This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.172 release.
There are 104 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat Jan 26 19:01:09 UTC 2019.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.172-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.4.172-rc1
Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
ipmi:ssif: Fix handling of multi-part return messages
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net: speed up skb_rbtree_purge()
Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
mm, proc: be more verbose about unstable VMA flags in /proc/<pid>/smaps
Brian Foster <[email protected]>
mm/page-writeback.c: don't break integrity writeback on ->writepage() error
Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
ocfs2: fix panic due to unrecovered local alloc
Qian Cai <[email protected]>
scsi: megaraid: fix out-of-bound array accesses
Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
sysfs: Disable lockdep for driver bind/unbind files
Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
ALSA: bebob: fix model-id of unit for Apogee Ensemble
Nikos Tsironis <[email protected]>
dm snapshot: Fix excessive memory usage and workqueue stalls
Nikos Tsironis <[email protected]>
dm kcopyd: Fix bug causing workqueue stalls
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf parse-events: Fix unchecked usage of strncpy()
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf svghelper: Fix unchecked usage of strncpy()
Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
perf intel-pt: Fix error with config term "pt=0"
Jonas Danielsson <[email protected]>
mmc: atmel-mci: do not assume idle after atmci_request_end
Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
kconfig: fix memory leak when EOF is encountered in quotation
Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
kconfig: fix file name and line number of warn_ignored_character()
Lucas Stach <[email protected]>
clk: imx6q: reset exclusive gates on init
David Disseldorp <[email protected]>
scsi: target: use consistent left-aligned ASCII INQUIRY data
yupeng <[email protected]>
net: call sk_dst_reset when set SO_DONTROUTE
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
media: firewire: Fix app_info parameter type in avc_ca{,_app}_info
Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries/cpuidle: Fix preempt warning
Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]>
pstore/ram: Do not treat empty buffers as valid
Daniel Santos <[email protected]>
jffs2: Fix use of uninitialized delayed_work, lockdep breakage
Anders Roxell <[email protected]>
arm64: perf: set suppress_bind_attrs flag to true
Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
MIPS: SiByte: Enable swiotlb for SWARM, LittleSur and BigSur
Anders Roxell <[email protected]>
writeback: don't decrement wb->refcnt if !wb->bdi
Miroslav Lichvar <[email protected]>
e1000e: allow non-monotonic SYSTIM readings
João Paulo Rechi Vita <[email protected]>
platform/x86: asus-wmi: Tell the EC the OS will handle the display off hotkey
Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
xfs: don't fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE
David Ahern <[email protected]>
ipv6: Take rcu_read_lock in __inet6_bind for mapped addresses
David Ahern <[email protected]>
ipv6: Consider sk_bound_dev_if when binding a socket to a v4 mapped address
Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>
r8169: Add support for new Realtek Ethernet
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
media: vb2: be sure to unlock mutex on errors
Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
drm/fb-helper: Ignore the value of fb_var_screeninfo.pixclock
Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
loop: Fix double mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex) in loop_control_ioctl()
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
loop: Fold __loop_release into loop_release
Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
block/loop: Use global lock for ioctl() operation.
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_doit
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_set
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: allocate sctp_sockaddr_entry with kzalloc
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy
J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
sunrpc: handle ENOMEM in rpcb_getport_async
Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: vb2: vb2_mmap: move lock up
James Morris <[email protected]>
LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on free
Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: vivid: set min width/height to a value > 0
Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: vivid: fix error handling of kthread_run
Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
omap2fb: Fix stack memory disclosure
YunQiang Su <[email protected]>
Disable MSI also when pcie-octeon.pcie_disable on
Jonathan Hunter <[email protected]>
mfd: tps6586x: Handle interrupts on suspend
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
mips: fix n32 compat_ipc_parse_version
Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
scsi: sd: Fix cache_type_store()
Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Yama: Check for pid death before checking ancestry
Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
btrfs: wait on ordered extents on abort cleanup
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: authenc - fix parsing key with misaligned rta_len
Harsh Jain <[email protected]>
crypto: authencesn - Avoid twice completion call in decrypt path
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
ip: on queued skb use skb_header_pointer instead of pskb_may_pull
Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
packet: Do not leak dev refcounts on error exit
JianJhen Chen <[email protected]>
net: bridge: fix a bug on using a neighbour cache entry without checking its state
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6: fix kernel-infoleak in ipv6_local_error()
Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags
Gwendal Grignou <[email protected]>
proc: Remove empty line in /proc/self/status
Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
media: em28xx: Fix misplaced reset of dev->v4l::field_count
Martin Blumenstingl <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix validation of the block count in sanity_check_raw_super
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix missing up_read
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix invalid memory access
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area v2
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with reserved blkaddr of inline inode
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with node footer and iblocks
Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
f2fs: Add sanity_check_inode() function
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with user_block_count
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with secs_per_zone
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: introduce and spread verify_blkaddr
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: clean up with is_valid_blkaddr()
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: enhance sanity_check_raw_super() to avoid potential overflow
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: sanity check on sit entry
Yunlei He <[email protected]>
f2fs: check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a bio
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: return error during fill_super
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: free meta pages if sanity check for ckpt is failed
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: detect wrong layout
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to determine start_cp_addr by sbi->cur_cp_pack
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: put directory inodes before checkpoint in roll-forward recovery
Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
f2fs: introduce get_checkpoint_version for cleanup
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: use crc and cp version to determine roll-forward recovery
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: avoid unneeded loop in build_sit_entries
Yunlei He <[email protected]>
f2fs: not allow to write illegal blkaddr
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to avoid reading out encrypted data in page cache
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix inode cache leak
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: factor out fsync inode entry operations
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: remove an obsolete variable
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: give -EINVAL for norecovery and rw mount
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to convert inline directory correctly
Shawn Lin <[email protected]>
f2fs: move sanity checking of cp into get_valid_checkpoint
Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
f2fs: cover more area with nat_tree_lock
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: clean up argument of recover_data
Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
can: gw: ensure DLC boundaries after CAN frame modification
Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
tty/ldsem: Wake up readers after timed out down_write()
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 4 +-
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 3 +
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 3 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp.S | 2 +-
arch/mips/Kconfig | 4 +
arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c | 4 +-
arch/mips/sibyte/common/Makefile | 1 +
arch/mips/sibyte/common/dma.c | 14 ++
crypto/authenc.c | 14 +-
crypto/authencesn.c | 2 +-
drivers/base/bus.c | 7 +-
drivers/block/loop.c | 79 +++++------
drivers/block/loop.h | 1 -
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 25 ++--
drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx6q.c | 6 +-
drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-pseries.c | 8 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c | 7 +-
drivers/md/dm-kcopyd.c | 19 ++-
drivers/md/dm-snap.c | 22 +++
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c | 6 +-
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv.h | 6 +-
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c | 5 +-
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c | 5 +-
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c | 2 +-
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-video.c | 4 +-
drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c | 14 +-
drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c | 24 ++++
drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c | 3 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ptp.c | 13 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 2 +
drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 3 +-
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/sd.c | 6 +
drivers/target/target_core_spc.c | 17 ++-
drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c | 10 ++
drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c | 2 +
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 8 ++
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 168 ++++++++++++-----------
fs/f2fs/data.c | 118 ++++++++++------
fs/f2fs/dir.c | 87 ++++++------
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 77 ++++++++---
fs/f2fs/file.c | 21 ++-
fs/f2fs/inline.c | 115 +++++++++++++++-
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 68 ++++++++-
fs/f2fs/node.c | 103 ++++++++------
fs/f2fs/node.h | 77 +++++++----
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 165 +++++++++++-----------
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 93 +++++++------
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 48 +++++--
fs/f2fs/super.c | 134 +++++++++++++++---
fs/jffs2/super.c | 3 +-
fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c | 9 +-
fs/proc/array.c | 2 +-
fs/pstore/ram_core.c | 5 +
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c | 9 +-
include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h | 8 ++
include/linux/f2fs_fs.h | 3 +
mm/page-writeback.c | 35 +++--
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 2 +-
net/can/gw.c | 30 +++-
net/core/skbuff.c | 11 +-
net/core/sock.c | 1 +
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 14 +-
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 11 +-
net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 +-
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 5 +-
net/sctp/protocol.c | 4 +-
net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c | 8 ++
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 50 ++++++-
scripts/kconfig/zconf.l | 4 +-
security/security.c | 7 +
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 4 +-
sound/firewire/bebob/bebob.c | 2 +-
tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c | 11 ++
tools/perf/util/parse-events.c | 2 +-
tools/perf/util/svghelper.c | 2 +-
81 files changed, 1335 insertions(+), 564 deletions(-)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 78682f79447998369a85f12b6437fa8fdbbdca50 upstream.
For encrypted inode, if user overwrites data of the inode, f2fs will read
encrypted data into page cache, and then do the decryption.
However reader can race with overwriter, and it will see encrypted data
which has not been decrypted by overwriter yet. Fix it by moving decrypting
work to background and keep page non-uptodated until data is decrypted.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_file_write_iter
- __generic_file_write_iter
- generic_perform_write
- f2fs_write_begin
- f2fs_submit_page_bio
- generic_file_read_iter
- do_generic_file_read
- lock_page_killable
- unlock_page
- copy_page_to_iter
hit the encrypted data in updated page
- lock_page
- fscrypt_decrypt_page
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Keep using f2fs_crypto functions instead of generic fscrypt API
- Use PAGE_CACHE_SIZE instead of PAGE_SIZE
- Use submit_bio() instead of __submit_bio()
- In f2fs_write_begin(), use dn.data_blkaddr instead of blkaddr
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/data.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -866,6 +866,37 @@ out:
return ret;
}
+struct bio *f2fs_grab_bio(struct inode *inode, block_t blkaddr,
+ unsigned nr_pages)
+{
+ struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
+ struct f2fs_crypto_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ struct block_device *bdev = sbi->sb->s_bdev;
+ struct bio *bio;
+
+ if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
+ ctx = f2fs_get_crypto_ctx(inode);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctx))
+ return ERR_CAST(ctx);
+
+ /* wait the page to be moved by cleaning */
+ f2fs_wait_on_encrypted_page_writeback(sbi, blkaddr);
+ }
+
+ bio = bio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL, min_t(int, nr_pages, BIO_MAX_PAGES));
+ if (!bio) {
+ if (ctx)
+ f2fs_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+ bio->bi_bdev = bdev;
+ bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = SECTOR_FROM_BLOCK(blkaddr);
+ bio->bi_end_io = f2fs_read_end_io;
+ bio->bi_private = ctx;
+
+ return bio;
+}
+
/*
* This function was originally taken from fs/mpage.c, and customized for f2fs.
* Major change was from block_size == page_size in f2fs by default.
@@ -884,7 +915,6 @@ static int f2fs_mpage_readpages(struct a
sector_t last_block;
sector_t last_block_in_file;
sector_t block_nr;
- struct block_device *bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
struct f2fs_map_blocks map;
map.m_pblk = 0;
@@ -958,31 +988,9 @@ submit_and_realloc:
bio = NULL;
}
if (bio == NULL) {
- struct f2fs_crypto_ctx *ctx = NULL;
-
- if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) &&
- S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
-
- ctx = f2fs_get_crypto_ctx(inode);
- if (IS_ERR(ctx))
- goto set_error_page;
-
- /* wait the page to be moved by cleaning */
- f2fs_wait_on_encrypted_page_writeback(
- F2FS_I_SB(inode), block_nr);
- }
-
- bio = bio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL,
- min_t(int, nr_pages, BIO_MAX_PAGES));
- if (!bio) {
- if (ctx)
- f2fs_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
+ bio = f2fs_grab_bio(inode, block_nr, nr_pages);
+ if (IS_ERR(bio))
goto set_error_page;
- }
- bio->bi_bdev = bdev;
- bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = SECTOR_FROM_BLOCK(block_nr);
- bio->bi_end_io = f2fs_read_end_io;
- bio->bi_private = ctx;
}
if (bio_add_page(bio, page, blocksize, 0) < blocksize)
@@ -1482,17 +1490,21 @@ put_next:
if (dn.data_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
} else {
- struct f2fs_io_info fio = {
- .sbi = sbi,
- .type = DATA,
- .rw = READ_SYNC,
- .blk_addr = dn.data_blkaddr,
- .page = page,
- .encrypted_page = NULL,
- };
- err = f2fs_submit_page_bio(&fio);
- if (err)
+ struct bio *bio;
+
+ bio = f2fs_grab_bio(inode, dn.data_blkaddr, 1);
+ if (IS_ERR(bio)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(bio);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (bio_add_page(bio, page, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, 0) < PAGE_CACHE_SIZE) {
+ bio_put(bio);
+ err = -EFAULT;
goto fail;
+ }
+
+ submit_bio(READ_SYNC, bio);
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(!PageUptodate(page))) {
@@ -1503,13 +1515,6 @@ put_next:
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
goto repeat;
}
-
- /* avoid symlink page */
- if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
- err = f2fs_decrypt_one(inode, page);
- if (err)
- goto fail;
- }
}
out_update:
SetPageUptodate(page);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit 9e1e6df412a28cdbbd2909de5c6189eda4a3383d upstream.
Before checkpoint, we'd be better drop any inodes.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ out:
set_ckpt_flags(sbi->ckpt, CP_ERROR_FLAG);
mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
+ /* let's drop all the directory inodes for clean checkpoint */
+ destroy_fsync_dnodes(&dir_list);
+
if (!err && need_writecp) {
struct cp_control cpc = {
.reason = CP_RECOVERY,
@@ -604,7 +607,6 @@ out:
write_checkpoint(sbi, &cpc);
}
- destroy_fsync_dnodes(&dir_list);
kmem_cache_destroy(fsync_entry_slab);
return ret ? ret: err;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit e1da7872f6eda977bd812346bf588c35e4495a1e upstream.
This patch introduces verify_blkaddr to check meta/data block address
with valid range to detect bug earlier.
In addition, once we encounter an invalid blkaddr, notice user to run
fsck to fix, and let the kernel panic.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- I skipped an earlier renaming of is_valid_meta_blkaddr() to
f2fs_is_valid_meta_blkaddr()
- Drop inapplicable change to check on f2fs_fio_info::old_blkaddr
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 11 +++++++++--
fs/f2fs/data.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
fs/f2fs/file.c | 9 +++++----
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 7 ++++---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 6 +++---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 8 +++-----
9 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb
return __get_meta_page(sbi, index, false);
}
-bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type)
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr, int type)
{
switch (type) {
case META_NAT:
@@ -127,10 +128,16 @@ bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_s
return false;
break;
case META_POR:
+ case DATA_GENERIC:
if (unlikely(blkaddr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
return false;
break;
+ case META_GENERIC:
+ if (unlikely(blkaddr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
+ blkaddr >= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
+ return false;
+ break;
default:
BUG();
}
@@ -160,7 +167,7 @@ int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *s
for (; nrpages-- > 0; blkno++) {
- if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
goto out;
switch (type) {
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode
goto unlock_out;
}
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(dn.data_blkaddr)) {
+ if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, dn.data_blkaddr)) {
if (create) {
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
err = -EIO;
@@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ int do_write_data_page(struct f2fs_io_in
* If current allocation needs SSR,
* it had better in-place writes for updated data.
*/
- if (unlikely(is_valid_blkaddr(fio->blk_addr) &&
+ if (unlikely(is_valid_data_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->blk_addr) &&
!is_cold_data(page) &&
need_inplace_update(inode))) {
rewrite_data_page(fio);
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct cp_control {
};
/*
- * For CP/NAT/SIT/SSA readahead
+ * indicate meta/data type
*/
enum {
META_CP,
@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ enum {
META_SIT,
META_SSA,
META_POR,
+ DATA_GENERIC,
+ META_GENERIC,
};
/* for the list of ino */
@@ -1647,13 +1649,36 @@ static inline void *f2fs_kvzalloc(size_t
(pgofs - ADDRS_PER_INODE(fi) + ADDRS_PER_BLOCK) / \
ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * ADDRS_PER_BLOCK + ADDRS_PER_INODE(fi))
-static inline bool is_valid_blkaddr(block_t blkaddr)
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr, int type);
+void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
+static inline void verify_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr, int type)
+{
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, type)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "invalid blkaddr: %u, type: %d, run fsck to fix.",
+ blkaddr, type);
+ f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline bool __is_valid_data_blkaddr(block_t blkaddr)
{
if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
return false;
return true;
}
+static inline bool is_valid_data_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr)
+{
+ if (!__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+ return false;
+ verify_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC);
+ return true;
+}
+
/*
* file.c
*/
@@ -1825,7 +1850,8 @@ void destroy_segment_manager_caches(void
struct page *grab_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
struct page *get_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
-bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type);
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr, int type);
int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t, int, int, bool);
void ra_meta_pages_cond(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
long sync_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, enum page_type, long);
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -305,13 +305,13 @@ static pgoff_t __get_first_dirty_index(s
return pgofs;
}
-static bool __found_offset(block_t blkaddr, pgoff_t dirty, pgoff_t pgofs,
- int whence)
+static bool __found_offset(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr,
+ pgoff_t dirty, pgoff_t pgofs, int whence)
{
switch (whence) {
case SEEK_DATA:
if ((blkaddr == NEW_ADDR && dirty == pgofs) ||
- is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+ is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
return true;
break;
case SEEK_HOLE:
@@ -374,7 +374,8 @@ static loff_t f2fs_seek_block(struct fil
block_t blkaddr;
blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
- if (__found_offset(blkaddr, dirty, pgofs, whence)) {
+ if (__found_offset(F2FS_I_SB(inode), blkaddr, dirty,
+ pgofs, whence)) {
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
goto found;
}
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -50,11 +50,12 @@ static void __get_inode_rdev(struct inod
}
}
-static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_inode *ri)
+static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ struct f2fs_inode *ri)
{
block_t addr = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_addr[0]);
- if (is_valid_blkaddr(addr))
+ if (is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, addr))
return true;
return false;
}
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
/* get rdev by using inline_info */
__get_inode_rdev(inode, ri);
- if (__written_first_block(ri))
+ if (__written_first_block(sbi, ri))
set_inode_flag(F2FS_I(inode), FI_FIRST_BLOCK_WRITTEN);
f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
new_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR);
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e) == NEW_ADDR &&
new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_valid_blkaddr(nat_get_blkaddr(e)) &&
+ f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e)) &&
new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
/* increment version no as node is removed */
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
/* change address */
nat_set_blkaddr(e, new_blkaddr);
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(new_blkaddr))
+ if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, new_blkaddr))
set_nat_flag(e, IS_CHECKPOINTED, false);
__set_nat_cache_dirty(nm_i, e);
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
while (1) {
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
- if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
return 0;
page = get_tmp_page(sbi, blkaddr);
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_s
}
/* dest is valid block, try to recover from src to dest */
- if (is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
+ if (f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
if (src == NULL_ADDR) {
err = reserve_new_block(&dn);
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
while (1) {
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
- if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
break;
ra_meta_pages_cond(sbi, blkaddr);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ bool is_checkpointed_data(struct f2fs_sb
struct seg_entry *se;
bool is_cp = false;
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+ if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
return true;
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ void f2fs_wait_on_encrypted_page_writeba
{
struct page *cpage;
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+ if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
return;
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, blkaddr == NULL_ADDR);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
(GET_SEGOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr) & (sbi->blocks_per_seg - 1))
#define GET_SEGNO(sbi, blk_addr) \
- ((!is_valid_blkaddr(blk_addr)) ? \
+ ((!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr)) ? \
NULL_SEGNO : GET_L2R_SEGNO(FREE_I(sbi), \
GET_SEGNO_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr)))
#define GET_SECNO(sbi, segno) \
@@ -588,11 +588,9 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(str
if (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&
(!is_read_io(fio->rw) || fio->is_meta))
- BUG_ON(blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
- blk_addr >= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, META_GENERIC);
else
- BUG_ON(blk_addr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
- blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC);
}
/*
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shawn Lin <[email protected]>
commit 984ec63c5a82a07ad4490ecc69bebacd23f6fa64 upstream.
>From the function name of get_valid_checkpoint, it seems to return
the valid cp or NULL for caller to check. If no valid one is found,
f2fs_fill_super will print the err log. But if get_valid_checkpoint
get one valid(the return value indicate that it's valid, however actually
it is invalid after sanity checking), then print another similar err
log. That seems strange. Let's keep sanity checking inside the procedure
of geting valid cp. Another improvement we gained from this move is
that even the large volume is supported, we check the cp in advanced
to skip the following procedure if failing the sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Shawn Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 4 ++++
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 +
fs/f2fs/super.c | 10 +---------
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -696,6 +696,10 @@ int get_valid_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_
cp_block = (struct f2fs_checkpoint *)page_address(cur_page);
memcpy(sbi->ckpt, cp_block, blk_size);
+ /* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
+ if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
+ goto fail_no_cp;
+
if (cp_blks <= 1)
goto done;
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1718,6 +1718,7 @@ int f2fs_commit_super(struct f2fs_sb_inf
int f2fs_sync_fs(struct super_block *, int);
extern __printf(3, 4)
void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *, const char *, const char *, ...);
+int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);
/*
* hash.c
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
return 0;
}
-static int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
@@ -1358,13 +1358,6 @@ try_onemore:
goto free_meta_inode;
}
- /* sanity checking of checkpoint */
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi)) {
- f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Invalid F2FS checkpoint");
- goto free_cp;
- }
-
sbi->total_valid_node_count =
le32_to_cpu(sbi->ckpt->valid_node_count);
sbi->total_valid_inode_count =
@@ -1517,7 +1510,6 @@ free_nm:
destroy_node_manager(sbi);
free_sm:
destroy_segment_manager(sbi);
-free_cp:
kfree(sbi->ckpt);
free_meta_inode:
make_bad_inode(sbi->meta_inode);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
With below serials, we will lose parts of dirents:
1) mount f2fs with inline_dentry option
2) echo 1 > /sys/fs/f2fs/sdX/dir_level
3) mkdir dir
4) touch 180 files named [1-180] in dir
5) touch 181 in dir
6) echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
7) ll dir
ls: cannot access 2: No such file or directory
ls: cannot access 4: No such file or directory
ls: cannot access 5: No such file or directory
ls: cannot access 6: No such file or directory
ls: cannot access 8: No such file or directory
ls: cannot access 9: No such file or directory
...
total 360
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 19 15:12 ./
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Feb 19 15:11 ../
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb 19 15:12 1
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb 19 15:12 10
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Feb 19 15:12 100
-????????? ? ? ? ? ? 101
-????????? ? ? ? ? ? 102
-????????? ? ? ? ? ? 103
...
The reason is: when doing the inline dir conversion, we didn't consider
that directory has hierarchical hash structure which can be configured
through sysfs interface 'dir_level'.
By default, dir_level of directory inode is 0, it means we have one bucket
in hash table located in first level, all dirents will be hashed in this
bucket, so it has no problem for us to do the duplication simply between
inline dentry page and converted normal dentry page.
However, if we configured dir_level with the value N (greater than 0), it
will expand the bucket number of first level hash table by 2^N - 1, it
hashs dirents into different buckets according their hash value, if we
still move all dirents to first bucket, it makes incorrent locating for
inline dirents, the result is, although we can iterate all dirents through
->readdir, we can't stat some of them in ->lookup which based on hash
table searching.
This patch fixes this issue by rehashing dirents into correct position
when converting inline directory.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Keep using f2fs_crypto functions instead of generic fscrypt API
- Use remove_dirty_dir_inode() instead of remove_dirty_inode()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/dir.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 4 +-
fs/f2fs/inline.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/f2fs_fs.h | 2 +
4 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ unsigned char f2fs_filetype_table[F2FS_F
[F2FS_FT_SYMLINK] = DT_LNK,
};
-#define S_SHIFT 12
static unsigned char f2fs_type_by_mode[S_IFMT >> S_SHIFT] = {
[S_IFREG >> S_SHIFT] = F2FS_FT_REG_FILE,
[S_IFDIR >> S_SHIFT] = F2FS_FT_DIR,
@@ -64,6 +63,13 @@ void set_de_type(struct f2fs_dir_entry *
de->file_type = f2fs_type_by_mode[(mode & S_IFMT) >> S_SHIFT];
}
+unsigned char get_de_type(struct f2fs_dir_entry *de)
+{
+ if (de->file_type < F2FS_FT_MAX)
+ return f2fs_filetype_table[de->file_type];
+ return DT_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
static unsigned long dir_block_index(unsigned int level,
int dir_level, unsigned int idx)
{
@@ -519,11 +525,7 @@ void f2fs_update_dentry(nid_t ino, umode
test_and_set_bit_le(bit_pos + i, (void *)d->bitmap);
}
-/*
- * Caller should grab and release a rwsem by calling f2fs_lock_op() and
- * f2fs_unlock_op().
- */
-int __f2fs_add_link(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name,
+int f2fs_add_regular_entry(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *new_name,
struct inode *inode, nid_t ino, umode_t mode)
{
unsigned int bit_pos;
@@ -536,28 +538,11 @@ int __f2fs_add_link(struct inode *dir, c
struct f2fs_dentry_block *dentry_blk = NULL;
struct f2fs_dentry_ptr d;
struct page *page = NULL;
- struct f2fs_filename fname;
- struct qstr new_name;
- int slots, err;
-
- err = f2fs_fname_setup_filename(dir, name, 0, &fname);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- new_name.name = fname_name(&fname);
- new_name.len = fname_len(&fname);
-
- if (f2fs_has_inline_dentry(dir)) {
- err = f2fs_add_inline_entry(dir, &new_name, inode, ino, mode);
- if (!err || err != -EAGAIN)
- goto out;
- else
- err = 0;
- }
+ int slots, err = 0;
level = 0;
- slots = GET_DENTRY_SLOTS(new_name.len);
- dentry_hash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&new_name, NULL);
+ slots = GET_DENTRY_SLOTS(new_name->len);
+ dentry_hash = f2fs_dentry_hash(new_name, NULL);
current_depth = F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth;
if (F2FS_I(dir)->chash == dentry_hash) {
@@ -566,10 +551,8 @@ int __f2fs_add_link(struct inode *dir, c
}
start:
- if (unlikely(current_depth == MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH)) {
- err = -ENOSPC;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (unlikely(current_depth == MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH))
+ return -ENOSPC;
/* Increase the depth, if required */
if (level == current_depth)
@@ -583,10 +566,8 @@ start:
for (block = bidx; block <= (bidx + nblock - 1); block++) {
dentry_page = get_new_data_page(dir, NULL, block, true);
- if (IS_ERR(dentry_page)) {
- err = PTR_ERR(dentry_page);
- goto out;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry_page))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry_page);
dentry_blk = kmap(dentry_page);
bit_pos = room_for_filename(&dentry_blk->dentry_bitmap,
@@ -606,7 +587,7 @@ add_dentry:
if (inode) {
down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_sem);
- page = init_inode_metadata(inode, dir, &new_name, NULL);
+ page = init_inode_metadata(inode, dir, new_name, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(page)) {
err = PTR_ERR(page);
goto fail;
@@ -616,7 +597,7 @@ add_dentry:
}
make_dentry_ptr(NULL, &d, (void *)dentry_blk, 1);
- f2fs_update_dentry(ino, mode, &d, &new_name, dentry_hash, bit_pos);
+ f2fs_update_dentry(ino, mode, &d, new_name, dentry_hash, bit_pos);
set_page_dirty(dentry_page);
@@ -638,7 +619,34 @@ fail:
}
kunmap(dentry_page);
f2fs_put_page(dentry_page, 1);
-out:
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caller should grab and release a rwsem by calling f2fs_lock_op() and
+ * f2fs_unlock_op().
+ */
+int __f2fs_add_link(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name,
+ struct inode *inode, nid_t ino, umode_t mode)
+{
+ struct f2fs_filename fname;
+ struct qstr new_name;
+ int err;
+
+ err = f2fs_fname_setup_filename(dir, name, 0, &fname);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ new_name.name = fname_name(&fname);
+ new_name.len = fname_len(&fname);
+
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ if (f2fs_has_inline_dentry(dir))
+ err = f2fs_add_inline_entry(dir, &new_name, inode, ino, mode);
+ if (err == -EAGAIN)
+ err = f2fs_add_regular_entry(dir, &new_name, inode, ino, mode);
+
f2fs_fname_free_filename(&fname);
return err;
}
@@ -792,10 +800,7 @@ bool f2fs_fill_dentries(struct dir_conte
break;
de = &d->dentry[bit_pos];
- if (de->file_type < F2FS_FT_MAX)
- d_type = f2fs_filetype_table[de->file_type];
- else
- d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
+ d_type = get_de_type(de);
de_name.name = d->filename[bit_pos];
de_name.len = le16_to_cpu(de->name_len);
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ struct dentry *f2fs_get_parent(struct de
*/
extern unsigned char f2fs_filetype_table[F2FS_FT_MAX];
void set_de_type(struct f2fs_dir_entry *, umode_t);
-
+unsigned char get_de_type(struct f2fs_dir_entry *);
struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_target_dentry(struct f2fs_filename *,
f2fs_hash_t, int *, struct f2fs_dentry_ptr *);
bool f2fs_fill_dentries(struct dir_context *, struct f2fs_dentry_ptr *,
@@ -1698,6 +1698,8 @@ void f2fs_set_link(struct inode *, struc
int update_dent_inode(struct inode *, struct inode *, const struct qstr *);
void f2fs_update_dentry(nid_t ino, umode_t mode, struct f2fs_dentry_ptr *,
const struct qstr *, f2fs_hash_t , unsigned int);
+int f2fs_add_regular_entry(struct inode *, const struct qstr *,
+ struct inode *, nid_t, umode_t);
int __f2fs_add_link(struct inode *, const struct qstr *, struct inode *, nid_t,
umode_t);
void f2fs_delete_entry(struct f2fs_dir_entry *, struct page *, struct inode *,
--- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ int make_empty_inline_dir(struct inode *
* NOTE: ipage is grabbed by caller, but if any error occurs, we should
* release ipage in this function.
*/
-static int f2fs_convert_inline_dir(struct inode *dir, struct page *ipage,
+static int f2fs_move_inline_dirents(struct inode *dir, struct page *ipage,
struct f2fs_inline_dentry *inline_dentry)
{
struct page *page;
@@ -428,6 +428,98 @@ out:
return err;
}
+static int f2fs_add_inline_entries(struct inode *dir,
+ struct f2fs_inline_dentry *inline_dentry)
+{
+ struct f2fs_dentry_ptr d;
+ unsigned long bit_pos = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ make_dentry_ptr(NULL, &d, (void *)inline_dentry, 2);
+
+ while (bit_pos < d.max) {
+ struct f2fs_dir_entry *de;
+ struct qstr new_name;
+ nid_t ino;
+ umode_t fake_mode;
+
+ if (!test_bit_le(bit_pos, d.bitmap)) {
+ bit_pos++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ de = &d.dentry[bit_pos];
+ new_name.name = d.filename[bit_pos];
+ new_name.len = de->name_len;
+
+ ino = le32_to_cpu(de->ino);
+ fake_mode = get_de_type(de) << S_SHIFT;
+
+ err = f2fs_add_regular_entry(dir, &new_name, NULL,
+ ino, fake_mode);
+ if (err)
+ goto punch_dentry_pages;
+
+ if (unlikely(!de->name_len))
+ d.max = -1;
+
+ bit_pos += GET_DENTRY_SLOTS(le16_to_cpu(de->name_len));
+ }
+ return 0;
+punch_dentry_pages:
+ truncate_inode_pages(&dir->i_data, 0);
+ truncate_blocks(dir, 0, false);
+ remove_dirty_dir_inode(dir);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int f2fs_move_rehashed_dirents(struct inode *dir, struct page *ipage,
+ struct f2fs_inline_dentry *inline_dentry)
+{
+ struct f2fs_inline_dentry *backup_dentry;
+ int err;
+
+ backup_dentry = kmalloc(sizeof(struct f2fs_inline_dentry),
+ GFP_F2FS_ZERO);
+ if (!backup_dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(backup_dentry, inline_dentry, MAX_INLINE_DATA);
+ truncate_inline_inode(ipage, 0);
+
+ unlock_page(ipage);
+
+ err = f2fs_add_inline_entries(dir, backup_dentry);
+ if (err)
+ goto recover;
+
+ lock_page(ipage);
+
+ stat_dec_inline_dir(dir);
+ clear_inode_flag(F2FS_I(dir), FI_INLINE_DENTRY);
+ update_inode(dir, ipage);
+ kfree(backup_dentry);
+ return 0;
+recover:
+ lock_page(ipage);
+ memcpy(inline_dentry, backup_dentry, MAX_INLINE_DATA);
+ i_size_write(dir, MAX_INLINE_DATA);
+ update_inode(dir, ipage);
+ f2fs_put_page(ipage, 1);
+
+ kfree(backup_dentry);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int f2fs_convert_inline_dir(struct inode *dir, struct page *ipage,
+ struct f2fs_inline_dentry *inline_dentry)
+{
+ if (!F2FS_I(dir)->i_dir_level)
+ return f2fs_move_inline_dirents(dir, ipage, inline_dentry);
+ else
+ return f2fs_move_rehashed_dirents(dir, ipage, inline_dentry);
+}
+
int f2fs_add_inline_entry(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name,
struct inode *inode, nid_t ino, umode_t mode)
{
--- a/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
@@ -497,4 +497,6 @@ enum {
F2FS_FT_MAX
};
+#define S_SHIFT 12
+
#endif /* _LINUX_F2FS_FS_H */
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit f61cce5b81f91ba336184008b24baec84afbb3dd upstream.
When testing f2fs with inline_dentry option, generic/342 reports:
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of dm-0. Self-destruct in 5 seconds. Have a nice day...
After rmmod f2fs module, kenrel shows following dmesg:
=============================================================================
BUG f2fs_inode_cache (Tainted: G O ): Objects remaining in f2fs_inode_cache on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Slab 0xf51ca0e0 objects=22 used=1 fp=0xd1e6fc60 flags=0x40004080
CPU: 3 PID: 7455 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B O 4.6.0-rc4+ #16
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
00000086 00000086 d062fe18 c13a83a0 f51ca0e0 d062fe38 d062fea4 c11c7276
c1981040 f51ca0e0 00000016 00000001 d1e6fc60 40004080 656a624f 20737463
616d6572 6e696e69 6e692067 66326620 6e695f73 5f65646f 68636163 6e6f2065
Call Trace:
[<c13a83a0>] dump_stack+0x5f/0x8f
[<c11c7276>] slab_err+0x76/0x80
[<c11cbfc0>] ? __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x100/0x2f0
[<c11cbfc0>] ? __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x100/0x2f0
[<c11cbfe5>] __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x125/0x2f0
[<c1198a38>] kmem_cache_destroy+0x158/0x1f0
[<c176b43d>] ? mutex_unlock+0xd/0x10
[<f8f15aa3>] exit_f2fs_fs+0x4b/0x5a8 [f2fs]
[<c10f596c>] SyS_delete_module+0x16c/0x1d0
[<c1001b10>] ? do_fast_syscall_32+0x30/0x1c0
[<c13c59bf>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x20
[<c10afa7d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xdd/0x210
[<c10ad50b>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0x10
[<c1001b81>] do_fast_syscall_32+0xa1/0x1c0
[<c176d888>] sysenter_past_esp+0x45/0x74
INFO: Object 0xd1e6d9e0 @offset=6624
kmem_cache_destroy f2fs_inode_cache: Slab cache still has objects
CPU: 3 PID: 7455 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G B O 4.6.0-rc4+ #16
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
00000286 00000286 d062fef4 c13a83a0 f174b000 d062ff14 d062ff28 c1198ac7
c197fe18 f3c5b980 d062ff20 000d04f2 d062ff0c d062ff0c d062ff14 d062ff14
f8f20dc0 fffffff5 d062e000 d062ff30 f8f15aa3 d062ff7c c10f596c 73663266
Call Trace:
[<c13a83a0>] dump_stack+0x5f/0x8f
[<c1198ac7>] kmem_cache_destroy+0x1e7/0x1f0
[<f8f15aa3>] exit_f2fs_fs+0x4b/0x5a8 [f2fs]
[<c10f596c>] SyS_delete_module+0x16c/0x1d0
[<c1001b10>] ? do_fast_syscall_32+0x30/0x1c0
[<c13c59bf>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x20
[<c10afa7d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xdd/0x210
[<c10ad50b>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0x10
[<c1001b81>] do_fast_syscall_32+0xa1/0x1c0
[<c176d888>] sysenter_past_esp+0x45/0x74
The reason is: in recovery flow, we use delayed iput mechanism for directory
which has recovered dentry block. It means the reference of inode will be
held until last dirty dentry page being writebacked.
But when we mount f2fs with inline_dentry option, during recovery, dirent
may only be recovered into dir inode page rather than dentry page, so there
are no chance for us to release inode reference in ->writepage when
writebacking last dentry page.
We can call paired iget/iput explicityly for inline_dentry case, but for
non-inline_dentry case, iput will call writeback_single_inode to write all
data pages synchronously, but during recovery, ->writepages of f2fs skips
writing all pages, result in losing dirent.
