Please see the accompanying userspace patchset:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2015-July/thread.html
[[PATCH V2] 0/2] Log on the future execution of a path
The userspace interface is not expected to change appreciably unless something
important has been overlooked. Setting and deleting rules works as expected.
If the path does not exist at rule creation time, it will be re-evaluated every
time there is a change to the parent directory at which point the change in
device and inode will be noted.
Here's a sample run:
Test for addition, trigger and deletion of tree executable rule:
# auditctl -a always,exit -S all -F dir=/tmp -F exe=/usr/bin/touch -F key=exetest_tree
----
time->Sat Jul 11 10:41:50 2015
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1436629310.720:44711): auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="add_rule" key="exetest_tree" list=4 res=1
----
# /usr/bin/touch /tmp/test
----
time->Sat Jul 11 10:41:50 2015
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1436629310.757:44712): proctitle=2F7573722F62696E2F746F756368002F746D702F74657374
type=PATH msg=audit(1436629310.757:44712): item=1 name="/tmp/test" inode=166932 dev=00:24 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE
type=PATH msg=audit(1436629310.757:44712): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=11525 dev=00:24 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT
type=CWD msg=audit(1436629310.757:44712): cwd="/root"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1436629310.757:44712): arch=c000003e syscall=2 success=yes exit=3 a0=7ffdee2f9e27 a1=941 a2=1b6 a3=691 items=2 ppid=17655 pid=17762 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm="touch" exe="/usr/bin/touch" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="exetest_tree"
----
# auditctl -d always,exit -S all -F dir=/tmp -F exe=/usr/bin/touch -F key=exetest_tree
----
time->Sat Jul 11 10:41:50 2015
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1436629310.839:44713): auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="remove_rule" key="exetest_tree" list=4 res=1
----
Revision history:
v9: Fix a rebase manual merge error that mixed parts of two patches.
v8: Re-spin due to mods to:
"audit: save signal match info in case entry passed in is the one deleted"
v7: Add Audit Feature Bitmap macro AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH to
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL.
Split out new patch to use macros for unset inode and device values.
Remove BUG() usage in stubs.
Rename audit_mark_free() to audit_fsnotify_mark_free().
Remove unused audit_get_mark() and audit_put_mark() functions.
Rework ino and dev comparisons and assignments, using macros and existing
funcs and eliminating temp variables.
Move audit_update_mark() above its first usage.
Move contents of kernel/audit_exe.c to kernel/audit_watch.c.
Merge patch 3 with 1, merge patch 4 with 1 and 3 and rewrite the patch descriptions.
Split out patch to audit by executable children.
v6: Explicitly declare prototypes as external.
Rename audit_dup_exe() to audit_dupe_exe() consistent with rule, watch, lsm_field.
Rebased on v4.1.
Rename audit_remove_mark_rule() called from audit_mark_handle_event() to
audit_autoremove_mark_rule() to avoid confusion with
audit_remove_{watch,tree}_rule() usage.
Add audit_remove_mark_rule() to provide similar interface as
audit_remove_{watch,tree}_rule().
Simplify stubs to defines.
Rename audit_free_fsnotify_mark() to audit_fsnotify_free_mark() in keeping with
the naming convention of inotify_free_mark(), dnotify_free_mark(),
fanotify_free_mark(), audit_watch_free_mark().
Return -ENOMEM rather than null in case of memory allocation failure for
audit_mark in audit_alloc_mark().
Rename audit_free_mark() to audit_mark_free() to avoid association with
{i,d,fa}notify_free_mark() and audit_watch_free_mark().
Clean up exe with similar interface as watch and tree.
Clean up audit exe mark just before audit_free_rule() rather than in it to
avoid mutex in software interrupt context.
Fixed bug in audit_dupe_exe() that returned error rather than valid pointer.
v5: Revert patch "Let audit_free_rule() take care of calling
audit_remove_mark()." since it caused a group mark deadlock.
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-October/msg00024.html
v4: Re-order and squash down fixups
Fix audit_dup_exe() to copy pathname string before calling audit_alloc_mark().
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-August/msg00065.html
v3: Rationalize and rename some function names and clean up get/put and free code.
Rename several "watch" references to "mark".
Rename audit_remove_rule() to audit_remove_mark_rule().
Let audit_free_rule() take care of calling audit_remove_mark().
Put audit_alloc_mark() arguments in same order as watch, tree and inode.
Move the access to the entry for audit_match_signal() to the beginning
of the function in case the entry found is the same one passed in.
This will enable it to be used by audit_remove_mark_rule().
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-July/msg00000.html
v2: Misguided attempt to add in audit_exe similar to watches
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-June/msg00066.html
v1.5: eparis' switch to fsnotify
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-May/msg00046.html
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-May/msg00066.html
v1: Change to path interface instead of inode
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-May/msg00017.html
v0: Peter Moodie's original patches
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2012-August/msg00033.html
Future step:
Get full-path notify working.
Richard Guy Briggs (3):
audit: clean simple fsnotify implementation
audit: implement audit by executable
audit: add audit by children of executable path
include/linux/audit.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 6 +-
kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
kernel/audit.h | 18 ++++
kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 215 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit_tree.c | 2 +
kernel/audit_watch.c | 31 +++++++
kernel/auditfilter.c | 60 ++++++++++++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 14 +++
9 files changed, 345 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
This is to be used to audit by executable path rules, but audit watches should
be able to share this code eventually.
At the moment the audit watch code is a lot more complex. That code only
creates one fsnotify watch per parent directory. That 'audit_parent' in
turn has a list of 'audit_watches' which contain the name, ino, dev of
the specific object we care about. This just creates one fsnotify watch
per object we care about. So if you watch 100 inodes in /etc this code
will create 100 fsnotify watches on /etc. The audit_watch code will
instead create 1 fsnotify watch on /etc (the audit_parent) and then 100
individual watches chained from that fsnotify mark.
We should be able to convert the audit_watch code to do one fsnotify
mark per watch and simplify things/remove a whole lot of code. After
that conversion we should be able to convert the audit_fsnotify code to
support that hierarchy if the optimization is necessary.
Move the access to the entry for audit_match_signal() to the beginning of
the audit_del_rule() function in case the entry found is the same one passed
in. This will enable it to be used by audit_autoremove_mark_rule(),
kill_rules() and audit_remove_parent_watches().
This is a heavily modified and merged version of two patches originally
submitted by Eric Paris.
Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
---
kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
kernel/audit.h | 14 +++
kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 231 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 60c302c..58b5b52 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += stop_machine.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES_SANITY_TEST) += test_kprobes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o auditfilter.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH) += audit_watch.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH) += audit_watch.o audit_fsnotify.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE) += audit_tree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL) += gcov/
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index d641f9b..46d10dd 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ enum audit_state {
/* Rule lists */
struct audit_watch;
+struct audit_fsnotify_mark;
struct audit_tree;
struct audit_chunk;
@@ -252,6 +253,7 @@ struct audit_net {
extern int selinux_audit_rule_update(void);
extern struct mutex audit_filter_mutex;
+extern int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *);
extern void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *);
extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
@@ -269,6 +271,13 @@ extern int audit_add_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, struct list_head **list);
extern void audit_remove_watch_rule(struct audit_krule *krule);
extern char *audit_watch_path(struct audit_watch *watch);
extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
+
+extern struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule, char *pathname, int len);
+extern char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
+extern void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark);
+extern void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule *krule);
+extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
+
#else
#define audit_put_watch(w) {}
#define audit_get_watch(w) {}
@@ -278,6 +287,11 @@ extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long ino, dev
#define audit_watch_path(w) ""
#define audit_watch_compare(w, i, d) 0
+#define audit_alloc_mark(k, p, l) (ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
+#define audit_mark_path(m) ""
+#define audit_remove_mark(m)
+#define audit_remove_mark_rule(k)
+#define audit_mark_compare(m, i, d) 0
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
diff --git a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..654c6c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/* audit_fsnotify.c -- tracking inodes
+ *
+ * Copyright 2003-2009,2014-2015 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "audit.h"
+
+/*
+ * this mark lives on the parent directory of the inode in question.
