +357,7 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
goto err_ret;
epd = &ep->desc;
+
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
return usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, epnum);
@@ -377,6 +380,27 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
}
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(epd)) {
+ /* validate packet size and number of packets */
+ unsigned int maxp, packets, bytes;
+
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT 11
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_MASK (3 << USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT)
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT(m) \
+ (((m) & USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_MASK) >> USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT)
+
+ maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
+ maxp *= (USB_EP_MAXP_MULT(
+ __le16_to_cpu(epd->wMaxPacketSize)) + 1);
+ bytes = pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
+ packets = DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, maxp);
+
+ if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets < 0 ||
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets > packets) {
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev,
+ "CMD_SUBMIT: isoc invalid num packets %d\n",
+ pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
return usb_sndisocpipe(udev, epnum);
else
@@ -385,7 +409,7 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
err_ret:
/* NOT REACHED */
- dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "get pipe() invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "CMD_SUBMIT: invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
return -1;
}
@@ -450,7 +474,7 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct
struct stub_priv *priv;
struct usbip_device *ud = &sdev->ud;
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
- int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
+ int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu);
if (pipe == -1)
return;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Francois Romieu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a78e93661c5fd30b9e1dee464b2f62f966883ef7 ]
Hardware statistics retrieval hurts in tight invocation loops.
Avoid extraneous write and enforce strict ordering of writes targeted to
the tally counters dump area address registers.
Signed-off-by: Francois Romieu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Oliver Freyermuth <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 9 ++-------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
@@ -2205,19 +2205,14 @@ static bool rtl8169_do_counters(struct n
void __iomem *ioaddr = tp->mmio_addr;
dma_addr_t paddr = tp->counters_phys_addr;
u32 cmd;
- bool ret;
RTL_W32(CounterAddrHigh, (u64)paddr >> 32);
+ RTL_R32(CounterAddrHigh);
cmd = (u64)paddr & DMA_BIT_MASK(32);
RTL_W32(CounterAddrLow, cmd);
RTL_W32(CounterAddrLow, cmd | counter_cmd);
- ret = rtl_udelay_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_counters_cond, 10, 1000);
-
- RTL_W32(CounterAddrLow, 0);
- RTL_W32(CounterAddrHigh, 0);
-
- return ret;
+ return rtl_udelay_loop_wait_low(tp, &rtl_counters_cond, 10, 1000);
}
static bool rtl8169_reset_counters(struct net_device *dev)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jia Zhang <[email protected]>
commit 7e702d17ed138cf4ae7c00e8c00681ed464587c7 upstream.
Commit b94b73733171 ("x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a
revision check") reduced the impact of erratum BDF90 for Broadwell model
79.
The impact can be reduced further by checking the size of the last level
cache portion per core.
Tony: "The erratum says the problem only occurs on the large-cache SKUs.
So we only need to avoid the update if we are on a big cache SKU that is
also running old microcode."
For more details, see erratum BDF90 in document #334165 (Intel Xeon
Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family Specification Update) from
September 2017.
Fixes: b94b73733171 ("x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check")
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
+/* last level cache size per core */
+static int llc_size_per_core;
+
static unsigned long mc_saved_in_initrd[MAX_UCODE_COUNT];
static struct mc_saved_data {
unsigned int mc_saved_count;
@@ -996,12 +999,14 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
/*
* Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
- * may result in a system hang. This behavior is documented in item
- * BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+ * and LLC size per core bigger than 2.5MB may result in a system hang.
+ * This behavior is documented in item BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon
+ * Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
*/
if (c->x86 == 6 &&
c->x86_model == 79 &&
c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+ llc_size_per_core > 2621440 &&
c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
@@ -1068,6 +1073,15 @@ static struct microcode_ops microcode_in
.microcode_fini_cpu = microcode_fini_cpu,
};
+static int __init calc_llc_size_per_core(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 llc_size = c->x86_cache_size * 1024;
+
+ do_div(llc_size, c->x86_max_cores);
+
+ return (int)llc_size;
+}
+
struct microcode_ops * __init init_intel_microcode(void)
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
@@ -1078,6 +1092,8 @@ struct microcode_ops * __init init_intel
return NULL;
}
+ llc_size_per_core = calc_llc_size_per_core(c);
+
return µcode_intel_ops;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit b831275a3553c32091222ac619cfddd73a5553fb upstream.
Linus noticed that lock_timer_base() lacks a READ_ONCE() for accessing the
timer flags. As a consequence the compiler is allowed to reload the flags
between the initial check for TIMER_MIGRATION and the following timer base
computation and the spin lock of the base.
While this has not been observed (yet), we need to make sure that it never
happens.
Fixes: 0eeda71bc30d ("timer: Replace timer base by a cpu index")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1610241711220.4983@nanos
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/time/timer.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -764,8 +764,15 @@ static struct tvec_base *lock_timer_base
__acquires(timer->base->lock)
{
for (;;) {
- u32 tf = timer->flags;
struct tvec_base *base;
+ u32 tf;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to use READ_ONCE() here, otherwise the compiler
+ * might re-read @tf between the check for TIMER_MIGRATING
+ * and spin_lock().
+ */
+ tf = READ_ONCE(timer->flags);
if (!(tf & TIMER_MIGRATING)) {
base = per_cpu_ptr(&tvec_bases, tf & TIMER_CPUMASK);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit f97238373b8662a6d580e204df2e7bcbfa43e27a upstream.
Accessing more than one byte from a symbol declared simply 'char' is undefined
behavior, as reported by UBSAN:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/base/power/trace.c:178:18
load of address ffffffff8203fc78 with insufficient space
for an object of type 'char'
Avoid this by declaring the symbols as arrays.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/base/power/trace.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/base/power/trace.c
+++ b/drivers/base/power/trace.c
@@ -166,14 +166,14 @@ void generate_pm_trace(const void *trace
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_pm_trace);
-extern char __tracedata_start, __tracedata_end;
+extern char __tracedata_start[], __tracedata_end[];
static int show_file_hash(unsigned int value)
{
int match;
char *tracedata;
match = 0;
- for (tracedata = &__tracedata_start ; tracedata < &__tracedata_end ;
+ for (tracedata = __tracedata_start ; tracedata < __tracedata_end ;
tracedata += 2 + sizeof(unsigned long)) {
unsigned short lineno = *(unsigned short *)tracedata;
const char *file = *(const char **)(tracedata + 2);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Doug Berger <[email protected]>
commit e048cb32f69038aa1c8f11e5c1b331be4181659d upstream.
The align_offset parameter is used by bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off()
to represent the offset of map's base from the previous alignment
boundary; the function ensures that the returned index, plus the
align_offset, honors the specified align_mask.
The logic introduced by commit b5be83e308f7 ("mm: cma: align to physical
address, not CMA region position") has the cma driver calculate the
offset to the *next* alignment boundary. In most cases, the base
alignment is greater than that specified when making allocations,
resulting in a zero offset whether we align up or down. In the example
given with the commit, the base alignment (8MB) was half the requested
alignment (16MB) so the math also happened to work since the offset is
8MB in both directions. However, when requesting allocations with an
alignment greater than twice that of the base, the returned index would
not be correctly aligned.
Also, the align_order arguments of cma_bitmap_aligned_mask() and
cma_bitmap_aligned_offset() should not be negative so the argument type
was made unsigned.
Fixes: b5be83e308f7 ("mm: cma: align to physical address, not CMA region position")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Angus Clark <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Berger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Gregory Fong <[email protected]>
Cc: Doug Berger <[email protected]>
Cc: Angus Clark <[email protected]>
Cc: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Lucas Stach <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Shiraz Hashim <[email protected]>
Cc: Jaewon Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/cma.c | 15 ++++++---------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/cma.c
+++ b/mm/cma.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned long cma_get_size(const struct
}
static unsigned long cma_bitmap_aligned_mask(const struct cma *cma,
- int align_order)
+ unsigned int align_order)
{
if (align_order <= cma->order_per_bit)
return 0;
@@ -62,17 +62,14 @@ static unsigned long cma_bitmap_aligned_
}
/*
- * Find a PFN aligned to the specified order and return an offset represented in
- * order_per_bits.
+ * Find the offset of the base PFN from the specified align_order.
+ * The value returned is represented in order_per_bits.
*/
static unsigned long cma_bitmap_aligned_offset(const struct cma *cma,
- int align_order)
+ unsigned int align_order)
{
- if (align_order <= cma->order_per_bit)
- return 0;
-
- return (ALIGN(cma->base_pfn, (1UL << align_order))
- - cma->base_pfn) >> cma->order_per_bit;
+ return (cma->base_pfn & ((1UL << align_order) - 1))
+ >> cma->order_per_bit;
}
static unsigned long cma_bitmap_pages_to_bits(const struct cma *cma,
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Liping Zhang <[email protected]>
commit b173a28f62cf929324a8a6adcc45adadce311d16 upstream.
The 'name' filed in struct nf_conntrack_expect_policy{} is not a
pointer, so check it is NULL or not will always return true. Even if the
name is empty, slash will always be displayed like follows:
# cat /proc/net/nf_conntrack_expect
297 l3proto = 2 proto=6 src=1.1.1.1 dst=2.2.2.2 sport=1 dport=1025 ftp/
^
Fixes: 3a8fc53a45c4 ("netfilter: nf_ct_helper: allocate 16 bytes for the helper and policy names")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static int exp_seq_show(struct seq_file
helper = rcu_dereference(nfct_help(expect->master)->helper);
if (helper) {
seq_printf(s, "%s%s", expect->flags ? " " : "", helper->name);
- if (helper->expect_policy[expect->class].name)
+ if (helper->expect_policy[expect->class].name[0])
seq_printf(s, "/%s",
helper->expect_policy[expect->class].name);
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Streetman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4ee806d51176ba7b8ff1efd81f271d7252e03a1d ]
When a tcp socket is closed, if it detects that its net namespace is
exiting, close immediately and do not wait for FIN sequence.
For normal sockets, a reference is taken to their net namespace, so it will
never exit while the socket is open. However, kernel sockets do not take a
reference to their net namespace, so it may begin exiting while the kernel
socket is still open. In this case if the kernel socket is a tcp socket,
it will stay open trying to complete its close sequence. The sock's dst(s)
hold a reference to their interface, which are all transferred to the
namespace's loopback interface when the real interfaces are taken down.
When the namespace tries to take down its loopback interface, it hangs
waiting for all references to the loopback interface to release, which
results in messages like:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
These messages continue until the socket finally times out and closes.
Since the net namespace cleanup holds the net_mutex while calling its
registered pernet callbacks, any new net namespace initialization is
blocked until the current net namespace finishes exiting.
After this change, the tcp socket notices the exiting net namespace, and
closes immediately, releasing its dst(s) and their reference to the
loopback interface, which lets the net namespace continue exiting.
Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1711407
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=97811
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/net/net_namespace.h | 10 ++++++++++
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 3 +++
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
--- a/include/net/net_namespace.h
+++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h
@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ int net_eq(const struct net *net1, const
return net1 == net2;
}
+static inline int check_net(const struct net *net)
+{
+ return atomic_read(&net->count) != 0;
+}
+
void net_drop_ns(void *);
#else
@@ -232,6 +237,11 @@ int net_eq(const struct net *net1, const
{
return 1;
}
+
+static inline int check_net(const struct net *net)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
#define net_drop_ns NULL
#endif
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2176,6 +2176,9 @@ adjudge_to_death:
tcp_send_active_reset(sk, GFP_ATOMIC);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONMEMORY);
+ } else if (!check_net(sock_net(sk))) {
+ /* Not possible to send reset; just close */
+ tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
}
}
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
@@ -46,11 +46,19 @@ static void tcp_write_err(struct sock *s
* to prevent DoS attacks. It is called when a retransmission timeout
* or zero probe timeout occurs on orphaned socket.
*
+ * Also close if our net namespace is exiting; in that case there is no
+ * hope of ever communicating again since all netns interfaces are already
+ * down (or about to be down), and we need to release our dst references,
+ * which have been moved to the netns loopback interface, so the namespace
+ * can finish exiting. This condition is only possible if we are a kernel
+ * socket, as those do not hold references to the namespace.
+ *
* Criteria is still not confirmed experimentally and may change.
* We kill the socket, if:
* 1. If number of orphaned sockets exceeds an administratively configured
* limit.
* 2. If we have strong memory pressure.
+ * 3. If our net namespace is exiting.
*/
static int tcp_out_of_resources(struct sock *sk, bool do_reset)
{
@@ -79,6 +87,13 @@ static int tcp_out_of_resources(struct s
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONMEMORY);
return 1;
}
+
+ if (!check_net(sock_net(sk))) {
+ /* Not possible to send reset; just close */
+ tcp_done(sk);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
commit fac51482577d5e05bbb0efa8d602a3c2111098bf upstream.
With CONFIG_OF enabled on x86, we get the following error on boot:
"
Failed to find cpu0 device node
Unable to detect cache hierarchy from DT for CPU 0
"
and the cacheinfo fails to get populated in the corresponding sysfs
entries. This is because cache_setup_of_node looks for of_node for
setting up the shared cpu_map without checking that it's already
populated in the architecture specific callback.
In order to indicate that the shared cpu_map is already populated, this
patch introduces a boolean `cpu_map_populated` in struct cpu_cacheinfo
that can be used by the generic code to skip cache_shared_cpu_map_setup.
This patch also sets that boolean for x86.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c | 2 ++
drivers/base/cacheinfo.c | 3 +++
include/linux/cacheinfo.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c
@@ -934,6 +934,8 @@ static int __populate_cache_leaves(unsig
ci_leaf_init(this_leaf++, &id4_regs);
__cache_cpumap_setup(cpu, idx, &id4_regs);
}
+ this_cpu_ci->cpu_map_populated = true;
+
return 0;
}
--- a/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ static int cache_shared_cpu_map_setup(un
unsigned int index;
int ret;
+ if (this_cpu_ci->cpu_map_populated)
+ return 0;
+
ret = cache_setup_of_node(cpu);
if (ret)
return ret;
--- a/include/linux/cacheinfo.h
+++ b/include/linux/cacheinfo.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct cpu_cacheinfo {
struct cacheinfo *info_list;
unsigned int num_levels;
unsigned int num_leaves;
+ bool cpu_map_populated;
};
/*
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Minghuan Lian <[email protected]>
commit 1195c103f6c98d9ff381cac3a8760d4f8a133627 upstream.
Some kinds of Layerscape PCIe controllers will forward the received message
TLPs to system application address space, which could corrupt system memory
or lead to a system hang. Enable MSG_DROP to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Minghuan Lian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/host/pci-layerscape.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/pci/host/pci-layerscape.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/host/pci-layerscape.c
@@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ static void ls_pcie_fix_class(struct ls_
iowrite16(PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI, pcie->dbi + PCI_CLASS_DEVICE);
}
+/* Drop MSG TLP except for Vendor MSG */
+static void ls_pcie_drop_msg_tlp(struct ls_pcie *pcie)
+{
+ u32 val;
+
+ val = ioread32(pcie->dbi + PCIE_STRFMR1);
+ val &= 0xDFFFFFFF;
+ iowrite32(val, pcie->dbi + PCIE_STRFMR1);
+}
+
static int ls1021_pcie_link_up(struct pcie_port *pp)
{
u32 state;
@@ -97,7 +107,7 @@ static int ls1021_pcie_link_up(struct pc
static void ls1021_pcie_host_init(struct pcie_port *pp)
{
struct ls_pcie *pcie = to_ls_pcie(pp);
- u32 val, index[2];
+ u32 index[2];
pcie->scfg = syscon_regmap_lookup_by_phandle(pp->dev->of_node,
"fsl,pcie-scfg");
@@ -116,13 +126,7 @@ static void ls1021_pcie_host_init(struct
dw_pcie_setup_rc(pp);
- /*
- * LS1021A Workaround for internal TKT228622
- * to fix the INTx hang issue
- */
- val = ioread32(pcie->dbi + PCIE_STRFMR1);
- val &= 0xffff;
- iowrite32(val, pcie->dbi + PCIE_STRFMR1);
+ ls_pcie_drop_msg_tlp(pcie);
}
static int ls_pcie_link_up(struct pcie_port *pp)
@@ -147,6 +151,7 @@ static void ls_pcie_host_init(struct pci
iowrite32(1, pcie->dbi + PCIE_DBI_RO_WR_EN);
ls_pcie_fix_class(pcie);
ls_pcie_clear_multifunction(pcie);
+ ls_pcie_drop_msg_tlp(pcie);
iowrite32(0, pcie->dbi + PCIE_DBI_RO_WR_EN);
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
commit c2a6bbaf0c5f90463a7011a295bbdb7e33c80b51 upstream.
The way acpi_find_child_device() works currently is that, if there
are two (or more) devices with the same _ADR value in the same
namespace scope (which is not specifically allowed by the spec and
the OS behavior in that case is not defined), the first one of them
found to be present (with the help of _STA) will be returned.
This covers the majority of cases, but is not sufficient if some of
the devices in question have a _HID (or _CID) returning some valid
ACPI/PNP device IDs (which is disallowed by the spec) and the
ASL writers' expectation appears to be that the OS will match
devices without a valid ACPI/PNP device ID against a given bus
address first.
To cover this special case as well, modify find_child_checks()
to prefer devices without ACPI/PNP device IDs over devices that
have them.
Suggested-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/acpi/glue.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/acpi/glue.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/glue.c
@@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ static int find_child_checks(struct acpi
return -ENODEV;
/*
- * If the device has a _HID (or _CID) returning a valid ACPI/PNP
- * device ID, it is better to make it look less attractive here, so that
- * the other device with the same _ADR value (that may not have a valid
- * device ID) can be matched going forward. [This means a second spec
- * violation in a row, so whatever we do here is best effort anyway.]
+ * If the device has a _HID returning a valid ACPI/PNP device ID, it is
+ * better to make it look less attractive here, so that the other device
+ * with the same _ADR value (that may not have a valid device ID) can be
+ * matched going forward. [This means a second spec violation in a row,
+ * so whatever we do here is best effort anyway.]
*/
- return sta_present && list_empty(&adev->pnp.ids) ?
+ return sta_present && !adev->pnp.type.platform_id ?
FIND_CHILD_MAX_SCORE : FIND_CHILD_MIN_SCORE;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
commit b050e3769c6b4013bb937e879fc43bf1847ee819 upstream.
Since commit 97a16fc82a7c ("mm, page_alloc: only enforce watermarks for
order-0 allocations"), __zone_watermark_ok() check for high-order
allocations will shortcut per-migratetype free list checks for
ALLOC_HARDER allocations, and return true as long as there's free page
of any migratetype. The intention is that ALLOC_HARDER can allocate
from MIGRATE_HIGHATOMIC free lists, while normal allocations can't.
