Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC. This is far too basic
of a mistake for us to have so pervasively in the year 2017, so let's begin
cleaning this stuff up. The following 6 locations were found with some
simple regex greps, but I'm sure more lurk below the surface. If you
maintain some code or know somebody who maintains some code that deals
with MACs, tell them to double check which comparison function they're
using.
Jason A. Donenfeld (6):
sunrpc: use constant time memory comparison for mac
net/ipv6: use constant time memory comparison for mac
ccree: use constant time memory comparison for macs and tags
security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs
bluetooth/smp: use constant time memory comparison for secret values
mac80211/wpa: use constant time memory comparison for MACs
Cc: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: David Safford <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c | 17 ++++++++-------
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++-
net/mac80211/wpa.c | 9 ++++----
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 3 ++-
security/keys/trusted.c | 7 ++++---
6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
--
2.13.1
Otherwise, we enable several different forgeries via timing attack.
While the C inside this file is nearly incomprehensible, I did notice a
high volume of "FIPS" and "NIST", which makes this kind of bug slightly
more embarrassing.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
---
drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c | 17 +++++++++--------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c
index d573574bbb98..3310997d8e3e 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ This file defines the driver FIPS Low Level implmentaion functions,
that executes the KAT.
***************************************************************/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include "ssi_driver.h"
#include "ssi_fips_local.h"
@@ -462,7 +463,7 @@ ssi_cipher_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffe
}
/* compare actual dout to expected */
- if (memcmp(virt_ctx->dout, cipherData->dataOut, cipherData->dataInSize) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->dout, cipherData->dataOut, cipherData->dataInSize))
{
FIPS_LOG("dout comparison error %d - oprMode=%d, isAes=%d\n", i, cipherData->oprMode, cipherData->isAes);
FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
@@ -586,7 +587,7 @@ ssi_cmac_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
}
/* compare actual mac result to expected */
- if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, cmac_data->mac_res, cmac_data->mac_res_size) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, cmac_data->mac_res, cmac_data->mac_res_size))
{
FIPS_LOG("comparison error %d - digest_size=%d \n", i, cmac_data->mac_res_size);
FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
@@ -760,7 +761,7 @@ ssi_hash_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
}
/* compare actual mac result to expected */
- if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, hash_data->mac_res, digest_size) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, hash_data->mac_res, digest_size))
{
FIPS_LOG("comparison error %d - hash_mode=%d digest_size=%d \n", i, hash_data->hash_mode, digest_size);
FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
@@ -1093,7 +1094,7 @@ ssi_hmac_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
}
/* compare actual mac result to expected */
- if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, hmac_data->mac_res, digest_size) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, hmac_data->mac_res, digest_size))
{
FIPS_LOG("comparison error %d - hash_mode=%d digest_size=%d \n", i, hmac_data->hash_mode, digest_size);
FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
@@ -1310,7 +1311,7 @@ ssi_ccm_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
}
/* compare actual dout to expected */
- if (memcmp(virt_ctx->dout, ccmData->dataOut, ccmData->dataInSize) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->dout, ccmData->dataOut, ccmData->dataInSize))
{
FIPS_LOG("dout comparison error %d - size=%d \n", i, ccmData->dataInSize);
error = CC_REE_FIPS_ERROR_AESCCM_PUT;
@@ -1318,7 +1319,7 @@ ssi_ccm_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
}
/* compare actual mac result to expected */
- if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, ccmData->macResOut, ccmData->tagSize) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, ccmData->macResOut, ccmData->tagSize))
{
FIPS_LOG("mac_res comparison error %d - mac_size=%d \n", i, ccmData->tagSize);
FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
@@ -1633,7 +1634,7 @@ ssi_gcm_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
if (gcmData->direction == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
/* compare actual dout to expected */
- if (memcmp(virt_ctx->dout, gcmData->dataOut, gcmData->dataInSize) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->dout, gcmData->dataOut, gcmData->dataInSize))
{
FIPS_LOG("dout comparison error %d - size=%d \n", i, gcmData->dataInSize);
FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
@@ -1649,7 +1650,7 @@ ssi_gcm_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
}
/* compare actual mac result to expected */
- if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, gcmData->macResOut, gcmData->tagSize) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, gcmData->macResOut, gcmData->tagSize))
{
FIPS_LOG("mac_res comparison error %d - mac_size=%d \n", i, gcmData->tagSize);
FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
--
2.13.1
Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: David Safford <[email protected]>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
---
security/keys/trusted.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 2ae31c5a87de..df7d30b0a6f7 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
* See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
*/
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree(sdesc);
@@ -335,7 +336,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -344,7 +345,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree(sdesc);
--
2.13.1
Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
---
net/mac80211/wpa.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index c1ef22df865f..cc19614ff4e6 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/mac80211.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include "ieee80211_i.h"
#include "michael.h"
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