+ * but dev, ino, and path are about the child
+ */
+struct audit_fsnotify_mark {
+ dev_t dev; /* associated superblock device */
+ unsigned long ino; /* associated inode number */
+ char *path; /* insertion path */
+ struct fsnotify_mark mark; /* fsnotify mark on the inode */
+ struct audit_krule *rule;
+};
+
+/* fsnotify handle. */
+static struct fsnotify_group *audit_fsnotify_group;
+
+/* fsnotify events we care about. */
+#define AUDIT_FS_EVENTS (FS_MOVE | FS_CREATE | FS_DELETE | FS_DELETE_SELF |\
+ FS_MOVE_SELF | FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD)
+
+static void audit_fsnotify_mark_free(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark)
+{
+ kfree(audit_mark->path);
+ kfree(audit_mark);
+}
+
+static void audit_fsnotify_free_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark)
+{
+ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
+
+ audit_mark = container_of(mark, struct audit_fsnotify_mark, mark);
+ audit_fsnotify_mark_free(audit_mark);
+}
+
+char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark)
+{
+ return mark->path;
+}
+
+int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev)
+{
+ if (mark->ino == AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
+ return 0;
+ return (mark->ino == ino) && (mark->dev == dev);
+}
+
+static void audit_update_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ audit_mark->dev = inode ? inode->i_sb->s_dev : AUDIT_DEV_UNSET;
+ audit_mark->ino = inode ? inode->i_ino : AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
+}
+
+struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule, char *pathname, int len)
+{
+ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
+ struct path path;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (pathname[0] != '/' || pathname[len-1] == '/')
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ dentry = kern_path_locked(pathname, &path);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return (void *)dentry; /* returning an error */
+ inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+ audit_mark = kzalloc(sizeof(*audit_mark), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!audit_mark)) {
+ audit_mark = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ fsnotify_init_mark(&audit_mark->mark, audit_fsnotify_free_mark);
+ audit_mark->mark.mask = AUDIT_FS_EVENTS;
+ audit_mark->path = pathname;
+ audit_update_mark(audit_mark, dentry->d_inode);
+ audit_mark->rule = krule;
+
+ ret = fsnotify_add_mark(&audit_mark->mark, audit_fsnotify_group, inode, NULL, true);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_fsnotify_mark_free(audit_mark);
+ audit_mark = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+out:
+ dput(dentry);
+ path_put(&path);
+ return audit_mark;
+}
+
+static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, char *op)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct audit_krule *rule = audit_mark->rule;
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ if (unlikely(!ab))
+ return;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u op=",
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ audit_log_string(ab, op);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, audit_mark->path);
+ audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", rule->listnr);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark)
+{
+ fsnotify_destroy_mark(&audit_mark->mark, audit_fsnotify_group);
+ fsnotify_put_mark(&audit_mark->mark);
+}
+
+void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark = krule->exe;
+
+ audit_remove_mark(mark);
+}
+
+static void audit_autoremove_mark_rule(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark)
+{
+ struct audit_krule *rule = audit_mark->rule;
+ struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(rule, struct audit_entry, rule);
+
+ audit_mark_log_rule_change(audit_mark, "autoremove_rule");
+ audit_del_rule(entry);
+}
+
+/* Update mark data in audit rules based on fsnotify events. */
+static int audit_mark_handle_event(struct fsnotify_group *group,
+ struct inode *to_tell,
+ struct fsnotify_mark *inode_mark,
+ struct fsnotify_mark *vfsmount_mark,
+ u32 mask, void *data, int data_type,
+ const unsigned char *dname, u32 cookie)
+{
+ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+
+ audit_mark = container_of(inode_mark, struct audit_fsnotify_mark, mark);
+
+ BUG_ON(group != audit_fsnotify_group);
+
+ switch (data_type) {
+ case (FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH):
+ inode = ((struct path *)data)->dentry->d_inode;
+ break;
+ case (FSNOTIFY_EVENT_INODE):
+ inode = (struct inode *)data;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ };
+
+ if (mask & (FS_CREATE|FS_MOVED_TO|FS_DELETE|FS_MOVED_FROM)) {
+ if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, audit_mark->path, AUDIT_NAME_FULL))
+ return 0;
+ audit_update_mark(audit_mark, inode);
+ } else if (mask & (FS_DELETE_SELF|FS_UNMOUNT|FS_MOVE_SELF))
+ audit_autoremove_mark_rule(audit_mark);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct fsnotify_ops audit_mark_fsnotify_ops = {
+ .handle_event = audit_mark_handle_event,
+};
+
+static int __init audit_fsnotify_init(void)
+{
+ audit_fsnotify_group = fsnotify_alloc_group(&audit_mark_fsnotify_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(audit_fsnotify_group)) {
+ audit_fsnotify_group = NULL;
+ audit_panic("cannot create audit fsnotify group");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(audit_fsnotify_init);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 018719a..3d99196 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
}
/* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
-static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
+int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_entry *e;
struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
--
1.7.1
This adds the ability audit the actions of a not-yet-running process.
This patch implements the ability to filter on the executable path. Instead of
just hard coding the ino and dev of the executable we care about at the moment
the rule is inserted into the kernel, use the new audit_fsnotify
infrastructure to manage this dynamically. This means that if the filename
does not yet exist but the containing directory does, or if the inode in
question is unlinked and creat'd (aka updated) the rule will just continue to
work. If the containing directory is moved or deleted or the filesystem is
unmounted, the rule is deleted automatically. A future enhancement would be to
have the rule survive across directory disruptions.