However, as a side effect, the watermark check will then also return
true when there are pages only on the MIGRATE_ISOLATE list, or (prior to
CMA conversion to ZONE_MOVABLE) on the MIGRATE_CMA list. Since the
allocation cannot actually obtain isolated pages, and might not be able
to obtain CMA pages, this can result in a false positive.
The condition should be rare and perhaps the outcome is not a fatal one.
Still, it's better if the watermark check is correct. There also
shouldn't be a performance tradeoff here.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 97a16fc82a7c ("mm, page_alloc: only enforce watermarks for order-0 allocations")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/page_alloc.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -2468,9 +2468,6 @@ static bool __zone_watermark_ok(struct z
if (!area->nr_free)
continue;
- if (alloc_harder)
- return true;
-
for (mt = 0; mt < MIGRATE_PCPTYPES; mt++) {
if (!list_empty(&area->free_list[mt]))
return true;
@@ -2482,6 +2479,9 @@ static bool __zone_watermark_ok(struct z
return true;
}
#endif
+ if (alloc_harder &&
+ !list_empty(&area->free_list[MIGRATE_HIGHATOMIC]))
+ return true;
}
return false;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrew Goodbody <[email protected]>
commit 21619792d1eca7e772ca190ba68588e57f29595b upstream.
Change spin_lock calls to spin_lock_irqsave to prevent
attmpted recursive lock taking in interrupt context.
This patch fixes Bug 109351
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109351
Signed-off-by: Andrew Goodbody <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_event.c | 5 +-
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c | 30 +++++++------
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 19 +++++---
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_tx.c | 14 +++---
5 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_event.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_event.c
@@ -117,11 +117,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usbip_event_add);
int usbip_event_happened(struct usbip_device *ud)
{
int happened = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&ud->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&ud->lock, flags);
if (ud->event != 0)
happened = 1;
- spin_unlock(&ud->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ud->lock, flags);
return happened;
}
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
@@ -121,9 +121,11 @@ static void dump_port_status_diff(u32 pr
void rh_port_connect(int rhport, enum usb_device_speed speed)
{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
usbip_dbg_vhci_rh("rh_port_connect %d\n", rhport);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
the_controller->port_status[rhport] |= USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION
| (1 << USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION);
@@ -139,22 +141,24 @@ void rh_port_connect(int rhport, enum us
break;
}
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usb_hcd_poll_rh_status(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller));
}
static void rh_port_disconnect(int rhport)
{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
usbip_dbg_vhci_rh("rh_port_disconnect %d\n", rhport);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
the_controller->port_status[rhport] &= ~USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION;
the_controller->port_status[rhport] |=
(1 << USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usb_hcd_poll_rh_status(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller));
}
@@ -182,13 +186,14 @@ static int vhci_hub_status(struct usb_hc
int retval;
int rhport;
int changed = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
retval = DIV_ROUND_UP(VHCI_NPORTS + 1, 8);
memset(buf, 0, retval);
vhci = hcd_to_vhci(hcd);
- spin_lock(&vhci->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vhci->lock, flags);
if (!HCD_HW_ACCESSIBLE(hcd)) {
usbip_dbg_vhci_rh("hw accessible flag not on?\n");
goto done;
@@ -209,7 +214,7 @@ static int vhci_hub_status(struct usb_hc
usb_hcd_resume_root_hub(hcd);
done:
- spin_unlock(&vhci->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vhci->lock, flags);
return changed ? retval : 0;
}
@@ -236,6 +241,7 @@ static int vhci_hub_control(struct usb_h
struct vhci_hcd *dum;
int retval = 0;
int rhport;
+ unsigned long flags;
u32 prev_port_status[VHCI_NPORTS];
@@ -254,7 +260,7 @@ static int vhci_hub_control(struct usb_h
dum = hcd_to_vhci(hcd);
- spin_lock(&dum->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&dum->lock, flags);
/* store old status and compare now and old later */
if (usbip_dbg_flag_vhci_rh) {
@@ -408,7 +414,7 @@ static int vhci_hub_control(struct usb_h
}
usbip_dbg_vhci_rh(" bye\n");
- spin_unlock(&dum->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dum->lock, flags);
return retval;
}
@@ -431,6 +437,7 @@ static void vhci_tx_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
struct vhci_device *vdev = get_vdev(urb->dev);
struct vhci_priv *priv;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (!vdev) {
pr_err("could not get virtual device");
@@ -443,7 +450,7 @@ static void vhci_tx_urb(struct urb *urb)
return;
}
- spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
priv->seqnum = atomic_inc_return(&the_controller->seqnum);
if (priv->seqnum == 0xffff)
@@ -457,7 +464,7 @@ static void vhci_tx_urb(struct urb *urb)
list_add_tail(&priv->list, &vdev->priv_tx);
wake_up(&vdev->waitq_tx);
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
}
static int vhci_urb_enqueue(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb,
@@ -466,15 +473,16 @@ static int vhci_urb_enqueue(struct usb_h
struct device *dev = &urb->dev->dev;
int ret = 0;
struct vhci_device *vdev;
+ unsigned long flags;
/* patch to usb_sg_init() is in 2.5.60 */
BUG_ON(!urb->transfer_buffer && urb->transfer_buffer_length);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
if (urb->status != -EINPROGRESS) {
dev_err(dev, "URB already unlinked!, status %d\n", urb->status);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
return urb->status;
}
@@ -486,7 +494,7 @@ static int vhci_urb_enqueue(struct usb_h
vdev->ud.status == VDEV_ST_ERROR) {
dev_err(dev, "enqueue for inactive port %d\n", vdev->rhport);
spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
return -ENODEV;
}
spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);
@@ -559,14 +567,14 @@ static int vhci_urb_enqueue(struct usb_h
out:
vhci_tx_urb(urb);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
return 0;
no_need_xmit:
usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(hcd, urb);
no_need_unlink:
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
if (!ret)
usb_hcd_giveback_urb(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller),
urb, urb->status);
@@ -623,14 +631,15 @@ static int vhci_urb_dequeue(struct usb_h
{
struct vhci_priv *priv;
struct vhci_device *vdev;
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
priv = urb->hcpriv;
if (!priv) {
/* URB was never linked! or will be soon given back by
* vhci_rx. */
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
return -EIDRM;
}
@@ -639,7 +648,7 @@ static int vhci_urb_dequeue(struct usb_h
ret = usb_hcd_check_unlink_urb(hcd, urb, status);
if (ret) {
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
}
@@ -664,10 +673,10 @@ static int vhci_urb_dequeue(struct usb_h
*/
usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(hcd, urb);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usb_hcd_giveback_urb(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller), urb,
urb->status);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
} else {
/* tcp connection is alive */
@@ -679,7 +688,7 @@ static int vhci_urb_dequeue(struct usb_h
unlink = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vhci_unlink), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!unlink) {
spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usbip_event_add(&vdev->ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_MALLOC);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -698,7 +707,7 @@ static int vhci_urb_dequeue(struct usb_h
spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
}
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usbip_dbg_vhci_hc("leave\n");
return 0;
@@ -707,8 +716,9 @@ static int vhci_urb_dequeue(struct usb_h
static void vhci_device_unlink_cleanup(struct vhci_device *vdev)
{
struct vhci_unlink *unlink, *tmp;
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(unlink, tmp, &vdev->unlink_tx, list) {
@@ -742,19 +752,19 @@ static void vhci_device_unlink_cleanup(s
list_del(&unlink->list);
spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usb_hcd_giveback_urb(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller), urb,
urb->status);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
kfree(unlink);
}
spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
}
/*
@@ -821,8 +831,9 @@ static void vhci_shutdown_connection(str
static void vhci_device_reset(struct usbip_device *ud)
{
struct vhci_device *vdev = container_of(ud, struct vhci_device, ud);
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&ud->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&ud->lock, flags);
vdev->speed = 0;
vdev->devid = 0;
@@ -836,14 +847,16 @@ static void vhci_device_reset(struct usb
}
ud->status = VDEV_ST_NULL;
- spin_unlock(&ud->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ud->lock, flags);
}
static void vhci_device_unusable(struct usbip_device *ud)
{
- spin_lock(&ud->lock);
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&ud->lock, flags);
ud->status = VDEV_ST_ERROR;
- spin_unlock(&ud->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ud->lock, flags);
}
static void vhci_device_init(struct vhci_device *vdev)
@@ -933,12 +946,13 @@ static int vhci_get_frame_number(struct
static int vhci_bus_suspend(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
{
struct vhci_hcd *vhci = hcd_to_vhci(hcd);
+ unsigned long flags;
dev_dbg(&hcd->self.root_hub->dev, "%s\n", __func__);
- spin_lock(&vhci->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vhci->lock, flags);
hcd->state = HC_STATE_SUSPENDED;
- spin_unlock(&vhci->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vhci->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -947,15 +961,16 @@ static int vhci_bus_resume(struct usb_hc
{
struct vhci_hcd *vhci = hcd_to_vhci(hcd);
int rc = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
dev_dbg(&hcd->self.root_hub->dev, "%s\n", __func__);
- spin_lock(&vhci->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vhci->lock, flags);
if (!HCD_HW_ACCESSIBLE(hcd))
rc = -ESHUTDOWN;
else
hcd->state = HC_STATE_RUNNING;
- spin_unlock(&vhci->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vhci->lock, flags);
return rc;
}
@@ -1053,17 +1068,18 @@ static int vhci_hcd_suspend(struct platf
int rhport = 0;
int connected = 0;
int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
hcd = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
for (rhport = 0; rhport < VHCI_NPORTS; rhport++)
if (the_controller->port_status[rhport] &
USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION)
connected += 1;
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
if (connected > 0) {
dev_info(&pdev->dev,
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c
@@ -71,10 +71,11 @@ static void vhci_recv_ret_submit(struct
{
struct usbip_device *ud = &vdev->ud;
struct urb *urb;
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
urb = pickup_urb_and_free_priv(vdev, pdu->base.seqnum);
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
if (!urb) {
pr_err("cannot find a urb of seqnum %u max seqnum %d\n",
@@ -103,9 +104,9 @@ static void vhci_recv_ret_submit(struct
usbip_dbg_vhci_rx("now giveback urb %u\n", pdu->base.seqnum);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller), urb);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usb_hcd_giveback_urb(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller), urb, urb->status);
@@ -116,8 +117,9 @@ static struct vhci_unlink *dequeue_pendi
struct usbip_header *pdu)
{
struct vhci_unlink *unlink, *tmp;
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry_safe(unlink, tmp, &vdev->unlink_rx, list) {
pr_info("unlink->seqnum %lu\n", unlink->seqnum);
@@ -126,12 +128,12 @@ static struct vhci_unlink *dequeue_pendi
unlink->seqnum);
list_del(&unlink->list);
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
return unlink;
}
}
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
@@ -141,6 +143,7 @@ static void vhci_recv_ret_unlink(struct
{
struct vhci_unlink *unlink;
struct urb *urb;
+ unsigned long flags;
usbip_dump_header(pdu);
@@ -151,9 +154,9 @@ static void vhci_recv_ret_unlink(struct
return;
}
- spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
urb = pickup_urb_and_free_priv(vdev, unlink->unlink_seqnum);
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
if (!urb) {
/*
@@ -170,9 +173,9 @@ static void vhci_recv_ret_unlink(struct
urb->status = pdu->u.ret_unlink.status;
pr_info("urb->status %d\n", urb->status);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller), urb);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usb_hcd_giveback_urb(vhci_to_hcd(the_controller), urb,
urb->status);
@@ -184,10 +187,11 @@ static void vhci_recv_ret_unlink(struct
static int vhci_priv_tx_empty(struct vhci_device *vdev)
{
int empty = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
empty = list_empty(&vdev->priv_rx);
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
return empty;
}
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
@@ -32,10 +32,11 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device
{
char *s = out;
int i = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
BUG_ON(!the_controller || !out);
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
/*
* output example:
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device
spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);
}
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
return out - s;
}
@@ -84,11 +85,12 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(status);
static int vhci_port_disconnect(__u32 rhport)
{
struct vhci_device *vdev;
+ unsigned long flags;
usbip_dbg_vhci_sysfs("enter\n");
/* lock */
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
vdev = port_to_vdev(rhport);
@@ -98,14 +100,14 @@ static int vhci_port_disconnect(__u32 rh
/* unlock */
spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* unlock */
spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
usbip_event_add(&vdev->ud, VDEV_EVENT_DOWN);
@@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ static ssize_t store_attach(struct devic
int sockfd = 0;
__u32 rhport = 0, devid = 0, speed = 0;
int err;
+ unsigned long flags;
/*
* @rhport: port number of vhci_hcd
@@ -206,14 +209,14 @@ static ssize_t store_attach(struct devic
/* now need lock until setting vdev status as used */
/* begin a lock */
- spin_lock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&the_controller->lock, flags);
vdev = port_to_vdev(rhport);
spin_lock(&vdev->ud.lock);
if (vdev->ud.status != VDEV_ST_NULL) {
/* end of the lock */
spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
sockfd_put(socket);
@@ -232,7 +235,7 @@ static ssize_t store_attach(struct devic
vdev->ud.status = VDEV_ST_NOTASSIGNED;
spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);
- spin_unlock(&the_controller->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&the_controller->lock, flags);
/* end the lock */
vdev->ud.tcp_rx = kthread_get_run(vhci_rx_loop, &vdev->ud, "vhci_rx");
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_tx.c
@@ -47,16 +47,17 @@ static void setup_cmd_submit_pdu(struct
static struct vhci_priv *dequeue_from_priv_tx(struct vhci_device *vdev)
{
struct vhci_priv *priv, *tmp;
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry_safe(priv, tmp, &vdev->priv_tx, list) {
list_move_tail(&priv->list, &vdev->priv_rx);
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
return priv;
}
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
@@ -137,16 +138,17 @@ static int vhci_send_cmd_submit(struct v
static struct vhci_unlink *dequeue_from_unlink_tx(struct vhci_device *vdev)
{
struct vhci_unlink *unlink, *tmp;
+ unsigned long flags;
- spin_lock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry_safe(unlink, tmp, &vdev->unlink_tx, list) {
list_move_tail(&unlink->list, &vdev->unlink_rx);
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
return unlink;
}
- spin_unlock(&vdev->priv_lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->priv_lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 6883cd7f68245e43e91e5ee583b7550abf14523f upstream.
When new directory 'DIR1' is created in a directory 'DIR0' with SGID bit
set, DIR1 is expected to have SGID bit set (and owning group equal to
the owning group of 'DIR0'). However when 'DIR0' also has some default
ACLs that 'DIR1' inherits, setting these ACLs will result in SGID bit on
'DIR1' to get cleared if user is not member of the owning group.
Fix the problem by moving posix_acl_update_mode() out of
__reiserfs_set_acl() into reiserfs_set_acl(). That way the function will
not be called when inheriting ACLs which is what we want as it prevents
SGID bit clearing and the mode has been properly set by
posix_acl_create() anyway.
Fixes: 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c | 12 +++++++-----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c
@@ -37,7 +37,14 @@ reiserfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, st
error = journal_begin(&th, inode->i_sb, jcreate_blocks);
reiserfs_write_unlock(inode->i_sb);
if (error == 0) {
+ if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && acl) {
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode,
+ &acl);
+ if (error)
+ goto unlock;
+ }
error = __reiserfs_set_acl(&th, inode, type, acl);
+unlock:
reiserfs_write_lock(inode->i_sb);
error2 = journal_end(&th);
reiserfs_write_unlock(inode->i_sb);
@@ -245,11 +252,6 @@ __reiserfs_set_acl(struct reiserfs_trans
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS;
- if (acl) {
- error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
- if (error)
- return error;
- }
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = POSIX_ACL_XATTR_DEFAULT;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
commit c995efd5a740d9cbafbf58bde4973e8b50b4d761 upstream.
On context switch from a shallow call stack to a deeper one, as the CPU
does 'ret' up the deeper side it may encounter RSB entries (predictions for
where the 'ret' goes to) which were populated in userspace.
This is problematic if neither SMEP nor KPTI (the latter of which marks
userspace pages as NX for the kernel) are active, as malicious code in
userspace may then be executed speculatively.
Overwrite the CPU's return prediction stack with calls which are predicted
to return to an infinite loop, to "capture" speculation if this
happens. This is required both for retpoline, and also in conjunction with
IBRS for !SMEP && !KPTI.
On Skylake+ the problem is slightly different, and an *underflow* of the
RSB may cause errant branch predictions to occur. So there it's not so much
overwrite, as *filling* the RSB to attempt to prevent it getting
empty. This is only a partial solution for Skylake+ since there are many
other conditions which may result in the RSB becoming empty. The full
solution on Skylake+ is to use IBRS, which will prevent the problem even
when the RSB becomes empty. With IBRS, the RSB-stuffing will not be
required on context switch.
[ tglx: Added missing vendor check and slighty massaged comments and
changelog ]
[js] backport to 4.4 -- __switch_to_asm does not exist there, we
have to patch the switch_to macros for both x86_32 and x86_64.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Turner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 75 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_EPP ( 7*32+13) /* Intel HWP_EPP */
#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_PKG_REQ ( 7*32+14) /* Intel HWP_PKG_REQ */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+29) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+30) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H
#define _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
struct task_struct; /* one of the stranger aspects of C forward declarations */
__visible struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *next);
@@ -24,6 +26,23 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct
#define __switch_canary_iparam
#endif /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ /*
+ * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
+ * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
+ * with userspace addresses. On CPUs where those concerns
+ * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
+ * speculative execution to prevent attack.
+ */
+#define __retpoline_fill_return_buffer \
+ ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", \
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%%ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %%esp)),\
+ X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) \
+ "910:\n\t"
+#else
+#define __retpoline_fill_return_buffer
+#endif
+
/*
* Saving eflags is important. It switches not only IOPL between tasks,
* it also protects other tasks from NT leaking through sysenter etc.
@@ -46,6 +65,7 @@ do { \
"movl $1f,%[prev_ip]\n\t" /* save EIP */ \
"pushl %[next_ip]\n\t" /* restore EIP */ \
__switch_canary \
+ __retpoline_fill_return_buffer \
"jmp __switch_to\n" /* regparm call */ \
"1:\t" \
"popl %%ebp\n\t" /* restore EBP */ \
@@ -100,6 +120,23 @@ do { \
#define __switch_canary_iparam
#endif /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ /*
+ * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
+ * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
+ * with userspace addresses. On CPUs where those concerns
+ * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
+ * speculative execution to prevent attack.
