This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.152 release.
There are 51 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed Jan 23 12:24:02 UTC 2019.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.152-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.9.152-rc1
Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
mm, memcg: fix reclaim deadlock with writeback
Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
drm/fb-helper: Ignore the value of fb_var_screeninfo.pixclock
Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
loop: Fix double mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex) in loop_control_ioctl()
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
loop: Fold __loop_release into loop_release
Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
block/loop: Use global lock for ioctl() operation.
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_doit
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_set
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable
Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: allocate sctp_sockaddr_entry with kzalloc
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
blockdev: Fix livelocks on loop device
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy
Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
netfilter: ebtables: account ebt_table_info to kmemcg
J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
sunrpc: handle ENOMEM in rpcb_getport_async
Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: vb2: vb2_mmap: move lock up
James Morris <[email protected]>
LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on free
Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: vivid: set min width/height to a value > 0
Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: vivid: fix error handling of kthread_run
Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
omap2fb: Fix stack memory disclosure
YunQiang Su <[email protected]>
Disable MSI also when pcie-octeon.pcie_disable on
Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
arm64: kaslr: ensure randomized quantities are clean to the PoC
Jonathan Hunter <[email protected]>
mfd: tps6586x: Handle interrupts on suspend
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
mips: fix n32 compat_ipc_parse_version
Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - fix ablkcipher for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - reorder code in talitos_edesc_alloc()
Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
scsi: sd: Fix cache_type_store()
Stanley Chu <[email protected]>
scsi: core: Synchronize request queue PM status only on successful resume
Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Yama: Check for pid death before checking ancestry
Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
btrfs: wait on ordered extents on abort cleanup
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: authenc - fix parsing key with misaligned rta_len
Harsh Jain <[email protected]>
crypto: authencesn - Avoid twice completion call in decrypt path
Aymen Sghaier <[email protected]>
crypto: caam - fix zero-length buffer DMA mapping
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
ip: on queued skb use skb_header_pointer instead of pskb_may_pull
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
bonding: update nest level on unlink
Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
packet: Do not leak dev refcounts on error exit
JianJhen Chen <[email protected]>
net: bridge: fix a bug on using a neighbour cache entry without checking its state
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6: fix kernel-infoleak in ipv6_local_error()
Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags
Varun Prakash <[email protected]>
scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix csk leak
Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Revert "scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix csk leak"
Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
proc: Remove empty line in /proc/self/status
Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
media: em28xx: Fix misplaced reset of dev->v4l::field_count
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Revert "f2fs: do not recover from previous remained wrong dnodes"
Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
can: gw: ensure DLC boundaries after CAN frame modification
Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
tty: Don't hold ldisc lock in tty_reopen() if ldisc present
Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
tty: Simplify tty->count math in tty_reopen()
Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
tty: Hold tty_ldisc_lock() during tty_reopen()
Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
tty/ldsem: Wake up readers after timed out down_write()
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 3 +
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 5 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 8 ++-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 2 +-
arch/mips/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c | 4 +-
crypto/authenc.c | 14 ++++-
crypto/authencesn.c | 2 +-
drivers/block/loop.c | 79 ++++++++++++------------
drivers/block/loop.h | 1 -
drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 15 +++--
drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 27 +++-----
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c | 7 ++-
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c | 5 +-
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c | 5 +-
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c | 2 +-
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-video.c | 4 +-
drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c | 11 +++-
drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c | 24 +++++++
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 3 +
drivers/scsi/scsi_pm.c | 26 ++++----
drivers/scsi/sd.c | 6 ++
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 22 ++++---
drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c | 10 +++
drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c | 2 +
fs/block_dev.c | 28 ++++++---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 8 +++
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 31 +---------
fs/proc/array.c | 3 +-
mm/memory.c | 22 +++++++
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 2 +-
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 +-
net/can/gw.c | 30 ++++++++-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 ++--
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 11 ++--
net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 +-
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 5 +-
net/sctp/protocol.c | 4 +-
net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c | 8 +++
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 50 ++++++++++++++-
security/security.c | 7 +++
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 4 +-
44 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 178 deletions(-)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
commit 231f8fd0cca078bd4396dd7e380db813ac5736e2 upstream.
ldsem_down_read() will sleep if there is pending writer in the queue.
If the writer times out, readers in the queue should be woken up,
otherwise they may miss a chance to acquire the semaphore until the last
active reader will do ldsem_up_read().
There was a couple of reports where there was one active reader and
other readers soft locked up:
Showing all locks held in the system:
2 locks held by khungtaskd/17:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: watchdog+0x124/0x6d1
#1: (tasklist_lock){.+.+..}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x72/0x2d3
2 locks held by askfirst/123:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){.+.+.+}, at: ldsem_down_read+0x46/0x58
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: n_tty_read+0x115/0xbe4
Prevent readers wait for active readers to release ldisc semaphore.
Link: lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907045041.GF1110@shao2-debian
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c
@@ -307,6 +307,16 @@ down_write_failed(struct ld_semaphore *s
if (!locked)
ldsem_atomic_update(-LDSEM_WAIT_BIAS, sem);
list_del(&waiter.list);
+
+ /*
+ * In case of timeout, wake up every reader who gave the right of way
+ * to writer. Prevent separation readers into two groups:
+ * one that helds semaphore and another that sleeps.
+ * (in case of no contention with a writer)
+ */
+ if (!locked && list_empty(&sem->write_wait))
+ __ldsem_wake_readers(sem);
+
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&sem->wait_lock);
__set_task_state(tsk, TASK_RUNNING);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Backport of upstream commit 4eaed6aa2c628101246bcabc91b203bfac1193f8 ]
In KVM we define the configuration of HCR_EL2 for a VHE HOST in
HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS, but we don't have a similar definition for the
non-VHE host flags, and open-code HCR_RW. Further, in head.S we
open-code the flags for VHE and non-VHE configurations.
In future, we're going to want to configure more flags for the host, so
lets add a HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS defintion, and consistently use both
HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS and HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS in the kvm code and head.S.
We now use mov_q to generate the HCR_EL2 value, as we use when
configuring other registers in head.S.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
[kristina: backport to 4.9.y: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 5 ++---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
index 68dedca5a47e..352bf2f7f60a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
HCR_AMO | HCR_SWIO | HCR_TIDCP | HCR_RW)
#define HCR_VIRT_EXCP_MASK (HCR_VSE | HCR_VI | HCR_VF)
#define HCR_INT_OVERRIDE (HCR_FMO | HCR_IMO)
+#define HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW)
#define HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW | HCR_TGE | HCR_E2H)
/* TCR_EL2 Registers bits */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
index fa52817d84c5..3289d1458791 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
@@ -517,10 +517,9 @@ CPU_LE( bic x0, x0, #(3 << 24) ) // Clear the EE and E0E bits for EL1
#endif
/* Hyp configuration. */
- mov x0, #HCR_RW // 64-bit EL1
+ mov_q x0, HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS
cbz x2, set_hcr
- orr x0, x0, #HCR_TGE // Enable Host Extensions
- orr x0, x0, #HCR_E2H
+ mov_q x0, HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS
set_hcr:
msr hcr_el2, x0
isb
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
index 12f9d1ecdf4c..115b0955715f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void __hyp_text __deactivate_traps_vhe(void)
static void __hyp_text __deactivate_traps_nvhe(void)
{
- write_sysreg(HCR_RW, hcr_el2);
+ write_sysreg(HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS, hcr_el2);
write_sysreg(CPTR_EL2_DEFAULT, cptr_el2);
}
--
2.19.1
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: JianJhen Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4c84edc11b76590859b1e45dd676074c59602dc4 ]
When handling DNAT'ed packets on a bridge device, the neighbour cache entry
from lookup was used without checking its state. It means that a cache entry
in the NUD_STALE state will be used directly instead of entering the NUD_DELAY
state to confirm the reachability of the neighbor.
This problem becomes worse after commit 2724680bceee ("neigh: Keep neighbour
cache entries if number of them is small enough."), since all neighbour cache
entries in the NUD_STALE state will be kept in the neighbour table as long as
the number of cache entries does not exceed the value specified in gc_thresh1.
This commit validates the state of a neighbour cache entry before using
the entry.
Signed-off-by: JianJhen Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: JinLin Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ int br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge(stru
struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = nf_bridge_info_get(skb);
int ret;
- if (neigh->hh.hh_len) {
+ if ((neigh->nud_state & NUD_CONNECTED) && neigh->hh.hh_len) {
neigh_hh_bridge(&neigh->hh, skb);
skb->dev = nf_bridge->physindev;
ret = br_handle_frame_finish(net, sk, skb);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Backport of upstream commit b3669b1e1c09890d61109a1a8ece2c5b66804714 ]
To allow EL0 (and/or EL1) to use pointer authentication functionality,
we must ensure that pointer authentication instructions and accesses to
pointer authentication keys are not trapped to EL2.
This patch ensures that HCR_EL2 is configured appropriately when the
kernel is booted at EL2. For non-VHE kernels we set HCR_EL2.{API,APK},
ensuring that EL1 can access keys and permit EL0 use of instructions.
For VHE kernels host EL0 (TGE && E2H) is unaffected by these settings,
and it doesn't matter how we configure HCR_EL2.{API,APK}, so we don't
bother setting them.
This does not enable support for KVM guests, since KVM manages HCR_EL2
itself when running VMs.
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
[kristina: backport to 4.9.y: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
index 352bf2f7f60a..a11c8c2915c9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#include <asm/types.h>
/* Hyp Configuration Register (HCR) bits */
+#define HCR_API (UL(1) << 41)
+#define HCR_APK (UL(1) << 40)
#define HCR_E2H (UL(1) << 34)
#define HCR_ID (UL(1) << 33)
#define HCR_CD (UL(1) << 32)
@@ -82,7 +84,7 @@
HCR_AMO | HCR_SWIO | HCR_TIDCP | HCR_RW)
#define HCR_VIRT_EXCP_MASK (HCR_VSE | HCR_VI | HCR_VF)
#define HCR_INT_OVERRIDE (HCR_FMO | HCR_IMO)
-#define HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW)
+#define HCR_HOST_NVHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW | HCR_API | HCR_APK)
#define HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS (HCR_RW | HCR_TGE | HCR_E2H)
/* TCR_EL2 Registers bits */
--
2.19.1
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
commit 1598ecda7b239e9232dda032bfddeed9d89fab6c upstream.
kaslr_early_init() is called with the kernel mapped at its
link time offset, and if it returns with a non-zero offset,
the kernel is unmapped and remapped again at the randomized
offset.
During its execution, kaslr_early_init() also randomizes the
base of the module region and of the linear mapping of DRAM,
and sets two variables accordingly. However, since these
variables are assigned with the caches on, they may get lost
during the cache maintenance that occurs when unmapping and
remapping the kernel, so ensure that these values are cleaned
to the PoC.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Fixes: f80fb3a3d508 ("arm64: add support for kernel ASLR")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
#include <asm/memory.h>
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ static __init u64 get_kaslr_seed(void *f
return ret;
}
-static __init const u8 *get_cmdline(void *fdt)
+static __init const u8 *kaslr_get_cmdline(void *fdt)
{
static __initconst const u8 default_cmdline[] = CONFIG_CMDLINE;
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys,
* Check if 'nokaslr' appears on the command line, and
* return 0 if that is the case.