This is a heavily modified version of a patch originally submitted by Eric
Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 5 +++-
kernel/audit.h | 4 +++
kernel/audit_tree.c | 2 +
kernel/audit_watch.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditfilter.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 3 ++
7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index c2e7e3a..aee456f 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct audit_krule {
struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
+ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *exe;
struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
struct list_head list; /* for AUDIT_LIST* purposes only */
u64 prio;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 971df22..e2ca600 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@
#define AUDIT_OBJ_UID 109
#define AUDIT_OBJ_GID 110
#define AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE 111
+#define AUDIT_EXE 112
#define AUDIT_ARG0 200
#define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1)
@@ -324,8 +325,10 @@ enum {
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT 0x00000001
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME 0x00000002
+#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH 0x00000004
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL (AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT | \
- AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME)
+ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME | \
+ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH )
/* deprecated: AUDIT_VERSION_* */
#define AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 46d10dd..dadf86a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ extern char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
extern void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark);
extern void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule *krule);
extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev);
+extern int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new, struct audit_krule *old);
+extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
#else
#define audit_put_watch(w) {}
@@ -292,6 +294,8 @@ extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned long in
#define audit_remove_mark(m)
#define audit_remove_mark_rule(k)
#define audit_mark_compare(m, i, d) 0
+#define audit_exe_compare(t, m) (-EINVAL)
+#define audit_dupe_exe(n, o) (-EINVAL)
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
index b0f9877..94ecdab 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
@@ -479,6 +479,8 @@ static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
if (rule->tree) {
/* not a half-baked one */
audit_tree_log_remove_rule(rule);
+ if (entry->rule.exe)
+ audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
rule->tree = NULL;
list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
list_del(&entry->rule.list);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index c668bfc..1255dbf 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -312,6 +312,8 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
list_replace(&oentry->rule.list,
&nentry->rule.list);
}
+ if (oentry->rule.exe)
+ audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
@@ -342,6 +344,8 @@ static void audit_remove_parent_watches(struct audit_parent *parent)
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, nextr, &w->rules, rlist) {
e = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, w, "remove_rule");
+ if (e->rule.exe)
+ audit_remove_mark(e->rule.exe);
list_del(&r->rlist);
list_del(&r->list);
list_del_rcu(&e->list);
@@ -514,3 +518,30 @@ static int __init audit_watch_init(void)
return 0;
}
device_initcall(audit_watch_init);
+
+int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new, struct audit_krule *old)
+{
+ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
+ char *pathname;
+
+ pathname = kstrdup(audit_mark_path(old->exe), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pathname)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(new, pathname, strlen(pathname));
+ if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
+ kfree(pathname);
+ return PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
+ }
+ new->exe = audit_mark;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark)
+{
+ unsigned long ino = tsk->mm->exe_file->f_inode->i_ino;
+ dev_t dev = tsk->mm->exe_file->f_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+
+ return audit_mark_compare(mark, ino, dev);
+}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 3d99196..c662638 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -405,6 +405,12 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
return -EINVAL;
break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ if (f->op != Audit_equal)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
};
return 0;
}
@@ -419,6 +425,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
int i;
char *str;
+ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
entry = audit_to_entry_common(data);
if (IS_ERR(entry))
@@ -539,6 +546,24 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
entry->rule.filterkey = str;
break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
+ goto exit_free;
+ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+ if (IS_ERR(str)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(str);
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+
+ audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val);
+ if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
+ kfree(str);
+ err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
+ break;
}
}
@@ -551,6 +576,8 @@ exit_nofree:
exit_free:
if (entry->rule.tree)
audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */
+ if (entry->rule.exe)
+ audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); /* that's the template one */
audit_free_rule(entry);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
@@ -615,6 +642,10 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
+ break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
@@ -678,6 +709,12 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
return 1;
break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ /* both paths exist based on above type compare */
+ if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe),
+ audit_mark_path(b->exe)))
+ return 1;
+ break;
case AUDIT_UID:
case AUDIT_EUID:
case AUDIT_SUID:
@@ -799,8 +836,14 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
err = -ENOMEM;
else
new->filterkey = fk;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old);
+ break;
}
if (err) {
+ if (new->exe)
+ audit_remove_mark(new->exe);
audit_free_rule(entry);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
@@ -963,6 +1006,9 @@ int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
if (e->rule.tree)
audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
+ if (e->rule.exe)
+ audit_remove_mark_rule(&e->rule);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
if (!dont_count)
audit_n_rules--;
@@ -1067,8 +1113,11 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data,
WARN_ON(1);
}
- if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE)
+ if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) {
+ if (entry->rule.exe)
+ audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
audit_free_rule(entry);
+ }
return err;
}
@@ -1360,6 +1409,8 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return 0;
nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r);
+ if (entry->rule.exe)
+ audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
/* save the first error encountered for the
* return value */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 701ea5c..e9bac2b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -466,6 +466,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
+ break;
case AUDIT_UID:
result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
break;
--
1.7.1
This adds the ability to audit the actions of children of a not-yet-running
process.
This is a split-out of a heavily modified version of a patch originally
submitted by Eric Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
---
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 11 +++++++++++
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index e2ca600..55a8dec 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@
#define AUDIT_OBJ_GID 110
#define AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE 111
#define AUDIT_EXE 112
+#define AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN 113
#define AUDIT_ARG0 200
#define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index c662638..802f0cc 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
+ case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
if (f->op != Audit_equal)
return -EINVAL;
if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT)
@@ -547,6 +548,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.filterkey = str;
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
+ case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
goto exit_free;
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
@@ -643,6 +645,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
+ case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
break;
@@ -710,6 +713,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 1;
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
+ case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
/* both paths exist based on above type compare */
if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe),
audit_mark_path(b->exe)))
@@ -838,6 +842,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->filterkey = fk;
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
+ case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old);
break;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e9bac2b..4f2b515 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -469,6 +469,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_EXE:
result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
+ {
+ struct task_struct *ptsk;
+ for (ptsk = tsk; ptsk->parent->pid > 0; ptsk = find_task_by_vpid(ptsk->parent->pid)) {
+ if (audit_exe_compare(ptsk, rule->exe)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
case AUDIT_UID:
result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
break;
--
1.7.1
On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:36 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> This is to be used to audit by executable path rules, but audit watches
> should be able to share this code eventually.
>
> At the moment the audit watch code is a lot more complex. That code only
> creates one fsnotify watch per parent directory. That 'audit_parent' in
> turn has a list of 'audit_watches' which contain the name, ino, dev of
> the specific object we care about. This just creates one fsnotify watch
> per object we care about. So if you watch 100 inodes in /etc this code
> will create 100 fsnotify watches on /etc. The audit_watch code will
> instead create 1 fsnotify watch on /etc (the audit_parent) and then 100
> individual watches chained from that fsnotify mark.
>
> We should be able to convert the audit_watch code to do one fsnotify
> mark per watch and simplify things/remove a whole lot of code. After
> that conversion we should be able to convert the audit_fsnotify code to
> support that hierarchy if the optimization is necessary.
>
> Move the access to the entry for audit_match_signal() to the beginning of
> the audit_del_rule() function in case the entry found is the same one passed
> in. This will enable it to be used by audit_autoremove_mark_rule(),
> kill_rules() and audit_remove_parent_watches().
>
> This is a heavily modified and merged version of two patches originally
> submitted by Eric Paris.
>
> Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
> Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> ---
> kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
> kernel/audit.h | 14 +++
> kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 231 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
Merged, although I had to add a line of whitespace to keep checkpatch happy.
> diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
> index 60c302c..58b5b52 100644
> --- a/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += stop_machine.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES_SANITY_TEST) += test_kprobes.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o auditfilter.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o
> -obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH) += audit_watch.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH) += audit_watch.o audit_fsnotify.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE) += audit_tree.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL) += gcov/
> obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index d641f9b..46d10dd 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ enum audit_state {
>
> /* Rule lists */
> struct audit_watch;
> +struct audit_fsnotify_mark;
> struct audit_tree;
> struct audit_chunk;
>
> @@ -252,6 +253,7 @@ struct audit_net {
> extern int selinux_audit_rule_update(void);
>
> extern struct mutex audit_filter_mutex;
> +extern int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *);
> extern void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *);
> extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
>
> @@ -269,6 +271,13 @@ extern int audit_add_watch(struct audit_krule *krule,
> struct list_head **list); extern void audit_remove_watch_rule(struct
> audit_krule *krule);
> extern char *audit_watch_path(struct audit_watch *watch);
> extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long
> ino, dev_t dev); +
> +extern struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule
> *krule, char *pathname, int len); +extern char *audit_mark_path(struct
> audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
> +extern void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark);
> +extern void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule *krule);
> +extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned
> long ino, dev_t dev); +
> #else
> #define audit_put_watch(w) {}
> #define audit_get_watch(w) {}
> @@ -278,6 +287,11 @@ extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch
> *watch, unsigned long ino, dev #define audit_watch_path(w) ""
> #define audit_watch_compare(w, i, d) 0
>
> +#define audit_alloc_mark(k, p, l) (ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
> +#define audit_mark_path(m) ""
> +#define audit_remove_mark(m)
> +#define audit_remove_mark_rule(k)
> +#define audit_mark_compare(m, i, d) 0
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
> diff --git a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..654c6c7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
> +/* audit_fsnotify.c -- tracking inodes
> + *
> + * Copyright 2003-2009,2014-2015 Red Hat, Inc.
> + * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
> + * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
> + * (at your option) any later version.
> + *
> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/audit.h>
> +#include <linux/kthread.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
> +#include <linux/namei.h>
> +#include <linux/netlink.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> +#include "audit.h"
> +
> +/*
> + * this mark lives on the parent directory of the inode in question.
> + * but dev, ino, and path are about the child
> + */
> +struct audit_fsnotify_mark {
> + dev_t dev; /* associated superblock device */
> + unsigned long ino; /* associated inode number */
> + char *path; /* insertion path */
> + struct fsnotify_mark mark; /* fsnotify mark on the inode */
> + struct audit_krule *rule;
> +};
> +
> +/* fsnotify handle. */
> +static struct fsnotify_group *audit_fsnotify_group;
> +
> +/* fsnotify events we care about. */
> +#define AUDIT_FS_EVENTS (FS_MOVE | FS_CREATE | FS_DELETE | FS_DELETE_SELF
> |\ + FS_MOVE_SELF | FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD)
> +
> +static void audit_fsnotify_mark_free(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> *audit_mark) +{
> + kfree(audit_mark->path);
> + kfree(audit_mark);
> +}
> +
> +static void audit_fsnotify_free_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark)
> +{
> + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
> +
> + audit_mark = container_of(mark, struct audit_fsnotify_mark, mark);
> + audit_fsnotify_mark_free(audit_mark);
> +}
> +
> +char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark)
> +{
> + return mark->path;
> +}
> +
> +int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned long ino,
> dev_t dev) +{
> + if (mark->ino == AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
> + return 0;
> + return (mark->ino == ino) && (mark->dev == dev);
> +}
> +
> +static void audit_update_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark,
> + struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + audit_mark->dev = inode ? inode->i_sb->s_dev : AUDIT_DEV_UNSET;
> + audit_mark->ino = inode ? inode->i_ino : AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
> +}
> +
> +struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule,
> char *pathname, int len) +{
> + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
> + struct path path;
> + struct dentry *dentry;
> + struct inode *inode;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (pathname[0] != '/' || pathname[len-1] == '/')
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> + dentry = kern_path_locked(pathname, &path);
> + if (IS_ERR(dentry))
> + return (void *)dentry; /* returning an error */
> + inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
> + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
> +
> + audit_mark = kzalloc(sizeof(*audit_mark), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (unlikely(!audit_mark)) {
> + audit_mark = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + fsnotify_init_mark(&audit_mark->mark, audit_fsnotify_free_mark);
> + audit_mark->mark.mask = AUDIT_FS_EVENTS;
> + audit_mark->path = pathname;
> + audit_update_mark(audit_mark, dentry->d_inode);
> + audit_mark->rule = krule;
> +
> + ret = fsnotify_add_mark(&audit_mark->mark, audit_fsnotify_group, inode,
> NULL, true); + if (ret < 0) {
> + audit_fsnotify_mark_free(audit_mark);
> + audit_mark = ERR_PTR(ret);
> + }
> +out:
> + dput(dentry);
> + path_put(&path);
> + return audit_mark;
> +}
> +
> +static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> *audit_mark, char *op) +{
> + struct audit_buffer *ab;
> + struct audit_krule *rule = audit_mark->rule;
> + if (!audit_enabled)
> + return;
> + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
> + if (unlikely(!ab))
> + return;
> + audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u op=",
> + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> + audit_get_sessionid(current));
> + audit_log_string(ab, op);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
> + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, audit_mark->path);
> + audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
> + audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", rule->listnr);
> + audit_log_end(ab);
> +}
> +
> +void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark)
> +{
> + fsnotify_destroy_mark(&audit_mark->mark, audit_fsnotify_group);
> + fsnotify_put_mark(&audit_mark->mark);
> +}
> +
> +void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule *krule)
> +{
> + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark = krule->exe;
> +
> + audit_remove_mark(mark);
> +}
> +
> +static void audit_autoremove_mark_rule(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> *audit_mark) +{
> + struct audit_krule *rule = audit_mark->rule;
> + struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(rule, struct audit_entry, rule);
> +
> + audit_mark_log_rule_change(audit_mark, "autoremove_rule");
> + audit_del_rule(entry);
> +}
> +
> +/* Update mark data in audit rules based on fsnotify events. */
> +static int audit_mark_handle_event(struct fsnotify_group *group,
> + struct inode *to_tell,
> + struct fsnotify_mark *inode_mark,
> + struct fsnotify_mark *vfsmount_mark,
> + u32 mask, void *data, int data_type,
> + const unsigned char *dname, u32 cookie)
> +{
> + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
> + struct inode *inode = NULL;
> +
> + audit_mark = container_of(inode_mark, struct audit_fsnotify_mark, mark);
> +
> + BUG_ON(group != audit_fsnotify_group);
> +
> + switch (data_type) {
> + case (FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH):
> + inode = ((struct path *)data)->dentry->d_inode;
> + break;
> + case (FSNOTIFY_EVENT_INODE):
> + inode = (struct inode *)data;
> + break;
> + default:
> + BUG();
> + return 0;
> + };
> +
> + if (mask & (FS_CREATE|FS_MOVED_TO|FS_DELETE|FS_MOVED_FROM)) {
> + if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, audit_mark->path, AUDIT_NAME_FULL))
> + return 0;
> + audit_update_mark(audit_mark, inode);
> + } else if (mask & (FS_DELETE_SELF|FS_UNMOUNT|FS_MOVE_SELF))
> + audit_autoremove_mark_rule(audit_mark);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct fsnotify_ops audit_mark_fsnotify_ops = {
> + .handle_event = audit_mark_handle_event,
> +};
> +
> +static int __init audit_fsnotify_init(void)
> +{
> + audit_fsnotify_group = fsnotify_alloc_group(&audit_mark_fsnotify_ops);
> + if (IS_ERR(audit_fsnotify_group)) {
> + audit_fsnotify_group = NULL;
> + audit_panic("cannot create audit fsnotify group");
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +device_initcall(audit_fsnotify_init);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 018719a..3d99196 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry
> *entry) }
>
> /* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
> -static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
> +int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
> {
> struct audit_entry *e;
> struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
--
paul moore
security @ redhat
On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:37 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> This adds the ability audit the actions of a not-yet-running process.