This patch fixes this issue by obsoleting old mechanism, and introduce a
new dir_list to hold all directory inodes which has recovered datas until
finishing recovery.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Deleted add_dirty_dir_inode() function is different
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 24 ---------------------
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 -
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -771,24 +771,6 @@ out:
f2fs_trace_pid(page);
}
-void add_dirty_dir_inode(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
- struct inode_entry *new =
- f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(inode_entry_slab, GFP_NOFS);
- int ret = 0;
-
- new->inode = inode;
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->list);
-
- spin_lock(&sbi->dir_inode_lock);
- ret = __add_dirty_inode(inode, new);
- spin_unlock(&sbi->dir_inode_lock);
-
- if (ret)
- kmem_cache_free(inode_entry_slab, new);
-}
-
void remove_dirty_dir_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
@@ -811,12 +793,6 @@ void remove_dirty_dir_inode(struct inode
stat_dec_dirty_dir(sbi);
spin_unlock(&sbi->dir_inode_lock);
kmem_cache_free(inode_entry_slab, entry);
-
- /* Only from the recovery routine */
- if (is_inode_flag_set(F2FS_I(inode), FI_DELAY_IPUT)) {
- clear_inode_flag(F2FS_I(inode), FI_DELAY_IPUT);
- iput(inode);
- }
}
void sync_dirty_dir_inodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1402,7 +1402,6 @@ enum {
FI_NO_ALLOC, /* should not allocate any blocks */
FI_FREE_NID, /* free allocated nide */
FI_UPDATE_DIR, /* should update inode block for consistency */
- FI_DELAY_IPUT, /* used for the recovery */
FI_NO_EXTENT, /* not to use the extent cache */
FI_INLINE_XATTR, /* used for inline xattr */
FI_INLINE_DATA, /* used for inline data*/
@@ -1828,7 +1827,6 @@ void remove_orphan_inode(struct f2fs_sb_
int recover_orphan_inodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *);
int get_valid_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *);
void update_dirty_page(struct inode *, struct page *);
-void add_dirty_dir_inode(struct inode *);
void remove_dirty_dir_inode(struct inode *);
void sync_dirty_dir_inodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *);
void write_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *, struct cp_control *);
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ static void del_fsync_inode(struct fsync
kmem_cache_free(fsync_entry_slab, entry);
}
-static int recover_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage)
+static int recover_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
+ struct list_head *dir_list)
{
struct f2fs_inode *raw_inode = F2FS_INODE(ipage);
nid_t pino = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_pino);
@@ -97,18 +98,29 @@ static int recover_dentry(struct inode *
struct qstr name;
struct page *page;
struct inode *dir, *einode;
+ struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
int err = 0;
- dir = f2fs_iget(inode->i_sb, pino);
- if (IS_ERR(dir)) {
- err = PTR_ERR(dir);
- goto out;
+ entry = get_fsync_inode(dir_list, pino);
+ if (!entry) {
+ dir = f2fs_iget(inode->i_sb, pino);
+ if (IS_ERR(dir)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(dir);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ entry = add_fsync_inode(dir_list, dir);
+ if (!entry) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ iput(dir);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
- if (file_enc_name(inode)) {
- iput(dir);
+ dir = entry->inode;
+
+ if (file_enc_name(inode))
return 0;
- }
name.len = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_namelen);
name.name = raw_inode->i_name;
@@ -116,7 +128,7 @@ static int recover_dentry(struct inode *
if (unlikely(name.len > F2FS_NAME_LEN)) {
WARN_ON(1);
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
- goto out_err;
+ goto out;
}
retry:
de = f2fs_find_entry(dir, &name, &page);
@@ -142,23 +154,12 @@ retry:
goto retry;
}
err = __f2fs_add_link(dir, &name, inode, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode);
- if (err)
- goto out_err;
-
- if (is_inode_flag_set(F2FS_I(dir), FI_DELAY_IPUT)) {
- iput(dir);
- } else {
- add_dirty_dir_inode(dir);
- set_inode_flag(F2FS_I(dir), FI_DELAY_IPUT);
- }
goto out;
out_unmap_put:
f2fs_dentry_kunmap(dir, page);
f2fs_put_page(page, 0);
-out_err:
- iput(dir);
out:
f2fs_msg(inode->i_sb, KERN_NOTICE,
"%s: ino = %x, name = %s, dir = %lx, err = %d",
@@ -479,7 +480,8 @@ out:
return err;
}
-static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head)
+static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *inode_list,
+ struct list_head *dir_list)
{
unsigned long long cp_ver = cur_cp_version(F2FS_CKPT(sbi));
struct curseg_info *curseg;
@@ -506,7 +508,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
break;
}
- entry = get_fsync_inode(head, ino_of_node(page));
+ entry = get_fsync_inode(inode_list, ino_of_node(page));
if (!entry)
goto next;
/*
@@ -517,7 +519,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
if (entry->last_inode == blkaddr)
recover_inode(entry->inode, page);
if (entry->last_dentry == blkaddr) {
- err = recover_dentry(entry->inode, page);
+ err = recover_dentry(entry->inode, page, dir_list);
if (err) {
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
break;
@@ -545,6 +547,7 @@ int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_in
{
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_WARM_NODE);
struct list_head inode_list;
+ struct list_head dir_list;
block_t blkaddr;
int err;
int ret = 0;
@@ -556,6 +559,7 @@ int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_in
return -ENOMEM;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&inode_list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir_list);
/* prevent checkpoint */
mutex_lock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
@@ -575,12 +579,11 @@ int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_in
need_writecp = true;
/* step #2: recover data */
- err = recover_data(sbi, &inode_list);
+ err = recover_data(sbi, &inode_list, &dir_list);
if (!err)
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !list_empty(&inode_list));
out:
destroy_fsync_dnodes(&inode_list);
- kmem_cache_destroy(fsync_entry_slab);
/* truncate meta pages to be used by the recovery */
truncate_inode_pages_range(META_MAPPING(sbi),
@@ -618,5 +621,8 @@ out:
} else {
mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
}
+
+ destroy_fsync_dnodes(&dir_list);
+ kmem_cache_destroy(fsync_entry_slab);
return ret ? ret: err;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit fb58ae22067e0595d974e3d856522c1ed6d2d7bf upstream.
This patch removes an obsolete variable used in add_free_nid.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Picked as dependency of commit 30a61ddf8117 "f2fs: fix race condition
in between free nid allocator/initializer"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 3 ---
1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -1430,7 +1430,6 @@ static int add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_i
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
struct free_nid *i;
struct nat_entry *ne;
- bool allocated = false;
if (!available_free_memory(sbi, FREE_NIDS))
return -1;
@@ -1444,8 +1443,6 @@ static int add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_i
ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
- allocated = true;
- if (allocated)
return 0;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 42bf546c1fe3f3654bdf914e977acbc2b80a5be5 upstream.
As Wen Xu reported in below link:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200183
- Overview
Divide zero in reset_curseg() when mounting a crafted f2fs image
- Reproduce
- Kernel message
[ 588.281510] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 588.282701] CPU: 0 PID: 1293 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 588.284000] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 588.286178] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0
[ 588.298166] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 588.299360] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b
[ 588.300809] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64
[ 588.305272] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 588.306822] FS: 00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 588.308456] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 588.309623] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 588.311085] Call Trace:
[ 588.311637] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x103f/0x3410
[ 588.316136] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 588.317031] ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140
[ 588.319473] f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20
[ 588.320166] mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[ 588.320847] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360
[ 588.321647] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[ 588.322432] do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[ 588.323175] ? strndup_user+0x46/0x70
[ 588.323937] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 588.324793] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0
[ 588.325702] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 588.326562] ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90
[ 588.327375] ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60
[ 588.328118] ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[ 588.328808] __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[ 588.329607] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 588.330400] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 588.331461] RIP: 0033:0x7fad848e8b9a
[ 588.336022] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7c5b6be8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 588.337547] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016f8030 RCX: 00007fad848e8b9a
[ 588.338999] RDX: 00000000016f8210 RSI: 00000000016f9f30 RDI: 0000000001700ec0
[ 588.340442] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 588.341887] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000001700ec0
[ 588.343341] R13: 00000000016f8210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 588.354891] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 588.355862] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0
[ 588.360742] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 588.361812] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b
[ 588.363485] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64
[ 588.365213] RBP: ffff8801e88d7968 R08: ffffed003c32266f R09: ffffed003c32266f
[ 588.366661] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003c32266e R12: ffff8801f0337700
[ 588.368110] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 588.370057] FS: 00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 588.372099] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 588.373291] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L2147
curseg->zone = GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG(sbi, curseg->segno);
If secs_per_zone is corrupted due to fuzzing test, it will cause divide
zero operation when using GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG macro, so we should do more
sanity check with secs_per_zone during mount to avoid this issue.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/super.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1088,9 +1088,9 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
return 1;
}
- if (secs_per_zone > total_sections) {
+ if (secs_per_zone > total_sections || !secs_per_zone) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
- "Wrong secs_per_zone (%u > %u)",
+ "Wrong secs_per_zone / total_sections (%u, %u)",
secs_per_zone, total_sections);
return 1;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit d600af236da51d9e3b90d21a23f95b820bd02e2f upstream.
When building each sit entry in cache, firstly, we will load it from
sit page, and then check all entries in sit journal, if there is one
updated entry in journal, cover cached entry with the journaled one.
Actually, most of check operation is unneeded since we only need
to update cached entries with journaled entries in batch, so
changing the flow as below for more efficient:
1. load all sit entries into cache from sit pages;
2. update sit entries with journal.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Keep using curseg->curseg_mutex for serialisation
- Use sum instead of journal
- Don't add f2fs_discard_en() condition]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -2145,22 +2145,11 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
struct f2fs_sit_entry sit;
struct page *page;
- mutex_lock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
- for (i = 0; i < sits_in_cursum(sum); i++) {
- if (le32_to_cpu(segno_in_journal(sum, i))
- == start) {
- sit = sit_in_journal(sum, i);
- mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
- goto got_it;
- }
- }
- mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
-
page = get_current_sit_page(sbi, start);
sit_blk = (struct f2fs_sit_block *)page_address(page);
sit = sit_blk->entries[SIT_ENTRY_OFFSET(sit_i, start)];
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
-got_it:
+
check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
seg_info_from_raw_sit(se, &sit);
@@ -2168,13 +2157,36 @@ got_it:
memcpy(se->discard_map, se->cur_valid_map, SIT_VBLOCK_MAP_SIZE);
sbi->discard_blks += sbi->blocks_per_seg - se->valid_blocks;
- if (sbi->segs_per_sec > 1) {
- struct sec_entry *e = get_sec_entry(sbi, start);
- e->valid_blocks += se->valid_blocks;
- }
+ if (sbi->segs_per_sec > 1)
+ get_sec_entry(sbi, start)->valid_blocks +=
+ se->valid_blocks;
}
start_blk += readed;
} while (start_blk < sit_blk_cnt);
+
+ mutex_lock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
+ for (i = 0; i < sits_in_cursum(sum); i++) {
+ struct f2fs_sit_entry sit;
+ struct seg_entry *se;
+ unsigned int old_valid_blocks;
+
+ start = le32_to_cpu(segno_in_journal(sum, i));
+ se = &sit_i->sentries[start];
+ sit = sit_in_journal(sum, i);
+
+ old_valid_blocks = se->valid_blocks;
+
+ check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ seg_info_from_raw_sit(se, &sit);
+
+ memcpy(se->discard_map, se->cur_valid_map, SIT_VBLOCK_MAP_SIZE);
+ sbi->discard_blks += old_valid_blocks - se->valid_blocks;
+
+ if (sbi->segs_per_sec > 1)
+ get_sec_entry(sbi, start)->valid_blocks +=
+ se->valid_blocks - old_valid_blocks;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
}
static void init_free_segmap(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit b7973f2378c619d0e17a075f13350bd58a9ebe3d upstream.
In recover_data, value of argument 'type' will be CURSEG_WARM_NODE all
the time, remove it for cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Picked as dependency of commit 6781eabba1bd "f2fs: give -EINVAL for
norecovery and rw mount"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -459,8 +459,7 @@ out:
return err;
}
-static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
- struct list_head *head, int type)
+static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head)
{
unsigned long long cp_ver = cur_cp_version(F2FS_CKPT(sbi));
struct curseg_info *curseg;
@@ -469,7 +468,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
block_t blkaddr;
/* get node pages in the current segment */
- curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, type);
+ curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_WARM_NODE);
blkaddr = NEXT_FREE_BLKADDR(sbi, curseg);
while (1) {
@@ -556,7 +555,7 @@ int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_in
need_writecp = true;
/* step #2: recover data */
- err = recover_data(sbi, &inode_list, CURSEG_WARM_NODE);
+ err = recover_data(sbi, &inode_list);
if (!err)
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !list_empty(&inode_list));
out:
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit 2040fce83fe17763b07c97c1f691da2bb85e4135 upstream.
Previous mkfs.f2fs allows small partition inappropriately, so f2fs should detect
that as well.
Refer this in f2fs-tools.
mkfs.f2fs: detect small partition by overprovision ratio and # of segments
Reported-and-Tested-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 2 ++
fs/f2fs/super.c | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
#define DEF_RECLAIM_PREFREE_SEGMENTS 5 /* 5% over total segments */
+#define F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS 9 /* SB + 2 (CP + SIT + NAT) + SSA + MAIN */
+
/* L: Logical segment # in volume, R: Relative segment # in main area */
#define GET_L2R_SEGNO(free_i, segno) (segno - free_i->start_segno)
#define GET_R2L_SEGNO(free_i, segno) (segno + free_i->start_segno)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
+ unsigned int ovp_segments, reserved_segments;
unsigned int main_segs, blocks_per_seg;
unsigned int sit_segs, nat_segs;
unsigned int sit_bitmap_size, nat_bitmap_size;
@@ -1096,6 +1097,16 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
if (unlikely(fsmeta >= total))
return 1;
+ ovp_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->overprov_segment_count);
+ reserved_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
+
+ if (unlikely(fsmeta < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
+ ovp_segments == 0 || reserved_segments == 0)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong layout: check mkfs.f2fs version");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
main_segs = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
blocks_per_seg = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
commit 44759979a49bfd2d20d789add7fa81a21eb1a4ab upstream.
Changing of caching mode via /sys/devices/.../scsi_disk/.../cache_type may
fail if device responds to MODE SENSE command with DPOFUA flag set, and
then checks this flag to be not set on MODE SELECT command.
In this scenario, when trying to change cache_type, write always fails:
# echo "none" >cache_type
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
And following appears in dmesg:
[13007.865745] sd 1:0:1:0: [sda] Sense Key : Illegal Request [current]
[13007.865753] sd 1:0:1:0: [sda] Add. Sense: Invalid field in parameter list
>From SBC-4 r15, 6.5.1 "Mode pages overview", description of DEVICE-SPECIFIC
PARAMETER field in the mode parameter header:
...
The write protect (WP) bit for mode data sent with a MODE SELECT
command shall be ignored by the device server.
...
The DPOFUA bit is reserved for mode data sent with a MODE SELECT
command.
...
The remaining bits in the DEVICE-SPECIFIC PARAMETER byte are also reserved
and shall be set to zero.
[mkp: shuffled commentary to commit description]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/sd.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sd.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sd.c
@@ -207,6 +207,12 @@ cache_type_store(struct device *dev, str
sp = buffer_data[0] & 0x80 ? 1 : 0;
buffer_data[0] &= ~0x80;
+ /*
+ * Ensure WP, DPOFUA, and RESERVED fields are cleared in
+ * received mode parameter buffer before doing MODE SELECT.
+ */
+ data.device_specific = 0;
+
if (scsi_mode_select(sdp, 1, sp, 8, buffer_data, len, SD_TIMEOUT,
SD_MAX_RETRIES, &data, &sshdr)) {
if (scsi_sense_valid(&sshdr))
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit a2125ff7dd1ed3a2a53cdc1f8f9c9cec9cfaa7ab upstream.
This fixes missing freeing meta pages in the error case.
Tested-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ int get_valid_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_
/* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
- goto fail_no_cp;
+ goto free_fail_no_cp;
if (cur_page == cp1)
sbi->cur_cp_pack = 1;
@@ -736,6 +736,9 @@ done:
f2fs_put_page(cp2, 1);
return 0;
+free_fail_no_cp:
+ f2fs_put_page(cp1, 1);
+ f2fs_put_page(cp2, 1);
fail_no_cp:
kfree(sbi->ckpt);
return -EINVAL;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 7b525dd01365c6764018e374d391c92466be1b7a upstream.
- rename is_valid_blkaddr() to is_valid_meta_blkaddr() for readability.
- introduce is_valid_blkaddr() for cleanup.
No logic change in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Drop inapplicable change to check on f2fs_fio_info::old_blkaddr
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/data.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 9 ++++++++-
fs/f2fs/file.c | 2 +-
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/f2fs/node.c | 5 ++---
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 6 +++---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 2 +-
9 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb
return __get_meta_page(sbi, index, false);
}
-bool is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type)
+bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type)
{
switch (type) {
case META_NAT:
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *s
for (; nrpages-- > 0; blkno++) {
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
+ if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
goto out;
switch (type) {
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode
goto unlock_out;
}
- if (dn.data_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || dn.data_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR) {
+ if (!is_valid_blkaddr(dn.data_blkaddr)) {
if (create) {
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
err = -EIO;
@@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ int do_write_data_page(struct f2fs_io_in
* If current allocation needs SSR,
* it had better in-place writes for updated data.
*/
- if (unlikely(fio->blk_addr != NEW_ADDR &&
+ if (unlikely(is_valid_blkaddr(fio->blk_addr) &&
!is_cold_data(page) &&
need_inplace_update(inode))) {
rewrite_data_page(fio);
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1647,6 +1647,13 @@ static inline void *f2fs_kvzalloc(size_t
(pgofs - ADDRS_PER_INODE(fi) + ADDRS_PER_BLOCK) / \
ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * ADDRS_PER_BLOCK + ADDRS_PER_INODE(fi))
+static inline bool is_valid_blkaddr(block_t blkaddr)
+{
+ if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
/*
* file.c
*/
@@ -1818,7 +1825,7 @@ void destroy_segment_manager_caches(void
struct page *grab_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
struct page *get_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
-bool is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t, int);
+bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type);
int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t, int, int, bool);
void ra_meta_pages_cond(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
long sync_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, enum page_type, long);
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static bool __found_offset(block_t blkad
switch (whence) {
case SEEK_DATA:
if ((blkaddr == NEW_ADDR && dirty == pgofs) ||
- (blkaddr != NEW_ADDR && blkaddr != NULL_ADDR))
+ is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
return true;
break;
case SEEK_HOLE:
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static bool __written_first_block(struct
{
block_t addr = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_addr[0]);
- if (addr != NEW_ADDR && addr != NULL_ADDR)
+ if (is_valid_blkaddr(addr))
return true;
return false;
}
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -296,8 +296,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
new_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR);
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e) == NEW_ADDR &&
new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e) != NEW_ADDR &&
- nat_get_blkaddr(e) != NULL_ADDR &&
+ f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_valid_blkaddr(nat_get_blkaddr(e)) &&
new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
/* increment version no as node is removed */
@@ -312,7 +311,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
/* change address */
nat_set_blkaddr(e, new_blkaddr);
- if (new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || new_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
+ if (!is_valid_blkaddr(new_blkaddr))
set_nat_flag(e, IS_CHECKPOINTED, false);
__set_nat_cache_dirty(nm_i, e);
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
while (1) {
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+ if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
return 0;
page = get_tmp_page(sbi, blkaddr);
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_s
}
/* dest is valid block, try to recover from src to dest */
- if (is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
+ if (is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
if (src == NULL_ADDR) {
err = reserve_new_block(&dn);
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
while (1) {
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+ if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
break;
ra_meta_pages_cond(sbi, blkaddr);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ bool is_checkpointed_data(struct f2fs_sb
struct seg_entry *se;
bool is_cp = false;
- if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
+ if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
return true;
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ void f2fs_wait_on_encrypted_page_writeba
{
struct page *cpage;
- if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR)
+ if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
return;
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, blkaddr == NULL_ADDR);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
(GET_SEGOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr) & (sbi->blocks_per_seg - 1))
#define GET_SEGNO(sbi, blk_addr) \
- (((blk_addr == NULL_ADDR) || (blk_addr == NEW_ADDR)) ? \
+ ((!is_valid_blkaddr(blk_addr)) ? \
NULL_SEGNO : GET_L2R_SEGNO(FREE_I(sbi), \
GET_SEGNO_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr)))
#define GET_SECNO(sbi, segno) \
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
This was done as part of commits 5d64600d4f33 "f2fs: avoid bug_on on
corrupted inode" and 76d56d4ab4f2 "f2fs: fix to do sanity check with
extra_attr feature" upstream, but the specific checks they added are
not applicable to 4.4.
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -95,6 +95,13 @@ static void __recover_inline_status(stru
return;
}
+static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static int do_read_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
@@ -143,6 +150,11 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
get_inline_info(fi, ri);
+ if (!sanity_check_inode(inode)) {
+ f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
/* check data exist */
if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) && !f2fs_exist_data(inode))
__recover_inline_status(inode, node_page);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit c9b60788fc760d136211853f10ce73dc152d1f4a upstream.
This patch add to do sanity check with below field:
- cp_pack_total_block_count
- blkaddr of data/node
- extent info
- Overview
BUG() in verify_block_addr() when writing to a corrupted f2fs image
- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)
- POC (poc.c)
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *foo_bar_baz;
int err;
static int buf[8192];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);
if (fd >= 0) {
write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
fdatasync(fd);
close(fd);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- Kernel message
[ 689.349473] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3
[ 699.728662] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1309 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2860 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[ 699.728670] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 699.729056] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.729064] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.729074] RIP: 0010:f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[ 699.729076] Code: ff e9 cf fe ff ff 49 8d 7d 10 e8 39 45 ad ff 4d 8b 7d 10 be 04 00 00 00 49 8d 7f 48 e8 07 49 ad ff 45 8b 7f 48 e9 fb fe ff ff <0f> 0b f0 41 80 4d 48 04 e9 65 fe ff ff 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 8d
[ 699.729130] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af568 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 699.729139] RAX: 000000000000003f RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88c9113
[ 699.729142] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8802024e5540
[ 699.729144] RBP: ffff8801f43af590 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: ffffffffffffffe8
[ 699.729147] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039b0596a R12: ffff8802024e5540
[ 699.729149] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a700 R15: ffff8801e1ee4450
[ 699.729154] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.729156] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.729159] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.729171] Call Trace:
[ 699.729192] f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[ 699.729203] ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[ 699.729238] ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[ 699.729269] ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[ 699.729276] __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[ 699.729291] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.729310] ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[ 699.729321] ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[ 699.729327] ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[ 699.729331] ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[ 699.729345] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.729351] f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[ 699.729358] ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[ 699.729374] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[ 699.729380] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.729391] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[ 699.729403] ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[ 699.729413] ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[ 699.729418] ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[ 699.729423] ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[ 699.729428] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[ 699.729433] ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[ 699.729438] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.729454] ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[ 699.729459] ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[ 699.729464] do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.729468] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.729472] ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.729478] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[ 699.729483] ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[ 699.729496] ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[ 699.729501] file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[ 699.729506] f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[ 699.729511] ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[ 699.729521] ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[ 699.729526] ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[ 699.729530] f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.729534] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.729548] vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.729554] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.729558] do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.729562] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.729585] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 699.729595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 699.729613] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.729615] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 699.729668] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.729673] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.729675] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.729678] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.729680] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.729683] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.729687] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 699.729782] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 699.729785] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:654!
[ 699.731055] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 699.732104] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.733684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.735611] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[ 699.736649] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[ 699.740524] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[ 699.741573] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[ 699.743006] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[ 699.744426] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[ 699.745833] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[ 699.747256] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 699.748683] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.750293] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.751462] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.752874] Call Trace:
[ 699.753386] ? f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x93/0x240
[ 699.754341] f2fs_inplace_write_data+0xd2/0x240
[ 699.755271] f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[ 699.756214] ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[ 699.757215] ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[ 699.758209] ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[ 699.759164] __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[ 699.760002] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.760823] ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[ 699.761573] ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[ 699.762345] ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[ 699.763332] ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[ 699.764374] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.765347] f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[ 699.766276] ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[ 699.767161] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[ 699.768112] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.768951] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[ 699.769739] ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[ 699.770885] ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[ 699.771743] ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[ 699.772569] ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[ 699.773680] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[ 699.774603] ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[ 699.775544] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.776510] ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[ 699.777299] ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[ 699.778279] do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.779026] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.779978] ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.780755] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[ 699.781746] ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[ 699.782820] ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[ 699.783597] file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[ 699.784540] f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[ 699.785381] ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[ 699.786415] ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[ 699.787204] ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[ 699.787941] f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.788694] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.789572] vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.790360] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.791128] do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.791779] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.792614] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 699.793371] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 699.794406] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.795134] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 699.798960] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.800483] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.801923] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.803373] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.804798] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.806233] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.807667] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 699.817079] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df6 ]---
[ 699.818068] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[ 699.819114] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[ 699.822919] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[ 699.823977] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[ 699.825436] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[ 699.826881] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[ 699.828292] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[ 699.829750] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 699.831192] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.832793] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.833981] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.835556] ==================================================================
[ 699.837029] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.838462] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801f43af970 by task a.out/1309
[ 699.840086] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G D W 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.841603] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.843475] Call Trace:
[ 699.843982] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 699.844661] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 699.845607] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 699.846351] ? update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.853831] __asan_load8+0x54/0x90
[ 699.854569] update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.855428] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.7+0x20/0x20
[ 699.856601] ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.857476] unwind_next_frame.part.5+0x18e/0x490
[ 699.858448] ? unwind_dump+0x290/0x290
[ 699.859217] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.860185] __unwind_start+0x106/0x190
[ 699.860974] __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.861808] ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.862691] ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.863525] save_stack_trace+0x1f/0x30
[ 699.864312] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 699.864993] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1420/0x1420
[ 699.865990] ? flush_tlb_mm_range+0x15e/0x220
[ 699.866889] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.867724] ? __dec_node_state+0x92/0xb0
[ 699.868543] ? lock_page_memcg+0x85/0xf0
[ 699.869350] ? unlock_page_memcg+0x16/0x80
[ 699.870185] ? page_remove_rmap+0x198/0x520
[ 699.871048] ? mark_page_accessed+0x133/0x200
[ 699.871930] ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[ 699.872700] ? unmap_page_range+0xcd4/0xe50
[ 699.873551] ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[ 699.874217] ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[ 699.874895] __kasan_slab_free+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 699.875734] ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.876563] kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[ 699.877315] kmem_cache_free+0x89/0x1e0
[ 699.878095] unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.878913] free_pgtables+0x101/0x1b0
[ 699.879677] exit_mmap+0x146/0x2a0
[ 699.880378] ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[ 699.881214] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.882052] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[ 699.882985] mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[ 699.883602] do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[ 699.884288] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 699.885212] ? f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.885995] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.886877] ? vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.887694] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.888442] ? do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.889118] ? __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.889996] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 699.890860] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.891585] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 699.892268] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.893781] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.895220] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.896643] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.898069] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.899505] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.901241] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 699.902215] page:ffffea0007d0ebc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 699.903811] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 699.904585] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff07d00101 0000000000000000
[ 699.906125] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 699.907673] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 699.909108] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 699.910077] ffff8801f43af800: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00
[ 699.911528] ffff8801f43af880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 699.912953] >ffff8801f43af900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 01 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2
[ 699.914392] ^
[ 699.915758] ffff8801f43af980: f2 00 f4 f4 00 00 00 00 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 699.917193] ffff8801f43afa00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
[ 699.918634] ==================================================================
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L644
Reported-by Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- CoW is not implemented so check f2fs_io_info::blk_addr instead of
f2fs_io_info::{old,new}_blkaddr
- Operation code is f2fs_io_info::rw instead of f2fs_io_info::op
- f2fs_stop_checkpoint() only takes one argument
- In f2fs_map_blocks(), validate dn.data_blkaddr instead of blkaddr
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
fs/f2fs/data.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 3 +++
fs/f2fs/file.c | 12 ++++++++++++
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
fs/f2fs/node.c | 4 ++++
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 3 +--
7 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -75,8 +75,10 @@ repeat:
fio.page = page;
if (f2fs_submit_page_bio(&fio)) {
- f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
- goto repeat;
+ memset(page_address(page), 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+ f2fs_stop_checkpoint(sbi);
+ f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
+ return page;
}
lock_page(page);
@@ -130,8 +132,14 @@ bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_s
case META_POR:
case DATA_GENERIC:
if (unlikely(blkaddr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
- blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
+ blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi))) {
+ if (type == DATA_GENERIC) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "access invalid blkaddr:%u", blkaddr);
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ }
return false;
+ }
break;
case META_GENERIC:
if (unlikely(blkaddr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
@@ -651,6 +659,14 @@ static struct page *validate_checkpoint(
&cp_page_1, version);
if (err)
goto invalid_cp1;
+
+ if (le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) >
+ sbi->blocks_per_seg) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "invalid cp_pack_total_block_count:%u",
+ le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count));
+ goto invalid_cp1;
+ }
pre_version = *version;
cp_addr += le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) - 1;
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -147,7 +147,10 @@ int f2fs_submit_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_
struct bio *bio;
struct page *page = fio->encrypted_page ? fio->encrypted_page : fio->page;
- verify_block_addr(fio, fio->blk_addr);
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->blk_addr,
+ __is_meta_io(fio) ? META_GENERIC : DATA_GENERIC))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
trace_f2fs_submit_page_bio(page, fio);
f2fs_trace_ios(fio, 0);
@@ -604,6 +607,12 @@ static int f2fs_map_blocks(struct inode
goto unlock_out;
}
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(dn.data_blkaddr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dn.data_blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto sync_out;
+ }
+
if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, dn.data_blkaddr)) {
if (create) {
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
@@ -972,6 +981,10 @@ got_it:
SetPageUptodate(page);
goto confused;
}
+
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(F2FS_I_SB(inode), block_nr,
+ DATA_GENERIC))
+ goto set_error_page;
} else {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
SetPageUptodate(page);
@@ -1086,6 +1099,12 @@ int do_write_data_page(struct f2fs_io_in
set_page_writeback(page);
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(fio->blk_addr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->blk_addr,
+ DATA_GENERIC)) {
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_writepage;
+ }
/*
* If current allocation needs SSR,
* it had better in-place writes for updated data.
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1649,6 +1649,9 @@ static inline void *f2fs_kvzalloc(size_t
(pgofs - ADDRS_PER_INODE(fi) + ADDRS_PER_BLOCK) / \
ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * ADDRS_PER_BLOCK + ADDRS_PER_INODE(fi))
+#define __is_meta_io(fio) (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META && \
+ (!is_read_io(fio->rw) || fio->is_meta))
+
bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
block_t blkaddr, int type);
void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -374,6 +374,13 @@ static loff_t f2fs_seek_block(struct fil
block_t blkaddr;
blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(F2FS_I_SB(inode),
+ blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+ f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (__found_offset(F2FS_I_SB(inode), blkaddr, dirty,
pgofs, whence)) {
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
@@ -467,6 +474,11 @@ int truncate_data_blocks_range(struct dn
dn->data_blkaddr = NULL_ADDR;
set_data_blkaddr(dn);
+
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ continue;
+
invalidate_blocks(sbi, blkaddr);
if (dn->ofs_in_node == 0 && IS_INODE(dn->node_page))
clear_inode_flag(F2FS_I(dn->inode),
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -120,6 +120,22 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct in
return false;
}
+ if (F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree) {
+ struct extent_info *ei = &F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree->largest;
+
+ if (ei->len &&
+ (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ei->blk, DATA_GENERIC) ||
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ei->blk + ei->len - 1,
+ DATA_GENERIC))) {
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "%s: inode (ino=%lx) extent info [%u, %u, %u] "
+ "is incorrect, run fsck to fix",
+ __func__, inode->i_ino,
+ ei->blk, ei->fofs, ei->len);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
return true;
}
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -1341,6 +1341,10 @@ static int f2fs_write_node_page(struct p
return 0;
}
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(ni.blk_addr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ goto redirty_out;
+
set_page_writeback(page);
fio.blk_addr = ni.blk_addr;
write_node_page(nid, &fio);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -586,8 +586,7 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(str
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
- if (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&
- (!is_read_io(fio->rw) || fio->is_meta))
+ if (__is_meta_io(fio))
verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, META_GENERIC);
else
verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit 701f49bc028edb19ffccd101997dd84f0d71e279 upstream.
kthread_run returns an error pointer, but elsewhere in the code
dev->kthread_vid_cap/out is checked against NULL.
If kthread_run returns an error, then set the pointer to NULL.
I chose this method over changing all kthread_vid_cap/out tests
elsewhere since this is more robust.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c | 5 ++++-
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c
@@ -863,8 +863,11 @@ int vivid_start_generating_vid_cap(struc
"%s-vid-cap", dev->v4l2_dev.name);
if (IS_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
+
+ dev->kthread_vid_cap = NULL;
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "kernel_thread() failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
+ return err;
}
*pstreaming = true;
vivid_grab_controls(dev, true);
--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c
@@ -248,8 +248,11 @@ int vivid_start_generating_vid_out(struc
"%s-vid-out", dev->v4l2_dev.name);
if (IS_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out);
+
+ dev->kthread_vid_out = NULL;
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "kernel_thread() failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out);
+ return err;
}
*pstreaming = true;
vivid_grab_controls(dev, true);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: James Morris <[email protected]>
commit a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 upstream.
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying
to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization
that could result in this.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -861,6 +861,13 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cre
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
+ /*
+ * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
+ * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
+ return;
+
call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit e494c2f995d6181d6e29c4927d68e0f295ecf75b upstream.
After fuzzing, cp_pack_start_sum could be corrupted, so current log's
summary info should be wrong due to loading incorrect summary block.
Then, if segment's type in current log is exceeded NR_CURSEG_TYPE, it
can lead accessing invalid dirty_i->dirty_segmap bitmap finally.
Add sanity check for cp_pack_start_sum to fix this issue.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200419
- Reproduce
- Kernel message (f2fs-dev w/ KASAN)
[ 3117.578432] F2FS-fs (loop0): Invalid log blocks per segment (8)
[ 3117.578445] F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 2th superblock
[ 3117.581364] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc_offset: 30716
[ 3117.583564] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1225 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:90 __get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.583570] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.584014] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.584017] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.584022] RIP: 0010:__get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.584023] Code: 00 49 8d bc 24 84 00 00 00 e8 74 54 da ff 41 83 8c 24 84 00 00 00 08 4c 89 f6 4c 89 ef e8 c0 d9 95 00 48 89 ef e8 18 e3 00 00 <0f> 0b f0 80 4d 48 04 e9 0f fe ff ff 0f 0b 48 89 c7 48 89 04 24 e8
[ 3117.584072] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb678c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 3117.584082] RAX: ffff88018f0a6a78 RBX: ffffea0007a46600 RCX: ffffffff9314d1b2
[ 3117.584085] RDX: ffffffff00000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0a6a98
[ 3117.584087] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 3117.584090] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed00326e4450 R12: ffff880193722200
[ 3117.584092] R13: ffff88018ebe9afc R14: 0000000000000206 R15: ffff88018eb67900
[ 3117.584096] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.584098] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.584101] CR2: 00000000016f21b8 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.584112] Call Trace:
[ 3117.584121] ? f2fs_set_meta_page_dirty+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.584127] ? f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xbf9/0x3190
[ 3117.584133] ? f2fs_npages_for_summary_flush+0x75/0x120
[ 3117.584145] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xda8/0x3190
[ 3117.584151] ? f2fs_get_valid_checkpoint+0x298/0xa00
[ 3117.584156] ? f2fs_flush_sit_entries+0x10e0/0x10e0
[ 3117.584184] ? map_id_range_down+0x17c/0x1b0
[ 3117.584188] ? __put_user_ns+0x30/0x30
[ 3117.584206] ? find_next_bit+0x53/0x90
[ 3117.584237] ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20
[ 3117.584249] f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.584258] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584279] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.584296] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.584302] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584305] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.584310] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.584320] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.584330] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.584343] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.584347] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.584357] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.584362] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.584373] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.584377] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.584383] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.584396] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.584401] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.584405] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.584427] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.584440] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.584455] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584456] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.584505] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.584510] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584512] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584514] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.584516] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584519] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.584523] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf31 ]---
[ 3117.685663] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_check_nid_range: out-of-range nid=2, run fsck to fix.