+ */
+#define __retpoline_fill_return_buffer \
+ ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", \
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%%r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %%rsp)),\
+ X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) \
+ "910:\n\t"
+#else
+#define __retpoline_fill_return_buffer
+#endif
+
/*
* There is no need to save or restore flags, because flags are always
* clean in kernel mode, with the possible exception of IOPL. Kernel IOPL
@@ -112,6 +149,7 @@ do { \
"call __switch_to\n\t" \
"movq "__percpu_arg([current_task])",%%rsi\n\t" \
__switch_canary \
+ __retpoline_fill_return_buffer \
"movq %P[thread_info](%%rsi),%%r8\n\t" \
"movq %%rax,%%rdi\n\t" \
"testl %[_tif_fork],%P[ti_flags](%%r8)\n\t" \
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -154,6 +155,23 @@ disable:
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
}
+/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
+static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -212,6 +230,24 @@ retpoline_auto:
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+
+ /*
+ * If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
+ * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
+ * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
+ * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+ *
+ * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
+ * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
+ * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
+ * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
+ * switch is required.
+ */
+ if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+ pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+ }
}
#undef pr_fmt
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
commit 95a8d19f28e6b29377a880c6264391a62e07fccc upstream.
In case nf_conntrack_tuple_taken did not find a conflicting entry
check that all entries in this hash slot were tested and restart
in case an entry was moved to another chain.
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Fixes: ea781f197d6a ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU and get rid of call_rcu()")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
@@ -719,6 +719,7 @@ nf_conntrack_tuple_taken(const struct nf
* least once for the stats anyway.
*/
rcu_read_lock_bh();
+ begin:
hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(h, n, &net->ct.hash[hash], hnnode) {
ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
if (ct != ignored_conntrack &&
@@ -730,6 +731,12 @@ nf_conntrack_tuple_taken(const struct nf
}
NF_CT_STAT_INC(net, searched);
}
+
+ if (get_nulls_value(n) != hash) {
+ NF_CT_STAT_INC(net, search_restart);
+ goto begin;
+ }
+
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return 0;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
commit 54930dfeb46e978b447af0fb8ab4e181c1bf9d7a upstream.
Most extended attributes will fit in a single block. More importantly,
we drop the reference to the inode while holding the transaction open
so the preallocated blocks aren't released. As a result, the inode
may be evicted before it's removed from the transaction's prealloc list
which can cause memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/reiserfs/bitmap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/reiserfs/bitmap.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/bitmap.c
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ static int determine_prealloc_size(reise
hint->prealloc_size = 0;
if (!hint->formatted_node && hint->preallocate) {
- if (S_ISREG(hint->inode->i_mode)
+ if (S_ISREG(hint->inode->i_mode) && !IS_PRIVATE(hint->inode)
&& hint->inode->i_size >=
REISERFS_SB(hint->th->t_super)->s_alloc_options.
preallocmin * hint->inode->i_sb->s_blocksize)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
commit 635f545a7e8be7596b9b2b6a43cab6bbd5a88e43 upstream.
get_pipe() routine doesn't validate the input endpoint number
and uses to reference ep_in and ep_out arrays. Invalid endpoint
number can trigger BUG(). Range check the epnum and returning
error instead of calling BUG().
Change caller stub_recv_cmd_submit() to handle the get_pipe()
error return.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -344,15 +344,15 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
+ if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
+ goto err_ret;
+
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_IN)
ep = udev->ep_in[epnum & 0x7f];
else
ep = udev->ep_out[epnum & 0x7f];
- if (!ep) {
- dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev, "no such endpoint?, %d\n",
- epnum);
- BUG();
- }
+ if (!ep)
+ goto err_ret;
epd = &ep->desc;
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
@@ -383,9 +383,10 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
return usb_rcvisocpipe(udev, epnum);
}
+err_ret:
/* NOT REACHED */
- dev_err(&sdev->interface->dev, "get pipe, epnum %d\n", epnum);
- return 0;
+ dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "get pipe() invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
+ return -1;
}
static void masking_bogus_flags(struct urb *urb)
@@ -451,6 +452,9 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
+ if (pipe == -1)
+ return;
+
priv = stub_priv_alloc(sdev, pdu);
if (!priv)
return;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit d5421ea43d30701e03cadc56a38854c36a8b4433 upstream.
The hrtimer interrupt code contains a hang detection and mitigation
mechanism, which prevents that a long delayed hrtimer interrupt causes a
continous retriggering of interrupts which prevent the system from making
progress. If a hang is detected then the timer hardware is programmed with
a certain delay into the future and a flag is set in the hrtimer cpu base
which prevents newly enqueued timers from reprogramming the timer hardware
prior to the chosen delay. The subsequent hrtimer interrupt after the delay
clears the flag and resumes normal operation.
If such a hang happens in the last hrtimer interrupt before a CPU is
unplugged then the hang_detected flag is set and stays that way when the
CPU is plugged in again. At that point the timer hardware is not armed and
it cannot be armed because the hang_detected flag is still active, so
nothing clears that flag. As a consequence the CPU does not receive hrtimer
interrupts and no timers expire on that CPU which results in RCU stalls and
other malfunctions.
Clear the flag along with some other less critical members of the hrtimer
cpu base to ensure starting from a clean state when a CPU is plugged in.
Thanks to Paul, Sebastian and Anna-Maria for their help to get down to the
root cause of that hard to reproduce heisenbug. Once understood it's
trivial and certainly justifies a brown paperbag.
Fixes: 41d2e4949377 ("hrtimer: Tune hrtimer_interrupt hang logic")
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <[email protected]>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801261447590.2067@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/time/hrtimer.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
@@ -669,7 +669,9 @@ static void hrtimer_reprogram(struct hrt
static inline void hrtimer_init_hres(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *base)
{
base->expires_next.tv64 = KTIME_MAX;
+ base->hang_detected = 0;
base->hres_active = 0;
+ base->next_timer = NULL;
}
/*
@@ -1615,6 +1617,7 @@ static void init_hrtimers_cpu(int cpu)
timerqueue_init_head(&cpu_base->clock_base[i].active);
}
+ cpu_base->active_bases = 0;
cpu_base->cpu = cpu;
hrtimer_init_hres(cpu_base);
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7c68d1a6b4db9012790af7ac0f0fdc0d2083422a ]
Without proper validation of DODGY packets, we might very well
feed qdisc_pkt_len_init() with invalid GSO packets.
tcp_hdrlen() might access out-of-bound data, so let's use
skb_header_pointer() and proper checks.
Whole story is described in commit d0c081b49137 ("flow_dissector:
properly cap thoff field")
We have the goal of validating DODGY packets earlier in the stack,
so we might very well revert this fix in the future.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/core/dev.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -2889,10 +2889,21 @@ static void qdisc_pkt_len_init(struct sk
hdr_len = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb);
/* + transport layer */
- if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6)))
- hdr_len += tcp_hdrlen(skb);
- else
- hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6))) {
+ const struct tcphdr *th;
+ struct tcphdr _tcphdr;
+
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ sizeof(_tcphdr), &_tcphdr);
+ if (likely(th))
+ hdr_len += __tcp_hdrlen(th);
+ } else {
+ struct udphdr _udphdr;
+
+ if (skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ sizeof(_udphdr), &_udphdr))
+ hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ }
if (shinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY)
gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit a992f2d38e4ce17b8c7d1f7f67b2de0eebdea069 upstream.
When new directory 'DIR1' is created in a directory 'DIR0' with SGID bit
set, DIR1 is expected to have SGID bit set (and owning group equal to
the owning group of 'DIR0'). However when 'DIR0' also has some default
ACLs that 'DIR1' inherits, setting these ACLs will result in SGID bit on
'DIR1' to get cleared if user is not member of the owning group.
Fix the problem by creating __ext2_set_acl() function that does not call
posix_acl_update_mode() and use it when inheriting ACLs. That prevents
SGID bit clearing and the mode has been properly set by
posix_acl_create() anyway.
Fixes: 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext2/acl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext2/acl.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/acl.c
@@ -178,11 +178,8 @@ ext2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int ty
return acl;
}
-/*
- * inode->i_mutex: down
- */
-int
-ext2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+static int
+__ext2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
@@ -192,13 +189,6 @@ ext2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct
switch(type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
- if (acl) {
- error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
- if (error)
- return error;
- inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
- mark_inode_dirty(inode);
- }
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
@@ -225,6 +215,24 @@ ext2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct
}
/*
+ * inode->i_mutex: down
+ */
+int
+ext2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && acl) {
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
+ mark_inode_dirty(inode);
+ }
+ return __ext2_set_acl(inode, acl, type);
+}
+
+/*
* Initialize the ACLs of a new inode. Called from ext2_new_inode.
*
* dir->i_mutex: down
@@ -241,12 +249,12 @@ ext2_init_acl(struct inode *inode, struc
return error;
if (default_acl) {
- error = ext2_set_acl(inode, default_acl, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
+ error = __ext2_set_acl(inode, default_acl, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
}
if (acl) {
if (!error)
- error = ext2_set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
+ error = __ext2_set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
posix_acl_release(acl);
}
return error;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
commit 86314751c7945fa0c67f459beeda2e7c610ca429 upstream.
Roland Dreier reports that one of his systems cannot boot because of
the changes made by commit ac212b6980d8 (ACPI / processor: Use common
hotplug infrastructure).
The problematic part of it is the request_region() call in
acpi_processor_get_info() that used to run at module init time before
the above commit and now it runs much earlier. Unfortunately, the
region(s) reserved by it fall into a range the PCI subsystem attempts
to reserve for AHCI IO BARs. As a result, the PCI reservation fails
and AHCI doesn't work, while previously the PCI reservation would
be made before acpi_processor_get_info() and it would succeed.
That request_region() call, however, was overlooked by commit
ac212b6980d8, as it is not necessary for the enumeration of the
processors. It only is needed when the ACPI processor driver
actually attempts to handle them which doesn't happen before
loading the ACPI processor driver module. Therefore that call
should have been moved from acpi_processor_get_info() into that
module.
Address the problem by moving the request_region() call in question
out of acpi_processor_get_info() and use the observation that the
region reserved by it is only needed if the FADT-based CPU
throttling method is going to be used, which means that it should
be sufficient to invoke it from acpi_processor_get_throttling_fadt().
Fixes: ac212b6980d8 (ACPI / processor: Use common hotplug infrastructure)
Reported-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c | 9 ---------
drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c | 9 +++++++++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
@@ -331,15 +331,6 @@ static int acpi_processor_get_info(struc
pr->throttling.duty_width = acpi_gbl_FADT.duty_width;
pr->pblk = object.processor.pblk_address;
-
- /*
- * We don't care about error returns - we just try to mark
- * these reserved so that nobody else is confused into thinking
- * that this region might be unused..
- *
- * (In particular, allocating the IO range for Cardbus)
- */
- request_region(pr->throttling.address, 6, "ACPI CPU throttle");
}
/*
--- a/drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c
@@ -676,6 +676,15 @@ static int acpi_processor_get_throttling
if (!pr->flags.throttling)
return -ENODEV;
+ /*
+ * We don't care about error returns - we just try to mark
+ * these reserved so that nobody else is confused into thinking
+ * that this region might be unused..
+ *
+ * (In particular, allocating the IO range for Cardbus)
+ */
+ request_region(pr->throttling.address, 6, "ACPI CPU throttle");
+
pr->throttling.state = 0;
duty_mask = pr->throttling.state_count - 1;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pau Espin Pedrol <[email protected]>
commit cc31d43b4154ad5a7d8aa5543255a93b7e89edc2 upstream.
Otherwise, RST packets generated by ipt_REJECT always have mark 0 when
the routing is checked later in the same code path.
Fixes: e110861f8609 ("net: add a sysctl to reflect the fwmark on replies")
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pau Espin Pedrol <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 2 ++
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, stru
/* ip_route_me_harder expects skb->dst to be set */
skb_dst_set_noref(nskb, skb_dst(oldskb));
+ nskb->mark = IP4_REPLY_MARK(net, oldskb->mark);
+
skb_reserve(nskb, LL_MAX_HEADER);
niph = nf_reject_iphdr_put(nskb, oldskb, IPPROTO_TCP,
ip4_dst_hoplimit(skb_dst(nskb)));
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ void nf_send_reset6(struct net *net, str
fl6.daddr = oip6h->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = otcph->dest;
fl6.fl6_dport = otcph->source;
+ fl6.flowi6_mark = IP6_REPLY_MARK(net, oldskb->mark);
security_skb_classify_flow(oldskb, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_route_output(net, NULL, &fl6);
if (dst == NULL || dst->error) {
@@ -180,6 +181,8 @@ void nf_send_reset6(struct net *net, str
skb_dst_set(nskb, dst);
+ nskb->mark = fl6.flowi6_mark;
+
skb_reserve(nskb, hh_len + dst->header_len);
ip6h = nf_reject_ip6hdr_put(nskb, oldskb, IPPROTO_TCP,
ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst));
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
commit 17a49cd549d9dc8707dc9262210166455c612dde upstream.
Since 09d9686047db ("netfilter: x_tables: do compat validation via
translate_table"), it used compatr structure to assign newinfo
structure. In translate_compat_table of ip_tables.c and ip6_tables.c,
it used compatr->hook_entry to replace info->hook_entry and
compatr->underflow to replace info->underflow, but not do the same
replacement in arp_tables.c.
It caused invoking 32-bit "arptbale -P INPUT ACCEPT" failed in 64bit
kernel.
--------------------------------------
root@qemux86-64:~# arptables -P INPUT ACCEPT
root@qemux86-64:~# arptables -P INPUT ACCEPT
ERROR: Policy for `INPUT' offset 448 != underflow 0
arptables: Incompatible with this kernel
--------------------------------------
Fixes: 09d9686047db ("netfilter: x_tables: do compat validation via translate_table")
Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -1339,8 +1339,8 @@ static int translate_compat_table(struct
newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
- newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
- newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
+ newinfo->hook_entry[i] = compatr->hook_entry[i];
+ newinfo->underflow[i] = compatr->underflow[i];
}
entry1 = newinfo->entries;
pos = entry1;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
commit 83170f3beccccd7ceb4f9a0ac0c4dc736afde90c upstream.
With the commit 48e8aa6e3137 ("ipv6: Set FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH at
flowi6_flags") ip6_pol_route() callers were asked to to set the
FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH properly and xt_TEE was updated accordingly,
but with the later refactor in commit bbde9fc1824a ("netfilter:
factor out packet duplication for IPv4/IPv6") the flowi6_flags
update was lost.
This commit re-add it just before the routing decision.
Fixes: bbde9fc1824a ("netfilter: factor out packet duplication for IPv4/IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_dup_ipv6.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_dup_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_dup_ipv6.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static bool nf_dup_ipv6_route(struct net
fl6.daddr = *gw;
fl6.flowlabel = (__force __be32)(((iph->flow_lbl[0] & 0xF) << 16) |
(iph->flow_lbl[1] << 8) | iph->flow_lbl[2]);
+ fl6.flowi6_flags = FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH;
dst = ip6_route_output(net, NULL, &fl6);
if (dst->error) {
dst_release(dst);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jim Westfall <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 096b9854c04df86f03b38a97d40b6506e5730919 ]
Use n->primary_key instead of pkey to account for the possibility that a neigh
constructor function may have modified the primary_key value.
Signed-off-by: Jim Westfall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/core/neighbour.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ struct neighbour *__neigh_create(struct
if (atomic_read(&tbl->entries) > (1 << nht->hash_shift))
nht = neigh_hash_grow(tbl, nht->hash_shift + 1);
- hash_val = tbl->hash(pkey, dev, nht->hash_rnd) >> (32 - nht->hash_shift);
+ hash_val = tbl->hash(n->primary_key, dev, nht->hash_rnd) >> (32 - nht->hash_shift);
if (n->parms->dead) {
rc = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ struct neighbour *__neigh_create(struct
n1 != NULL;
n1 = rcu_dereference_protected(n1->next,
lockdep_is_held(&tbl->lock))) {
- if (dev == n1->dev && !memcmp(n1->primary_key, pkey, key_len)) {
+ if (dev == n1->dev && !memcmp(n1->primary_key, n->primary_key, key_len)) {
if (want_ref)
neigh_hold(n1);
rc = n1;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jonathan Dieter <[email protected]>
commit e5dfa3f902b9a642ae8c6997d57d7c41e384a90b upstream.
The usbip userspace tools call sprintf()/snprintf() and don't check for
the return value which can lead the paths to overflow, truncating the
final file in the path.
More urgently, GCC 7 now warns that these aren't checked with
-Wformat-overflow, and with -Werror enabled in configure.ac, that makes
these tools unbuildable.
This patch fixes these problems by replacing sprintf() with snprintf() in
one place and adding checks for the return value of snprintf().
Reviewed-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Dieter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c | 9 ++++++++-
tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_host_driver.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c
+++ b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c
@@ -215,9 +215,16 @@ int read_usb_interface(struct usbip_usb_
struct usbip_usb_interface *uinf)
{
char busid[SYSFS_BUS_ID_SIZE];
+ int size;
struct udev_device *sif;
- sprintf(busid, "%s:%d.%d", udev->busid, udev->bConfigurationValue, i);
+ size = snprintf(busid, sizeof(busid), "%s:%d.%d",
+ udev->busid, udev->bConfigurationValue, i);
+ if (size < 0 || (unsigned int)size >= sizeof(busid)) {
+ err("busid length %i >= %lu or < 0", size,
+ (unsigned long)sizeof(busid));
+ return -1;
+ }
sif = udev_device_new_from_subsystem_sysname(udev_context, "usb", busid);
if (!sif) {
--- a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_host_driver.c
+++ b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_host_driver.c
@@ -39,13 +39,19 @@ struct udev *udev_context;
static int32_t read_attr_usbip_status(struct usbip_usb_device *udev)
{
char status_attr_path[SYSFS_PATH_MAX];
+ int size;
int fd;
int length;
char status;
int value = 0;
- snprintf(status_attr_path, SYSFS_PATH_MAX, "%s/usbip_status",
- udev->path);
+ size = snprintf(status_attr_path, SYSFS_PATH_MAX, "%s/usbip_status",
+ udev->path);
+ if (size < 0 || (unsigned int)size >= sizeof(status_attr_path)) {
+ err("usbip_status path length %i >= %lu or < 0", size,
+ (unsigned long)sizeof(status_attr_path));
+ return -1;
+ }
fd = open(status_attr_path, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
@@ -225,6 +231,7 @@ int usbip_host_export_device(struct usbi
{
char attr_name[] = "usbip_sockfd";
char sockfd_attr_path[SYSFS_PATH_MAX];
+ int size;
char sockfd_buff[30];
int ret;
@@ -244,10 +251,20 @@ int usbip_host_export_device(struct usbi
}
/* only the first interface is true */
- snprintf(sockfd_attr_path, sizeof(sockfd_attr_path), "%s/%s",
- edev->udev.path, attr_name);
+ size = snprintf(sockfd_attr_path, sizeof(sockfd_attr_path), "%s/%s",
+ edev->udev.path, attr_name);
+ if (size < 0 || (unsigned int)size >= sizeof(sockfd_attr_path)) {
+ err("exported device path length %i >= %lu or < 0", size,
+ (unsigned long)sizeof(sockfd_attr_path));
+ return -1;
+ }
- snprintf(sockfd_buff, sizeof(sockfd_buff), "%d\n", sockfd);
+ size = snprintf(sockfd_buff, sizeof(sockfd_buff), "%d\n", sockfd);
+ if (size < 0 || (unsigned int)size >= sizeof(sockfd_buff)) {
+ err("socket length %i >= %lu or < 0", size,
+ (unsigned long)sizeof(sockfd_buff));
+ return -1;
+ }
ret = write_sysfs_attribute(sockfd_attr_path, sockfd_buff,
strlen(sockfd_buff));
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Maloney <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 749439bfac6e1a2932c582e2699f91d329658196 ]
The logic in __ip6_append_data() assumes that the MTU is at least large
enough for the headers. A device's MTU may be adjusted after being
added while sendmsg() is processing data, resulting in
__ip6_append_data() seeing any MTU. For an mtu smaller than the size of
the fragmentation header, the math results in a negative 'maxfraglen',
which causes problems when refragmenting any previous skb in the
skb_write_queue, leaving it possibly malformed.