>
> This patch implements the ability to filter on the executable path. Instead
> of just hard coding the ino and dev of the executable we care about at the
> moment the rule is inserted into the kernel, use the new audit_fsnotify
> infrastructure to manage this dynamically. This means that if the filename
> does not yet exist but the containing directory does, or if the inode in
> question is unlinked and creat'd (aka updated) the rule will just continue
> to work. If the containing directory is moved or deleted or the filesystem
> is unmounted, the rule is deleted automatically. A future enhancement
> would be to have the rule survive across directory disruptions.
>
> This is a heavily modified version of a patch originally submitted by Eric
> Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
>
> Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
> Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 5 +++-
> kernel/audit.h | 4 +++
> kernel/audit_tree.c | 2 +
> kernel/audit_watch.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> kernel/auditsc.c | 3 ++
> 7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Merged, although some more minor whitespace tweaks were necessary for
checkpatch. On a related note, if you're not running ./scripts/checlpatch.pl
on your patches before sending them out, I would recommend it. It isn't
perfect, but it can catch some silly things that we all do from time to time.
Also, one last thing. It is pretty late in the -rcX cycle to merge these two
patches, but considering that we've been talking about these for a while, I'm
reasonably okay merging them. In the future, if it isn't in audit#next by the
time -rc5 is released, it isn't going to make the merge window.
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index c2e7e3a..aee456f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct audit_krule {
> struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
> struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
> struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
> + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *exe;
> struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
> struct list_head list; /* for AUDIT_LIST* purposes only */
> u64 prio;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 971df22..e2ca600 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -266,6 +266,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_OBJ_UID 109
> #define AUDIT_OBJ_GID 110
> #define AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE 111
> +#define AUDIT_EXE 112
>
> #define AUDIT_ARG0 200
> #define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1)
> @@ -324,8 +325,10 @@ enum {
>
> #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT 0x00000001
> #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME 0x00000002
> +#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH 0x00000004
> #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL (AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT | \
> - AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME)
> + AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME | \
> + AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH )
>
> /* deprecated: AUDIT_VERSION_* */
> #define AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 46d10dd..dadf86a 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ extern char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> *mark); extern void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> *audit_mark); extern void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule
> *krule);
> extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned
> long ino, dev_t dev); +extern int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new,
> struct audit_krule *old); +extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct
> *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
>
> #else
> #define audit_put_watch(w) {}
> @@ -292,6 +294,8 @@ extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> *mark, unsigned long in #define audit_remove_mark(m)
> #define audit_remove_mark_rule(k)
> #define audit_mark_compare(m, i, d) 0
> +#define audit_exe_compare(t, m) (-EINVAL)
> +#define audit_dupe_exe(n, o) (-EINVAL)
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
> diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
> index b0f9877..94ecdab 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
> @@ -479,6 +479,8 @@ static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
> if (rule->tree) {
> /* not a half-baked one */
> audit_tree_log_remove_rule(rule);
> + if (entry->rule.exe)
> + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
> rule->tree = NULL;
> list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
> list_del(&entry->rule.list);
> diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
> index c668bfc..1255dbf 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
> @@ -312,6 +312,8 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent
> *parent, list_replace(&oentry->rule.list,
> &nentry->rule.list);
> }
> + if (oentry->rule.exe)
> + audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
>
> audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
>
> @@ -342,6 +344,8 @@ static void audit_remove_parent_watches(struct
> audit_parent *parent) list_for_each_entry_safe(r, nextr, &w->rules, rlist)
> {
> e = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
> audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, w, "remove_rule");
> + if (e->rule.exe)
> + audit_remove_mark(e->rule.exe);
> list_del(&r->rlist);
> list_del(&r->list);
> list_del_rcu(&e->list);
> @@ -514,3 +518,30 @@ static int __init audit_watch_init(void)
> return 0;
> }
> device_initcall(audit_watch_init);
> +
> +int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new, struct audit_krule *old)
> +{
> + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
> + char *pathname;
> +
> + pathname = kstrdup(audit_mark_path(old->exe), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!pathname)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(new, pathname, strlen(pathname));
> + if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
> + kfree(pathname);
> + return PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
> + }
> + new->exe = audit_mark;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> *mark) +{
> + unsigned long ino = tsk->mm->exe_file->f_inode->i_ino;
> + dev_t dev = tsk->mm->exe_file->f_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> +
> + return audit_mark_compare(mark, ino, dev);
> +}
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 3d99196..c662638 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -405,6 +405,12 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry,
> struct audit_field *f) if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
> return -EINVAL;
> break;
> + case AUDIT_EXE:
> + if (f->op != Audit_equal)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + break;
> };
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -419,6 +425,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct
> audit_rule_data *data, size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct
> audit_rule_data);
> int i;
> char *str;
> + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
>
> entry = audit_to_entry_common(data);
> if (IS_ERR(entry))
> @@ -539,6 +546,24 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct
> audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
> entry->rule.filterkey = str;
> break;
> + case AUDIT_EXE:
> + if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
> + goto exit_free;
> + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
> + if (IS_ERR(str)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(str);
> + goto exit_free;
> + }
> + entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
> +
> + audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val);
> + if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
> + kfree(str);
> + err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
> + goto exit_free;
> + }
> + entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
> + break;
> }
> }
>
> @@ -551,6 +576,8 @@ exit_nofree:
> exit_free:
> if (entry->rule.tree)
> audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */
> + if (entry->rule.exe)
> + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); /* that's the template one */
> audit_free_rule(entry);
> return ERR_PTR(err);
> }
> @@ -615,6 +642,10 @@ static struct audit_rule_data
> *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->buflen +=
> data->values[i] =
> audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
> break;
> + case AUDIT_EXE:
> + data->buflen += data->values[i] =
> + audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
> + break;
> case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
> data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
> @@ -678,6 +709,12 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a,
> struct audit_krule *b) if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
> return 1;
> break;
> + case AUDIT_EXE:
> + /* both paths exist based on above type compare */
> + if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe),
> + audit_mark_path(b->exe)))
> + return 1;
> + break;
> case AUDIT_UID:
> case AUDIT_EUID:
> case AUDIT_SUID:
> @@ -799,8 +836,14 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule
> *old) err = -ENOMEM;
> else
> new->filterkey = fk;
> + break;
> + case AUDIT_EXE:
> + err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old);
> + break;
> }
> if (err) {
> + if (new->exe)
> + audit_remove_mark(new->exe);
> audit_free_rule(entry);
> return ERR_PTR(err);
> }
> @@ -963,6 +1006,9 @@ int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
> if (e->rule.tree)
> audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
>
> + if (e->rule.exe)
> + audit_remove_mark_rule(&e->rule);
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> if (!dont_count)
> audit_n_rules--;
> @@ -1067,8 +1113,11 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int
> seq, void *data, WARN_ON(1);
> }
>
> - if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE)
> + if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) {
> + if (entry->rule.exe)
> + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
> audit_free_rule(entry);
> + }
>
> return err;
> }
> @@ -1360,6 +1409,8 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> return 0;
>
> nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r);
> + if (entry->rule.exe)
> + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
> if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
> /* save the first error encountered for the
> * return value */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 701ea5c..e9bac2b 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -466,6 +466,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
> }
> break;
> + case AUDIT_EXE:
> + result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
> + break;
> case AUDIT_UID:
> result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
> break;
--
paul moore
security @ redhat
On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:38 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> This adds the ability to audit the actions of children of a not-yet-running
> process.