*/
- cmdline = get_cmdline(fdt);
+ cmdline = kaslr_get_cmdline(fdt);
str = strstr(cmdline, "nokaslr");
if (str == cmdline || (str > cmdline && *(str - 1) == ' '))
return 0;
@@ -178,5 +179,8 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys,
module_alloc_base += (module_range * (seed & ((1 << 21) - 1))) >> 21;
module_alloc_base &= PAGE_MASK;
+ __flush_dcache_area(&module_alloc_base, sizeof(module_alloc_base));
+ __flush_dcache_area(&memstart_offset_seed, sizeof(memstart_offset_seed));
+
return offset;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
commit d3736d82e8169768218ee0ef68718875918091a0 upstream.
Try to get reference for ldisc during tty_reopen().
If ldisc present, we don't need to do tty_ldisc_reinit() and lock the
write side for line discipline semaphore.
Effectively, it optimizes fast-path for tty_reopen(), but more
importantly it won't interrupt ongoing IO on the tty as no ldisc change
is needed.
Fixes user-visible issue when tty_reopen() interrupted login process for
user with a long password, observed and reported by Lukas.
Fixes: c96cf923a98d ("tty: Don't block on IO when ldisc change is pending")
Fixes: 83d817f41070 ("tty: Hold tty_ldisc_lock() during tty_reopen()")
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Lukas F. Hartmann <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Lukas F. Hartmann <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -1475,7 +1475,8 @@ static void tty_driver_remove_tty(struct
static int tty_reopen(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct tty_driver *driver = tty->driver;
- int retval;
+ struct tty_ldisc *ld;
+ int retval = 0;
if (driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY &&
driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER)
@@ -1487,13 +1488,18 @@ static int tty_reopen(struct tty_struct
if (test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EBUSY;
- retval = tty_ldisc_lock(tty, 5 * HZ);
- if (retval)
- return retval;
-
- if (!tty->ldisc)
- retval = tty_ldisc_reinit(tty, tty->termios.c_line);
- tty_ldisc_unlock(tty);
+ ld = tty_ldisc_ref_wait(tty);
+ if (ld) {
+ tty_ldisc_deref(ld);
+ } else {
+ retval = tty_ldisc_lock(tty, 5 * HZ);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (!tty->ldisc)
+ retval = tty_ldisc_reinit(tty, tty->termios.c_line);
+ tty_ldisc_unlock(tty);
+ }
if (retval == 0)
tty->count++;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 2753ca5d9009c180dbfd4c802c80983b4b6108d1 upstream.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x404/0xa10 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335
CPU: 0 PID: 4514 Comm: syz-executor485 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
__msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x404/0xa10 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x164b/0x2700 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1153
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x1686/0x1810 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624
netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2447
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1311 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x166b/0x1740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1337
netlink_sendmsg+0x1048/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091
SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x43fda9
RSP: 002b:00007ffd0c184ba8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fda9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020023000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 00000000004016d0
R13: 0000000000401760 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188
kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1183 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0x9a6/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1875
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091
SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
In tipc_nl_compat_recv(), when the len variable returned by
nlmsg_attrlen() is 0, the message is still treated as a valid one,
which is obviously unresonable. When len is zero, it means the
message not only doesn't contain any valid TLV payload, but also
TLV header is not included. Under this stituation, tlv_type field
in TLV header is still accessed in tipc_nl_compat_dumpit() or
tipc_nl_compat_doit(), but the field space is obviously illegal.
Of course, it is not initialized.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_recv(struct sk
}
len = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
- if (len && !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
+ if (!len || !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_SUPPORTED);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto send;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
commit 9474f4e7cd71a633fa1ef93b7daefd44bbdfd482 upstream.
It's possible that a pid has died before we take the rcu lock, in which
case we can't walk the ancestry list as it may be detached. Instead, check
for death first before doing the walk.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 2d514487faf1 ("security: Yama LSM")
Cc: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -359,7 +359,9 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(stru
break;
case YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL:
rcu_read_lock();
- if (!task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
+ if (!pid_alive(child))
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if (!rc && !task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
!ptracer_exception_found(current, child) &&
!ns_capable(__task_cred(child)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
rc = -EPERM;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 0a42e99b58a208839626465af194cfe640ef9493 upstream.
Now that loop_ctl_mutex is global, just get rid of loop_index_mutex as
there is no good reason to keep these two separate and it just
complicates the locking.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
static DEFINE_IDR(loop_index_idr);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_index_mutex);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_ctl_mutex);
static int max_part;
@@ -1560,9 +1559,11 @@ static int lo_compat_ioctl(struct block_
static int lo_open(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode)
{
struct loop_device *lo;
- int err = 0;
+ int err;
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ err = mutex_lock_killable(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
lo = bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
if (!lo) {
err = -ENXIO;
@@ -1571,7 +1572,7 @@ static int lo_open(struct block_device *
atomic_inc(&lo->lo_refcnt);
out:
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
return err;
}
@@ -1580,12 +1581,11 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
struct loop_device *lo;
int err;
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
lo = disk->private_data;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
- goto unlock_index;
+ goto out_unlock;
- mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
@@ -1593,7 +1593,7 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
- goto unlock_index;
+ return;
} else {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
@@ -1602,9 +1602,8 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
loop_flush(lo);
}
+out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
-unlock_index:
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
}
static const struct block_device_operations lo_fops = {
@@ -1890,7 +1889,7 @@ static struct kobject *loop_probe(dev_t
struct kobject *kobj;
int err;
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
err = loop_lookup(&lo, MINOR(dev) >> part_shift);
if (err < 0)
err = loop_add(&lo, MINOR(dev) >> part_shift);
@@ -1898,7 +1897,7 @@ static struct kobject *loop_probe(dev_t
kobj = NULL;
else
kobj = get_disk(lo->lo_disk);
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
*part = 0;
return kobj;
@@ -1908,9 +1907,13 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
unsigned long parm)
{
struct loop_device *lo;
- int ret = -ENOSYS;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_killable(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ ret = -ENOSYS;
switch (cmd) {
case LOOP_CTL_ADD:
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
@@ -1924,7 +1927,6 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
if (ret < 0)
break;
- mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
ret = -EBUSY;
mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
@@ -1936,7 +1938,6 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
break;
}
lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
idr_remove(&loop_index_idr, lo->lo_number);
loop_remove(lo);
break;
@@ -1946,7 +1947,7 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
break;
ret = loop_add(&lo, -1);
}
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -2029,10 +2030,10 @@ static int __init loop_init(void)
THIS_MODULE, loop_probe, NULL, NULL);
/* pre-create number of devices given by config or max_loop */
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
loop_add(&lo, i);
- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
printk(KERN_INFO "loop: module loaded\n");
return 0;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
commit 63f3655f950186752236bb88a22f8252c11ce394 upstream.
Liu Bo has experienced a deadlock between memcg (legacy) reclaim and the
ext4 writeback
task1:
wait_on_page_bit+0x82/0xa0
shrink_page_list+0x907/0x960
shrink_inactive_list+0x2c7/0x680
shrink_node_memcg+0x404/0x830
shrink_node+0xd8/0x300
do_try_to_free_pages+0x10d/0x330
try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages+0xd5/0x1b0
try_charge+0x14d/0x720
memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x3c/0xa0
memcg_kmem_charge+0x7e/0xd0
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x178/0x260
alloc_pages_current+0x95/0x140
pte_alloc_one+0x17/0x40
__pte_alloc+0x1e/0x110
alloc_set_pte+0x5fe/0xc20
do_fault+0x103/0x970
handle_mm_fault+0x61e/0xd10
__do_page_fault+0x252/0x4d0
do_page_fault+0x30/0x80
page_fault+0x28/0x30
task2:
__lock_page+0x86/0xa0
mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0x2e7/0x310 [ext4]
ext4_writepages+0x479/0xd60
do_writepages+0x1e/0x30
__writeback_single_inode+0x45/0x320
writeback_sb_inodes+0x272/0x600
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x92/0xc0
wb_writeback+0x268/0x300
wb_workfn+0xb4/0x390
process_one_work+0x189/0x420
worker_thread+0x4e/0x4b0
kthread+0xe6/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x41/0x50
He adds
"task1 is waiting for the PageWriteback bit of the page that task2 has
collected in mpd->io_submit->io_bio, and tasks2 is waiting for the
LOCKED bit the page which tasks1 has locked"
More precisely task1 is handling a page fault and it has a page locked
while it charges a new page table to a memcg. That in turn hits a
memory limit reclaim and the memcg reclaim for legacy controller is
waiting on the writeback but that is never going to finish because the
writeback itself is waiting for the page locked in the #PF path. So
this is essentially ABBA deadlock:
lock_page(A)
SetPageWriteback(A)
unlock_page(A)
lock_page(B)
lock_page(B)
pte_alloc_pne
shrink_page_list
wait_on_page_writeback(A)
SetPageWriteback(B)
unlock_page(B)
# flush A, B to clear the writeback
This accumulating of more pages to flush is used by several filesystems
to generate a more optimal IO patterns.
Waiting for the writeback in legacy memcg controller is a workaround for
pre-mature OOM killer invocations because there is no dirty IO
throttling available for the controller. There is no easy way around
that unfortunately. Therefore fix this specific issue by pre-allocating
the page table outside of the page lock. We have that handy
infrastructure for that already so simply reuse the fault-around pattern
which already does this.
There are probably other hidden __GFP_ACCOUNT | GFP_KERNEL allocations
from under a fs page locked but they should be really rare. I am not
aware of a better solution unfortunately.
[[email protected]: fix mm/memory.c:__do_fault()]
[[email protected]: coding-style fixes]
[[email protected]: enhance comment, per Johannes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c3b94f44fcb0 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Liu Bo <[email protected]>
Debugged-by: Liu Bo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/memory.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -2823,6 +2823,28 @@ static int __do_fault(struct fault_env *
struct vm_fault vmf;
int ret;
+ /*
+ * Preallocate pte before we take page_lock because this might lead to
+ * deadlocks for memcg reclaim which waits for pages under writeback:
+ * lock_page(A)
+ * SetPageWriteback(A)
+ * unlock_page(A)
+ * lock_page(B)
+ * lock_page(B)
+ * pte_alloc_pne
+ * shrink_page_list
+ * wait_on_page_writeback(A)
+ * SetPageWriteback(B)
+ * unlock_page(B)
+ * # flush A, B to clear the writeback
+ */
+ if (pmd_none(*fe->pmd) && !fe->prealloc_pte) {
+ fe->prealloc_pte = pte_alloc_one(vma->vm_mm, fe->address);
+ if (!fe->prealloc_pte)
+ return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+ smp_wmb(); /* See comment in __pte_alloc() */
+ }
+
vmf.virtual_address = (void __user *)(fe->address & PAGE_MASK);
vmf.pgoff = pgoff;
vmf.flags = fe->flags;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
commit 1bea445b0a022ee126ca328b3705cd4df18ebc14 upstream.