Instead sendmsg returns EINVAL when the mtu is calculated to be less
than IPV6_MIN_MTU.
Found by syzkaller:
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2064!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 14216 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #2
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
task: ffff8801d0b68580 task.stack: ffff8801ac6b8000
RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617
RSP: 0018:ffff8801ac6bf570 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000028 RCX: ffffc90003cce000
RDX: 00000000000001b8 RSI: ffffffff839df06f RDI: ffff8801d9478ca0
RBP: ffff8801ac6bf780 R08: ffff8801cc3f1dbc R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8801ac6bf7a0 R11: 43cb4b7b1948a9e7 R12: ffff8801cc3f1dc8
R13: ffff8801cc3f1d40 R14: 0000000000001036 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f43d740c700(0000) GS:ffff8801dc100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7834984000 CR3: 00000001d79b9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ip6_finish_skb include/net/ipv6.h:911 [inline]
udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x255/0x390 net/ipv6/udp.c:1093
udpv6_sendmsg+0x280d/0x31a0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1363
inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
SYSC_sendto+0x352/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750
SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007f43d740bc08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000007180a8 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020d08000 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 00000000209c1000 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000040800 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b9c69
R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 00000000202c2000
Code: 9e 01 fe e9 c5 e8 ff ff e8 7f 9e 01 fe e9 4a ea ff ff 48 89 f7 e8 52 9e 01 fe e9 aa eb ff ff e8 a8 b6 cf fd 0f 0b e8 a1 b6 cf fd <0f> 0b 49 8d 45 78 4d 8d 45 7c 48 89 85 78 fe ff ff 49 8d 85 ba
RIP: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline] RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570
RIP: __ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617 RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Maloney <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1246,14 +1246,16 @@ static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *s
v6_cork->tclass = tclass;
if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
- rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
+ READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
else
mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
- rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
+ READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
+ if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+ return -EINVAL;
cork->base.fragsize = mtu;
if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
cork->base.flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
commit 561b5e0709e4a248c67d024d4d94b6e31e3edf2f upstream.
Commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas") has
introduced a regression in some rust and Java environments which are
trying to implement their own stack guard page. They are punching a new
MAP_FIXED mapping inside the existing stack Vma.
This will confuse expand_{downwards,upwards} into thinking that the
stack expansion would in fact get us too close to an existing non-stack
vma which is a correct behavior wrt safety. It is a real regression on
the other hand.
Let's work around the problem by considering PROT_NONE mapping as a part
of the stack. This is a gros hack but overflowing to such a mapping
would trap anyway an we only can hope that usespace knows what it is
doing and handle it propely.
Fixes: 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Debugged-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2188,7 +2188,8 @@ int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct
gap_addr = TASK_SIZE;
next = vma->vm_next;
- if (next && next->vm_start < gap_addr) {
+ if (next && next->vm_start < gap_addr &&
+ (next->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (!(next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
return -ENOMEM;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
@@ -2273,7 +2274,8 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_stru
if (gap_addr > address)
return -ENOMEM;
prev = vma->vm_prev;
- if (prev && prev->vm_end > gap_addr) {
+ if (prev && prev->vm_end > gap_addr &&
+ (prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (!(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
return -ENOMEM;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Meyer <[email protected]>
commit 883354afbc109c57f925ccc19840055193da0cc0 upstream.
Debian's gcc defaults to pie. The global Makefile already defines the -fno-pie option.
Link UML dynamic kernel image also with -no-pie to fix the build.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Cc: Bernie Innocenti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/um/Makefile | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/um/Makefile
+++ b/arch/um/Makefile
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ archheaders:
archprepare: include/generated/user_constants.h
LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_STATIC) += -static
-LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_DYN) += -Wl,-rpath,/lib
+LINK-$(CONFIG_LD_SCRIPT_DYN) += -Wl,-rpath,/lib $(call cc-option, -no-pie)
CFLAGS_NO_HARDENING := $(call cc-option, -fno-PIC,) $(call cc-option, -fno-pic,) \
$(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector,) \
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d0c081b49137cd3200f2023c0875723be66e7ce5 ]
syzbot reported yet another crash [1] that is caused by
insufficient validation of DODGY packets.
Two bugs are happening here to trigger the crash.
1) Flow dissection leaves with incorrect thoff field.
2) skb_probe_transport_header() sets transport header to this invalid
thoff, even if pointing after skb valid data.
3) qdisc_pkt_len_init() reads out-of-bound data because it
trusts tcp_hdrlen(skb)
Possible fixes :
- Full flow dissector validation before injecting bad DODGY packets in
the stack.
This approach was attempted here : https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/
861874/
- Have more robust functions in the core.
This might be needed anyway for stable versions.
This patch fixes the flow dissection issue.
[1]
CPU: 1 PID: 3144 Comm: syzkaller271204 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc4-mm1+ #49
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:355 [inline]
kasan_report+0x23b/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:413
__asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:432
__tcp_hdrlen include/linux/tcp.h:35 [inline]
tcp_hdrlen include/linux/tcp.h:40 [inline]
qdisc_pkt_len_init net/core/dev.c:3160 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x20d3/0x2200 net/core/dev.c:3465
dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3554
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2943 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x3ad5/0x60a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:2968
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:628 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:638
sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:907
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1776 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline]
__vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482
vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544
SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline]
SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 34fad54c2537 ("net: __skb_flow_dissect() must cap its return value")
Fixes: a6e544b0a88b ("flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/core/flow_dissector.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/flow_dissector.c
+++ b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
@@ -492,8 +492,8 @@ ip_proto_again:
out_good:
ret = true;
- key_control->thoff = (u16)nhoff;
out:
+ key_control->thoff = min_t(u16, nhoff, skb ? skb->len : hlen);
key_basic->n_proto = proto;
key_basic->ip_proto = ip_proto;
@@ -501,7 +501,6 @@ out:
out_bad:
ret = false;
- key_control->thoff = min_t(u16, nhoff, skb ? skb->len : hlen);
goto out;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__skb_flow_dissect);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
commit 18365225f0440d09708ad9daade2ec11275c3df9 upstream.
Laurent Dufour has noticed that hwpoinsoned pages are kept charged. In
his particular case he has hit a bad_page("page still charged to
cgroup") when onlining a hwpoison page. While this looks like something
that shouldn't happen in the first place because onlining hwpages and
returning them to the page allocator makes only little sense it shows a
real problem.
hwpoison pages do not get freed usually so we do not uncharge them (at
least not since commit 0a31bc97c80c ("mm: memcontrol: rewrite uncharge
API")). Each charge pins memcg (since e8ea14cc6ead ("mm: memcontrol:
take a css reference for each charged page")) as well and so the
mem_cgroup and the associated state will never go away. Fix this leak
by forcibly uncharging a LRU hwpoisoned page in delete_from_lru_cache().
We also have to tweak uncharge_list because it cannot rely on zero ref
count for these pages.
[[email protected]: coding-style fixes]
Fixes: 0a31bc97c80c ("mm: memcontrol: rewrite uncharge API")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Laurent Dufour <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Laurent Dufour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/memcontrol.c | 2 +-
mm/memory-failure.c | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -5576,7 +5576,7 @@ static void uncharge_list(struct list_he
next = page->lru.next;
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageLRU(page), page);
- VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_count(page), page);
+ VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHWPoison(page) && page_count(page), page);
if (!page->mem_cgroup)
continue;
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -539,6 +539,13 @@ static int delete_from_lru_cache(struct
*/
ClearPageActive(p);
ClearPageUnevictable(p);
+
+ /*
+ * Poisoned page might never drop its ref count to 0 so we have
+ * to uncharge it manually from its memcg.
+ */
+ mem_cgroup_uncharge(p);
+
/*
* drop the page count elevated by isolate_lru_page()
*/
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
commit 2f2d0088eb93db5c649d2a5e34a3800a8a935fc5 upstream.
When a client has a USB device attached over IP, the vhci_hcd driver is
locally leaking a socket pointer address via the
/sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd/status file (world-readable) and in debug
output when "usbip --debug port" is run.
Fix it to not leak. The socket pointer address is not used at the moment
and it was made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}.
As this opens a security hole, the fix replaces socket pointer address with
sockfd.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h | 1 +
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 8 ++++----
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ struct usbip_device {
/* lock for status */
spinlock_t lock;
+ int sockfd;
struct socket *tcp_socket;
struct task_struct *tcp_rx;
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
@@ -39,16 +39,20 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device
/*
* output example:
- * prt sta spd dev socket local_busid
- * 000 004 000 000 c5a7bb80 1-2.3
- * 001 004 000 000 d8cee980 2-3.4
+ * port sta spd dev sockfd local_busid
+ * 0000 004 000 00000000 000003 1-2.3
+ * 0001 004 000 00000000 000004 2-3.4
*
- * IP address can be retrieved from a socket pointer address by looking
- * up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. Also, a userland program may remember a
- * port number and its peer IP address.
+ * Output includes socket fd instead of socket pointer address to
+ * avoid leaking kernel memory address in:
+ * /sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd.0/status and in debug output.
+ * The socket pointer address is not used at the moment and it was
+ * made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
+ * pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. As this opens
+ * a security hole, the change is made to use sockfd instead.
*/
out += sprintf(out,
- "prt sta spd bus dev socket local_busid\n");
+ "prt sta spd bus dev sockfd local_busid\n");
for (i = 0; i < VHCI_NPORTS; i++) {
struct vhci_device *vdev = port_to_vdev(i);
@@ -60,11 +64,11 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device
out += sprintf(out, "%03u %08x ",
vdev->speed, vdev->devid);
out += sprintf(out, "%16p ", vdev->ud.tcp_socket);
+ out += sprintf(out, "%06u", vdev->ud.sockfd);
out += sprintf(out, "%s", dev_name(&vdev->udev->dev));
- } else {
- out += sprintf(out, "000 000 000 0000000000000000 0-0");
- }
+ } else
+ out += sprintf(out, "000 000 000 000000 0-0");
out += sprintf(out, "\n");
spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);
@@ -223,6 +227,7 @@ static ssize_t store_attach(struct devic
vdev->devid = devid;
vdev->speed = speed;
+ vdev->ud.sockfd = sockfd;
vdev->ud.tcp_socket = socket;
vdev->ud.status = VDEV_ST_NOTASSIGNED;
--- a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
+++ b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c
@@ -55,12 +55,12 @@ static int parse_status(const char *valu
while (*c != '\0') {
int port, status, speed, devid;
- unsigned long socket;
+ int sockfd;
char lbusid[SYSFS_BUS_ID_SIZE];
- ret = sscanf(c, "%d %d %d %x %lx %31s\n",
+ ret = sscanf(c, "%d %d %d %x %u %31s\n",
&port, &status, &speed,
- &devid, &socket, lbusid);
+ &devid, &sockfd, lbusid);
if (ret < 5) {
dbg("sscanf failed: %d", ret);
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int parse_status(const char *valu
dbg("port %d status %d speed %d devid %x",
port, status, speed, devid);
- dbg("socket %lx lbusid %s", socket, lbusid);
+ dbg("sockfd %u lbusid %s", sockfd, lbusid);
/* if a device is connected, look at it */
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e9191ffb65d8e159680ce0ad2224e1acbde6985c ]
Commit 513674b5a2c9 ("net: reevalulate autoflowlabel setting after
sysctl setting") removed the initialisation of
ipv6_pinfo::autoflowlabel and added a second flag to indicate
whether this field or the net namespace default should be used.
The getsockopt() handling for this case was not updated, so it
currently returns 0 for all sockets for which IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL is
not explicitly enabled. Fix it to return the effective value, whether
that has been set at the socket or net namespace level.
Fixes: 513674b5a2c9 ("net: reevalulate autoflowlabel setting after sysctl ...")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/net/ipv6.h | 1 +
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ int ipv6_flowlabel_opt_get(struct sock *
int flags);
int ip6_flowlabel_init(void);
void ip6_flowlabel_cleanup(void);
+bool ip6_autoflowlabel(struct net *net, const struct ipv6_pinfo *np);
static inline void fl6_sock_release(struct ip6_flowlabel *fl)
{
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int ip6_output(struct net *net, struct s
!(IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_REROUTED));
}
-static bool ip6_autoflowlabel(struct net *net, const struct ipv6_pinfo *np)
+bool ip6_autoflowlabel(struct net *net, const struct ipv6_pinfo *np)
{
if (!np->autoflowlabel_set)
return ip6_default_np_autolabel(net);
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ static int do_ipv6_getsockopt(struct soc
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
- val = np->autoflowlabel;
+ val = ip6_autoflowlabel(sock_net(sk), np);
break;
default:
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ad23b750933ea7bf962678972a286c78a8fa36aa ]
Commit "net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports"
introduced a check to validate the source address of locally generated
IGMPv3 packets.
Instead of checking the local interface address directly, it uses
inet_ifa_match(fl4->saddr, ifa), which checks if the address is on the
local subnet (or equal to the point-to-point address if used).
This breaks for point-to-point interfaces, so check against
ifa->ifa_local directly.
Cc: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
Fixes: a46182b00290 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports")
Reported-by: Sebastian Gottschall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/igmp.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static __be32 igmpv3_get_srcaddr(struct
return htonl(INADDR_ANY);
for_ifa(in_dev) {
- if (inet_ifa_match(fl4->saddr, ifa))
+ if (fl4->saddr == ifa->ifa_local)
return fl4->saddr;
} endfor_ifa(in_dev);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit 92b4423e3a0bc5d43ecde4bcad871f8b5ba04efd upstream.
This is a forward-port of the original patch from Andrzej Hajda,
he said:
"IS_ERR_VALUE should be used only with unsigned long type.
Otherwise it can work incorrectly. To achieve this function
xt_percpu_counter_alloc is modified to return unsigned long,
and its result is assigned to temporary variable to perform
error checking, before assigning to .pcnt field.
The patch follows conclusion from discussion on LKML [1][2].
[1]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2120927
[2]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2150581"
Original patch from Andrzej is here:
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/582970/
This patch has clashed with input validation fixes for x_tables.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 6 +++---
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 6 ++++--
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 6 ++++--
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 6 ++++--
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
@@ -381,16 +381,16 @@ static inline unsigned long ifname_compa
* allows us to return 0 for single core systems without forcing
* callers to deal with SMP vs. NONSMP issues.
*/
-static inline u64 xt_percpu_counter_alloc(void)
+static inline unsigned long xt_percpu_counter_alloc(void)
{
if (nr_cpu_ids > 1) {
void __percpu *res = __alloc_percpu(sizeof(struct xt_counters),
sizeof(struct xt_counters));
if (res == NULL)
- return (u64) -ENOMEM;
+ return -ENOMEM;
- return (u64) (__force unsigned long) res;
+ return (__force unsigned long) res;
}
return 0;
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -511,11 +511,13 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, c
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
+ unsigned long pcnt;
int ret;
- e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
- if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(pcnt))
return -ENOMEM;
+ e->counters.pcnt = pcnt;
t = arpt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -653,10 +653,12 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, st
unsigned int j;
struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ unsigned long pcnt;
- e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
- if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(pcnt))
return -ENOMEM;
+ e->counters.pcnt = pcnt;
j = 0;
mtpar.net = net;
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -666,10 +666,12 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, s
unsigned int j;
struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ unsigned long pcnt;
- e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
- if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(pcnt))
return -ENOMEM;
+ e->counters.pcnt = pcnt;
j = 0;
mtpar.net = net;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 02612bb05e51df8489db5e94d0cf8d1c81f87b0c ]
In pppoe_sendmsg(), reserving dev->hard_header_len bytes of headroom
was probably fine before the introduction of ->needed_headroom in
commit f5184d267c1a ("net: Allow netdevices to specify needed head/tailroom").
But now, virtual devices typically advertise the size of their overhead
in dev->needed_headroom, so we must also take it into account in
skb_reserve().
Allocation size of skb is also updated to take dev->needed_tailroom
into account and replace the arbitrary 32 bytes with the real size of
a PPPoE header.
This issue was discovered by syzbot, who connected a pppoe socket to a
gre device which had dev->header_ops->create == ipgre_header and
dev->hard_header_len == 0. Therefore, PPPoE didn't reserve any
headroom, and dev_hard_header() crashed when ipgre_header() tried to
prepend its header to skb->data.
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:000000001d390b3a len:31 put:24
head:00000000d8ed776f data:000000008150e823 tail:0x7 end:0xc0 dev:gre0
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 3670 Comm: syzkaller801466 Not tainted
4.15.0-rc7-next-20180115+ #97
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x162/0x1f0 net/core/skbuff.c:100
RSP: 0018:ffff8801d9bd7840 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000083 RBX: ffff8801d4f083c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000083 RSI: 1ffff1003b37ae92 RDI: ffffed003b37aefc
RBP: ffff8801d9bd78a8 R08: 1ffff1003b37ae8a R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff86200de0
R13: ffffffff84a981ad R14: 0000000000000018 R15: ffff8801d2d34180
FS: 00000000019c4880(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000208bc000 CR3: 00000001d9111001 CR4: 00000000001606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
skb_under_panic net/core/skbuff.c:114 [inline]
skb_push+0xce/0xf0 net/core/skbuff.c:1714
ipgre_header+0x6d/0x4e0 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:879
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:2723 [inline]
pppoe_sendmsg+0x58e/0x8b0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:890
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:640
sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:909
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1775 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x525/0x7f0 fs/read_write.c:653
do_iter_write+0x154/0x540 fs/read_write.c:932
vfs_writev+0x18a/0x340 fs/read_write.c:977
do_writev+0xfc/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:1012
SYSC_writev fs/read_write.c:1085 [inline]
SyS_writev+0x27/0x30 fs/read_write.c:1082
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0
Admittedly PPPoE shouldn't be allowed to run on non Ethernet-like
interfaces, but reserving space for ->needed_headroom is a more
fundamental issue that needs to be addressed first.