>
> This is a split-out of a heavily modified version of a patch originally
> submitted by Eric Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
>
> Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
> Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 11 +++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
I'm still not really comfortable with that loop and since there hasn't been a
really convincing use case I'm going to pass on this patch for right now. If
someone comes up with a *really* compelling case in the future I'll reconsider
it.
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index e2ca600..55a8dec 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -267,6 +267,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_OBJ_GID 110
> #define AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE 111
> #define AUDIT_EXE 112
> +#define AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN 113
>
> #define AUDIT_ARG0 200
> #define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index c662638..802f0cc 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry,
> struct audit_field *f) return -EINVAL;
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> + case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
> if (f->op != Audit_equal)
> return -EINVAL;
> if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT)
> @@ -547,6 +548,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct
> audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.filterkey = str;
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> + case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
> if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
> goto exit_free;
> str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
> @@ -643,6 +645,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data
> *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) audit_pack_string(&bufp,
> krule->filterkey);
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> + case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
> data->buflen += data->values[i] =
> audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
> break;
> @@ -710,6 +713,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a,
> struct audit_krule *b) return 1;
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> + case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
> /* both paths exist based on above type compare */
> if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe),
> audit_mark_path(b->exe)))
> @@ -838,6 +842,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule
> *old) new->filterkey = fk;
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> + case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
> err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old);
> break;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index e9bac2b..4f2b515 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -469,6 +469,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
> break;
> + case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
> + {
> + struct task_struct *ptsk;
> + for (ptsk = tsk; ptsk->parent->pid > 0; ptsk =
> find_task_by_vpid(ptsk->parent->pid)) { + if
(audit_exe_compare(ptsk,
> rule->exe)) {
> + ++result;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> + break;
> case AUDIT_UID:
> result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
> break;
--
paul moore
security @ redhat
On Thursday, August 06, 2015 04:24:58 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:38 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > This adds the ability to audit the actions of children of a
> > not-yet-running
> > process.
> >
> >
> >
> > This is a split-out of a heavily modified version of a patch originally
> > submitted by Eric Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
> >
> >
> >
> > Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
> > Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > ---
> >
> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++++
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> I'm still not really comfortable with that loop and since there hasn't been
> a really convincing use case I'm going to pass on this patch for right
> now. If someone comes up with a *really* compelling case in the future
> I'll reconsider it.
Its the same reason strace has a -f option. Sometimes you need to also see
what the children did. For example, maybe you want to audit file access to a
specific directory and several cgi-bin programs can get there. You could write
a rule for apache and be done. Or maybe, you have an app that lets people have
shell access and you need to see files accessed or connections opened. Or maybe
its a control panel application with helper scripts and you need to see
changes that its making. Or maybe you have a program that is at risk of being
compromised and you want to see if someone gets a shell from it. There are a
lot of cases where it could be useful.
-Steve
On August 6, 2015 5:11:50 PM Steve Grubb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thursday, August 06, 2015 04:24:58 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:38 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > This adds the ability to audit the actions of children of a
> > > not-yet-running
> > > process.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > This is a split-out of a heavily modified version of a patch originally
> > > submitted by Eric Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
> > > Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > > ---
> > >
> > > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> > > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++++
> > > kernel/auditsc.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > I'm still not really comfortable with that loop and since there hasn't been
> > a really convincing use case I'm going to pass on this patch for right
> > now. If someone comes up with a *really* compelling case in the future
> > I'll reconsider it.
>
> Its the same reason strace has a -f option. Sometimes you need to also see
> what the children did. For example, maybe you want to audit file access to a
> specific directory and several cgi-bin programs can get there. You could write
> a rule for apache and be done. Or maybe, you have an app that lets people have
> shell access and you need to see files accessed or connections opened. Or maybe
> its a control panel application with helper scripts and you need to see
> changes that its making. Or maybe you have a program that is at risk of being
> compromised and you want to see if someone gets a shell from it. There are a
> lot of cases where it could be useful.
>
> -Steve
>
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not currently convinced that there is
enough value in this to offset the risk I feel the loop presents. I
understand the use cases that you are mentioning, the are the same as the
last time we discussed this, but I'm going to need something better than that.
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:37 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > This adds the ability audit the actions of a not-yet-running process.
> >
> > This patch implements the ability to filter on the executable path. Instead
> > of just hard coding the ino and dev of the executable we care about at the
> > moment the rule is inserted into the kernel, use the new audit_fsnotify
> > infrastructure to manage this dynamically. This means that if the filename
> > does not yet exist but the containing directory does, or if the inode in
> > question is unlinked and creat'd (aka updated) the rule will just continue
> > to work. If the containing directory is moved or deleted or the filesystem
> > is unmounted, the rule is deleted automatically. A future enhancement
> > would be to have the rule survive across directory disruptions.
> >
> > This is a heavily modified version of a patch originally submitted by Eric
> > Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
> >
> > Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
> > Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > include/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 5 +++-
> > kernel/audit.h | 4 +++
> > kernel/audit_tree.c | 2 +
> > kernel/audit_watch.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > kernel/auditfilter.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 3 ++
> > 7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> Merged, although some more minor whitespace tweaks were necessary for
> checkpatch. On a related note, if you're not running ./scripts/checlpatch.pl
> on your patches before sending them out, I would recommend it. It isn't
> perfect, but it can catch some silly things that we all do from time to time.
No excuses... I have been running it pretty regularly and got lazy and
distracted with patch revisions. I can't say I agree with the no space
before closing round parenthesis due to legibility, but will comply.
> Also, one last thing. It is pretty late in the -rcX cycle to merge these two
> patches, but considering that we've been talking about these for a while, I'm
> reasonably okay merging them. In the future, if it isn't in audit#next by the
> time -rc5 is released, it isn't going to make the merge window.