[ 2.364486] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 60 at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/io.h:837 dma_nommu_map_page+0x44/0xd4
[ 2.373579] CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: cryptomgr_test Tainted: G W 4.20.0-rc5-00560-g6bfb52e23a00-dirty #531
[ 2.384740] NIP: c000c540 LR: c000c584 CTR: 00000000
[ 2.389743] REGS: c95abab0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (4.20.0-rc5-00560-g6bfb52e23a00-dirty)
[ 2.400042] MSR: 00029032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24042204 XER: 00000000
[ 2.406669]
[ 2.406669] GPR00: c02f2244 c95abb60 c6262990 c95abd80 0000256a 00000001 00000001 00000001
[ 2.406669] GPR08: 00000000 00002000 00000010 00000010 24042202 00000000 00000100 c95abd88
[ 2.406669] GPR16: 00000000 c05569d4 00000001 00000010 c95abc88 c0615664 00000004 00000000
[ 2.406669] GPR24: 00000010 c95abc88 c95abc88 00000000 c61ae210 c7ff6d40 c61ae210 00003d68
[ 2.441559] NIP [c000c540] dma_nommu_map_page+0x44/0xd4
[ 2.446720] LR [c000c584] dma_nommu_map_page+0x88/0xd4
[ 2.451762] Call Trace:
[ 2.454195] [c95abb60] [82000808] 0x82000808 (unreliable)
[ 2.459572] [c95abb80] [c02f2244] talitos_edesc_alloc+0xbc/0x3c8
[ 2.465493] [c95abbb0] [c02f2600] ablkcipher_edesc_alloc+0x4c/0x5c
[ 2.471606] [c95abbd0] [c02f4ed0] ablkcipher_encrypt+0x20/0x64
[ 2.477389] [c95abbe0] [c02023b0] __test_skcipher+0x4bc/0xa08
[ 2.483049] [c95abe00] [c0204b60] test_skcipher+0x2c/0xcc
[ 2.488385] [c95abe20] [c0204c48] alg_test_skcipher+0x48/0xbc
[ 2.494064] [c95abe40] [c0205cec] alg_test+0x164/0x2e8
[ 2.499142] [c95abf00] [c0200dec] cryptomgr_test+0x48/0x50
[ 2.504558] [c95abf10] [c0039ff4] kthread+0xe4/0x110
[ 2.509471] [c95abf40] [c000e1d0] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c
[ 2.515532] Instruction dump:
[ 2.518468] 7c7e1b78 7c9d2378 7cbf2b78 41820054 3d20c076 8089c200 3d20c076 7c84e850
[ 2.526127] 8129c204 7c842e70 7f844840 419c0008 <0fe00000> 2f9e0000 54847022 7c84fa14
[ 2.533960] ---[ end trace bf78d94af73fe3b8 ]---
[ 2.539123] talitos ff020000.crypto: master data transfer error
[ 2.544775] talitos ff020000.crypto: TEA error: ISR 0x20000000_00000040
[ 2.551625] alg: skcipher: encryption failed on test 1 for ecb-aes-talitos: ret=22
IV cannot be on stack when CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is selected because the stack
cannot be DMA mapped anymore.
This patch copies the IV into the extended descriptor.
Fixes: 4de9d0b547b9 ("crypto: talitos - Add ablkcipher algorithms")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -1398,12 +1398,15 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_ede
dma_len = 0;
alloc_len += icv_stashing ? authsize : 0;
}
+ alloc_len += ivsize;
edesc = kmalloc(alloc_len, GFP_DMA | flags);
if (!edesc)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- if (ivsize)
+ if (ivsize) {
+ iv = memcpy(((u8 *)edesc) + alloc_len - ivsize, iv, ivsize);
iv_dma = dma_map_single(dev, iv, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ }
edesc->src_nents = src_nents;
edesc->dst_nents = dst_nents;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 0762216c0ad2a2fccd63890648eca491f2c83d9a upstream.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484
CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917
__msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500
strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484
nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389
__tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x440179
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00
R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid
string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable().
Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions:
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable()
tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump()
tipc_nl_compat_media_set()
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set()
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *bearer;
struct tipc_bearer_config *b;
+ int len;
b = (struct tipc_bearer_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -387,6 +388,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(b->name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, b->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -412,6 +417,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable
{
char *name;
struct nlattr *bearer;
+ int len;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -419,6 +425,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -479,6 +489,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump
struct nlattr *prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX + 1];
int err;
+ int len;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -505,6 +516,11 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump
return err;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (strcmp(name, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME])) != 0)
return 0;
@@ -645,6 +661,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_media_set(stru
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *media;
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
+ int len;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -652,6 +669,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_media_set(stru
if (!media)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME, lc->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -672,6 +693,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set(str
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *bearer;
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
+ int len;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -679,6 +701,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set(str
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, lc->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit 400b8b9a2a17918f8ce00786f596f530e7f30d50 upstream.
The similar issue as fixed in Commit 4a2eb0c37b47 ("sctp: initialize
sin6_flowinfo for ipv6 addrs in sctp_inet6addr_event") also exists
in sctp_inetaddr_event, as Alexander noticed.
To fix it, allocate sctp_sockaddr_entry with kzalloc for both sctp
ipv4 and ipv6 addresses, as does in sctp_v4/6_copy_addrlist().
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 5 +----
net/sctp/protocol.c | 4 +---
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -97,11 +97,9 @@ static int sctp_inet6addr_event(struct n
switch (ev) {
case NETDEV_UP:
- addr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_sockaddr_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
- addr->a.v6.sin6_port = 0;
- addr->a.v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
addr->a.v6.sin6_addr = ifa->addr;
addr->a.v6.sin6_scope_id = ifa->idev->dev->ifindex;
addr->valid = 1;
@@ -413,7 +411,6 @@ static void sctp_v6_copy_addrlist(struct
addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
- addr->a.v6.sin6_port = 0;
addr->a.v6.sin6_addr = ifp->addr;
addr->a.v6.sin6_scope_id = dev->ifindex;
addr->valid = 1;
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static void sctp_v4_copy_addrlist(struct
addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
- addr->a.v4.sin_port = 0;
addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_local;
addr->valid = 1;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addr->list);
@@ -777,10 +776,9 @@ static int sctp_inetaddr_event(struct no
switch (ev) {
case NETDEV_UP:
- addr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_sockaddr_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (addr) {
addr->a.v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
- addr->a.v4.sin_port = 0;
addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_local;
addr->valid = 1;
spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit 701f49bc028edb19ffccd101997dd84f0d71e279 upstream.
kthread_run returns an error pointer, but elsewhere in the code
dev->kthread_vid_cap/out is checked against NULL.
If kthread_run returns an error, then set the pointer to NULL.
I chose this method over changing all kthread_vid_cap/out tests
elsewhere since this is more robust.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c | 5 ++++-
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c
@@ -877,8 +877,11 @@ int vivid_start_generating_vid_cap(struc
"%s-vid-cap", dev->v4l2_dev.name);
if (IS_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
+
+ dev->kthread_vid_cap = NULL;
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "kernel_thread() failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
+ return err;
}
*pstreaming = true;
vivid_grab_controls(dev, true);
--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c
@@ -248,8 +248,11 @@ int vivid_start_generating_vid_out(struc
"%s-vid-out", dev->v4l2_dev.name);
if (IS_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out);
+
+ dev->kthread_vid_out = NULL;
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "kernel_thread() failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out);
+ return err;
}
*pstreaming = true;
vivid_grab_controls(dev, true);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit d47b8715953ad0cf82bb0a9d30d7b11d83bc9c11 upstream.
i_times of inode will be set with current system time which can be
configured through 'date', so it's not safe to judge dnode block as
garbage data or unchanged inode depend on i_times.
Now, we have used enhanced 'cp_ver + cp' crc method to verify valid
dnode block, so I expect recoverying invalid dnode is almost not
possible.
This reverts commit 807b1e1c8e08452948495b1a9985ab46d329e5c2.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 31 +------------------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -196,32 +196,6 @@ static void recover_inode(struct inode *
ino_of_node(page), name);
}
-static bool is_same_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage)
-{
- struct f2fs_inode *ri = F2FS_INODE(ipage);
- struct timespec disk;
-
- if (!IS_INODE(ipage))
- return true;
-
- disk.tv_sec = le64_to_cpu(ri->i_ctime);
- disk.tv_nsec = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_ctime_nsec);
- if (timespec_compare(&inode->i_ctime, &disk) > 0)
- return false;
-
- disk.tv_sec = le64_to_cpu(ri->i_atime);
- disk.tv_nsec = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_atime_nsec);
- if (timespec_compare(&inode->i_atime, &disk) > 0)
- return false;
-
- disk.tv_sec = le64_to_cpu(ri->i_mtime);
- disk.tv_nsec = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_mtime_nsec);
- if (timespec_compare(&inode->i_mtime, &disk) > 0)
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-
static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct list_head *head)
{
struct curseg_info *curseg;
@@ -248,10 +222,7 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
goto next;
entry = get_fsync_inode(head, ino_of_node(page));
- if (entry) {
- if (!is_same_inode(entry->inode, page))
- goto next;
- } else {
+ if (!entry) {
if (IS_INODE(page) && is_dent_dnode(page)) {
err = recover_inode_page(sbi, page);
if (err)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 8b66fee7f8ee18f9c51260e7a43ab37db5177a05 upstream.
syzbot reports following splat:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
CPU: 1 PID: 11057 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
__msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295
strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats+0x1f0/0x360 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:760
__tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x457ec9
Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f2557338c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f25573396d4
R13: 00000000004cb478 R14: 00000000004d86c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
The uninitialised access happened in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats:
nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name)
This is because name string is not validated before it's used.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ static int tipc_skb_tailroom(struct sk_b
return limit;
}
+static inline int TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(struct tlv_desc *tlv)
+{
+ return TLV_GET_LEN(tlv) - TLV_SPACE(0);
+}
+
static int tipc_add_tlv(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 type, void *data, u16 len)
{
struct tlv_desc *tlv = (struct tlv_desc *)skb_tail_pointer(skb);
@@ -166,6 +171,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *tipc_get_err_tlv(
return buf;
}
+static inline bool string_is_valid(char *s, int len)
+{
+ return memchr(s, '\0', len) ? true : false;
+}
+
static int __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump *cmd,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct sk_buff *arg)
@@ -741,6 +751,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_sta
{
char *name;
struct nlattr *link;
+ int len;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
@@ -748,6 +759,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_sta
if (!link)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
The backport of commit afeaade90db4 "media: em28xx: make
v4l2-compliance happier by starting sequence on zero" added a
reset on em28xx_v4l2::field_count to em28xx_ctrl_notify(),
but it should be done in em28xx_start_analog_streaming().