Same problem exists for __pppoe_xmit(), which also needs to take
dev->needed_headroom into account in skb_cow_head().
Fixes: f5184d267c1a ("net: Allow netdevices to specify needed head/tailroom")
Reported-by: syzbot+ed0838d0fa4c4f2b528e20286e6dc63effc7c14d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
@@ -860,6 +860,7 @@ static int pppoe_sendmsg(struct socket *
struct pppoe_hdr *ph;
struct net_device *dev;
char *start;
+ int hlen;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) || !(sk->sk_state & PPPOX_CONNECTED)) {
@@ -878,16 +879,16 @@ static int pppoe_sendmsg(struct socket *
if (total_len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len))
goto end;
-
- skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, total_len + dev->hard_header_len + 32,
- 0, GFP_KERNEL);
+ hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
+ skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, hlen + sizeof(*ph) + total_len +
+ dev->needed_tailroom, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto end;
}
/* Reserve space for headers. */
- skb_reserve(skb, dev->hard_header_len);
+ skb_reserve(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb->dev = dev;
@@ -948,7 +949,7 @@ static int __pppoe_xmit(struct sock *sk,
/* Copy the data if there is no space for the header or if it's
* read-only.
*/
- if (skb_cow_head(skb, sizeof(*ph) + dev->hard_header_len))
+ if (skb_cow_head(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) + sizeof(*ph)))
goto abort;
__skb_push(skb, sizeof(*ph));
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: yangbo lu <[email protected]>
commit 1ef5e49e46b919052474d9b54a15debc79ff0133 upstream.
A previous patch had removed esdhc_of_platform_init() by mistake.
static void esdhc_of_platform_init(struct sdhci_host *host)
{
u32 vvn;
vvn = in_be32(host->ioaddr + SDHCI_SLOT_INT_STATUS);
vvn = (vvn & SDHCI_VENDOR_VER_MASK) >> SDHCI_VENDOR_VER_SHIFT;
if (vvn == VENDOR_V_22)
host->quirks2 |= SDHCI_QUIRK2_HOST_NO_CMD23;
if (vvn > VENDOR_V_22)
host->quirks &= ~SDHCI_QUIRK_NO_BUSY_IRQ;
}
This patch is used to fix it by add/remove some quirks according to
verdor version in probe.
Signed-off-by: Yangbo Lu <[email protected]>
Fixes: f4932cfd22f1 ("mmc: sdhci-of-esdhc: support both BE and LE host controller")
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-esdhc.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-esdhc.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-esdhc.c
@@ -584,6 +584,8 @@ static int sdhci_esdhc_probe(struct plat
{
struct sdhci_host *host;
struct device_node *np;
+ struct sdhci_pltfm_host *pltfm_host;
+ struct sdhci_esdhc *esdhc;
int ret;
np = pdev->dev.of_node;
@@ -600,6 +602,14 @@ static int sdhci_esdhc_probe(struct plat
sdhci_get_of_property(pdev);
+ pltfm_host = sdhci_priv(host);
+ esdhc = pltfm_host->priv;
+ if (esdhc->vendor_ver == VENDOR_V_22)
+ host->quirks2 |= SDHCI_QUIRK2_HOST_NO_CMD23;
+
+ if (esdhc->vendor_ver > VENDOR_V_22)
+ host->quirks &= ~SDHCI_QUIRK_NO_BUSY_IRQ;
+
if (of_device_is_compatible(np, "fsl,p5040-esdhc") ||
of_device_is_compatible(np, "fsl,p5020-esdhc") ||
of_device_is_compatible(np, "fsl,p4080-esdhc") ||
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <[email protected]>
commit 3effcb4247e74a51f5d8b775a1ee4abf87cc089a upstream.
We have been facing some problems with self-suspending constrained
deadline tasks. The main reason is that the original CBS was not
designed for such sort of tasks.
One problem reported by Xunlei Pang takes place when a task
suspends, and then is awakened before the deadline, but so close
to the deadline that its remaining runtime can cause the task
to have an absolute density higher than allowed. In such situation,
the original CBS assumes that the task is facing an early activation,
and so it replenishes the task and set another deadline, one deadline
in the future. This rule works fine for implicit deadline tasks.
Moreover, it allows the system to adapt the period of a task in which
the external event source suffered from a clock drift.
However, this opens the window for bandwidth leakage for constrained
deadline tasks. For instance, a task with the following parameters:
runtime = 5 ms
deadline = 7 ms
[density] = 5 / 7 = 0.71
period = 1000 ms
If the task runs for 1 ms, and then suspends for another 1ms,
it will be awakened with the following parameters:
remaining runtime = 4
laxity = 5
presenting a absolute density of 4 / 5 = 0.80.
In this case, the original CBS would assume the task had an early
wakeup. Then, CBS will reset the runtime, and the absolute deadline will
be postponed by one relative deadline, allowing the task to run.
The problem is that, if the task runs this pattern forever, it will keep
receiving bandwidth, being able to run 1ms every 2ms. Following this
behavior, the task would be able to run 500 ms in 1 sec. Thus running
more than the 5 ms / 1 sec the admission control allowed it to run.
Trying to address the self-suspending case, Luca Abeni, Giuseppe
Lipari, and Juri Lelli [1] revisited the CBS in order to deal with
self-suspending tasks. In the new approach, rather than
replenishing/postponing the absolute deadline, the revised wakeup rule
adjusts the remaining runtime, reducing it to fit into the allowed
density.
A revised version of the idea is:
At a given time t, the maximum absolute density of a task cannot be
higher than its relative density, that is:
runtime / (deadline - t) <= dl_runtime / dl_deadline
Knowing the laxity of a task (deadline - t), it is possible to move
it to the other side of the equality, thus enabling to define max
remaining runtime a task can use within the absolute deadline, without
over-running the allowed density:
runtime = (dl_runtime / dl_deadline) * (deadline - t)
For instance, in our previous example, the task could still run:
runtime = ( 5 / 7 ) * 5
runtime = 3.57 ms
Without causing damage for other deadline tasks. It is note worthy
that the laxity cannot be negative because that would cause a negative
runtime. Thus, this patch depends on the patch:
df8eac8cafce ("sched/deadline: Throttle a constrained deadline task activated after the deadline")
Which throttles a constrained deadline task activated after the
deadline.
Finally, it is also possible to use the revised wakeup rule for
all other tasks, but that would require some more discussions
about pros and cons.
[The main difference from the original commit is that
the BW_SHIFT define was not present yet. As BW_SHIFT was
introduced in a new feature, I just used the value (20),
likewise we used to use before the #define.
Other changes were required because of comments. - bistrot]
Reported-by: Xunlei Pang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <[email protected]>
[peterz: replaced dl_is_constrained with dl_is_implicit]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Luca Abeni <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c800ab3a74a168a84ee5f3f84d12a02e11383be.1495803804.git.bristot@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/sched.h | 1
kernel/sched/core.c | 2
kernel/sched/deadline.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1313,6 +1313,7 @@ struct sched_dl_entity {
u64 dl_deadline; /* relative deadline of each instance */
u64 dl_period; /* separation of two instances (period) */
u64 dl_bw; /* dl_runtime / dl_deadline */
+ u64 dl_density; /* dl_runtime / dl_deadline */
/*
* Actual scheduling parameters. Initialized with the values above,
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -2109,6 +2109,7 @@ void __dl_clear_params(struct task_struc
dl_se->dl_period = 0;
dl_se->flags = 0;
dl_se->dl_bw = 0;
+ dl_se->dl_density = 0;
dl_se->dl_throttled = 0;
dl_se->dl_new = 1;
@@ -3647,6 +3648,7 @@ __setparam_dl(struct task_struct *p, con
dl_se->dl_period = attr->sched_period ?: dl_se->dl_deadline;
dl_se->flags = attr->sched_flags;
dl_se->dl_bw = to_ratio(dl_se->dl_period, dl_se->dl_runtime);
+ dl_se->dl_density = to_ratio(dl_se->dl_deadline, dl_se->dl_runtime);
/*
* Changing the parameters of a task is 'tricky' and we're not doing
--- a/kernel/sched/deadline.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/deadline.c
@@ -480,13 +480,84 @@ static bool dl_entity_overflow(struct sc
}
/*
- * When a -deadline entity is queued back on the runqueue, its runtime and
- * deadline might need updating.
+ * Revised wakeup rule [1]: For self-suspending tasks, rather then
+ * re-initializing task's runtime and deadline, the revised wakeup
+ * rule adjusts the task's runtime to avoid the task to overrun its
+ * density.
*
- * The policy here is that we update the deadline of the entity only if:
- * - the current deadline is in the past,
- * - using the remaining runtime with the current deadline would make
- * the entity exceed its bandwidth.
+ * Reasoning: a task may overrun the density if:
+ * runtime / (deadline - t) > dl_runtime / dl_deadline
+ *
+ * Therefore, runtime can be adjusted to:
+ * runtime = (dl_runtime / dl_deadline) * (deadline - t)
+ *
+ * In such way that runtime will be equal to the maximum density
+ * the task can use without breaking any rule.
+ *
+ * [1] Luca Abeni, Giuseppe Lipari, and Juri Lelli. 2015. Constant
+ * bandwidth server revisited. SIGBED Rev. 11, 4 (January 2015), 19-24.
+ */
+static void
+update_dl_revised_wakeup(struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se, struct rq *rq)
+{
+ u64 laxity = dl_se->deadline - rq_clock(rq);
+
+ /*
+ * If the task has deadline < period, and the deadline is in the past,
+ * it should already be throttled before this check.
+ *
+ * See update_dl_entity() comments for further details.
+ */
+ WARN_ON(dl_time_before(dl_se->deadline, rq_clock(rq)));
+
+ dl_se->runtime = (dl_se->dl_density * laxity) >> 20;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Regarding the deadline, a task with implicit deadline has a relative
+ * deadline == relative period. A task with constrained deadline has a
+ * relative deadline <= relative period.
+ *
+ * We support constrained deadline tasks. However, there are some restrictions
+ * applied only for tasks which do not have an implicit deadline. See
+ * update_dl_entity() to know more about such restrictions.
+ *
+ * The dl_is_implicit() returns true if the task has an implicit deadline.
+ */
+static inline bool dl_is_implicit(struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se)
+{
+ return dl_se->dl_deadline == dl_se->dl_period;
+}
+
+/*
+ * When a deadline entity is placed in the runqueue, its runtime and deadline
+ * might need to be updated. This is done by a CBS wake up rule. There are two
+ * different rules: 1) the original CBS; and 2) the Revisited CBS.
+ *
+ * When the task is starting a new period, the Original CBS is used. In this
+ * case, the runtime is replenished and a new absolute deadline is set.
+ *
+ * When a task is queued before the begin of the next period, using the
+ * remaining runtime and deadline could make the entity to overflow, see
+ * dl_entity_overflow() to find more about runtime overflow. When such case
+ * is detected, the runtime and deadline need to be updated.
+ *
+ * If the task has an implicit deadline, i.e., deadline == period, the Original
+ * CBS is applied. the runtime is replenished and a new absolute deadline is
+ * set, as in the previous cases.
+ *
+ * However, the Original CBS does not work properly for tasks with
+ * deadline < period, which are said to have a constrained deadline. By
+ * applying the Original CBS, a constrained deadline task would be able to run
+ * runtime/deadline in a period. With deadline < period, the task would
+ * overrun the runtime/period allowed bandwidth, breaking the admission test.
+ *
+ * In order to prevent this misbehave, the Revisited CBS is used for
+ * constrained deadline tasks when a runtime overflow is detected. In the
+ * Revisited CBS, rather than replenishing & setting a new absolute deadline,
+ * the remaining runtime of the task is reduced to avoid runtime overflow.
+ * Please refer to the comments update_dl_revised_wakeup() function to find
+ * more about the Revised CBS rule.
*/
static void update_dl_entity(struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se,
struct sched_dl_entity *pi_se)
@@ -505,6 +576,14 @@ static void update_dl_entity(struct sche
if (dl_time_before(dl_se->deadline, rq_clock(rq)) ||
dl_entity_overflow(dl_se, pi_se, rq_clock(rq))) {
+
+ if (unlikely(!dl_is_implicit(dl_se) &&
+ !dl_time_before(dl_se->deadline, rq_clock(rq)) &&
+ !dl_se->dl_boosted)){
+ update_dl_revised_wakeup(dl_se, rq);
+ return;
+ }
+
dl_se->deadline = rq_clock(rq) + pi_se->dl_deadline;
dl_se->runtime = pi_se->dl_runtime;
}
@@ -991,11 +1070,6 @@ static void dequeue_dl_entity(struct sch
__dequeue_dl_entity(dl_se);
}
-static inline bool dl_is_constrained(struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se)
-{
- return dl_se->dl_deadline < dl_se->dl_period;
-}
-
static void enqueue_task_dl(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
struct task_struct *pi_task = rt_mutex_get_top_task(p);
@@ -1027,7 +1101,7 @@ static void enqueue_task_dl(struct rq *r
* If that is the case, the task will be throttled and
* the replenishment timer will be set to the next period.
*/
- if (!p->dl.dl_throttled && dl_is_constrained(&p->dl))
+ if (!p->dl.dl_throttled && !dl_is_implicit(&p->dl))
dl_check_constrained_dl(&p->dl);
/*
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
The backport of commit b94b73733171 ("x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW
late-loading with a revision check") to 4.4-stable deleted a "return true"
statement. This bug is not present upstream or other stable branches.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
+ return true;
}
return false;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 848b159835ddef99cc4193083f7e786c3992f580 ]
with the introduction of commit
b0eb57cb97e7837ebb746404c2c58c6f536f23fa, it appears that rq->buf_info
is improperly handled. While it is heap allocated when an rx queue is
setup, and freed when torn down, an old line of code in
vmxnet3_rq_destroy was not properly removed, leading to rq->buf_info[0]
being set to NULL prior to its being freed, causing a memory leak, which
eventually exhausts the system on repeated create/destroy operations
(for example, when the mtu of a vmxnet3 interface is changed
frequently.
Fix is pretty straight forward, just move the NULL set to after the
free.
Tested by myself with successful results
Applies to net, and should likely be queued for stable, please
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reported-By: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: Shrikrishna Khare <[email protected]>
CC: "VMware, Inc." <[email protected]>
CC: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Shrikrishna Khare <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c
@@ -1563,7 +1563,6 @@ static void vmxnet3_rq_destroy(struct vm
rq->rx_ring[i].basePA);
rq->rx_ring[i].base = NULL;
}
- rq->buf_info[i] = NULL;
}
if (rq->comp_ring.base) {
@@ -1578,6 +1577,7 @@ static void vmxnet3_rq_destroy(struct vm
(rq->rx_ring[0].size + rq->rx_ring[1].size);
dma_free_coherent(&adapter->pdev->dev, sz, rq->buf_info[0],
rq->buf_info_pa);
+ rq->buf_info[0] = rq->buf_info[1] = NULL;
}
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 5132ede0fe8092b043dae09a7cc32b8ae7272baa upstream.
This reverts commit 6cfb521ac0d5b97470883ff9b7facae264b7ab12.
Turns out distros do not want to make retpoline as part of their "ABI",
so this patch should not have been merged. Sorry Andi, this was my
fault, I suggested it when your original patch was the "correct" way of
doing this instead.
Reported-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6cfb521ac0d5 ("module: Add retpoline tag to VERMAGIC")
Acked-by: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/vermagic.h | 8 +-------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/vermagic.h
+++ b/include/linux/vermagic.h
@@ -24,16 +24,10 @@
#ifndef MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC
#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC ""
#endif
-#ifdef RETPOLINE
-#define MODULE_VERMAGIC_RETPOLINE "retpoline "
-#else
-#define MODULE_VERMAGIC_RETPOLINE ""
-#endif
#define VERMAGIC_STRING \
UTS_RELEASE " " \
MODULE_VERMAGIC_SMP MODULE_VERMAGIC_PREEMPT \
MODULE_VERMAGIC_MODULE_UNLOAD MODULE_VERMAGIC_MODVERSIONS \
- MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC \
- MODULE_VERMAGIC_RETPOLINE
+ MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
commit 8cb68751c115d176ec851ca56ecfbb411568c9e8 upstream.
If an invalid CAN frame is received, from a driver or from a tun
interface, a Kernel warning is generated.
This patch replaces the WARN_ONCE by a simple pr_warn_once, so that a
kernel, bootet with panic_on_warn, does not panic. A printk seems to be
more appropriate here.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/can/af_can.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/net/can/af_can.c
+++ b/net/can/af_can.c
@@ -722,13 +722,12 @@ static int can_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (unlikely(!net_eq(dev_net(dev), &init_net)))
goto drop;
- if (WARN_ONCE(dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN ||
- skb->len != CAN_MTU ||
- cfd->len > CAN_MAX_DLEN,
- "PF_CAN: dropped non conform CAN skbuf: "
- "dev type %d, len %d, datalen %d\n",
- dev->type, skb->len, cfd->len))
+ if (unlikely(dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN || skb->len != CAN_MTU ||
+ cfd->len > CAN_MAX_DLEN)) {
+ pr_warn_once("PF_CAN: dropped non conform CAN skbuf: dev type %d, len %d, datalen %d\n",
+ dev->type, skb->len, cfd->len);
goto drop;
+ }
can_receive(skb, dev);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
commit 2d19309cf86883f634a4f8ec55a54bda87db19bf upstream.
The select(2) syscall performs a kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL) where size grows
with the number of fds passed. We had a customer report page allocation
failures of order-4 for this allocation. This is a costly order, so it might
easily fail, as the VM expects such allocation to have a lower-order fallback.
Such trivial fallback is vmalloc(), as the memory doesn't have to be physically
contiguous and the allocation is temporary for the duration of the syscall
only. There were some concerns, whether this would have negative impact on the
system by exposing vmalloc() to userspace. Although an excessive use of vmalloc
can cause some system wide performance issues - TLB flushes etc. - a large
order allocation is not for free either and an excessive reclaim/compaction can
have a similar effect. Also note that the size is effectively limited by
RLIMIT_NOFILE which defaults to 1024 on the systems I checked. That means the
bitmaps will fit well within single page and thus the vmalloc() fallback could
be only excercised for processes where root allows a higher limit.
Note that the poll(2) syscall seems to use a linked list of order-0 pages, so
it doesn't need this kind of fallback.