I've been quite aware of that looming merge window... This feature has
been iterating for a while, so there are no big surprises. I was aiming
for earlier. :)
> > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> > index c2e7e3a..aee456f 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct audit_krule {
> > struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
> > struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
> > struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
> > + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *exe;
> > struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
> > struct list_head list; /* for AUDIT_LIST* purposes only */
> > u64 prio;
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > index 971df22..e2ca600 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -266,6 +266,7 @@
> > #define AUDIT_OBJ_UID 109
> > #define AUDIT_OBJ_GID 110
> > #define AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE 111
> > +#define AUDIT_EXE 112
> >
> > #define AUDIT_ARG0 200
> > #define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1)
> > @@ -324,8 +325,10 @@ enum {
> >
> > #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT 0x00000001
> > #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME 0x00000002
> > +#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH 0x00000004
> > #define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL (AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT | \
> > - AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME)
> > + AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME | \
> > + AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH )
> >
> > /* deprecated: AUDIT_VERSION_* */
> > #define AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> > index 46d10dd..dadf86a 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.h
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> > @@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ extern char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> > *mark); extern void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> > *audit_mark); extern void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule
> > *krule);
> > extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned
> > long ino, dev_t dev); +extern int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new,
> > struct audit_krule *old); +extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct
> > *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark);
> >
> > #else
> > #define audit_put_watch(w) {}
> > @@ -292,6 +294,8 @@ extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> > *mark, unsigned long in #define audit_remove_mark(m)
> > #define audit_remove_mark_rule(k)
> > #define audit_mark_compare(m, i, d) 0
> > +#define audit_exe_compare(t, m) (-EINVAL)
> > +#define audit_dupe_exe(n, o) (-EINVAL)
> > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH */
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
> > index b0f9877..94ecdab 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
> > @@ -479,6 +479,8 @@ static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
> > if (rule->tree) {
> > /* not a half-baked one */
> > audit_tree_log_remove_rule(rule);
> > + if (entry->rule.exe)
> > + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
> > rule->tree = NULL;
> > list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
> > list_del(&entry->rule.list);
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
> > index c668bfc..1255dbf 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
> > @@ -312,6 +312,8 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent
> > *parent, list_replace(&oentry->rule.list,
> > &nentry->rule.list);
> > }
> > + if (oentry->rule.exe)
> > + audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
> >
> > audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
> >
> > @@ -342,6 +344,8 @@ static void audit_remove_parent_watches(struct
> > audit_parent *parent) list_for_each_entry_safe(r, nextr, &w->rules, rlist)
> > {
> > e = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
> > audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, w, "remove_rule");
> > + if (e->rule.exe)
> > + audit_remove_mark(e->rule.exe);
> > list_del(&r->rlist);
> > list_del(&r->list);
> > list_del_rcu(&e->list);
> > @@ -514,3 +518,30 @@ static int __init audit_watch_init(void)
> > return 0;
> > }
> > device_initcall(audit_watch_init);
> > +
> > +int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new, struct audit_krule *old)
> > +{
> > + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
> > + char *pathname;
> > +
> > + pathname = kstrdup(audit_mark_path(old->exe), GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!pathname)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(new, pathname, strlen(pathname));
> > + if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
> > + kfree(pathname);
> > + return PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
> > + }
> > + new->exe = audit_mark;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark
> > *mark) +{
> > + unsigned long ino = tsk->mm->exe_file->f_inode->i_ino;
> > + dev_t dev = tsk->mm->exe_file->f_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> > +
> > + return audit_mark_compare(mark, ino, dev);
> > +}
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> > index 3d99196..c662638 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> > @@ -405,6 +405,12 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry,
> > struct audit_field *f) if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
> > return -EINVAL;
> > break;
> > + case AUDIT_EXE:
> > + if (f->op != Audit_equal)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > };
> > return 0;
> > }
> > @@ -419,6 +425,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct
> > audit_rule_data *data, size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct
> > audit_rule_data);
> > int i;
> > char *str;
> > + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
> >
> > entry = audit_to_entry_common(data);
> > if (IS_ERR(entry))
> > @@ -539,6 +546,24 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct
> > audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
> > entry->rule.filterkey = str;
> > break;
> > + case AUDIT_EXE:
> > + if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
> > + goto exit_free;
> > + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
> > + if (IS_ERR(str)) {
> > + err = PTR_ERR(str);
> > + goto exit_free;
> > + }
> > + entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
> > +
> > + audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val);
> > + if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
> > + kfree(str);
> > + err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
> > + goto exit_free;
> > + }
> > + entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
> > + break;
> > }
> > }
> >
> > @@ -551,6 +576,8 @@ exit_nofree:
> > exit_free:
> > if (entry->rule.tree)
> > audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */
> > + if (entry->rule.exe)
> > + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); /* that's the template one */
> > audit_free_rule(entry);
> > return ERR_PTR(err);
> > }
> > @@ -615,6 +642,10 @@ static struct audit_rule_data
> > *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->buflen +=
> > data->values[i] =
> > audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
> > break;
> > + case AUDIT_EXE:
> > + data->buflen += data->values[i] =
> > + audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
> > + break;
> > case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> > if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
> > data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
> > @@ -678,6 +709,12 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a,
> > struct audit_krule *b) if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
> > return 1;
> > break;
> > + case AUDIT_EXE:
> > + /* both paths exist based on above type compare */
> > + if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe),
> > + audit_mark_path(b->exe)))
> > + return 1;
> > + break;
> > case AUDIT_UID:
> > case AUDIT_EUID:
> > case AUDIT_SUID:
> > @@ -799,8 +836,14 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule
> > *old) err = -ENOMEM;
> > else
> > new->filterkey = fk;
> > + break;
> > + case AUDIT_EXE:
> > + err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old);
> > + break;
> > }
> > if (err) {
> > + if (new->exe)
> > + audit_remove_mark(new->exe);
> > audit_free_rule(entry);
> > return ERR_PTR(err);
> > }
> > @@ -963,6 +1006,9 @@ int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
> > if (e->rule.tree)
> > audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
> >
> > + if (e->rule.exe)
> > + audit_remove_mark_rule(&e->rule);
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> > if (!dont_count)
> > audit_n_rules--;
> > @@ -1067,8 +1113,11 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int
> > seq, void *data, WARN_ON(1);
> > }
> >
> > - if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE)
> > + if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) {
> > + if (entry->rule.exe)
> > + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
> > audit_free_rule(entry);
> > + }
> >
> > return err;
> > }
> > @@ -1360,6 +1409,8 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> > return 0;
> >
> > nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r);
> > + if (entry->rule.exe)
> > + audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
> > if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
> > /* save the first error encountered for the
> > * return value */
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 701ea5c..e9bac2b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -466,6 +466,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
> > }
> > break;
> > + case AUDIT_EXE:
> > + result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
> > + break;
> > case AUDIT_UID:
> > result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
> > break;
>
> --
> paul moore
> security @ redhat
>
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545
On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote:
> On August 6, 2015 5:11:50 PM Steve Grubb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> >On Thursday, August 06, 2015 04:24:58 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> >> On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:38 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> >> > This adds the ability to audit the actions of children of a
> >> > not-yet-running
> >> > process.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > This is a split-out of a heavily modified version of a patch originally
> >> > submitted by Eric Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Cc: Peter Moody <[email protected]>
> >> > Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
> >> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> >> > ---
> >> >
> >> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> >> > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++++
> >> > kernel/auditsc.c | 11 +++++++++++
> >> > 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> I'm still not really comfortable with that loop and since there hasn't been
> >> a really convincing use case I'm going to pass on this patch for right
> >> now. If someone comes up with a *really* compelling case in the future
> >> I'll reconsider it.
> >
> >Its the same reason strace has a -f option. Sometimes you need to also see
> >what the children did. For example, maybe you want to audit file access to a
> >specific directory and several cgi-bin programs can get there. You could write
> >a rule for apache and be done. Or maybe, you have an app that lets people have
> >shell access and you need to see files accessed or connections opened. Or maybe
> >its a control panel application with helper scripts and you need to see
> >changes that its making. Or maybe you have a program that is at risk of being
> >compromised and you want to see if someone gets a shell from it. There are a
> >lot of cases where it could be useful.