[ 3117.685673] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_data: ino = 2 (i_size: recover) recovered = 1, err = 0
[ 3117.685707] ==================================================================
[ 3117.685955] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686175] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88018f0a63d0 by task mount/1225
[ 3117.686477] CPU: 0 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.686481] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.686483] Call Trace:
[ 3117.686494] dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 3117.686512] print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 3117.686517] kasan_report+0x28e/0x390
[ 3117.686522] ? __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686527] __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686532] locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.686538] f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.686543] recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.686547] ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.686553] ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686564] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.686567] ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.686571] ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.686592] ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.686597] ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.686602] ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.686606] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.686618] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.686633] ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.686648] ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.686656] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.686660] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.686664] f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.686670] ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.686674] ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.686678] ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.686683] ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.686686] ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.686695] ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.686700] ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.686707] f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.686728] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686735] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.686740] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.686745] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686748] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.686753] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.686758] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.686762] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.686769] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.686773] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.686777] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.686780] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.686786] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.686790] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.686795] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.686801] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.686804] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686809] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.686816] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.686824] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.686829] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686830] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.686887] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.686892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686894] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686896] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.686899] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686901] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.687005] Allocated by task 1225:
[ 3117.687152] kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.687157] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xfd/0x200
[ 3117.687161] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x2d09/0x3190
[ 3117.687165] f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.687168] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.687171] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.687174] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.687177] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.687180] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.687182] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.687186] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.687190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.687285] Freed by task 19:
[ 3117.687412] __kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x190
[ 3117.687416] kfree+0x8b/0x1b0
[ 3117.687460] ttm_bo_man_put_node+0x61/0x80 [ttm]
[ 3117.687476] ttm_bo_cleanup_refs+0x15f/0x250 [ttm]
[ 3117.687492] ttm_bo_delayed_delete+0x2f0/0x300 [ttm]
[ 3117.687507] ttm_bo_delayed_workqueue+0x17/0x50 [ttm]
[ 3117.687528] process_one_work+0x2f9/0x740
[ 3117.687531] worker_thread+0x78/0x6b0
[ 3117.687541] kthread+0x177/0x1c0
[ 3117.687545] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 3117.687638] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018f0a6300
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 3117.688014] The buggy address is located 16 bytes to the right of
192-byte region [ffff88018f0a6300, ffff88018f0a63c0)
[ 3117.688382] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 3117.688554] page:ffffea00063c2980 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f3403180 index:0x0
[ 3117.688788] flags: 0x17fff8000000100(slab)
[ 3117.688944] raw: 017fff8000000100 ffffea00063c2840 0000000e0000000e ffff8801f3403180
[ 3117.689166] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 3117.689386] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 3117.689653] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 3117.689816] ffff88018f0a6280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690027] ffff88018f0a6300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690239] >ffff88018f0a6380: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690448] ^
[ 3117.690644] ffff88018f0a6400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690868] ffff88018f0a6480: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.691077] ==================================================================
[ 3117.691290] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 3117.693893] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
[ 3117.694120] PGD 80000001f01bc067 P4D 80000001f01bc067 PUD 1d9638067 PMD 0
[ 3117.694338] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 3117.694490] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G B W 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.694703] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.695073] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.695246] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.695793] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.695969] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.696182] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.696391] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.696604] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.696813] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.697032] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.697280] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.702357] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.707235] Call Trace:
[ 3117.712077] locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.716891] f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.721617] recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.726316] ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.730957] ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.735573] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.740198] ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.744829] ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.749487] ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.754152] ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.758831] ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.763448] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.768046] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.772603] ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.777159] ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.781648] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.786067] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.790476] f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.794790] ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.799086] ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.803304] ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.807563] ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.811766] ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.815947] ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.820087] ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.824262] f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.828367] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.832432] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.836500] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.840501] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.844420] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.848275] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.852053] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.855810] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.859441] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.862996] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.866417] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.869719] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.872948] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.876121] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.879333] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.882467] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.885604] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.888700] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.891742] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.894692] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.897669] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.900563] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.906922] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.910159] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.913469] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.916764] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.920071] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.923393] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.926680] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.949979] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.954283] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf32 ]---
[ 3117.958575] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.962810] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.971789] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.976333] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.980926] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.985497] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.990098] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.994761] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.999392] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3118.004096] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3118.008816] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L775
if (test_and_clear_bit(segno, dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t]))
dirty_i->nr_dirty[t]--;
Here dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t] can be NULL which leads to crash in test_and_clear_bit()
Reported-by Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: The function is called sanity_check_ckpt()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 8 ++++----
fs/f2fs/super.c | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -731,15 +731,15 @@ int get_valid_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_
cp_block = (struct f2fs_checkpoint *)page_address(cur_page);
memcpy(sbi->ckpt, cp_block, blk_size);
- /* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
- if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
- goto free_fail_no_cp;
-
if (cur_page == cp1)
sbi->cur_cp_pack = 1;
else
sbi->cur_cp_pack = 2;
+ /* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
+ if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
+ goto free_fail_no_cp;
+
if (cp_blks <= 1)
goto done;
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1141,6 +1141,7 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
unsigned int sit_bitmap_size, nat_bitmap_size;
unsigned int log_blocks_per_seg;
unsigned int segment_count_main;
+ unsigned int cp_pack_start_sum, cp_payload;
block_t user_block_count;
int i;
@@ -1201,6 +1202,17 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
return 1;
}
+ cp_pack_start_sum = __start_sum_addr(sbi);
+ cp_payload = __cp_payload(sbi);
+ if (cp_pack_start_sum < cp_payload + 1 ||
+ cp_pack_start_sum > blocks_per_seg - 1 -
+ NR_CURSEG_TYPE) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong cp_pack_start_sum: %u",
+ cp_pack_start_sum);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
return 1;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Backport of upstream commit 4eaed6aa2c628101246bcabc91b203bfac1193f8 ]
In KVM we define the configuration of HCR_EL2 for a VHE HOST in
HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS, but we don't have a similar definition for the
non-VHE host flags, and open-code HCR_RW. Further, in head.S we
open-code the flags for VHE and non-VHE configurations.
In future, we're going to want to configure more flags for the host, so
lets add a HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS defintion, and consistently use both
HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS and HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS in the kvm code and head.S.
We now use mov_q to generate the HCR_EL2 value, as we use when
configuring other registers in head.S.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
[kristina: backport to 4.4.y: non-VHE only; __deactivate_traps_nvhe in
assembly; add #include]
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 3 ++-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp.S | 2 +-
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
index ef8e13d379cb..013b7de45ee7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
HCR_AMO | HCR_SWIO | HCR_TIDCP | HCR_RW)
#define HCR_VIRT_EXCP_MASK (HCR_VA | HCR_VI | HCR_VF)
#define HCR_INT_OVERRIDE (HCR_FMO | HCR_IMO)
+#define HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW)
/* Hyp System Control Register (SCTLR_EL2) bits */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
index d019c3a58cc2..0382eba4bf7b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <asm/cache.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
#include <asm/memory.h>
#include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -464,7 +465,7 @@ CPU_LE( bic x0, x0, #(3 << 24) ) // Clear the EE and E0E bits for EL1
ret
/* Hyp configuration. */
-2: mov x0, #(1 << 31) // 64-bit EL1
+2: mov_q x0, HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS
msr hcr_el2, x0
/* Generic timers. */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp.S
index 86c289832272..8d3da858c257 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp.S
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@
.endm
.macro deactivate_traps
- mov x2, #HCR_RW
+ mov_q x2, HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS
msr hcr_el2, x2
msr hstr_el2, xzr
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit 400b8b9a2a17918f8ce00786f596f530e7f30d50 upstream.
The similar issue as fixed in Commit 4a2eb0c37b47 ("sctp: initialize
sin6_flowinfo for ipv6 addrs in sctp_inet6addr_event") also exists
in sctp_inetaddr_event, as Alexander noticed.
To fix it, allocate sctp_sockaddr_entry with kzalloc for both sctp
ipv4 and ipv6 addresses, as does in sctp_v4/6_copy_addrlist().
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 5 +----
net/sctp/protocol.c | 4 +---
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -97,11 +97,9 @@ static int sctp_inet6addr_event(struct n
switch (ev) {
case NETDEV_UP:
- addr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_sockaddr_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
- addr->a.v6.sin6_port = 0;
- addr->a.v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
addr->a.v6.sin6_addr = ifa->addr;
addr->a.v6.sin6_scope_id = ifa->idev->dev->ifindex;
addr->valid = 1;
@@ -412,7 +410,6 @@ static void sctp_v6_copy_addrlist(struct
addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
- addr->a.v6.sin6_port = 0;
addr->a.v6.sin6_addr = ifp->addr;
addr->a.v6.sin6_scope_id = dev->ifindex;
addr->valid = 1;
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static void sctp_v4_copy_addrlist(struct
addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
- addr->a.v4.sin_port = 0;
addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_local;
addr->valid = 1;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addr->list);
@@ -775,10 +774,9 @@ static int sctp_inetaddr_event(struct no
switch (ev) {
case NETDEV_UP:
- addr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_sockaddr_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
- addr->a.v4.sin_port = 0;
addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_local;
addr->valid = 1;
spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 0762216c0ad2a2fccd63890648eca491f2c83d9a upstream.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484
CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917
__msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500
strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484
nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389
__tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x440179
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00
R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid
string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable().
Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions:
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable()
tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump()
tipc_nl_compat_media_set()
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set()
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *bearer;
struct tipc_bearer_config *b;
+ int len;
b = (struct tipc_bearer_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -381,6 +382,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(b->name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, b->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -406,6 +411,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable
{
char *name;
struct nlattr *bearer;
+ int len;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -413,6 +419,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -472,6 +482,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX + 1];
+ int len;
nla_parse_nested(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK], NULL);
@@ -482,6 +493,11 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump
NULL);
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (strcmp(name, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME])) != 0)
return 0;
@@ -615,6 +631,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_media_set(stru
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *media;
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
+ int len;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -622,6 +639,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_media_set(stru
if (!media)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME, lc->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -642,6 +663,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set(str
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *bearer;
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
+ int len;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -649,6 +671,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set(str
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, lc->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
commit 74d5d229b1bf60f93bff244b2dfc0eb21ec32a07 upstream.
If we flip read-only before we initiate writeback on all dirty pages for
ordered extents we've created then we'll have ordered extents left over
on umount, which results in all sorts of bad things happening. Fix this
by making sure we wait on ordered extents if we have to do the aborted
transaction cleanup stuff.
generic/475 can produce this warning:
[ 8531.177332] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 11997 at fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3856 btrfs_free_fs_root+0x95/0xa0 [btrfs]
[ 8531.183282] CPU: 2 PID: 11997 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.0.0-rc1-default+ #394
[ 8531.185164] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626cc-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[ 8531.187851] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_fs_root+0x95/0xa0 [btrfs]
[ 8531.193082] RSP: 0018:ffffb1ab86163d98 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 8531.194198] RAX: ffff9f3449494d18 RBX: ffff9f34a2695000 RCX:0000000000000000
[ 8531.195629] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI:0000000000000000
[ 8531.197315] RBP: ffff9f344e930000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:0000000000000000
[ 8531.199095] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9f34494d4ff8 R12:ffffb1ab86163dc0
[ 8531.200870] R13: ffff9f344e9300b0 R14: ffffb1ab86163db8 R15:0000000000000000
[ 8531.202707] FS: 00007fc68e949fc0(0000) GS:ffff9f34bd800000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8531.204851] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8531.205942] CR2: 00007ffde8114dd8 CR3: 000000002dfbd000 CR4:00000000000006e0
[ 8531.207516] Call Trace:
[ 8531.208175] btrfs_free_fs_roots+0xdb/0x170 [btrfs]
[ 8531.210209] ? wait_for_completion+0x5b/0x190
[ 8531.211303] close_ctree+0x157/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 8531.212412] generic_shutdown_super+0x64/0x100
[ 8531.213485] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
[ 8531.214430] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0xa0 [btrfs]
[ 8531.215539] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
[ 8531.216633] cleanup_mnt+0x3b/0x70
[ 8531.217497] task_work_run+0x98/0xc0
[ 8531.218397] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x83/0x90
[ 8531.219324] do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x180
[ 8531.220192] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 8531.221286] RIP: 0033:0x7fc68e5e4d07
[ 8531.225621] RSP: 002b:00007ffde8116608 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:00000000000000a6
[ 8531.227512] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00005580c2175970 RCX:00007fc68e5e4d07
[ 8531.229098] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:00005580c2175b80
[ 8531.230730] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00005580c2175ba0 R09:00007ffde8114e80
[ 8531.232269] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:00005580c2175b80
[ 8531.233839] R13: 00007fc68eac61c4 R14: 00005580c2175a68 R15:0000000000000000
Leaving a tree in the rb-tree:
3853 void btrfs_free_fs_root(struct btrfs_root *root)
3854 {
3855 iput(root->ino_cache_inode);
3856 WARN_ON(!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&root->inode_tree));
CC: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
[ add stacktrace ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -4111,6 +4111,14 @@ static void btrfs_destroy_all_ordered_ex
spin_lock(&fs_info->ordered_root_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&fs_info->ordered_root_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * We need this here because if we've been flipped read-only we won't
+ * get sync() from the umount, so we need to make sure any ordered
+ * extents that haven't had their dirty pages IO start writeout yet
+ * actually get run and error out properly.
+ */
+ btrfs_wait_ordered_roots(fs_info, -1);
}
static int btrfs_destroy_delayed_refs(struct btrfs_transaction *trans,
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
commit 9474f4e7cd71a633fa1ef93b7daefd44bbdfd482 upstream.
It's possible that a pid has died before we take the rcu lock, in which
case we can't walk the ancestry list as it may be detached. Instead, check
for death first before doing the walk.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 2d514487faf1 ("security: Yama LSM")
Cc: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -288,7 +288,9 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(stru
break;
case YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL:
rcu_read_lock();
- if (!task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
+ if (!pid_alive(child))
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if (!rc && !task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
!ptracer_exception_found(current, child) &&
!ns_capable(__task_cred(child)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
rc = -EPERM;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
commit 66a8d5bfb518f9f12d47e1d2dce1732279f9451e upstream.
Strict requirement of pixclock to be zero breaks support of SDL 1.2
which contains hardcoded table of supported video modes with non-zero
pixclock values[1].
To better understand which pixclock values are considered valid and how
driver should handle these values, I briefly examined few existing fbdev
drivers and documentation in Documentation/fb/. And it looks like there
are no strict rules on that and actual behaviour varies:
* some drivers treat (pixclock == 0) as "use defaults" (uvesafb.c);
* some treat (pixclock == 0) as invalid value which leads to
-EINVAL (clps711x-fb.c);
* some pass converted pixclock value to hardware (uvesafb.c);
* some are trying to find nearest value from predefined table
(vga16fb.c, video_gx.c).
Given this, I believe that it should be safe to just ignore this value if
changing is not supported. It seems that any portable fbdev application
which was not written only for one specific device working under one
specific kernel version should not rely on any particular behaviour of
pixclock anyway.
However, while enabling SDL1 applications to work out of the box when
there is no /etc/fb.modes with valid settings, this change affects the
video mode choosing logic in SDL. Depending on current screen
resolution, contents of /etc/fb.modes and resolution requested by
application, this may lead to user-visible difference (not always):
image will be displayed in a right way, but it will be aligned to the
left instead of center. There is no "right behaviour" here as well, as
emulated fbdev, opposing to old fbdev drivers, simply ignores any
requsts of video mode changes with resolutions smaller than current.
The easiest way to reproduce this problem is to install sdl-sopwith[2],
remove /etc/fb.modes file if it exists, and then try to run sopwith
from console without X. At least in Fedora 29, sopwith may be simply
installed from standard repositories.
[1] SDL 1.2.15 source code, src/video/fbcon/SDL_fbvideo.c, vesa_timings
[2] http://sdl-sopwith.sourceforge.net/
Signed-off-by: Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 79e539453b34e ("DRM: i915: add mode setting support")
Fixes: 771fe6b912fca ("drm/radeon: introduce kernel modesetting for radeon hardware")
Fixes: 785b93ef8c309 ("drm/kms: move driver specific fb common code to helper functions (v2)")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c
@@ -1109,9 +1109,14 @@ int drm_fb_helper_check_var(struct fb_va
struct drm_framebuffer *fb = fb_helper->fb;
int depth;
- if (var->pixclock != 0 || in_dbg_master())
+ if (in_dbg_master())
return -EINVAL;
+ if (var->pixclock != 0) {
+ DRM_DEBUG("fbdev emulation doesn't support changing the pixel clock, value of pixclock is ignored\n");
+ var->pixclock = 0;
+ }
+
/* Need to resize the fb object !!! */
if (var->bits_per_pixel > fb->bits_per_pixel ||
var->xres > fb->width || var->yres > fb->height ||
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: YunQiang Su <[email protected]>
commit a214720cbf50cd8c3f76bbb9c3f5c283910e9d33 upstream.
Octeon has an boot-time option to disable pcie.
Since MSI depends on PCI-E, we should also disable MSI also with
this option is on in order to avoid inadvertently accessing PCIe
registers.
Signed-off-by: YunQiang Su <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected] # v3.3+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c
+++ b/arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c
@@ -369,7 +369,9 @@ int __init octeon_msi_initialize(void)
int irq;
struct irq_chip *msi;
- if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_PCIE) {
+ if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_INVALID) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_PCIE) {
msi_rcv_reg[0] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV0;
msi_rcv_reg[1] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV1;
msi_rcv_reg[2] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV2;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 78f3ac76d9e5219589718b9e4733bee21627b3f5 ]
In the past, Asus firmwares would change the panel backlight directly
through the EC when the display off hotkey (Fn+F7) was pressed, and
only notify the OS of such change, with 0x33 when the LCD was ON and
0x34 when the LCD was OFF. These are currently mapped to
KEY_DISPLAYTOGGLE and KEY_DISPLAY_OFF, respectively.
Most recently the EC on Asus most machines lost ability to toggle the
LCD backlight directly, but unless the OS informs the firmware it is
going to handle the display toggle hotkey events, the firmware still
tries change the brightness through the EC, to no effect. The end result
is a long list (at Endless we counted 11) of Asus laptop models where
the display toggle hotkey does not perform any action. Our firmware
engineers contacts at Asus were surprised that there were still machines
out there with the old behavior.
Calling WMNB(ASUS_WMI_DEVID_BACKLIGHT==0x00050011, 2) on the _WDG device
tells the firmware that it should let the OS handle the display toggle
event, in which case it will simply notify the OS of a key press with
0x35, as shown by the DSDT excerpts bellow.
Scope (_SB)
{
(...)
Device (ATKD)
{
(...)
Name (_WDG, Buffer (0x28)
{
/* 0000 */ 0xD0, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x97, 0x6D, 0x4E, 0xDE, 0x11,
/* 0008 */ 0x8A, 0x39, 0x08, 0x00, 0x20, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x66,
/* 0010 */ 0x4E, 0x42, 0x01, 0x02, 0x35, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x0B,
/* 0018 */ 0xC2, 0xE3, 0xED, 0x45, 0x91, 0xC2, 0x4C, 0x5A,
/* 0020 */ 0x6D, 0x19, 0x5D, 0x1C, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x01, 0x08
})
Method (WMNB, 3, Serialized)
{
CreateDWordField (Arg2, Zero, IIA0)
CreateDWordField (Arg2, 0x04, IIA1)
Local0 = (Arg1 & 0xFFFFFFFF)
(...)
If ((Local0 == 0x53564544))
{
(...)
If ((IIA0 == 0x00050011))
{
If ((IIA1 == 0x02))
{
^^PCI0.SBRG.EC0.SPIN (0x72, One)
^^PCI0.SBRG.EC0.BLCT = One
}
Return (One)
}
}
(...)
}
(...)
}
(...)
}
(...)
Scope (_SB.PCI0.SBRG.EC0)
{
(...)
Name (BLCT, Zero)
(...)
Method (_Q10, 0, NotSerialized) // _Qxx: EC Query
{
If ((BLCT == Zero))
{
Local0 = One
Local0 = RPIN (0x72)
Local0 ^= One
SPIN (0x72, Local0)
If (ATKP)
{
Local0 = (0x34 - Local0)
^^^^ATKD.IANE (Local0)
}
}
ElseIf ((BLCT == One))
{
If (ATKP)
{
^^^^ATKD.IANE (0x35)
}
}
}
(...)
}
Signed-off-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
index f96f7b865267..7c1defaef3f5 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
@@ -2084,7 +2084,8 @@ static int asus_wmi_add(struct platform_device *pdev)
err = asus_wmi_backlight_init(asus);
if (err && err != -ENODEV)
goto fail_backlight;
- }
+ } else
+ err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(ASUS_WMI_DEVID_BACKLIGHT, 2, NULL);
status = wmi_install_notify_handler(asus->driver->event_guid,
asus_wmi_notify, asus);
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7d033c9f6a7fd3821af75620a0257db87c2b552a ]
This patch makes sure the flow label in the IPv6 header
forged in ipv6_local_error() is initialized.
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
CPU: 1 PID: 24675 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #4
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x455/0xb00 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:675
kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601
_copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:177 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x2e9/0x4f0 net/socket.c:227
___sys_recvmsg+0x5d7/0x1140 net/socket.c:2284
__sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x457ec9
Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f8750c06c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000020000400 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8750c076d4
R13: 00000000004c4a60 R14: 00000000004d8140 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Uninit was stored to memory at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:219 [inline]
kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x134/0x230 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:439
__msan_chain_origin+0x70/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:200
ipv6_recv_error+0x1e3f/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:475
udpv6_recvmsg+0x398/0x2ab0 net/ipv6/udp.c:335
inet_recvmsg+0x4fb/0x600 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:830
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x1d1/0x230 net/socket.c:801
___sys_recvmsg+0x4d5/0x1140 net/socket.c:2278
__sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline]
ipv6_local_error+0x1a7/0x9e0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:334
__ip6_append_data+0x129f/0x4fd0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1311
ip6_make_skb+0x6cc/0xcf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1775
udpv6_sendmsg+0x3f8e/0x45d0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1384
inet_sendmsg+0x54a/0x720 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796
__x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
Bytes 4-7 of 28 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 28 starts at ffff8881937bfce0
Data copied to user address 0000000020000000
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ void ipv6_local_error(struct sock *sk, i
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
iph->daddr = fl6->daddr;
+ ip6_flow_hdr(iph, 0, 0);
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
serr->ee.ee_errno = err;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
commit a01421e4484327fe44f8e126793ed5a48a221e24 upstream.
Using [1] for static analysis I found that the OMAPFB_QUERY_PLANE,
OMAPFB_GET_COLOR_KEY, OMAPFB_GET_DISPLAY_INFO, and OMAPFB_GET_VRAM_INFO
cases could all leak uninitialized stack memory--either due to
uninitialized padding or 'reserved' fields.
Fix them by clearing the shared union used to store copied out data.
[1] https://github.com/vlad902/kernel-uninitialized-memory-checker
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Fixes: b39a982ddecf ("OMAP: DSS2: omapfb driver")
Cc: [email protected]
[b.zolnierkie: prefix patch subject with "omap2fb: "]
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c
@@ -609,6 +609,8 @@ int omapfb_ioctl(struct fb_info *fbi, un
int r = 0;
+ memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p));
+
switch (cmd) {
case OMAPFB_SYNC_GFX:
DBG("ioctl SYNC_GFX\n");
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 8f9c469348487844328e162db57112f7d347c49f upstream.
Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte
'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key.
crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys.
However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is
longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends
before the next 4-byte aligned boundary. In this case, 'keylen -=
RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX. This
causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey().
Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size.
Reproducer using AF_ALG:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "aead",
.salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
};
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
__be32 enckeylen;
char keys[1];
} __attribute__((packed)) key = {
.attr.rta_len = sizeof(key),
.attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */,
};
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &key, sizeof(key));
}
It caused:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000
PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155
[...]
Call Trace:
sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321
crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178
shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186
crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202
hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66
shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223
crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202
crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96
crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62
aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256
__sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: e236d4a89a2f ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/authenc.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/authenc.c
+++ b/crypto/authenc.c
@@ -58,14 +58,22 @@ int crypto_authenc_extractkeys(struct cr
return -EINVAL;
if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
return -EINVAL;
- if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
+
+ /*
+ * RTA_OK() didn't align the rtattr's payload when validating that it
+ * fits in the buffer. Yet, the keys should start on the next 4-byte
+ * aligned boundary. To avoid confusion, require that the rtattr
+ * payload be exactly the param struct, which has a 4-byte aligned size.
+ */
+ if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) != sizeof(*param))
return -EINVAL;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*param) % RTA_ALIGNTO);
param = RTA_DATA(rta);
keys->enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
- key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
- keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+ key += rta->rta_len;
+ keylen -= rta->rta_len;
if (keylen < keys->enckeylen)
return -EINVAL;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit e4849aff1e169b86c561738daf8ff020e9de1011 ]
The Broadcom SiByte BCM1250, BCM1125, and BCM1125H SOCs have an onchip
DRAM controller that supports memory amounts of up to 16GiB, and due to
how the address decoder has been wired in the SOC any memory beyond 1GiB
is actually mapped starting from 4GiB physical up, that is beyond the
32-bit addressable limit[1]. Consequently if the maximum amount of
memory has been installed, then it will span up to 19GiB.
Many of the evaluation boards we support that are based on one of these
SOCs have their memory soldered and the amount present fits in the
32-bit address range. The BCM91250A SWARM board however has actual DIMM
slots and accepts, depending on the peripherals revision of the SOC, up
to 4GiB or 8GiB of memory in commercially available JEDEC modules[2].
I believe this is also the case with the BCM91250C2 LittleSur board.
This means that up to either 3GiB or 7GiB of memory requires 64-bit
addressing to access.
I believe the BCM91480B BigSur board, which has the BCM1480 SOC instead,
accepts at least as much memory, although I have no documentation or
actual hardware available to verify that.
Both systems have PCI slots installed for use by any PCI option boards,
including ones that only support 32-bit addressing (additionally the
32-bit PCI host bridge of the BCM1250, BCM1125, and BCM1125H SOCs limits
addressing to 32-bits), and there is no IOMMU available. Therefore for
PCI DMA to work in the presence of memory beyond enable swiotlb for the
affected systems.
All the other SOC onchip DMA devices use 40-bit addressing and therefore
can address the whole memory, so only enable swiotlb if PCI support and
support for DMA beyond 4GiB have been both enabled in the configuration
of the kernel.
This shows up as follows:
Broadcom SiByte BCM1250 B2 @ 800 MHz (SB1 rev 2)
Board type: SiByte BCM91250A (SWARM)
Determined physical RAM map:
memory: 000000000fe7fe00 @ 0000000000000000 (usable)
memory: 000000001ffffe00 @ 0000000080000000 (usable)
memory: 000000000ffffe00 @ 00000000c0000000 (usable)
memory: 0000000087fffe00 @ 0000000100000000 (usable)
software IO TLB: mapped [mem 0xcbffc000-0xcfffc000] (64MB)
in the bootstrap log and removes failures like these:
defxx 0000:02:00.0: dma_direct_map_page: overflow 0x0000000185bc6080+4608 of device mask ffffffff bus mask 0
fddi0: Receive buffer allocation failed
fddi0: Adapter open failed!
IP-Config: Failed to open fddi0
defxx 0000:09:08.0: dma_direct_map_page: overflow 0x0000000185bc6080+4608 of device mask ffffffff bus mask 0
fddi1: Receive buffer allocation failed
fddi1: Adapter open failed!
IP-Config: Failed to open fddi1
when memory beyond 4GiB is handed out to devices that can only do 32-bit
addressing.
This updates commit cce335ae47e2 ("[MIPS] 64-bit Sibyte kernels need
DMA32.").
References:
[1] "BCM1250/BCM1125/BCM1125H User Manual", Revision 1250_1125-UM100-R,
Broadcom Corporation, 21 Oct 2002, Section 3: "System Overview",
"Memory Map", pp. 34-38
[2] "BCM91250A User Manual", Revision 91250A-UM100-R, Broadcom
Corporation, 18 May 2004, Section 3: "Physical Description",
"Supported DRAM", p. 23
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: Remove GPL text from dma.c; SPDX tag covers it]
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/21108/
References: cce335ae47e2 ("[MIPS] 64-bit Sibyte kernels need DMA32.")
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/Kconfig | 3 +++
arch/mips/sibyte/common/Makefile | 1 +
arch/mips/sibyte/common/dma.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/mips/sibyte/common/dma.c
diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig
index 3a908cc81317..333ea0389adb 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
@@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ config SIBYTE_SWARM
select SYS_SUPPORTS_HIGHMEM
select SYS_SUPPORTS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
select ZONE_DMA32 if 64BIT
+ select SWIOTLB if ARCH_DMA_ADDR_T_64BIT && PCI
config SIBYTE_LITTLESUR
bool "Sibyte BCM91250C2-LittleSur"
@@ -782,6 +783,7 @@ config SIBYTE_SENTOSA
select SYS_HAS_CPU_SB1
select SYS_SUPPORTS_BIG_ENDIAN
select SYS_SUPPORTS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ select SWIOTLB if ARCH_DMA_ADDR_T_64BIT && PCI
config SIBYTE_BIGSUR
bool "Sibyte BCM91480B-BigSur"
@@ -795,6 +797,7 @@ config SIBYTE_BIGSUR
select SYS_SUPPORTS_HIGHMEM
select SYS_SUPPORTS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
select ZONE_DMA32 if 64BIT
+ select SWIOTLB if ARCH_DMA_ADDR_T_64BIT && PCI
config SNI_RM
bool "SNI RM200/300/400"
diff --git a/arch/mips/sibyte/common/Makefile b/arch/mips/sibyte/common/Makefile
index b3d6bf23a662..3ef3fb658136 100644
--- a/arch/mips/sibyte/common/Makefile
+++ b/arch/mips/sibyte/common/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
obj-y := cfe.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SWIOTLB) += dma.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SIBYTE_BUS_WATCHER) += bus_watcher.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SIBYTE_CFE_CONSOLE) += cfe_console.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SIBYTE_TBPROF) += sb_tbprof.o
diff --git a/arch/mips/sibyte/common/dma.c b/arch/mips/sibyte/common/dma.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..eb47a94f3583
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/mips/sibyte/common/dma.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * DMA support for Broadcom SiByte platforms.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Maciej W. Rozycki
+ */
+
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <asm/bootinfo.h>
+
+void __init plat_swiotlb_setup(void)
+{
+ swiotlb_init(1);
+}
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit cd26d1c4d1bc947b56ae404998ae2276df7b39b7 upstream.
If a filehandle is dup()ped, then it is possible to close it from one fd
and call mmap from the other. This creates a race condition in vb2_mmap
where it is using queue data that __vb2_queue_free (called from close())
is in the process of releasing.
By moving up the mutex_lock(mmap_lock) in vb2_mmap this race is avoided
since __vb2_queue_free is called with the same mutex locked. So vb2_mmap
now reads consistent buffer data.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c
@@ -1976,9 +1976,13 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
return -EINVAL;
}
}
+
+ mutex_lock(&q->mmap_lock);
+
if (vb2_fileio_is_active(q)) {
dprintk(1, "mmap: file io in progress\n");
- return -EBUSY;
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
}
/*
@@ -1986,7 +1990,7 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
*/
ret = __find_plane_by_offset(q, off, &buffer, &plane);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto unlock;
vb = q->bufs[buffer];
@@ -2002,8 +2006,9 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
return -EINVAL;
}
- mutex_lock(&q->mmap_lock);
ret = call_memop(vb, mmap, vb->planes[plane].mem_priv, vma);
+
+unlock:
mutex_unlock(&q->mmap_lock);
if (ret)
return ret;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit ae460c115b7aa50c9a36cf78fced07b27962c9d0 ]
On our AT91SAM9260 board we use the same sdio bus for wifi and for the
sd card slot. This caused the atmel-mci to give the following splat on
the serial console:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 538 at drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c:859 atmci_send_command+0x24/0x44
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 538 Comm: mmcqd/0 Not tainted 4.14.76 #14
Hardware name: Atmel AT91SAM9
[<c000fccc>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c000d3dc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c000d3dc>] (show_stack) from [<c0017644>] (__warn+0xd8/0xf4)
[<c0017644>] (__warn) from [<c0017704>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24)
[<c0017704>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c033bb9c>] (atmci_send_command+0x24/0x44)
[<c033bb9c>] (atmci_send_command) from [<c033e984>] (atmci_start_request+0x1f4/0x2dc)
[<c033e984>] (atmci_start_request) from [<c033f3b4>] (atmci_request+0xf0/0x164)
[<c033f3b4>] (atmci_request) from [<c0327108>] (mmc_start_request+0x280/0x2d0)
[<c0327108>] (mmc_start_request) from [<c032800c>] (mmc_start_areq+0x230/0x330)
[<c032800c>] (mmc_start_areq) from [<c03366f8>] (mmc_blk_issue_rw_rq+0xc4/0x310)
[<c03366f8>] (mmc_blk_issue_rw_rq) from [<c03372c4>] (mmc_blk_issue_rq+0x118/0x5ac)
[<c03372c4>] (mmc_blk_issue_rq) from [<c033781c>] (mmc_queue_thread+0xc4/0x118)
[<c033781c>] (mmc_queue_thread) from [<c002daf8>] (kthread+0x100/0x118)
[<c002daf8>] (kthread) from [<c000a580>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x34)
---[ end trace 594371ddfa284bd6 ]---
This is:
WARN_ON(host->cmd);
This was fixed on our board by letting atmci_request_end determine what
state we are in. Instead of unconditionally setting it to STATE_IDLE on
STATE_END_REQUEST.
Signed-off-by: Jonas Danielsson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c b/drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c
index bf62e429f7fc..98be9eb3184b 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c
@@ -1840,13 +1840,14 @@ static void atmci_tasklet_func(unsigned long priv)
}
atmci_request_end(host, host->mrq);
- state = STATE_IDLE;
+ goto unlock; /* atmci_request_end() sets host->state */
break;
}
} while (state != prev_state);
host->state = state;
+unlock:
spin_unlock(&host->lock);
}
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream.
levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -726,7 +726,8 @@ static int sens_destroy(void *key, void
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
levdatum = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ if (levdatum->level)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
kfree(levdatum->level);
}
kfree(datum);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 2f5302533f306d5ee87bd375aef9ca35b91762cb ]
The strncpy() function may leave the destination string buffer
unterminated, better use strlcpy() that we have a __weak fallback
implementation for systems without it.
In this specific case this would only happen if fgets() was buggy, as
its man page states that it should read one less byte than the size of
the destination buffer, so that it can put the nul byte at the end of
it, so it would never copy 255 non-nul chars, as fgets reads into the
orig buffer at most 254 non-nul chars and terminates it. But lets just
switch to strlcpy to keep the original intent and silence the gcc 8.2
warning.
This fixes this warning on an Alpine Linux Edge system with gcc 8.2:
In function 'cpu_model',
inlined from 'svg_cpu_box' at util/svghelper.c:378:2:
util/svghelper.c:337:5: error: 'strncpy' output may be truncated copying 255 bytes from a string of length 255 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
strncpy(cpu_m, &buf[13], 255);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Fixes: f48d55ce7871 ("perf: Add a SVG helper library file")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
tools/perf/util/svghelper.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/svghelper.c b/tools/perf/util/svghelper.c
index eec6c1149f44..132878d4847a 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/svghelper.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/svghelper.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static char *cpu_model(void)
if (file) {
while (fgets(buf, 255, file)) {
if (strstr(buf, "model name")) {
- strncpy(cpu_m, &buf[13], 255);
+ strlcpy(cpu_m, &buf[13], 255);
break;
}
}
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit edf5ff04a45750ac8ce2435974f001dc9cfbf055 upstream.
syzbot reports following splat:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
CPU: 1 PID: 9306 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
__msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313
strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline]
__tipc_nl_compat_link_set net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:708 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x929/0x1220 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:744
__tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
The uninitialised access happened in
nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, lc->name)
This is because lc->name string is not validated before it's used.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -723,9 +723,14 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_set(struc
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
struct tipc_media *media;
+ int len;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
media = tipc_media_find(lc->name);
if (media) {
cmd->doit = &tipc_nl_media_set;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 974cb0e3e7c963ced06c4e32c5b2884173fa5e01 upstream.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x4a8/0xba0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:826
CPU: 0 PID: 6290 Comm: syz-executor848 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917
__msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500
__arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
__fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x4a8/0xba0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:826
__tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x59e/0xdb0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:205
tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x63a/0x820 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:270
tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1151 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1402/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x440179
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffecec49318 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00
R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
We cannot take for granted the thing that the length of data contained
in TLV is longer than the size of struct tipc_name_table_query in
tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump().
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -785,6 +785,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dum
};
ntq = (struct tipc_name_table_query *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+ if (TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req) < sizeof(struct tipc_name_table_query))
+ return -EINVAL;
depth = ntohl(ntq->depth);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 721b1d98fb517ae99ab3b757021cf81db41e67be ]
kcopyd has no upper limit to the number of jobs one can allocate and
issue. Under certain workloads this can lead to excessive memory usage
and workqueue stalls. For example, when creating multiple dm-snapshot
targets with a 4K chunk size and then writing to the origin through the
page cache. Syncing the page cache causes a large number of BIOs to be
issued to the dm-snapshot origin target, which itself issues an even
larger (because of the BIO splitting taking place) number of kcopyd
jobs.