[[email protected]: fix failure path logic]
[[email protected]: use proper type for size]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: David Laight <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/select.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/select.c
+++ b/fs/select.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/rt.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <net/busy_poll.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -550,7 +551,7 @@ int core_sys_select(int n, fd_set __user
fd_set_bits fds;
void *bits;
int ret, max_fds;
- unsigned int size;
+ size_t size, alloc_size;
struct fdtable *fdt;
/* Allocate small arguments on the stack to save memory and be faster */
long stack_fds[SELECT_STACK_ALLOC/sizeof(long)];
@@ -577,7 +578,14 @@ int core_sys_select(int n, fd_set __user
if (size > sizeof(stack_fds) / 6) {
/* Not enough space in on-stack array; must use kmalloc */
ret = -ENOMEM;
- bits = kmalloc(6 * size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (size > (SIZE_MAX / 6))
+ goto out_nofds;
+
+ alloc_size = 6 * size;
+ bits = kmalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!bits && alloc_size > PAGE_SIZE)
+ bits = vmalloc(alloc_size);
+
if (!bits)
goto out_nofds;
}
@@ -614,7 +622,7 @@ int core_sys_select(int n, fd_set __user
out:
if (bits != stack_fds)
- kfree(bits);
+ kvfree(bits);
out_nofds:
return ret;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
commit f4dc77713f8016d2e8a3295e1c9c53a21f296def upstream.
The dummy ruleset I used to test the original validation change was broken,
most rules were unreachable and were not tested by mark_source_chains().
In some cases rulesets that used to load in a few seconds now require
several minutes.
sample ruleset that shows the behaviour:
echo "*filter"
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf ":chain_%06x - [0:0]\n" $i
done
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
done
echo COMMIT
[ pipe result into iptables-restore ]
This ruleset will be about 74mbyte in size, with ~500k searches
though all 500k[1] rule entries. iptables-restore will take forever
(gave up after 10 minutes)
Instead of always searching the entire blob for a match, fill an
array with the start offsets of every single ipt_entry struct,
then do a binary search to check if the jump target is present or not.
After this change ruleset restore times get again close to what one
gets when reverting 36472341017529e (~3 seconds on my workstation).
[1] every user-defined rule gets an implicit RETURN, so we get
300k jumps + 100k userchains + 100k returns -> 500k rule entries
Fixes: 36472341017529e ("netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps")
Reported-by: Jeff Wu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jeff Wu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 4 ++
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++----------------
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++----------------
net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
@@ -243,6 +243,10 @@ int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *b
unsigned int target_offset,
unsigned int next_offset);
+unsigned int *xt_alloc_entry_offsets(unsigned int size);
+bool xt_find_jump_offset(const unsigned int *offsets,
+ unsigned int target, unsigned int size);
+
int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
bool inv_proto);
int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -367,23 +367,12 @@ static inline bool unconditional(const s
memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
}
-static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
- const struct arpt_entry *target)
-{
- struct arpt_entry *iter;
-
- xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) {
- if (iter == target)
- return true;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
/* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
* there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom.
*/
static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
- unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
+ unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0,
+ unsigned int *offsets)
{
unsigned int hook;
@@ -472,10 +461,11 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const stru
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
+ if (!xt_find_jump_offset(offsets, newpos,
+ newinfo->number))
+ return 0;
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
- if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, e))
- return 0;
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
@@ -642,6 +632,7 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_tab
const struct arpt_replace *repl)
{
struct arpt_entry *iter;
+ unsigned int *offsets;
unsigned int i;
int ret = 0;
@@ -655,6 +646,9 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_tab
}
duprintf("translate_table: size %u\n", newinfo->size);
+ offsets = xt_alloc_entry_offsets(newinfo->number);
+ if (!offsets)
+ return -ENOMEM;
i = 0;
/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
@@ -665,7 +659,9 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_tab
repl->underflow,
repl->valid_hooks);
if (ret != 0)
- break;
+ goto out_free;
+ if (i < repl->num_entries)
+ offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0;
++i;
if (strcmp(arpt_get_target(iter)->u.user.name,
XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
@@ -673,12 +669,13 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_tab
}
duprintf("translate_table: ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE gives %d\n", ret);
if (ret != 0)
- return ret;
+ goto out_free;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
if (i != repl->num_entries) {
duprintf("translate_table: %u not %u entries\n",
i, repl->num_entries);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
/* Check hooks all assigned */
@@ -689,17 +686,20 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_tab
if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
i, repl->hook_entry[i]);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
if (newinfo->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
i, repl->underflow[i]);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
}
- if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0))
- return -ELOOP;
+ if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0, offsets)) {
+ ret = -ELOOP;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ kvfree(offsets);
/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
i = 0;
@@ -720,6 +720,9 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_tab
}
return ret;
+ out_free:
+ kvfree(offsets);
+ return ret;
}
static void get_counters(const struct xt_table_info *t,
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -443,23 +443,12 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
#endif
}
-static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
- const struct ipt_entry *target)
-{
- struct ipt_entry *iter;
-
- xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) {
- if (iter == target)
- return true;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
/* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */
static int
mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
- unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
+ unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0,
+ unsigned int *offsets)
{
unsigned int hook;
@@ -552,10 +541,11 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
+ if (!xt_find_jump_offset(offsets, newpos,
+ newinfo->number))
+ return 0;
e = (struct ipt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
- if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, e))
- return 0;
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
@@ -811,6 +801,7 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
const struct ipt_replace *repl)
{
struct ipt_entry *iter;
+ unsigned int *offsets;
unsigned int i;
int ret = 0;
@@ -824,6 +815,9 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
}
duprintf("translate_table: size %u\n", newinfo->size);
+ offsets = xt_alloc_entry_offsets(newinfo->number);
+ if (!offsets)
+ return -ENOMEM;
i = 0;
/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) {
@@ -833,17 +827,20 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
repl->underflow,
repl->valid_hooks);
if (ret != 0)
- return ret;
+ goto out_free;
+ if (i < repl->num_entries)
+ offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0;
++i;
if (strcmp(ipt_get_target(iter)->u.user.name,
XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
++newinfo->stacksize;
}
+ ret = -EINVAL;
if (i != repl->num_entries) {
duprintf("translate_table: %u not %u entries\n",
i, repl->num_entries);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
/* Check hooks all assigned */
@@ -854,17 +851,20 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
i, repl->hook_entry[i]);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
if (newinfo->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
i, repl->underflow[i]);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
}
- if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0))
- return -ELOOP;
+ if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0, offsets)) {
+ ret = -ELOOP;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ kvfree(offsets);
/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
i = 0;
@@ -885,6 +885,9 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
}
return ret;
+ out_free:
+ kvfree(offsets);
+ return ret;
}
static void
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -455,23 +455,12 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
#endif
}
-static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
- const struct ip6t_entry *target)
-{
- struct ip6t_entry *iter;
-
- xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) {
- if (iter == target)
- return true;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
/* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */
static int
mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
- unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
+ unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0,
+ unsigned int *offsets)
{
unsigned int hook;
@@ -564,10 +553,11 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
+ if (!xt_find_jump_offset(offsets, newpos,
+ newinfo->number))
+ return 0;
e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
- if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, e))
- return 0;
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
@@ -823,6 +813,7 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
const struct ip6t_replace *repl)
{
struct ip6t_entry *iter;
+ unsigned int *offsets;
unsigned int i;
int ret = 0;
@@ -836,6 +827,9 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
}
duprintf("translate_table: size %u\n", newinfo->size);
+ offsets = xt_alloc_entry_offsets(newinfo->number);
+ if (!offsets)
+ return -ENOMEM;
i = 0;
/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) {
@@ -845,17 +839,20 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
repl->underflow,
repl->valid_hooks);
if (ret != 0)
- return ret;
+ goto out_free;
+ if (i < repl->num_entries)
+ offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0;
++i;
if (strcmp(ip6t_get_target(iter)->u.user.name,
XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
++newinfo->stacksize;
}
+ ret = -EINVAL;
if (i != repl->num_entries) {
duprintf("translate_table: %u not %u entries\n",
i, repl->num_entries);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
/* Check hooks all assigned */
@@ -866,17 +863,20 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
i, repl->hook_entry[i]);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
if (newinfo->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
i, repl->underflow[i]);
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
}
}
- if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0))
- return -ELOOP;
+ if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0, offsets)) {
+ ret = -ELOOP;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ kvfree(offsets);
/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
i = 0;
@@ -897,6 +897,9 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct
}
return ret;
+ out_free:
+ kvfree(offsets);
+ return ret;
}
static void
--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
@@ -701,6 +701,56 @@ int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *b
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_check_entry_offsets);
+/**
+ * xt_alloc_entry_offsets - allocate array to store rule head offsets
+ *
+ * @size: number of entries
+ *
+ * Return: NULL or kmalloc'd or vmalloc'd array
+ */
+unsigned int *xt_alloc_entry_offsets(unsigned int size)
+{
+ unsigned int *off;
+
+ off = kcalloc(size, sizeof(unsigned int), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+
+ if (off)
+ return off;
+
+ if (size < (SIZE_MAX / sizeof(unsigned int)))
+ off = vmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned int));
+
+ return off;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_alloc_entry_offsets);
+
+/**
+ * xt_find_jump_offset - check if target is a valid jump offset
+ *
+ * @offsets: array containing all valid rule start offsets of a rule blob
+ * @target: the jump target to search for
+ * @size: entries in @offset
+ */
+bool xt_find_jump_offset(const unsigned int *offsets,
+ unsigned int target, unsigned int size)
+{
+ int m, low = 0, hi = size;
+
+ while (hi > low) {
+ m = (low + hi) / 2u;
+
+ if (offsets[m] > target)
+ hi = m;
+ else if (offsets[m] < target)
+ low = m + 1;
+ else
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_find_jump_offset);
+
int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *par,
unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto)
{
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
commit eef9ffdf9cd39b2986367bc8395e2772bc1284ba upstream.
The SCSI host byte should be shifted left by 16 in order to have
scsi_decide_disposition() do the right thing (.i.e. requeue the
command).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Fixes: 661134ad3765 ("[SCSI] libiscsi, bnx2i: make bound ep check common")
Cc: Lee Duncan <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Leech <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Lee Duncan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c
@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ int iscsi_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host
if (test_bit(ISCSI_SUSPEND_BIT, &conn->suspend_tx)) {
reason = FAILURE_SESSION_IN_RECOVERY;
- sc->result = DID_REQUEUE;
+ sc->result = DID_REQUEUE << 16;
goto fault;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c5006b8aa74599ce19104b31d322d2ea9ff887cc ]
The check in sctp_sockaddr_af is not robust enough to forbid binding a
v4mapped v6 addr on a v4 socket.
The worse thing is that v4 socket's bind_verify would not convert this
v4mapped v6 addr to a v4 addr. syzbot even reported a crash as the v4
socket bound a v6 addr.
This patch is to fix it by doing the common sa.sa_family check first,
then AF_INET check for v4mapped v6 addrs.
Fixes: 7dab83de50c7 ("sctp: Support ipv6only AF_INET6 sockets.")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 14 ++++++--------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -332,16 +332,14 @@ static struct sctp_af *sctp_sockaddr_af(
if (len < sizeof (struct sockaddr))
return NULL;
+ if (!opt->pf->af_supported(addr->sa.sa_family, opt))
+ return NULL;
+
/* V4 mapped address are really of AF_INET family */
if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
- ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr->v6.sin6_addr)) {
- if (!opt->pf->af_supported(AF_INET, opt))
- return NULL;
- } else {
- /* Does this PF support this AF? */
- if (!opt->pf->af_supported(addr->sa.sa_family, opt))
- return NULL;
- }
+ ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) &&
+ !opt->pf->af_supported(AF_INET, opt))
+ return NULL;
/* If we get this far, af is valid. */
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa.sa_family);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
commit 55877ef45fbd7f975d078426866b7d1a2435dcc3 upstream.
ARM64 enables both CONFIG_OF and CONFIG_ACPI and the firmware can pass
both ACPI tables and the device tree. Based on the kernel parameter, one
of the two will be chosen. If acpi is enabled, then device tree is not
unflattened.
Currently ARM64 platforms report:
"
Failed to find cpu0 device node
Unable to detect cache hierarchy from DT for CPU 0
"
which is incorrect when booting with ACPI. Also latest ACPI v6.1 has no
support for cache properties/hierarchy.
This patch adds check for unflattened device tree and also returns as
"not supported" if ACPI is runtime enabled.
It also removes the reference to DT from the error message as the cache
hierarchy can be detected from the firmware(OF/DT/ACPI)
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/base/cacheinfo.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/cacheinfo.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
@@ -104,12 +105,16 @@ static int cache_shared_cpu_map_setup(un
struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
struct cacheinfo *this_leaf, *sib_leaf;
unsigned int index;
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
if (this_cpu_ci->cpu_map_populated)
return 0;
- ret = cache_setup_of_node(cpu);
+ if (of_have_populated_dt())
+ ret = cache_setup_of_node(cpu);
+ else if (!acpi_disabled)
+ /* No cache property/hierarchy support yet in ACPI */
+ ret = -ENOTSUPP;
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -206,8 +211,7 @@ static int detect_cache_attributes(unsig
*/
ret = cache_shared_cpu_map_setup(cpu);
if (ret) {
- pr_warn("Unable to detect cache hierarchy from DT for CPU %d\n",
- cpu);
+ pr_warn("Unable to detect cache hierarchy for CPU %d\n", cpu);
goto free_ci;
}
return 0;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
commit 90120d15f4c397272aaf41077960a157fc4212bf upstream.
usbip driver is leaking socket pointer address in messages. Remove
the messages that aren't useful and print sockfd in the ones that
are useful for debugging.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c | 3 +--
drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 15 ++++-----------
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
@@ -163,8 +163,7 @@ static void stub_shutdown_connection(str
* step 1?
*/
if (ud->tcp_socket) {
- dev_dbg(&sdev->udev->dev, "shutdown tcp_socket %p\n",
- ud->tcp_socket);
+ dev_dbg(&sdev->udev->dev, "shutdown sockfd %d\n", ud->sockfd);
kernel_sock_shutdown(ud->tcp_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
}
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -317,18 +317,14 @@ int usbip_recv(struct socket *sock, void
struct msghdr msg;
struct kvec iov;
int total = 0;
-
/* for blocks of if (usbip_dbg_flag_xmit) */
char *bp = buf;
int osize = size;
- usbip_dbg_xmit("enter\n");
-
- if (!sock || !buf || !size) {
- pr_err("invalid arg, sock %p buff %p size %d\n", sock, buf,
- size);
+ if (!sock || !buf || !size)
return -EINVAL;
- }
+
+ usbip_dbg_xmit("enter\n");
do {
sock->sk->sk_allocation = GFP_NOIO;
@@ -341,11 +337,8 @@ int usbip_recv(struct socket *sock, void
msg.msg_flags = MSG_NOSIGNAL;
result = kernel_recvmsg(sock, &msg, &iov, 1, size, MSG_WAITALL);
- if (result <= 0) {
- pr_debug("receive sock %p buf %p size %u ret %d total %d\n",
- sock, buf, size, result, total);
+ if (result <= 0)
goto err;
- }
size -= result;
buf += result;
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c
@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ static void vhci_shutdown_connection(str
/* need this? see stub_dev.c */
if (ud->tcp_socket) {
- pr_debug("shutdown tcp_socket %p\n", ud->tcp_socket);
+ pr_debug("shutdown sockfd %d\n", ud->sockfd);
kernel_sock_shutdown(ud->tcp_socket, SHUT_RDWR);
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a0ff660058b88d12625a783ce9e5c1371c87951f ]
After commit cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from
wait_buf sleep"), it may change to lock another sk if the asoc has been
peeled off in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf.
However, the asoc's new sk could be already closed elsewhere, as it's in
the sendmsg context of the old sk that can't avoid the new sk's closing.
If the sk's last one refcnt is held by this asoc, later on after putting
this asoc, the new sk will be freed, while under it's own lock.
This patch is to revert that commit, but fix the old issue by returning
error under the old sk's lock.
Fixes: cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from wait_buf sleep")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 16 ++++++----------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
static int sctp_writeable(struct sock *sk);
static void sctp_wfree(struct sk_buff *skb);
static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p,
- size_t msg_len, struct sock **orig_sk);
+ size_t msg_len);
static int sctp_wait_for_packet(struct sock *sk, int *err, long *timeo_p);
static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *, long *timeo_p);
static int sctp_wait_for_accept(struct sock *sk, long timeo);
@@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk,
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (!sctp_wspace(asoc)) {
/* sk can be changed by peel off when waiting for buf. */
- err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, &timeo, msg_len, &sk);
+ err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, &timeo, msg_len);
if (err) {
if (err == -ESRCH) {
/* asoc is already dead. */
@@ -6974,12 +6974,12 @@ void sctp_sock_rfree(struct sk_buff *skb
/* Helper function to wait for space in the sndbuf. */
static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p,
- size_t msg_len, struct sock **orig_sk)
+ size_t msg_len)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
- int err = 0;
long current_timeo = *timeo_p;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
+ int err = 0;
pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p, timeo:%ld, msg_len:%zu\n", __func__, asoc,
*timeo_p, msg_len);
@@ -7008,17 +7008,13 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct s
release_sock(sk);
current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
- if (sk != asoc->base.sk) {
- release_sock(sk);
- sk = asoc->base.sk;
- lock_sock(sk);
- }
+ if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
+ goto do_error;
*timeo_p = current_timeo;
}
out:
- *orig_sk = sk;
finish_wait(&asoc->wait, &wait);
/* Release the association's refcnt. */
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Liping Zhang <[email protected]>
commit 00a3101f561816e58de054a470484996f78eb5eb upstream.
Like NFQNL_MSG_VERDICT_BATCH do, we should also reject the verdict
request when the portid is not same with the initial portid(maybe
from another process).
Fixes: 97d32cf9440d ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: batch verdict support")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -1053,10 +1053,8 @@ nfqnl_recv_verdict(struct sock *ctnl, st
struct net *net = sock_net(ctnl);
struct nfnl_queue_net *q = nfnl_queue_pernet(net);
- queue = instance_lookup(q, queue_num);
- if (!queue)
- queue = verdict_instance_lookup(q, queue_num,
- NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
+ queue = verdict_instance_lookup(q, queue_num,
+ NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
if (IS_ERR(queue))
return PTR_ERR(queue);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
The backport of KAISER to 4.4 turned vsyscall emulate mode into native
mode. Add a vsyscall_pgprot variable to hold the correct page
protections, like Borislav and Hugh did for 3.2 and 3.18.
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 7 ++++---
arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static enum { EMULATE, NATIVE, NONE } vs
#else
EMULATE;
#endif
+unsigned long vsyscall_pgprot = __PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL;
static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
{
@@ -336,11 +337,11 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void)
extern char __vsyscall_page;
unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page);
+ if (vsyscall_mode != NATIVE)
+ vsyscall_pgprot = __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR;
if (vsyscall_mode != NONE)
__set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall,
- vsyscall_mode == NATIVE
- ? PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL
- : PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR);
+ __pgprot(vsyscall_pgprot));
BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) !=
(unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR);
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ extern void map_vsyscall(void);
*/
extern bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address);
extern bool vsyscall_enabled(void);
+extern unsigned long vsyscall_pgprot;
#else
static inline void map_vsyscall(void) {}
static inline bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ void __init kaiser_init(void)
if (vsyscall_enabled())
kaiser_add_user_map_early((void *)VSYSCALL_ADDR,
PAGE_SIZE,
- __PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL);
+ vsyscall_pgprot);
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
void *percpu_vaddr = __per_cpu_user_mapped_start +
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
commit 3b2d69114fefa474fca542e51119036dceb4aa6f upstream.
ACPICA commit a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS
virtual_box 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ns_terminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list).
But the deletion code in acpi_ns_terminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in acpi_ns_terminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/a23325b2
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/acpi/acpica/nsutils.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpica/nsutils.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpica/nsutils.c
@@ -593,25 +593,20 @@ struct acpi_namespace_node *acpi_ns_vali
void acpi_ns_terminate(void)
{
acpi_status status;
+ union acpi_operand_object *prev;
+ union acpi_operand_object *next;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE(ns_terminate);
-#ifdef ACPI_EXEC_APP
- {
- union acpi_operand_object *prev;
- union acpi_operand_object *next;
+ /* Delete any module-level code blocks */
- /* Delete any module-level code blocks */
-
- next = acpi_gbl_module_code_list;
- while (next) {
- prev = next;
- next = next->method.mutex;
- prev->method.mutex = NULL; /* Clear the Mutex (cheated) field */
- acpi_ut_remove_reference(prev);
- }
+ next = acpi_gbl_module_code_list;
+ while (next) {
+ prev = next;
+ next = next->method.mutex;
+ prev->method.mutex = NULL; /* Clear the Mutex (cheated) field */
+ acpi_ut_remove_reference(prev);
}
-#endif
/*
* Free the entire namespace -- all nodes and all objects
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
commit fc3dc67471461c0efcb1ed22fb7595121d65fad9 upstream.
fcntl(0, F_SETOWN, 0x80000000) triggers:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/fcntl.c:118:7
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 1 PID: 18261 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.1-0-syzkaller #1
...
Call Trace:
...
[<ffffffffad8f0868>] ? f_setown+0x1d8/0x200
[<ffffffffad8f19a9>] ? SyS_fcntl+0x999/0xf30
[<ffffffffaed1fb00>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc1
Fix that by checking the arg parameter properly (against INT_MAX) before
"who = -who". And return immediatelly with -EINVAL in case it is wrong.
Note that according to POSIX we can return EINVAL:
http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fcntl.html
[EINVAL]
The cmd argument is F_SETOWN and the value of the argument
is not valid as a process or process group identifier.
[v2] returns an error, v1 used to fail silently
[v3] implement proper check for the bad value INT_MIN
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/fcntl.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/fcntl.c
+++ b/fs/fcntl.c
@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@ void f_setown(struct file *filp, unsigne
int who = arg;
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
if (who < 0) {
+ /* avoid overflow below */
+ if (who == INT_MIN)
+ return;
+
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
who = -who;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rui Wang <[email protected]>
commit 9d98bcec731756b8688b59ec998707924d716d7b upstream.
On a 4-socket Brickland system, hot-removing one ioapic is fine.
Hot-removing the 2nd one causes panic in mp_unregister_ioapic()
while calling release_resource().
It is because the iomem_res pointer has already been released
when removing the first ioapic.
To explain the use of &res[num] here: res is assigned to ioapic_resources,
and later in ioapic_insert_resources() we do:
struct resource *r = ioapic_resources;
for_each_ioapic(i) {
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, r);
r++;
}
Here 'r' is treated as an arry of 'struct resource', and the r++ ensures
that each element of the array is inserted separately. Thus we should call
release_resouce() on each element at &res[num].
Fix it by assigning the correct pointers to ioapics[i].iomem_res in
ioapic_setup_resources().
Signed-off-by: Rui Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
@@ -2592,8 +2592,8 @@ static struct resource * __init ioapic_s
res[num].flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
snprintf(mem, IOAPIC_RESOURCE_NAME_SIZE, "IOAPIC %u", i);
mem += IOAPIC_RESOURCE_NAME_SIZE;
+ ioapics[i].iomem_res = &res[num];
num++;
- ioapics[i].iomem_res = res;
}
ioapic_resources = res;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
commit f5d07b9e98022d50720e38aa936fc11c67868ece upstream.
Lenovo introduced trackpoint compatible sticks with minimum PS/2 commands.
They supposed to reply with 0x02, 0x03, or 0x04 in response to the
"Read Extended ID" command, so we would know not to try certain extended
commands. Unfortunately even some trackpoints reporting the original IBM
version (0x01 firmware 0x0e) now respond with incorrect data to the "Get
Extended Buttons" command:
thinkpad_acpi: ThinkPad BIOS R0DET87W (1.87 ), EC unknown
thinkpad_acpi: Lenovo ThinkPad E470, model 20H1004SGE
psmouse serio2: trackpoint: IBM TrackPoint firmware: 0x0e, buttons: 0/0
Since there are no trackpoints without buttons, let's assume the trackpoint
has 3 buttons when we get 0 response to the extended buttons query.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma <[email protected]>
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196253
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/input/mouse/trackpoint.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/input/mouse/trackpoint.c
+++ b/drivers/input/mouse/trackpoint.c
@@ -383,6 +383,9 @@ int trackpoint_detect(struct psmouse *ps
if (trackpoint_read(&psmouse->ps2dev, TP_EXT_BTN, &button_info)) {
psmouse_warn(psmouse, "failed to get extended button data, assuming 3 buttons\n");
button_info = 0x33;
+ } else if (!button_info) {
+ psmouse_warn(psmouse, "got 0 in extended button data, assuming 3 buttons\n");
+ button_info = 0x33;
}
psmouse->private = kzalloc(sizeof(struct trackpoint_data), GFP_KERNEL);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
commit 916a27901de01446bcf57ecca4783f6cff493309 upstream.
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d
These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS
fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
@@ -69,6 +70,9 @@ static int xt_osf_add_callback(struct so
struct xt_osf_finger *kf = NULL, *sf;
int err = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -112,6 +116,9 @@ static int xt_osf_remove_callback(struct
struct xt_osf_finger *sf;
int err = -ENOENT;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
commit 08db141b5313ac2f64b844fb5725b8d81744b417 upstream.
The main loop in __discard_prealloc is protected by the reiserfs write lock
which is dropped across schedules like the BKL it replaced. The problem is
that it checks the value, calls a routine that schedules, and then adjusts
the state. As a result, two threads that are calling
reiserfs_prealloc_discard at the same time can race when one calls
reiserfs_free_prealloc_block, the lock is dropped, and the other calls
reiserfs_free_prealloc_block with the same block number. In the right
circumstances, it can cause the prealloc count to go negative.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/reiserfs/bitmap.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/reiserfs/bitmap.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/bitmap.c
@@ -513,9 +513,17 @@ static void __discard_prealloc(struct re
"inode has negative prealloc blocks count.");
#endif
while (ei->i_prealloc_count > 0) {
- reiserfs_free_prealloc_block(th, inode, ei->i_prealloc_block);
- ei->i_prealloc_block++;
+ b_blocknr_t block_to_free;
+
+ /*
+ * reiserfs_free_prealloc_block can drop the write lock,
+ * which could allow another caller to free the same block.
+ * We can protect against it by modifying the prealloc
+ * state before calling it.
+ */
+ block_to_free = ei->i_prealloc_block++;
ei->i_prealloc_count--;
+ reiserfs_free_prealloc_block(th, inode, block_to_free);
dirty = 1;
}
if (dirty)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
commit d4689846881d160a4d12a514e991a740bcb5d65a upstream.
If an invalid CANFD frame is received, from a driver or from a tun
interface, a Kernel warning is generated.
This patch replaces the WARN_ONCE by a simple pr_warn_once, so that a
kernel, bootet with panic_on_warn, does not panic. A printk seems to be
more appropriate here.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Cc: linux-stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/can/af_can.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/net/can/af_can.c
+++ b/net/can/af_can.c
@@ -745,13 +745,12 @@ static int canfd_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb
if (unlikely(!net_eq(dev_net(dev), &init_net)))
goto drop;
- if (WARN_ONCE(dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN ||
- skb->len != CANFD_MTU ||
- cfd->len > CANFD_MAX_DLEN,
- "PF_CAN: dropped non conform CAN FD skbuf: "
- "dev type %d, len %d, datalen %d\n",
- dev->type, skb->len, cfd->len))
+ if (unlikely(dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN || skb->len != CANFD_MTU ||
+ cfd->len > CANFD_MAX_DLEN)) {
+ pr_warn_once("PF_CAN: dropped non conform CAN FD skbuf: dev type %d, len %d, datalen %d\n",
+ dev->type, skb->len, cfd->len);
goto drop;
+ }
can_receive(skb, dev);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jim Westfall <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cd9ff4de0107c65d69d02253bb25d6db93c3dbc1 ]
Map all lookup neigh keys to INADDR_ANY for loopback/point-to-point devices
to avoid making an entry for every remote ip the device needs to talk to.
This used the be the old behavior but became broken in a263b3093641f
(ipv4: Make neigh lookups directly in output packet path) and later removed
in 0bb4087cbec0 (ipv4: Fix neigh lookup keying over loopback/point-to-point
devices) because it was broken.
Signed-off-by: Jim Westfall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/net/arp.h | 3 +++
net/ipv4/arp.c | 7 ++++++-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/net/arp.h
+++ b/include/net/arp.h
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ static inline u32 arp_hashfn(const void
static inline struct neighbour *__ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(struct net_device *dev, u32 key)
{
+ if (dev->flags & (IFF_LOOPBACK | IFF_POINTOPOINT))
+ key = INADDR_ANY;
+
return ___neigh_lookup_noref(&arp_tbl, neigh_key_eq32, arp_hashfn, &key, dev);
}
--- a/net/ipv4/arp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/arp.c
@@ -223,11 +223,16 @@ static bool arp_key_eq(const struct neig
static int arp_constructor(struct neighbour *neigh)
{
- __be32 addr = *(__be32 *)neigh->primary_key;
+ __be32 addr;
struct net_device *dev = neigh->dev;
struct in_device *in_dev;
struct neigh_parms *parms;
+ u32 inaddr_any = INADDR_ANY;
+ if (dev->flags & (IFF_LOOPBACK | IFF_POINTOPOINT))
+ memcpy(neigh->primary_key, &inaddr_any, arp_tbl.key_len);
+
+ addr = *(__be32 *)neigh->primary_key;
rcu_read_lock();
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
if (!in_dev) {
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yang Shi <[email protected]>
commit dbae40b76abef2f8a7e7bf1701f77df9e73def48 upstream.
The Layerscape PCI host driver must recognize ls2085a compatible when using
firmware with ls2085a compatible property, otherwise the PCI bus won't be
detected even though ls2085a compatible is included by the dts.
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pci/host/pci-layerscape.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/pci/host/pci-layerscape.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/host/pci-layerscape.c
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id ls_pcie
{ .compatible = "fsl,ls1021a-pcie", .data = &ls1021_drvdata },
{ .compatible = "fsl,ls1043a-pcie", .data = &ls1043_drvdata },
{ .compatible = "fsl,ls2080a-pcie", .data = &ls2080_drvdata },
+ { .compatible = "fsl,ls2085a-pcie", .data = &ls2080_drvdata },
{ },
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, ls_pcie_of_match);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Janakarajan Natarajan <[email protected]>
commit 88d879d29f9cc0de2d930b584285638cdada6625 upstream.
Newer hardware has uncovered a bug in the software implementation of
using MWAITX for the delay function. A value of 0 for the timer is meant
to indicate that a timeout will not be used to exit MWAITX. On newer
hardware this can result in MWAITX never returning, resulting in NMI
soft lockup messages being printed. On older hardware, some of the other
conditions under which MWAITX can exit masked this issue. The AMD APM
does not currently document this and will be updated.
Please refer to http://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=148950623231140 for
information regarding NMI soft lockup messages on an AMD Ryzen 1800X.
This has been root-caused as a 0 passed to MWAITX causing it to wait
indefinitely.
This change has the added benefit of avoiding the unnecessary setup of
MONITORX/MWAITX when the delay value is zero.
Signed-off-by: Janakarajan Natarajan <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static void delay_mwaitx(unsigned long _
{
u64 start, end, delay, loops = __loops;
+ /*
+ * Timer value of 0 causes MWAITX to wait indefinitely, unless there
+ * is a store on the memory monitored by MONITORX.
+ */
+ if (loops == 0)
+ return;
+
start = rdtsc_ordered();
for (;;) {
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Craig Gallek <[email protected]>
commit d9b3fca27385eafe61c3ca6feab6cb1e7dc77482 upstream.
tcp_hdrlen is wasteful if you already have a pointer to struct tcphdr.
This splits the size calculation into a helper function that can be
used if a struct tcphdr is already available.
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/tcp.h | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
@@ -29,9 +29,14 @@ static inline struct tcphdr *tcp_hdr(con
return (struct tcphdr *)skb_transport_header(skb);
}
+static inline unsigned int __tcp_hdrlen(const struct tcphdr *th)
+{
+ return th->doff * 4;
+}
+
static inline unsigned int tcp_hdrlen(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return tcp_hdr(skb)->doff * 4;
+ return __tcp_hdrlen(tcp_hdr(skb));
}
static inline struct tcphdr *inner_tcp_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
commit 979515c5645830465739254abc1b1648ada41518 upstream.
I ran into this:
================================================================================
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/time/hrtimer.c:310:16
signed integer overflow:
9223372036854775807 + 50000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
CPU: 2 PID: 4798 Comm: trinity-c2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #91
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
0000000000000000 ffff88010ce6fb88 ffffffff82344740 0000000041b58ab3
ffffffff84f97a20 ffffffff82344694 ffff88010ce6fbb0 ffff88010ce6fb60
000000000000c350 ffff88010ce6f968 dffffc0000000000 ffffffff857bc320
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff82344740>] dump_stack+0xac/0xfc
[<ffffffff82344694>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0xc4/0xc4
[<ffffffff8242df78>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x8a
[<ffffffff8242e6b4>] handle_overflow+0x202/0x23d
[<ffffffff8242e4b2>] ? val_to_string.constprop.6+0x11e/0x11e
[<ffffffff8236df71>] ? timerqueue_add+0x151/0x410
[<ffffffff81485c48>] ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x3b8/0x1380
[<ffffffff81795631>] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[<ffffffff8242e6fd>] __ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0xe/0x10
[<ffffffff81488ac9>] hrtimer_nanosleep+0x5d9/0x790
[<ffffffff814884f0>] ? hrtimer_init_sleeper+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff813a9ffb>] ? __might_sleep+0x5b/0x260
[<ffffffff8148be10>] common_nsleep+0x20/0x30
[<ffffffff814906c7>] SyS_clock_nanosleep+0x197/0x210
[<ffffffff81490530>] ? SyS_clock_getres+0x150/0x150
[<ffffffff823c7113>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[<ffffffff8162ef60>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.3+0x30/0x1b0
[<ffffffff81490530>] ? SyS_clock_getres+0x150/0x150
[<ffffffff81007bd3>] do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0
[<ffffffff845f85aa>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
================================================================================
Add a new ktime_add_unsafe() helper which doesn't check for overflow, but
doesn't throw a UBSAN warning when it does overflow either.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Cochran <[email protected]>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/ktime.h | 7 +++++++
kernel/time/hrtimer.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/linux/ktime.h
+++ b/include/linux/ktime.h
@@ -64,6 +64,13 @@ static inline ktime_t ktime_set(const s6
({ (ktime_t){ .tv64 = (lhs).tv64 + (rhs).tv64 }; })
/*
+ * Same as ktime_add(), but avoids undefined behaviour on overflow; however,
+ * this means that you must check the result for overflow yourself.
+ */
+#define ktime_add_unsafe(lhs, rhs) \
+ ({ (ktime_t){ .tv64 = (u64) (lhs).tv64 + (rhs).tv64 }; })
+
+/*
* Add a ktime_t variable and a scalar nanosecond value.
* res = kt + nsval:
*/
--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__ktime_divns);
*/
ktime_t ktime_add_safe(const ktime_t lhs, const ktime_t rhs)
{
- ktime_t res = ktime_add(lhs, rhs);
+ ktime_t res = ktime_add_unsafe(lhs, rhs);
/*
* We use KTIME_SEC_MAX here, the maximum timeout which we can
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg KH <[email protected]>
commit 7e040726850a106587485c21bdacc0bfc8a0cbed upstream.
[resend due to me forgetting to cc: linux-api the first time around I
posted these back on Feb 23]
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
For some reason these values are not in the uapi header file, so any
libc has to define it themselves. To prevent them from needing to do
this, just have the kernel provide the correct values.
Reported-by: Elliott Hughes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
--- a/include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/eventpoll.h
@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@
#define EPOLL_CTL_DEL 2
#define EPOLL_CTL_MOD 3
+/* Epoll event masks */
+#define EPOLLIN 0x00000001
+#define EPOLLPRI 0x00000002
+#define EPOLLOUT 0x00000004
+#define EPOLLERR 0x00000008
+#define EPOLLHUP 0x00000010
+#define EPOLLRDNORM 0x00000040
+#define EPOLLRDBAND 0x00000080
+#define EPOLLWRNORM 0x00000100
+#define EPOLLWRBAND 0x00000200
+#define EPOLLMSG 0x00000400
+#define EPOLLRDHUP 0x00002000
+
/*
* Request the handling of system wakeup events so as to prevent system suspends
* from happening while those events are being processed.
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
commit 4b380c42f7d00a395feede754f0bc2292eebe6e5 upstream.
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, nfnl_cthelper_list is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
$ nfct helper list
nfct v1.4.4: netlink error: Operation not permitted
$ vpnns -- nfct helper list
{
.name = ftp,
.queuenum = 0,
.l3protonum = 2,
.l4protonum = 6,
.priv_data_len = 24,
.status = enabled,
};
Add capable() checks in nfnetlink_cthelper, as this is cleaner than
trying to generalize the solution.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
@@ -392,6 +393,9 @@ nfnl_cthelper_new(struct sock *nfnl, str
struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth;
int ret = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!tb[NFCTH_NAME] || !tb[NFCTH_TUPLE])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -595,6 +599,9 @@ nfnl_cthelper_get(struct sock *nfnl, str
struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth;
bool tuple_set = false;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = nfnl_cthelper_dump_table,
@@ -661,6 +668,9 @@ nfnl_cthelper_del(struct sock *nfnl, str
struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth, *n;
int j = 0, ret;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (tb[NFCTH_NAME])
helper_name = nla_data(tb[NFCTH_NAME]);
On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 01:56:05PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.114 release.