> >
> >-Steve
> >
> >--
> >Linux-audit mailing list
> >[email protected]
> >https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
>
> I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not currently convinced that
> there is enough value in this to offset the risk I feel the loop
> presents. I understand the use cases that you are mentioning, the
> are the same as the last time we discussed this, but I'm going to
> need something better than that.
Can you better describe the loop that concerns you? I don't quite see
it.
> paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545
On Friday, August 07, 2015 02:25:14 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote:
>
> > Merged, although some more minor whitespace tweaks were necessary for
> > checkpatch. On a related note, if you're not running
> > ./scripts/checlpatch.pl on your patches before sending them out, I would
> > recommend it. It isn't perfect, but it can catch some silly things that
> > we all do from time to time.
>
> No excuses... I have been running it pretty regularly and got lazy and
> distracted with patch revisions. I can't say I agree with the no space
> before closing round parenthesis due to legibility, but will comply.
Okay, glad to hear you run it regularly when submitting patches.
I agree that there are some things I might change about the kernel's style
choices, but I think it is more important that we remain consistent with the
kernel as a whole. I really like tools that enforce things like this, even if
I don't agree 100% with the results.
> > Also, one last thing. It is pretty late in the -rcX cycle to merge these
> > two patches, but considering that we've been talking about these for a
> > while, I'm reasonably okay merging them. In the future, if it isn't in
> > audit#next by the time -rc5 is released, it isn't going to make the merge
> > window.
>
> I've been quite aware of that looming merge window... This feature has
> been iterating for a while, so there are no big surprises. I was aiming
> for earlier. :)
Well, I think it is a little early to say there are no big surprises, we won't
know that for a few more weeks, but if we make it to -rc3/4 without any
problems I'll breathe a bit easier ;)
--
paul moore
security @ redhat
On Friday, August 07, 2015 02:37:15 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote:
>
> > I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not currently convinced that
> > there is enough value in this to offset the risk I feel the loop
> > presents. I understand the use cases that you are mentioning, the
> > are the same as the last time we discussed this, but I'm going to
> > need something better than that.
>
> Can you better describe the loop that concerns you? I don't quite see
> it.
It would be the only loop in the patch, look at the for loop in
audit_filter_rules() which iterates up the process' parent chain.
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On 15/08/07, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Friday, August 07, 2015 02:37:15 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote:
> >
> > > I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not currently convinced that
> > > there is enough value in this to offset the risk I feel the loop
> > > presents. I understand the use cases that you are mentioning, the
> > > are the same as the last time we discussed this, but I'm going to
> > > need something better than that.
> >
> > Can you better describe the loop that concerns you? I don't quite see
> > it.
>
> It would be the only loop in the patch, look at the for loop in
> audit_filter_rules() which iterates up the process' parent chain.
Sorry, I should reword that... What risk do you see in that loop? It
works up the task ancestry tree until it triggers, or hits init for that
PID namespace that terminates the loop. Do you see a risk in the
numerical pids rolling underneath the loop?
I *do* notice that find_task_by_vpid(pid_t) must be replaced with
find_task_by_pid_ns(pid_t, &init_pid_ns), since task_struct->pid is
always stored in the initial PID namespace.
> paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545
On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 15/08/07, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Friday, August 07, 2015 02:37:15 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>> > On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote:
>> >
>> > > I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not currently convinced that
>> > > there is enough value in this to offset the risk I feel the loop
>> > > presents. I understand the use cases that you are mentioning, the
>> > > are the same as the last time we discussed this, but I'm going to
>> > > need something better than that.
>> >
>> > Can you better describe the loop that concerns you? I don't quite see
>> > it.
>>
>> It would be the only loop in the patch, look at the for loop in
>> audit_filter_rules() which iterates up the process' parent chain.
>
> Sorry, I should reword that... What risk do you see in that loop? It
> works up the task ancestry tree until it triggers, or hits init for that
> PID namespace that terminates the loop. Do you see a risk in the
> numerical pids rolling underneath the loop?
I suppose there is some risk of PID overlap, and while that is a
concern, it isn't my first.
My main concern is that a malicious user could add an extra level of
burden to the system by making an absurdly tall process tree and then
hammer the system with trivial, short lived syscalls. Granted, there
are userspace limits which would bound the impact to some extent, but
there is no way to really reduce the risk. You could further put hard
limits on the loop, but what good would that do? Malicious users
would just know to blow past that limit before they did their Evil
Deeds.
I'll say it again; I'm not completely opposed to something like this -
perhaps in some modified form - but I have yet to see a need for this
functionality that is great enough to counter the risk.
> I *do* notice that find_task_by_vpid(pid_t) must be replaced with
> find_task_by_pid_ns(pid_t, &init_pid_ns), since task_struct->pid is
> always stored in the initial PID namespace.
Another thing that needs to be resolved.
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On 15/08/07, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 15/08/07, Paul Moore wrote:
> >> On Friday, August 07, 2015 02:37:15 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> >> > On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote:
> >> >
> >> > > I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not currently convinced that
> >> > > there is enough value in this to offset the risk I feel the loop
> >> > > presents. I understand the use cases that you are mentioning, the
> >> > > are the same as the last time we discussed this, but I'm going to
> >> > > need something better than that.
> >> >
> >> > Can you better describe the loop that concerns you? I don't quite see
> >> > it.
> >>
> >> It would be the only loop in the patch, look at the for loop in
> >> audit_filter_rules() which iterates up the process' parent chain.
> >
> > Sorry, I should reword that... What risk do you see in that loop? It
> > works up the task ancestry tree until it triggers, or hits init for that
> > PID namespace that terminates the loop. Do you see a risk in the
> > numerical pids rolling underneath the loop?
>
> I suppose there is some risk of PID overlap, and while that is a
> concern, it isn't my first.
>
> My main concern is that a malicious user could add an extra level of
> burden to the system by making an absurdly tall process tree and then
> hammer the system with trivial, short lived syscalls. Granted, there
> are userspace limits which would bound the impact to some extent, but
> there is no way to really reduce the risk. You could further put hard
> limits on the loop, but what good would that do? Malicious users
> would just know to blow past that limit before they did their Evil
> Deeds.
>
> I'll say it again; I'm not completely opposed to something like this -
> perhaps in some modified form - but I have yet to see a need for this
> functionality that is great enough to counter the risk.
I am not going to lobby hard for it. I split this part of the patch out
to avoid jeopardizing the acceptability of the rest of the patchset and
to isolate it to make it easier to focus on its issues and apply it
later once they are addressed.
I'll reflect on this concern and see if I can come up with any ways to
minimize this danger. This issue is related to the request to list the
chain of processes back to the first ancestor in each record. You can
make a best effort to record or track the entire chain, but at some
point need to put a limit on it to avoid a DoS, at which point there is
no point in listing the information since it is incomplete. (Too many
"point"s in that last sentence...)
> > I *do* notice that find_task_by_vpid(pid_t) must be replaced with
> > find_task_by_pid_ns(pid_t, &init_pid_ns), since task_struct->pid is
> > always stored in the initial PID namespace.
>
> Another thing that needs to be resolved.
I've already fixed it in my tree:
ptsk = find_task_by_pid_ns(ptsk->parent->pid) &init_pid_ns)
> paul moore
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545