- if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN))
goto mic_fail;
/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
@@ -1048,7 +1049,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
bip_aad(skb, aad);
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
- if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
@@ -1098,7 +1099,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
bip_aad(skb, aad);
ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
- if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
@@ -1202,7 +1203,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
mic) < 0 ||
- memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
+ crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
--
2.13.1
This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
complexity, some other type of attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
---
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 14585edc9439..a0ef89772c36 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
@@ -523,7 +524,7 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
if (err)
return false;
- return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
+ return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
}
int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
@@ -579,7 +580,7 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
* we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
*/
- if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
break;
}
smp->debug_key = false;
@@ -993,7 +994,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
if (ret)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
}
@@ -1512,7 +1513,7 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
smp->passkey_round++;
@@ -1908,7 +1909,7 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
* we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
*/
- if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
break;
}
}
@@ -2176,7 +2177,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
} else {
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
@@ -2660,7 +2661,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
}
@@ -2693,7 +2694,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
else
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
- if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
+ if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
@@ -2792,7 +2793,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
if (!hcon->out) {
@@ -3506,10 +3507,10 @@ static int __init test_debug_key(void)
if (!generate_ecdh_keys(pk, sk))
return -EINVAL;
- if (memcmp(sk, debug_sk, 32))
+ if (crypto_memneq(sk, debug_sk, 32))
return -EINVAL;
- if (memcmp(pk, debug_pk, 64))
+ if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -3529,7 +3530,7 @@ static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
if (err)
return err;
- if (memcmp(res, exp, 3))
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -3559,7 +3560,7 @@ static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
if (err)
return err;
- if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -3584,7 +3585,7 @@ static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
if (err)
return err;
- if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -3616,7 +3617,7 @@ static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
if (err)
return err;
- if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -3650,10 +3651,10 @@ static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
if (err)
return err;
- if (memcmp(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
return -EINVAL;
- if (memcmp(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -3686,7 +3687,7 @@ static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
if (err)
return err;
- if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -3740,7 +3741,7 @@ static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
if (err)
return err;
- if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
+ if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
--
2.13.1
Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
---
net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
index f950cb53d5e3..54213c83b44e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <net/seg6.h>
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (seg6_hmac_compute(hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, hmac_output))
return false;
- if (memcmp(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN))
return false;
return true;
--
2.13.1
Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
---
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index fb39284ec174..12649c9fedab 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
*/
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
@@ -927,7 +928,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf,
if (ret)
goto out_err;
- if (memcmp(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto out_err;
}
--
2.13.1
Thank you Jason,
I think what you are doing is very important.
On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 5:59 AM, Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]> wrote:
> Otherwise, we enable several different forgeries via timing attack.
>
> While the C inside this file is nearly incomprehensible, I did notice a
> high volume of "FIPS" and "NIST", which makes this kind of bug slightly
> more embarrassing.
>
The code you are referring to implements, as the function name states,
FIPS power up tests[*].
Specifically, this is the code that compares computed results to known
good results.
As far as I understand the purpose of timing and memory side channel
attacks is to deduce
key material by measurement of time and/or memory usage. However, this
being a FIPS power
up test, the key material is actually part of the source code, so not
much use here.
So, unless I've missed something, I'm going to NAK this one. Your
patch however did inspire me
to look in the ccree driver for other places where not using these
mechanisms is more dangerous,
so thank you for that.
[*] whose implementation inside the driver itself is questionable and
will probably go away as part
of staging clean-ups.
Thanks,
Gilad
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
> Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> ---
> drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c
> index d573574bbb98..3310997d8e3e 100644
> --- a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c
> +++ b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_fips_ll.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ This file defines the driver FIPS Low Level implmentaion functions,
> that executes the KAT.