Running the following test, from the device mapper test suite [1],
dmtest run --suite snapshot -n many_snapshots_of_same_volume_N
, with 8 active snapshots, results in the kcopyd job slab cache growing
to 10G. Depending on the available system RAM this can lead to the OOM
killer killing user processes:
[463.492878] kthreadd invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x6040c0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP),
nodemask=(null), order=1, oom_score_adj=0
[463.492894] kthreadd cpuset=/ mems_allowed=0
[463.492948] CPU: 7 PID: 2 Comm: kthreadd Not tainted 4.19.0-rc7 #3
[463.492950] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
[463.492952] Call Trace:
[463.492964] dump_stack+0x7d/0xbb
[463.492973] dump_header+0x6b/0x2fc
[463.492987] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xee/0x190
[463.493012] oom_kill_process+0x302/0x370
[463.493021] out_of_memory+0x113/0x560
[463.493030] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xf40/0x1020
[463.493055] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x348/0x3c0
[463.493067] cache_grow_begin+0x81/0x8b0
[463.493072] ? cache_grow_begin+0x874/0x8b0
[463.493078] fallback_alloc+0x1e4/0x280
[463.493092] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xd6/0x370
[463.493098] ? copy_process.part.31+0x1c5/0x20d0
[463.493105] copy_process.part.31+0x1c5/0x20d0
[463.493115] ? __lock_acquire+0x3cc/0x1550
[463.493121] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[463.493129] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[463.493135] ? finish_task_switch+0x90/0x280
[463.493165] _do_fork+0xe0/0x6d0
[463.493191] ? kthreadd+0x19f/0x220
[463.493233] kernel_thread+0x25/0x30
[463.493235] kthreadd+0x1bf/0x220
[463.493242] ? kthread_create_on_cpu+0x90/0x90
[463.493248] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[463.493279] Mem-Info:
[463.493285] active_anon:20631 inactive_anon:4831 isolated_anon:0
[463.493285] active_file:80216 inactive_file:80107 isolated_file:435
[463.493285] unevictable:0 dirty:51266 writeback:109372 unstable:0
[463.493285] slab_reclaimable:31191 slab_unreclaimable:3483521
[463.493285] mapped:526 shmem:4903 pagetables:1759 bounce:0
[463.493285] free:33623 free_pcp:2392 free_cma:0
...
[463.493489] Unreclaimable slab info:
[463.493513] Name Used Total
[463.493522] bio-6 1028KB 1028KB
[463.493525] bio-5 1028KB 1028KB
[463.493528] dm_snap_pending_exception 236783KB 243789KB
[463.493531] dm_exception 41KB 42KB
[463.493534] bio-4 1216KB 1216KB
[463.493537] bio-3 439396KB 439396KB
[463.493539] kcopyd_job 6973427KB 6973427KB
...
[463.494340] Out of memory: Kill process 1298 (ruby2.3) score 1 or sacrifice child
[463.494673] Killed process 1298 (ruby2.3) total-vm:435740kB, anon-rss:20180kB, file-rss:4kB, shmem-rss:0kB
[463.506437] oom_reaper: reaped process 1298 (ruby2.3), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
Moreover, issuing a large number of kcopyd jobs results in kcopyd
hogging the CPU, while processing them. As a result, processing of work
items, queued for execution on the same CPU as the currently running
kcopyd thread, is stalled for long periods of time, hurting performance.
Running the aforementioned test we get, in dmesg, messages like the
following:
[67501.194592] BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 27s!
[67501.195586] Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
[67501.195591] workqueue events: flags=0x0
[67501.195597] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[67501.195611] pending: cache_reap
[67501.195641] workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
[67501.195645] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[67501.195656] pending: vmstat_update
[67501.195682] workqueue kblockd: flags=0x18
[67501.195687] pwq 5: cpus=2 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=-20 active=1/256
[67501.195698] pending: blk_timeout_work
[67501.195753] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[67501.195757] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[67501.195768] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[67501.195802] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[67501.195806] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[67501.195817] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[67501.195834] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[67501.195838] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[67501.195848] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[67501.195881] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[67501.195885] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[67501.195896] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[67501.195920] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[67501.195924] pwq 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=2/256
[67501.195935] in-flight: 67:do_work [dm_mod]
[67501.195945] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[67501.195961] pool 8: cpus=4 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 hung=27s workers=3 idle: 129 23765
The root cause for these issues is the way dm-snapshot uses kcopyd. In
particular, the lack of an explicit or implicit limit to the maximum
number of in-flight COW jobs. The merging path is not affected because
it implicitly limits the in-flight kcopyd jobs to one.
Fix these issues by using a semaphore to limit the maximum number of
in-flight kcopyd jobs. We grab the semaphore before allocating a new
kcopyd job in start_copy() and start_full_bio() and release it after the
job finishes in copy_callback().
The initial semaphore value is configurable through a module parameter,
to allow fine tuning the maximum number of in-flight COW jobs. Setting
this parameter to zero initializes the semaphore to INT_MAX.
A default value of 2048 maximum in-flight kcopyd jobs was chosen. This
value was decided experimentally as a trade-off between memory
consumption, stalling the kernel's workqueues and maintaining a high
enough throughput.
Re-running the aforementioned test:
* Workqueue stalls are eliminated
* kcopyd's job slab cache uses a maximum of 130MB
* The time taken by the test to write to the snapshot-origin target is
reduced from 05m20.48s to 03m26.38s
[1] https://github.com/jthornber/device-mapper-test-suite
Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Tsitsimpis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/dm-snap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-snap.c b/drivers/md/dm-snap.c
index e108deebbaaa..5d3797728b9c 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-snap.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-snap.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/log2.h>
#include <linux/dm-kcopyd.h>
+#include <linux/semaphore.h>
#include "dm.h"
@@ -105,6 +106,9 @@ struct dm_snapshot {
/* The on disk metadata handler */
struct dm_exception_store *store;
+ /* Maximum number of in-flight COW jobs. */
+ struct semaphore cow_count;
+
struct dm_kcopyd_client *kcopyd_client;
/* Wait for events based on state_bits */
@@ -145,6 +149,19 @@ struct dm_snapshot {
#define RUNNING_MERGE 0
#define SHUTDOWN_MERGE 1
+/*
+ * Maximum number of chunks being copied on write.
+ *
+ * The value was decided experimentally as a trade-off between memory
+ * consumption, stalling the kernel's workqueues and maintaining a high enough
+ * throughput.
+ */
+#define DEFAULT_COW_THRESHOLD 2048
+
+static int cow_threshold = DEFAULT_COW_THRESHOLD;
+module_param_named(snapshot_cow_threshold, cow_threshold, int, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snapshot_cow_threshold, "Maximum number of chunks being copied on write");
+
DECLARE_DM_KCOPYD_THROTTLE_WITH_MODULE_PARM(snapshot_copy_throttle,
"A percentage of time allocated for copy on write");
@@ -1190,6 +1207,8 @@ static int snapshot_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
goto bad_hash_tables;
}
+ sema_init(&s->cow_count, (cow_threshold > 0) ? cow_threshold : INT_MAX);
+
s->kcopyd_client = dm_kcopyd_client_create(&dm_kcopyd_throttle);
if (IS_ERR(s->kcopyd_client)) {
r = PTR_ERR(s->kcopyd_client);
@@ -1563,6 +1582,7 @@ static void copy_callback(int read_err, unsigned long write_err, void *context)
}
list_add(&pe->out_of_order_entry, lh);
}
+ up(&s->cow_count);
}
/*
@@ -1586,6 +1606,7 @@ static void start_copy(struct dm_snap_pending_exception *pe)
dest.count = src.count;
/* Hand over to kcopyd */
+ down(&s->cow_count);
dm_kcopyd_copy(s->kcopyd_client, &src, 1, &dest, 0, copy_callback, pe);
}
@@ -1606,6 +1627,7 @@ static void start_full_bio(struct dm_snap_pending_exception *pe,
pe->full_bio_end_io = bio->bi_end_io;
pe->full_bio_private = bio->bi_private;
+ down(&s->cow_count);
callback_data = dm_kcopyd_prepare_callback(s->kcopyd_client,
copy_callback, pe);
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
commit 628bd85947091830a8c4872adfd5ed1d515a9cf2 upstream.
Commit 0a42e99b58a20883 ("loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex") forgot to
remove mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex) from loop_control_ioctl() when
replacing loop_index_mutex with loop_ctl_mutex.
Fixes: 0a42e99b58a20883 ("loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -1936,12 +1936,10 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
break;
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
ret = -EBUSY;
- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 0) {
ret = -EBUSY;
- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harsh Jain <[email protected]>
commit a7773363624b034ab198c738661253d20a8055c2 upstream.
Authencesn template in decrypt path unconditionally calls aead_request_complete
after ahash_verify which leads to following kernel panic in after decryption.
[ 338.539800] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
[ 338.548372] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 338.551157] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 338.554919] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W I 4.19.7+ #13
[ 338.564431] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10
[ 338.572212] RIP: 0010:esp_input_done2+0x350/0x410 [esp4]
[ 338.578030] Code: ff 0f b6 68 10 48 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 e9 8e fe ff ff 8b 04 25 04 00 00 00 83 e8 01 48 98 48 8b 3c c5 10 00 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff <8b> 04 25 04 00 00 00 83 e8 01 48 98 4c 8b 24 c5 10 00 00 00 e9 3b
[ 338.598547] RSP: 0018:ffff911c97803c00 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 338.604268] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff911c4469ee00 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 338.612090] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000130 RDI: ffff911b87c20400
[ 338.619874] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff911b87c20498 R09: 000000000000000a
[ 338.627610] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 338.635402] R13: ffff911c89590000 R14: ffff911c91730000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 338.643234] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff911c97800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 338.652047] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 338.658299] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000001ec20a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 338.666382] Call Trace:
[ 338.669051] <IRQ>
[ 338.671254] esp_input_done+0x12/0x20 [esp4]
[ 338.675922] chcr_handle_resp+0x3b5/0x790 [chcr]
[ 338.680949] cpl_fw6_pld_handler+0x37/0x60 [chcr]
[ 338.686080] chcr_uld_rx_handler+0x22/0x50 [chcr]
[ 338.691233] uldrx_handler+0x8c/0xc0 [cxgb4]
[ 338.695923] process_responses+0x2f0/0x5d0 [cxgb4]
[ 338.701177] ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x3a/0x90
[ 338.706882] ? matrix_alloc_area.constprop.7+0x60/0x90
[ 338.712517] ? apic_update_irq_cfg+0x82/0xf0
[ 338.717177] napi_rx_handler+0x14/0xe0 [cxgb4]
[ 338.722015] net_rx_action+0x2aa/0x3e0
[ 338.726136] __do_softirq+0xcb/0x280
[ 338.730054] irq_exit+0xde/0xf0
[ 338.733504] do_IRQ+0x54/0xd0
[ 338.736745] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
Fixes: 104880a6b470 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD...")
Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/authencesn.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypto/authencesn.c
+++ b/crypto/authencesn.c
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static void authenc_esn_verify_ahash_don
struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
err = err ?: crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt_tail(req, 0);
- aead_request_complete(req, err);
+ authenc_esn_request_complete(req, err);
}
static int crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
commit 7b38460dc8e4eafba06c78f8e37099d3b34d473c upstream.
Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr
fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and
then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having
not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag. This fails because the attr is no
longer present, causing a fs shutdown.
This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really
shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c
@@ -528,7 +528,14 @@ xfs_attr_shortform_addname(xfs_da_args_t
if (args->flags & ATTR_CREATE)
return retval;
retval = xfs_attr_shortform_remove(args);
- ASSERT(retval == 0);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+ /*
+ * Since we have removed the old attr, clear ATTR_REPLACE so
+ * that the leaf format add routine won't trip over the attr
+ * not being around.
+ */
+ args->flags &= ~ATTR_REPLACE;
}
if (args->namelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX ||
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit c7a082e4242fd8cd21a441071e622f87c16bdacc ]
UBSAN reported those with MegaRAID SAS-3 3108,
[ 77.467308] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c:117:32
[ 77.475402] index 255 is out of range for type 'MR_LD_SPAN_MAP [1]'
[ 77.481677] CPU: 16 PID: 333 Comm: kworker/16:1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc5+ #1
[ 77.488556] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.50 06/01/2018
[ 77.495791] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[ 77.500154] Call trace:
[ 77.502610] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2c8
[ 77.506279] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 77.509604] dump_stack+0x118/0x19c
[ 77.513098] ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x60
[ 77.516765] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xfc/0x13c
[ 77.521767] mr_update_load_balance_params+0x150/0x158 [megaraid_sas]
[ 77.528230] MR_ValidateMapInfo+0x2cc/0x10d0 [megaraid_sas]
[ 77.533825] megasas_get_map_info+0x244/0x2f0 [megaraid_sas]
[ 77.539505] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x9b0/0xf48 [megaraid_sas]
[ 77.545794] megasas_init_fw+0x1ab4/0x3518 [megaraid_sas]
[ 77.551212] megasas_probe_one+0x2c4/0xbe0 [megaraid_sas]
[ 77.556614] local_pci_probe+0x7c/0xf0
[ 77.560365] work_for_cpu_fn+0x34/0x50
[ 77.564118] process_one_work+0x61c/0xf08
[ 77.568129] worker_thread+0x534/0xa70
[ 77.571882] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0
[ 77.575114] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c
[ 89.240332] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c:117:32
[ 89.248426] index 255 is out of range for type 'MR_LD_SPAN_MAP [1]'
[ 89.254700] CPU: 16 PID: 95 Comm: kworker/u130:0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc5+ #1
[ 89.261665] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.50 06/01/2018
[ 89.268903] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
[ 89.274222] Call trace:
[ 89.276680] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2c8
[ 89.280348] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 89.283671] dump_stack+0x118/0x19c
[ 89.287167] ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x60
[ 89.290835] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xfc/0x13c
[ 89.295828] MR_LdRaidGet+0x50/0x58 [megaraid_sas]
[ 89.300638] megasas_build_io_fusion+0xbb8/0xd90 [megaraid_sas]
[ 89.306576] megasas_build_and_issue_cmd_fusion+0x138/0x460 [megaraid_sas]
[ 89.313468] megasas_queue_command+0x398/0x3d0 [megaraid_sas]
[ 89.319222] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x1dc/0x8a8
[ 89.323321] scsi_request_fn+0x8e8/0xdd0
[ 89.327249] __blk_run_queue+0xc4/0x158
[ 89.331090] blk_execute_rq_nowait+0xf4/0x158
[ 89.335449] blk_execute_rq+0xdc/0x158
[ 89.339202] __scsi_execute+0x130/0x258
[ 89.343041] scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x2fc/0x1488
[ 89.347661] __scsi_scan_target+0x1cc/0x8c8
[ 89.351848] scsi_scan_channel.part.3+0x8c/0xc0
[ 89.356382] scsi_scan_host_selected+0x130/0x1f0
[ 89.361002] do_scsi_scan_host+0xd8/0xf0
[ 89.364927] do_scan_async+0x9c/0x320
[ 89.368594] async_run_entry_fn+0x138/0x420
[ 89.372780] process_one_work+0x61c/0xf08
[ 89.376793] worker_thread+0x13c/0xa70
[ 89.380546] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0
[ 89.383778] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c
This is because when populating Driver Map using firmware raid map, all
non-existing VDs set their ldTgtIdToLd to 0xff, so it can be skipped later.
>From drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c ,
memset(instance->ld_ids, 0xff, MEGASAS_MAX_LD_IDS);
>From drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c ,
/* For non existing VDs, iterate to next VD*/
if (ld >= (MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT - 1))
continue;
However, there are a few places that failed to skip those non-existing VDs
due to off-by-one errors. Then, those 0xff leaked into MR_LdRaidGet(0xff,
map) and triggered the out-of-bound accesses.
Fixes: 51087a8617fe ("megaraid_sas : Extended VD support")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c
index 741509b35617..14f32c114c55 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ void mr_update_load_balance_params(struct MR_DRV_RAID_MAP_ALL *drv_map,
for (ldCount = 0; ldCount < MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT; ldCount++) {
ld = MR_TargetIdToLdGet(ldCount, drv_map);
- if (ld >= MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT) {
+ if (ld >= MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT - 1) {
lbInfo[ldCount].loadBalanceFlag = 0;
continue;
}
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c
index 213944ed64d9..3d3bfa814093 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c
@@ -1758,7 +1758,7 @@ static void megasas_build_ld_nonrw_fusion(struct megasas_instance *instance,
device_id < instance->fw_supported_vd_count)) {
ld = MR_TargetIdToLdGet(device_id, local_map_ptr);
- if (ld >= instance->fw_supported_vd_count)
+ if (ld >= instance->fw_supported_vd_count - 1)
fp_possible = 0;
raid = MR_LdRaidGet(ld, local_map_ptr);
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: JianJhen Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4c84edc11b76590859b1e45dd676074c59602dc4 ]
When handling DNAT'ed packets on a bridge device, the neighbour cache entry
from lookup was used without checking its state. It means that a cache entry
in the NUD_STALE state will be used directly instead of entering the NUD_DELAY
state to confirm the reachability of the neighbor.
This problem becomes worse after commit 2724680bceee ("neigh: Keep neighbour
cache entries if number of them is small enough."), since all neighbour cache
entries in the NUD_STALE state will be kept in the neighbour table as long as
the number of cache entries does not exceed the value specified in gc_thresh1.
This commit validates the state of a neighbour cache entry before using
the entry.
Signed-off-by: JianJhen Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: JinLin Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ int br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge(stru
struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = nf_bridge_info_get(skb);
int ret;
- if (neigh->hh.hh_len) {
+ if ((neigh->nud_state & NUD_CONNECTED) && neigh->hh.hh_len) {
neigh_hh_bridge(&neigh->hh, skb);
skb->dev = nf_bridge->physindev;
ret = br_handle_frame_finish(net, sk, skb);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 7c90584c66cc4b033a3b684b0e0950f79e7b7166 upstream.
As measured in my prior patch ("sch_netem: faster rb tree removal"),
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe() is nice looking but much slower
than using rb_next() directly, except when tree is small enough
to fit in CPU caches (then the cost is the same)
Also note that there is not even an increase of text size :
$ size net/core/skbuff.o.before net/core/skbuff.o
text data bss dec hex filename
40711 1298 0 42009 a419 net/core/skbuff.o.before
40711 1298 0 42009 a419 net/core/skbuff.o
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/core/skbuff.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -2388,12 +2388,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_queue_purge);
*/
void skb_rbtree_purge(struct rb_root *root)
{
- struct sk_buff *skb, *next;
+ struct rb_node *p = rb_first(root);
- rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(skb, next, root, rbnode)
- kfree_skb(skb);
+ while (p) {
+ struct sk_buff *skb = rb_entry(p, struct sk_buff, rbnode);
- *root = RB_ROOT;
+ p = rb_next(p);
+ rb_erase(&skb->rbnode, root);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
}
/**
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit a788c5272769ddbcdbab297cf386413eeac04463 ]
jffs2_sync_fs makes the assumption that if CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_WRITEBUFFER
is defined then a write buffer is available and has been initialized.
However, this does is not the case when the mtd device has no
out-of-band buffer:
int jffs2_nand_flash_setup(struct jffs2_sb_info *c)
{
if (!c->mtd->oobsize)
return 0;
...
The resulting call to cancel_delayed_work_sync passing a uninitialized
(but zeroed) delayed_work struct forces lockdep to become disabled.
[ 90.050639] overlayfs: upper fs does not support tmpfile.
[ 90.652264] INFO: trying to register non-static key.
[ 90.662171] the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
[ 90.673090] turning off the locking correctness validator.
[ 90.684021] CPU: 0 PID: 1762 Comm: mount_root Not tainted 4.14.63 #0
[ 90.696672] Stack : 00000000 00000000 80d8f6a2 00000038 805f0000 80444600 8fe364f4 805dfbe7
[ 90.713349] 80563a30 000006e2 8068370c 00000001 00000000 00000001 8e2fdc48 ffffffff
[ 90.730020] 00000000 00000000 80d90000 00000000 00000106 00000000 6465746e 312e3420
[ 90.746690] 6b636f6c 03bf0000 f8000000 20676e69 00000000 80000000 00000000 8e2c2a90
[ 90.763362] 80d90000 00000001 00000000 8e2c2a90 00000003 80260dc0 08052098 80680000
[ 90.780033] ...
[ 90.784902] Call Trace:
[ 90.789793] [<8000f0d8>] show_stack+0xb8/0x148
[ 90.798659] [<8005a000>] register_lock_class+0x270/0x55c
[ 90.809247] [<8005cb64>] __lock_acquire+0x13c/0xf7c
[ 90.818964] [<8005e314>] lock_acquire+0x194/0x1dc
[ 90.828345] [<8003f27c>] flush_work+0x200/0x24c
[ 90.837374] [<80041dfc>] __cancel_work_timer+0x158/0x210
[ 90.847958] [<801a8770>] jffs2_sync_fs+0x20/0x54
[ 90.857173] [<80125cf4>] iterate_supers+0xf4/0x120
[ 90.866729] [<80158fc4>] sys_sync+0x44/0x9c
[ 90.875067] [<80014424>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58
Signed-off-by: Daniel Santos <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
fs/jffs2/super.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/super.c b/fs/jffs2/super.c
index 1544f530ccd0..023e7f32ee1b 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/super.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/super.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ static int jffs2_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
struct jffs2_sb_info *c = JFFS2_SB_INFO(sb);
#ifdef CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_WRITEBUFFER
- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&c->wbuf_dwork);
+ if (jffs2_is_writebuffered(c))
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&c->wbuf_dwork);
#endif
mutex_lock(&c->alloc_sem);
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit f7542d817733f461258fd3a47d77da35b2d9fc81 ]
The exclusive gates may be set up in the wrong way by software running
before the clock driver comes up. In that case the exclusive setup is
locked in its initial state, as the complementary function can't be
activated without disabling the initial setup first.
To avoid this lock situation, reset the exclusive gates to the off
state and allow the kernel to provide the proper setup.
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dong Aisheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx6q.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx6q.c b/drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx6q.c
index a0df83e6b84b..46c05c9a9354 100644
--- a/drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx6q.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx6q.c
@@ -239,8 +239,12 @@ static void __init imx6q_clocks_init(struct device_node *ccm_node)
* lvds1_gate and lvds2_gate are pseudo-gates. Both can be
* independently configured as clock inputs or outputs. We treat
* the "output_enable" bit as a gate, even though it's really just
- * enabling clock output.
+ * enabling clock output. Initially the gate bits are cleared, as
+ * otherwise the exclusive configuration gets locked in the setup done
+ * by software running before the clock driver, with no way to change
+ * it.
*/
+ writel(readl(base + 0x160) & ~0x3c00, base + 0x160);
clk[IMX6QDL_CLK_LVDS1_GATE] = imx_clk_gate_exclusive("lvds1_gate", "lvds1_sel", base + 0x160, 10, BIT(12));
clk[IMX6QDL_CLK_LVDS2_GATE] = imx_clk_gate_exclusive("lvds2_gate", "lvds2_sel", base + 0x160, 11, BIT(13));
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit d7e6b8dfc7bcb3f4f3a18313581f67486a725b52 ]
When using kcopyd to run callbacks through dm_kcopyd_do_callback() or
submitting copy jobs with a source size of 0, the jobs are pushed
directly to the complete_jobs list, which could be under processing by
the kcopyd thread. As a result, the kcopyd thread can continue running
completed jobs indefinitely, without releasing the CPU, as long as
someone keeps submitting new completed jobs through the aforementioned
paths. Processing of work items, queued for execution on the same CPU as
the currently running kcopyd thread, is thus stalled for excessive
amounts of time, hurting performance.
Running the following test, from the device mapper test suite [1],
dmtest run --suite snapshot -n parallel_io_to_many_snaps_N
, with 8 active snapshots, we get, in dmesg, messages like the
following:
[68899.948523] BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 95s!
[68899.949282] Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
[68899.949288] workqueue events: flags=0x0
[68899.949295] pwq 0: cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=2/256
[68899.949306] pending: vmstat_shepherd, cache_reap
[68899.949331] workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
[68899.949337] pwq 0: cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[68899.949345] pending: vmstat_update
[68899.949387] workqueue dm_bufio_cache: flags=0x8
[68899.949392] pwq 4: cpus=2 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[68899.949400] pending: work_fn [dm_bufio]
[68899.949423] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[68899.949429] pwq 0: cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[68899.949437] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[68899.949452] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[68899.949458] pwq 0: cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=2/256
[68899.949466] in-flight: 13:do_work [dm_mod]
[68899.949474] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[68899.949487] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[68899.949493] pwq 0: cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[68899.949501] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[68899.949515] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[68899.949521] pwq 0: cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[68899.949529] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[68899.949541] workqueue kcopyd: flags=0x8
[68899.949547] pwq 0: cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256
[68899.949555] pending: do_work [dm_mod]
[68899.949568] pool 0: cpus=0 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 hung=95s workers=4 idle: 27130 27223 1084
Fix this by splitting the complete_jobs list into two parts: A user
facing part, named callback_jobs, and one used internally by kcopyd,
retaining the name complete_jobs. dm_kcopyd_do_callback() and
dispatch_job() now push their jobs to the callback_jobs list, which is
spliced to the complete_jobs list once, every time the kcopyd thread
wakes up. This prevents kcopyd from hogging the CPU indefinitely and
causing workqueue stalls.
Re-running the aforementioned test:
* Workqueue stalls are eliminated
* The maximum writing time among all targets is reduced from 09m37.10s
to 06m04.85s and the total run time of the test is reduced from
10m43.591s to 7m19.199s
[1] https://github.com/jthornber/device-mapper-test-suite
Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Tsitsimpis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/dm-kcopyd.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-kcopyd.c b/drivers/md/dm-kcopyd.c
index 54c308e6704f..04248394843e 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-kcopyd.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-kcopyd.c
@@ -55,15 +55,17 @@ struct dm_kcopyd_client {
struct dm_kcopyd_throttle *throttle;
/*
- * We maintain three lists of jobs:
+ * We maintain four lists of jobs:
*
* i) jobs waiting for pages
* ii) jobs that have pages, and are waiting for the io to be issued.
- * iii) jobs that have completed.
+ * iii) jobs that don't need to do any IO and just run a callback
+ * iv) jobs that have completed.
*
- * All three of these are protected by job_lock.
+ * All four of these are protected by job_lock.
*/
spinlock_t job_lock;
+ struct list_head callback_jobs;
struct list_head complete_jobs;
struct list_head io_jobs;
struct list_head pages_jobs;
@@ -583,6 +585,7 @@ static void do_work(struct work_struct *work)
struct dm_kcopyd_client *kc = container_of(work,
struct dm_kcopyd_client, kcopyd_work);
struct blk_plug plug;
+ unsigned long flags;
/*
* The order that these are called is *very* important.
@@ -591,6 +594,10 @@ static void do_work(struct work_struct *work)
* list. io jobs call wake when they complete and it all
* starts again.
*/
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&kc->job_lock, flags);
+ list_splice_tail_init(&kc->callback_jobs, &kc->complete_jobs);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kc->job_lock, flags);
+
blk_start_plug(&plug);
process_jobs(&kc->complete_jobs, kc, run_complete_job);
process_jobs(&kc->pages_jobs, kc, run_pages_job);
@@ -608,7 +615,7 @@ static void dispatch_job(struct kcopyd_job *job)
struct dm_kcopyd_client *kc = job->kc;
atomic_inc(&kc->nr_jobs);
if (unlikely(!job->source.count))
- push(&kc->complete_jobs, job);
+ push(&kc->callback_jobs, job);
else if (job->pages == &zero_page_list)
push(&kc->io_jobs, job);
else
@@ -795,7 +802,7 @@ void dm_kcopyd_do_callback(void *j, int read_err, unsigned long write_err)
job->read_err = read_err;
job->write_err = write_err;
- push(&kc->complete_jobs, job);
+ push(&kc->callback_jobs, job);
wake(kc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(dm_kcopyd_do_callback);
@@ -825,6 +832,7 @@ struct dm_kcopyd_client *dm_kcopyd_client_create(struct dm_kcopyd_throttle *thro
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
spin_lock_init(&kc->job_lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kc->callback_jobs);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kc->complete_jobs);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kc->io_jobs);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kc->pages_jobs);
@@ -874,6 +882,7 @@ void dm_kcopyd_client_destroy(struct dm_kcopyd_client *kc)
/* Wait for completion of all jobs submitted by this client. */
wait_event(kc->destroyq, !atomic_read(&kc->nr_jobs));
+ BUG_ON(!list_empty(&kc->callback_jobs));
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&kc->complete_jobs));
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&kc->io_jobs));
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&kc->pages_jobs));
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 644b2e97405b0b74845e1d3c2b4fe4c34858062b ]
This commit fixes hard-coded model-id for an unit of Apogee Ensemble with
a correct value. This unit uses DM1500 ASIC produced ArchWave AG (formerly
known as BridgeCo AG).
I note that this model supports three modes in the number of data channels
in tx/rx streams; 8 ch pairs, 10 ch pairs, 18 ch pairs. The mode is
switched by Vendor-dependent AV/C command, like:
$ cd linux-firewire-utils
$ ./firewire-request /dev/fw1 fcp 0x00ff000003dbeb0600000000 (8ch pairs)
$ ./firewire-request /dev/fw1 fcp 0x00ff000003dbeb0601000000 (10ch pairs)
$ ./firewire-request /dev/fw1 fcp 0x00ff000003dbeb0602000000 (18ch pairs)
When switching between different mode, the unit disappears from IEEE 1394
bus, then appears on the bus with different combination of stream formats.
In a mode of 18 ch pairs, available sampling rate is up to 96.0 kHz, else
up to 192.0 kHz.
$ ./hinawa-config-rom-printer /dev/fw1
{ 'bus-info': { 'adj': False,
'bmc': True,
'chip_ID': 21474898341,
'cmc': True,
'cyc_clk_acc': 100,
'generation': 2,
'imc': True,
'isc': True,
'link_spd': 2,
'max_ROM': 1,
'max_rec': 512,
'name': '1394',
'node_vendor_ID': 987,
'pmc': False},
'root-directory': [ ['HARDWARE_VERSION', 19],
[ 'NODE_CAPABILITIES',
{ 'addressing': {'64': True, 'fix': True, 'prv': False},
'misc': {'int': False, 'ms': False, 'spt': True},
'state': { 'atn': False,
'ded': False,
'drq': True,
'elo': False,
'init': False,
'lst': True,
'off': False},
'testing': {'bas': False, 'ext': False}}],
['VENDOR', 987],
['DESCRIPTOR', 'Apogee Electronics'],
['MODEL', 126702],
['DESCRIPTOR', 'Ensemble'],
['VERSION', 5297],
[ 'UNIT',
[ ['SPECIFIER_ID', 41005],
['VERSION', 65537],
['MODEL', 126702],
['DESCRIPTOR', 'Ensemble']]],
[ 'DEPENDENT_INFO',
[ ['SPECIFIER_ID', 2037],
['VERSION', 1],
[(58, 'IMMEDIATE'), 16777159],
[(59, 'IMMEDIATE'), 1048576],
[(60, 'IMMEDIATE'), 16777159],
[(61, 'IMMEDIATE'), 6291456]]]]}
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
sound/firewire/bebob/bebob.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob.c b/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob.c
index 091290d1f3ea..1898fa4228ad 100644
--- a/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob.c
+++ b/sound/firewire/bebob/bebob.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static const struct ieee1394_device_id bebob_id_table[] = {
/* Apogee Electronics, DA/AD/DD-16X (X-FireWire card) */
SND_BEBOB_DEV_ENTRY(VEN_APOGEE, 0x00010048, &spec_normal),
/* Apogee Electronics, Ensemble */
- SND_BEBOB_DEV_ENTRY(VEN_APOGEE, 0x00001eee, &spec_normal),
+ SND_BEBOB_DEV_ENTRY(VEN_APOGEE, 0x01eeee, &spec_normal),
/* ESI, Quatafire610 */
SND_BEBOB_DEV_ENTRY(VEN_ESI, 0x00010064, &spec_normal),
/* AcousticReality, eARMasterOne */
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 0de263577de5d5e052be5f4f93334e63cc8a7f0b ]
spc5r17.pdf specifies:
4.3.1 ASCII data field requirements
ASCII data fields shall contain only ASCII printable characters (i.e.,
code values 20h to 7Eh) and may be terminated with one or more ASCII null
(00h) characters. ASCII data fields described as being left-aligned
shall have any unused bytes at the end of the field (i.e., highest
offset) and the unused bytes shall be filled with ASCII space characters
(20h).
LIO currently space-pads the T10 VENDOR IDENTIFICATION and PRODUCT
IDENTIFICATION fields in the standard INQUIRY data. However, the PRODUCT
REVISION LEVEL field in the standard INQUIRY data as well as the T10 VENDOR
IDENTIFICATION field in the INQUIRY Device Identification VPD Page are
zero-terminated/zero-padded.
Fix this inconsistency by using space-padding for all of the above fields.
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bryant G. Ly <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roman Bolshakov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/target_core_spc.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_spc.c b/drivers/target/target_core_spc.c
index 9413e1a949e5..5af4d6a03d6e 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_spc.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_spc.c
@@ -108,12 +108,17 @@ spc_emulate_inquiry_std(struct se_cmd *cmd, unsigned char *buf)
buf[7] = 0x2; /* CmdQue=1 */
- memcpy(&buf[8], "LIO-ORG ", 8);
- memset(&buf[16], 0x20, 16);
+ /*
+ * ASCII data fields described as being left-aligned shall have any
+ * unused bytes at the end of the field (i.e., highest offset) and the
+ * unused bytes shall be filled with ASCII space characters (20h).
+ */
+ memset(&buf[8], 0x20, 8 + 16 + 4);
+ memcpy(&buf[8], "LIO-ORG", sizeof("LIO-ORG") - 1);
memcpy(&buf[16], dev->t10_wwn.model,
- min_t(size_t, strlen(dev->t10_wwn.model), 16));
+ strnlen(dev->t10_wwn.model, 16));
memcpy(&buf[32], dev->t10_wwn.revision,
- min_t(size_t, strlen(dev->t10_wwn.revision), 4));
+ strnlen(dev->t10_wwn.revision, 4));
buf[4] = 31; /* Set additional length to 31 */
return 0;
@@ -251,7 +256,9 @@ check_t10_vend_desc:
buf[off] = 0x2; /* ASCII */
buf[off+1] = 0x1; /* T10 Vendor ID */
buf[off+2] = 0x0;
- memcpy(&buf[off+4], "LIO-ORG", 8);
+ /* left align Vendor ID and pad with spaces */
+ memset(&buf[off+4], 0x20, 8);
+ memcpy(&buf[off+4], "LIO-ORG", sizeof("LIO-ORG") - 1);
/* Extra Byte for NULL Terminator */
id_len++;
/* Identifier Length */
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit b2e9a4eda11fd2cb1e6714e9ad3f455c402568ff ]
Clang warns:
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c:999:45: warning: implicit
conversion from 'int' to 'char' changes value from 159 to -97
[-Wconstant-conversion]
app_info[0] = (EN50221_TAG_APP_INFO >> 16) & 0xff;
~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c:1000:45: warning: implicit
conversion from 'int' to 'char' changes value from 128 to -128
[-Wconstant-conversion]
app_info[1] = (EN50221_TAG_APP_INFO >> 8) & 0xff;
~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c:1040:44: warning: implicit
conversion from 'int' to 'char' changes value from 159 to -97
[-Wconstant-conversion]
app_info[0] = (EN50221_TAG_CA_INFO >> 16) & 0xff;
~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c:1041:44: warning: implicit
conversion from 'int' to 'char' changes value from 128 to -128
[-Wconstant-conversion]
app_info[1] = (EN50221_TAG_CA_INFO >> 8) & 0xff;
~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
4 warnings generated.