> There are 74 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 31 12:38:21 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.114-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Merged, compiled, and flashed onto my Pixel 2 XL and OnePlus 5.
No conflicts, no initial issues noticed in dmesg or general usage.
Reference trees for Android: https://github.com/android-linux-stable
Thanks!
Nathan
On 01/29/2018 05:56 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.114 release.
> There are 74 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 31 12:38:21 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.114-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 02:30:53PM -0700, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 01:56:05PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.114 release.
> > There are 74 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Wed Jan 31 12:38:21 UTC 2018.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.114-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> >
>
> Merged, compiled, and flashed onto my Pixel 2 XL and OnePlus 5.
>
> No conflicts, no initial issues noticed in dmesg or general usage.
>
> Reference trees for Android: https://github.com/android-linux-stable
Very nice, thanks for testing and letting me know.
greg k-h
On 29 January 2018 at 18:26, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.114 release.
> There are 74 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 31 12:38:21 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.114-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.4.114-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.4.y
git commit: d9fcd0a3af9c5d6c1cc6cf729546f1ae0a527628
git describe: v4.4.113-76-gd9fcd0a3af9c
Test details: https://staging-qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/v4.4.113-76-gd9fcd0a3af9c
No regressions (compared to build v4.4.113-75-gaa55f991278a)
Boards, architectures and test suites:
-------------------------------------
x15 - arm
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - pass: 32, skip: 28
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 87, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 60,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 20, skip: 2
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 13, skip: 1
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 1036, skip: 67
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,
x86_64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - pass: 45, skip: 31
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 90, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 61, skip: 1
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 9, skip: 1
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 1015, skip: 117
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,
Hikey test results summary
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.4.114-rc1
git repo: https://git.linaro.org/lkft/arm64-stable-rc.git
git tag: 4.4.114-rc1-hikey-20180129-121
git commit: 01517f424e9be016a5471a19e8c4ffa4bbbe9933
git describe: 4.4.114-rc1-hikey-20180129-121
Test details: https://staging-qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linaro-hikey-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/4.4.114-rc1-hikey-20180129-121
No regressions (compared to build 4.4.114-rc1-hikey-20180129-120)
Boards, architectures and test suites:
-------------------------------------
hi6220-hikey - arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - pass: 30, skip: 31
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 90, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 28, skip: 36
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 60,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 21, skip: 1
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 14,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 980, skip: 124
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,
Documentation - https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/LKFT/Email+Reports
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 02:22:55PM +0100, Florian Wolters wrote:
> Tested-by: Florian Wolters <[email protected]>
>
> I have tested this patch applied to 4.4.113 with positive result within
> the fli4l project.
Thanks for testing and letting me know.
greg k-h
Tested-by: Florian Wolters <[email protected]>
I have tested this patch applied to 4.4.113 with positive result within
the fli4l project.
On 01/29/2018 01:57 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
>
>
> [ Upstream commit ad23b750933ea7bf962678972a286c78a8fa36aa ]
>
> Commit "net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports"
> introduced a check to validate the source address of locally generated
> IGMPv3 packets.
> Instead of checking the local interface address directly, it uses
> inet_ifa_match(fl4->saddr, ifa), which checks if the address is on the
> local subnet (or equal to the point-to-point address if used).
>
> This breaks for point-to-point interfaces, so check against
> ifa->ifa_local directly.
>
> Cc: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
> Fixes: a46182b00290 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports")
> Reported-by: Sebastian Gottschall <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
> ---
> net/ipv4/igmp.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
> @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static __be32 igmpv3_get_srcaddr(struct
> return htonl(INADDR_ANY);
>
> for_ifa(in_dev) {
> - if (inet_ifa_match(fl4->saddr, ifa))
> + if (fl4->saddr == ifa->ifa_local)
> return fl4->saddr;
> } endfor_ifa(in_dev);
>
>
On 01/29/2018 04:56 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.114 release.
> There are 74 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 31 12:38:21 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 118 pass: 118 fail: 0
Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.
Guenter
On 01/29/2018, 01:56 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
>
> commit c2a6bbaf0c5f90463a7011a295bbdb7e33c80b51 upstream.
>
> The way acpi_find_child_device() works currently is that, if there
> are two (or more) devices with the same _ADR value in the same
> namespace scope (which is not specifically allowed by the spec and
> the OS behavior in that case is not defined), the first one of them
> found to be present (with the help of _STA) will be returned.
>
> This covers the majority of cases, but is not sufficient if some of
> the devices in question have a _HID (or _CID) returning some valid
> ACPI/PNP device IDs (which is disallowed by the spec) and the
> ASL writers' expectation appears to be that the OS will match
> devices without a valid ACPI/PNP device ID against a given bus
> address first.
>
> To cover this special case as well, modify find_child_checks()
> to prefer devices without ACPI/PNP device IDs over devices that
> have them.
>
> Suggested-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
You seem you took this from SLE12-SP2? But where did you take the
upstream commit SHA from? In SLE, I have "Git-commit: fdad4e7a876a2..."
which is the correct SHA of this patch. The above c2a6bbaf0c is a
different patch. So are your scripts broken or is this a manual oversight?
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>
> ---
> drivers/acpi/glue.c | 12 ++++++------
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/drivers/acpi/glue.c
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/glue.c
> @@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ static int find_child_checks(struct acpi
> return -ENODEV;
>
> /*
> - * If the device has a _HID (or _CID) returning a valid ACPI/PNP
> - * device ID, it is better to make it look less attractive here, so that
> - * the other device with the same _ADR value (that may not have a valid
> - * device ID) can be matched going forward. [This means a second spec
> - * violation in a row, so whatever we do here is best effort anyway.]
> + * If the device has a _HID returning a valid ACPI/PNP device ID, it is
> + * better to make it look less attractive here, so that the other device
> + * with the same _ADR value (that may not have a valid device ID) can be
> + * matched going forward. [This means a second spec violation in a row,
> + * so whatever we do here is best effort anyway.]
> */
> - return sta_present && list_empty(&adev->pnp.ids) ?
> + return sta_present && !adev->pnp.type.platform_id ?
> FIND_CHILD_MAX_SCORE : FIND_CHILD_MIN_SCORE;
> }
>
>
>
--
js
suse labs
On 02/01/2018, 09:46 AM, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> On 01/29/2018, 01:56 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>>
>> ------------------
>>
>> From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
>>
>> commit c2a6bbaf0c5f90463a7011a295bbdb7e33c80b51 upstream.
>>
>> The way acpi_find_child_device() works currently is that, if there
>> are two (or more) devices with the same _ADR value in the same
>> namespace scope (which is not specifically allowed by the spec and
>> the OS behavior in that case is not defined), the first one of them
>> found to be present (with the help of _STA) will be returned.
>>
>> This covers the majority of cases, but is not sufficient if some of
>> the devices in question have a _HID (or _CID) returning some valid
>> ACPI/PNP device IDs (which is disallowed by the spec) and the
>> ASL writers' expectation appears to be that the OS will match
>> devices without a valid ACPI/PNP device ID against a given bus
>> address first.
>>
>> To cover this special case as well, modify find_child_checks()
>> to prefer devices without ACPI/PNP device IDs over devices that
>> have them.
>>
>> Suggested-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
>> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
>> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
>> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
>
> You seem you took this from SLE12-SP2? But where did you take the
> upstream commit SHA from? In SLE, I have "Git-commit: fdad4e7a876a2..."
> which is the correct SHA of this patch. The above c2a6bbaf0c is a
> different patch. So are your scripts broken or is this a manual oversight?
Not only the SHA, the whole commit message is taken from c2a6bbaf0c. But
the diff below is fdad4e7a876a2.
To clarify: upstream c2a6bbaf0c is in 4.4.80 already (as f4a42f8492).
The diff below is a fix for it with upstream SHA fdad4e7a876a2 (in 4.4
as 1fe277d48f). So the code is correct, unlike meta data.
>> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>>
>> ---
>> drivers/acpi/glue.c | 12 ++++++------
>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> --- a/drivers/acpi/glue.c
>> +++ b/drivers/acpi/glue.c
>> @@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ static int find_child_checks(struct acpi
>> return -ENODEV;
>>
>> /*
>> - * If the device has a _HID (or _CID) returning a valid ACPI/PNP
>> - * device ID, it is better to make it look less attractive here, so that
>> - * the other device with the same _ADR value (that may not have a valid
>> - * device ID) can be matched going forward. [This means a second spec
>> - * violation in a row, so whatever we do here is best effort anyway.]
>> + * If the device has a _HID returning a valid ACPI/PNP device ID, it is
>> + * better to make it look less attractive here, so that the other device
>> + * with the same _ADR value (that may not have a valid device ID) can be
>> + * matched going forward. [This means a second spec violation in a row,
>> + * so whatever we do here is best effort anyway.]
>> */
>> - return sta_present && list_empty(&adev->pnp.ids) ?
>> + return sta_present && !adev->pnp.type.platform_id ?
>> FIND_CHILD_MAX_SCORE : FIND_CHILD_MIN_SCORE;
>> }
thanks,
--
js
suse labs
On Thu, Feb 01, 2018 at 09:57:21AM +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> On 02/01/2018, 09:46 AM, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> > On 01/29/2018, 01:56 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> >> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >>
> >> ------------------
> >>
> >> From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
> >>
> >> commit c2a6bbaf0c5f90463a7011a295bbdb7e33c80b51 upstream.
> >>
> >> The way acpi_find_child_device() works currently is that, if there
> >> are two (or more) devices with the same _ADR value in the same
> >> namespace scope (which is not specifically allowed by the spec and
> >> the OS behavior in that case is not defined), the first one of them
> >> found to be present (with the help of _STA) will be returned.
> >>
> >> This covers the majority of cases, but is not sufficient if some of
> >> the devices in question have a _HID (or _CID) returning some valid
> >> ACPI/PNP device IDs (which is disallowed by the spec) and the
> >> ASL writers' expectation appears to be that the OS will match
> >> devices without a valid ACPI/PNP device ID against a given bus
> >> address first.
> >>
> >> To cover this special case as well, modify find_child_checks()
> >> to prefer devices without ACPI/PNP device IDs over devices that
> >> have them.
> >>
> >> Suggested-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
> >> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
> >> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
> >> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
> >
> > You seem you took this from SLE12-SP2? But where did you take the
> > upstream commit SHA from? In SLE, I have "Git-commit: fdad4e7a876a2..."
> > which is the correct SHA of this patch. The above c2a6bbaf0c is a
> > different patch. So are your scripts broken or is this a manual oversight?
>
> Not only the SHA, the whole commit message is taken from c2a6bbaf0c. But
> the diff below is fdad4e7a876a2.
>
> To clarify: upstream c2a6bbaf0c is in 4.4.80 already (as f4a42f8492).
> The diff below is a fix for it with upstream SHA fdad4e7a876a2 (in 4.4
> as 1fe277d48f). So the code is correct, unlike meta data.
This was my fault, I searched the kernel log for the real git commit id
by just looking at the start of the shortlog string, not the full thing.
It matched on the wrong one, which I used here for the body of the
patch, but not the content.
Thanks for finding this, sorry for the confusion.
greg k-h
On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 01:56:07PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
>
> commit 2f2d0088eb93db5c649d2a5e34a3800a8a935fc5 upstream.
>
> When a client has a USB device attached over IP, the vhci_hcd driver is
> locally leaking a socket pointer address via the
>
> /sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd/status file (world-readable) and in debug
> output when "usbip --debug port" is run.
>
> Fix it to not leak. The socket pointer address is not used at the moment
> and it was made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
> pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}.
>
> As this opens a security hole, the fix replaces socket pointer address with
> sockfd.
>
> Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>
>
> ---
> drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h | 1 +
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
> tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 8 ++++----
> 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
> +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
> @@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ struct usbip_device {
> /* lock for status */
> spinlock_t lock;
>
> + int sockfd;
> struct socket *tcp_socket;
>
> struct task_struct *tcp_rx;
> --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> @@ -39,16 +39,20 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device
>
> /*
> * output example:
> - * prt sta spd dev socket local_busid
> - * 000 004 000 000 c5a7bb80 1-2.3
> - * 001 004 000 000 d8cee980 2-3.4
> + * port sta spd dev sockfd local_busid
> + * 0000 004 000 00000000 000003 1-2.3
> + * 0001 004 000 00000000 000004 2-3.4
> *
> - * IP address can be retrieved from a socket pointer address by looking
> - * up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. Also, a userland program may remember a
> - * port number and its peer IP address.
> + * Output includes socket fd instead of socket pointer address to
> + * avoid leaking kernel memory address in:
> + * /sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd.0/status and in debug output.
> + * The socket pointer address is not used at the moment and it was
> + * made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
> + * pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. As this opens
> + * a security hole, the change is made to use sockfd instead.
> */
> out += sprintf(out,
> - "prt sta spd bus dev socket local_busid\n");
> + "prt sta spd bus dev sockfd local_busid\n");
>
> for (i = 0; i < VHCI_NPORTS; i++) {
> struct vhci_device *vdev = port_to_vdev(i);
> @@ -60,11 +64,11 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device
> out += sprintf(out, "%03u %08x ",
> vdev->speed, vdev->devid);
> out += sprintf(out, "%16p ", vdev->ud.tcp_socket);
> + out += sprintf(out, "%06u", vdev->ud.sockfd);
> out += sprintf(out, "%s", dev_name(&vdev->udev->dev));
This backport is wrong; it's still printing the pointer...
Eric
On 02/03/2018 01:30 AM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 01:56:07PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>>
>> ------------------
>>
>> From: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
>>
>> commit 2f2d0088eb93db5c649d2a5e34a3800a8a935fc5 upstream.
>>
>> When a client has a USB device attached over IP, the vhci_hcd driver is
>> locally leaking a socket pointer address via the
>>
>> /sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd/status file (world-readable) and in debug
>> output when "usbip --debug port" is run.
>>
>> Fix it to not leak. The socket pointer address is not used at the moment
>> and it was made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
>> pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}.
>>
>> As this opens a security hole, the fix replaces socket pointer address with
>> sockfd.
>>
>> Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
>> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
>> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>>
>>
>> ---
>> drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h | 1 +
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
>> tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 8 ++++----
>> 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>>
>> --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
>> +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.h
>> @@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ struct usbip_device {
>> /* lock for status */
>> spinlock_t lock;
>>
>> + int sockfd;
>> struct socket *tcp_socket;
>>
>> struct task_struct *tcp_rx;
>> --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
>> +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
>> @@ -39,16 +39,20 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device
>>
>> /*
>> * output example:
>> - * prt sta spd dev socket local_busid
>> - * 000 004 000 000 c5a7bb80 1-2.3
>> - * 001 004 000 000 d8cee980 2-3.4
>> + * port sta spd dev sockfd local_busid
>> + * 0000 004 000 00000000 000003 1-2.3
>> + * 0001 004 000 00000000 000004 2-3.4
>> *
>> - * IP address can be retrieved from a socket pointer address by looking
>> - * up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. Also, a userland program may remember a
>> - * port number and its peer IP address.
>> + * Output includes socket fd instead of socket pointer address to
>> + * avoid leaking kernel memory address in:
>> + * /sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd.0/status and in debug output.
>> + * The socket pointer address is not used at the moment and it was
>> + * made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
>> + * pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. As this opens
>> + * a security hole, the change is made to use sockfd instead.
>> */
>> out += sprintf(out,
>> - "prt sta spd bus dev socket local_busid\n");
>> + "prt sta spd bus dev sockfd local_busid\n");
>>
>> for (i = 0; i < VHCI_NPORTS; i++) {
>> struct vhci_device *vdev = port_to_vdev(i);
>> @@ -60,11 +64,11 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device
>> out += sprintf(out, "%03u %08x ",
>> vdev->speed, vdev->devid);
>> out += sprintf(out, "%16p ", vdev->ud.tcp_socket);
>> + out += sprintf(out, "%06u", vdev->ud.sockfd);
>> out += sprintf(out, "%s", dev_name(&vdev->udev->dev));
>
> This backport is wrong; it's still printing the pointer...
>
> Eric
>
Eric,
Yes I have a patch ready to send to fix this problem. My bad.
thanks,
-- Shuah
On Mon, 2018-02-19 at 20:46 +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> On Mon, 2018-01-29 at 13:57 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: Mike Maloney <[email protected]>
> >
> >
> > [ Upstream commit 749439bfac6e1a2932c582e2699f91d329658196 ]
>
> [...]
> > --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> > @@ -1246,14 +1246,16 @@ static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *s
> > v6_cork->tclass = tclass;
> > if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
> > mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
> > - rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
> > + READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
> > else
> > mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
> > - rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
> > + READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
> > if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
> > if (np->frag_size)
> > mtu = np->frag_size;
> > }
> > + if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
> > + return -EINVAL;
>
> This error path appears to leak a reference to rt->dst.
Never mind, I see that the callers release it.
Ben.
> Ben.
>
> > > > cork->base.fragsize = mtu;
> > > > if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
> > > > cork->base.flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
> >
> >
> >
--
Ben Hutchings
Software Developer, Codethink Ltd.
On Mon, 2018-01-29 at 13:57 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Mike Maloney <[email protected]>
>
>
> [ Upstream commit 749439bfac6e1a2932c582e2699f91d329658196 ]
[...]
> --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> @@ -1246,14 +1246,16 @@ static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *s
> v6_cork->tclass = tclass;
> if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
> mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
> - rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
> + READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
> else
> mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
> - rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
> + READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
> if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
> if (np->frag_size)
> mtu = np->frag_size;
> }
> + if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
> + return -EINVAL;
This error path appears to leak a reference to rt->dst.
Ben.
> cork->base.fragsize = mtu;
> if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
> cork->base.flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
>
>
>
--
Ben Hutchings
Software Developer, Codethink Ltd.
On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Ben Hutchings
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, 2018-02-19 at 20:46 +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
>> On Mon, 2018-01-29 at 13:57 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> > 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>> >
>> > ------------------
>> >
>> > From: Mike Maloney <[email protected]>
>> >
>> >
>> > [ Upstream commit 749439bfac6e1a2932c582e2699f91d329658196 ]
>>
>> [...]
>> > --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
>> > +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
>> > @@ -1246,14 +1246,16 @@ static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *s
>> > v6_cork->tclass = tclass;
>> > if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
>> > mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
>> > - rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
>> > + READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
>> > else
>> > mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
>> > - rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
>> > + READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
>> > if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
>> > if (np->frag_size)
>> > mtu = np->frag_size;
>> > }
>> > + if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>>
>> This error path appears to leak a reference to rt->dst.
>
> Never mind, I see that the callers release it.
Yes, I agree this is quite confusing :/