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-video.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-video.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-video.c
@@ -1062,6 +1062,8 @@ int em28xx_start_analog_streaming(struct
em28xx_videodbg("%s\n", __func__);
+ dev->v4l2->field_count = 0;
+
/* Make sure streaming is not already in progress for this type
of filehandle (e.g. video, vbi) */
rc = res_get(dev, vq->type);
@@ -1290,8 +1292,6 @@ static void em28xx_ctrl_notify(struct v4
{
struct em28xx *dev = priv;
- dev->v4l2->field_count = 0;
-
/*
* In the case of non-AC97 volume controls, we still need
* to do some setups at em28xx, in order to mute/unmute
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit cd26d1c4d1bc947b56ae404998ae2276df7b39b7 upstream.
If a filehandle is dup()ped, then it is possible to close it from one fd
and call mmap from the other. This creates a race condition in vb2_mmap
where it is using queue data that __vb2_queue_free (called from close())
is in the process of releasing.
By moving up the mutex_lock(mmap_lock) in vb2_mmap this race is avoided
since __vb2_queue_free is called with the same mutex locked. So vb2_mmap
now reads consistent buffer data.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c
@@ -1916,9 +1916,13 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
return -EINVAL;
}
}
+
+ mutex_lock(&q->mmap_lock);
+
if (vb2_fileio_is_active(q)) {
dprintk(1, "mmap: file io in progress\n");
- return -EBUSY;
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
}
/*
@@ -1926,7 +1930,7 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
*/
ret = __find_plane_by_offset(q, off, &buffer, &plane);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto unlock;
vb = q->bufs[buffer];
@@ -1942,8 +1946,9 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
return -EINVAL;
}
- mutex_lock(&q->mmap_lock);
ret = call_memop(vb, mmap, vb->planes[plane].mem_priv, vma);
+
+unlock:
mutex_unlock(&q->mmap_lock);
if (ret)
return ret;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
If CONFIG_SECCOMP=n, /proc/self/status includes an empty line. This causes
the iotop application to bail out with an error message.
File "/usr/local/lib64/python2.7/site-packages/iotop/data.py", line 196,
in parse_proc_pid_status
key, value = line.split(':\t', 1)
ValueError: need more than 1 value to unpack
The problem is seen in v4.9.y but not upstream because commit af884cd4a5ae6
("proc: report no_new_privs state") has not been backported to v4.9.y.
The backport of commit fae1fa0fc6cc ("proc: Provide details on speculation
flaw mitigations") tried to address the resulting differences but was
wrong, introducing the problem.
Fixes: 51ef9af2a35b ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Gwendal Grignou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
This patch only applies to v4.9.y. v4.4.y also needs to be fixed (see
https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg279131.html), but the fix
is slightly different. v4.14.y and later are not affected.
fs/proc/array.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -346,8 +346,9 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct s
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
+ seq_putc(m, '\n');
#endif
- seq_printf(m, "\nSpeculation_Store_Bypass:\t");
+ seq_printf(m, "Speculation_Store_Bypass:\t");
switch (arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(p, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) {
case -EINVAL:
seq_printf(m, "unknown");
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit 974cb0e3e7c963ced06c4e32c5b2884173fa5e01 upstream.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x4a8/0xba0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:826
CPU: 0 PID: 6290 Comm: syz-executor848 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917
__msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500
__arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
__fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x4a8/0xba0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:826
__tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x59e/0xdb0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:205
tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x63a/0x820 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:270
tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1151 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1402/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x440179
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffecec49318 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00
R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
We cannot take for granted the thing that the length of data contained
in TLV is longer than the size of struct tipc_name_table_query in
tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump().
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -815,6 +815,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dum
};
ntq = (struct tipc_name_table_query *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+ if (TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req) < sizeof(struct tipc_name_table_query))
+ return -EINVAL;
depth = ntohl(ntq->depth);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
commit 310ca162d779efee8a2dc3731439680f3e9c1e86 upstream.
syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference [1] which is caused by
race condition between ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0) versus
ioctl(other_loop_fd, LOOP_SET_FD, loop_fd) due to traversing other
loop devices at loop_validate_file() without holding corresponding
lo->lo_ctl_mutex locks.
Since ioctl() request on loop devices is not frequent operation, we don't
need fine grained locking. Let's use global lock in order to allow safe
traversal at loop_validate_file().
Note that syzbot is also reporting circular locking dependency between
bdev->bd_mutex and lo->lo_ctl_mutex [2] which is caused by calling
blkdev_reread_part() with lock held. This patch does not address it.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f3cfe26e785d85f9ee259f385515291d21bd80a3
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=bf154052f0eea4bc7712499e4569505907d15889
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
drivers/block/loop.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
static DEFINE_IDR(loop_index_idr);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_index_mutex);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_ctl_mutex);
static int max_part;
static int part_shift;
@@ -1033,7 +1034,7 @@ static int loop_clr_fd(struct loop_devic
*/
if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 1) {
lo->lo_flags |= LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR;
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
return 0;
}
@@ -1082,12 +1083,12 @@ static int loop_clr_fd(struct loop_devic
if (!part_shift)
lo->lo_disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN;
loop_unprepare_queue(lo);
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
/*
- * Need not hold lo_ctl_mutex to fput backing file.
- * Calling fput holding lo_ctl_mutex triggers a circular
+ * Need not hold loop_ctl_mutex to fput backing file.
+ * Calling fput holding loop_ctl_mutex triggers a circular
* lock dependency possibility warning as fput can take
- * bd_mutex which is usually taken before lo_ctl_mutex.
+ * bd_mutex which is usually taken before loop_ctl_mutex.
*/
fput(filp);
return 0;
@@ -1350,7 +1351,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
struct loop_device *lo = bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
int err;
- mutex_lock_nested(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex, 1);
+ mutex_lock_nested(&loop_ctl_mutex, 1);
switch (cmd) {
case LOOP_SET_FD:
err = loop_set_fd(lo, mode, bdev, arg);
@@ -1359,7 +1360,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
err = loop_change_fd(lo, bdev, arg);
break;
case LOOP_CLR_FD:
- /* loop_clr_fd would have unlocked lo_ctl_mutex on success */
+ /* loop_clr_fd would have unlocked loop_ctl_mutex on success */
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
goto out_unlocked;
@@ -1395,7 +1396,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
default:
err = lo->ioctl ? lo->ioctl(lo, cmd, arg) : -EINVAL;
}
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
out_unlocked:
return err;
@@ -1528,16 +1529,16 @@ static int lo_compat_ioctl(struct block_
switch(cmd) {
case LOOP_SET_STATUS:
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
err = loop_set_status_compat(
lo, (const struct compat_loop_info __user *) arg);
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
case LOOP_GET_STATUS:
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
err = loop_get_status_compat(
lo, (struct compat_loop_info __user *) arg);
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
case LOOP_SET_CAPACITY:
case LOOP_CLR_FD:
@@ -1581,7 +1582,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
return;
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
@@ -1598,7 +1599,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
loop_flush(lo);
}
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
}
static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
@@ -1644,10 +1645,10 @@ static int unregister_transfer_cb(int id
struct loop_device *lo = ptr;
struct loop_func_table *xfer = data;
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_encryption == xfer)
loop_release_xfer(lo);
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
return 0;
}
@@ -1813,7 +1814,6 @@ static int loop_add(struct loop_device *
if (!part_shift)
disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN;
disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_EXT_DEVT;
- mutex_init(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
atomic_set(&lo->lo_refcnt, 0);
lo->lo_number = i;
spin_lock_init(&lo->lo_lock);
@@ -1926,19 +1926,19 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
if (ret < 0)
break;
- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
ret = -EBUSY;
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 0) {
ret = -EBUSY;
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
idr_remove(&loop_index_idr, lo->lo_number);
loop_remove(lo);
break;
--- a/drivers/block/loop.h
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.h
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ struct loop_device {
spinlock_t lo_lock;
int lo_state;
- struct mutex lo_ctl_mutex;
struct kthread_worker worker;
struct task_struct *worker_task;
bool use_dio;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream.
levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -726,7 +726,8 @@ static int sens_destroy(void *key, void
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
levdatum = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ if (levdatum->level)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
kfree(levdatum->level);
}
kfree(datum);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 04906b2f542c23626b0ef6219b808406f8dddbe9 upstream.
bd_set_size() updates also block device's block size. This is somewhat
unexpected from its name and at this point, only blkdev_open() uses this
functionality. Furthermore, this can result in changing block size under
a filesystem mounted on a loop device which leads to livelocks inside
__getblk_gfp() like:
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 10863 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc5+ #151
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google
01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x3f/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:106
...
Call Trace:
init_page_buffers+0x3e2/0x530 fs/buffer.c:904
grow_dev_page fs/buffer.c:947 [inline]
grow_buffers fs/buffer.c:1009 [inline]
__getblk_slow fs/buffer.c:1036 [inline]
__getblk_gfp+0x906/0xb10 fs/buffer.c:1313
__bread_gfp+0x2d/0x310 fs/buffer.c:1347
sb_bread include/linux/buffer_head.h:307 [inline]
fat12_ent_bread+0x14e/0x3d0 fs/fat/fatent.c:75
fat_ent_read_block fs/fat/fatent.c:441 [inline]
fat_alloc_clusters+0x8ce/0x16e0 fs/fat/fatent.c:489
fat_add_cluster+0x7a/0x150 fs/fat/inode.c:101
__fat_get_block fs/fat/inode.c:148 [inline]
...
Trivial reproducer for the problem looks like:
truncate -s 1G /tmp/image
losetup /dev/loop0 /tmp/image
mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 /dev/loop0
mount -t ext4 /dev/loop0 /mnt
losetup -c /dev/loop0
l /mnt
Fix the problem by moving initialization of a block device block size
into a separate function and call it when needed.
Thanks to Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> for help with
debugging the problem.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/block_dev.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/block_dev.c
+++ b/fs/block_dev.c
@@ -114,6 +114,20 @@ void invalidate_bdev(struct block_device
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(invalidate_bdev);
+static void set_init_blocksize(struct block_device *bdev)
+{
+ unsigned bsize = bdev_logical_block_size(bdev);
+ loff_t size = i_size_read(bdev->bd_inode);
+
+ while (bsize < PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (size & bsize)
+ break;
+ bsize <<= 1;
+ }
+ bdev->bd_block_size = bsize;
+ bdev->bd_inode->i_blkbits = blksize_bits(bsize);
+}
+
int set_blocksize(struct block_device *bdev, int size)
{
/* Size must be a power of two, and between 512 and PAGE_SIZE */
@@ -1209,18 +1223,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_disk_change);
void bd_set_size(struct block_device *bdev, loff_t size)
{
- unsigned bsize = bdev_logical_block_size(bdev);
-
inode_lock(bdev->bd_inode);
i_size_write(bdev->bd_inode, size);
inode_unlock(bdev->bd_inode);
- while (bsize < PAGE_SIZE) {
- if (size & bsize)
- break;
- bsize <<= 1;
- }
- bdev->bd_block_size = bsize;
- bdev->bd_inode->i_blkbits = blksize_bits(bsize);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bd_set_size);
@@ -1297,8 +1302,10 @@ static int __blkdev_get(struct block_dev
}
}
- if (!ret)
+ if (!ret) {
bd_set_size(bdev,(loff_t)get_capacity(disk)<<9);
+ set_init_blocksize(bdev);
+ }
/*
* If the device is invalidated, rescan partition
@@ -1333,6 +1340,7 @@ static int __blkdev_get(struct block_dev
goto out_clear;
}
bd_set_size(bdev, (loff_t)bdev->bd_part->nr_sects << 9);
+ set_init_blocksize(bdev);
}
} else {
if (bdev->bd_contains == bdev) {
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
commit e2c8d550a973bb34fc28bc8d0ec996f84562fb8a upstream.
The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.
By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
we need to fix vmalloc.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -1147,14 +1147,16 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, c
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
- newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
+ newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
+ PAGE_KERNEL);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
if (countersize)
memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
- newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
+ newinfo->entries = __vmalloc(tmp.entries_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
+ PAGE_KERNEL);
if (!newinfo->entries) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_newinfo;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
commit 81c88b18de1f11f70c97f28ced8d642c00bb3955 upstream.
If we ignore the error we'll hit a null dereference a little later.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c
@@ -770,6 +770,12 @@ void rpcb_getport_async(struct rpc_task
case RPCBVERS_3:
map->r_netid = xprt->address_strings[RPC_DISPLAY_NETID];
map->r_addr = rpc_sockaddr2uaddr(sap, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!map->r_addr) {
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ dprintk("RPC: %5u %s: no memory available\n",
+ task->tk_pid, __func__);
+ goto bailout_free_args;
+ }
map->r_owner = "";
break;
case RPCBVERS_2:
@@ -792,6 +798,8 @@ void rpcb_getport_async(struct rpc_task
rpc_put_task(child);
return;
+bailout_free_args:
+ kfree(map);
bailout_release_client:
rpc_release_client(rpcb_clnt);
bailout_nofree:
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 967d1dc144b50ad005e5eecdfadfbcfb399ffff6 upstream.
__loop_release() has a single call site. Fold it there. This is
currently not a huge win but it will make following replacement of
loop_index_mutex more obvious.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 16 +++++++---------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -1575,12 +1575,15 @@ out:
return err;
}
-static void __lo_release(struct loop_device *lo)
+static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
+ struct loop_device *lo;
int err;
+ mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ lo = disk->private_data;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
- return;
+ goto unlock_index;
mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
@@ -1590,7 +1593,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
- return;
+ goto unlock_index;
} else {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
@@ -1600,12 +1603,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
}
mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
-}
-
-static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
-{
- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
- __lo_release(disk->private_data);
+unlock_index:
mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
commit 628bd85947091830a8c4872adfd5ed1d515a9cf2 upstream.
Commit 0a42e99b58a20883 ("loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex") forgot to
remove mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex) from loop_control_ioctl() when
replacing loop_index_mutex with loop_ctl_mutex.
Fixes: 0a42e99b58a20883 ("loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -1929,12 +1929,10 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
break;
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
ret = -EBUSY;
- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 0) {
ret = -EBUSY;
- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
break;
}
lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: James Morris <[email protected]>
commit a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 upstream.
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying
to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization
that could result in this.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
security/security.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -904,6 +904,13 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cre
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
+ /*
+ * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
+ * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
+ return;
+
call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit 9729d6d282a6d7ce88e64c9119cecdf79edf4e88 upstream.
The capture DV timings capabilities allowed for a minimum width and
height of 0. So passing a timings struct with 0 values is allowed
and will later cause a division by zero.
Ensure that the width and height must be >= 16 to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ const struct v4l2_dv_timings_cap vivid_d
.type = V4L2_DV_BT_656_1120,
/* keep this initialization for compatibility with GCC < 4.4.6 */
.reserved = { 0 },
- V4L2_INIT_BT_TIMINGS(0, MAX_WIDTH, 0, MAX_HEIGHT, 14000000, 775000000,
+ V4L2_INIT_BT_TIMINGS(16, MAX_WIDTH, 16, MAX_HEIGHT, 14000000, 775000000,
V4L2_DV_BT_STD_CEA861 | V4L2_DV_BT_STD_DMT |
V4L2_DV_BT_STD_CVT | V4L2_DV_BT_STD_GTF,
V4L2_DV_BT_CAP_PROGRESSIVE | V4L2_DV_BT_CAP_INTERLACED)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
commit 66a8d5bfb518f9f12d47e1d2dce1732279f9451e upstream.
Strict requirement of pixclock to be zero breaks support of SDL 1.2
which contains hardcoded table of supported video modes with non-zero
pixclock values[1].
To better understand which pixclock values are considered valid and how
driver should handle these values, I briefly examined few existing fbdev
drivers and documentation in Documentation/fb/. And it looks like there
are no strict rules on that and actual behaviour varies:
* some drivers treat (pixclock == 0) as "use defaults" (uvesafb.c);
* some treat (pixclock == 0) as invalid value which leads to
-EINVAL (clps711x-fb.c);
* some pass converted pixclock value to hardware (uvesafb.c);
* some are trying to find nearest value from predefined table
(vga16fb.c, video_gx.c).
Given this, I believe that it should be safe to just ignore this value if
changing is not supported. It seems that any portable fbdev application
which was not written only for one specific device working under one
specific kernel version should not rely on any particular behaviour of
pixclock anyway.
However, while enabling SDL1 applications to work out of the box when
there is no /etc/fb.modes with valid settings, this change affects the
video mode choosing logic in SDL. Depending on current screen
resolution, contents of /etc/fb.modes and resolution requested by
application, this may lead to user-visible difference (not always):
image will be displayed in a right way, but it will be aligned to the
left instead of center. There is no "right behaviour" here as well, as
emulated fbdev, opposing to old fbdev drivers, simply ignores any
requsts of video mode changes with resolutions smaller than current.
The easiest way to reproduce this problem is to install sdl-sopwith[2],
remove /etc/fb.modes file if it exists, and then try to run sopwith
from console without X. At least in Fedora 29, sopwith may be simply
installed from standard repositories.
[1] SDL 1.2.15 source code, src/video/fbcon/SDL_fbvideo.c, vesa_timings
[2] http://sdl-sopwith.sourceforge.net/
Signed-off-by: Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 79e539453b34e ("DRM: i915: add mode setting support")
Fixes: 771fe6b912fca ("drm/radeon: introduce kernel modesetting for radeon hardware")
Fixes: 785b93ef8c309 ("drm/kms: move driver specific fb common code to helper functions (v2)")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c
@@ -1238,9 +1238,14 @@ int drm_fb_helper_check_var(struct fb_va
struct drm_framebuffer *fb = fb_helper->fb;
int depth;
- if (var->pixclock != 0 || in_dbg_master())
+ if (in_dbg_master())
return -EINVAL;
+ if (var->pixclock != 0) {
+ DRM_DEBUG("fbdev emulation doesn't support changing the pixel clock, value of pixclock is ignored\n");
+ var->pixclock = 0;
+ }
+
/* Need to resize the fb object !!! */
if (var->bits_per_pixel > fb->bits_per_pixel ||
var->xres > fb->width || var->yres > fb->height ||
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
commit 0aaa81377c5a01f686bcdb8c7a6929a7bf330c68 upstream.
Muyu Yu provided a POC where user root with CAP_NET_ADMIN can create a CAN
frame modification rule that makes the data length code a higher value than
the available CAN frame data size. In combination with a configured checksum
calculation where the result is stored relatively to the end of the data
(e.g. cgw_csum_xor_rel) the tail of the skb (e.g. frag_list pointer in
skb_shared_info) can be rewritten which finally can cause a system crash.
Michael Kubecek suggested to drop frames that have a DLC exceeding the
available space after the modification process and provided a patch that can
handle CAN FD frames too. Within this patch we also limit the length for the
checksum calculations to the maximum of Classic CAN data length (8).
CAN frames that are dropped by these additional checks are counted with the
CGW_DELETED counter which indicates misconfigurations in can-gw rules.
This fixes CVE-2019-3701.
Reported-by: Muyu Yu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Muyu Yu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
Cc: linux-stable <[email protected]> # >= v3.2
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/can/gw.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/can/gw.c
+++ b/net/can/gw.c
@@ -418,13 +418,29 @@ static void can_can_gw_rcv(struct sk_buf
while (modidx < MAX_MODFUNCTIONS && gwj->mod.modfunc[modidx])
(*gwj->mod.modfunc[modidx++])(cf, &gwj->mod);
- /* check for checksum updates when the CAN frame has been modified */
+ /* Has the CAN frame been modified? */
if (modidx) {
- if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8)
+ /* get available space for the processed CAN frame type */
+ int max_len = nskb->len - offsetof(struct can_frame, data);
+
+ /* dlc may have changed, make sure it fits to the CAN frame */
+ if (cf->can_dlc > max_len)
+ goto out_delete;
+
+ /* check for checksum updates in classic CAN length only */
+ if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8) {
+ if (cf->can_dlc > 8)
+ goto out_delete;
+
(*gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8)(cf, &gwj->mod.csum.crc8);
+ }
+
+ if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.xor) {
+ if (cf->can_dlc > 8)
+ goto out_delete;
- if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.xor)
(*gwj->mod.csumfunc.xor)(cf, &gwj->mod.csum.xor);
+ }
}
/* clear the skb timestamp if not configured the other way */
@@ -436,6 +452,14 @@ static void can_can_gw_rcv(struct sk_buf
gwj->dropped_frames++;
else
gwj->handled_frames++;
+
+ return;
+
+ out_delete:
+ /* delete frame due to misconfiguration */
+ gwj->deleted_frames++;
+ kfree_skb(nskb);
+ return;
}
static inline int cgw_register_filter(struct cgw_job *gwj)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
commit edf5ff04a45750ac8ce2435974f001dc9cfbf055 upstream.
syzbot reports following splat:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
CPU: 1 PID: 9306 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
__msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313
strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline]
__tipc_nl_compat_link_set net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:708 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x929/0x1220 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:744
__tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
The uninitialised access happened in
nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, lc->name)
This is because lc->name string is not validated before it's used.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
@@ -753,9 +753,14 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_set(struc
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
struct tipc_media *media;
+ int len;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
+ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
media = tipc_media_find(lc->name);
if (media) {
cmd->doit = &tipc_nl_media_set;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
commit a01421e4484327fe44f8e126793ed5a48a221e24 upstream.
Using [1] for static analysis I found that the OMAPFB_QUERY_PLANE,
OMAPFB_GET_COLOR_KEY, OMAPFB_GET_DISPLAY_INFO, and OMAPFB_GET_VRAM_INFO
cases could all leak uninitialized stack memory--either due to
uninitialized padding or 'reserved' fields.
Fix them by clearing the shared union used to store copied out data.
[1] https://github.com/vlad902/kernel-uninitialized-memory-checker
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Fixes: b39a982ddecf ("OMAP: DSS2: omapfb driver")
Cc: [email protected]
[b.zolnierkie: prefix patch subject with "omap2fb: "]
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c
@@ -609,6 +609,8 @@ int omapfb_ioctl(struct fb_info *fbi, un
int r = 0;
+ memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p));
+
switch (cmd) {
case OMAPFB_SYNC_GFX:
DBG("ioctl SYNC_GFX\n");
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: YunQiang Su <[email protected]>
commit a214720cbf50cd8c3f76bbb9c3f5c283910e9d33 upstream.
Octeon has an boot-time option to disable pcie.
Since MSI depends on PCI-E, we should also disable MSI also with
this option is on in order to avoid inadvertently accessing PCIe
registers.
Signed-off-by: YunQiang Su <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected] # v3.3+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c
+++ b/arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c
@@ -369,7 +369,9 @@ int __init octeon_msi_initialize(void)
int irq;
struct irq_chip *msi;
- if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_PCIE) {
+ if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_INVALID) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_PCIE) {
msi_rcv_reg[0] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV0;
msi_rcv_reg[1] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV1;
msi_rcv_reg[2] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV2;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
commit cf62a1a13749db0d32b5cdd800ea91a4087319de upstream.
As notted by Jiri, tty_ldisc_reinit() shouldn't rely on tty counter.
Simplify math by increasing the counter after reinit success.
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Link: lkml.kernel.org/r/<[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 13 +++++--------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -1491,16 +1491,13 @@ static int tty_reopen(struct tty_struct
if (retval)
return retval;
- tty->count++;
- if (tty->ldisc)
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (!tty->ldisc)
+ retval = tty_ldisc_reinit(tty, tty->termios.c_line);
+ tty_ldisc_unlock(tty);
- retval = tty_ldisc_reinit(tty, tty->termios.c_line);
- if (retval)
- tty->count--;
+ if (retval == 0)
+ tty->count++;
-out_unlock:
- tty_ldisc_unlock(tty);
return retval;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jonathan Hunter <[email protected]>
commit ac4ca4b9f4623ba5e1ea7a582f286567c611e027 upstream.
The tps6586x driver creates an irqchip that is used by its various child
devices for managing interrupts. The tps6586x-rtc device is one of its
children that uses the tps6586x irqchip. When using the tps6586x-rtc as
a wake-up device from suspend, the following is seen:
PM: Syncing filesystems ... done.
Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
OOM killer disabled.
Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.000 seconds) done.
Disabling non-boot CPUs ...
Entering suspend state LP1
Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
CPU1 is up
tps6586x 3-0034: failed to read interrupt status
tps6586x 3-0034: failed to read interrupt status
The reason why the tps6586x interrupt status cannot be read is because
the tps6586x interrupt is not masked during suspend and when the
tps6586x-rtc interrupt occurs, to wake-up the device, the interrupt is
seen before the i2c controller has been resumed in order to read the
tps6586x interrupt status.
The tps6586x-rtc driver sets it's interrupt as a wake-up source during
suspend, which gets propagated to the parent tps6586x interrupt.
However, the tps6586x-rtc driver cannot disable it's interrupt during
suspend otherwise we would never be woken up and so the tps6586x must
disable it's interrupt instead.
Prevent the tps6586x interrupt handler from executing on exiting suspend
before the i2c controller has been resumed by disabling the tps6586x
interrupt on entering suspend and re-enabling it on resuming from
suspend.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c
@@ -594,6 +594,29 @@ static int tps6586x_i2c_remove(struct i2
return 0;
}
+static int __maybe_unused tps6586x_i2c_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tps6586x *tps6586x = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ if (tps6586x->client->irq)
+ disable_irq(tps6586x->client->irq);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused tps6586x_i2c_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tps6586x *tps6586x = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ if (tps6586x->client->irq)
+ enable_irq(tps6586x->client->irq);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(tps6586x_pm_ops, tps6586x_i2c_suspend,
+ tps6586x_i2c_resume);
+
static const struct i2c_device_id tps6586x_id_table[] = {
{ "tps6586x", 0 },
{ },
@@ -604,6 +627,7 @@ static struct i2c_driver tps6586x_driver
.driver = {
.name = "tps6586x",
.of_match_table = of_match_ptr(tps6586x_of_match),
+ .pm = &tps6586x_pm_ops,
},
.probe = tps6586x_i2c_probe,
.remove = tps6586x_i2c_remove,
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit 5a9372f751b5350e0ce3d2ee91832f1feae2c2e5 upstream.
While reading through the sysvipc implementation, I noticed that the n32
semctl/shmctl/msgctl system calls behave differently based on whether
o32 support is enabled or not: Without o32, the IPC_64 flag passed by
user space is rejected but calls without that flag get IPC_64 behavior.
As far as I can tell, this was inadvertently changed by a cleanup patch
but never noticed by anyone, possibly nobody has tried using sysvipc
on n32 after linux-3.19.
Change it back to the old behavior now.
Fixes: 78aaf956ba3a ("MIPS: Compat: Fix build error if CONFIG_MIPS32_COMPAT but no compat ABI.")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected] # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/mips/Kconfig | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
@@ -3135,6 +3135,7 @@ config MIPS32_O32
config MIPS32_N32
bool "Kernel support for n32 binaries"
depends on 64BIT
+ select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
select COMPAT
select MIPS32_COMPAT
select SYSVIPC_COMPAT if SYSVIPC
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
commit c56c2e173773097a248fd3bace91ac8f6fc5386d upstream.
This patch moves the mapping of IV after the kmalloc(). This
avoids having to unmap in case kmalloc() fails.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 26 +++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -1347,23 +1347,18 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_ede
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
int max_len = is_sec1 ? TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN : TALITOS2_MAX_DATA_LEN;
- void *err;
if (cryptlen + authsize > max_len) {
dev_err(dev, "length exceeds h/w max limit\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
- if (ivsize)
- iv_dma = dma_map_single(dev, iv, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-
if (!dst || dst == src) {
src_len = assoclen + cryptlen + authsize;
src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(src, src_len);
if (src_nents < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
- err = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- goto error_sg;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
src_nents = (src_nents == 1) ? 0 : src_nents;
dst_nents = dst ? src_nents : 0;
@@ -1373,16 +1368,14 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_ede
src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(src, src_len);
if (src_nents < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
- err = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- goto error_sg;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
src_nents = (src_nents == 1) ? 0 : src_nents;
dst_len = assoclen + cryptlen + (encrypt ? authsize : 0);
dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(dst, dst_len);
if (dst_nents < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of dst SG.\n");
- err = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- goto error_sg;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
dst_nents = (dst_nents == 1) ? 0 : dst_nents;
}
@@ -1407,11 +1400,10 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_ede
}
edesc = kmalloc(alloc_len, GFP_DMA | flags);
- if (!edesc) {
- dev_err(dev, "could not allocate edescriptor\n");
- err = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- goto error_sg;
- }
+ if (!edesc)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ if (ivsize)
+ iv_dma = dma_map_single(dev, iv, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
edesc->src_nents = src_nents;
edesc->dst_nents = dst_nents;
@@ -1423,10 +1415,6 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_ede
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
return edesc;
-error_sg:
- if (iv_dma)
- dma_unmap_single(dev, iv_dma, ivsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- return err;
}
static struct talitos_edesc *aead_edesc_alloc(struct aead_request *areq, u8 *iv,
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
commit 44759979a49bfd2d20d789add7fa81a21eb1a4ab upstream.
Changing of caching mode via /sys/devices/.../scsi_disk/.../cache_type may
fail if device responds to MODE SENSE command with DPOFUA flag set, and
then checks this flag to be not set on MODE SELECT command.
In this scenario, when trying to change cache_type, write always fails:
# echo "none" >cache_type
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
And following appears in dmesg:
[13007.865745] sd 1:0:1:0: [sda] Sense Key : Illegal Request [current]
[13007.865753] sd 1:0:1:0: [sda] Add. Sense: Invalid field in parameter list
>From SBC-4 r15, 6.5.1 "Mode pages overview", description of DEVICE-SPECIFIC
PARAMETER field in the mode parameter header:
...
The write protect (WP) bit for mode data sent with a MODE SELECT
command shall be ignored by the device server.
...
The DPOFUA bit is reserved for mode data sent with a MODE SELECT
command.
...
The remaining bits in the DEVICE-SPECIFIC PARAMETER byte are also reserved
and shall be set to zero.
[mkp: shuffled commentary to commit description]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ivan Mironov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/sd.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sd.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sd.c
@@ -208,6 +208,12 @@ cache_type_store(struct device *dev, str
sp = buffer_data[0] & 0x80 ? 1 : 0;
buffer_data[0] &= ~0x80;
+ /*
+ * Ensure WP, DPOFUA, and RESERVED fields are cleared in
+ * received mode parameter buffer before doing MODE SELECT.
+ */
+ data.device_specific = 0;
+
if (scsi_mode_select(sdp, 1, sp, 8, buffer_data, len, SD_TIMEOUT,
SD_MAX_RETRIES, &data, &sshdr)) {
if (scsi_sense_valid(&sshdr))
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
This reverts commit 8323aafe67b31c7f73d18747604ba1cc6c3e4f3a.
A wrong commit message was used for the stable commit because of a human
error (and duplicate commit subject lines).
This patch reverts this error, and the following patches add the two
upstream commits.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c | 5 +----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c
index 8652475e01d0..2fb1bf1a26c5 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c
@@ -631,11 +631,8 @@ static void cxgbit_send_halfclose(struct cxgbit_sock *csk)
static void cxgbit_arp_failure_discard(void *handle, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct cxgbit_sock *csk = handle;
-
pr_debug("%s cxgbit_device %p\n", __func__, handle);
kfree_skb(skb);
- cxgbit_put_csk(csk);
}
static void cxgbit_abort_arp_failure(void *handle, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1139,7 +1136,7 @@ cxgbit_pass_accept_rpl(struct cxgbit_sock *csk, struct cpl_pass_accept_req *req)
rpl5->opt0 = cpu_to_be64(opt0);
rpl5->opt2 = cpu_to_be32(opt2);
set_wr_txq(skb, CPL_PRIORITY_SETUP, csk->ctrlq_idx);
- t4_set_arp_err_handler(skb, csk, cxgbit_arp_failure_discard);
+ t4_set_arp_err_handler(skb, NULL, cxgbit_arp_failure_discard);
cxgbit_l2t_send(csk->com.cdev, skb, csk->l2t);
}
--
2.19.1
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
commit 83d817f41070c48bc3eb7ec18e43000a548fca5c upstream.
tty_ldisc_reinit() doesn't race with neither tty_ldisc_hangup()
nor set_ldisc() nor tty_ldisc_release() as they use tty lock.
But it races with anyone who expects line discipline to be the same
after hoding read semaphore in tty_ldisc_ref().
We've seen the following crash on v4.9.108 stable:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000002260
IP: [..] n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x5f/0x86d
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
Call Trace:
[..] n_tty_receive_buf2
[..] tty_ldisc_receive_buf
[..] flush_to_ldisc
[..] process_one_work
[..] worker_thread
[..] kthread
[..] ret_from_fork
tty_ldisc_reinit() should be called with ldisc_sem hold for writing,
which will protect any reader against line discipline changes.
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # b027e2298bd5 ("tty: fix data race between tty_init_dev and flush of buf")
Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -1487,15 +1487,20 @@ static int tty_reopen(struct tty_struct
if (test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EBUSY;
- tty->count++;
+ retval = tty_ldisc_lock(tty, 5 * HZ);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+ tty->count++;
if (tty->ldisc)
- return 0;
+ goto out_unlock;
retval = tty_ldisc_reinit(tty, tty->termios.c_line);
if (retval)
tty->count--;
+out_unlock:
+ tty_ldisc_unlock(tty);
return retval;
}
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harsh Jain <[email protected]>
commit a7773363624b034ab198c738661253d20a8055c2 upstream.
Authencesn template in decrypt path unconditionally calls aead_request_complete
after ahash_verify which leads to following kernel panic in after decryption.
[ 338.539800] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
[ 338.548372] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 338.551157] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 338.554919] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W I 4.19.7+ #13
[ 338.564431] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10
[ 338.572212] RIP: 0010:esp_input_done2+0x350/0x410 [esp4]
[ 338.578030] Code: ff 0f b6 68 10 48 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 e9 8e fe ff ff 8b 04 25 04 00 00 00 83 e8 01 48 98 48 8b 3c c5 10 00 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff <8b> 04 25 04 00 00 00 83 e8 01 48 98 4c 8b 24 c5 10 00 00 00 e9 3b
[ 338.598547] RSP: 0018:ffff911c97803c00 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 338.604268] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff911c4469ee00 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 338.612090] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000130 RDI: ffff911b87c20400
[ 338.619874] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff911b87c20498 R09: 000000000000000a
[ 338.627610] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 338.635402] R13: ffff911c89590000 R14: ffff911c91730000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 338.643234] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff911c97800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 338.652047] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 338.658299] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000001ec20a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 338.666382] Call Trace:
[ 338.669051] <IRQ>
[ 338.671254] esp_input_done+0x12/0x20 [esp4]
[ 338.675922] chcr_handle_resp+0x3b5/0x790 [chcr]
[ 338.680949] cpl_fw6_pld_handler+0x37/0x60 [chcr]
[ 338.686080] chcr_uld_rx_handler+0x22/0x50 [chcr]
[ 338.691233] uldrx_handler+0x8c/0xc0 [cxgb4]
[ 338.695923] process_responses+0x2f0/0x5d0 [cxgb4]
[ 338.701177] ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x3a/0x90
[ 338.706882] ? matrix_alloc_area.constprop.7+0x60/0x90
[ 338.712517] ? apic_update_irq_cfg+0x82/0xf0
[ 338.717177] napi_rx_handler+0x14/0xe0 [cxgb4]
[ 338.722015] net_rx_action+0x2aa/0x3e0
[ 338.726136] __do_softirq+0xcb/0x280
[ 338.730054] irq_exit+0xde/0xf0
[ 338.733504] do_IRQ+0x54/0xd0
[ 338.736745] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
Fixes: 104880a6b470 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD...")
Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/authencesn.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypto/authencesn.c
+++ b/crypto/authencesn.c
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static void authenc_esn_verify_ahash_don
struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
err = err ?: crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt_tail(req, 0);
- aead_request_complete(req, err);
+ authenc_esn_request_complete(req, err);
}
static int crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d972f3dce8d161e2142da0ab1ef25df00e2f21a9 ]
'dev' is non NULL when the addr_len check triggers so it must goto a label
that does the dev_put otherwise dev will have a leaked refcount.
This bug causes the ib_ipoib module to become unloadable when using
systemd-network as it triggers this check on InfiniBand links.
Fixes: 99137b7888f4 ("packet: validate address length")
Reported-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2663,7 +2663,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc
addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr : NULL;
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(&po->sk), saddr->sll_ifindex);
if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len)
- goto out;
+ goto out_put;
}
err = -ENXIO;
@@ -2862,7 +2862,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc
addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr : NULL;
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), saddr->sll_ifindex);
if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len)
- goto out;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
err = -ENXIO;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stanley Chu <[email protected]>
commit 3f7e62bba0003f9c68f599f5997c4647ef5b4f4e upstream.
The commit 356fd2663cff ("scsi: Set request queue runtime PM status back to
active on resume") fixed up the inconsistent RPM status between request
queue and device. However changing request queue RPM status shall be done
only on successful resume, otherwise status may be still inconsistent as
below,
Request queue: RPM_ACTIVE
Device: RPM_SUSPENDED
This ends up soft lockup because requests can be submitted to underlying
devices but those devices and their required resource are not resumed.
For example,
After above inconsistent status happens, IO request can be submitted to UFS
device driver but required resource (like clock) is not resumed yet thus
lead to warning as below call stack,
WARN_ON(hba->clk_gating.state != CLKS_ON);
ufshcd_queuecommand
scsi_dispatch_cmd
scsi_request_fn
__blk_run_queue
cfq_insert_request
__elv_add_request
blk_flush_plug_list
blk_finish_plug
jbd2_journal_commit_transaction
kjournald2
We may see all behind IO requests hang because of no response from storage
host or device and then soft lockup happens in system. In the end, system
may crash in many ways.
Fixes: 356fd2663cff (scsi: Set request queue runtime PM status back to active on resume)
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stanley Chu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/scsi/scsi_pm.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_pm.c
@@ -79,8 +79,22 @@ static int scsi_dev_type_resume(struct d
if (err == 0) {
pm_runtime_disable(dev);
- pm_runtime_set_active(dev);
+ err = pm_runtime_set_active(dev);
pm_runtime_enable(dev);
+
+ /*
+ * Forcibly set runtime PM status of request queue to "active"
+ * to make sure we can again get requests from the queue
+ * (see also blk_pm_peek_request()).
+ *
+ * The resume hook will correct runtime PM status of the disk.
+ */
+ if (!err && scsi_is_sdev_device(dev)) {
+ struct scsi_device *sdev = to_scsi_device(dev);
+
+ if (sdev->request_queue->dev)
+ blk_set_runtime_active(sdev->request_queue);
+ }
}
return err;
@@ -139,16 +153,6 @@ static int scsi_bus_resume_common(struct
else
fn = NULL;
- /*
- * Forcibly set runtime PM status of request queue to "active" to
- * make sure we can again get requests from the queue (see also
- * blk_pm_peek_request()).
- *
- * The resume hook will correct runtime PM status of the disk.
- */
- if (scsi_is_sdev_device(dev) && pm_runtime_suspended(dev))
- blk_set_runtime_active(to_scsi_device(dev)->request_queue);
-
if (fn) {
async_schedule_domain(fn, dev, &scsi_sd_pm_domain);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
commit 74d5d229b1bf60f93bff244b2dfc0eb21ec32a07 upstream.
If we flip read-only before we initiate writeback on all dirty pages for
ordered extents we've created then we'll have ordered extents left over
on umount, which results in all sorts of bad things happening. Fix this
by making sure we wait on ordered extents if we have to do the aborted
transaction cleanup stuff.
generic/475 can produce this warning:
[ 8531.177332] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 11997 at fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3856 btrfs_free_fs_root+0x95/0xa0 [btrfs]
[ 8531.183282] CPU: 2 PID: 11997 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.0.0-rc1-default+ #394
[ 8531.185164] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626cc-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[ 8531.187851] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_fs_root+0x95/0xa0 [btrfs]
[ 8531.193082] RSP: 0018:ffffb1ab86163d98 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 8531.194198] RAX: ffff9f3449494d18 RBX: ffff9f34a2695000 RCX:0000000000000000
[ 8531.195629] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI:0000000000000000
[ 8531.197315] RBP: ffff9f344e930000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:0000000000000000
[ 8531.199095] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9f34494d4ff8 R12:ffffb1ab86163dc0
[ 8531.200870] R13: ffff9f344e9300b0 R14: ffffb1ab86163db8 R15:0000000000000000
[ 8531.202707] FS: 00007fc68e949fc0(0000) GS:ffff9f34bd800000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8531.204851] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8531.205942] CR2: 00007ffde8114dd8 CR3: 000000002dfbd000 CR4:00000000000006e0
[ 8531.207516] Call Trace:
[ 8531.208175] btrfs_free_fs_roots+0xdb/0x170 [btrfs]
[ 8531.210209] ? wait_for_completion+0x5b/0x190
[ 8531.211303] close_ctree+0x157/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 8531.212412] generic_shutdown_super+0x64/0x100
[ 8531.213485] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
[ 8531.214430] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0xa0 [btrfs]
[ 8531.215539] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
[ 8531.216633] cleanup_mnt+0x3b/0x70
[ 8531.217497] task_work_run+0x98/0xc0
[ 8531.218397] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x83/0x90
[ 8531.219324] do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x180
[ 8531.220192] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 8531.221286] RIP: 0033:0x7fc68e5e4d07
[ 8531.225621] RSP: 002b:00007ffde8116608 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:00000000000000a6
[ 8531.227512] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00005580c2175970 RCX:00007fc68e5e4d07
[ 8531.229098] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:00005580c2175b80
[ 8531.230730] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00005580c2175ba0 R09:00007ffde8114e80
[ 8531.232269] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:00005580c2175b80
[ 8531.233839] R13: 00007fc68eac61c4 R14: 00005580c2175a68 R15:0000000000000000
Leaving a tree in the rb-tree:
3853 void btrfs_free_fs_root(struct btrfs_root *root)
3854 {
3855 iput(root->ino_cache_inode);
3856 WARN_ON(!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&root->inode_tree));
CC: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
[ add stacktrace ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -4193,6 +4193,14 @@ static void btrfs_destroy_all_ordered_ex
spin_lock(&fs_info->ordered_root_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&fs_info->ordered_root_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * We need this here because if we've been flipped read-only we won't
+ * get sync() from the umount, so we need to make sure any ordered
+ * extents that haven't had their dirty pages IO start writeout yet
+ * actually get run and error out properly.
+ */
+ btrfs_wait_ordered_roots(fs_info, -1, 0, (u64)-1);
}
static int btrfs_destroy_delayed_refs(struct btrfs_transaction *trans,
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4a06fa67c4da20148803525151845276cdb995c1 ]
Commit 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call
pskb_may_pull") avoided a read beyond the end of the skb linear
segment by calling pskb_may_pull.
That function can trigger a BUG_ON in pskb_expand_head if the skb is
shared, which it is when when peeking. It can also return ENOMEM.
Avoid both by switching to safer skb_header_pointer.
Fixes: 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +++++-------
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 10 ++++------
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -133,19 +133,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ __be16 _ports[2], *ports;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
- __be16 *ports;
- int end;
-
- end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4;
- if (end > 0 && !pskb_may_pull(skb, end))
- return;
/* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the
* first four bytes of the transport header and this function is
* written with this assumption in mind.
*/
- ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
+ ports = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ sizeof(_ports), &_ports);
+ if (!ports)
+ return;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -695,17 +695,15 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(stru
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr) {
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
- __be16 *ports;
- int end;
+ __be16 _ports[2], *ports;
- end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4;
- if (end <= 0 || pskb_may_pull(skb, end)) {
+ ports = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+ sizeof(_ports), &_ports);
+ if (ports) {
/* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the
* first four bytes of the transport header and this function is
* written with this assumption in mind.
*/
- ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
-
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
sin6.sin6_port = ports[1];
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7d033c9f6a7fd3821af75620a0257db87c2b552a ]
This patch makes sure the flow label in the IPv6 header
forged in ipv6_local_error() is initialized.
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
CPU: 1 PID: 24675 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #4
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x455/0xb00 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:675
kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601
_copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:177 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x2e9/0x4f0 net/socket.c:227
___sys_recvmsg+0x5d7/0x1140 net/socket.c:2284
__sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x457ec9
Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f8750c06c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000020000400 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8750c076d4
R13: 00000000004c4a60 R14: 00000000004d8140 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Uninit was stored to memory at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:219 [inline]
kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x134/0x230 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:439
__msan_chain_origin+0x70/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:200
ipv6_recv_error+0x1e3f/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:475
udpv6_recvmsg+0x398/0x2ab0 net/ipv6/udp.c:335
inet_recvmsg+0x4fb/0x600 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:830
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x1d1/0x230 net/socket.c:801
___sys_recvmsg+0x4d5/0x1140 net/socket.c:2278
__sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline]
ipv6_local_error+0x1a7/0x9e0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:334
__ip6_append_data+0x129f/0x4fd0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1311
ip6_make_skb+0x6cc/0xcf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1775
udpv6_sendmsg+0x3f8e/0x45d0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1384
inet_sendmsg+0x54a/0x720 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796
__x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
Bytes 4-7 of 28 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 28 starts at ffff8881937bfce0
Data copied to user address 0000000020000000
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ void ipv6_local_error(struct sock *sk, i
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
iph->daddr = fl6->daddr;
+ ip6_flow_hdr(iph, 0, 0);
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
serr->ee.ee_errno = err;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 8f9c469348487844328e162db57112f7d347c49f upstream.
Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte
'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key.
crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys.
However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is
longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends
before the next 4-byte aligned boundary. In this case, 'keylen -=
RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX. This
causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey().
Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size.
Reproducer using AF_ALG:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "aead",
.salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
};
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
__be32 enckeylen;
char keys[1];
} __attribute__((packed)) key = {
.attr.rta_len = sizeof(key),
.attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */,
};
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &key, sizeof(key));
}
It caused:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000
PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155
[...]
Call Trace:
sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321
crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178
shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186
crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202
hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66
shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223
crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202
crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96
crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62
aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256
__sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: e236d4a89a2f ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/authenc.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/authenc.c
+++ b/crypto/authenc.c
@@ -58,14 +58,22 @@ int crypto_authenc_extractkeys(struct cr
return -EINVAL;
if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
return -EINVAL;
- if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
+
+ /*
+ * RTA_OK() didn't align the rtattr's payload when validating that it
+ * fits in the buffer. Yet, the keys should start on the next 4-byte
+ * aligned boundary. To avoid confusion, require that the rtattr
+ * payload be exactly the param struct, which has a 4-byte aligned size.
+ */
+ if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) != sizeof(*param))
return -EINVAL;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*param) % RTA_ALIGNTO);
param = RTA_DATA(rta);
keys->enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
- key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
- keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+ key += rta->rta_len;
+ keylen -= rta->rta_len;
if (keylen < keys->enckeylen)
return -EINVAL;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aymen Sghaier <[email protected]>
commit 04e6d25c5bb244c1a37eb9fe0b604cc11a04e8c5 upstream.
Recent changes - probably DMA API related (generic and/or arm64-specific) -
exposed a case where driver maps a zero-length buffer:
ahash_init()->ahash_update()->ahash_final() with a zero-length string to
hash
kernel BUG at kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:475!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 1823 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f2 #1
Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT)
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
pc : swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x170/0x2b8
lr : swiotlb_map_page+0x134/0x1f8
sp : ffff00000f79b8f0
x29: ffff00000f79b8f0 x28: 0000000000000000
x27: ffff0000093d0000 x26: 0000000000000000
x25: 00000000001f3ffe x24: 0000000000200000
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 00000009f2c538c0
x21: ffff800970aeb410 x20: 0000000000000001
x19: ffff800970aeb410 x18: 0000000000000007
x17: 000000000000000e x16: 0000000000000001
x15: 0000000000000019 x14: c32cb8218a167fe8
x13: ffffffff00000000 x12: ffff80097fdae348
x11: 0000800976bca000 x10: 0000000000000010
x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff0000091fd6c8
x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000009f2c538bf
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001
x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 00000009f2c538c0
x1 : 00000000f9fff000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Process cryptomgr_test (pid: 1823, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____))
Call trace:
swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x170/0x2b8
swiotlb_map_page+0x134/0x1f8
ahash_final_no_ctx+0xc4/0x6cc
ahash_final+0x10/0x18
crypto_ahash_op+0x30/0x84
crypto_ahash_final+0x14/0x1c
__test_hash+0x574/0xe0c
test_hash+0x28/0x80
__alg_test_hash+0x84/0xd0
alg_test_hash+0x78/0x144
alg_test.part.30+0x12c/0x2b4
alg_test+0x3c/0x68
cryptomgr_test+0x44/0x4c
kthread+0xfc/0x128
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Code: d34bfc18 2a1a03f7 1a9f8694 35fff89a (d4210000)
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Aymen Sghaier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 15 +++++++++------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c
@@ -1232,13 +1232,16 @@ static int ahash_final_no_ctx(struct aha
desc = edesc->hw_desc;
- state->buf_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, buf, buflen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, state->buf_dma)) {
- dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map src\n");
- goto unmap;
- }
+ if (buflen) {
+ state->buf_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, buf, buflen,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, state->buf_dma)) {
+ dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map src\n");
+ goto unmap;
+ }
- append_seq_in_ptr(desc, state->buf_dma, buflen, 0);
+ append_seq_in_ptr(desc, state->buf_dma, buflen, 0);
+ }
edesc->dst_dma = map_seq_out_ptr_result(desc, jrdev, req->result,
digestsize);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 001e465f09a18857443489a57e74314a3368c805 ]
A network device stack with multiple layers of bonding devices can
trigger a false positive lockdep warning. Adding lockdep nest levels
fixes this. Update the level on both enslave and unlink, to avoid the
following series of events ..
ip netns add test
ip netns exec test bash
ip link set dev lo addr 00:11:22:33:44:55
ip link set dev lo down
ip link add dev bond1 type bond
ip link add dev bond2 type bond
ip link set dev lo master bond1
ip link set dev bond1 master bond2
ip link set dev bond1 nomaster
ip link set dev bond2 master bond1
.. from still generating a splat:
[ 193.652127] ======================================================
[ 193.658231] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 193.664350] 4.20.0 #8 Not tainted
[ 193.668310] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 193.674417] ip/15577 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 193.678897] 00000000a40e3b69 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#3/3){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0x58/0x290
[ 193.687851]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 193.693625] 00000000807b9d9f (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0x58/0x290
[..]
[ 193.851092] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x190
[ 193.855138] _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x2d/0x40
[ 193.859878] bond_get_stats+0x58/0x290
[ 193.864093] dev_get_stats+0x5a/0xc0
[ 193.868140] bond_get_stats+0x105/0x290
[ 193.872444] dev_get_stats+0x5a/0xc0
[ 193.876493] rtnl_fill_stats+0x40/0x130
[ 193.880797] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x6c5/0xdc0
[ 193.885271] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x86/0xe0
[ 193.890091] rtnetlink_event+0x5b/0xa0
[ 193.894320] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x43/0x60
[ 193.899225] netdev_change_features+0x50/0xa0
[ 193.904044] bond_compute_features.isra.46+0x1ab/0x270
[ 193.909640] bond_enslave+0x141d/0x15b0
[ 193.913946] do_set_master+0x89/0xa0
[ 193.918016] do_setlink+0x37c/0xda0
[ 193.921980] __rtnl_newlink+0x499/0x890
[ 193.926281] rtnl_newlink+0x48/0x70
[ 193.930238] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x171/0x4b0
[ 193.934801] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd1/0x110
[ 193.939103] rtnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20
[ 193.943151] netlink_unicast+0x3b5/0x520
[ 193.947544] netlink_sendmsg+0x2fd/0x3f0
[ 193.951942] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x50
[ 193.955899] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2ba/0x2d0
[ 193.960205] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xad/0x100
[ 193.964687] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x460
[ 193.968823] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: 7e2556e40026 ("bonding: avoid lockdep confusion in bond_get_stats()")
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -1900,6 +1900,9 @@ static int __bond_release_one(struct net
if (!bond_has_slaves(bond)) {
bond_set_carrier(bond);
eth_hw_addr_random(bond_dev);
+ bond->nest_level = SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING;
+ } else {
+ bond->nest_level = dev_get_nest_level(bond_dev) + 1;
}
unblock_netpoll_tx();
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
[ Upstream commit ed076c55b359cc9982ca8b065bcc01675f7365f6 ]
In case of arp failure call cxgbit_put_csk() to free csk.
Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c
index 2fb1bf1a26c5..8652475e01d0 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/cxgbit/cxgbit_cm.c
@@ -631,8 +631,11 @@ static void cxgbit_send_halfclose(struct cxgbit_sock *csk)
static void cxgbit_arp_failure_discard(void *handle, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct cxgbit_sock *csk = handle;
+
pr_debug("%s cxgbit_device %p\n", __func__, handle);
kfree_skb(skb);
+ cxgbit_put_csk(csk);
}
static void cxgbit_abort_arp_failure(void *handle, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1136,7 +1139,7 @@ cxgbit_pass_accept_rpl(struct cxgbit_sock *csk, struct cpl_pass_accept_req *req)
rpl5->opt0 = cpu_to_be64(opt0);
rpl5->opt2 = cpu_to_be32(opt2);
set_wr_txq(skb, CPL_PRIORITY_SETUP, csk->ctrlq_idx);
- t4_set_arp_err_handler(skb, NULL, cxgbit_arp_failure_discard);
+ t4_set_arp_err_handler(skb, csk, cxgbit_arp_failure_discard);
cxgbit_l2t_send(csk->com.cdev, skb, csk->l2t);
}
--
2.19.1
On Mon, 21 Jan 2019 at 19:28, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.152 release.
> There are 51 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 23 12:24:02 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.152-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.9.152-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: 5e5ea6306dfd1c05e5a09b0c6859511f9c7a2c5c
git describe: v4.9.151-55-g5e5ea6306dfd
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.151-55-g5e5ea6306dfd
No regressions (compared to build v4.9.151)
No fixes (compared to build v4.9.151)
Ran 21456 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 02:43:56PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.152 release.
> There are 51 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 23 12:24:02 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 315 pass: 315 fail: 0
Guenter
On 1/21/19 6:43 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.152 release.
> There are 51 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 23 12:24:02 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.152-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
On 21/01/2019 13:43, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.152 release.
> There are 51 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 23 12:24:02 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.152-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.9:
8 builds: 8 pass, 0 fail
16 boots: 16 pass, 0 fail
14 tests: 14 pass, 0 fail
Linux version: 4.9.152-rc1-g5e5ea63
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers
Jon
--
nvpublic