Change app_info's type to unsigned char to match the type of the
member msg in struct ca_msg, which is the only thing passed into the
app_info parameter in this function.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/105
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c | 6 ++++--
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv.h | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c b/drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c
index 251a556112a9..280b5ffea592 100644
--- a/drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c
+++ b/drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-avc.c
@@ -968,7 +968,8 @@ static int get_ca_object_length(struct avc_response_frame *r)
return r->operand[7];
}
-int avc_ca_app_info(struct firedtv *fdtv, char *app_info, unsigned int *len)
+int avc_ca_app_info(struct firedtv *fdtv, unsigned char *app_info,
+ unsigned int *len)
{
struct avc_command_frame *c = (void *)fdtv->avc_data;
struct avc_response_frame *r = (void *)fdtv->avc_data;
@@ -1009,7 +1010,8 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-int avc_ca_info(struct firedtv *fdtv, char *app_info, unsigned int *len)
+int avc_ca_info(struct firedtv *fdtv, unsigned char *app_info,
+ unsigned int *len)
{
struct avc_command_frame *c = (void *)fdtv->avc_data;
struct avc_response_frame *r = (void *)fdtv->avc_data;
diff --git a/drivers/media/firewire/firedtv.h b/drivers/media/firewire/firedtv.h
index 345d1eda8c05..5b18a08c6285 100644
--- a/drivers/media/firewire/firedtv.h
+++ b/drivers/media/firewire/firedtv.h
@@ -124,8 +124,10 @@ int avc_lnb_control(struct firedtv *fdtv, char voltage, char burst,
struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *diseqcmd);
void avc_remote_ctrl_work(struct work_struct *work);
int avc_register_remote_control(struct firedtv *fdtv);
-int avc_ca_app_info(struct firedtv *fdtv, char *app_info, unsigned int *len);
-int avc_ca_info(struct firedtv *fdtv, char *app_info, unsigned int *len);
+int avc_ca_app_info(struct firedtv *fdtv, unsigned char *app_info,
+ unsigned int *len);
+int avc_ca_info(struct firedtv *fdtv, unsigned char *app_info,
+ unsigned int *len);
int avc_ca_reset(struct firedtv *fdtv);
int avc_ca_pmt(struct firedtv *fdtv, char *app_info, int length);
int avc_ca_get_time_date(struct firedtv *fdtv, int *interval);
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 532e1e54c8140188e192348c790317921cb2dc1c ]
mount.ocfs2 ignore the inconsistent error that journal is clean but
local alloc is unrecovered. After mount, local alloc not empty, then
reserver cluster didn't alloc a new local alloc window, reserveration
map is empty(ocfs2_reservation_map.m_bitmap_len = 0), that triggered the
following panic.
This issue was reported at
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2015-May/010854.html
and was advised to fixed during mount. But this is a very unusual
inconsistent state, usually journal dirty flag should be cleared at the
last stage of umount until every other things go right. We may need do
further debug to check that. Any way to avoid possible futher
corruption, mount should be abort and fsck should be run.
(mount.ocfs2,1765,1):ocfs2_load_local_alloc:353 ERROR: Local alloc hasn't been recovered!
found = 6518, set = 6518, taken = 8192, off = 15912372
ocfs2: Mounting device (202,64) on (node 0, slot 3) with ordered data mode.
o2dlm: Joining domain 89CEAC63CC4F4D03AC185B44E0EE0F3F ( 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 ) 8 nodes
ocfs2: Mounting device (202,80) on (node 0, slot 3) with ordered data mode.
o2hb: Region 89CEAC63CC4F4D03AC185B44E0EE0F3F (xvdf) is now a quorum device
o2net: Accepted connection from node yvwsoa17p (num 7) at 172.22.77.88:7777
o2dlm: Node 7 joins domain 64FE421C8C984E6D96ED12C55FEE2435 ( 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ) 9 nodes
o2dlm: Node 7 joins domain 89CEAC63CC4F4D03AC185B44E0EE0F3F ( 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ) 9 nodes
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/reservations.c:507!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ocfs2 rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfs fscache lockd grace ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter ip_tables ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 ovmapi ppdev parport_pc parport xen_netfront fb_sys_fops sysimgblt sysfillrect syscopyarea acpi_cpufreq pcspkr i2c_piix4 i2c_core sg ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom xen_blkfront pata_acpi ata_generic ata_piix floppy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 0 PID: 4349 Comm: startWebLogic.s Not tainted 4.1.12-124.19.2.el6uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.4.4OVM 09/06/2018
task: ffff8803fb04e200 ti: ffff8800ea4d8000 task.ti: ffff8800ea4d8000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05e96a8>] [<ffffffffa05e96a8>] __ocfs2_resv_find_window+0x498/0x760 [ocfs2]
Call Trace:
ocfs2_resmap_resv_bits+0x10d/0x400 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_claim_local_alloc_bits+0xd0/0x640 [ocfs2]
__ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x178/0x360 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_convert_inline_data_to_extents+0x634/0xa60 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x1c6/0x1da0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_write_begin+0x13e/0x230 [ocfs2]
generic_perform_write+0xbf/0x1c0
__generic_file_write_iter+0x19c/0x1d0
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x589/0x1360 [ocfs2]
__vfs_write+0xb8/0x110
vfs_write+0xa9/0x1b0
SyS_write+0x46/0xb0
system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7
Code: ff ff 8b 75 b8 39 75 b0 8b 45 c8 89 45 98 0f 84 e5 fe ff ff 45 8b 74 24 18 41 8b 54 24 1c e9 56 fc ff ff 85 c0 0f 85 48 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 05 cf c3 de ff 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 48 85
RIP __ocfs2_resv_find_window+0x498/0x760 [ocfs2]
RSP <ffff8800ea4db668>
---[ end trace 566f07529f2edf3c ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yiwen Jiang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c b/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c
index 0a4457fb0711..85111d740c9d 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c
@@ -345,13 +345,18 @@ int ocfs2_load_local_alloc(struct ocfs2_super *osb)
if (num_used
|| alloc->id1.bitmap1.i_used
|| alloc->id1.bitmap1.i_total
- || la->la_bm_off)
- mlog(ML_ERROR, "Local alloc hasn't been recovered!\n"
+ || la->la_bm_off) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "inconsistent detected, clean journal with"
+ " unrecovered local alloc, please run fsck.ocfs2!\n"
"found = %u, set = %u, taken = %u, off = %u\n",
num_used, le32_to_cpu(alloc->id1.bitmap1.i_used),
le32_to_cpu(alloc->id1.bitmap1.i_total),
OCFS2_LOCAL_ALLOC(alloc)->la_bm_off);
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ goto bail;
+ }
+
osb->local_alloc_bh = alloc_bh;
osb->local_alloc_state = OCFS2_LA_ENABLED;
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
commit 7d6380cd40f7993f75c4bde5b36f6019237e8719 upstream.
The block number was not being compared right, it was off by one
when checking the response.
Some statistics wouldn't be incremented properly in some cases.
Check to see if that middle-part messages always have 31 bytes of
data.
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.4
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
@@ -637,8 +637,9 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif
/* Remove the multi-part read marker. */
len -= 2;
+ data += 2;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- ssif_info->data[i] = data[i+2];
+ ssif_info->data[i] = data[i];
ssif_info->multi_len = len;
ssif_info->multi_pos = 1;
@@ -666,8 +667,19 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif
}
blocknum = data[0];
+ len--;
+ data++;
+
+ if (blocknum != 0xff && len != 31) {
+ /* All blocks but the last must have 31 data bytes. */
+ result = -EIO;
+ if (ssif_info->ssif_debug & SSIF_DEBUG_MSG)
+ pr_info("Received middle message <31\n");
- if (ssif_info->multi_len + len - 1 > IPMI_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
+ goto continue_op;
+ }
+
+ if (ssif_info->multi_len + len > IPMI_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
/* Received message too big, abort the operation. */
result = -E2BIG;
if (ssif_info->ssif_debug & SSIF_DEBUG_MSG)
@@ -676,16 +688,14 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif
goto continue_op;
}
- /* Remove the blocknum from the data. */
- len--;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- ssif_info->data[i + ssif_info->multi_len] = data[i + 1];
+ ssif_info->data[i + ssif_info->multi_len] = data[i];
ssif_info->multi_len += len;
if (blocknum == 0xff) {
/* End of read */
len = ssif_info->multi_len;
data = ssif_info->data;
- } else if (blocknum + 1 != ssif_info->multi_pos) {
+ } else if (blocknum != ssif_info->multi_pos) {
/*
* Out of sequence block, just abort. Block
* numbers start at zero for the second block,
@@ -713,6 +723,7 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif
}
}
+ continue_op:
if (result < 0) {
ssif_inc_stat(ssif_info, receive_errors);
} else {
@@ -720,8 +731,6 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif
ssif_inc_stat(ssif_info, received_message_parts);
}
-
- continue_op:
if (ssif_info->ssif_debug & SSIF_DEBUG_STATE)
pr_info(PFX "DONE 1: state = %d, result=%d.\n",
ssif_info->ssif_state, result);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 347a28b586802d09604a149c1a1f6de5dccbe6fa ]
This happened while running in qemu-system-aarch64, the AMBA PL011 UART
driver when enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.
arch_initcall(pl011_init) came before subsys_initcall(default_bdi_init),
devtmpfs' handle_remove() crashes because the reference count is a NULL
pointer only because wb->bdi hasn't been initialized yet.
Rework so that wb_put have an extra check if wb->bdi before decrement
wb->refcnt and also add a WARN_ON_ONCE to get a warning if it happens again
in other drivers.
Fixes: 52ebea749aae ("writeback: make backing_dev_info host cgroup-specific bdi_writebacks")
Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h b/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h
index a307c37c2e6c..072501a0ac86 100644
--- a/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h
@@ -225,6 +225,14 @@ static inline void wb_get(struct bdi_writeback *wb)
*/
static inline void wb_put(struct bdi_writeback *wb)
{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!wb->bdi)) {
+ /*
+ * A driver bug might cause a file to be removed before bdi was
+ * initialized.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
if (wb != &wb->bdi->wb)
percpu_ref_put(&wb->refcnt);
}
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 2b038cbc5fcf12a7ee1cc9bfd5da1e46dacdee87 ]
When booting a pseries kernel with PREEMPT enabled, it dumps the
following warning:
BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: swapper/0/1
caller is pseries_processor_idle_init+0x5c/0x22c
CPU: 13 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc3-00090-g12201a0128bc-dirty #828
Call Trace:
[c000000429437ab0] [c0000000009c8878] dump_stack+0xec/0x164 (unreliable)
[c000000429437b00] [c0000000005f2f24] check_preemption_disabled+0x154/0x160
[c000000429437b90] [c000000000cab8e8] pseries_processor_idle_init+0x5c/0x22c
[c000000429437c10] [c000000000010ed4] do_one_initcall+0x64/0x300
[c000000429437ce0] [c000000000c54500] kernel_init_freeable+0x3f0/0x500
[c000000429437db0] [c0000000000112dc] kernel_init+0x2c/0x160
[c000000429437e20] [c00000000000c1d0] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x6c
This happens because the code calls get_lppaca() which calls
get_paca() and it checks if preemption is disabled through
check_preemption_disabled().
Preemption should be disabled because the per CPU variable may make no
sense if there is a preemption (and a CPU switch) after it reads the
per CPU data and when it is used.
In this device driver specifically, it is not a problem, because this
code just needs to have access to one lppaca struct, and it does not
matter if it is the current per CPU lppaca struct or not (i.e. when
there is a preemption and a CPU migration).
That said, the most appropriate fix seems to be related to avoiding
the debug_smp_processor_id() call at get_paca(), instead of calling
preempt_disable() before get_paca().
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-pseries.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-pseries.c b/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-pseries.c
index 07135e009d8b..601a6c3acc7f 100644
--- a/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-pseries.c
+++ b/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-pseries.c
@@ -240,7 +240,13 @@ static int pseries_idle_probe(void)
return -ENODEV;
if (firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_SPLPAR)) {
- if (lppaca_shared_proc(get_lppaca())) {
+ /*
+ * Use local_paca instead of get_lppaca() since
+ * preemption is not disabled, and it is not required in
+ * fact, since lppaca_ptr does not need to be the value
+ * associated to the current CPU, it can be from any CPU.
+ */
+ if (lppaca_shared_proc(local_paca->lppaca_ptr)) {
cpuidle_state_table = shared_states;
max_idle_state = ARRAY_SIZE(shared_states);
} else {
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 3fa750dcf29e8606e3969d13d8e188cc1c0f511d ]
write_cache_pages() is used in both background and integrity writeback
scenarios by various filesystems. Background writeback is mostly
concerned with cleaning a certain number of dirty pages based on various
mm heuristics. It may not write the full set of dirty pages or wait for
I/O to complete. Integrity writeback is responsible for persisting a set
of dirty pages before the writeback job completes. For example, an
fsync() call must perform integrity writeback to ensure data is on disk
before the call returns.
write_cache_pages() unconditionally breaks out of its processing loop in
the event of a ->writepage() error. This is fine for background
writeback, which had no strict requirements and will eventually come
around again. This can cause problems for integrity writeback on
filesystems that might need to clean up state associated with failed page
writeouts. For example, XFS performs internal delayed allocation
accounting before returning a ->writepage() error, where applicable. If
the current writeback happens to be associated with an unmount and
write_cache_pages() completes the writeback prematurely due to error, the
filesystem is unmounted in an inconsistent state if dirty+delalloc pages
still exist.
To handle this problem, update write_cache_pages() to always process the
full set of pages for integrity writeback regardless of ->writepage()
errors. Save the first encountered error and return it to the caller once
complete. This facilitates XFS (or any other fs that expects integrity
writeback to process the entire set of dirty pages) to clean up its
internal state completely in the event of persistent mapping errors.
Background writeback continues to exit on the first error encountered.
[[email protected]: fix typo in comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
mm/page-writeback.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/page-writeback.c b/mm/page-writeback.c
index 3309dbda7ffa..0bc7fa21db85 100644
--- a/mm/page-writeback.c
+++ b/mm/page-writeback.c
@@ -2151,6 +2151,7 @@ int write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
{
int ret = 0;
int done = 0;
+ int error;
struct pagevec pvec;
int nr_pages;
pgoff_t uninitialized_var(writeback_index);
@@ -2247,25 +2248,31 @@ continue_unlock:
goto continue_unlock;
trace_wbc_writepage(wbc, inode_to_bdi(mapping->host));
- ret = (*writepage)(page, wbc, data);
- if (unlikely(ret)) {
- if (ret == AOP_WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE) {
+ error = (*writepage)(page, wbc, data);
+ if (unlikely(error)) {
+ /*
+ * Handle errors according to the type of
+ * writeback. There's no need to continue for
+ * background writeback. Just push done_index
+ * past this page so media errors won't choke
+ * writeout for the entire file. For integrity
+ * writeback, we must process the entire dirty
+ * set regardless of errors because the fs may
+ * still have state to clear for each page. In
+ * that case we continue processing and return
+ * the first error.
+ */
+ if (error == AOP_WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE) {
unlock_page(page);
- ret = 0;
- } else {
- /*
- * done_index is set past this page,
- * so media errors will not choke
- * background writeout for the entire
- * file. This has consequences for
- * range_cyclic semantics (ie. it may
- * not be suitable for data integrity
- * writeout).
- */
+ error = 0;
+ } else if (wbc->sync_mode != WB_SYNC_ALL) {
+ ret = error;
done_index = page->index + 1;
done = 1;
break;
}
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = error;
}
/*
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 81e9fa8bab381f8b6eb04df7cdf0f71994099bd4 ]
The armv8_pmuv3 driver doesn't have a remove function, and when the test
'CONFIG_DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE=y' is enabled, the following Call trace
can be seen.
[ 1.424287] Failed to register pmu: armv8_pmuv3, reason -17
[ 1.424870] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at ../kernel/events/core.c:11771 perf_event_sysfs_init+0x98/0xdc
[ 1.425220] Modules linked in:
[ 1.425531] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.19.0-rc7-next-20181012-00003-ge7a97b1ad77b-dirty #35
[ 1.425951] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 1.426212] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1.426458] pc : perf_event_sysfs_init+0x98/0xdc
[ 1.426720] lr : perf_event_sysfs_init+0x98/0xdc
[ 1.426908] sp : ffff00000804bd50
[ 1.427077] x29: ffff00000804bd50 x28: ffff00000934e078
[ 1.427429] x27: ffff000009546000 x26: 0000000000000007
[ 1.427757] x25: ffff000009280710 x24: 00000000ffffffef
[ 1.428086] x23: ffff000009408000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 1.428415] x21: ffff000009136008 x20: ffff000009408730
[ 1.428744] x19: ffff80007b20b400 x18: 000000000000000a
[ 1.429075] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1.429418] x15: 0000000000000400 x14: 2e79726f74636572
[ 1.429748] x13: 696420656d617320 x12: 656874206e692065
[ 1.430060] x11: 6d616e20656d6173 x10: 2065687420687469
[ 1.430335] x9 : ffff00000804bd50 x8 : 206e6f7361657220
[ 1.430610] x7 : 2c3376756d705f38 x6 : ffff00000954d7ce
[ 1.430880] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.431226] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1.431554] x1 : 4d151327adc50b00 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 1.431868] Call trace:
[ 1.432102] perf_event_sysfs_init+0x98/0xdc
[ 1.432382] do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x1a8
[ 1.432637] kernel_init_freeable+0x1bc/0x280
[ 1.432905] kernel_init+0x18/0x160
[ 1.433115] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 1.433297] ---[ end trace 27fd415390eb9883 ]---
Rework to set suppress_bind_attrs flag to avoid removing the device when
CONFIG_DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE=y, since there's no real reason to
remove the armv8_pmuv3 driver.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
index 62d3dc60ca09..e99a0ed7e66b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
@@ -670,6 +670,7 @@ static struct platform_driver armv8_pmu_driver = {
.driver = {
.name = "armv8-pmu",
.of_match_table = armv8_pmu_of_device_ids,
+ .suppress_bind_attrs = true,
},
.probe = armv8_pmu_device_probe,
};
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 4f4b374332ec0ae9c738ff8ec9bed5cd97ff9adc ]
This is the much more correct fix for my earlier attempt at:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/12/10/118
Short recap:
- There's not actually a locking issue, it's just lockdep being a bit
too eager to complain about a possible deadlock.
- Contrary to what I claimed the real problem is recursion on
kn->count. Greg pointed me at sysfs_break_active_protection(), used
by the scsi subsystem to allow a sysfs file to unbind itself. That
would be a real deadlock, which isn't what's happening here. Also,
breaking the active protection means we'd need to manually handle
all the lifetime fun.
- With Rafael we discussed the task_work approach, which kinda works,
but has two downsides: It's a functional change for a lockdep
annotation issue, and it won't work for the bind file (which needs
to get the errno from the driver load function back to userspace).
- Greg also asked why this never showed up: To hit this you need to
unregister a 2nd driver from the unload code of your first driver. I
guess only gpus do that. The bug has always been there, but only
with a recent patch series did we add more locks so that lockdep
built a chain from unbinding the snd-hda driver to the
acpi_video_unregister call.
Full lockdep splat:
[12301.898799] ============================================
[12301.898805] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[12301.898811] 4.20.0-rc7+ #84 Not tainted
[12301.898815] --------------------------------------------
[12301.898821] bash/5297 is trying to acquire lock:
[12301.898826] 00000000f61c6093 (kn->count#39){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80
[12301.898841] but task is already holding lock:
[12301.898847] 000000005f634021 (kn->count#39){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xdc/0x190
[12301.898856] other info that might help us debug this:
[12301.898862] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12301.898867] CPU0
[12301.898870] ----
[12301.898874] lock(kn->count#39);
[12301.898879] lock(kn->count#39);
[12301.898883] *** DEADLOCK ***
[12301.898891] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[12301.898899] 5 locks held by bash/5297:
[12301.898903] #0: 00000000cd800e54 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x17f/0x1b0
[12301.898915] #1: 000000000465e7c2 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xd3/0x190
[12301.898925] #2: 000000005f634021 (kn->count#39){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xdc/0x190
[12301.898936] #3: 00000000414ef7ac (&dev->mutex){....}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x34/0x240
[12301.898950] #4: 000000003218fbdf (register_count_mutex){+.+.}, at: acpi_video_unregister+0xe/0x40
[12301.898960] stack backtrace:
[12301.898968] CPU: 1 PID: 5297 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #84
[12301.898974] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook 8460p/161C, BIOS 68SCF Ver. F.01 03/11/2011
[12301.898982] Call Trace:
[12301.898989] dump_stack+0x67/0x9b
[12301.898997] __lock_acquire+0x6ad/0x1410
[12301.899003] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80
[12301.899010] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[12301.899017] ? mutex_spin_on_owner+0xe4/0x150
[12301.899023] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[12301.899030] ? lock_acquire+0x90/0x180
[12301.899036] lock_acquire+0x90/0x180
[12301.899042] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80
[12301.899049] __kernfs_remove+0x296/0x310
[12301.899055] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80
[12301.899060] ? kernfs_name_hash+0xd/0x80
[12301.899066] ? kernfs_find_ns+0x6c/0x100
[12301.899073] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x3b/0x80
[12301.899080] bus_remove_driver+0x92/0xa0
[12301.899085] acpi_video_unregister+0x24/0x40
[12301.899127] i915_driver_unload+0x42/0x130 [i915]
[12301.899160] i915_pci_remove+0x19/0x30 [i915]
[12301.899169] pci_device_remove+0x36/0xb0
[12301.899176] device_release_driver_internal+0x185/0x240
[12301.899183] unbind_store+0xaf/0x180
[12301.899189] kernfs_fop_write+0x104/0x190
[12301.899195] __vfs_write+0x31/0x180
[12301.899203] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6f/0x80
[12301.899209] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x29/0x50
[12301.899216] ? __sb_start_write+0x13c/0x1a0
[12301.899221] ? vfs_write+0x17f/0x1b0
[12301.899227] vfs_write+0xb9/0x1b0
[12301.899233] ksys_write+0x50/0xc0
[12301.899239] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x180
[12301.899247] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[12301.899253] RIP: 0033:0x7f452ac7f7a4
[12301.899259] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 8b 05 aa f0 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 f3 c3 66 90 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89 f3 48 83
[12301.899273] RSP: 002b:00007ffceafa6918 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[12301.899282] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007f452ac7f7a4
[12301.899288] RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 00005612a1abf7c0 RDI: 0000000000000001
[12301.899295] RBP: 00005612a1abf7c0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 00005612a1c46730
[12301.899301] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000d
[12301.899308] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f452af4a740 R15: 000000000000000d
Looking around I've noticed that usb and i2c already handle similar
recursion problems, where a sysfs file can unbind the same type of
sysfs somewhere else in the hierarchy. Relevant commits are:
commit 356c05d58af05d582e634b54b40050c73609617b
Author: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Date: Mon May 14 13:30:03 2012 -0400
sysfs: get rid of some lockdep false positives
commit e9b526fe704812364bca07edd15eadeba163ebfb
Author: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]>
Date: Fri May 17 14:56:35 2013 +0200
i2c: suppress lockdep warning on delete_device
Implement the same trick for driver bind/unbind.
v2: Put the macro into bus.c (Greg).
Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Cc: Ramalingam C <[email protected]>
Cc: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
Cc: Heikki Krogerus <[email protected]>
Cc: Vivek Gautam <[email protected]>
Cc: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/base/bus.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/bus.c b/drivers/base/bus.c
index 0346e46e2871..ecca4ae248e0 100644
--- a/drivers/base/bus.c
+++ b/drivers/base/bus.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ static struct kset *system_kset;
#define to_drv_attr(_attr) container_of(_attr, struct driver_attribute, attr)
+#define DRIVER_ATTR_IGNORE_LOCKDEP(_name, _mode, _show, _store) \
+ struct driver_attribute driver_attr_##_name = \
+ __ATTR_IGNORE_LOCKDEP(_name, _mode, _show, _store)
static int __must_check bus_rescan_devices_helper(struct device *dev,
void *data);
@@ -198,7 +201,7 @@ static ssize_t unbind_store(struct device_driver *drv, const char *buf,
bus_put(bus);
return err;
}
-static DRIVER_ATTR_WO(unbind);
+static DRIVER_ATTR_IGNORE_LOCKDEP(unbind, S_IWUSR, NULL, unbind_store);
/*
* Manually attach a device to a driver.
@@ -234,7 +237,7 @@ static ssize_t bind_store(struct device_driver *drv, const char *buf,
bus_put(bus);
return err;
}
-static DRIVER_ATTR_WO(bind);
+static DRIVER_ATTR_IGNORE_LOCKDEP(bind, S_IWUSR, NULL, bind_store);
static ssize_t show_drivers_autoprobe(struct bus_type *bus, char *buf)
{
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit bd8d57fb7e25e9fcf67a9eef5fa13aabe2016e07 ]
The strncpy() function may leave the destination string buffer
unterminated, better use strlcpy() that we have a __weak fallback
implementation for systems without it.
This fixes this warning on an Alpine Linux Edge system with gcc 8.2:
util/parse-events.c: In function 'print_symbol_events':
util/parse-events.c:2465:4: error: 'strncpy' specified bound 100 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
strncpy(name, syms->symbol, MAX_NAME_LEN);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In function 'print_symbol_events.constprop',
inlined from 'print_events' at util/parse-events.c:2508:2:
util/parse-events.c:2465:4: error: 'strncpy' specified bound 100 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
strncpy(name, syms->symbol, MAX_NAME_LEN);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In function 'print_symbol_events.constprop',
inlined from 'print_events' at util/parse-events.c:2511:2:
util/parse-events.c:2465:4: error: 'strncpy' specified bound 100 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
strncpy(name, syms->symbol, MAX_NAME_LEN);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Fixes: 947b4ad1d198 ("perf list: Fix max event string size")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
tools/perf/util/parse-events.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/parse-events.c b/tools/perf/util/parse-events.c
index e81dfb2e239c..9351738df703 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/parse-events.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/parse-events.c
@@ -1903,7 +1903,7 @@ restart:
if (!name_only && strlen(syms->alias))
snprintf(name, MAX_NAME_LEN, "%s OR %s", syms->symbol, syms->alias);
else
- strncpy(name, syms->symbol, MAX_NAME_LEN);
+ strlcpy(name, syms->symbol, MAX_NAME_LEN);
evt_list[evt_i] = strdup(name);
if (evt_list[evt_i] == NULL)
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 0fbe82e628c817e292ff588cd5847fc935e025f2 ]
after set SO_DONTROUTE to 1, the IP layer should not route packets if
the dest IP address is not in link scope. But if the socket has cached
the dst_entry, such packets would be routed until the sk_dst_cache
expires. So we should clean the sk_dst_cache when a user set
SO_DONTROUTE option. Below are server/client python scripts which
could reprodue this issue:
server side code:
==========================================================================
import socket
import struct
import time
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.bind(('0.0.0.0', 9000))
s.listen(1)
sock, addr = s.accept()
sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_DONTROUTE, struct.pack('i', 1))
while True:
sock.send(b'foo')
time.sleep(1)
==========================================================================
client side code:
==========================================================================
import socket
import time
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(('server_address', 9000))
while True:
data = s.recv(1024)
print(data)
==========================================================================
Signed-off-by: yupeng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/core/sock.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 9fb1c073d0c4..8aa4a5f89572 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -732,6 +732,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
break;
case SO_DONTROUTE:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE, valbool);
+ sk_dst_reset(sk);
break;
case SO_BROADCAST:
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST, valbool);
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 77c1c0fa8b1477c5799bdad65026ea5ff676da44 ]
Currently, warn_ignore_character() displays invalid file name and
line number.
The lexer should use current_file->name and yylineno, while the parser
should use zconf_curname() and zconf_lineno().
This difference comes from that the lexer is always going ahead
of the parser. The parser needs to look ahead one token to make a
shift/reduce decision, so the lexer is requested to scan more text
from the input file.
This commit fixes the warning message from warn_ignored_character().
[Test Code]
----(Kconfig begin)----
/
-----(Kconfig end)-----
[Output]
Before the fix:
<none>:0:warning: ignoring unsupported character '/'
After the fix:
Kconfig:1:warning: ignoring unsupported character '/'
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
scripts/kconfig/zconf.l | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/zconf.l b/scripts/kconfig/zconf.l
index c410d257da06..6534dc5ac803 100644
--- a/scripts/kconfig/zconf.l
+++ b/scripts/kconfig/zconf.l
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static void warn_ignored_character(char chr)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"%s:%d:warning: ignoring unsupported character '%c'\n",
- zconf_curname(), zconf_lineno(), chr);
+ current_file->name, yylineno, chr);
}
%}
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 30696378f68a9e3dad6bfe55938b112e72af00c2 ]
The ramoops backend currently calls persistent_ram_save_old() even
if a buffer is empty. While this appears to work, it is does not seem
like the right thing to do and could lead to future bugs so lets avoid
that. It also prevents misleading prints in the logs which claim the
buffer is valid.
I got something like:
found existing buffer, size 0, start 0
When I was expecting:
no valid data in buffer (sig = ...)
This bails out early (and reports with pr_debug()), since it's an
acceptable state.
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
fs/pstore/ram_core.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/pstore/ram_core.c b/fs/pstore/ram_core.c
index bd21795ce657..679d75a864d0 100644
--- a/fs/pstore/ram_core.c
+++ b/fs/pstore/ram_core.c
@@ -445,6 +445,11 @@ static int persistent_ram_post_init(struct persistent_ram_zone *prz, u32 sig,
sig ^= PERSISTENT_RAM_SIG;
if (prz->buffer->sig == sig) {
+ if (buffer_size(prz) == 0) {
+ pr_debug("found existing empty buffer\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (buffer_size(prz) > prz->buffer_size ||
buffer_start(prz) > buffer_size(prz))
pr_info("found existing invalid buffer, size %zu, start %zu\n",
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
The backport of commit afeaade90db4 "media: em28xx: make
v4l2-compliance happier by starting sequence on zero" added a
reset on em28xx_v4l2::field_count to em28xx_ctrl_notify(),
but it should be done in em28xx_start_analog_streaming().
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-video.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-video.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-video.c
@@ -930,6 +930,8 @@ int em28xx_start_analog_streaming(struct
em28xx_videodbg("%s\n", __func__);
+ dev->v4l2->field_count = 0;
+
/* Make sure streaming is not already in progress for this type
of filehandle (e.g. video, vbi) */
rc = res_get(dev, vq->type);
@@ -1149,8 +1151,6 @@ static void em28xx_ctrl_notify(struct v4
{
struct em28xx *dev = priv;
- dev->v4l2->field_count = 0;
-
/*
* In the case of non-AC97 volume controls, we still need
* to do some setups at em28xx, in order to mute/unmute
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d972f3dce8d161e2142da0ab1ef25df00e2f21a9 ]
'dev' is non NULL when the addr_len check triggers so it must goto a label
that does the dev_put otherwise dev will have a leaked refcount.
This bug causes the ib_ipoib module to become unloadable when using
systemd-network as it triggers this check on InfiniBand links.
Fixes: 99137b7888f4 ("packet: validate address length")
Reported-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2514,7 +2514,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc
addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr : NULL;
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(&po->sk), saddr->sll_ifindex);
if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len)
- goto out;
+ goto out_put;
}
err = -ENXIO;
@@ -2683,7 +2683,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc
addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr : NULL;
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), saddr->sll_ifindex);
if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len)
- goto out;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
err = -ENXIO;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 7550c6079846a24f30d15ac75a941c8515dbedfb ]
Patch series "THP eligibility reporting via proc".
This series of three patches aims at making THP eligibility reporting much
more robust and long term sustainable. The trigger for the change is a
regression report [2] and the long follow up discussion. In short the
specific application didn't have good API to query whether a particular
mapping can be backed by THP so it has used VMA flags to workaround that.
These flags represent a deep internal state of VMAs and as such they
should be used by userspace with a great deal of caution.
A similar has happened for [3] when users complained that VM_MIXEDMAP is
no longer set on DAX mappings. Again a lack of a proper API led to an
abuse.
The first patch in the series tries to emphasise that that the semantic of
flags might change and any application consuming those should be really
careful.
The remaining two patches provide a more suitable interface to address [2]
and provide a consistent API to query the THP status both for each VMA and
process wide as well. [1]
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [2]
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[3] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
This patch (of 3):
Even though vma flags exported via /proc/<pid>/smaps are explicitly
documented to be not guaranteed for future compatibility the warning
doesn't go far enough because it doesn't mention semantic changes to those
flags. And they are important as well because these flags are a deep
implementation internal to the MM code and the semantic might change at
any time.
Let's consider two recent examples:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
: commit e1fb4a086495 "dax: remove VM_MIXEDMAP for fsdax and device dax" has
: removed VM_MIXEDMAP flag from DAX VMAs. Now our testing shows that in the
: mean time certain customer of ours started poking into /proc/<pid>/smaps
: and looks at VMA flags there and if VM_MIXEDMAP is missing among the VMA
: flags, the application just fails to start complaining that DAX support is
: missing in the kernel.
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
: Commit 1860033237d4 ("mm: make PR_SET_THP_DISABLE immediately active")
: introduced a regression in that userspace cannot always determine the set
: of vmas where thp is ineligible.
: Userspace relies on the "nh" flag being emitted as part of /proc/pid/smaps
: to determine if a vma is eligible to be backed by hugepages.
: Previous to this commit, prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 1) would cause thp to
: be disabled and emit "nh" as a flag for the corresponding vmas as part of
: /proc/pid/smaps. After the commit, thp is disabled by means of an mm
: flag and "nh" is not emitted.
: This causes smaps parsing libraries to assume a vma is eligible for thp
: and ends up puzzling the user on why its memory is not backed by thp.
In both cases userspace was relying on a semantic of a specific VMA flag.
The primary reason why that happened is a lack of a proper interface.
While this has been worked on and it will be fixed properly, it seems that
our wording could see some refinement and be more vocal about semantic
aspect of these flags as well.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Oppenheimer <[email protected]>
Cc: William Kucharski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
index 6d2689ebf824..5b87946a53a3 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -466,7 +466,9 @@ manner. The codes are the following:
Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
be present in all further kernel releases. Things get changed, the flags may
-be vanished or the reverse -- new added.
+be vanished or the reverse -- new added. Interpretation of their meaning
+might change in future as well. So each consumer of these flags has to
+follow each specific kernel version for the exact semantic.
This file is only present if the CONFIG_MMU kernel configuration option is
enabled.
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit 1c6f709b9f96366cc47af23c05ecec9b8c0c392d ]
Users should never use 'pt=0', but if they do it may give a meaningless
error:
$ perf record -e intel_pt/pt=0/u uname
Error:
The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for
event (intel_pt/pt=0/u).
Fix that by forcing 'pt=1'.
Committer testing:
# perf record -e intel_pt/pt=0/u uname
Error:
The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for event (intel_pt/pt=0/u).
/bin/dmesg | grep -i perf may provide additional information.
# perf record -e intel_pt/pt=0/u uname
pt=0 doesn't make sense, forcing pt=1
Linux
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.020 MB perf.data ]
#
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c b/tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c
index c53f78767568..df21da796fa7 100644
--- a/tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c
+++ b/tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c
@@ -471,10 +471,21 @@ static int intel_pt_validate_config(struct perf_pmu *intel_pt_pmu,
struct perf_evsel *evsel)
{
int err;
+ char c;
if (!evsel)
return 0;
+ /*
+ * If supported, force pass-through config term (pt=1) even if user
+ * sets pt=0, which avoids senseless kernel errors.
+ */
+ if (perf_pmu__scan_file(intel_pt_pmu, "format/pt", "%c", &c) == 1 &&
+ !(evsel->attr.config & 1)) {
+ pr_warning("pt=0 doesn't make sense, forcing pt=1\n");
+ evsel->attr.config |= 1;
+ }
+
err = intel_pt_val_config_term(intel_pt_pmu, "caps/cycle_thresholds",
"cyc_thresh", "caps/psb_cyc",
evsel->attr.config);
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Ahern <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ec90ad334986fa5856d11dd272f7f22fa86c55c4 ]
Similar to c5ee066333eb ("ipv6: Consider sk_bound_dev_if when binding a
socket to an address"), binding a socket to v4 mapped addresses needs to
consider if the socket is bound to a device.
This problem also exists from the beginning of git history.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru
/* Check if the address belongs to the host. */
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
+ struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int chk_addr_ret;
/* Binding to v4-mapped address on a v6-only socket
@@ -302,9 +303,17 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru
goto out;
}
+ if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
+ dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
+ if (!dev) {
+ err = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Reproduce AF_INET checks to make the bindings consistent */
v4addr = addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
- chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, v4addr);
+ chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type_dev_table(net, dev, v4addr);
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind &&
!(inet->freebind || inet->transparent) &&
v4addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) &&
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
commit c06ef2e9acef4cda1feee2ce055b8086e33d251a upstream.
As reported by smatch:
drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c: drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c:2159 vb2_mmap() warn: inconsistent returns 'mutex:&q->mmap_lock'.
Locked on: line 2148
Unlocked on: line 2100
line 2108
line 2113
line 2118
line 2156
line 2159
There is one error condition that doesn't unlock a mutex.
Fixes: cd26d1c4d1bc ("media: vb2: vb2_mmap: move lock up")
Reviewed-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c
@@ -2003,7 +2003,8 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
if (length < (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start)) {
dprintk(1,
"MMAP invalid, as it would overflow buffer length\n");
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto unlock;
}
ret = call_memop(vb, mmap, vb->planes[plane].mem_priv, vma);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 36352991835ce99e46b4441dd0eb6980f9a83e8f ]
There are two new Realtek Ethernet devices which are re-branded r8168h.
Add the IDs to to support them.
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
@@ -324,6 +324,8 @@ enum cfg_version {
};
static const struct pci_device_id rtl8169_pci_tbl[] = {
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(REALTEK, 0x2502), RTL_CFG_1 },
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(REALTEK, 0x2600), RTL_CFG_1 },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_REALTEK, 0x8129), 0, 0, RTL_CFG_0 },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_REALTEK, 0x8136), 0, 0, RTL_CFG_2 },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_REALTEK, 0x8161), 0, 0, RTL_CFG_1 },
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Ahern <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d4a7e9bb74b5aaf07b89f6531c080b1130bdf019 ]
I realized the last patch calls dev_get_by_index_rcu in a branch not
holding the rcu lock. Add the calls to rcu_read_lock and rcu_read_unlock.
Fixes: ec90ad334986 ("ipv6: Consider sk_bound_dev_if when binding a socket to a v4 mapped address")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -303,17 +303,20 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru
goto out;
}
+ rcu_read_lock();
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!dev) {
err = -ENODEV;
- goto out;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Reproduce AF_INET checks to make the bindings consistent */
v4addr = addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type_dev_table(net, dev, v4addr);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind &&
!(inet->freebind || inet->transparent) &&
v4addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) &&
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 0a42e99b58a208839626465af194cfe640ef9493 upstream.
Now that loop_ctl_mutex is global, just get rid of loop_index_mutex as
there is no good reason to keep these two separate and it just
complicates the locking.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
static DEFINE_IDR(loop_index_idr);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_index_mutex);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_ctl_mutex);
static int max_part;
@@ -1571,9 +1570,11 @@ static int lo_compat_ioctl(struct block_
static int lo_open(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode)
{
struct loop_device *lo;
- int err = 0;
+ int err;
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ err = mutex_lock_killable(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
lo = bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
if (!lo) {
err = -ENXIO;
@@ -1582,7 +1583,7 @@ static int lo_open(struct block_device *
atomic_inc(&lo->lo_refcnt);
out:
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
return err;
}
@@ -1591,12 +1592,11 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
struct loop_device *lo;
int err;
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
lo = disk->private_data;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
- goto unlock_index;
+ goto out_unlock;
- mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
@@ -1604,7 +1604,7 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
- goto unlock_index;
+ return;
} else {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
@@ -1613,9 +1613,8 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
loop_flush(lo);
}
+out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
-unlock_index:
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
}
static const struct block_device_operations lo_fops = {
@@ -1897,7 +1896,7 @@ static struct kobject *loop_probe(dev_t
struct kobject *kobj;
int err;
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
err = loop_lookup(&lo, MINOR(dev) >> part_shift);
if (err < 0)
err = loop_add(&lo, MINOR(dev) >> part_shift);
@@ -1905,7 +1904,7 @@ static struct kobject *loop_probe(dev_t
kobj = NULL;
else
kobj = get_disk(lo->lo_disk);
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
*part = 0;
return kobj;
@@ -1915,9 +1914,13 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
unsigned long parm)
{
struct loop_device *lo;
- int ret = -ENOSYS;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_killable(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ ret = -ENOSYS;
switch (cmd) {
case LOOP_CTL_ADD:
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
@@ -1931,7 +1934,6 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
if (ret < 0)
break;
- mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
ret = -EBUSY;
mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
@@ -1943,7 +1945,6 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
break;
}
lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
idr_remove(&loop_index_idr, lo->lo_number);
loop_remove(lo);
break;
@@ -1953,7 +1954,7 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
break;
ret = loop_add(&lo, -1);
}
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -2036,10 +2037,10 @@ static int __init loop_init(void)
THIS_MODULE, loop_probe, NULL, NULL);
/* pre-create number of devices given by config or max_loop */
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
loop_add(&lo, i);
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
printk(KERN_INFO "loop: module loaded\n");
return 0;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit fbac5977d81cb2b2b7e37b11c459055d9585273c ]
An unterminated string literal followed by new line is passed to the
parser (with "multi-line strings not supported" warning shown), then
handled properly there.
On the other hand, an unterminated string literal at end of file is
never passed to the parser, then results in memory leak.
[Test Code]
----------(Kconfig begin)----------
source "Kconfig.inc"
config A
bool "a"
-----------(Kconfig end)-----------
--------(Kconfig.inc begin)--------
config B
bool "b\No new line at end of file
---------(Kconfig.inc end)---------
[Summary from Valgrind]
Before the fix:
LEAK SUMMARY:
definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks
...
After the fix:
LEAK SUMMARY:
definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
...
Eliminate the memory leak path by handling this case. Of course, such
a Kconfig file is wrong already, so I will add an error message later.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
scripts/kconfig/zconf.l | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/zconf.l b/scripts/kconfig/zconf.l
index 6534dc5ac803..0c7800112ff5 100644
--- a/scripts/kconfig/zconf.l
+++ b/scripts/kconfig/zconf.l
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ n [A-Za-z0-9_-]
}
<<EOF>> {
BEGIN(INITIAL);
+ yylval.string = text;
+ return T_WORD_QUOTE;
}
}
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit e1f65b0d70e9e5c80e15105cd96fa00174d7c436 ]
It seems with some NICs supported by the e1000e driver a SYSTIM reading
may occasionally be few microseconds before the previous reading and if
enabled also pass e1000e_sanitize_systim() without reaching the maximum
number of rereads, even if the function is modified to check three
consecutive readings (i.e. it doesn't look like a double read error).
This causes an underflow in the timecounter and the PHC time jumps hours
ahead.
This was observed on 82574, I217 and I219. The fastest way to reproduce
it is to run a program that continuously calls the PTP_SYS_OFFSET ioctl
on the PHC.
Modify e1000e_phc_gettime() to use timecounter_cyc2time() instead of
timecounter_read() in order to allow non-monotonic SYSTIM readings and
prevent the PHC from jumping.
Cc: Richard Cochran <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Lichvar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ptp.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ptp.c
index 25a0ad5102d6..855cf8c15c8a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ptp.c
@@ -111,10 +111,14 @@ static int e1000e_phc_gettime(struct ptp_clock_info *ptp, struct timespec64 *ts)
struct e1000_adapter *adapter = container_of(ptp, struct e1000_adapter,
ptp_clock_info);
unsigned long flags;
- u64 ns;
+ u64 cycles, ns;
spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->systim_lock, flags);
- ns = timecounter_read(&adapter->tc);
+
+ /* Use timecounter_cyc2time() to allow non-monotonic SYSTIM readings */
+ cycles = adapter->cc.read(&adapter->cc);
+ ns = timecounter_cyc2time(&adapter->tc, cycles);
+
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->systim_lock, flags);
*ts = ns_to_timespec64(ns);
@@ -170,9 +174,12 @@ static void e1000e_systim_overflow_work(struct work_struct *work)
systim_overflow_work.work);
struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
struct timespec64 ts;
+ u64 ns;
- adapter->ptp_clock_info.gettime64(&adapter->ptp_clock_info, &ts);
+ /* Update the timecounter */
+ ns = timecounter_read(&adapter->tc);
+ ts = ns_to_timespec64(ns);
e_dbg("SYSTIM overflow check at %lld.%09lu\n",
(long long) ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Backport of upstream commit b3669b1e1c09890d61109a1a8ece2c5b66804714 ]
To allow EL0 (and/or EL1) to use pointer authentication functionality,
we must ensure that pointer authentication instructions and accesses to
pointer authentication keys are not trapped to EL2.
This patch ensures that HCR_EL2 is configured appropriately when the
kernel is booted at EL2. For non-VHE kernels we set HCR_EL2.{API,APK},
ensuring that EL1 can access keys and permit EL0 use of instructions.
For VHE kernels host EL0 (TGE && E2H) is unaffected by these settings,
and it doesn't matter how we configure HCR_EL2.{API,APK}, so we don't
bother setting them.
This does not enable support for KVM guests, since KVM manages HCR_EL2
itself when running VMs.
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
[kristina: backport to 4.4.y: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
index 013b7de45ee7..d7e7cf56e8d6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#include <asm/types.h>
/* Hyp Configuration Register (HCR) bits */
+#define HCR_API (UL(1) << 41)
+#define HCR_APK (UL(1) << 40)
#define HCR_ID (UL(1) << 33)
#define HCR_CD (UL(1) << 32)
#define HCR_RW_SHIFT 31
@@ -81,7 +83,7 @@
HCR_AMO | HCR_SWIO | HCR_TIDCP | HCR_RW)
#define HCR_VIRT_EXCP_MASK (HCR_VA | HCR_VI | HCR_VF)
#define HCR_INT_OVERRIDE (HCR_FMO | HCR_IMO)
-#define HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW)
+#define HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW | HCR_API | HCR_APK)
/* Hyp System Control Register (SCTLR_EL2) bits */
--
2.19.1
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
commit 310ca162d779efee8a2dc3731439680f3e9c1e86 upstream.
syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference [1] which is caused by
race condition between ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0) versus
ioctl(other_loop_fd, LOOP_SET_FD, loop_fd) due to traversing other
loop devices at loop_validate_file() without holding corresponding
lo->lo_ctl_mutex locks.
Since ioctl() request on loop devices is not frequent operation, we don't
need fine grained locking. Let's use global lock in order to allow safe
traversal at loop_validate_file().
Note that syzbot is also reporting circular locking dependency between
bdev->bd_mutex and lo->lo_ctl_mutex [2] which is caused by calling
blkdev_reread_part() with lock held. This patch does not address it.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f3cfe26e785d85f9ee259f385515291d21bd80a3
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=bf154052f0eea4bc7712499e4569505907d15889
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
drivers/block/loop.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
static DEFINE_IDR(loop_index_idr);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_index_mutex);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_ctl_mutex);
static int max_part;
static int part_shift;
@@ -1044,7 +1045,7 @@ static int loop_clr_fd(struct loop_devic
*/
if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 1) {
lo->lo_flags |= LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR;
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
return 0;
}
@@ -1093,12 +1094,12 @@ static int loop_clr_fd(struct loop_devic
if (!part_shift)
lo->lo_disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN;
loop_unprepare_queue(lo);
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
/*
- * Need not hold lo_ctl_mutex to fput backing file.
- * Calling fput holding lo_ctl_mutex triggers a circular
+ * Need not hold loop_ctl_mutex to fput backing file.
+ * Calling fput holding loop_ctl_mutex triggers a circular
* lock dependency possibility warning as fput can take
- * bd_mutex which is usually taken before lo_ctl_mutex.
+ * bd_mutex which is usually taken before loop_ctl_mutex.
*/
fput(filp);
return 0;
@@ -1361,7 +1362,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
struct loop_device *lo = bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
int err;
- mutex_lock_nested(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex, 1);
+ mutex_lock_nested(&loop_ctl_mutex, 1);
switch (cmd) {
case LOOP_SET_FD:
err = loop_set_fd(lo, mode, bdev, arg);
@@ -1370,7 +1371,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
err = loop_change_fd(lo, bdev, arg);
break;
case LOOP_CLR_FD:
- /* loop_clr_fd would have unlocked lo_ctl_mutex on success */
+ /* loop_clr_fd would have unlocked loop_ctl_mutex on success */
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
goto out_unlocked;
@@ -1406,7 +1407,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
default:
err = lo->ioctl ? lo->ioctl(lo, cmd, arg) : -EINVAL;
}
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
out_unlocked:
return err;
@@ -1539,16 +1540,16 @@ static int lo_compat_ioctl(struct block_
switch(cmd) {
case LOOP_SET_STATUS:
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
err = loop_set_status_compat(
lo, (const struct compat_loop_info __user *) arg);
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
case LOOP_GET_STATUS:
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
err = loop_get_status_compat(
lo, (struct compat_loop_info __user *) arg);
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
case LOOP_SET_CAPACITY:
case LOOP_CLR_FD:
@@ -1592,7 +1593,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
return;
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
@@ -1609,7 +1610,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
loop_flush(lo);
}
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
}
static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
@@ -1655,10 +1656,10 @@ static int unregister_transfer_cb(int id
struct loop_device *lo = ptr;
struct loop_func_table *xfer = data;
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_encryption == xfer)
loop_release_xfer(lo);
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
return 0;
}
@@ -1820,7 +1821,6 @@ static int loop_add(struct loop_device *
if (!part_shift)
disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN;
disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_EXT_DEVT;
- mutex_init(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
atomic_set(&lo->lo_refcnt, 0);
lo->lo_number = i;
spin_lock_init(&lo->lo_lock);
@@ -1933,19 +1933,19 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
if (ret < 0)
break;
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
ret = -EBUSY;
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 0) {
ret = -EBUSY;
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
idr_remove(&loop_index_idr, lo->lo_number);
loop_remove(lo);
break;
--- a/drivers/block/loop.h
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.h
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ struct loop_device {
spinlock_t lo_lock;
int lo_state;
- struct mutex lo_ctl_mutex;
struct kthread_worker worker;
struct task_struct *worker_task;
bool use_dio;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 2753ca5d9009c180dbfd4c802c80983b4b6108d1 upstream.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x404/0xa10 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335
CPU: 0 PID: 4514 Comm: syz-executor485 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
__msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x404/0xa10 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x164b/0x2700 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1153
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x1686/0x1810 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624
netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2447
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1311 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x166b/0x1740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1337
netlink_sendmsg+0x1048/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091
SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x43fda9
RSP: 002b:00007ffd0c184ba8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fda9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020023000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 00000000004016d0
R13: 0000000000401760 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188
kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1183 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0x9a6/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1875
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091
SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
In tipc_nl_compat_recv(), when the len variable returned by
nlmsg_attrlen() is 0, the message is still treated as a valid one,
which is obviously unresonable. When len is zero, it means the
message not only doesn't contain any valid TLV payload, but also
TLV header is not included. Under this stituation, tlv_type field
in TLV header is still accessed in tipc_nl_compat_dumpit() or
tipc_nl_compat_doit(), but the field space is obviously illegal.
Of course, it is not initialized.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_recv(struct sk
}
len = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
- if (len && !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
+ if (!len || !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_SUPPORTED);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto send;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4a06fa67c4da20148803525151845276cdb995c1 ]
Commit 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call
pskb_may_pull") avoided a read beyond the end of the skb linear
segment by calling pskb_may_pull.
That function can trigger a BUG_ON in pskb_expand_head if the skb is
shared, which it is when when peeking. It can also return ENOMEM.
Avoid both by switching to safer skb_header_pointer.
Fixes: 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +++++-------
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 10 ++++------
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -133,19 +133,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ __be16 _ports[2], *ports;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
- __be16 *ports;
- int end;
-
- end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4;
- if (end > 0 && !pskb_may_pull(skb, end))
- return;
/* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the
* first four bytes of the transport header and this function is
* written with this assumption in mind.
*/
- ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
+ ports = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ sizeof(_ports), &_ports);
+ if (!ports)
+ return;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -658,17 +658,15 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(stru
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr) {
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
- __be16 *ports;
- int end;
+ __be16 _ports[2], *ports;
- end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4;
- if (end <= 0 || pskb_may_pull(skb, end)) {
+ ports = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ sizeof(_ports), &_ports);
+ if (ports) {
/* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the
* first four bytes of the transport header and this function is
* written with this assumption in mind.
*/
- ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
-
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
sin6.sin6_port = ports[1];
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
commit 81c88b18de1f11f70c97f28ced8d642c00bb3955 upstream.
If we ignore the error we'll hit a null dereference a little later.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c
@@ -772,6 +772,12 @@ void rpcb_getport_async(struct rpc_task
case RPCBVERS_3:
map->r_netid = xprt->address_strings[RPC_DISPLAY_NETID];
map->r_addr = rpc_sockaddr2uaddr(sap, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!map->r_addr) {
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ dprintk("RPC: %5u %s: no memory available\n",
+ task->tk_pid, __func__);
+ goto bailout_free_args;
+ }
map->r_owner = "";
break;
case RPCBVERS_2:
@@ -794,6 +800,8 @@ void rpcb_getport_async(struct rpc_task
rpc_put_task(child);
return;
+bailout_free_args:
+ kfree(map);
bailout_release_client:
rpc_release_client(rpcb_clnt);
bailout_nofree:
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 967d1dc144b50ad005e5eecdfadfbcfb399ffff6 upstream.
__loop_release() has a single call site. Fold it there. This is
currently not a huge win but it will make following replacement of
loop_index_mutex more obvious.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 16 +++++++---------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -1586,12 +1586,15 @@ out:
return err;
}
-static void __lo_release(struct loop_device *lo)
+static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
+ struct loop_device *lo;
int err;
+ mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ lo = disk->private_data;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
- return;
+ goto unlock_index;
mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
@@ -1601,7 +1604,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
- return;
+ goto unlock_index;
} else {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
@@ -1611,12 +1614,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
}
mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
-}
-
-static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
-{
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
- __lo_release(disk->private_data);
+unlock_index:
mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit 9729d6d282a6d7ce88e64c9119cecdf79edf4e88 upstream.
The capture DV timings capabilities allowed for a minimum width and
height of 0. So passing a timings struct with 0 values is allowed
and will later cause a division by zero.
Ensure that the width and height must be >= 16 to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ const struct v4l2_dv_timings_cap vivid_d
.type = V4L2_DV_BT_656_1120,
/* keep this initialization for compatibility with GCC < 4.4.6 */
.reserved = { 0 },
- V4L2_INIT_BT_TIMINGS(0, MAX_WIDTH, 0, MAX_HEIGHT, 14000000, 775000000,
+ V4L2_INIT_BT_TIMINGS(16, MAX_WIDTH, 16, MAX_HEIGHT, 14000000, 775000000,
V4L2_DV_BT_STD_CEA861 | V4L2_DV_BT_STD_DMT |
V4L2_DV_BT_STD_CVT | V4L2_DV_BT_STD_GTF,
V4L2_DV_BT_CAP_PROGRESSIVE | V4L2_DV_BT_CAP_INTERLACED)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 8b66fee7f8ee18f9c51260e7a43ab37db5177a05 upstream.
syzbot reports following splat:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
CPU: 1 PID: 11057 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
__msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295
strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats+0x1f0/0x360 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:760
__tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x457ec9
Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f2557338c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f25573396d4
R13: 00000000004cb478 R14: 00000000004d86c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
The uninitialised access happened in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats:
nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name)
This is because name string is not validated before it's used.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ static int tipc_skb_tailroom(struct sk_b
return limit;
}
+static inline int TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(struct tlv_desc *tlv)
+{
+ return TLV_GET_LEN(tlv) - TLV_SPACE(0);
+}
+
static int tipc_add_tlv(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 type, void *data, u16 len)
{
struct tlv_desc *tlv = (struct tlv_desc *)skb_tail_pointer(skb);
@@ -166,6 +171,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *tipc_get_err_tlv(
return buf;
}
+static inline bool string_is_valid(char *s, int len)
+{
+ return memchr(s, '\0', len) ? true : false;
+}
+
static int __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump *cmd,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct sk_buff *arg)
@@ -711,6 +721,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_sta
{
char *name;
struct nlattr *link;
+ int len;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -718,6 +729,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_sta
if (!link)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gwendal Grignou <[email protected]>
Prevent an empty line in /proc/self/status, allow iotop to work.
iotop does not like empty lines, fails with:
File "/usr/local/lib64/python2.7/site-packages/iotop/data.py", line
196, in parse_proc_pid_status
key, value = line.split(':\t', 1)
ValueError: need more than 1 value to unpack
[reading /proc/self/status]
Fixes: 84964fa3e5a0 ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Gwendal Grignou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
v2: Format commit message properly with proper subject and fixes
keyword.
fs/proc/array.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct s
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
seq_printf(m, "Seccomp:\t%d\n", p->seccomp.mode);
#endif
- seq_printf(m, "\nSpeculation_Store_Bypass:\t");
+ seq_printf(m, "Speculation_Store_Bypass:\t");
switch (arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(p, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) {
case -EINVAL:
seq_printf(m, "unknown");
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 3f8ab270855b0b461995da5dc48dce9461c85d94 upstream.
Factor out fsync inode entry operations into {add,del}_fsync_inode.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -67,6 +67,28 @@ static struct fsync_inode_entry *get_fsy
return NULL;
}
+static struct fsync_inode_entry *add_fsync_inode(struct list_head *head,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
+
+ entry = kmem_cache_alloc(fsync_entry_slab, GFP_F2FS_ZERO);
+ if (!entry)
+ return NULL;
+
+ entry->inode = inode;
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, head);
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+static void del_fsync_inode(struct fsync_inode_entry *entry)
+{
+ iput(entry->inode);
+ list_del(&entry->list);
+ kmem_cache_free(fsync_entry_slab, entry);
+}
+
static int recover_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage)
{
struct f2fs_inode *raw_inode = F2FS_INODE(ipage);
@@ -172,6 +194,7 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
{
unsigned long long cp_ver = cur_cp_version(F2FS_CKPT(sbi));
struct curseg_info *curseg;
+ struct inode *inode;
struct page *page = NULL;
block_t blkaddr;
int err = 0;
@@ -204,27 +227,27 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
break;
}
- /* add this fsync inode to the list */
- entry = kmem_cache_alloc(fsync_entry_slab, GFP_F2FS_ZERO);
- if (!entry) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- break;
- }
/*
* CP | dnode(F) | inode(DF)
* For this case, we should not give up now.
*/
- entry->inode = f2fs_iget(sbi->sb, ino_of_node(page));
- if (IS_ERR(entry->inode)) {
- err = PTR_ERR(entry->inode);
- kmem_cache_free(fsync_entry_slab, entry);
+ inode = f2fs_iget(sbi->sb, ino_of_node(page));
+ if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (err == -ENOENT) {
err = 0;
goto next;
}
break;
}
- list_add_tail(&entry->list, head);
+
+ /* add this fsync inode to the list */
+ entry = add_fsync_inode(head, inode);
+ if (!entry) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ iput(inode);
+ break;
+ }
}
entry->blkaddr = blkaddr;
@@ -248,11 +271,8 @@ static void destroy_fsync_dnodes(struct
{
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry, *tmp;
- list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, head, list) {
- iput(entry->inode);
- list_del(&entry->list);
- kmem_cache_free(fsync_entry_slab, entry);
- }
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, head, list)
+ del_fsync_inode(entry);
}
static int check_index_in_prev_nodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
@@ -509,11 +529,8 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
break;
}
- if (entry->blkaddr == blkaddr) {
- iput(entry->inode);
- list_del(&entry->list);
- kmem_cache_free(fsync_entry_slab, entry);
- }
+ if (entry->blkaddr == blkaddr)
+ del_fsync_inode(entry);
next:
/* check next segment */
blkaddr = next_blkaddr_of_node(page);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jonathan Hunter <[email protected]>
commit ac4ca4b9f4623ba5e1ea7a582f286567c611e027 upstream.
The tps6586x driver creates an irqchip that is used by its various child
devices for managing interrupts. The tps6586x-rtc device is one of its
children that uses the tps6586x irqchip. When using the tps6586x-rtc as
a wake-up device from suspend, the following is seen:
PM: Syncing filesystems ... done.
Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
OOM killer disabled.
Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.000 seconds) done.
Disabling non-boot CPUs ...
Entering suspend state LP1
Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
CPU1 is up
tps6586x 3-0034: failed to read interrupt status
tps6586x 3-0034: failed to read interrupt status
The reason why the tps6586x interrupt status cannot be read is because
the tps6586x interrupt is not masked during suspend and when the
tps6586x-rtc interrupt occurs, to wake-up the device, the interrupt is
seen before the i2c controller has been resumed in order to read the
tps6586x interrupt status.
The tps6586x-rtc driver sets it's interrupt as a wake-up source during
suspend, which gets propagated to the parent tps6586x interrupt.
However, the tps6586x-rtc driver cannot disable it's interrupt during
suspend otherwise we would never be woken up and so the tps6586x must
disable it's interrupt instead.
Prevent the tps6586x interrupt handler from executing on exiting suspend
before the i2c controller has been resumed by disabling the tps6586x
interrupt on entering suspend and re-enabling it on resuming from
suspend.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c
@@ -594,6 +594,29 @@ static int tps6586x_i2c_remove(struct i2
return 0;
}
+static int __maybe_unused tps6586x_i2c_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tps6586x *tps6586x = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ if (tps6586x->client->irq)
+ disable_irq(tps6586x->client->irq);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused tps6586x_i2c_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tps6586x *tps6586x = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ if (tps6586x->client->irq)
+ enable_irq(tps6586x->client->irq);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(tps6586x_pm_ops, tps6586x_i2c_suspend,
+ tps6586x_i2c_resume);
+
static const struct i2c_device_id tps6586x_id_table[] = {
{ "tps6586x", 0 },
{ },
@@ -604,6 +627,7 @@ static struct i2c_driver tps6586x_driver
.driver = {
.name = "tps6586x",
.of_match_table = of_match_ptr(tps6586x_of_match),
+ .pm = &tps6586x_pm_ops,
},
.probe = tps6586x_i2c_probe,
.remove = tps6586x_i2c_remove,
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit 5a9372f751b5350e0ce3d2ee91832f1feae2c2e5 upstream.
While reading through the sysvipc implementation, I noticed that the n32
semctl/shmctl/msgctl system calls behave differently based on whether
o32 support is enabled or not: Without o32, the IPC_64 flag passed by
user space is rejected but calls without that flag get IPC_64 behavior.
As far as I can tell, this was inadvertently changed by a cleanup patch
but never noticed by anyone, possibly nobody has tried using sysvipc
on n32 after linux-3.19.
Change it back to the old behavior now.
Fixes: 78aaf956ba3a ("MIPS: Compat: Fix build error if CONFIG_MIPS32_COMPAT but no compat ABI.")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected] # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/Kconfig | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
@@ -2972,6 +2972,7 @@ config MIPS32_O32
config MIPS32_N32
bool "Kernel support for n32 binaries"
depends on 64BIT
+ select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
select COMPAT
select MIPS32_COMPAT
select SYSVIPC_COMPAT if SYSVIPC
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin Blumenstingl <[email protected]>
commit 88960068f25fcc3759455d85460234dcc9d43fef upstream.
Treat "block_count" from struct f2fs_super_block as 64-bit little endian
value in sanity_check_raw_super() because struct f2fs_super_block
declares "block_count" as "__le64".
This fixes a bug where the superblock validation fails on big endian
devices with the following error:
F2FS-fs (sda1): Wrong segment_count / block_count (61439 > 0)
F2FS-fs (sda1): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock
F2FS-fs (sda1): Wrong segment_count / block_count (61439 > 0)
F2FS-fs (sda1): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 2th superblock
As result of this the partition cannot be mounted.
With this patch applied the superblock validation works fine and the
partition can be mounted again:
F2FS-fs (sda1): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7c84
My little endian x86-64 hardware was able to mount the partition without
this fix.
To confirm that mounting f2fs filesystems works on big endian machines
again I tested this on a 32-bit MIPS big endian (lantiq) device.
Fixes: 0cfe75c5b01199 ("f2fs: enhance sanity_check_raw_super() to avoid potential overflows")
Signed-off-by: Martin Blumenstingl <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/super.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1081,10 +1081,10 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
return 1;
}
- if (segment_count > (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->block_count) >> 9)) {
+ if (segment_count > (le64_to_cpu(raw_super->block_count) >> 9)) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
- "Wrong segment_count / block_count (%u > %u)",
- segment_count, le32_to_cpu(raw_super->block_count));
+ "Wrong segment_count / block_count (%u > %llu)",
+ segment_count, le64_to_cpu(raw_super->block_count));
return 1;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit 89d13c38501df730cbb2e02c4499da1b5187119d upstream.
This patch fixes missing up_read call.
Fixes: c9b60788fc76 ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area")
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -1342,8 +1342,10 @@ static int f2fs_write_node_page(struct p
}
if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(ni.blk_addr) &&
- !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+ up_read(&sbi->node_write);
goto redirty_out;
+ }
set_page_writeback(page);
fio.blk_addr = ni.blk_addr;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit 6781eabba1bdb133eb9125c4acf6704ccbe4df02 upstream.
Once detecting something to recover, f2fs should stop mounting, given norecovery
and rw mount options.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 +-
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 11 +++++++----
fs/f2fs/super.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ void build_gc_manager(struct f2fs_sb_inf
/*
* recovery.c
*/
-int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *);
+int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *, bool);
bool space_for_roll_forward(struct f2fs_sb_info *);
/*
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -524,12 +524,13 @@ next:
return err;
}
-int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool check_only)
{
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_WARM_NODE);
struct list_head inode_list;
block_t blkaddr;
int err;
+ int ret = 0;
bool need_writecp = false;
fsync_entry_slab = f2fs_kmem_cache_create("f2fs_fsync_inode_entry",
@@ -546,11 +547,13 @@ int recover_fsync_data(struct f2fs_sb_in
/* step #1: find fsynced inode numbers */
err = find_fsync_dnodes(sbi, &inode_list);
- if (err)
+ if (err || list_empty(&inode_list))
goto out;
- if (list_empty(&inode_list))
+ if (check_only) {
+ ret = 1;
goto out;
+ }
need_writecp = true;
@@ -598,5 +601,5 @@ out:
} else {
mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
}
- return err;
+ return ret ? ret: err;
}
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1457,14 +1457,24 @@ try_onemore:
if (need_fsck)
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
- err = recover_fsync_data(sbi);
- if (err) {
+ err = recover_fsync_data(sbi, false);
+ if (err < 0) {
need_fsck = true;
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot recover all fsync data errno=%ld", err);
goto free_kobj;
}
+ } else {
+ err = recover_fsync_data(sbi, true);
+
+ if (!f2fs_readonly(sb) && err > 0) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Need to recover fsync data");
+ goto free_kobj;
+ }
}
+
/* recover_fsync_data() cleared this already */
clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 91291e9998d208370eb8156c760691b873bd7522 upstream.
This patch adds f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr() in below functions to do sanity
check with block address to avoid pentential panic:
- f2fs_grab_read_bio()
- __written_first_block()
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200465
- Reproduce
- POC (poc.c)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <error.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <linux/loop.h>
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *xattr;
int err;
err = asprintf(&xattr, "%s/foo/bar/xattr", mpoint);
char buf2[113];
memset(buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2));
listxattr(xattr, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- kernel message
[ 844.718738] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[ 846.430929] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:1024
[ 846.431058] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:154 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[ 846.431059] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.431310] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.431312] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.431315] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[ 846.431316] Code: 00 eb ed 31 c0 83 fa 05 75 ae 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 3f 89 f1 48 c7 c2 fc 0b 0f 8b 48 c7 c6 8b d7 09 8b 88 44 24 07 e8 61 8b ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 48 83 c4 08 eb 81 4c 8b 47 10 8b 8f 38 04 00
[ 846.431347] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7bc0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 846.431349] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787b8ea80 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431350] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff89dfffd165d8 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d8
[ 846.431351] RBP: ffff961c414a7c20 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000248
[ 846.431353] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000248 R12: 0000000000000007
[ 846.431369] R13: ffff89dff5492800 R14: ffff89dfae3aa000 R15: ffff89dff4ff88d0
[ 846.431372] FS: 00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.431373] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.431374] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 846.431384] Call Trace:
[ 846.431426] f2fs_iget+0x6f4/0xe70
[ 846.431430] ? f2fs_find_entry+0x71/0x90
[ 846.431432] f2fs_lookup+0x1aa/0x390
[ 846.431452] __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[ 846.431459] lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[ 846.431462] walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[ 846.431479] ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[ 846.431488] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[ 846.431491] path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[ 846.431501] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[ 846.431504] filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[ 846.431534] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[ 846.431541] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[ 846.431549] ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.431551] path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.431570] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[ 846.431583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 846.431607] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[ 846.431607] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 846.431639] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 846.431641] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[ 846.431642] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[ 846.431643] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431645] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[ 846.431646] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431648] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5c ]---
[ 846.431651] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid blkaddr: 1024, type: 5, run fsck to fix.
[ 846.431762] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2697 f2fs_iget+0xd17/0xe70
[ 846.431763] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.431797] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.431798] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.431800] RIP: 0010:f2fs_iget+0xd17/0xe70
[ 846.431801] Code: ff ff 48 63 d8 e9 e1 f6 ff ff 48 8b 45 c8 41 b8 05 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 d8 e8 0e 8b 48 c7 c6 1d b0 0a 8b 48 8b 38 e8 f9 b4 00 00 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 c8 f0 80 48 48 04 e9 d8 f9 ff ff 0f 0b 48 8b 43 18
[ 846.431832] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7bd0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 846.431834] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787b8ea80 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 846.431835] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[ 846.431836] RBP: ffff961c414a7c20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000273
[ 846.431837] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff89dfad50ca60 R12: 0000000000000007
[ 846.431838] R13: ffff89dff5492800 R14: ffff89dfae3aa000 R15: ffff89dff4ff88d0
[ 846.431840] FS: 00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.431841] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.431842] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 846.431846] Call Trace:
[ 846.431850] ? f2fs_find_entry+0x71/0x90
[ 846.431853] f2fs_lookup+0x1aa/0x390
[ 846.431856] __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[ 846.431858] lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[ 846.431874] walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[ 846.431878] ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[ 846.431880] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[ 846.431882] path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[ 846.431884] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[ 846.431886] filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[ 846.431890] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[ 846.431891] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[ 846.431894] ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.431896] path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.431898] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[ 846.431901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 846.431902] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[ 846.431903] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 846.431934] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 846.431936] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[ 846.431937] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[ 846.431939] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431940] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[ 846.431941] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431943] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5d ]---
[ 846.432033] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:1024
[ 846.432051] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:154 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[ 846.432051] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.432085] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.432086] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.432089] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[ 846.432089] Code: 00 eb ed 31 c0 83 fa 05 75 ae 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 3f 89 f1 48 c7 c2 fc 0b 0f 8b 48 c7 c6 8b d7 09 8b 88 44 24 07 e8 61 8b ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 48 83 c4 08 eb 81 4c 8b 47 10 8b 8f 38 04 00
[ 846.432120] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7900 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 846.432122] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000400 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 846.432123] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[ 846.432124] RBP: ffff89dff5492800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000000029d
[ 846.432125] R10: ffff961c414a7820 R11: 000000000000029d R12: 0000000000000400
[ 846.432126] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432128] FS: 00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.432130] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.432131] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 846.432135] Call Trace:
[ 846.432151] f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0x20/0x110
[ 846.432158] f2fs_grab_read_bio+0xbc/0xe0
[ 846.432161] f2fs_submit_page_read+0x21/0x280
[ 846.432163] f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xb7/0x3c0
[ 846.432165] f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x29/0x1e0
[ 846.432167] f2fs_get_new_data_page+0x148/0x550
[ 846.432170] f2fs_add_regular_entry+0x1d2/0x550
[ 846.432178] ? __switch_to+0x12f/0x460
[ 846.432181] f2fs_add_dentry+0x6a/0xd0
[ 846.432184] f2fs_do_add_link+0xe9/0x140
[ 846.432186] __recover_dot_dentries+0x260/0x280
[ 846.432189] f2fs_lookup+0x343/0x390
[ 846.432193] __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[ 846.432195] lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[ 846.432208] walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[ 846.432212] ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[ 846.432215] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[ 846.432217] path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[ 846.432219] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[ 846.432221] filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[ 846.432224] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[ 846.432226] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[ 846.432228] ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.432230] path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.432233] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[ 846.432235] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 846.432237] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[ 846.432237] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 846.432269] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 846.432271] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[ 846.432272] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[ 846.432273] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432274] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[ 846.432275] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432277] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5e ]---
[ 846.432279] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid blkaddr: 1024, type: 5, run fsck to fix.
[ 846.432376] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2697 f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0xb1/0x110
[ 846.432376] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.432410] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.432411] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.432413] RIP: 0010:f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0xb1/0x110
[ 846.432414] Code: 66 90 f0 ff 4b 34 74 59 5b 5d c3 48 8b 7d 00 41 b8 05 00 00 00 89 d9 48 c7 c2 d8 e8 0e 8b 48 c7 c6 1d b0 0a 8b e8 df bc fd ff <0f> 0b f0 80 4d 48 04 e9 67 ff ff ff 48 8b 03 48 c1 e8 37 83 e0 07
[ 846.432445] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7910 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 846.432447] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000400 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 846.432448] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[ 846.432449] RBP: ffff89dff5492800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000002d1
[ 846.432450] R10: ffff961c414a7820 R11: ffff89dfad50cf80 R12: 0000000000000400
[ 846.432451] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432453] FS: 00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.432454] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.432455] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 846.432459] Call Trace:
[ 846.432463] f2fs_grab_read_bio+0xbc/0xe0
[ 846.432464] f2fs_submit_page_read+0x21/0x280
[ 846.432466] f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xb7/0x3c0
[ 846.432468] f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x29/0x1e0
[ 846.432470] f2fs_get_new_data_page+0x148/0x550
[ 846.432473] f2fs_add_regular_entry+0x1d2/0x550
[ 846.432475] ? __switch_to+0x12f/0x460
[ 846.432477] f2fs_add_dentry+0x6a/0xd0
[ 846.432480] f2fs_do_add_link+0xe9/0x140
[ 846.432483] __recover_dot_dentries+0x260/0x280
[ 846.432485] f2fs_lookup+0x343/0x390
[ 846.432488] __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[ 846.432490] lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[ 846.432505] walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[ 846.432509] ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[ 846.432511] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[ 846.432513] path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[ 846.432515] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[ 846.432517] filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[ 846.432520] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[ 846.432522] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[ 846.432525] ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.432526] path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.432529] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[ 846.432531] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 846.432533] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[ 846.432533] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 846.432565] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 846.432567] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[ 846.432568] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[ 846.432569] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432570] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[ 846.432571] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432573] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5f ]---
[ 846.434280] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
[ 846.434424] PGD 80000001ebd3a067 P4D 80000001ebd3a067 PUD 1eb1ae067 PMD 0
[ 846.434551] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 846.434697] CPU: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.434805] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.435000] Workqueue: fscrypt_read_queue decrypt_work
[ 846.435174] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_do_page_crypto+0x6e/0x2d0
[ 846.435351] Code: 00 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 88 00 00 00 31 c0 e8 43 c2 e0 ff 49 8b 86 48 02 00 00 85 ed c7 44 24 70 00 00 00 00 <48> 8b 58 08 0f 84 14 02 00 00 48 8b 78 10 48 8b 0c 24 48 c7 84 24
[ 846.435696] RSP: 0018:ffff961c40f9bd60 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 846.435870] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787719b80 RCX: ffffc5f787719b80
[ 846.436051] RDX: ffffffff8b9f4b88 RSI: ffffffff8b0ae622 RDI: ffff961c40f9bdb8
[ 846.436261] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: ffffc5f787719b80 R09: 0000000000001000
[ 846.436433] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffffc5f787719b80
[ 846.436562] R13: ffffc5f787719b80 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0ffff89dfaddee60
[ 846.436658] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89dfffc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.436758] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.436898] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001eddd0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 846.437001] Call Trace:
[ 846.437181] ? check_preempt_wakeup+0xf2/0x230
[ 846.437276] ? check_preempt_curr+0x7c/0x90
[ 846.437370] fscrypt_decrypt_page+0x48/0x4d
[ 846.437466] __fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x5b/0x90
[ 846.437542] decrypt_work+0x12/0x20
[ 846.437651] process_one_work+0x15e/0x3d0
[ 846.437740] worker_thread+0x4c/0x440
[ 846.437848] kthread+0xf8/0x130
[ 846.437938] ? rescuer_thread+0x350/0x350
[ 846.438022] ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x90/0x90
[ 846.438117] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 846.438201] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.438653] CR2: 0000000000000008
[ 846.438713] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f60 ]---
[ 846.438796] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_do_page_crypto+0x6e/0x2d0
[ 846.438844] Code: 00 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 88 00 00 00 31 c0 e8 43 c2 e0 ff 49 8b 86 48 02 00 00 85 ed c7 44 24 70 00 00 00 00 <48> 8b 58 08 0f 84 14 02 00 00 48 8b 78 10 48 8b 0c 24 48 c7 84 24
[ 846.439084] RSP: 0018:ffff961c40f9bd60 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 846.439176] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787719b80 RCX: ffffc5f787719b80
[ 846.440927] RDX: ffffffff8b9f4b88 RSI: ffffffff8b0ae622 RDI: ffff961c40f9bdb8
[ 846.442083] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: ffffc5f787719b80 R09: 0000000000001000
[ 846.443284] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffffc5f787719b80
[ 846.444448] R13: ffffc5f787719b80 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0ffff89dfaddee60
[ 846.445558] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89dfffc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.446687] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.447796] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001eddd0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc4/source/fs/crypto/crypto.c#L149
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
Here ci can be NULL
Note that this issue maybe require CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y to reproduce.
Reported-by Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/data.c | 3 +++
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -884,6 +884,9 @@ struct bio *f2fs_grab_bio(struct inode *
struct block_device *bdev = sbi->sb->s_bdev;
struct bio *bio;
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
ctx = f2fs_get_crypto_ctx(inode);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -50,14 +50,16 @@ static void __get_inode_rdev(struct inod
}
}
-static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+static int __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct f2fs_inode *ri)
{
block_t addr = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_addr[0]);
- if (is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, addr))
- return true;
- return false;
+ if (!__is_valid_data_blkaddr(addr))
+ return 1;
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
}
static void __set_inode_rdev(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_inode *ri)
@@ -145,6 +147,7 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
struct page *node_page;
struct f2fs_inode *ri;
+ int err;
/* Check if ino is within scope */
if (check_nid_range(sbi, inode->i_ino)) {
@@ -199,7 +202,12 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
/* get rdev by using inline_info */
__get_inode_rdev(inode, ri);
- if (__written_first_block(sbi, ri))
+ err = __written_first_block(sbi, ri);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!err)
set_inode_flag(F2FS_I(inode), FI_FIRST_BLOCK_WRITTEN);
f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit a51311938e14c17f5a94d30baac9d7bec71f5858 upstream.
There was a subtle bug on nat cache management which incurs wrong nid allocation
or wrong block addresses when try_to_free_nats is triggered heavily.
This patch enlarges the previous coverage of nat_tree_lock to avoid data race.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 29 ++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -261,13 +261,11 @@ static void cache_nat_entry(struct f2fs_
{
struct nat_entry *e;
- down_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
e = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
if (!e) {
e = grab_nat_entry(nm_i, nid);
node_info_from_raw_nat(&e->ni, ne);
}
- up_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
}
static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct node_info *ni,
@@ -379,6 +377,8 @@ void get_node_info(struct f2fs_sb_info *
memset(&ne, 0, sizeof(struct f2fs_nat_entry));
+ down_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
+
/* Check current segment summary */
mutex_lock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
i = lookup_journal_in_cursum(sum, NAT_JOURNAL, nid, 0);
@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ void get_node_info(struct f2fs_sb_info *
cache:
/* cache nat entry */
cache_nat_entry(NM_I(sbi), nid, &ne);
+ up_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
}
/*
@@ -1440,13 +1441,10 @@ static int add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_i
if (build) {
/* do not add allocated nids */
- down_read(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
- if (ne &&
- (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
+ if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
allocated = true;
- up_read(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
if (allocated)
return 0;
}
@@ -1532,6 +1530,8 @@ static void build_free_nids(struct f2fs_
ra_meta_pages(sbi, NAT_BLOCK_OFFSET(nid), FREE_NID_PAGES,
META_NAT, true);
+ down_read(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
+
while (1) {
struct page *page = get_current_nat_page(sbi, nid);
@@ -1560,6 +1560,7 @@ static void build_free_nids(struct f2fs_
remove_free_nid(nm_i, nid);
}
mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
+ up_read(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
ra_meta_pages(sbi, NAT_BLOCK_OFFSET(nm_i->next_scan_nid),
nm_i->ra_nid_pages, META_NAT, false);
@@ -1842,14 +1843,12 @@ static void remove_nats_in_journal(struc
raw_ne = nat_in_journal(sum, i);
- down_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
if (!ne) {
ne = grab_nat_entry(nm_i, nid);
node_info_from_raw_nat(&ne->ni, &raw_ne);
}
__set_nat_cache_dirty(nm_i, ne);
- up_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
}
update_nats_in_cursum(sum, -i);
mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
@@ -1883,7 +1882,6 @@ static void __flush_nat_entry_set(struct
struct f2fs_nat_block *nat_blk;
struct nat_entry *ne, *cur;
struct page *page = NULL;
- struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
/*
* there are two steps to flush nat entries:
@@ -1920,12 +1918,8 @@ static void __flush_nat_entry_set(struct
raw_ne = &nat_blk->entries[nid - start_nid];
}
raw_nat_from_node_info(raw_ne, &ne->ni);
-
- down_write(&NM_I(sbi)->nat_tree_lock);
nat_reset_flag(ne);
__clear_nat_cache_dirty(NM_I(sbi), ne);
- up_write(&NM_I(sbi)->nat_tree_lock);
-
if (nat_get_blkaddr(ne) == NULL_ADDR)
add_free_nid(sbi, nid, false);
}
@@ -1937,9 +1931,7 @@ static void __flush_nat_entry_set(struct
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, set->entry_cnt);
- down_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
radix_tree_delete(&NM_I(sbi)->nat_set_root, set->set);
- up_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
kmem_cache_free(nat_entry_set_slab, set);
}
@@ -1959,6 +1951,9 @@ void flush_nat_entries(struct f2fs_sb_in
if (!nm_i->dirty_nat_cnt)
return;
+
+ down_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
+
/*
* if there are no enough space in journal to store dirty nat
* entries, remove all entries from journal and merge them
@@ -1967,7 +1962,6 @@ void flush_nat_entries(struct f2fs_sb_in
if (!__has_cursum_space(sum, nm_i->dirty_nat_cnt, NAT_JOURNAL))
remove_nats_in_journal(sbi);
- down_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
while ((found = __gang_lookup_nat_set(nm_i,
set_idx, SETVEC_SIZE, setvec))) {
unsigned idx;
@@ -1976,12 +1970,13 @@ void flush_nat_entries(struct f2fs_sb_in
__adjust_nat_entry_set(setvec[idx], &sets,
MAX_NAT_JENTRIES(sum));
}
- up_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
/* flush dirty nats in nat entry set */
list_for_each_entry_safe(set, tmp, &sets, set_list)
__flush_nat_entry_set(sbi, set);
+ up_write(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
+
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nm_i->dirty_nat_cnt);
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 4dbe38dc386910c668c75ae616b99b823b59f3eb upstream.
As Wen Xu reported in bugzilla, after image was injected with random data
by fuzzing, inline inode would contain invalid reserved blkaddr, then
during inline conversion, we will encounter illegal memory accessing
reported by KASAN, the root cause of this is when writing out converted
inline page, we will use invalid reserved blkaddr to update sit bitmap,
result in accessing memory beyond sit bitmap boundary.
In order to fix this issue, let's do sanity check with reserved block
address of inline inode to avoid above condition.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200179
[ 1428.846352] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in update_sit_entry+0x80/0x7f0
[ 1428.846618] Read of size 4 at addr ffff880194483540 by task a.out/2741
[ 1428.846855] CPU: 0 PID: 2741 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.17.0+ #1
[ 1428.846858] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 1428.846860] Call Trace:
[ 1428.846868] dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 1428.846875] print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 1428.846881] kasan_report+0x28e/0x390
[ 1428.846888] ? update_sit_entry+0x80/0x7f0
[ 1428.846898] update_sit_entry+0x80/0x7f0
[ 1428.846906] f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x6db/0xc70
[ 1428.846914] ? f2fs_get_node_info+0x14f/0x590
[ 1428.846920] do_write_page+0xc8/0x150
[ 1428.846928] f2fs_outplace_write_data+0xfe/0x210
[ 1428.846935] ? f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x170/0x170
[ 1428.846941] ? radix_tree_tag_clear+0xff/0x130
[ 1428.846946] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x22/0xa0
[ 1428.846951] ? inc_zone_page_state+0x54/0x100
[ 1428.846956] ? __test_set_page_writeback+0x336/0x5d0
[ 1428.846964] f2fs_convert_inline_page+0x407/0x6d0
[ 1428.846971] ? f2fs_read_inline_data+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 1428.846978] ? __get_node_page+0x335/0x6b0
[ 1428.846987] f2fs_convert_inline_inode+0x41b/0x500
[ 1428.846994] ? f2fs_convert_inline_page+0x6d0/0x6d0
[ 1428.847000] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 1428.847005] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 1428.847024] f2fs_file_mmap+0x79/0xc0
[ 1428.847029] mmap_region+0x58b/0x880
[ 1428.847037] ? arch_get_unmapped_area+0x370/0x370
[ 1428.847042] do_mmap+0x55b/0x7a0
[ 1428.847048] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x16f/0x1c0
[ 1428.847055] ? vma_is_stack_for_current+0x50/0x50
[ 1428.847062] ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags.part.1+0x160/0x160
[ 1428.847068] ? do_sys_open+0x206/0x2a0
[ 1428.847073] ? __fget+0xb4/0x100
[ 1428.847079] ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x278/0x360
[ 1428.847085] ? find_mergeable_anon_vma+0x50/0x50
[ 1428.847091] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 1428.847098] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1428.847102] RIP: 0033:0x7fb1430766ba
[ 1428.847103] Code: 89 f5 41 54 49 89 fc 55 53 74 35 49 63 e8 48 63 da 4d 89 f9 49 89 e8 4d 63 d6 48 89 da 4c 89 ee 4c 89 e7 b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 0f 1f 00
[ 1428.847162] RSP: 002b:00007ffc651d9388 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009
[ 1428.847167] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fb1430766ba
[ 1428.847170] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 1428.847173] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1428.847176] R10: 0000000000008002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1428.847179] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: 0000000000008002 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 1428.847252] Allocated by task 2683:
[ 1428.847372] kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 1428.847380] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x1e0
[ 1428.847385] getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0
[ 1428.847390] user_path_at_empty+0x1d/0x40
[ 1428.847395] vfs_statx+0xc1/0x150
[ 1428.847401] __do_sys_newlstat+0x7e/0xd0
[ 1428.847405] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 1428.847411] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1428.847466] Freed by task 2683:
[ 1428.847566] __kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x190
[ 1428.847571] kmem_cache_free+0x85/0x1e0
[ 1428.847575] filename_lookup+0x191/0x280
[ 1428.847580] vfs_statx+0xc1/0x150
[ 1428.847585] __do_sys_newlstat+0x7e/0xd0
[ 1428.847590] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 1428.847596] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1428.847648] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880194483300
which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096
[ 1428.847946] The buggy address is located 576 bytes inside of
4096-byte region [ffff880194483300, ffff880194484300)
[ 1428.848234] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 1428.848366] page:ffffea0006512000 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f3586380 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 1428.848606] flags: 0x17fff8000008100(slab|head)
[ 1428.848737] raw: 017fff8000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8801f3586380
[ 1428.848931] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 1428.849122] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 1428.849305] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 1428.849436] ffff880194483400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1428.849620] ffff880194483480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1428.849804] >ffff880194483500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1428.849985] ^
[ 1428.850120] ffff880194483580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1428.850303] ffff880194483600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1428.850498] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/inline.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
@@ -127,6 +127,16 @@ int f2fs_convert_inline_page(struct dnod
if (err)
return err;
+ if (unlikely(dn->data_blkaddr != NEW_ADDR)) {
+ f2fs_put_dnode(dn);
+ set_sbi_flag(fio.sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ f2fs_msg(fio.sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "%s: corrupted inline inode ino=%lx, i_addr[0]:0x%x, "
+ "run fsck to fix.",
+ __func__, dn->inode->i_ino, dn->data_blkaddr);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, DATA);
if (PageUptodate(page))
@@ -386,6 +396,17 @@ static int f2fs_move_inline_dirents(stru
if (err)
goto out;
+ if (unlikely(dn.data_blkaddr != NEW_ADDR)) {
+ f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
+ set_sbi_flag(F2FS_P_SB(page), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ f2fs_msg(F2FS_P_SB(page)->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "%s: corrupted inline inode ino=%lx, i_addr[0]:0x%x, "
+ "run fsck to fix.",
+ __func__, dir->i_ino, dn.data_blkaddr);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, DATA);
zero_user_segment(page, MAX_INLINE_DATA, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit e34438c903b653daca2b2a7de95aed46226f8ed3 upstream.
This patch adds to do sanity check with below fields of inode to
avoid reported panic.
- node footer
- iblocks
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200223
- Overview
BUG() triggered in f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks() when un-mounting a mounted f2fs image after writing to it
- Reproduce
- POC (poc.c)
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *foo_bar_baz;
int err;
static int buf[8192];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
// open / write / read
int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);
if (fd >= 0) {
write(fd, (char *)buf, 517);
write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
close(fd);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- Kernel meesage
[ 552.479723] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[ 556.451891] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 556.451899] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/node.c:987!
[ 556.452920] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 556.453936] CPU: 1 PID: 1310 Comm: umount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 556.455213] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 556.457140] RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x4a7/0x6f0
[ 556.458280] Code: e8 ae ea ff ff 41 89 c7 c1 e8 1f 84 c0 74 0a 41 83 ff fe 0f 85 35 ff ff ff 81 85 b0 fe ff ff fb 03 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 62 b7 9a 00 48 8b bd a0 fe ff ff e8 56 54 ae ff 48 8b b5
[ 556.462015] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f292f808 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 556.463068] RAX: ffffed003e73242d RBX: ffff8801f292f958 RCX: ffffffffb88b81bc
[ 556.464479] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8801f3992164
[ 556.465901] RBP: ffff8801f292f980 R08: ffffed003e73242d R09: ffffed003e73242d
[ 556.467311] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e73242c R12: 00000000fffffc64
[ 556.468706] R13: ffff8801f3992000 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 00000000ffff8801
[ 556.470117] FS: 00007f8029297840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 556.471702] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 556.472838] CR2: 000055f5f57305d8 CR3: 00000001f18b0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 556.474265] Call Trace:
[ 556.474782] ? f2fs_alloc_nid_failed+0xf0/0xf0
[ 556.475686] ? truncate_nodes+0x980/0x980
[ 556.476516] ? pagecache_get_page+0x21f/0x2f0
[ 556.477412] ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[ 556.478153] ? __get_node_page+0x331/0x5b0
[ 556.478992] ? reweight_entity+0x1e6/0x3b0
[ 556.479826] f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x55e/0x740
[ 556.480709] ? f2fs_truncate_data_blocks+0x20/0x20
[ 556.481689] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x34/0x160
[ 556.482630] ? radix_tree_lookup+0xd/0x10
[ 556.483445] f2fs_truncate+0xd4/0x1a0
[ 556.484206] f2fs_evict_inode+0x5ce/0x630
[ 556.485032] evict+0x16f/0x290
[ 556.485664] iput+0x280/0x300
[ 556.486300] dentry_unlink_inode+0x165/0x1e0
[ 556.487169] __dentry_kill+0x16a/0x260
[ 556.487936] dentry_kill+0x70/0x250
[ 556.488651] shrink_dentry_list+0x125/0x260
[ 556.489504] shrink_dcache_parent+0xc1/0x110
[ 556.490379] ? shrink_dcache_sb+0x200/0x200
[ 556.491231] ? bit_wait_timeout+0xc0/0xc0
[ 556.492047] do_one_tree+0x12/0x40
[ 556.492743] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x3f/0xa0
[ 556.493656] generic_shutdown_super+0x43/0x1c0
[ 556.494561] kill_block_super+0x52/0x80
[ 556.495341] kill_f2fs_super+0x62/0x70
[ 556.496105] deactivate_locked_super+0x6f/0xa0
[ 556.497004] deactivate_super+0x5e/0x80
[ 556.497785] cleanup_mnt+0x61/0xa0
[ 556.498492] __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 556.499218] task_work_run+0xc8/0xf0
[ 556.499949] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x125/0x130
[ 556.500846] do_syscall_64+0x138/0x170
[ 556.501609] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 556.502659] RIP: 0033:0x7f8028b77487
[ 556.503384] Code: 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 f6 e9 09 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 c9 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 556.507137] RSP: 002b:00007fff9f2e3598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 556.508637] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000ebd030 RCX: 00007f8028b77487
[ 556.510069] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000ec41e0
[ 556.511481] RBP: 0000000000ec41e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[ 556.512892] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f802908083c
[ 556.514320] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000ebd210 R15: 00007fff9f2e3820
[ 556.515745] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 556.529276] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 556.530340] RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x4a7/0x6f0
[ 556.531513] Code: e8 ae ea ff ff 41 89 c7 c1 e8 1f 84 c0 74 0a 41 83 ff fe 0f 85 35 ff ff ff 81 85 b0 fe ff ff fb 03 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 62 b7 9a 00 48 8b bd a0 fe ff ff e8 56 54 ae ff 48 8b b5
[ 556.535330] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f292f808 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 556.536395] RAX: ffffed003e73242d RBX: ffff8801f292f958 RCX: ffffffffb88b81bc
[ 556.537824] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8801f3992164
[ 556.539290] RBP: ffff8801f292f980 R08: ffffed003e73242d R09: ffffed003e73242d
[ 556.540709] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e73242c R12: 00000000fffffc64
[ 556.542131] R13: ffff8801f3992000 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 00000000ffff8801
[ 556.543579] FS: 00007f8029297840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 556.545180] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 556.546338] CR2: 000055f5f57305d8 CR3: 00000001f18b0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 556.547809] ==================================================================
[ 556.549248] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.550672] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8801f292fd10 by task umount/1310
[ 556.552338] CPU: 1 PID: 1310 Comm: umount Tainted: G D 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 556.553886] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 556.555756] Call Trace:
[ 556.556264] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 556.556944] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 556.557903] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 556.558649] ? arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.559537] __asan_store8+0x57/0x90
[ 556.560268] arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.561110] tlb_gather_mmu+0x12/0x40
[ 556.561862] exit_mmap+0x123/0x2a0
[ 556.562555] ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[ 556.563384] ? exit_aio+0x98/0x230
[ 556.564079] ? __x32_compat_sys_io_submit+0x260/0x260
[ 556.565099] ? taskstats_exit+0x1f4/0x640
[ 556.565925] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 556.566739] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[ 556.567652] mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[ 556.568260] do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[ 556.568937] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 556.569855] ? deactivate_super+0x5e/0x80
[ 556.570668] ? cleanup_mnt+0x61/0xa0
[ 556.571395] ? __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 556.572156] ? task_work_run+0xc8/0xf0
[ 556.572917] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x125/0x130
[ 556.573861] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 556.574707] RIP: 0033:0x7f8028b77487
[ 556.575428] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 556.576106] RSP: 002b:00007fff9f2e3598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 556.577599] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000ebd030 RCX: 00007f8028b77487
[ 556.579020] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000ec41e0
[ 556.580422] RBP: 0000000000ec41e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[ 556.581833] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f802908083c
[ 556.583252] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000ebd210 R15: 00007fff9f2e3820
[ 556.584983] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 556.585961] page:ffffea0007ca4bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 556.587540] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 556.588296] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[ 556.589822] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 556.591359] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 556.592786] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 556.593753] ffff8801f292fc00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 556.595191] ffff8801f292fc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00
[ 556.596613] >ffff8801f292fd00: 00 00 f3 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 f4 f4 f4
[ 556.598044] ^
[ 556.598797] ffff8801f292fd80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 556.600225] ffff8801f292fe00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4
[ 556.601647] ==================================================================
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/node.c#L987
case NODE_DIND_BLOCK:
err = truncate_nodes(&dn, nofs, offset[1], 3);
cont = 0;
break;
default:
BUG(); <---
}
Reported-by Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -95,9 +95,30 @@ static void __recover_inline_status(stru
return;
}
-static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode)
+static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
+ unsigned long long iblocks;
+
+ iblocks = le64_to_cpu(F2FS_INODE(node_page)->i_blocks);
+ if (!iblocks) {
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "%s: corrupted inode i_blocks i_ino=%lx iblocks=%llu, "
+ "run fsck to fix.",
+ __func__, inode->i_ino, iblocks);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (ino_of_node(node_page) != nid_of_node(node_page)) {
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "%s: corrupted inode footer i_ino=%lx, ino,nid: "
+ "[%u, %u] run fsck to fix.",
+ __func__, inode->i_ino,
+ ino_of_node(node_page), nid_of_node(node_page));
+ return false;
+ }
return true;
}
@@ -150,7 +171,7 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
get_inline_info(fi, ri);
- if (!sanity_check_inode(inode)) {
+ if (!sanity_check_inode(inode, node_page)) {
f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
return -EINVAL;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit 0cfe75c5b011994651a4ca6d74f20aa997bfc69a upstream.
In order to avoid the below overflow issue, we should have checked the
boundaries in superblock before reaching out to allocation. As Linus suggested,
the right place should be sanity_check_raw_super().
Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect reported:
There are integer overflows with using the cp_payload superblock field in the
f2fs filesystem potentially leading to memory corruption.
include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
struct f2fs_super_block {
...
__le32 cp_payload;
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
typedef u32 block_t; /*
* should not change u32, since it is the on-disk block
* address format, __le32.
*/
...
static inline block_t __cp_payload(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
return le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->cp_payload);
}
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
block_t start_blk, orphan_blocks, i, j;
...
start_blk = __start_cp_addr(sbi) + 1 + __cp_payload(sbi);
orphan_blocks = __start_sum_addr(sbi) - 1 - __cp_payload(sbi);
+++ integer overflows
...
unsigned int cp_blks = 1 + __cp_payload(sbi);
...
sbi->ckpt = kzalloc(cp_blks * blk_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+++ integer overflow leading to incorrect heap allocation.
int cp_payload_blks = __cp_payload(sbi);
...
ckpt->cp_pack_start_sum = cpu_to_le32(1 + cp_payload_blks +
orphan_blocks);
+++ sign bug and integer overflow
...
for (i = 1; i < 1 + cp_payload_blks; i++)
+++ integer overflow
...
sbi->max_orphans = (sbi->blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS -
NR_CURSEG_TYPE - __cp_payload(sbi)) *
F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK;
+++ integer overflow
Reported-by: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Silvio Cesare <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- No hot file extension support
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/super.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -994,6 +994,8 @@ static inline bool sanity_check_area_bou
static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct super_block *sb,
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super)
{
+ block_t segment_count, segs_per_sec, secs_per_zone;
+ block_t total_sections, blocks_per_seg;
unsigned int blocksize;
if (F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC != le32_to_cpu(raw_super->magic)) {
@@ -1047,6 +1049,68 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
return 1;
}
+ segment_count = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
+ segs_per_sec = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segs_per_sec);
+ secs_per_zone = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->secs_per_zone);
+ total_sections = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->section_count);
+
+ /* blocks_per_seg should be 512, given the above check */
+ blocks_per_seg = 1 << le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg);
+
+ if (segment_count > F2FS_MAX_SEGMENT ||
+ segment_count < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Invalid segment count (%u)",
+ segment_count);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (total_sections > segment_count ||
+ total_sections < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
+ segs_per_sec > segment_count || !segs_per_sec) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Invalid segment/section count (%u, %u x %u)",
+ segment_count, total_sections, segs_per_sec);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((segment_count / segs_per_sec) < total_sections) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Small segment_count (%u < %u * %u)",
+ segment_count, segs_per_sec, total_sections);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (segment_count > (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->block_count) >> 9)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Wrong segment_count / block_count (%u > %u)",
+ segment_count, le32_to_cpu(raw_super->block_count));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (secs_per_zone > total_sections) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Wrong secs_per_zone (%u > %u)",
+ secs_per_zone, total_sections);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->extension_count) > F2FS_MAX_EXTENSION) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Corrupted extension count (%u > %u)",
+ le32_to_cpu(raw_super->extension_count),
+ F2FS_MAX_EXTENSION);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->cp_payload) >
+ (blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Insane cp_payload (%u > %u)",
+ le32_to_cpu(raw_super->cp_payload),
+ blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/* check reserved ino info */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino) != 1 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino) != 2 ||
@@ -1059,13 +1123,6 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
return 1;
}
- if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count) > F2FS_MAX_SEGMENT) {
- f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
- "Invalid segment count (%u)",
- le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count));
- return 1;
- }
-
/* check CP/SIT/NAT/SSA/MAIN_AREA area boundary */
if (sanity_check_area_boundary(sb, raw_super))
return 1;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit b2ca374f33bd33fd822eb871876e4888cf79dc97 upstream.
syzbot hit the following crash on upstream commit
87ef12027b9b1dd0e0b12cf311fbcb19f9d92539 (Wed Apr 18 19:48:17 2018 +0000)
Merge tag 'ceph-for-4.17-rc2' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
syzbot dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=83699adeb2d13579c31e
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?id=5805208181407744
syzkaller reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?id=6005073343676416
Raw console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?id=6555047731134464
Kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?id=1808800213120130118
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: [email protected]
It will help syzbot understand when the bug is fixed. See footer for details.
If you forward the report, please keep this part and the footer.
F2FS-fs (loop0): Magic Mismatch, valid(0xf2f52010) - read(0x0)
F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffed006b2a50c0
PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21fbeb067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 4514 Comm: syzkaller989480 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #8
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:3653 [inline]
RIP: 0010:build_segment_manager+0x7ef7/0xbf70 fs/f2fs/segment.c:3852
RSP: 0018:ffff8801b102e5b0 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: 1ffff1006b2a50c0 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8801ac74243e
RBP: ffff8801b102f410 R08: ffff8801acbd46c0 R09: fffffbfff14d9af8
R10: fffffbfff14d9af8 R11: ffff8801acbd46c0 R12: ffff8801ac742a80
R13: ffff8801d9519100 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff880359528600
FS: 0000000001e04880(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffed006b2a50c0 CR3: 00000001ac6ac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
f2fs_fill_super+0x4095/0x7bf0 fs/f2fs/super.c:2803
mount_bdev+0x30c/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1165
f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:3020
mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1268
vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2517 [inline]
do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2847
ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3063
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3077 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3074 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3074
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x443d6a
RSP: 002b:00007ffd312813c8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000c00 RCX: 0000000000443d6a
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffd312813d0
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000020016a00 R09: 000000000000000a
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000402c60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
RIP: build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:3653 [inline] RSP: ffff8801b102e5b0
RIP: build_segment_manager+0x7ef7/0xbf70 fs/f2fs/segment.c:3852 RSP: ffff8801b102e5b0
CR2: ffffed006b2a50c0
---[ end trace a2034989e196ff17 ]---
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -2152,6 +2152,15 @@ static int build_sit_entries(struct f2fs
unsigned int old_valid_blocks;
start = le32_to_cpu(segno_in_journal(sum, i));
+ if (start >= MAIN_SEGS(sbi)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong journal entry on segno %u",
+ start);
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
se = &sit_i->sentries[start];
sit = sit_in_journal(sum, i);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
commit 0833721ec3658a4e9d5e58b6fa82cf9edc431e59 upstream.
This patch check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a
write or read bio.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- CoW is not implemented so check f2fs_io_info::blk_addr instead of
f2fs_io_info::{old,new}_blkaddr
- Operation code is f2fs_io_info::rw instead of f2fs_io_info::op
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 2 ++
fs/f2fs/data.c | 3 ++-
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 +
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static struct page *__get_meta_page(stru
.rw = READ_SYNC | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO,
.blk_addr = index,
.encrypted_page = NULL,
+ .is_meta = is_meta,
};
if (unlikely(!is_meta))
@@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *s
.type = META,
.rw = sync ? (READ_SYNC | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO) : READA,
.encrypted_page = NULL,
+ .is_meta = (type != META_POR),
};
if (unlikely(type == META_POR))
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ int f2fs_submit_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_
struct bio *bio;
struct page *page = fio->encrypted_page ? fio->encrypted_page : fio->page;
+ verify_block_addr(fio, fio->blk_addr);
trace_f2fs_submit_page_bio(page, fio);
f2fs_trace_ios(fio, 0);
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ void f2fs_submit_page_mbio(struct f2fs_i
io = is_read ? &sbi->read_io : &sbi->write_io[btype];
- verify_block_addr(sbi, fio->blk_addr);
+ verify_block_addr(fio, fio->blk_addr);
down_write(&io->io_rwsem);
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ struct f2fs_io_info {
block_t blk_addr; /* block address to be written */
struct page *page; /* page to be written */
struct page *encrypted_page; /* encrypted page */
+ bool is_meta; /* indicate borrow meta inode mapping or not */
};
#define is_read_io(rw) (((rw) & 1) == READ)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -48,13 +48,19 @@
(secno == CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_COLD_NODE)->segno / \
sbi->segs_per_sec)) \
-#define MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) (SM_I(sbi)->main_blkaddr)
-#define SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) (SM_I(sbi)->seg0_blkaddr)
+#define MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) \
+ (SM_I(sbi) ? SM_I(sbi)->main_blkaddr : \
+ le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->main_blkaddr))
+#define SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) \
+ (SM_I(sbi) ? SM_I(sbi)->seg0_blkaddr : \
+ le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->segment0_blkaddr))
#define MAIN_SEGS(sbi) (SM_I(sbi)->main_segments)
#define MAIN_SECS(sbi) (sbi->total_sections)
-#define TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) (SM_I(sbi)->segment_count)
+#define TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) \
+ (SM_I(sbi) ? SM_I(sbi)->segment_count : \
+ le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->segment_count))
#define TOTAL_BLKS(sbi) (TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) << sbi->log_blocks_per_seg)
#define MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) (SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) + TOTAL_BLKS(sbi))
@@ -576,10 +582,17 @@ static inline void check_seg_range(struc
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, segno > TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) - 1);
}
-static inline void verify_block_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blk_addr)
+static inline void verify_block_addr(struct f2fs_io_info *fio, block_t blk_addr)
{
- BUG_ON(blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi)
- || blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
+
+ if (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&
+ (!is_read_io(fio->rw) || fio->is_meta))
+ BUG_ON(blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
+ blk_addr >= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ else
+ BUG_ON(blk_addr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
+ blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
}
/*
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit d3f07c049dab1a3f1740f476afd3d5e5b738c21c upstream.
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: d9bd94c0bcaa Add linux-next specific files for 20180801
git tree: linux-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1001189c400000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=cc8964ea4d04518c
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c966a82db0b14aa37e81
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: [email protected]
loop7: rw=12288, want=8200, limit=20
netlink: 65342 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor4'.
openvswitch: netlink: Message has 8 unknown bytes.
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 7615 Comm: syz-executor7 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc7-next-20180801+ #29
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:188 [inline]
RIP: 0010:compound_head include/linux/page-flags.h:142 [inline]
RIP: 0010:PageLocked include/linux/page-flags.h:272 [inline]
RIP: 0010:f2fs_put_page fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2011 [inline]
RIP: 0010:validate_checkpoint+0x66d/0xec0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:835
Code: e8 58 05 7f fe 4c 8d 6b 80 4d 8d 74 24 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 c6 04 02 00 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 f4 06 00 00 4c 89 ea 4d 8b 7c 24 08 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8801937cebe8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801937cef30 RCX: ffffc90006035000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82fd9658 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff8801937cef58 R08: ffff8801ab254700 R09: fffff94000d9e026
R10: fffff94000d9e026 R11: ffffea0006cf0137 R12: fffffffffffffffb
R13: ffff8801937ceeb0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffff880193419b40
FS: 00007f36a61d5700(0000) GS:ffff8801db100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc04ff93000 CR3: 00000001d0562000 CR4: 00000000001426e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
f2fs_get_valid_checkpoint+0x436/0x1ec0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:860
f2fs_fill_super+0x2d42/0x8110 fs/f2fs/super.c:2883
mount_bdev+0x314/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1344
f2fs_mount+0x3c/0x50 fs/f2fs/super.c:3133
legacy_get_tree+0x131/0x460 fs/fs_context.c:729
vfs_get_tree+0x1cb/0x5c0 fs/super.c:1743
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2603 [inline]
do_mount+0x6f2/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:2927
ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3143
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3157 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3154 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3154
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x45943a
Code: b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bd 8a fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9a 8a fb ff c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f36a61d4a88 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f36a61d4b30 RCX: 000000000045943a
RDX: 00007f36a61d4ad0 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f36a61d4af0
RBP: 0000000020000100 R08: 00007f36a61d4b30 R09: 00007f36a61d4ad0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000013
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000004c8ea0 R15: 0000000000000000
Modules linked in:
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace bd8550c129352286 ]---
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:188 [inline]
RIP: 0010:compound_head include/linux/page-flags.h:142 [inline]
RIP: 0010:PageLocked include/linux/page-flags.h:272 [inline]
RIP: 0010:f2fs_put_page fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2011 [inline]
RIP: 0010:validate_checkpoint+0x66d/0xec0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:835
Code: e8 58 05 7f fe 4c 8d 6b 80 4d 8d 74 24 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 c6 04 02 00 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 f4 06 00 00 4c 89 ea 4d 8b 7c 24 08 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8801937cebe8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801937cef30 RCX: ffffc90006035000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82fd9658 RDI: 0000000000000005
netlink: 65342 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor4'.
RBP: ffff8801937cef58 R08: ffff8801ab254700 R09: fffff94000d9e026
openvswitch: netlink: Message has 8 unknown bytes.
R10: fffff94000d9e026 R11: ffffea0006cf0137 R12: fffffffffffffffb
R13: ffff8801937ceeb0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffff880193419b40
FS: 00007f36a61d5700(0000) GS:ffff8801db100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc04ff93000 CR3: 00000001d0562000 CR4: 00000000001426e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
In validate_checkpoint(), if we failed to call get_checkpoint_version(), we
will pass returned invalid page pointer into f2fs_put_page, cause accessing
invalid memory, this patch tries to handle error path correctly to fix this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -631,6 +631,7 @@ static int get_checkpoint_version(struct
crc_offset = le32_to_cpu((*cp_block)->checksum_offset);
if (crc_offset >= blk_size) {
+ f2fs_put_page(*cp_page, 1);
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
"invalid crc_offset: %zu", crc_offset);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -639,6 +640,7 @@ static int get_checkpoint_version(struct
crc = le32_to_cpu(*((__le32 *)((unsigned char *)*cp_block
+ crc_offset)));
if (!f2fs_crc_valid(crc, *cp_block, crc_offset)) {
+ f2fs_put_page(*cp_page, 1);
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING, "invalid crc value");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -658,14 +660,14 @@ static struct page *validate_checkpoint(
err = get_checkpoint_version(sbi, cp_addr, &cp_block,
&cp_page_1, version);
if (err)
- goto invalid_cp1;
+ return NULL;
if (le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) >
sbi->blocks_per_seg) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
"invalid cp_pack_total_block_count:%u",
le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count));
- goto invalid_cp1;
+ goto invalid_cp;
}
pre_version = *version;
@@ -673,7 +675,7 @@ static struct page *validate_checkpoint(
err = get_checkpoint_version(sbi, cp_addr, &cp_block,
&cp_page_2, version);
if (err)
- goto invalid_cp2;
+ goto invalid_cp;
cur_version = *version;
if (cur_version == pre_version) {
@@ -681,9 +683,8 @@ static struct page *validate_checkpoint(
f2fs_put_page(cp_page_2, 1);
return cp_page_1;
}
-invalid_cp2:
f2fs_put_page(cp_page_2, 1);
-invalid_cp1:
+invalid_cp:
f2fs_put_page(cp_page_1, 1);
return NULL;
}
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
commit 0aaa81377c5a01f686bcdb8c7a6929a7bf330c68 upstream.
Muyu Yu provided a POC where user root with CAP_NET_ADMIN can create a CAN
frame modification rule that makes the data length code a higher value than
the available CAN frame data size. In combination with a configured checksum
calculation where the result is stored relatively to the end of the data
(e.g. cgw_csum_xor_rel) the tail of the skb (e.g. frag_list pointer in
skb_shared_info) can be rewritten which finally can cause a system crash.
Michael Kubecek suggested to drop frames that have a DLC exceeding the
available space after the modification process and provided a patch that can
handle CAN FD frames too. Within this patch we also limit the length for the
checksum calculations to the maximum of Classic CAN data length (8).
CAN frames that are dropped by these additional checks are counted with the
CGW_DELETED counter which indicates misconfigurations in can-gw rules.
This fixes CVE-2019-3701.
Reported-by: Muyu Yu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Muyu Yu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Cc: linux-stable <[email protected]> # >= v3.2
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/can/gw.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/can/gw.c
+++ b/net/can/gw.c
@@ -418,13 +418,29 @@ static void can_can_gw_rcv(struct sk_buf
while (modidx < MAX_MODFUNCTIONS && gwj->mod.modfunc[modidx])
(*gwj->mod.modfunc[modidx++])(cf, &gwj->mod);
- /* check for checksum updates when the CAN frame has been modified */
+ /* Has the CAN frame been modified? */
if (modidx) {
- if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8)
+ /* get available space for the processed CAN frame type */
+ int max_len = nskb->len - offsetof(struct can_frame, data);
+
+ /* dlc may have changed, make sure it fits to the CAN frame */
+ if (cf->can_dlc > max_len)
+ goto out_delete;
+
+ /* check for checksum updates in classic CAN length only */
+ if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8) {
+ if (cf->can_dlc > 8)
+ goto out_delete;
+
(*gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8)(cf, &gwj->mod.csum.crc8);
+ }
+
+ if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.xor) {
+ if (cf->can_dlc > 8)
+ goto out_delete;
- if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.xor)
(*gwj->mod.csumfunc.xor)(cf, &gwj->mod.csum.xor);
+ }
}
/* clear the skb timestamp if not configured the other way */
@@ -436,6 +452,14 @@ static void can_can_gw_rcv(struct sk_buf
gwj->dropped_frames++;
else
gwj->handled_frames++;
+
+ return;
+
+ out_delete:
+ /* delete frame due to misconfiguration */
+ gwj->deleted_frames++;
+ kfree_skb(nskb);
+ return;
}
static inline int cgw_register_filter(struct cgw_job *gwj)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit 8508e44ae98622f841f5ef29d0bf3d5db4e0c1cc upstream.
We don't guarantee cp_addr is fixed by cp_version.
This is to sync with f2fs-tools.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 8 +++++++-
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -710,6 +710,11 @@ int get_valid_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_
if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
goto fail_no_cp;
+ if (cur_page == cp1)
+ sbi->cur_cp_pack = 1;
+ else
+ sbi->cur_cp_pack = 2;
+
if (cp_blks <= 1)
goto done;
@@ -1008,7 +1013,7 @@ static void do_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb
le32_to_cpu(ckpt->checksum_offset)))
= cpu_to_le32(crc32);
- start_blk = __start_cp_addr(sbi);
+ start_blk = __start_cp_next_addr(sbi);
/* need to wait for end_io results */
wait_on_all_pages_writeback(sbi);
@@ -1063,6 +1068,7 @@ static void do_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb
clear_prefree_segments(sbi, cpc);
clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_IS_DIRTY);
+ __set_cp_next_pack(sbi);
}
/*
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -731,6 +731,7 @@ struct f2fs_sb_info {
/* for checkpoint */
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt; /* raw checkpoint pointer */
+ int cur_cp_pack; /* remain current cp pack */
struct inode *meta_inode; /* cache meta blocks */
struct mutex cp_mutex; /* checkpoint procedure lock */
struct rw_semaphore cp_rwsem; /* blocking FS operations */
@@ -1140,22 +1141,27 @@ static inline void *__bitmap_ptr(struct
static inline block_t __start_cp_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
- block_t start_addr;
- struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
- unsigned long long ckpt_version = cur_cp_version(ckpt);
-
- start_addr = le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->cp_blkaddr);
+ block_t start_addr = le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->cp_blkaddr);
- /*
- * odd numbered checkpoint should at cp segment 0
- * and even segment must be at cp segment 1
- */
- if (!(ckpt_version & 1))
+ if (sbi->cur_cp_pack == 2)
start_addr += sbi->blocks_per_seg;
+ return start_addr;
+}
+static inline block_t __start_cp_next_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+{
+ block_t start_addr = le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->cp_blkaddr);
+
+ if (sbi->cur_cp_pack == 1)
+ start_addr += sbi->blocks_per_seg;
return start_addr;
}
+static inline void __set_cp_next_pack(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+{
+ sbi->cur_cp_pack = (sbi->cur_cp_pack == 1) ? 2 : 1;
+}
+
static inline block_t __start_sum_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
return le32_to_cpu(F2FS_CKPT(sbi)->cp_pack_start_sum);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 9dc956b2c8523aed39d1e6508438be9fea28c8fc upstream.
This patch fixs to do sanity check with user_block_count.
- Overview
Divide zero in utilization when mount() a corrupted f2fs image
- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)
- Kernel message
[ 564.099503] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
[ 564.101991] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 564.103103] CPU: 1 PID: 1298 Comm: f2fs_discard-7: Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 564.104584] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 564.106624] RIP: 0010:issue_discard_thread+0x248/0x5c0
[ 564.107692] Code: ff ff 48 8b bd e8 fe ff ff 41 8b 9d 4c 04 00 00 e8 cd b8 ad ff 41 8b 85 50 04 00 00 31 d2 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <48> f7 f3 83 f8 50 7e 16 41 c7 86 7c ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 41 c7 86
[ 564.111686] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f3117dc0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 564.112775] RAX: 0000000000000384 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb88c1e03
[ 564.114250] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3aa4850
[ 564.115706] RBP: ffff8801f3117f00 R08: 1ffffffff751a1d0 R09: fffffbfff751a1d0
[ 564.117177] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff751a1d0 R12: 00000000fffffffc
[ 564.118634] R13: ffff8801e3aa4400 R14: ffff8801f3117ed8 R15: ffff8801e2050000
[ 564.120094] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 564.121748] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 564.122923] CR2: 000000000202b078 CR3: 00000001f11ac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 564.124383] Call Trace:
[ 564.124924] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.125882] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[ 564.126756] ? __kthread_parkme+0xcb/0x100
[ 564.127620] ? kthread_blkcg+0x70/0x70
[ 564.128412] kthread+0x180/0x1d0
[ 564.129105] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.130029] ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x150/0x150
[ 564.131033] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 564.131794] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 564.141798] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 564.142773] RIP: 0010:issue_discard_thread+0x248/0x5c0
[ 564.143885] Code: ff ff 48 8b bd e8 fe ff ff 41 8b 9d 4c 04 00 00 e8 cd b8 ad ff 41 8b 85 50 04 00 00 31 d2 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <48> f7 f3 83 f8 50 7e 16 41 c7 86 7c ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 41 c7 86
[ 564.147776] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f3117dc0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 564.148856] RAX: 0000000000000384 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb88c1e03
[ 564.150424] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3aa4850
[ 564.151906] RBP: ffff8801f3117f00 R08: 1ffffffff751a1d0 R09: fffffbfff751a1d0
[ 564.153463] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff751a1d0 R12: 00000000fffffffc
[ 564.154915] R13: ffff8801e3aa4400 R14: ffff8801f3117ed8 R15: ffff8801e2050000
[ 564.156405] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 564.158070] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 564.159279] CR2: 000000000202b078 CR3: 00000001f11ac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 564.161043] ==================================================================
[ 564.162587] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.163994] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801f3117c84 by task f2fs_discard-7:/1298
[ 564.165852] CPU: 1 PID: 1298 Comm: f2fs_discard-7: Tainted: G D 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 564.167593] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 564.169522] Call Trace:
[ 564.170057] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 564.170778] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 564.171765] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 564.172540] ? from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.173408] __asan_load4+0x78/0x80
[ 564.174148] from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.174962] do_notify_parent+0x1f5/0x4f0
[ 564.175808] ? send_sigqueue+0x390/0x390
[ 564.176639] ? css_set_move_task+0x152/0x340
[ 564.184197] do_exit+0x1290/0x1390
[ 564.184950] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.185884] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 564.186829] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[ 564.187672] ? __kthread_parkme+0xcb/0x100
[ 564.188528] ? kthread_blkcg+0x70/0x70
[ 564.189333] ? kthread+0x180/0x1d0
[ 564.190052] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.190983] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 564.192190] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 564.193213] page:ffffea0007cc45c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 564.194856] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 564.195644] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[ 564.197247] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 564.198826] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 564.200299] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 564.201306] ffff8801f3117b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.202779] ffff8801f3117c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
[ 564.204252] >ffff8801f3117c80: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[ 564.205742] ^
[ 564.206424] ffff8801f3117d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.207908] ffff8801f3117d80: f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.209389] ==================================================================
[ 564.231795] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L586
return div_u64((u64)valid_user_blocks(sbi) * 100,
sbi->user_block_count);
Missing checks on sbi->user_block_count.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/super.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1140,6 +1140,8 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
unsigned int sit_segs, nat_segs;
unsigned int sit_bitmap_size, nat_bitmap_size;
unsigned int log_blocks_per_seg;
+ unsigned int segment_count_main;
+ block_t user_block_count;
int i;
total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
@@ -1164,6 +1166,16 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
return 1;
}
+ user_block_count = le64_to_cpu(ckpt->user_block_count);
+ segment_count_main = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
+ log_blocks_per_seg = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg);
+ if (!user_block_count || user_block_count >=
+ segment_count_main << log_blocks_per_seg) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong user_block_count: %u", user_block_count);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
main_segs = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
blocks_per_seg = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
@@ -1180,7 +1192,6 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
sit_bitmap_size = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize);
nat_bitmap_size = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->nat_ver_bitmap_bytesize);
- log_blocks_per_seg = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg);
if (sit_bitmap_size != ((sit_segs / 2) << log_blocks_per_seg) / 8 ||
nat_bitmap_size != ((nat_segs / 2) << log_blocks_per_seg) / 8) {
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
commit bb413d6acd4e1c361daebf8486efc3923f429792 upstream.
we came across an error as below:
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 1718] addr[0x 1c18ddc] ino[0x 1718]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 1719] addr[0x 1c193d5] ino[0x 1719]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171a] addr[0x 1c1736e] ino[0x 171a]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171b] addr[0x 58b3ee8f] ino[0x815f92ed]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171c] addr[0x fcdc94b] ino[0x49366377]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171d] addr[0x 7cd2facf] ino[0xb3c55300]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171e] addr[0x bd4e25d0] ino[0x77c34c09]
... ...
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 1718] addr[0x 1c18ddc] ino[0x 1718]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 1719] addr[0x 1c193d5] ino[0x 1719]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171a] addr[0x 1c1736e] ino[0x 171a]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171b] addr[0x 58b3ee8f] ino[0x815f92ed]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171c] addr[0x fcdc94b] ino[0x49366377]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171d] addr[0x 7cd2facf] ino[0xb3c55300]
[build_nat_area_bitmap:1710] nid[0x 171e] addr[0x bd4e25d0] ino[0x77c34c09]
One nat block may be stepped by a data block, so this patch forbid to
write if the blkaddr is illegal
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -576,8 +576,8 @@ static inline void check_seg_range(struc
static inline void verify_block_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blk_addr)
{
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi)
- || blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ BUG_ON(blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi)
+ || blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
}
/*
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
commit 231f8fd0cca078bd4396dd7e380db813ac5736e2 upstream.
ldsem_down_read() will sleep if there is pending writer in the queue.
If the writer times out, readers in the queue should be woken up,
otherwise they may miss a chance to acquire the semaphore until the last
active reader will do ldsem_up_read().
There was a couple of reports where there was one active reader and
other readers soft locked up:
Showing all locks held in the system:
2 locks held by khungtaskd/17:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: watchdog+0x124/0x6d1
#1: (tasklist_lock){.+.+..}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x72/0x2d3
2 locks held by askfirst/123:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){.+.+.+}, at: ldsem_down_read+0x46/0x58
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: n_tty_read+0x115/0xbe4
Prevent readers wait for active readers to release ldisc semaphore.
Link: lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907045041.GF1110@shao2-debian
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c
@@ -307,6 +307,16 @@ down_write_failed(struct ld_semaphore *s
if (!locked)
ldsem_atomic_update(-LDSEM_WAIT_BIAS, sem);
list_del(&waiter.list);
+
+ /*
+ * In case of timeout, wake up every reader who gave the right of way
+ * to writer. Prevent separation readers into two groups:
+ * one that helds semaphore and another that sleeps.
+ * (in case of no contention with a writer)
+ */
+ if (!locked && list_empty(&sem->write_wait))
+ __ldsem_wake_readers(sem);
+
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&sem->wait_lock);
__set_task_state(tsk, TASK_RUNNING);
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit c39a1b348c4fe172729eff77c533dabc3c7cdaa7 upstream.
Let's avoid BUG_ON during fill_super, when on-disk was totall corrupted.
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -2101,7 +2101,7 @@ static int build_curseg(struct f2fs_sb_i
return restore_curseg_summaries(sbi);
}
-static void build_sit_entries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+static int build_sit_entries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct sit_info *sit_i = SIT_I(sbi);
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_COLD_DATA);
@@ -2110,6 +2110,7 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
unsigned int i, start, end;
unsigned int readed, start_blk = 0;
int nrpages = MAX_BIO_BLOCKS(sbi);
+ int err = 0;
do {
readed = ra_meta_pages(sbi, start_blk, nrpages, META_SIT, true);
@@ -2128,7 +2129,9 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
sit = sit_blk->entries[SIT_ENTRY_OFFSET(sit_i, start)];
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
- check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ err = check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
seg_info_from_raw_sit(se, &sit);
/* build discard map only one time */
@@ -2154,7 +2157,9 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
old_valid_blocks = se->valid_blocks;
- check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ err = check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ if (err)
+ break;
seg_info_from_raw_sit(se, &sit);
memcpy(se->discard_map, se->cur_valid_map, SIT_VBLOCK_MAP_SIZE);
@@ -2165,6 +2170,7 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
se->valid_blocks - old_valid_blocks;
}
mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
+ return err;
}
static void init_free_segmap(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
@@ -2326,7 +2332,9 @@ int build_segment_manager(struct f2fs_sb
return err;
/* reinit free segmap based on SIT */
- build_sit_entries(sbi);
+ err = build_sit_entries(sbi);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
init_free_segmap(sbi);
err = build_dirty_segmap(sbi);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(str
/*
* Summary block is always treated as an invalid block
*/
-static inline void check_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+static inline int check_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
int segno, struct f2fs_sit_entry *raw_sit)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS
@@ -607,11 +607,25 @@ static inline void check_block_count(str
cur_pos = next_pos;
is_valid = !is_valid;
} while (cur_pos < sbi->blocks_per_seg);
- BUG_ON(GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) != valid_blocks);
+
+ if (unlikely(GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) != valid_blocks)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Mismatch valid blocks %d vs. %d",
+ GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit), valid_blocks);
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
#endif
/* check segment usage, and check boundary of a given segment number */
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) > sbi->blocks_per_seg
- || segno > TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) - 1);
+ if (unlikely(GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) > sbi->blocks_per_seg
+ || segno > TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) - 1)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong valid blocks %d or segno %u",
+ GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit), segno);
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
static inline pgoff_t current_sit_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 30a61ddf8117c26ac5b295e1233eaa9629a94ca3 upstream.
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- add_free_nid() returns 0 in case of any error (except low memory)
- Tree/list addition has not been moved into __insert_nid_to_list()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -1428,8 +1428,9 @@ static void __del_from_free_nid_list(str
static int add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t nid, bool build)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
- struct free_nid *i;
+ struct free_nid *i, *e;
struct nat_entry *ne;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
if (!available_free_memory(sbi, FREE_NIDS))
return -1;
@@ -1438,35 +1439,58 @@ static int add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_i
if (unlikely(nid == 0))
return 0;
- if (build) {
- /* do not add allocated nids */
- ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
- if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
- nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
- return 0;
- }
-
i = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(free_nid_slab, GFP_NOFS);
i->nid = nid;
i->state = NID_NEW;
- if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS)) {
- kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS))
+ goto err;
spin_lock(&nm_i->free_nid_list_lock);
- if (radix_tree_insert(&nm_i->free_nid_root, i->nid, i)) {
- spin_unlock(&nm_i->free_nid_list_lock);
- radix_tree_preload_end();
- kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
- return 0;
+
+ if (build) {
+ /*
+ * Thread A Thread B
+ * - f2fs_create
+ * - f2fs_new_inode
+ * - alloc_nid
+ * - __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
+ * - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
+ * - build_free_nids
+ * - __build_free_nids
+ * - scan_nat_page
+ * - add_free_nid
+ * - __lookup_nat_cache
+ * - f2fs_add_link
+ * - init_inode_metadata
+ * - new_inode_page
+ * - new_node_page
+ * - set_node_addr
+ * - alloc_nid_done
+ * - __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
+ * - __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
+ */
+ ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
+ if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
+ nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
+ goto err_out;
+
+ e = __lookup_free_nid_list(nm_i, nid);
+ if (e)
+ goto err_out;
}
+ if (radix_tree_insert(&nm_i->free_nid_root, i->nid, i))
+ goto err_out;
+ err = 0;
list_add_tail(&i->list, &nm_i->free_nid_list);
nm_i->fcnt++;
+err_out:
spin_unlock(&nm_i->free_nid_list_lock);
radix_tree_preload_end();
- return 1;
+err:
+ if (err)
+ kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
+ return !err;
}
static void remove_free_nid(struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i, nid_t nid)
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
commit fc0065adb202518e25fb929cda7d5887a456f774 upstream.
There exists almost same codes when get the value of pre_version
and cur_version in function validate_checkpoint, this patch adds
get_checkpoint_version to clean up redundant codes.
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: f2fs_crc_valid() doesn't take an f2fs_sb_info pointer]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -601,45 +601,55 @@ static void write_orphan_inodes(struct f
}
}
-static struct page *validate_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
- block_t cp_addr, unsigned long long *version)
+static int get_checkpoint_version(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t cp_addr,
+ struct f2fs_checkpoint **cp_block, struct page **cp_page,
+ unsigned long long *version)
{
- struct page *cp_page_1, *cp_page_2 = NULL;
unsigned long blk_size = sbi->blocksize;
- struct f2fs_checkpoint *cp_block;
- unsigned long long cur_version = 0, pre_version = 0;
- size_t crc_offset;
+ size_t crc_offset = 0;
__u32 crc = 0;
- /* Read the 1st cp block in this CP pack */
- cp_page_1 = get_meta_page(sbi, cp_addr);
+ *cp_page = get_meta_page(sbi, cp_addr);
+ *cp_block = (struct f2fs_checkpoint *)page_address(*cp_page);
- /* get the version number */
- cp_block = (struct f2fs_checkpoint *)page_address(cp_page_1);
- crc_offset = le32_to_cpu(cp_block->checksum_offset);
- if (crc_offset >= blk_size)
- goto invalid_cp1;
+ crc_offset = le32_to_cpu((*cp_block)->checksum_offset);
+ if (crc_offset >= blk_size) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "invalid crc_offset: %zu", crc_offset);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- crc = le32_to_cpu(*((__le32 *)((unsigned char *)cp_block + crc_offset)));
- if (!f2fs_crc_valid(crc, cp_block, crc_offset))
- goto invalid_cp1;
+ crc = le32_to_cpu(*((__le32 *)((unsigned char *)*cp_block
+ + crc_offset)));
+ if (!f2fs_crc_valid(crc, *cp_block, crc_offset)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING, "invalid crc value");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- pre_version = cur_cp_version(cp_block);
+ *version = cur_cp_version(*cp_block);
+ return 0;
+}
- /* Read the 2nd cp block in this CP pack */
- cp_addr += le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) - 1;
- cp_page_2 = get_meta_page(sbi, cp_addr);
+static struct page *validate_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t cp_addr, unsigned long long *version)
+{
+ struct page *cp_page_1 = NULL, *cp_page_2 = NULL;
+ struct f2fs_checkpoint *cp_block = NULL;
+ unsigned long long cur_version = 0, pre_version = 0;
+ int err;
- cp_block = (struct f2fs_checkpoint *)page_address(cp_page_2);
- crc_offset = le32_to_cpu(cp_block->checksum_offset);
- if (crc_offset >= blk_size)
- goto invalid_cp2;
+ err = get_checkpoint_version(sbi, cp_addr, &cp_block,
+ &cp_page_1, version);
+ if (err)
+ goto invalid_cp1;
+ pre_version = *version;
- crc = le32_to_cpu(*((__le32 *)((unsigned char *)cp_block + crc_offset)));
- if (!f2fs_crc_valid(crc, cp_block, crc_offset))
+ cp_addr += le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) - 1;
+ err = get_checkpoint_version(sbi, cp_addr, &cp_block,
+ &cp_page_2, version);
+ if (err)
goto invalid_cp2;
-
- cur_version = cur_cp_version(cp_block);
+ cur_version = *version;
if (cur_version == pre_version) {
*version = cur_version;
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
commit a468f0ef516fda9c7d91bb550d458e853d76955e upstream.
Previously, we used cp_version only to detect recoverable dnodes.
In order to avoid same garbage cp_version, we needed to truncate the next
dnode during checkpoint, resulting in additional discard or data write.
If we can distinguish this by using crc in addition to cp_version, we can
remove this overhead.
There is backward compatibility concern where it changes node_footer layout.
So, this patch introduces a new checkpoint flag, CP_CRC_RECOVERY_FLAG, to
detect new layout. New layout will be activated only when this flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Deleted code is slightly different
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 21 +------------
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1
fs/f2fs/node.h | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 30 +++---------------
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 22 -------------
fs/f2fs/super.c | 5 ++-
include/linux/f2fs_fs.h | 1
7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -902,7 +902,6 @@ static void wait_on_all_pages_writeback(
static void do_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct cp_control *cpc)
{
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
- struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_WARM_NODE);
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
unsigned long orphan_num = sbi->im[ORPHAN_INO].ino_num;
nid_t last_nid = nm_i->next_scan_nid;
@@ -911,15 +910,6 @@ static void do_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb
__u32 crc32 = 0;
int i;
int cp_payload_blks = __cp_payload(sbi);
- block_t discard_blk = NEXT_FREE_BLKADDR(sbi, curseg);
- bool invalidate = false;
-
- /*
- * This avoids to conduct wrong roll-forward operations and uses
- * metapages, so should be called prior to sync_meta_pages below.
- */
- if (discard_next_dnode(sbi, discard_blk))
- invalidate = true;
/* Flush all the NAT/SIT pages */
while (get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_META)) {
@@ -996,6 +986,9 @@ static void do_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb
if (is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK))
set_ckpt_flags(ckpt, CP_FSCK_FLAG);
+ /* set this flag to activate crc|cp_ver for recovery */
+ set_ckpt_flags(ckpt, CP_CRC_RECOVERY_FLAG);
+
/* update SIT/NAT bitmap */
get_sit_bitmap(sbi, __bitmap_ptr(sbi, SIT_BITMAP));
get_nat_bitmap(sbi, __bitmap_ptr(sbi, NAT_BITMAP));
@@ -1053,14 +1046,6 @@ static void do_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb
/* wait for previous submitted meta pages writeback */
wait_on_all_pages_writeback(sbi);
- /*
- * invalidate meta page which is used temporarily for zeroing out
- * block at the end of warm node chain.
- */
- if (invalidate)
- invalidate_mapping_pages(META_MAPPING(sbi), discard_blk,
- discard_blk);
-
release_dirty_inode(sbi);
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi)))
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1780,7 +1780,6 @@ bool is_checkpointed_data(struct f2fs_sb
void refresh_sit_entry(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t, block_t);
void clear_prefree_segments(struct f2fs_sb_info *, struct cp_control *);
void release_discard_addrs(struct f2fs_sb_info *);
-bool discard_next_dnode(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t);
int npages_for_summary_flush(struct f2fs_sb_info *, bool);
void allocate_new_segments(struct f2fs_sb_info *);
int f2fs_trim_fs(struct f2fs_sb_info *, struct fstrim_range *);
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.h
@@ -212,6 +212,37 @@ static inline void set_to_next_nat(struc
f2fs_change_bit(block_off, nm_i->nat_bitmap);
}
+static inline nid_t ino_of_node(struct page *node_page)
+{
+ struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
+ return le32_to_cpu(rn->footer.ino);
+}
+
+static inline nid_t nid_of_node(struct page *node_page)
+{
+ struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
+ return le32_to_cpu(rn->footer.nid);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int ofs_of_node(struct page *node_page)
+{
+ struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
+ unsigned flag = le32_to_cpu(rn->footer.flag);
+ return flag >> OFFSET_BIT_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static inline __u64 cpver_of_node(struct page *node_page)
+{
+ struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
+ return le64_to_cpu(rn->footer.cp_ver);
+}
+
+static inline block_t next_blkaddr_of_node(struct page *node_page)
+{
+ struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
+ return le32_to_cpu(rn->footer.next_blkaddr);
+}
+
static inline void fill_node_footer(struct page *page, nid_t nid,
nid_t ino, unsigned int ofs, bool reset)
{
@@ -242,40 +273,30 @@ static inline void fill_node_footer_blka
{
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(F2FS_P_SB(page));
struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(page);
+ size_t crc_offset = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->checksum_offset);
+ __u64 cp_ver = le64_to_cpu(ckpt->checkpoint_ver);
- rn->footer.cp_ver = ckpt->checkpoint_ver;
+ if (is_set_ckpt_flags(ckpt, CP_CRC_RECOVERY_FLAG)) {
+ __u64 crc = le32_to_cpu(*((__le32 *)
+ ((unsigned char *)ckpt + crc_offset)));
+ cp_ver |= (crc << 32);
+ }
+ rn->footer.cp_ver = cpu_to_le64(cp_ver);
rn->footer.next_blkaddr = cpu_to_le32(blkaddr);
}
-static inline nid_t ino_of_node(struct page *node_page)
-{
- struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
- return le32_to_cpu(rn->footer.ino);
-}
-
-static inline nid_t nid_of_node(struct page *node_page)
-{
- struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
- return le32_to_cpu(rn->footer.nid);
-}
-
-static inline unsigned int ofs_of_node(struct page *node_page)
-{
- struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
- unsigned flag = le32_to_cpu(rn->footer.flag);
- return flag >> OFFSET_BIT_SHIFT;
-}
-
-static inline unsigned long long cpver_of_node(struct page *node_page)
+static inline bool is_recoverable_dnode(struct page *page)
{
- struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
- return le64_to_cpu(rn->footer.cp_ver);
-}
+ struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(F2FS_P_SB(page));
+ size_t crc_offset = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->checksum_offset);
+ __u64 cp_ver = cur_cp_version(ckpt);
-static inline block_t next_blkaddr_of_node(struct page *node_page)
-{
- struct f2fs_node *rn = F2FS_NODE(node_page);
- return le32_to_cpu(rn->footer.next_blkaddr);
+ if (is_set_ckpt_flags(ckpt, CP_CRC_RECOVERY_FLAG)) {
+ __u64 crc = le32_to_cpu(*((__le32 *)
+ ((unsigned char *)ckpt + crc_offset)));
+ cp_ver |= (crc << 32);
+ }
+ return cpu_to_le64(cp_ver) == cpver_of_node(page);
}
/*
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -193,7 +193,6 @@ static void recover_inode(struct inode *
static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head)
{
- unsigned long long cp_ver = cur_cp_version(F2FS_CKPT(sbi));
struct curseg_info *curseg;
struct inode *inode;
struct page *page = NULL;
@@ -214,7 +213,7 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
page = get_tmp_page(sbi, blkaddr);
- if (cp_ver != cpver_of_node(page))
+ if (!is_recoverable_dnode(page))
break;
if (!is_fsync_dnode(page))
@@ -483,7 +482,6 @@ out:
static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *inode_list,
struct list_head *dir_list)
{
- unsigned long long cp_ver = cur_cp_version(F2FS_CKPT(sbi));
struct curseg_info *curseg;
struct page *page = NULL;
int err = 0;
@@ -503,7 +501,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
page = get_tmp_page(sbi, blkaddr);
- if (cp_ver != cpver_of_node(page)) {
+ if (!is_recoverable_dnode(page)) {
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
break;
}
@@ -595,31 +593,15 @@ out:
}
clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING);
- if (err) {
- bool invalidate = false;
-
- if (discard_next_dnode(sbi, blkaddr))
- invalidate = true;
-
- /* Flush all the NAT/SIT pages */
- while (get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_META))
- sync_meta_pages(sbi, META, LONG_MAX);
-
- /* invalidate temporary meta page */
- if (invalidate)
- invalidate_mapping_pages(META_MAPPING(sbi),
- blkaddr, blkaddr);
-
+ if (err)
set_ckpt_flags(sbi->ckpt, CP_ERROR_FLAG);
- mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
- } else if (need_writecp) {
+ mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
+
+ if (!err && need_writecp) {
struct cp_control cpc = {
.reason = CP_RECOVERY,
};
- mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
write_checkpoint(sbi, &cpc);
- } else {
- mutex_unlock(&sbi->cp_mutex);
}
destroy_fsync_dnodes(&dir_list);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -519,28 +519,6 @@ static int f2fs_issue_discard(struct f2f
return blkdev_issue_discard(sbi->sb->s_bdev, start, len, GFP_NOFS, 0);
}
-bool discard_next_dnode(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr)
-{
- int err = -ENOTSUPP;
-
- if (test_opt(sbi, DISCARD)) {
- struct seg_entry *se = get_seg_entry(sbi,
- GET_SEGNO(sbi, blkaddr));
- unsigned int offset = GET_BLKOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blkaddr);
-
- if (f2fs_test_bit(offset, se->discard_map))
- return false;
-
- err = f2fs_issue_discard(sbi, blkaddr, 1);
- }
-
- if (err) {
- update_meta_page(sbi, NULL, blkaddr);
- return true;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
static void __add_discard_entry(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct cp_control *cpc, struct seg_entry *se,
unsigned int start, unsigned int end)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1457,6 +1457,9 @@ try_onemore:
if (need_fsck)
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ if (!retry)
+ goto skip_recovery;
+
err = recover_fsync_data(sbi, false);
if (err < 0) {
need_fsck = true;
@@ -1474,7 +1477,7 @@ try_onemore:
goto free_kobj;
}
}
-
+skip_recovery:
/* recover_fsync_data() cleared this already */
clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING);
--- a/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ struct f2fs_super_block {
/*
* For checkpoint
*/
+#define CP_CRC_RECOVERY_FLAG 0x00000040
#define CP_FASTBOOT_FLAG 0x00000020
#define CP_FSCK_FLAG 0x00000010
#define CP_ERROR_FLAG 0x00000008
On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 at 00:57, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.172 release.
> There are 104 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Jan 26 19:01:09 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.172-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
NOTE: Kselftest source have been updated to version 4.20
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.4.172-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.4.y
git commit: d1bc58cd527575fc76a81364495a796ffbea5f4d
git describe: v4.4.171-105-gd1bc58cd5275
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/v4.4.171-105-gd1bc58cd5275
No regressions (compared to build v4.4.171)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fixes (compared to build v4.4.171)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The test case fixes coming from kselftest version 4.20
kselftest:
* net_tls
Ran 17336 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.4.172-rc1
git repo: https://git.linaro.org/lkft/arm64-stable-rc.git
git branch: 4.4.172-rc1-hikey-20190124-358
git commit: 2d32e8ca1050f34cf7437c2f9bc72ee4f01881f4
git describe: 4.4.172-rc1-hikey-20190124-358
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linaro-hikey-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/4.4.172-rc1-hikey-20190124-358
No regressions (compared to build 4.4.172-rc1-hikey-20190124-357)
No fixes (compared to build 4.4.172-rc1-hikey-20190124-357)
Ran 2813 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- qemu_arm64
Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* ltp-fs-tests
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
On 1/24/19 12:18 PM, wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.172 release.
> There are 104 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Jan 26 19:01:09 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.172-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 08:18:49PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.172 release.
> There are 104 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Jan 26 19:01:09 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 171 pass: 171 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 291 pass: 291 fail: 0
Guenter
On 24/01/2019 19:18, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.172 release.
> There are 104 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Jan 26 19:01:09 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.172-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.4:
6 builds: 6 pass, 0 fail
12 boots: 12 pass, 0 fail
10 tests: 10 pass, 0 fail
Linux version: 4.4.172-rc1-gd1bc58c
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers
Jon
--
nvpublic
On Thu 24-01-19 20:19:57, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
>
> commit 967d1dc144b50ad005e5eecdfadfbcfb399ffff6 upstream.
>
> __loop_release() has a single call site. Fold it there. This is
> currently not a huge win but it will make following replacement of
> loop_index_mutex more obvious.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>
Hello Greg!
This and the following two (patches 69 & 70) loop patches are just
preparatory cleanups for commits 0da03cab87e632 "loop: Fix deadlock when
calling blkdev_reread_part()" and 1dded9acf6dc9a "loop: Avoid circular
locking dependency between loop_ctl_mutex and bd_mutex". As such they don't
fix anything and it doesn't make sense to carry them in stable unless
someone backports also the other patches in the series including the fixes
themselves (which honestly I don't think is worth it for stable).
Honza
> ---
> drivers/block/loop.c | 16 +++++++---------
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/drivers/block/loop.c
> +++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
> @@ -1586,12 +1586,15 @@ out:
> return err;
> }
>
> -static void __lo_release(struct loop_device *lo)
> +static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
> {
> + struct loop_device *lo;
> int err;
>
> + mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
> + lo = disk->private_data;
> if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
> - return;
> + goto unlock_index;
>
> mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
> if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
> @@ -1601,7 +1604,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
> */
> err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
> if (!err)
> - return;
> + goto unlock_index;
> } else {
> /*
> * Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
> @@ -1611,12 +1614,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
> }
>
> mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
> -}
> -
> -static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
> -{
> - mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
> - __lo_release(disk->private_data);
> +unlock_index:
> mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
> }
>
>
>
--
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, CR
On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 02:31:03PM +0100, Jan Kara wrote:
> On Thu 24-01-19 20:19:57, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
> >
> > commit 967d1dc144b50ad005e5eecdfadfbcfb399ffff6 upstream.
> >
> > __loop_release() has a single call site. Fold it there. This is
> > currently not a huge win but it will make following replacement of
> > loop_index_mutex more obvious.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
> >
>
> Hello Greg!
>
> This and the following two (patches 69 & 70) loop patches are just
> preparatory cleanups for commits 0da03cab87e632 "loop: Fix deadlock when
> calling blkdev_reread_part()" and 1dded9acf6dc9a "loop: Avoid circular
> locking dependency between loop_ctl_mutex and bd_mutex". As such they don't
> fix anything and it doesn't make sense to carry them in stable unless
> someone backports also the other patches in the series including the fixes
> themselves (which honestly I don't think is worth it for stable).
Ah, you are right, sorry about that. I was backporting the loop fixes
and these ended up working on 4.4.y, but as you say, were not needed
unless the later patches also showed up. I'll go revert them now,
thanks.
greg k-h