> ***************************************************************/
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <crypto/algapi.h>
>
> #include "ssi_driver.h"
> #include "ssi_fips_local.h"
> @@ -462,7 +463,7 @@ ssi_cipher_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffe
> }
>
> /* compare actual dout to expected */
> - if (memcmp(virt_ctx->dout, cipherData->dataOut, cipherData->dataInSize) != 0)
> + if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->dout, cipherData->dataOut, cipherData->dataInSize))
> {
> FIPS_LOG("dout comparison error %d - oprMode=%d, isAes=%d\n", i, cipherData->oprMode, cipherData->isAes);
> FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
> @@ -586,7 +587,7 @@ ssi_cmac_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
> }
>
> /* compare actual mac result to expected */
> - if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, cmac_data->mac_res, cmac_data->mac_res_size) != 0)
> + if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, cmac_data->mac_res, cmac_data->mac_res_size))
> {
> FIPS_LOG("comparison error %d - digest_size=%d \n", i, cmac_data->mac_res_size);
> FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
> @@ -760,7 +761,7 @@ ssi_hash_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
> }
>
> /* compare actual mac result to expected */
> - if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, hash_data->mac_res, digest_size) != 0)
> + if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, hash_data->mac_res, digest_size))
> {
> FIPS_LOG("comparison error %d - hash_mode=%d digest_size=%d \n", i, hash_data->hash_mode, digest_size);
> FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
> @@ -1093,7 +1094,7 @@ ssi_hmac_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
> }
>
> /* compare actual mac result to expected */
> - if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, hmac_data->mac_res, digest_size) != 0)
> + if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, hmac_data->mac_res, digest_size))
> {
> FIPS_LOG("comparison error %d - hash_mode=%d digest_size=%d \n", i, hmac_data->hash_mode, digest_size);
> FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
> @@ -1310,7 +1311,7 @@ ssi_ccm_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
> }
>
> /* compare actual dout to expected */
> - if (memcmp(virt_ctx->dout, ccmData->dataOut, ccmData->dataInSize) != 0)
> + if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->dout, ccmData->dataOut, ccmData->dataInSize))
> {
> FIPS_LOG("dout comparison error %d - size=%d \n", i, ccmData->dataInSize);
> error = CC_REE_FIPS_ERROR_AESCCM_PUT;
> @@ -1318,7 +1319,7 @@ ssi_ccm_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
> }
>
> /* compare actual mac result to expected */
> - if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, ccmData->macResOut, ccmData->tagSize) != 0)
> + if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, ccmData->macResOut, ccmData->tagSize))
> {
> FIPS_LOG("mac_res comparison error %d - mac_size=%d \n", i, ccmData->tagSize);
> FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
> @@ -1633,7 +1634,7 @@ ssi_gcm_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
>
> if (gcmData->direction == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
> /* compare actual dout to expected */
> - if (memcmp(virt_ctx->dout, gcmData->dataOut, gcmData->dataInSize) != 0)
> + if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->dout, gcmData->dataOut, gcmData->dataInSize))
> {
> FIPS_LOG("dout comparison error %d - size=%d \n", i, gcmData->dataInSize);
> FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
> @@ -1649,7 +1650,7 @@ ssi_gcm_fips_power_up_tests(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata, void *cpu_addr_buffer,
> }
>
> /* compare actual mac result to expected */
> - if (memcmp(virt_ctx->mac_res, gcmData->macResOut, gcmData->tagSize) != 0)
> + if (crypto_memneq(virt_ctx->mac_res, gcmData->macResOut, gcmData->tagSize))
> {
> FIPS_LOG("mac_res comparison error %d - mac_size=%d \n", i, gcmData->tagSize);
> FIPS_LOG(" i expected received \n");
> --
> 2.13.1
>
--
Gilad Ben-Yossef
Chief Coffee Drinker
"If you take a class in large-scale robotics, can you end up in a
situation where the homework eats your dog?"
-- Jean-Baptiste Queru
Hey Gilad,
That's fine. As I mentioned, I really have no clue what this code's
trying to do. If this is just part of some test that doesn't deal with
actual messages that could be forged, then of course there's nothing
that needs to be done and this can be NAKd.
Jason
Hi Jason,
> This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
> MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
> attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
> complexity, some other type of attack.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
> Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> ---
> net/bluetooth/smp.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
patch has been applied to bluetooth-next tree.
Regards
Marcel
On Sat, 10 Jun 2017, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> That's fine. As I mentioned, I really have no clue what this code's
> trying to do. If this is just part of some test that doesn't deal with
> actual messages that could be forged, then of course there's nothing
> that needs to be done and this can be NAKd.
Well, it is *testing* things, so you might want to use whatever the
module(s) will actually use. Maybe test with both?
--
Henrique Holschuh
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> writes:
> Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
> crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
> which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC.
Do you have any pointers where I could learn more about this?
--
Kalle Valo
On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Kalle Valo <[email protected]> wrote:
> "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> writes:
>
>> Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
>> crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
>> which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC.
>
> Do you have any pointers where I could learn more about this?
While not using C specifically, this talks about the problem generally:
https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/articles/beginners-guide-constant-time-cryptography.html
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Kalle Valo <[email protected]> wrote:
> > "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> writes:
> >
> >> Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
> >> crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
> >> which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC.
> >
> > Do you have any pointers where I could learn more about this?
>
> While not using C specifically, this talks about the problem generally:
> https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/articles/beginners-guide-constant-time-cryptography.html
>
Sorry for the stupid question, but the MAC address is in plaintext in
the air anyway or easily accessible via user space tools. I fail to
see what it is so secret about a MAC address in that code where that
same MAC address is accessible via myriads of ways.
Am Samstag, 10. Juni 2017, 04:59:06 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Hi Jason,
> Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
> crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
> which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC. This is far too basic
> of a mistake for us to have so pervasively in the year 2017, so let's begin
> cleaning this stuff up. The following 6 locations were found with some
> simple regex greps, but I'm sure more lurk below the surface. If you
> maintain some code or know somebody who maintains some code that deals
> with MACs, tell them to double check which comparison function they're
> using.
Are you planning to send an update to your patch set? If yes, there is another
one which should be converted too: crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c.
Otherwise, I will send a patch converting this one.
Thanks.
Ciao
Stephan
Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Stephan Müller <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
---
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
index 8baab4307f7b..7830d304dff6 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
goto done;
pos++;
- if (memcmp(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size))
+ if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size))
goto done;
pos += digest_info->size;
--
2.13.1
Hi Stephan,
On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 11:06 PM, Stephan Müller <[email protected]> wrote:
> Are you planning to send an update to your patch set? If yes, there is another
> one which should be converted too: crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c.
I just sent an update to this thread patching that, per your
suggestion. Since these issues are expected to be cherry picked by
their respective committer, I figure we can just pile on the patches
here, listing the 0/6 intro email as each patch's parent.
Jason
2017-06-11 22:48 GMT+02:00 Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>:
> On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Kalle Valo <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> writes:
>> >
>> >> Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
>> >> crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
>> >> which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC.
>> >
>> > Do you have any pointers where I could learn more about this?
>>
>> While not using C specifically, this talks about the problem generally:
>> https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/articles/beginners-guide-constant-time-cryptography.html
>>
>
> Sorry for the stupid question, but the MAC address is in plaintext in
> the air anyway or easily accessible via user space tools. I fail to
> see what it is so secret about a MAC address in that code where that
> same MAC address is accessible via myriads of ways.
I think you're mixing up Media Access Control (MAC) addresses with
Message Authentication Code (MAC). The second one is a cryptographic
signature of a message.
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 12:30 AM, Emil Lenngren <[email protected]> wrote:
> 2017-06-11 22:48 GMT+02:00 Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>:
>> On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Kalle Valo <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> > "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> writes:
>>> >
>>> >> Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
>>> >> crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
>>> >> which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC.
>>> >
>>> > Do you have any pointers where I could learn more about this?
>>>
>>> While not using C specifically, this talks about the problem generally:
>>> https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/articles/beginners-guide-constant-time-cryptography.html
>>>
>>
>> Sorry for the stupid question, but the MAC address is in plaintext in
>> the air anyway or easily accessible via user space tools. I fail to
>> see what it is so secret about a MAC address in that code where that
>> same MAC address is accessible via myriads of ways.
>
> I think you're mixing up Media Access Control (MAC) addresses with
> Message Authentication Code (MAC). The second one is a cryptographic
> signature of a message.
Obviously... Sorry for the noise.
On 6/11/2017 11:30 PM, Emil Lenngren wrote:
> 2017-06-11 22:48 GMT+02:00 Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>:
>> On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Kalle Valo <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
>>>>> crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
>>>>> which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC.
>>>>
>>>> Do you have any pointers where I could learn more about this?
>>>
>>> While not using C specifically, this talks about the problem generally:
>>> https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/articles/beginners-guide-constant-time-cryptography.html
>>>
>>
>> Sorry for the stupid question, but the MAC address is in plaintext in
>> the air anyway or easily accessible via user space tools. I fail to
>> see what it is so secret about a MAC address in that code where that
>> same MAC address is accessible via myriads of ways.
>
> I think you're mixing up Media Access Control (MAC) addresses with
> Message Authentication Code (MAC). The second one is a cryptographic
> signature of a message.
While this may be obvious to those who are in the know this mixup is
easily made outside the crypto domain and especially in the (wireless)
networking domain (my mind wandered towards the same error path). As
this series is touching stuff outside crypto it is good to be explicit
and not use such abbreviations that can be misinterpreted. The article
Kees referred to is also useful to get into the proper context here and
at least worth mentioning this or other useful references in the cover
letter.
Regards,
Arend
On Sat, 2017-06-10 at 04:59 +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
I'm not really sure that this is actually true, since you don't get
much feedback on your frame that's dropped, especially if you're
attacking from remote. Basically, I don't see how you can observe the
timing of this operation?
Anyway, applied.
johannes
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 10:20 AM, Johannes Berg
<[email protected]> wrote:
> I'm not really sure that this is actually true, since you don't get
> much feedback on your frame that's dropped, especially if you're
> attacking from remote. Basically, I don't see how you can observe the
> timing of this operation?
There have been practical attacks published before that relied on
jitter coming from simultaneous operations.
> Anyway, applied.
Great, thanks.
On Sat, 10 Jun 2017, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
> Cc: David Safford <[email protected]>
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
--
James Morris
<[email protected]>
On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 11:20:23PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
> Suggested-by: Stephan M?ller <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
Patch applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt