This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.18 release.
There are 123 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed 22 May 2019 11:50:46 AM UTC.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.18-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 5.0.18-rc1
Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
ext4: don't update s_rev_level if not required
zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
ext4: fix compile error when using BUFFER_TRACE
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: fix block validity checks for journal inodes using indirect blocks
Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
ext4: unsigned int compared against zero
Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
s390/mm: convert to the generic get_user_pages_fast code
Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
s390/mm: make the pxd_offset functions more robust
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
iov_iter: optimize page_copy_sane()
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
libnvdimm/namespace: Fix label tracking error
Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
xen/pvh: correctly setup the PV EFI interface for dom0
Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
xen/pvh: set xen_domain_type to HVM in xen_pvh_init
Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
kbuild: turn auto.conf.cmd into a mandatory include file
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: lapic: Busy wait for timer to expire when using hv_timer
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Skip EFER vs. guest CPUID checks for host-initiated writes
Peter Xu <[email protected]>
KVM: Fix the bitmap range to copy during clear dirty
Chengguang Xu <[email protected]>
jbd2: fix potential double free
Michał Wadowski <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix for Lenovo B50-70 inverted internal microphone bug
Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - Fixup headphone noise via runtime suspend
Jeremy Soller <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - Corrected fixup for System76 Gazelle (gaze14)
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot due to aborted journal
Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>
ext4: fix use-after-free in dx_release()
Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
ext4: fix data corruption caused by overlapping unaligned and aligned IO
Sriram Rajagopalan <[email protected]>
ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
Anup Patel <[email protected]>
tty: Don't force RISCV SBI console as preferred console
Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
fs/writeback.c: use rcu_barrier() to wait for inflight wb switches going into workqueue when umount
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base"
Kamlakant Patel <[email protected]>
ipmi:ssif: compare block number correctly for multi-part return messages
Coly Li <[email protected]>
bcache: never set KEY_PTRS of journal key to 0 in journal_reclaim()
Liang Chen <[email protected]>
bcache: fix a race between cache register and cacheset unregister
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: fix race between send and deduplication that lead to failures and crashes
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: do not start a transaction at iterate_extent_inodes()
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: do not start a transaction during fiemap
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: send, flush dellaloc in order to avoid data loss
Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
btrfs: Honour FITRIM range constraints during free space trim
Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
btrfs: Correctly free extent buffer in case btree_read_extent_buffer_pages fails
Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
btrfs: Check the first key and level for cached extent buffer
Debabrata Banerjee <[email protected]>
ext4: fix ext4_show_options for file systems w/o journal
Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
ext4: actually request zeroing of inode table after grow
Barret Rhoden <[email protected]>
ext4: fix use-after-free race with debug_want_extra_isize
Pan Bian <[email protected]>
ext4: avoid drop reference to iloc.bh twice
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: ignore e_value_offs for xattrs with value-in-ea-inode
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext4: make sanity check in mballoc more strict
Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
jbd2: check superblock mapped prior to committing
Sergei Trofimovich <[email protected]>
tty/vt: fix write/write race in ioctl(KDSKBSENT) handler
Yifeng Li <[email protected]>
tty: vt.c: Fix TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN console blanking if blankinterval == 0
Chris Packham <[email protected]>
mtd: maps: Allow MTD_PHYSMAP with MTD_RAM
Chris Packham <[email protected]>
mtd: maps: physmap: Store gpio_values correctly
Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]>
mtd: spi-nor: intel-spi: Avoid crossing 4K address boundary on read/write
Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
mfd: max77620: Fix swapped FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US values
Steve Twiss <[email protected]>
mfd: da9063: Fix OTP control register names to match datasheets for DA9063/63L
Rajat Jain <[email protected]>
ACPI: PM: Set enable_for_wake for wakeup GPEs during suspend-to-idle
Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails
Shuning Zhang <[email protected]>
ocfs2: fix ocfs2 read inode data panic in ocfs2_iget
Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
hugetlb: use same fault hash key for shared and private mappings
Kai Shen <[email protected]>
mm/hugetlb.c: don't put_page in lock of hugetlb_lock
Dan Williams <[email protected]>
mm/huge_memory: fix vmf_insert_pfn_{pmd, pud}() crash, handle unaligned addresses
Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
mm/mincore.c: make mincore() more conservative
Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - handle tee fips error during power management resume
Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - add function to handle cryptocell tee fips error
Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN should be the last CC access during suspend
Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - pm resume first enable the source clk
Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - don't map AEAD key and IV on stack
Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - use correct internal state sizes for export
Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - don't map MAC key on stack
Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - fix mem leak on error path
Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - remove special handling of chained sg
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf, arm64: remove prefetch insn in xadd mapping
Libin Yang <[email protected]>
ASoC: codec: hdac_hdmi add device_link to card device
S.j. Wang <[email protected]>
ASoC: fsl_esai: Fix missing break in switch statement
Curtis Malainey <[email protected]>
ASoC: RT5677-SPI: Disable 16Bit SPI Transfers
Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
ASoC: max98090: Fix restore of DAPM Muxes
Jeremy Soller <[email protected]>
ALSA: hdea/realtek - Headset fixup for System76 Gazelle (gaze14)
Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - EAPD turn on later
Hui Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/hdmi - Consider eld_valid when reporting jack event
Hui Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/hdmi - Read the pin sense from register when repolling
Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix a memory leak bug
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: line6: toneport: Fix broken usage of timer for delayed execution
Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
mmc: sdhci-pci: Fix BYT OCP setting
Raul E Rangel <[email protected]>
mmc: core: Fix tag set memory leak
Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
mmc: tegra: fix ddr signaling for non-ddr modes
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: arm/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
crypto: caam/qi2 - generate hash keys in-place
Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
crypto: caam/qi2 - fix DMA mapping of stack memory
Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
crypto: caam/qi2 - fix zero-length buffer DMA mapping
Zhang Zhijie <[email protected]>
crypto: rockchip - update IV buffer to contain the next IV
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: gcm - fix incompatibility between "gcm" and "gcm_base"
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/gcm-aes-ce - fix no-NEON fallback code
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: x86/crct10dif-pcl - fix use via crypto_shash_digest()
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: crct10dif-generic - fix use via crypto_shash_digest()
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: skcipher - don't WARN on unprocessed data after slow walk step
Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
crypto: vmx - fix copy-paste error in CTR mode
Singh, Brijesh <[email protected]>
crypto: ccp - Do not free psp_master when PLATFORM_INIT fails
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - set cra_name correctly
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: chacha-generic - fix use as arm64 no-NEON fallback
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: lrw - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: salsa20 - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
crypto: crypto4xx - fix cfb and ofb "overran dst buffer" issues
Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV
Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
x86/MCE/AMD: Don't report L1 BTB MCA errors on some family 17h models
Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
x86/MCE: Group AMD function prototypes in <asm/mce.h>
Shirish S <[email protected]>
x86/MCE/AMD: Carve out the MC4_MISC thresholding quirk
Shirish S <[email protected]>
x86/MCE/AMD: Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding on all family 0x15 models
Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
x86/MCE: Add an MCE-record filtering function
Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
sched/x86: Save [ER]FLAGS on context switch
Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
arm64: Save and restore OSDLR_EL1 across suspend/resume
Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
arm64: Clear OSDLR_EL1 on CPU boot
Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
arm64: compat: Reduce address limit
Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: arch_timer: Ensure counter register reads occur with seqlock held
Boyang Zhou <[email protected]>
arm64: mmap: Ensure file offset is treated as unsigned
Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
power: supply: axp288_fuel_gauge: Add ACEPC T8 and T11 mini PCs to the blacklist
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
power: supply: axp288_charger: Fix unchecked return value
Wen Yang <[email protected]>
ARM: exynos: Fix a leaked reference by adding missing of_node_put
Christoph Muellner <[email protected]>
mmc: sdhci-of-arasan: Add DTS property to disable DCMDs.
Sylwester Nawrocki <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: exynos: Fix audio (microphone) routing on Odroid XU3
Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: exynos: Fix interrupt for shared EINTs on Exynos5260
Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: qcom: ipq4019: enlarge PCIe BAR range
Christoph Muellner <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: rockchip: Disable DCMDs on RK3399's eMMC controller.
Katsuhiro Suzuki <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: rockchip: fix IO domain voltage setting of APIO5 on rockpro64
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
objtool: Fix function fallthrough detection
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/speculation/mds: Improve CPU buffer clear documentation
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
x86/speculation/mds: Revert CPU buffer clear on double fault exit
Waiman Long <[email protected]>
locking/rwsem: Prevent decrement of reader count before increment
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 44 +--
Makefile | 6 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi | 2 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi | 2 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/qcom-ipq4019.dtsi | 4 +-
arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 +
arch/arm/mach-exynos/firmware.c | 1 +
arch/arm/mach-exynos/suspend.c | 2 +
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-rockpro64.dts | 2 +-
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi | 1 +
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 +
arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c | 10 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h | 33 ++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 8 +
arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gettimeofday.S | 15 +-
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 34 +--
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h | 6 -
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 -
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 79 ++++--
arch/s390/mm/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/s390/mm/gup.c | 300 ---------------------
arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pclmul_glue.c | 13 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 +
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h | 25 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c | 62 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 38 +--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/genpool.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h | 9 +
arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 7 +
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 +
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 8 -
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 37 ++-
arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c | 8 +-
arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 12 +-
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c | 7 +-
arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h | 4 +-
crypto/ccm.c | 44 ++-
crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 4 +-
crypto/chacha_generic.c | 2 +-
crypto/crct10dif_generic.c | 11 +-
crypto/gcm.c | 34 +--
crypto/lrw.c | 4 +-
crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 2 +-
crypto/skcipher.c | 9 +-
drivers/acpi/sleep.c | 4 +
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 6 +-
drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_alg.c | 12 +-
drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c | 31 ++-
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c | 177 ++++++------
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.h | 2 -
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c | 11 +-
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c | 113 +++-----
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h | 1 +
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_fips.c | 23 +-
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_fips.h | 2 +
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c | 28 +-
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_ivgen.c | 9 +-
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c | 9 +-
drivers/crypto/rockchip/rk3288_crypto_ablkcipher.c | 25 +-
drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl | 4 +-
drivers/dax/device.c | 6 +-
drivers/edac/mce_amd.c | 4 +-
drivers/md/bcache/journal.c | 11 +-
drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 2 +-
drivers/mmc/core/queue.c | 1 +
drivers/mmc/host/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-arasan.c | 5 +-
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-core.c | 96 +++++++
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-tegra.c | 1 +
drivers/mtd/maps/Kconfig | 2 +-
drivers/mtd/maps/physmap-core.c | 2 +
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/intel-spi.c | 8 +
drivers/nvdimm/label.c | 29 +-
drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c | 15 ++
drivers/nvdimm/nd.h | 4 +
drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c | 4 +
drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c | 20 ++
drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_riscv_sbi.c | 1 -
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 33 ++-
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 -
fs/btrfs/backref.c | 34 ++-
fs/btrfs/ctree.c | 10 +
fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 6 +
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 27 +-
fs/btrfs/disk-io.h | 3 +
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 25 +-
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 19 +-
fs/btrfs/send.c | 62 +++++
fs/dax.c | 6 +-
fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 54 ++++
fs/ext4/ext4.h | 6 +-
fs/ext4/extents.c | 17 +-
fs/ext4/file.c | 7 +
fs/ext4/inode.c | 7 +-
fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 2 +-
fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 2 +-
fs/ext4/namei.c | 5 +-
fs/ext4/resize.c | 1 +
fs/ext4/super.c | 63 +++--
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 2 +-
fs/fs-writeback.c | 11 +-
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 7 +-
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 53 ++--
fs/jbd2/revoke.c | 32 ++-
fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 8 +-
fs/ocfs2/export.c | 30 ++-
include/linux/huge_mm.h | 6 +-
include/linux/hugetlb.h | 4 +-
include/linux/jbd2.h | 8 +-
include/linux/mfd/da9063/registers.h | 6 +-
include/linux/mfd/max77620.h | 4 +-
kernel/fork.c | 31 ++-
kernel/locking/rwsem-xadd.c | 44 ++-
lib/iov_iter.c | 17 +-
mm/huge_memory.c | 16 +-
mm/hugetlb.c | 25 +-
mm/mincore.c | 23 +-
mm/userfaultfd.c | 3 +-
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 11 +-
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 68 +++--
sound/soc/codecs/hdac_hdmi.c | 11 +
sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c | 12 +-
sound/soc/codecs/rt5677-spi.c | 35 ++-
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_esai.c | 2 +-
sound/usb/line6/toneport.c | 16 +-
sound/usb/mixer.c | 2 +
tools/objtool/check.c | 3 +-
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +-
136 files changed, 1421 insertions(+), 1053 deletions(-)
From: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
commit 607ca3bd220f4022e6f5356026b19dafc363863a upstream.
Let EAPD turn on after set pin output.
[ NOTE: This change is supposed to reduce the possible click noises at
(runtime) PM resume. The functionality should be same (i.e. the
verbs are executed correctly) no matter which order is, so this
should be safe to apply for all codecs -- tiwai ]
Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -803,11 +803,10 @@ static int alc_init(struct hda_codec *co
if (spec->init_hook)
spec->init_hook(codec);
+ snd_hda_gen_init(codec);
alc_fix_pll(codec);
alc_auto_init_amp(codec, spec->init_amp);
- snd_hda_gen_init(codec);
-
snd_hda_apply_fixup(codec, HDA_FIXUP_ACT_INIT);
return 0;
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit aec286cd36eacfd797e3d5dab8d5d23c15d1bb5e upstream.
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
Fix this in the LRW template by checking the return value of
skcipher_walk_virt().
This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation. When the extra
self-tests were run on a KASAN-enabled kernel, a KASAN use-after-free
splat occured during lrw(aes) testing.
Fixes: c778f96bf347 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.20+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/lrw.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypto/lrw.c
+++ b/crypto/lrw.c
@@ -162,8 +162,10 @@ static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_req
}
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, req, false);
- iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
counter[0] = be32_to_cpu(iv[3]);
counter[1] = be32_to_cpu(iv[2]);
counter[2] = be32_to_cpu(iv[1]);
From: S.j. Wang <[email protected]>
commit 903c220b1ece12f17c868e43f2243b8f81ff2d4c upstream.
case ESAI_HCKT_EXTAL and case ESAI_HCKR_EXTAL should be
independent of each other, so replace fall-through with break.
Fixes: 43d24e76b698 ("ASoC: fsl_esai: Add ESAI CPU DAI driver")
Signed-off-by: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_esai.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_esai.c
+++ b/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_esai.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static int fsl_esai_set_dai_sysclk(struc
break;
case ESAI_HCKT_EXTAL:
ecr |= ESAI_ECR_ETI;
- /* fall through */
+ break;
case ESAI_HCKR_EXTAL:
ecr |= ESAI_ECR_ERI;
break;
From: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
commit 827a108e354db633698f0b4a10c1ffd2b1f8d1d0 upstream.
When the CPU comes out of suspend, the firmware may have modified the OS
Double Lock Register. Save it in an unused slot of cpu_suspend_ctx, and
restore it on resume.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 34 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S
@@ -76,24 +76,25 @@ ENTRY(cpu_do_suspend)
mrs x2, tpidr_el0
mrs x3, tpidrro_el0
mrs x4, contextidr_el1
- mrs x5, cpacr_el1
- mrs x6, tcr_el1
- mrs x7, vbar_el1
- mrs x8, mdscr_el1
- mrs x9, oslsr_el1
- mrs x10, sctlr_el1
+ mrs x5, osdlr_el1
+ mrs x6, cpacr_el1
+ mrs x7, tcr_el1
+ mrs x8, vbar_el1
+ mrs x9, mdscr_el1
+ mrs x10, oslsr_el1
+ mrs x11, sctlr_el1
alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN
- mrs x11, tpidr_el1
+ mrs x12, tpidr_el1
alternative_else
- mrs x11, tpidr_el2
+ mrs x12, tpidr_el2
alternative_endif
- mrs x12, sp_el0
+ mrs x13, sp_el0
stp x2, x3, [x0]
- stp x4, xzr, [x0, #16]
- stp x5, x6, [x0, #32]
- stp x7, x8, [x0, #48]
- stp x9, x10, [x0, #64]
- stp x11, x12, [x0, #80]
+ stp x4, x5, [x0, #16]
+ stp x6, x7, [x0, #32]
+ stp x8, x9, [x0, #48]
+ stp x10, x11, [x0, #64]
+ stp x12, x13, [x0, #80]
ret
ENDPROC(cpu_do_suspend)
@@ -116,8 +117,8 @@ ENTRY(cpu_do_resume)
msr cpacr_el1, x6
/* Don't change t0sz here, mask those bits when restoring */
- mrs x5, tcr_el1
- bfi x8, x5, TCR_T0SZ_OFFSET, TCR_TxSZ_WIDTH
+ mrs x7, tcr_el1
+ bfi x8, x7, TCR_T0SZ_OFFSET, TCR_TxSZ_WIDTH
msr tcr_el1, x8
msr vbar_el1, x9
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ alternative_endif
/*
* Restore oslsr_el1 by writing oslar_el1
*/
+ msr osdlr_el1, x5
ubfx x11, x11, #1, #1
msr oslar_el1, x11
reset_pmuserenr_el0 x0 // Disable PMU access from EL0
From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
commit 6690e86be83ac75832e461c141055b5d601c0a6d upstream.
Effectively reverts commit:
2c7577a75837 ("sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch")
Specifically because SMAP uses FLAGS.AC which invalidates the claim
that the kernel has clean flags.
In particular; while preemption from interrupt return is fine (the
IRET frame on the exception stack contains FLAGS) it breaks any code
that does synchonous scheduling, including preempt_enable().
This has become a significant issue ever since commit:
5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses")
provided for means of having 'normal' C code between STAC / CLAC,
exposing the FLAGS.AC state. So far this hasn't led to trouble,
however fix it before it comes apart.
Reported-by: Julien Thierry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 ++++++++
5 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -650,6 +650,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
pushl %ebx
pushl %edi
pushl %esi
+ pushfl
/* switch stack */
movl %esp, TASK_threadsp(%eax)
@@ -672,6 +673,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
+ popfl
popl %esi
popl %edi
popl %ebx
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
pushq %r13
pushq %r14
pushq %r15
+ pushfq
/* switch stack */
movq %rsp, TASK_threadsp(%rdi)
@@ -313,6 +314,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
+ popfq
popq %r15
popq %r14
popq %r13
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void);
* order of the fields must match the code in __switch_to_asm().
*/
struct inactive_task_frame {
+ unsigned long flags;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
unsigned long r15;
unsigned long r14;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
@@ -127,6 +127,13 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_
struct task_struct *tsk;
int err;
+ /*
+ * For a new task use the RESET flags value since there is no before.
+ * All the status flags are zero; DF and all the system flags must also
+ * be 0, specifically IF must be 0 because we context switch to the new
+ * task with interrupts disabled.
+ */
+ frame->flags = X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
frame->bp = 0;
frame->ret_addr = (unsigned long) ret_from_fork;
p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) fork_frame;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -392,6 +392,14 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_
childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
fork_frame = container_of(childregs, struct fork_frame, regs);
frame = &fork_frame->frame;
+
+ /*
+ * For a new task use the RESET flags value since there is no before.
+ * All the status flags are zero; DF and all the system flags must also
+ * be 0, specifically IF must be 0 because we context switch to the new
+ * task with interrupts disabled.
+ */
+ frame->flags = X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
frame->bp = 0;
frame->ret_addr = (unsigned long) ret_from_fork;
p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) fork_frame;
From: Shuning Zhang <[email protected]>
commit e091eab028f9253eac5c04f9141bbc9d170acab3 upstream.
In some cases, ocfs2_iget() reads the data of inode, which has been
deleted for some reason. That will make the system panic. So We should
judge whether this inode has been deleted, and tell the caller that the
inode is a bad inode.
For example, the ocfs2 is used as the backed of nfs, and the client is
nfsv3. This issue can be reproduced by the following steps.
on the nfs server side,
..../patha/pathb
Step 1: The process A was scheduled before calling the function fh_verify.
Step 2: The process B is removing the 'pathb', and just completed the call
to function dput. Then the dentry of 'pathb' has been deleted from the
dcache, and all ancestors have been deleted also. The relationship of
dentry and inode was deleted through the function hlist_del_init. The
following is the call stack.
dentry_iput->hlist_del_init(&dentry->d_u.d_alias)
At this time, the inode is still in the dcache.
Step 3: The process A call the function ocfs2_get_dentry, which get the
inode from dcache. Then the refcount of inode is 1. The following is the
call stack.
nfsd3_proc_getacl->fh_verify->exportfs_decode_fh->fh_to_dentry(ocfs2_get_dentry)
Step 4: Dirty pages are flushed by bdi threads. So the inode of 'patha'
is evicted, and this directory was deleted. But the inode of 'pathb'
can't be evicted, because the refcount of the inode was 1.
Step 5: The process A keep running, and call the function
reconnect_path(in exportfs_decode_fh), which call function
ocfs2_get_parent of ocfs2. Get the block number of parent
directory(patha) by the name of ... Then read the data from disk by the
block number. But this inode has been deleted, so the system panic.
Process A Process B
1. in nfsd3_proc_getacl |
2. | dput
3. fh_to_dentry(ocfs2_get_dentry) |
4. bdi flush dirty cache |
5. ocfs2_iget |
[283465.542049] OCFS2: ERROR (device sdp): ocfs2_validate_inode_block:
Invalid dinode #580640: OCFS2_VALID_FL not set
[283465.545490] Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device sdp): panic forced
after error
[283465.546889] CPU: 5 PID: 12416 Comm: nfsd Tainted: G W
4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.bug28762940v3.x86_64 #2
[283465.548382] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX
Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 09/21/2015
[283465.549657] 0000000000000000 ffff8800a56fb7b8 ffffffff816e839c
ffffffffa0514758
[283465.550392] 000000000008dc20 ffff8800a56fb838 ffffffff816e62d3
0000000000000008
[283465.551056] ffff880000000010 ffff8800a56fb848 ffff8800a56fb7e8
ffff88005df9f000
[283465.551710] Call Trace:
[283465.552516] [<ffffffff816e839c>] dump_stack+0x63/0x81
[283465.553291] [<ffffffff816e62d3>] panic+0xcb/0x21b
[283465.554037] [<ffffffffa04e66b0>] ocfs2_handle_error+0xf0/0xf0 [ocfs2]
[283465.554882] [<ffffffffa04e7737>] __ocfs2_error+0x67/0x70 [ocfs2]
[283465.555768] [<ffffffffa049c0f9>] ocfs2_validate_inode_block+0x229/0x230
[ocfs2]
[283465.556683] [<ffffffffa047bcbc>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x46c/0x7b0 [ocfs2]
[283465.557408] [<ffffffffa049bed0>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x20/0x20
[ocfs2]
[283465.557973] [<ffffffffa049f0eb>] ocfs2_read_inode_block_full+0x3b/0x60
[ocfs2]
[283465.558525] [<ffffffffa049f5ba>] ocfs2_iget+0x4aa/0x880 [ocfs2]
[283465.559082] [<ffffffffa049146e>] ocfs2_get_parent+0x9e/0x220 [ocfs2]
[283465.559622] [<ffffffff81297c05>] reconnect_path+0xb5/0x300
[283465.560156] [<ffffffff81297f46>] exportfs_decode_fh+0xf6/0x2b0
[283465.560708] [<ffffffffa062faf0>] ? nfsd_proc_getattr+0xa0/0xa0 [nfsd]
[283465.561262] [<ffffffff810a8196>] ? prepare_creds+0x26/0x110
[283465.561932] [<ffffffffa0630860>] fh_verify+0x350/0x660 [nfsd]
[283465.562862] [<ffffffffa0637804>] ? nfsd_cache_lookup+0x44/0x630 [nfsd]
[283465.563697] [<ffffffffa063a8b9>] nfsd3_proc_getattr+0x69/0xf0 [nfsd]
[283465.564510] [<ffffffffa062cf60>] nfsd_dispatch+0xe0/0x290 [nfsd]
[283465.565358] [<ffffffffa05eb892>] ? svc_tcp_adjust_wspace+0x12/0x30
[sunrpc]
[283465.566272] [<ffffffffa05ea652>] svc_process_common+0x412/0x6a0 [sunrpc]
[283465.567155] [<ffffffffa05eaa03>] svc_process+0x123/0x210 [sunrpc]
[283465.568020] [<ffffffffa062c90f>] nfsd+0xff/0x170 [nfsd]
[283465.568962] [<ffffffffa062c810>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x80/0x80 [nfsd]
[283465.570112] [<ffffffff810a622b>] kthread+0xcb/0xf0
[283465.571099] [<ffffffff810a6160>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
[283465.572114] [<ffffffff816f11b8>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
[283465.573156] [<ffffffff810a6160>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Shuning Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: piaojun <[email protected]>
Cc: "Gang He" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ocfs2/export.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ocfs2/export.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/export.c
@@ -148,16 +148,24 @@ static struct dentry *ocfs2_get_parent(s
u64 blkno;
struct dentry *parent;
struct inode *dir = d_inode(child);
+ int set;
trace_ocfs2_get_parent(child, child->d_name.len, child->d_name.name,
(unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(dir)->ip_blkno);
+ status = ocfs2_nfs_sync_lock(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb), 1);
+ if (status < 0) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "getting nfs sync lock(EX) failed %d\n", status);
+ parent = ERR_PTR(status);
+ goto bail;
+ }
+
status = ocfs2_inode_lock(dir, NULL, 0);
if (status < 0) {
if (status != -ENOENT)
mlog_errno(status);
parent = ERR_PTR(status);
- goto bail;
+ goto unlock_nfs_sync;
}
status = ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name(dir, "..", 2, &blkno);
@@ -166,11 +174,31 @@ static struct dentry *ocfs2_get_parent(s
goto bail_unlock;
}
+ status = ocfs2_test_inode_bit(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb), blkno, &set);
+ if (status < 0) {
+ if (status == -EINVAL) {
+ status = -ESTALE;
+ } else
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "test inode bit failed %d\n", status);
+ parent = ERR_PTR(status);
+ goto bail_unlock;
+ }
+
+ trace_ocfs2_get_dentry_test_bit(status, set);
+ if (!set) {
+ status = -ESTALE;
+ parent = ERR_PTR(status);
+ goto bail_unlock;
+ }
+
parent = d_obtain_alias(ocfs2_iget(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb), blkno, 0, 0));
bail_unlock:
ocfs2_inode_unlock(dir, 0);
+unlock_nfs_sync:
+ ocfs2_nfs_sync_unlock(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb), 1);
+
bail:
trace_ocfs2_get_parent_end(parent);
From: Rajat Jain <[email protected]>
commit 2f844b61db8297a1f7a06adf2eb5c43381f2c183 upstream.
I noticed that recently multiple systems (chromebooks) couldn't wake
from S0ix using LID or Keyboard after updating to a newer kernel. I
bisected and it turned up commit f941d3e41da7 ("ACPI: EC / PM: Disable
non-wakeup GPEs for suspend-to-idle"). I checked that the issue got
fixed if that commit was reverted.
I debugged and found that although PNP0C0D:00 (representing the LID)
is wake capable and should wakeup the system per the code in
acpi_wakeup_gpe_init() and in drivers/acpi/button.c:
localhost /sys # cat /proc/acpi/wakeup
Device S-state Status Sysfs node
LID0 S4 *enabled platform:PNP0C0D:00
CREC S5 *disabled platform:GOOG0004:00
*disabled platform:cros-ec-dev.1.auto
*disabled platform:cros-ec-accel.0
*disabled platform:cros-ec-accel.1
*disabled platform:cros-ec-gyro.0
*disabled platform:cros-ec-ring.0
*disabled platform:cros-usbpd-charger.2.auto
*disabled platform:cros-usbpd-logger.3.auto
D015 S3 *enabled i2c:i2c-ELAN0000:00
PENH S3 *enabled platform:PRP0001:00
XHCI S3 *enabled pci:0000:00:14.0
GLAN S4 *disabled
WIFI S3 *disabled pci:0000:00:14.3
localhost /sys #
On debugging, I found that its corresponding GPE is not being enabled.
The particular GPE's "gpe_register_info->enable_for_wake" does not
have any bits set when acpi_enable_all_wakeup_gpes() comes around to
use it. I looked at code and could not find any other code path that
should set the bits in "enable_for_wake" bitmask for the wake enabled
devices for s2idle. [I do see that it happens for S3 in
acpi_sleep_prepare()].
Thus I used the same call to enable the GPEs for wake enabled devices,
and verified that this fixes the regression I was seeing on multiple
of my devices.
[ rjw: The problem is that commit f941d3e41da7 ("ACPI: EC / PM:
Disable non-wakeup GPEs for suspend-to-idle") forgot to add
the acpi_enable_wakeup_devices() call for s2idle along with
acpi_enable_all_wakeup_gpes(). ]
Fixes: f941d3e41da7 ("ACPI: EC / PM: Disable non-wakeup GPEs for suspend-to-idle")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203579
Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain <[email protected]>
[ rjw: Subject & changelog ]
Cc: 5.0+ <[email protected]> # 5.0+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/acpi/sleep.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/acpi/sleep.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/sleep.c
@@ -977,6 +977,8 @@ static int acpi_s2idle_prepare(void)
if (acpi_sci_irq_valid())
enable_irq_wake(acpi_sci_irq);
+ acpi_enable_wakeup_devices(ACPI_STATE_S0);
+
/* Change the configuration of GPEs to avoid spurious wakeup. */
acpi_enable_all_wakeup_gpes();
acpi_os_wait_events_complete();
@@ -1027,6 +1029,8 @@ static void acpi_s2idle_restore(void)
{
acpi_enable_all_runtime_gpes();
+ acpi_disable_wakeup_devices(ACPI_STATE_S0);
+
if (acpi_sci_irq_valid())
disable_irq_wake(acpi_sci_irq);
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 7f84ff68be05ec7a5d2acf8fdc734fe5897af48f upstream.
The line6 toneport driver has code for some delayed initialization,
and this hits the kernel Oops because mutex and other sleepable
functions are used in the timer callback. Fix the abuse by a delayed
work instead so that everything works gracefully.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/usb/line6/toneport.c | 16 +++++++++-------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/usb/line6/toneport.c
+++ b/sound/usb/line6/toneport.c
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ struct usb_line6_toneport {
/* Firmware version (x 100) */
u8 firmware_version;
- /* Timer for delayed PCM startup */
- struct timer_list timer;
+ /* Work for delayed PCM startup */
+ struct delayed_work pcm_work;
/* Device type */
enum line6_device_type type;
@@ -241,9 +241,10 @@ static int snd_toneport_source_put(struc
return 1;
}
-static void toneport_start_pcm(struct timer_list *t)
+static void toneport_start_pcm(struct work_struct *work)
{
- struct usb_line6_toneport *toneport = from_timer(toneport, t, timer);
+ struct usb_line6_toneport *toneport =
+ container_of(work, struct usb_line6_toneport, pcm_work.work);
struct usb_line6 *line6 = &toneport->line6;
line6_pcm_acquire(line6->line6pcm, LINE6_STREAM_MONITOR, true);
@@ -393,7 +394,8 @@ static int toneport_setup(struct usb_lin
if (toneport_has_led(toneport))
toneport_update_led(toneport);
- mod_timer(&toneport->timer, jiffies + TONEPORT_PCM_DELAY * HZ);
+ schedule_delayed_work(&toneport->pcm_work,
+ msecs_to_jiffies(TONEPORT_PCM_DELAY * 1000));
return 0;
}
@@ -405,7 +407,7 @@ static void line6_toneport_disconnect(st
struct usb_line6_toneport *toneport =
(struct usb_line6_toneport *)line6;
- del_timer_sync(&toneport->timer);
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&toneport->pcm_work);
if (toneport_has_led(toneport))
toneport_remove_leds(toneport);
@@ -422,7 +424,7 @@ static int toneport_init(struct usb_line
struct usb_line6_toneport *toneport = (struct usb_line6_toneport *) line6;
toneport->type = id->driver_info;
- timer_setup(&toneport->timer, toneport_start_pcm, 0);
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&toneport->pcm_work, toneport_start_pcm);
line6->disconnect = line6_toneport_disconnect;
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit e5d01196c0428a206f307e9ee5f6842964098ff0 upstream.
In other places in fs/ext4/xattr.c, if e_value_inum is non-zero, the
code ignores the value in e_value_offs. The e_value_offs *should* be
zero, but we shouldn't depend upon it, since it might not be true in a
corrupted/fuzzed file system.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202897
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202877
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -1696,7 +1696,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct e
/* No failures allowed past this point. */
- if (!s->not_found && here->e_value_size && here->e_value_offs) {
+ if (!s->not_found && here->e_value_size && !here->e_value_inum) {
/* Remove the old value. */
void *first_val = s->base + min_offs;
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
From: Debabrata Banerjee <[email protected]>
commit 50b29d8f033a7c88c5bc011abc2068b1691ab755 upstream.
Instead of removing EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM from s_def_mount_opt as
I assume was intended, all other options were blown away leading to
_ext4_show_options() output being incorrect.
Fixes: 1e381f60dad9 ("ext4: do not allow journal_opts for fs w/o journal")
Signed-off-by: Debabrata Banerjee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -4270,7 +4270,7 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_
"data=, fs mounted w/o journal");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
- sbi->s_def_mount_opt &= EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM;
+ sbi->s_def_mount_opt &= ~EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM;
clear_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
From: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
commit 537f38f019fa0b762dbb4c0fc95d7fcce9db8e2d upstream.
If a an eb fails to be read for whatever reason - it's corrupted on disk
and parent transid/key validations fail or IO for eb pages fail then
this buffer must be removed from the buffer cache. Currently the code
calls free_extent_buffer if an error occurs. Unfortunately this doesn't
achieve the desired behavior since btrfs_find_create_tree_block returns
with eb->refs == 2.
On the other hand free_extent_buffer will only decrement the refs once
leaving it added to the buffer cache radix tree. This enables later
code to look up the buffer from the cache and utilize it potentially
leading to a crash.
The correct way to free the buffer is call free_extent_buffer_stale.
This function will correctly call atomic_dec explicitly for the buffer
and subsequently call release_extent_buffer which will decrement the
final reference thus correctly remove the invalid buffer from buffer
cache. This change affects only newly allocated buffers since they have
eb->refs == 2.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202755
Reported-by: Jungyeon <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected] # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 17 +++++++++++------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -1017,13 +1017,18 @@ void readahead_tree_block(struct btrfs_f
{
struct extent_buffer *buf = NULL;
struct inode *btree_inode = fs_info->btree_inode;
+ int ret;
buf = btrfs_find_create_tree_block(fs_info, bytenr);
if (IS_ERR(buf))
return;
- read_extent_buffer_pages(&BTRFS_I(btree_inode)->io_tree,
- buf, WAIT_NONE, 0);
- free_extent_buffer(buf);
+
+ ret = read_extent_buffer_pages(&BTRFS_I(btree_inode)->io_tree, buf,
+ WAIT_NONE, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ free_extent_buffer_stale(buf);
+ else
+ free_extent_buffer(buf);
}
int reada_tree_block_flagged(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 bytenr,
@@ -1043,12 +1048,12 @@ int reada_tree_block_flagged(struct btrf
ret = read_extent_buffer_pages(io_tree, buf, WAIT_PAGE_LOCK,
mirror_num);
if (ret) {
- free_extent_buffer(buf);
+ free_extent_buffer_stale(buf);
return ret;
}
if (test_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &buf->bflags)) {
- free_extent_buffer(buf);
+ free_extent_buffer_stale(buf);
return -EIO;
} else if (extent_buffer_uptodate(buf)) {
*eb = buf;
@@ -1102,7 +1107,7 @@ struct extent_buffer *read_tree_block(st
ret = btree_read_extent_buffer_pages(fs_info, buf, parent_transid,
level, first_key);
if (ret) {
- free_extent_buffer(buf);
+ free_extent_buffer_stale(buf);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
return buf;
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
commit 134fca9063ad4851de767d1768180e5dede9a881 upstream.
The semantics of what mincore() considers to be resident is not
completely clear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache".
That's potentially a problem, as that [in]directly exposes
meta-information about pagecache / memory mapping state even about
memory not strictly belonging to the process executing the syscall,
opening possibilities for sidechannel attacks.
Change the semantics of mincore() so that it only reveals pagecache
information for non-anonymous mappings that belog to files that the
calling process could (if it tried to) successfully open for writing;
otherwise we'd be including shared non-exclusive mappings, which
- is the sidechannel
- is not the usecase for mincore(), as that's primarily used for data,
not (shared) text
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: restructure can_do_mincore() conditions]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Josh Snyder <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Originally-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Originally-by: Dominique Martinet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Easton <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyril Hrubis <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Gruss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/mincore.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/mincore.c
+++ b/mm/mincore.c
@@ -169,6 +169,22 @@ out:
return 0;
}
+static inline bool can_do_mincore(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (vma_is_anonymous(vma))
+ return true;
+ if (!vma->vm_file)
+ return false;
+ /*
+ * Reveal pagecache information only for non-anonymous mappings that
+ * correspond to the files the calling process could (if tried) open
+ * for writing; otherwise we'd be including shared non-exclusive
+ * mappings, which opens a side channel.
+ */
+ return inode_owner_or_capable(file_inode(vma->vm_file)) ||
+ inode_permission(file_inode(vma->vm_file), MAY_WRITE) == 0;
+}
+
/*
* Do a chunk of "sys_mincore()". We've already checked
* all the arguments, we hold the mmap semaphore: we should
@@ -189,8 +205,13 @@ static long do_mincore(unsigned long add
vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
if (!vma || addr < vma->vm_start)
return -ENOMEM;
- mincore_walk.mm = vma->vm_mm;
end = min(vma->vm_end, addr + (pages << PAGE_SHIFT));
+ if (!can_do_mincore(vma)) {
+ unsigned long pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(end - addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ memset(vec, 1, pages);
+ return pages;
+ }
+ mincore_walk.mm = vma->vm_mm;
err = walk_page_range(addr, end, &mincore_walk);
if (err < 0)
return err;
From: Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
commit ec084de929e419e51bcdafaafe567d9e7d0273b7 upstream.
synchronize_rcu() didn't wait for call_rcu() callbacks, so inode wb
switch may not go to the workqueue after synchronize_rcu(). Thus
previous scheduled switches was not finished even flushing the
workqueue, which will cause a NULL pointer dereferenced followed below.
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of vdd. Self-destruct in 5 seconds. Have a nice day...
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000278
evict+0xb3/0x180
iput+0x1b0/0x230
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn+0x3c0/0x6a0
worker_thread+0x4e/0x490
? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
kthread+0xe6/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50
Replace the synchronize_rcu() call with a rcu_barrier() to wait for all
pending callbacks to finish. And inc isw_nr_in_flight after call_rcu()
in inode_switch_wbs() to make more sense.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/fs-writeback.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/fs-writeback.c
+++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c
@@ -523,8 +523,6 @@ static void inode_switch_wbs(struct inod
isw->inode = inode;
- atomic_inc(&isw_nr_in_flight);
-
/*
* In addition to synchronizing among switchers, I_WB_SWITCH tells
* the RCU protected stat update paths to grab the i_page
@@ -532,6 +530,9 @@ static void inode_switch_wbs(struct inod
* Let's continue after I_WB_SWITCH is guaranteed to be visible.
*/
call_rcu(&isw->rcu_head, inode_switch_wbs_rcu_fn);
+
+ atomic_inc(&isw_nr_in_flight);
+
goto out_unlock;
out_free:
@@ -901,7 +902,11 @@ restart:
void cgroup_writeback_umount(void)
{
if (atomic_read(&isw_nr_in_flight)) {
- synchronize_rcu();
+ /*
+ * Use rcu_barrier() to wait for all pending callbacks to
+ * ensure that all in-flight wb switches are in the workqueue.
+ */
+ rcu_barrier();
flush_workqueue(isw_wq);
}
}
From: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
commit e8662a6a5f8f7f2cadc0edb934aef622d96ac3ee upstream.
The AEAD authenc key and IVs might be passed to us on stack. Copy it to
a slab buffer before mapping to gurantee proper DMA mapping.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c | 11 ++++++++++-
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct cc
/* This function prepers the user key so it can pass to the hmac processing
* (copy to intenral buffer or hash in case of key longer than block
*/
-static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *authkey,
unsigned int keylen)
{
dma_addr_t key_dma_addr = 0;
@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct
unsigned int hashmode;
unsigned int idx = 0;
int rc = 0;
+ u8 *key = NULL;
struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ];
dma_addr_t padded_authkey_dma_addr =
ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr;
@@ -455,11 +456,17 @@ static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct
}
if (keylen != 0) {
+
+ key = kmemdup(authkey, keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
key_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, (void *)key, keylen,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, key_dma_addr)) {
dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
key, keylen);
+ kzfree(key);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (keylen > blocksize) {
@@ -542,6 +549,8 @@ static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct
if (key_dma_addr)
dma_unmap_single(dev, key_dma_addr, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ kzfree(key);
+
return rc;
}
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
@@ -560,6 +560,7 @@ void cc_unmap_aead_request(struct device
if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr) {
dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr,
hw_iv_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+ kzfree(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
}
/* Release pool */
@@ -664,19 +665,27 @@ static int cc_aead_chain_iv(struct cc_dr
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
unsigned int hw_iv_size = areq_ctx->hw_iv_size;
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
+ gfp_t flags = cc_gfp_flags(&req->base);
int rc = 0;
if (!req->iv) {
areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr = 0;
+ areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv = NULL;
goto chain_iv_exit;
}
- areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, req->iv,
- hw_iv_size,
- DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+ areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv = kmemdup(req->iv, hw_iv_size, flags);
+ if (!areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr =
+ dma_map_single(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv, hw_iv_size,
+ DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr)) {
dev_err(dev, "Mapping iv %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
hw_iv_size, req->iv);
+ kzfree(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
+ areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv = NULL;
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto chain_iv_exit;
}
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ struct cc_alg_template {
struct async_gen_req_ctx {
dma_addr_t iv_dma_addr;
+ u8 *iv;
enum drv_crypto_direction op_type;
};
From: Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
commit 742b06b5628f2cd23cb51a034cb54dc33c6162c5 upstream.
We hit a BUG at fs/buffer.c:3057 if we detached the nbd device
before unmounting ext4 filesystem.
The typical chain of events leading to the BUG:
jbd2_write_superblock
submit_bh
submit_bh_wbc
BUG_ON(!buffer_mapped(bh));
The block device is removed and all the pages are invalidated. JBD2
was trying to write journal superblock to the block device which is
no longer present.
Fix this by checking the journal superblock's buffer head prior to
submitting.
Reported-by: Eric Ren <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
@@ -1366,6 +1366,10 @@ static int jbd2_write_superblock(journal
journal_superblock_t *sb = journal->j_superblock;
int ret;
+ /* Buffer got discarded which means block device got invalidated */
+ if (!buffer_mapped(bh))
+ return -EIO;
+
trace_jbd2_write_superblock(journal, write_flags);
if (!(journal->j_flags & JBD2_BARRIER))
write_flags &= ~(REQ_FUA | REQ_PREFLUSH);
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 345c0dbf3a30872d9b204db96b5857cd00808cae upstream.
Add the blocks which belong to the journal inode to block_validity's
system zone so attempts to deallocate or overwrite the journal due a
corrupted file system where the journal blocks are also claimed by
another inode.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202879
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/ext4/inode.c | 4 +++
2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
@@ -137,6 +137,48 @@ static void debug_print_tree(struct ext4
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
}
+static int ext4_protect_reserved_inode(struct super_block *sb, u32 ino)
+{
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+ struct ext4_map_blocks map;
+ u32 i = 0, err = 0, num, n;
+
+ if ((ino < EXT4_ROOT_INO) ||
+ (ino > le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_inodes_count)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ inode = ext4_iget(sb, ino, EXT4_IGET_SPECIAL);
+ if (IS_ERR(inode))
+ return PTR_ERR(inode);
+ num = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+ while (i < num) {
+ map.m_lblk = i;
+ map.m_len = num - i;
+ n = ext4_map_blocks(NULL, inode, &map, 0);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ err = n;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (n == 0) {
+ i++;
+ } else {
+ if (!ext4_data_block_valid(sbi, map.m_pblk, n)) {
+ ext4_error(sb, "blocks %llu-%llu from inode %u "
+ "overlap system zone", map.m_pblk,
+ map.m_pblk + map.m_len - 1, ino);
+ err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ err = add_system_zone(sbi, map.m_pblk, n);
+ if (err < 0)
+ break;
+ i += n;
+ }
+ }
+ iput(inode);
+ return err;
+}
+
int ext4_setup_system_zone(struct super_block *sb)
{
ext4_group_t ngroups = ext4_get_groups_count(sb);
@@ -171,6 +213,12 @@ int ext4_setup_system_zone(struct super_
if (ret)
return ret;
}
+ if (ext4_has_feature_journal(sb) && sbi->s_es->s_journal_inum) {
+ ret = ext4_protect_reserved_inode(sb,
+ le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_journal_inum));
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG))
debug_print_tree(sbi);
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -399,6 +399,10 @@ static int __check_block_validity(struct
unsigned int line,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map)
{
+ if (ext4_has_feature_journal(inode->i_sb) &&
+ (inode->i_ino ==
+ le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+ return 0;
if (!ext4_data_block_valid(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), map->m_pblk,
map->m_len)) {
ext4_error_inode(inode, func, line, map->m_pblk,
From: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
commit d2f8ae0e4c5c754f1b2a7b8388d19a1a977e698a upstream.
syncconfig is responsible for keeping auto.conf up-to-date, so if it
fails for any reason, the build must be terminated immediately.
However, since commit 9390dff66a52 ("kbuild: invoke syncconfig if
include/config/auto.conf.cmd is missing"), Kbuild continues running
even after syncconfig fails.
You can confirm this by intentionally making syncconfig error out:
# diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c b/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
# index 08ba146..307b9de 100644
# --- a/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
# +++ b/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
# @@ -1023,6 +1023,9 @@ int conf_write_autoconf(int overwrite)
# FILE *out, *tristate, *out_h;
# int i;
#
# + if (overwrite)
# + return 1;
# +
# if (!overwrite && is_present(autoconf_name))
# return 0;
Then, syncconfig fails, but Make would not stop:
$ make -s mrproper allyesconfig defconfig
$ make
scripts/kconfig/conf --syncconfig Kconfig
*** Error during sync of the configuration.
make[2]: *** [scripts/kconfig/Makefile;69: syncconfig] Error 1
make[1]: *** [Makefile;557: syncconfig] Error 2
make: *** [include/config/auto.conf.cmd] Deleting file 'include/config/tristate.conf'
make: Failed to remake makefile 'include/config/auto.conf'.
SYSTBL arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_32.h
SYSHDR arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unistd_32_ia32.h
SYSHDR arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unistd_64_x32.h
SYSTBL arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h
[ continue running ... ]
The reason is in the behavior of a pattern rule with multi-targets.
%/auto.conf %/auto.conf.cmd %/tristate.conf: $(KCONFIG_CONFIG)
$(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile syncconfig
GNU Make knows this rule is responsible for making all the three files
simultaneously. As far as examined, auto.conf.cmd is the target in
question when this rule is invoked. It is probably because auto.conf.cmd
is included below the inclusion of auto.conf.
The inclusion of auto.conf is mandatory, while that of auto.conf.cmd
is optional. GNU Make does not care about the failure in the process
of updating optional include files.
I filed this issue (https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?56301) in case this
behavior could be improved somehow in future releases of GNU Make.
Anyway, it is quite easy to fix our Makefile.
Given that auto.conf is already a mandatory include file, there is no
reason to stick auto.conf.cmd optional. Make it mandatory as well.
Cc: linux-stable <[email protected]> # 5.0+
Fixes: 9390dff66a52 ("kbuild: invoke syncconfig if include/config/auto.conf.cmd is missing")
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
[commented out diff above to keep patch happy - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
Makefile | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ ifeq ($(may-sync-config),1)
# Read in dependencies to all Kconfig* files, make sure to run syncconfig if
# changes are detected. This should be included after arch/$(SRCARCH)/Makefile
# because some architectures define CROSS_COMPILE there.
--include include/config/auto.conf.cmd
+include include/config/auto.conf.cmd
# To avoid any implicit rule to kick in, define an empty command
$(KCONFIG_CONFIG): ;
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 6daef95b8c914866a46247232a048447fff97279 upstream.
Avoid cache line miss dereferencing struct page if we can.
page_copy_sane() mostly deals with order-0 pages.
Extra cache line miss is visible on TCP recvmsg() calls dealing
with GRO packets (typically 45 page frags are attached to one skb).
Bringing the 45 struct pages into cpu cache while copying the data
is not free, since the freeing of the skb (and associated
page frags put_page()) can happen after cache lines have been evicted.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
lib/iov_iter.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/lib/iov_iter.c
+++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
@@ -861,8 +861,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_iter_full_nocac
static inline bool page_copy_sane(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t n)
{
- struct page *head = compound_head(page);
- size_t v = n + offset + page_address(page) - page_address(head);
+ struct page *head;
+ size_t v = n + offset;
+
+ /*
+ * The general case needs to access the page order in order
+ * to compute the page size.
+ * However, we mostly deal with order-0 pages and thus can
+ * avoid a possible cache line miss for requests that fit all
+ * page orders.
+ */
+ if (n <= v && v <= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return true;
+
+ head = compound_head(page);
+ v += (page - head) << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (likely(n <= v && v <= (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(head))))
return true;
From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
commit 448de471cd4cab0cedd15770082567a69a784a11 upstream.
[BUG]
When reading a file from a fuzzed image, kernel can panic like:
BTRFS warning (device loop0): csum failed root 5 ino 270 off 0 csum 0x98f94189 expected csum 0x00000000 mirror 1
assertion failed: !memcmp_extent_buffer(b, &disk_key, offsetof(struct btrfs_leaf, items[0].key), sizeof(disk_key)), file: fs/btrfs/ctree.c, line: 2544
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3500!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:btrfs_search_slot.cold.24+0x61/0x63 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
btrfs_lookup_csum+0x52/0x150 [btrfs]
__btrfs_lookup_bio_sums+0x209/0x640 [btrfs]
btrfs_submit_bio_hook+0x103/0x170 [btrfs]
submit_one_bio+0x59/0x80 [btrfs]
extent_read_full_page+0x58/0x80 [btrfs]
generic_file_read_iter+0x2f6/0x9d0
__vfs_read+0x14d/0x1a0
vfs_read+0x8d/0x140
ksys_read+0x52/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[CAUSE]
The fuzzed image has a corrupted leaf whose first key doesn't match its
parent:
checksum tree key (CSUM_TREE ROOT_ITEM 0)
node 29741056 level 1 items 14 free 107 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE
fs uuid 3381d111-94a3-4ac7-8f39-611bbbdab7e6
chunk uuid 9af1c3c7-2af5-488b-8553-530bd515f14c
...
key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 79691776) block 29761536 gen 19
leaf 29761536 items 1 free space 1726 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE
leaf 29761536 flags 0x1(WRITTEN) backref revision 1
fs uuid 3381d111-94a3-4ac7-8f39-611bbbdab7e6
chunk uuid 9af1c3c7-2af5-488b-8553-530bd515f14c
item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 8798638964736) itemoff 1751 itemsize 2244
range start 8798638964736 end 8798641262592 length 2297856
When reading the above tree block, we have extent_buffer->refs = 2 in
the context:
- initial one from __alloc_extent_buffer()
alloc_extent_buffer()
|- __alloc_extent_buffer()
|- atomic_set(&eb->refs, 1)
- one being added to fs_info->buffer_radix
alloc_extent_buffer()
|- check_buffer_tree_ref()
|- atomic_inc(&eb->refs)
So if even we call free_extent_buffer() in read_tree_block or other
similar situation, we only decrease the refs by 1, it doesn't reach 0
and won't be freed right now.
The staled eb and its corrupted content will still be kept cached.
Furthermore, we have several extra cases where we either don't do first
key check or the check is not proper for all callers:
- scrub
We just don't have first key in this context.
- shared tree block
One tree block can be shared by several snapshot/subvolume trees.
In that case, the first key check for one subvolume doesn't apply to
another.
So for the above reasons, a corrupted extent buffer can sneak into the
buffer cache.
[FIX]
Call verify_level_key in read_block_for_search to do another
verification. For that purpose the function is exported.
Due to above reasons, although we can free corrupted extent buffer from
cache, we still need the check in read_block_for_search(), for scrub and
shared tree blocks.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202755
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202757
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202759
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202761
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202767
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202769
Reported-by: Yoon Jungyeon <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected] # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/ctree.c | 10 ++++++++++
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 10 +++++-----
fs/btrfs/disk-io.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
@@ -2401,6 +2401,16 @@ read_block_for_search(struct btrfs_root
if (tmp) {
/* first we do an atomic uptodate check */
if (btrfs_buffer_uptodate(tmp, gen, 1) > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Do extra check for first_key, eb can be stale due to
+ * being cached, read from scrub, or have multiple
+ * parents (shared tree blocks).
+ */
+ if (btrfs_verify_level_key(fs_info, tmp,
+ parent_level - 1, &first_key, gen)) {
+ free_extent_buffer(tmp);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
*eb_ret = tmp;
return 0;
}
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -414,9 +414,9 @@ static int btrfs_check_super_csum(struct
return ret;
}
-static int verify_level_key(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
- struct extent_buffer *eb, int level,
- struct btrfs_key *first_key, u64 parent_transid)
+int btrfs_verify_level_key(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
+ struct extent_buffer *eb, int level,
+ struct btrfs_key *first_key, u64 parent_transid)
{
int found_level;
struct btrfs_key found_key;
@@ -493,8 +493,8 @@ static int btree_read_extent_buffer_page
if (verify_parent_transid(io_tree, eb,
parent_transid, 0))
ret = -EIO;
- else if (verify_level_key(fs_info, eb, level,
- first_key, parent_transid))
+ else if (btrfs_verify_level_key(fs_info, eb, level,
+ first_key, parent_transid))
ret = -EUCLEAN;
else
break;
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.h
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ static inline u64 btrfs_sb_offset(int mi
struct btrfs_device;
struct btrfs_fs_devices;
+int btrfs_verify_level_key(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
+ struct extent_buffer *eb, int level,
+ struct btrfs_key *first_key, u64 parent_transid);
struct extent_buffer *read_tree_block(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 bytenr,
u64 parent_transid, int level,
struct btrfs_key *first_key);
From: Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>
commit 08fc98a4d6424af66eb3ac4e2cedd2fc927ed436 upstream.
The buffer_head (frames[0].bh) and it's corresping page can be
potentially free'd once brelse() is done inside the for loop
but before the for loop exits in dx_release(). It can be free'd
in another context, when the page cache is flushed via
drop_caches_sysctl_handler(). This results into below data abort
when accessing info->indirect_levels in dx_release().
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc17ac3e01e
Call trace:
dx_release+0x70/0x90
ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x2d4/0x300
ext4_readdir+0x244/0x6f8
iterate_dir+0xbc/0x160
SyS_getdents64+0x94/0x174
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/namei.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -871,12 +871,15 @@ static void dx_release(struct dx_frame *
{
struct dx_root_info *info;
int i;
+ unsigned int indirect_levels;
if (frames[0].bh == NULL)
return;
info = &((struct dx_root *)frames[0].bh->b_data)->info;
- for (i = 0; i <= info->indirect_levels; i++) {
+ /* save local copy, "info" may be freed after brelse() */
+ indirect_levels = info->indirect_levels;
+ for (i = 0; i <= indirect_levels; i++) {
if (frames[i].bh == NULL)
break;
brelse(frames[i].bh);
From: Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
commit 7138377ce10455b7183c6dde4b2c51b33f464c45 upstream.
in order to support cryptocell tee fips error that may occurs while
cryptocell ree is suspended, an cc_tee_handle_fips_error call added
to the cc_pm_resume function.
Signed-off-by: Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "cc_ivgen.h"
#include "cc_hash.h"
#include "cc_pm.h"
+#include "cc_fips.h"
#define POWER_DOWN_ENABLE 0x01
#define POWER_DOWN_DISABLE 0x00
@@ -50,12 +51,13 @@ int cc_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
}
cc_iowrite(drvdata, CC_REG(HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN), POWER_DOWN_DISABLE);
-
rc = init_cc_regs(drvdata, false);
if (rc) {
dev_err(dev, "init_cc_regs (%x)\n", rc);
return rc;
}
+ /* check if tee fips error occurred during power down */
+ cc_tee_handle_fips_error(drvdata);
rc = cc_resume_req_queue(drvdata);
if (rc) {
From: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
commit 1a42010cdc26bb7e5912984f3c91b8c6d55f089a upstream.
Define the gup_fast_permitted to check against the asce_limit of the
mm attached to the current task, then replace the s390 specific gup
code with the generic implementation in mm/gup.c.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 12 +
arch/s390/mm/Makefile | 2
arch/s390/mm/gup.c | 291 ----------------------------------------
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 292 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ config S390
select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER
select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
select HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
+ select HAVE_GENERIC_GUP
select HAVE_KERNEL_BZIP2
select HAVE_KERNEL_GZIP
select HAVE_KERNEL_LZ4
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1264,6 +1264,18 @@ static inline pte_t *pte_offset(pmd_t *p
#define pte_offset_map(pmd, address) pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address)
#define pte_unmap(pte) do { } while (0)
+static inline bool gup_fast_permitted(unsigned long start, int nr_pages)
+{
+ unsigned long len, end;
+
+ len = (unsigned long) nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ end = start + len;
+ if (end < start)
+ return false;
+ return end <= current->mm->context.asce_limit;
+}
+#define gup_fast_permitted gup_fast_permitted
+
#define pfn_pte(pfn,pgprot) mk_pte_phys(__pa((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT),(pgprot))
#define pte_pfn(x) (pte_val(x) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
#define pte_page(x) pfn_to_page(pte_pfn(x))
--- a/arch/s390/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
obj-y := init.o fault.o extmem.o mmap.o vmem.o maccess.o
-obj-y += page-states.o gup.o pageattr.o pgtable.o pgalloc.o
+obj-y += page-states.o pageattr.o pgtable.o pgalloc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CMM) += cmm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE) += hugetlbpage.o
--- a/arch/s390/mm/gup.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-/*
- * Lockless get_user_pages_fast for s390
- *
- * Copyright IBM Corp. 2010
- * Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
- */
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/mm.h>
-#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
-#include <linux/vmstat.h>
-#include <linux/pagemap.h>
-#include <linux/rwsem.h>
-#include <asm/pgtable.h>
-
-/*
- * The performance critical leaf functions are made noinline otherwise gcc
- * inlines everything into a single function which results in too much
- * register pressure.
- */
-static inline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
-{
- struct page *head, *page;
- unsigned long mask;
- pte_t *ptep, pte;
-
- mask = (write ? _PAGE_PROTECT : 0) | _PAGE_INVALID | _PAGE_SPECIAL;
-
- ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr);
- do {
- pte = *ptep;
- barrier();
- /* Similar to the PMD case, NUMA hinting must take slow path */
- if (pte_protnone(pte))
- return 0;
- if ((pte_val(pte) & mask) != 0)
- return 0;
- VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
- page = pte_page(pte);
- head = compound_head(page);
- if (!page_cache_get_speculative(head))
- return 0;
- if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) {
- put_page(head);
- return 0;
- }
- VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
- pages[*nr] = page;
- (*nr)++;
-
- } while (ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static inline int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
-{
- struct page *head, *page;
- unsigned long mask;
- int refs;
-
- mask = (write ? _SEGMENT_ENTRY_PROTECT : 0) | _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID;
- if ((pmd_val(pmd) & mask) != 0)
- return 0;
- VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pmd_val(pmd) >> PAGE_SHIFT));
-
- refs = 0;
- head = pmd_page(pmd);
- page = head + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- do {
- VM_BUG_ON(compound_head(page) != head);
- pages[*nr] = page;
- (*nr)++;
- page++;
- refs++;
- } while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
-
- if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
- *nr -= refs;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (unlikely(pmd_val(pmd) != pmd_val(*pmdp))) {
- *nr -= refs;
- while (refs--)
- put_page(head);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-
-static inline int gup_pmd_range(pud_t pud, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
-{
- unsigned long next;
- pmd_t *pmdp, pmd;
-
- pmdp = pmd_offset(&pud, addr);
- do {
- pmd = *pmdp;
- barrier();
- next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
- if (pmd_none(pmd))
- return 0;
- if (unlikely(pmd_large(pmd))) {
- /*
- * NUMA hinting faults need to be handled in the GUP
- * slowpath for accounting purposes and so that they
- * can be serialised against THP migration.
- */
- if (pmd_protnone(pmd))
- return 0;
- if (!gup_huge_pmd(pmdp, pmd, addr, next,
- write, pages, nr))
- return 0;
- } else if (!gup_pte_range(pmd, addr, next,
- write, pages, nr))
- return 0;
- } while (pmdp++, addr = next, addr != end);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int gup_huge_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
-{
- struct page *head, *page;
- unsigned long mask;
- int refs;
-
- mask = (write ? _REGION_ENTRY_PROTECT : 0) | _REGION_ENTRY_INVALID;
- if ((pud_val(pud) & mask) != 0)
- return 0;
- VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pud_pfn(pud)));
-
- refs = 0;
- head = pud_page(pud);
- page = head + ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- do {
- VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
- pages[*nr] = page;
- (*nr)++;
- page++;
- refs++;
- } while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
-
- if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
- *nr -= refs;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (unlikely(pud_val(pud) != pud_val(*pudp))) {
- *nr -= refs;
- while (refs--)
- put_page(head);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static inline int gup_pud_range(p4d_t p4d, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
-{
- unsigned long next;
- pud_t *pudp, pud;
-
- pudp = pud_offset(&p4d, addr);
- do {
- pud = *pudp;
- barrier();
- next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
- if (pud_none(pud))
- return 0;
- if (unlikely(pud_large(pud))) {
- if (!gup_huge_pud(pudp, pud, addr, next, write, pages,
- nr))
- return 0;
- } else if (!gup_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, write, pages,
- nr))
- return 0;
- } while (pudp++, addr = next, addr != end);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static inline int gup_p4d_range(pgd_t pgd, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
-{
- unsigned long next;
- p4d_t *p4dp, p4d;
-
- p4dp = p4d_offset(&pgd, addr);
- do {
- p4d = *p4dp;
- barrier();
- next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
- if (p4d_none(p4d))
- return 0;
- if (!gup_pud_range(p4d, addr, next, write, pages, nr))
- return 0;
- } while (p4dp++, addr = next, addr != end);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Like get_user_pages_fast() except its IRQ-safe in that it won't fall
- * back to the regular GUP.
- * Note a difference with get_user_pages_fast: this always returns the
- * number of pages pinned, 0 if no pages were pinned.
- */
-int __get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, int write,
- struct page **pages)
-{
- struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
- unsigned long addr, len, end;
- unsigned long next, flags;
- pgd_t *pgdp, pgd;
- int nr = 0;
-
- start &= PAGE_MASK;
- addr = start;
- len = (unsigned long) nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
- end = start + len;
- if ((end <= start) || (end > mm->context.asce_limit))
- return 0;
- /*
- * local_irq_save() doesn't prevent pagetable teardown, but does
- * prevent the pagetables from being freed on s390.
- *
- * So long as we atomically load page table pointers versus teardown,
- * we can follow the address down to the the page and take a ref on it.
- */
- local_irq_save(flags);
- pgdp = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
- do {
- pgd = *pgdp;
- barrier();
- next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
- if (pgd_none(pgd))
- break;
- if (!gup_p4d_range(pgd, addr, next, write, pages, &nr))
- break;
- } while (pgdp++, addr = next, addr != end);
- local_irq_restore(flags);
-
- return nr;
-}
-
-/**
- * get_user_pages_fast() - pin user pages in memory
- * @start: starting user address
- * @nr_pages: number of pages from start to pin
- * @write: whether pages will be written to
- * @pages: array that receives pointers to the pages pinned.
- * Should be at least nr_pages long.
- *
- * Attempt to pin user pages in memory without taking mm->mmap_sem.
- * If not successful, it will fall back to taking the lock and
- * calling get_user_pages().
- *
- * Returns number of pages pinned. This may be fewer than the number
- * requested. If nr_pages is 0 or negative, returns 0. If no pages
- * were pinned, returns -errno.
- */
-int get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, int write,
- struct page **pages)
-{
- int nr, ret;
-
- might_sleep();
- start &= PAGE_MASK;
- nr = __get_user_pages_fast(start, nr_pages, write, pages);
- if (nr == nr_pages)
- return nr;
-
- /* Try to get the remaining pages with get_user_pages */
- start += nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
- pages += nr;
- ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(start, nr_pages - nr, pages,
- write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0);
- /* Have to be a bit careful with return values */
- if (nr > 0)
- ret = (ret < 0) ? nr : ret + nr;
- return ret;
-}
From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
commit fbbbbd2f28aec991f3fbc248df211550fbdfd58c upstream.
There are two cases where u32 variables n and err are being checked
for less than zero error values, the checks is always false because
the variables are not signed. Fix this by making the variables ints.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0")
Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
@@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ static int ext4_protect_reserved_inode(s
struct inode *inode;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
- u32 i = 0, err = 0, num, n;
+ u32 i = 0, num;
+ int err = 0, n;
if ((ino < EXT4_ROOT_INO) ||
(ino > le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_inodes_count)))
From: Anup Patel <[email protected]>
commit f91253a3d005796404ae0e578b3394459b5f9b71 upstream.
The Linux kernel will auto-disables all boot consoles whenever it
gets a preferred real console.
Currently on RISC-V systems, if we have a real console which is not
RISCV SBI console then boot consoles (such as earlycon=sbi) are not
auto-disabled when a real console (ttyS0 or ttySIF0) is available.
This results in duplicate prints at boot-time after kernel starts
using real console (i.e. ttyS0 or ttySIF0) if "earlycon=" kernel
parameter was passed by bootloader.
The reason for above issue is that RISCV SBI console always adds
itself as preferred console which is causing other real consoles
to be not used as preferred console.
Ideally "console=" kernel parameter passed by bootloaders should
be the one selecting a preferred real console.
This patch fixes above issue by not forcing RISCV SBI console as
preferred console.
Fixes: afa6b1ccfad5 ("tty: New RISC-V SBI console driver")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_riscv_sbi.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_riscv_sbi.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_riscv_sbi.c
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ device_initcall(hvc_sbi_init);
static int __init hvc_sbi_console_init(void)
{
hvc_instantiate(0, 0, &hvc_sbi_ops);
- add_preferred_console("hvc", 0, NULL);
return 0;
}
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit ee66e453db13d4837a0dcf9d43efa7a88603161b upstream.
...now that VMX's preemption timer, i.e. the hv_timer, also adjusts its
programmed time based on lapic_timer_advance_ns. Without the delay, a
guest can see a timer interrupt arrive before the requested time when
KVM is using the hv_timer to emulate the guest's interrupt.
Fixes: c5ce8235cffa0 ("KVM: VMX: Optimize tscdeadline timer latency")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -1453,7 +1453,7 @@ static void apic_timer_expired(struct kv
if (swait_active(q))
swake_up_one(q);
- if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
+ if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic) || ktimer->hv_timer_in_use)
ktimer->expired_tscdeadline = ktimer->tscdeadline;
}
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit 11988499e62b310f3bf6f6d0a807a06d3f9ccc96 upstream.
KVM allows userspace to violate consistency checks related to the
guest's CPUID model to some degree. Generally speaking, userspace has
carte blanche when it comes to guest state so long as jamming invalid
state won't negatively affect the host.
Currently this is seems to be a non-issue as most of the interesting
EFER checks are missing, e.g. NX and LME, but those will be added
shortly. Proactively exempt userspace from the CPUID checks so as not
to break userspace.
Note, the efer_reserved_bits check still applies to userspace writes as
that mask reflects the host's capabilities, e.g. KVM shouldn't allow a
guest to run with NX=1 if it has been disabled in the host.
Fixes: d80174745ba39 ("KVM: SVM: Only allow setting of EFER_SVME when CPUID SVM is set")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1262,31 +1262,42 @@ static int do_get_msr_feature(struct kvm
return 0;
}
-bool kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+static bool __kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
{
- if (efer & efer_reserved_bits)
- return false;
-
if (efer & EFER_FFXSR && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT))
- return false;
+ return false;
if (efer & EFER_SVME && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM))
- return false;
+ return false;
return true;
+
+}
+bool kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+ if (efer & efer_reserved_bits)
+ return false;
+
+ return __kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, efer);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_valid_efer);
-static int set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+static int set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
u64 old_efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
+ u64 efer = msr_info->data;
- if (!kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, efer))
- return 1;
+ if (efer & efer_reserved_bits)
+ return false;
- if (is_paging(vcpu)
- && (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) != (efer & EFER_LME))
- return 1;
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
+ if (!__kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, efer))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (is_paging(vcpu) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) != (efer & EFER_LME))
+ return 1;
+ }
efer &= ~EFER_LMA;
efer |= vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LMA;
@@ -2456,7 +2467,7 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *
vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = data;
break;
case MSR_EFER:
- return set_efer(vcpu, data);
+ return set_efer(vcpu, msr_info);
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
data &= ~(u64)0x40; /* ignore flush filter disable */
data &= ~(u64)0x100; /* ignore ignne emulation enable */
From: Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
commit 7766dd774d80463cec7b81d90c8672af91de2da1 upstream.
On power management resume function first enable the device clk source
to allow access to the device registers.
Signed-off-by: Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c
@@ -42,14 +42,15 @@ int cc_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
struct cc_drvdata *drvdata = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
dev_dbg(dev, "unset HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN\n");
- cc_iowrite(drvdata, CC_REG(HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN), POWER_DOWN_DISABLE);
-
+ /* Enables the device source clk */
rc = cc_clk_on(drvdata);
if (rc) {
dev_err(dev, "failed getting clock back on. We're toast.\n");
return rc;
}
+ cc_iowrite(drvdata, CC_REG(HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN), POWER_DOWN_DISABLE);
+
rc = init_cc_regs(drvdata, false);
if (rc) {
dev_err(dev, "init_cc_regs (%x)\n", rc);
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 6a1faa4a43f5fabf9cbeaa742d916e7b5e73120f upstream.
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/ccm.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/ccm.c
+++ b/crypto/ccm.c
@@ -458,7 +458,6 @@ static void crypto_ccm_free(struct aead_
static int crypto_ccm_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct rtattr **tb,
- const char *full_name,
const char *ctr_name,
const char *mac_name)
{
@@ -486,7 +485,8 @@ static int crypto_ccm_create_common(stru
mac = __crypto_hash_alg_common(mac_alg);
err = -EINVAL;
- if (mac->digestsize != 16)
+ if (strncmp(mac->base.cra_name, "cbcmac(", 7) != 0 ||
+ mac->digestsize != 16)
goto out_put_mac;
inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -509,23 +509,27 @@ static int crypto_ccm_create_common(stru
ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->ctr);
- /* Not a stream cipher? */
+ /* The skcipher algorithm must be CTR mode, using 16-byte blocks. */
err = -EINVAL;
- if (ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
+ if (strncmp(ctr->base.cra_name, "ctr(", 4) != 0 ||
+ crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(ctr) != 16 ||
+ ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
goto err_drop_ctr;
- /* We want the real thing! */
- if (crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(ctr) != 16)
+ /* ctr and cbcmac must use the same underlying block cipher. */
+ if (strcmp(ctr->base.cra_name + 4, mac->base.cra_name + 7) != 0)
goto err_drop_ctr;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "ccm(%s", ctr->base.cra_name + 4) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto err_drop_ctr;
+
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"ccm_base(%s,%s)", ctr->base.cra_driver_name,
mac->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_drop_ctr;
- memcpy(inst->alg.base.cra_name, full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
-
inst->alg.base.cra_flags = ctr->base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = (mac->base.cra_priority +
ctr->base.cra_priority) / 2;
@@ -567,7 +571,6 @@ static int crypto_ccm_create(struct cryp
const char *cipher_name;
char ctr_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
char mac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
- char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(cipher_name))
@@ -581,12 +584,7 @@ static int crypto_ccm_create(struct cryp
cipher_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
- if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "ccm(%s)", cipher_name) >=
- CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-
- return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name, ctr_name,
- mac_name);
+ return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, mac_name);
}
static struct crypto_template crypto_ccm_tmpl = {
@@ -599,23 +597,17 @@ static int crypto_ccm_base_create(struct
struct rtattr **tb)
{
const char *ctr_name;
- const char *cipher_name;
- char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ const char *mac_name;
ctr_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(ctr_name))
return PTR_ERR(ctr_name);
- cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
- if (IS_ERR(cipher_name))
- return PTR_ERR(cipher_name);
-
- if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "ccm_base(%s,%s)",
- ctr_name, cipher_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ mac_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+ if (IS_ERR(mac_name))
+ return PTR_ERR(mac_name);
- return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name, ctr_name,
- cipher_name);
+ return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, mac_name);
}
static struct crypto_template crypto_ccm_base_tmpl = {
From: Coly Li <[email protected]>
commit 1bee2addc0c8470c8aaa65ef0599eeae96dd88bc upstream.
In journal_reclaim() ja->cur_idx of each cache will be update to
reclaim available journal buckets. Variable 'int n' is used to count how
many cache is successfully reclaimed, then n is set to c->journal.key
by SET_KEY_PTRS(). Later in journal_write_unlocked(), a for_each_cache()
loop will write the jset data onto each cache.
The problem is, if all jouranl buckets on each cache is full, the
following code in journal_reclaim(),
529 for_each_cache(ca, c, iter) {
530 struct journal_device *ja = &ca->journal;
531 unsigned int next = (ja->cur_idx + 1) % ca->sb.njournal_buckets;
532
533 /* No space available on this device */
534 if (next == ja->discard_idx)
535 continue;
536
537 ja->cur_idx = next;
538 k->ptr[n++] = MAKE_PTR(0,
539 bucket_to_sector(c, ca->sb.d[ja->cur_idx]),
540 ca->sb.nr_this_dev);
541 }
542
543 bkey_init(k);
544 SET_KEY_PTRS(k, n);
If there is no available bucket to reclaim, the if() condition at line
534 will always true, and n remains 0. Then at line 544, SET_KEY_PTRS()
will set KEY_PTRS field of c->journal.key to 0.
Setting KEY_PTRS field of c->journal.key to 0 is wrong. Because in
journal_write_unlocked() the journal data is written in following loop,
649 for (i = 0; i < KEY_PTRS(k); i++) {
650-671 submit journal data to cache device
672 }
If KEY_PTRS field is set to 0 in jouranl_reclaim(), the journal data
won't be written to cache device here. If system crahed or rebooted
before bkeys of the lost journal entries written into btree nodes, data
corruption will be reported during bcache reload after rebooting the
system.
Indeed there is only one cache in a cache set, there is no need to set
KEY_PTRS field in journal_reclaim() at all. But in order to keep the
for_each_cache() logic consistent for now, this patch fixes the above
problem by not setting 0 KEY_PTRS of journal key, if there is no bucket
available to reclaim.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/bcache/journal.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/journal.c
@@ -540,11 +540,11 @@ static void journal_reclaim(struct cache
ca->sb.nr_this_dev);
}
- bkey_init(k);
- SET_KEY_PTRS(k, n);
-
- if (n)
+ if (n) {
+ bkey_init(k);
+ SET_KEY_PTRS(k, n);
c->journal.blocks_free = c->sb.bucket_size >> c->block_bits;
+ }
out:
if (!journal_full(&c->journal))
__closure_wake_up(&c->journal.wait);
@@ -671,6 +671,9 @@ static void journal_write_unlocked(struc
ca->journal.seq[ca->journal.cur_idx] = w->data->seq;
}
+ /* If KEY_PTRS(k) == 0, this jset gets lost in air */
+ BUG_ON(i == 0);
+
atomic_dec_bug(&fifo_back(&c->journal.pin));
bch_journal_next(&c->journal);
journal_reclaim(c);
From: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
commit f3df82b468f00cca241d96ee3697c9a5e7fb6bd0 upstream.
We were computing the size of the import buffer based on the digest size
but the 318 and 224 byte variants use 512 and 256 bytes internal state
sizes respectfully, thus causing the import buffer to overrun.
Fix it by using the right sizes.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
@@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ static struct cc_hash_template driver_ha
.setkey = cc_hash_setkey,
.halg = {
.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
- .statesize = CC_STATE_SIZE(SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE),
+ .statesize = CC_STATE_SIZE(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE),
},
},
.hash_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA224,
@@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ static struct cc_hash_template driver_ha
.setkey = cc_hash_setkey,
.halg = {
.digestsize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
- .statesize = CC_STATE_SIZE(SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE),
+ .statesize = CC_STATE_SIZE(SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE),
},
},
.hash_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA384,
From: Sriram Rajagopalan <[email protected]>
commit 592acbf16821288ecdc4192c47e3774a4c48bb64 upstream.
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/extents.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -1035,6 +1035,7 @@ static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *hand
__le32 border;
ext4_fsblk_t *ablocks = NULL; /* array of allocated blocks */
int err = 0;
+ size_t ext_size = 0;
/* make decision: where to split? */
/* FIXME: now decision is simplest: at current extent */
@@ -1126,6 +1127,10 @@ static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *hand
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
+ /* zero out unused area in the extent block */
+ ext_size = sizeof(struct ext4_extent_header) +
+ sizeof(struct ext4_extent) * le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_entries);
+ memset(bh->b_data + ext_size, 0, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - ext_size);
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
@@ -1205,6 +1210,11 @@ static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *hand
sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
+ /* zero out unused area in the extent block */
+ ext_size = sizeof(struct ext4_extent_header) +
+ (sizeof(struct ext4_extent) * le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_entries));
+ memset(bh->b_data + ext_size, 0,
+ inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - ext_size);
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
@@ -1270,6 +1280,7 @@ static int ext4_ext_grow_indepth(handle_
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, goal = 0;
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es;
int err = 0;
+ size_t ext_size = 0;
/* Try to prepend new index to old one */
if (ext_depth(inode))
@@ -1295,9 +1306,11 @@ static int ext4_ext_grow_indepth(handle_
goto out;
}
+ ext_size = sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data);
/* move top-level index/leaf into new block */
- memmove(bh->b_data, EXT4_I(inode)->i_data,
- sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data));
+ memmove(bh->b_data, EXT4_I(inode)->i_data, ext_size);
+ /* zero out unused area in the extent block */
+ memset(bh->b_data + ext_size, 0, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - ext_size);
/* set size of new block */
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
From: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
commit c2d1b3aae33605a61cbab445d8ae1c708ccd2698 upstream.
Up until now trimming the freespace was done irrespective of what the
arguments of the FITRIM ioctl were. For example fstrim's -o/-l arguments
will be entirely ignored. Fix it by correctly handling those paramter.
This requires breaking if the found freespace extent is after the end of
the passed range as well as completing trim after trimming
fstrim_range::len bytes.
Fixes: 499f377f49f0 ("btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM")
CC: [email protected] # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
@@ -11192,9 +11192,9 @@ int btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(struc
* held back allocations.
*/
static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struct btrfs_device *device,
- u64 minlen, u64 *trimmed)
+ struct fstrim_range *range, u64 *trimmed)
{
- u64 start = 0, len = 0;
+ u64 start = range->start, len = 0;
int ret;
*trimmed = 0;
@@ -11237,8 +11237,8 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struc
if (!trans)
up_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
- ret = find_free_dev_extent_start(trans, device, minlen, start,
- &start, &len);
+ ret = find_free_dev_extent_start(trans, device, range->minlen,
+ start, &start, &len);
if (trans) {
up_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
btrfs_put_transaction(trans);
@@ -11251,6 +11251,16 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struc
break;
}
+ /* If we are out of the passed range break */
+ if (start > range->start + range->len - 1) {
+ mutex_unlock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ start = max(range->start, start);
+ len = min(range->len, len);
+
ret = btrfs_issue_discard(device->bdev, start, len, &bytes);
mutex_unlock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
@@ -11260,6 +11270,10 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struc
start += len;
*trimmed += bytes;
+ /* We've trimmed enough */
+ if (*trimmed >= range->len)
+ break;
+
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
@@ -11343,8 +11357,7 @@ int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *
mutex_lock(&fs_info->fs_devices->device_list_mutex);
devices = &fs_info->fs_devices->devices;
list_for_each_entry(device, devices, dev_list) {
- ret = btrfs_trim_free_extents(device, range->minlen,
- &group_trimmed);
+ ret = btrfs_trim_free_extents(device, range, &group_trimmed);
if (ret) {
dev_failed++;
dev_ret = ret;
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 31562b954b60f02acb91b7349dc6432d3f8c3c5f upstream.
The sanity check in mb_find_extent() only checked that returned extent
does not extend past blocksize * 8, however it should not extend past
EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb). This can happen when clusters_per_group <
blocksize * 8 and the tail of the bitmap is not properly filled by 1s
which happened e.g. when ancient kernels have grown the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ static int mb_find_extent(struct ext4_bu
ex->fe_len += 1 << order;
}
- if (ex->fe_start + ex->fe_len > (1 << (e4b->bd_blkbits + 3))) {
+ if (ex->fe_start + ex->fe_len > EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(e4b->bd_sb)) {
/* Should never happen! (but apparently sometimes does?!?) */
WARN_ON(1);
ext4_error(e4b->bd_sb, "corruption or bug in mb_find_extent "
From: Yifeng Li <[email protected]>
commit 75ddbc1fb11efac87b611d48e9802f6fe2bb2163 upstream.
Previously, in the userspace, it was possible to use the "setterm" command
from util-linux to blank the VT console by default, using the following
command.
According to the man page,
> The force option keeps the screen blank even if a key is pressed.
It was implemented by calling TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN.
case BLANKSCREEN:
ioctlarg = TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN;
if (ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCLINUX, &ioctlarg))
warn(_("cannot force blank"));
break;
However, after Linux 4.12, this command ceased to work anymore, which is
unexpected. By inspecting the kernel source, it shows that the issue was
triggered by the side-effect from commit a4199f5eb809 ("tty: Disable
default console blanking interval").
The console blanking is implemented by function do_blank_screen() in vt.c:
"blank_state" will be initialized to "blank_normal_wait" in con_init() if
AND ONLY IF ("blankinterval" > 0). If "blankinterval" is 0, "blank_state"
will be "blank_off" (== 0), and a call to do_blank_screen() will always
abort, even if a forced blanking is required from the user by calling
TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN, the console won't be blanked.
This behavior is unexpected from a user's point-of-view, since it's not
mentioned in any documentation. The setterm man page suggests it will
always work, and the kernel comments in uapi/linux/tiocl.h says
> /* keep screen blank even if a key is pressed */
> #define TIOCL_BLANKSCREEN 14
To fix it, we simply remove the "blank_state != blank_off" check, as
pointed out by Nicolas Pitre, this check doesn't logically make sense
and it's safe to remove.
Suggested-by: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
Fixes: a4199f5eb809 ("tty: Disable default console blanking interval")
Signed-off-by: Yifeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
@@ -4152,8 +4152,6 @@ void do_blank_screen(int entering_gfx)
return;
}
- if (blank_state != blank_normal_wait)
- return;
blank_state = blank_off;
/* don't blank graphics */
From: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
commit ea611d1cc180fbb56982c83cd5142a2b34881f5c upstream.
The FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US definitions are swapped for MAX20024 and MAX77620,
fix it.
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/mfd/max77620.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/mfd/max77620.h
+++ b/include/linux/mfd/max77620.h
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@
#define MAX77620_FPS_PERIOD_MIN_US 40
#define MAX20024_FPS_PERIOD_MIN_US 20
-#define MAX77620_FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US 2560
-#define MAX20024_FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US 5120
+#define MAX20024_FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US 2560
+#define MAX77620_FPS_PERIOD_MAX_US 5120
#define MAX77620_REG_FPS_GPIO1 0x54
#define MAX77620_REG_FPS_GPIO2 0x55
From: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
commit 1b426bac66e6cc83c9f2d92b96e4e72acf43419a upstream.
hugetlb uses a fault mutex hash table to prevent page faults of the
same pages concurrently. The key for shared and private mappings is
different. Shared keys off address_space and file index. Private keys
off mm and virtual address. Consider a private mappings of a populated
hugetlbfs file. A fault will map the page from the file and if needed
do a COW to map a writable page.
Hugetlbfs hole punch uses the fault mutex to prevent mappings of file
pages. It uses the address_space file index key. However, private
mappings will use a different key and could race with this code to map
the file page. This causes problems (BUG) for the page cache remove
code as it expects the page to be unmapped. A sample stack is:
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_mapped(page))
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:169!
...
RIP: 0010:unaccount_page_cache_page+0x1b8/0x200
...
Call Trace:
__delete_from_page_cache+0x39/0x220
delete_from_page_cache+0x45/0x70
remove_inode_hugepages+0x13c/0x380
? __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x162/0x380
hugetlbfs_fallocate+0x403/0x540
? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
? __inode_security_revalidate+0x5d/0x70
? selinux_file_permission+0x100/0x130
vfs_fallocate+0x13f/0x270
ksys_fallocate+0x3c/0x80
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
There seems to be another potential COW issue/race with this approach
of different private and shared keys as noted in commit 8382d914ebf7
("mm, hugetlb: improve page-fault scalability").
Since every hugetlb mapping (even anon and private) is actually a file
mapping, just use the address_space index key for all mappings. This
results in potentially more hash collisions. However, this should not
be the common case.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412165235.t4sscoujczfhuiyt@linux-r8p5
Fixes: b5cec28d36f5 ("hugetlbfs: truncate_hugepages() takes a range of pages")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 7 ++-----
include/linux/hugetlb.h | 4 +---
mm/hugetlb.c | 22 ++++++----------------
mm/userfaultfd.c | 3 +--
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
@@ -426,9 +426,7 @@ static void remove_inode_hugepages(struc
u32 hash;
index = page->index;
- hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, current->mm,
- &pseudo_vma,
- mapping, index, 0);
+ hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mapping, index, 0);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
/*
@@ -625,8 +623,7 @@ static long hugetlbfs_fallocate(struct f
addr = index * hpage_size;
/* mutex taken here, fault path and hole punch */
- hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mm, &pseudo_vma, mapping,
- index, addr);
+ hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mapping, index, addr);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
/* See if already present in mapping to avoid alloc/free */
--- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h
+++ b/include/linux/hugetlb.h
@@ -123,9 +123,7 @@ void move_hugetlb_state(struct page *old
void free_huge_page(struct page *page);
void hugetlb_fix_reserve_counts(struct inode *inode);
extern struct mutex *hugetlb_fault_mutex_table;
-u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct hstate *h, struct mm_struct *mm,
- struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- struct address_space *mapping,
+u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct hstate *h, struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t idx, unsigned long address);
pte_t *huge_pmd_share(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pud_t *pud);
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -3777,8 +3777,7 @@ retry:
* handling userfault. Reacquire after handling
* fault to make calling code simpler.
*/
- hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mm, vma, mapping,
- idx, haddr);
+ hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mapping, idx, haddr);
mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
ret = handle_userfault(&vmf, VM_UFFD_MISSING);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
@@ -3886,21 +3885,14 @@ backout_unlocked:
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct hstate *h, struct mm_struct *mm,
- struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- struct address_space *mapping,
+u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct hstate *h, struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t idx, unsigned long address)
{
unsigned long key[2];
u32 hash;
- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
- key[0] = (unsigned long) mapping;
- key[1] = idx;
- } else {
- key[0] = (unsigned long) mm;
- key[1] = address >> huge_page_shift(h);
- }
+ key[0] = (unsigned long) mapping;
+ key[1] = idx;
hash = jhash2((u32 *)&key, sizeof(key)/sizeof(u32), 0);
@@ -3911,9 +3903,7 @@ u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct hsta
* For uniprocesor systems we always use a single mutex, so just
* return 0 and avoid the hashing overhead.
*/
-u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct hstate *h, struct mm_struct *mm,
- struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- struct address_space *mapping,
+u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct hstate *h, struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t idx, unsigned long address)
{
return 0;
@@ -3958,7 +3948,7 @@ vm_fault_t hugetlb_fault(struct mm_struc
* get spurious allocation failures if two CPUs race to instantiate
* the same page in the page cache.
*/
- hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mm, vma, mapping, idx, haddr);
+ hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mapping, idx, haddr);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
entry = huge_ptep_get(ptep);
--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c
@@ -271,8 +271,7 @@ retry:
*/
idx = linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr);
mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
- hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, dst_mm, dst_vma, mapping,
- idx, dst_addr);
+ hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, mapping, idx, dst_addr);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
err = -ENOMEM;
From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
commit dcf7b48212c0fab7df69e84fab22d6cb7c8c0fb9 upstream.
The original assembly imported from OpenSSL has two copy-paste
errors in handling CTR mode. When dealing with a 2 or 3 block tail,
the code branches to the CBC decryption exit path, rather than to
the CTR exit path.
This leads to corruption of the IV, which leads to subsequent blocks
being corrupted.
This can be detected with libkcapi test suite, which is available at
https://github.com/smuellerDD/libkcapi
Reported-by: Ondrej Mosnáček <[email protected]>
Fixes: 5c380d623ed3 ("crypto: vmx - Add support for VMS instructions by ASM")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl
+++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl
@@ -1854,7 +1854,7 @@ Lctr32_enc8x_three:
stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
addi $out,$out,0x30
- b Lcbc_dec8x_done
+ b Lctr32_enc8x_done
.align 5
Lctr32_enc8x_two:
@@ -1866,7 +1866,7 @@ Lctr32_enc8x_two:
stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out
stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
addi $out,$out,0x20
- b Lcbc_dec8x_done
+ b Lctr32_enc8x_done
.align 5
Lctr32_enc8x_one:
From: Raul E Rangel <[email protected]>
commit 43d8dabb4074cf7f3b1404bfbaeba5aa6f3e5cfc upstream.
The tag set is allocated in mmc_init_queue but never freed. This results
in a memory leak. This change makes sure we free the tag set when the
queue is also freed.
Signed-off-by: Raul E Rangel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Fixes: 81196976ed94 ("mmc: block: Add blk-mq support")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mmc/core/queue.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/mmc/core/queue.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/core/queue.c
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ void mmc_cleanup_queue(struct mmc_queue
blk_mq_unquiesce_queue(q);
blk_cleanup_queue(q);
+ blk_mq_free_tag_set(&mq->tag_set);
/*
* A request can be completed before the next request, potentially
From: Chris Packham <[email protected]>
commit 64d14c6fe040361ff6aecb825e392cf97837cd9e upstream.
When the gpio-addr-flash.c driver was merged with physmap-core.c the
code to store the current gpio_values was lost. This meant that once a
gpio was asserted it was never de-asserted. Fix this by storing the
current offset in gpio_values like the old driver used to.
Fixes: commit ba32ce95cbd9 ("mtd: maps: Merge gpio-addr-flash.c into physmap-core.c")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mtd/maps/physmap-core.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/mtd/maps/physmap-core.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/maps/physmap-core.c
@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static void physmap_set_addr_gpios(struc
gpiod_set_value(info->gpios->desc[i], !!(BIT(i) & ofs));
}
+
+ info->gpio_values = ofs;
}
#define win_mask(order) (BIT(order) - 1)
From: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
commit 6fda41bf12615ee7c3ddac88155099b1a8cf8d00 upstream.
Some firmwares may reboot CPUs with OS Double Lock set. Make sure that
it is unlocked, in order to use debug exceptions.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(disable_debug_monitors);
*/
static int clear_os_lock(unsigned int cpu)
{
+ write_sysreg(0, osdlr_el1);
write_sysreg(0, oslar_el1);
isb();
return 0;
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 767f015ea0b7ab9d60432ff6cd06b664fd71f50f upstream.
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
arm32 xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't
affected by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However
this is more subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to
the alignmask being removed by commit cc477bf64573 ("crypto: arm/aes -
replace bit-sliced OpenSSL NEON code"). Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to
start checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().
Fixes: e4e7f10bfc40 ("ARM: add support for bit sliced AES using NEON instructions")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ static int __xts_crypt(struct skcipher_r
int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tweak_tfm, walk.iv, walk.iv);
From: Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
commit 5965dc745287bebf7a2eba91a66f017537fa4c54 upstream.
Commits c19650d6ea99 ("crypto: caam - fix DMA mapping of stack memory")
and 65055e210884 ("crypto: caam - fix hash context DMA unmap size")
fixed the ahash implementation in caam/jr driver such that req->result
is not DMA-mapped (since it's not guaranteed to be DMA-able).
Apply a similar fix for ahash implementation in caam/qi2 driver.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.20+
Fixes: 3f16f6c9d632 ("crypto: caam/qi2 - add support for ahash algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c | 111 +++++++++++++++-----------------------
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.h | 2
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
@@ -2855,6 +2855,7 @@ struct caam_hash_state {
struct caam_request caam_req;
dma_addr_t buf_dma;
dma_addr_t ctx_dma;
+ int ctx_dma_len;
u8 buf_0[CAAM_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
int buflen_0;
u8 buf_1[CAAM_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
@@ -2928,6 +2929,7 @@ static inline int ctx_map_to_qm_sg(struc
struct caam_hash_state *state, int ctx_len,
struct dpaa2_sg_entry *qm_sg, u32 flag)
{
+ state->ctx_dma_len = ctx_len;
state->ctx_dma = dma_map_single(dev, state->caam_ctx, ctx_len, flag);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, state->ctx_dma)) {
dev_err(dev, "unable to map ctx\n");
@@ -3166,14 +3168,12 @@ bad_free_key:
}
static inline void ahash_unmap(struct device *dev, struct ahash_edesc *edesc,
- struct ahash_request *req, int dst_len)
+ struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct caam_hash_state *state = ahash_request_ctx(req);
if (edesc->src_nents)
dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, edesc->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- if (edesc->dst_dma)
- dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->dst_dma, dst_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
if (edesc->qm_sg_bytes)
dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->qm_sg_dma, edesc->qm_sg_bytes,
@@ -3188,18 +3188,15 @@ static inline void ahash_unmap(struct de
static inline void ahash_unmap_ctx(struct device *dev,
struct ahash_edesc *edesc,
- struct ahash_request *req, int dst_len,
- u32 flag)
+ struct ahash_request *req, u32 flag)
{
- struct crypto_ahash *ahash = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
- struct caam_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(ahash);
struct caam_hash_state *state = ahash_request_ctx(req);
if (state->ctx_dma) {
- dma_unmap_single(dev, state->ctx_dma, ctx->ctx_len, flag);
+ dma_unmap_single(dev, state->ctx_dma, state->ctx_dma_len, flag);
state->ctx_dma = 0;
}
- ahash_unmap(dev, edesc, req, dst_len);
+ ahash_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
}
static void ahash_done(void *cbk_ctx, u32 status)
@@ -3220,16 +3217,13 @@ static void ahash_done(void *cbk_ctx, u3
ecode = -EIO;
}
- ahash_unmap(ctx->dev, edesc, req, digestsize);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ memcpy(req->result, state->caam_ctx, digestsize);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
print_hex_dump_debug("ctx@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ",
DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, state->caam_ctx,
ctx->ctx_len, 1);
- if (req->result)
- print_hex_dump_debug("result@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ",
- DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, req->result,
- digestsize, 1);
req->base.complete(&req->base, ecode);
}
@@ -3251,7 +3245,7 @@ static void ahash_done_bi(void *cbk_ctx,
ecode = -EIO;
}
- ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, ctx->ctx_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
switch_buf(state);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
@@ -3284,16 +3278,13 @@ static void ahash_done_ctx_src(void *cbk
ecode = -EIO;
}
- ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, digestsize, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+ memcpy(req->result, state->caam_ctx, digestsize);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
print_hex_dump_debug("ctx@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ",
DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, state->caam_ctx,
ctx->ctx_len, 1);
- if (req->result)
- print_hex_dump_debug("result@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ",
- DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, req->result,
- digestsize, 1);
req->base.complete(&req->base, ecode);
}
@@ -3315,7 +3306,7 @@ static void ahash_done_ctx_dst(void *cbk
ecode = -EIO;
}
- ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, ctx->ctx_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
switch_buf(state);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
@@ -3453,7 +3444,7 @@ static int ahash_update_ctx(struct ahash
return ret;
unmap_ctx:
- ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, ctx->ctx_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -3485,7 +3476,7 @@ static int ahash_final_ctx(struct ahash_
sg_table = &edesc->sgt[0];
ret = ctx_map_to_qm_sg(ctx->dev, state, ctx->ctx_len, sg_table,
- DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (ret)
goto unmap_ctx;
@@ -3504,22 +3495,13 @@ static int ahash_final_ctx(struct ahash_
}
edesc->qm_sg_bytes = qm_sg_bytes;
- edesc->dst_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, req->result, digestsize,
- DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
- if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, edesc->dst_dma)) {
- dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map dst\n");
- edesc->dst_dma = 0;
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto unmap_ctx;
- }
-
memset(&req_ctx->fd_flt, 0, sizeof(req_ctx->fd_flt));
dpaa2_fl_set_final(in_fle, true);
dpaa2_fl_set_format(in_fle, dpaa2_fl_sg);
dpaa2_fl_set_addr(in_fle, edesc->qm_sg_dma);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(in_fle, ctx->ctx_len + buflen);
dpaa2_fl_set_format(out_fle, dpaa2_fl_single);
- dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, edesc->dst_dma);
+ dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, state->ctx_dma);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(out_fle, digestsize);
req_ctx->flc = &ctx->flc[FINALIZE];
@@ -3534,7 +3516,7 @@ static int ahash_final_ctx(struct ahash_
return ret;
unmap_ctx:
- ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, digestsize, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -3587,7 +3569,7 @@ static int ahash_finup_ctx(struct ahash_
sg_table = &edesc->sgt[0];
ret = ctx_map_to_qm_sg(ctx->dev, state, ctx->ctx_len, sg_table,
- DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (ret)
goto unmap_ctx;
@@ -3606,22 +3588,13 @@ static int ahash_finup_ctx(struct ahash_
}
edesc->qm_sg_bytes = qm_sg_bytes;
- edesc->dst_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, req->result, digestsize,
- DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
- if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, edesc->dst_dma)) {
- dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map dst\n");
- edesc->dst_dma = 0;
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto unmap_ctx;
- }
-
memset(&req_ctx->fd_flt, 0, sizeof(req_ctx->fd_flt));
dpaa2_fl_set_final(in_fle, true);
dpaa2_fl_set_format(in_fle, dpaa2_fl_sg);
dpaa2_fl_set_addr(in_fle, edesc->qm_sg_dma);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(in_fle, ctx->ctx_len + buflen + req->nbytes);
dpaa2_fl_set_format(out_fle, dpaa2_fl_single);
- dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, edesc->dst_dma);
+ dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, state->ctx_dma);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(out_fle, digestsize);
req_ctx->flc = &ctx->flc[FINALIZE];
@@ -3636,7 +3609,7 @@ static int ahash_finup_ctx(struct ahash_
return ret;
unmap_ctx:
- ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, digestsize, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -3705,18 +3678,19 @@ static int ahash_digest(struct ahash_req
dpaa2_fl_set_addr(in_fle, sg_dma_address(req->src));
}
- edesc->dst_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, req->result, digestsize,
+ state->ctx_dma_len = digestsize;
+ state->ctx_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, state->caam_ctx, digestsize,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
- if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, edesc->dst_dma)) {
- dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map dst\n");
- edesc->dst_dma = 0;
+ if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, state->ctx_dma)) {
+ dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map ctx\n");
+ state->ctx_dma = 0;
goto unmap;
}
dpaa2_fl_set_final(in_fle, true);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(in_fle, req->nbytes);
dpaa2_fl_set_format(out_fle, dpaa2_fl_single);
- dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, edesc->dst_dma);
+ dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, state->ctx_dma);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(out_fle, digestsize);
req_ctx->flc = &ctx->flc[DIGEST];
@@ -3730,7 +3704,7 @@ static int ahash_digest(struct ahash_req
return ret;
unmap:
- ahash_unmap(ctx->dev, edesc, req, digestsize);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -3765,11 +3739,12 @@ static int ahash_final_no_ctx(struct aha
}
}
- edesc->dst_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, req->result, digestsize,
+ state->ctx_dma_len = digestsize;
+ state->ctx_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, state->caam_ctx, digestsize,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
- if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, edesc->dst_dma)) {
- dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map dst\n");
- edesc->dst_dma = 0;
+ if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, state->ctx_dma)) {
+ dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map ctx\n");
+ state->ctx_dma = 0;
goto unmap;
}
@@ -3787,7 +3762,7 @@ static int ahash_final_no_ctx(struct aha
dpaa2_fl_set_len(in_fle, buflen);
}
dpaa2_fl_set_format(out_fle, dpaa2_fl_single);
- dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, edesc->dst_dma);
+ dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, state->ctx_dma);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(out_fle, digestsize);
req_ctx->flc = &ctx->flc[DIGEST];
@@ -3802,7 +3777,7 @@ static int ahash_final_no_ctx(struct aha
return ret;
unmap:
- ahash_unmap(ctx->dev, edesc, req, digestsize);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -3882,6 +3857,7 @@ static int ahash_update_no_ctx(struct ah
}
edesc->qm_sg_bytes = qm_sg_bytes;
+ state->ctx_dma_len = ctx->ctx_len;
state->ctx_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, state->caam_ctx,
ctx->ctx_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, state->ctx_dma)) {
@@ -3930,7 +3906,7 @@ static int ahash_update_no_ctx(struct ah
return ret;
unmap_ctx:
- ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, ctx->ctx_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -3995,11 +3971,12 @@ static int ahash_finup_no_ctx(struct aha
}
edesc->qm_sg_bytes = qm_sg_bytes;
- edesc->dst_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, req->result, digestsize,
+ state->ctx_dma_len = digestsize;
+ state->ctx_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, state->caam_ctx, digestsize,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
- if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, edesc->dst_dma)) {
- dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map dst\n");
- edesc->dst_dma = 0;
+ if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, state->ctx_dma)) {
+ dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map ctx\n");
+ state->ctx_dma = 0;
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto unmap;
}
@@ -4010,7 +3987,7 @@ static int ahash_finup_no_ctx(struct aha
dpaa2_fl_set_addr(in_fle, edesc->qm_sg_dma);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(in_fle, buflen + req->nbytes);
dpaa2_fl_set_format(out_fle, dpaa2_fl_single);
- dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, edesc->dst_dma);
+ dpaa2_fl_set_addr(out_fle, state->ctx_dma);
dpaa2_fl_set_len(out_fle, digestsize);
req_ctx->flc = &ctx->flc[DIGEST];
@@ -4025,7 +4002,7 @@ static int ahash_finup_no_ctx(struct aha
return ret;
unmap:
- ahash_unmap(ctx->dev, edesc, req, digestsize);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -4112,6 +4089,7 @@ static int ahash_update_first(struct aha
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(next_buf, req->src, to_hash,
*next_buflen, 0);
+ state->ctx_dma_len = ctx->ctx_len;
state->ctx_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, state->caam_ctx,
ctx->ctx_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, state->ctx_dma)) {
@@ -4155,7 +4133,7 @@ static int ahash_update_first(struct aha
return ret;
unmap_ctx:
- ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, ctx->ctx_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ ahash_unmap_ctx(ctx->dev, edesc, req, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
qi_cache_free(edesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -4174,6 +4152,7 @@ static int ahash_init(struct ahash_reque
state->final = ahash_final_no_ctx;
state->ctx_dma = 0;
+ state->ctx_dma_len = 0;
state->current_buf = 0;
state->buf_dma = 0;
state->buflen_0 = 0;
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.h
@@ -160,14 +160,12 @@ struct skcipher_edesc {
/*
* ahash_edesc - s/w-extended ahash descriptor
- * @dst_dma: I/O virtual address of req->result
* @qm_sg_dma: I/O virtual address of h/w link table
* @src_nents: number of segments in input scatterlist
* @qm_sg_bytes: length of dma mapped qm_sg space
* @sgt: pointer to h/w link table
*/
struct ahash_edesc {
- dma_addr_t dst_dma;
dma_addr_t qm_sg_dma;
int src_nents;
int qm_sg_bytes;
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit dec3d0b1071a0f3194e66a83d26ecf4aa8c5910e upstream.
The ->digest() method of crct10dif-pclmul reads the current CRC value
from the shash_desc context. But this value is uninitialized, causing
crypto_shash_digest() to compute the wrong result. Fix it.
Probably this wasn't noticed before because lib/crc-t10dif.c only uses
crypto_shash_update(), not crypto_shash_digest(). Likewise,
crypto_shash_digest() is not yet tested by the crypto self-tests because
those only test the ahash API which only uses shash init/update/final.
Fixes: 0b95a7f85718 ("crypto: crct10dif - Glue code to cast accelerated CRCT10DIF assembly as a crypto transform")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.11+
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pclmul_glue.c | 13 +++++--------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pclmul_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crct10dif-pclmul_glue.c
@@ -76,15 +76,14 @@ static int chksum_final(struct shash_des
return 0;
}
-static int __chksum_finup(__u16 *crcp, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
- u8 *out)
+static int __chksum_finup(__u16 crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
if (irq_fpu_usable()) {
kernel_fpu_begin();
- *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_pcl(*crcp, data, len);
+ *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_pcl(crc, data, len);
kernel_fpu_end();
} else
- *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_generic(*crcp, data, len);
+ *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_generic(crc, data, len);
return 0;
}
@@ -93,15 +92,13 @@ static int chksum_finup(struct shash_des
{
struct chksum_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- return __chksum_finup(&ctx->crc, data, len, out);
+ return __chksum_finup(ctx->crc, data, len, out);
}
static int chksum_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int length, u8 *out)
{
- struct chksum_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-
- return __chksum_finup(&ctx->crc, data, length, out);
+ return __chksum_finup(0, data, length, out);
}
static struct shash_alg alg = {
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 307508d1072979f4435416f87936f87eaeb82054 upstream.
The ->digest() method of crct10dif-generic reads the current CRC value
from the shash_desc context. But this value is uninitialized, causing
crypto_shash_digest() to compute the wrong result. Fix it.
Probably this wasn't noticed before because lib/crc-t10dif.c only uses
crypto_shash_update(), not crypto_shash_digest(). Likewise,
crypto_shash_digest() is not yet tested by the crypto self-tests because
those only test the ahash API which only uses shash init/update/final.
This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.
Fixes: 2d31e518a428 ("crypto: crct10dif - Wrap crc_t10dif function all to use crypto transform framework")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.11+
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/crct10dif_generic.c | 11 ++++-------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/crct10dif_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/crct10dif_generic.c
@@ -65,10 +65,9 @@ static int chksum_final(struct shash_des
return 0;
}
-static int __chksum_finup(__u16 *crcp, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
- u8 *out)
+static int __chksum_finup(__u16 crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
- *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_generic(*crcp, data, len);
+ *(__u16 *)out = crc_t10dif_generic(crc, data, len);
return 0;
}
@@ -77,15 +76,13 @@ static int chksum_finup(struct shash_des
{
struct chksum_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- return __chksum_finup(&ctx->crc, data, len, out);
+ return __chksum_finup(ctx->crc, data, len, out);
}
static int chksum_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int length, u8 *out)
{
- struct chksum_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-
- return __chksum_finup(&ctx->crc, data, length, out);
+ return __chksum_finup(0, data, length, out);
}
static struct shash_alg alg = {
From: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
commit c4b22bf51b815fb61a35a27fc847a88bc28ebb63 upstream.
We were handling chained scattergather lists with specialized code
needlessly as the regular sg APIs handle them just fine. The code
handling this also had an (unused) code path with a use-before-init
error, flagged by Coverity.
Remove all special handling of chained sg and leave their handling
to the regular sg APIs.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c | 98 +++++++----------------------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
@@ -83,24 +83,17 @@ static void cc_copy_mac(struct device *d
*/
static unsigned int cc_get_sgl_nents(struct device *dev,
struct scatterlist *sg_list,
- unsigned int nbytes, u32 *lbytes,
- bool *is_chained)
+ unsigned int nbytes, u32 *lbytes)
{
unsigned int nents = 0;
while (nbytes && sg_list) {
- if (sg_list->length) {
- nents++;
- /* get the number of bytes in the last entry */
- *lbytes = nbytes;
- nbytes -= (sg_list->length > nbytes) ?
- nbytes : sg_list->length;
- sg_list = sg_next(sg_list);
- } else {
- sg_list = (struct scatterlist *)sg_page(sg_list);
- if (is_chained)
- *is_chained = true;
- }
+ nents++;
+ /* get the number of bytes in the last entry */
+ *lbytes = nbytes;
+ nbytes -= (sg_list->length > nbytes) ?
+ nbytes : sg_list->length;
+ sg_list = sg_next(sg_list);
}
dev_dbg(dev, "nents %d last bytes %d\n", nents, *lbytes);
return nents;
@@ -142,7 +135,7 @@ void cc_copy_sg_portion(struct device *d
{
u32 nents, lbytes;
- nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, sg, end, &lbytes, NULL);
+ nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, sg, end, &lbytes);
sg_copy_buffer(sg, nents, (void *)dest, (end - to_skip + 1), to_skip,
(direct == CC_SG_TO_BUF));
}
@@ -311,40 +304,10 @@ static void cc_add_sg_entry(struct devic
sgl_data->num_of_buffers++;
}
-static int cc_dma_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg, u32 nents,
- enum dma_data_direction direction)
-{
- u32 i, j;
- struct scatterlist *l_sg = sg;
-
- for (i = 0; i < nents; i++) {
- if (!l_sg)
- break;
- if (dma_map_sg(dev, l_sg, 1, direction) != 1) {
- dev_err(dev, "dma_map_page() sg buffer failed\n");
- goto err;
- }
- l_sg = sg_next(l_sg);
- }
- return nents;
-
-err:
- /* Restore mapped parts */
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- if (!sg)
- break;
- dma_unmap_sg(dev, sg, 1, direction);
- sg = sg_next(sg);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
static int cc_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
unsigned int nbytes, int direction, u32 *nents,
u32 max_sg_nents, u32 *lbytes, u32 *mapped_nents)
{
- bool is_chained = false;
-
if (sg_is_last(sg)) {
/* One entry only case -set to DLLI */
if (dma_map_sg(dev, sg, 1, direction) != 1) {
@@ -358,35 +321,21 @@ static int cc_map_sg(struct device *dev,
*nents = 1;
*mapped_nents = 1;
} else { /*sg_is_last*/
- *nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, sg, nbytes, lbytes,
- &is_chained);
+ *nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, sg, nbytes, lbytes);
if (*nents > max_sg_nents) {
*nents = 0;
dev_err(dev, "Too many fragments. current %d max %d\n",
*nents, max_sg_nents);
return -ENOMEM;
}
- if (!is_chained) {
- /* In case of mmu the number of mapped nents might
- * be changed from the original sgl nents
- */
- *mapped_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, sg, *nents, direction);
- if (*mapped_nents == 0) {
- *nents = 0;
- dev_err(dev, "dma_map_sg() sg buffer failed\n");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
- } else {
- /*In this case the driver maps entry by entry so it
- * must have the same nents before and after map
- */
- *mapped_nents = cc_dma_map_sg(dev, sg, *nents,
- direction);
- if (*mapped_nents != *nents) {
- *nents = *mapped_nents;
- dev_err(dev, "dma_map_sg() sg buffer failed\n");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ /* In case of mmu the number of mapped nents might
+ * be changed from the original sgl nents
+ */
+ *mapped_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, sg, *nents, direction);
+ if (*mapped_nents == 0) {
+ *nents = 0;
+ dev_err(dev, "dma_map_sg() sg buffer failed\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
}
@@ -571,7 +520,6 @@ void cc_unmap_aead_request(struct device
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct cc_drvdata *drvdata = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
u32 dummy;
- bool chained;
u32 size_to_unmap = 0;
if (areq_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr) {
@@ -636,15 +584,14 @@ void cc_unmap_aead_request(struct device
size_to_unmap += crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src,
- cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->src, size_to_unmap,
- &dummy, &chained),
+ cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->src, size_to_unmap, &dummy),
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (req->src != req->dst) {
dev_dbg(dev, "Unmapping dst sgl: req->dst=%pK\n",
sg_virt(req->dst));
dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst,
cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->dst, size_to_unmap,
- &dummy, &chained),
+ &dummy),
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
if (drvdata->coherent &&
@@ -1022,7 +969,6 @@ static int cc_aead_chain_data(struct cc_
unsigned int size_for_map = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
u32 sg_index = 0;
- bool chained = false;
bool is_gcm4543 = areq_ctx->is_gcm4543;
u32 size_to_skip = req->assoclen;
@@ -1043,7 +989,7 @@ static int cc_aead_chain_data(struct cc_
size_for_map += (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
authsize : 0;
src_mapped_nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->src, size_for_map,
- &src_last_bytes, &chained);
+ &src_last_bytes);
sg_index = areq_ctx->src_sgl->length;
//check where the data starts
while (sg_index <= size_to_skip) {
@@ -1085,7 +1031,7 @@ static int cc_aead_chain_data(struct cc_
}
dst_mapped_nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->dst, size_for_map,
- &dst_last_bytes, &chained);
+ &dst_last_bytes);
sg_index = areq_ctx->dst_sgl->length;
offset = size_to_skip;
@@ -1486,7 +1432,7 @@ int cc_map_hash_request_update(struct cc
dev_dbg(dev, " less than one block: curr_buff=%pK *curr_buff_cnt=0x%X copy_to=%pK\n",
curr_buff, *curr_buff_cnt, &curr_buff[*curr_buff_cnt]);
areq_ctx->in_nents =
- cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, src, nbytes, &dummy, NULL);
+ cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, src, nbytes, &dummy);
sg_copy_to_buffer(src, areq_ctx->in_nents,
&curr_buff[*curr_buff_cnt], nbytes);
*curr_buff_cnt += nbytes;
From: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
commit d263119387de9975d2acba1dfd3392f7c5979c18 upstream.
Currently, compat tasks running on arm64 can allocate memory up to
TASK_SIZE_32 (UL(0x100000000)).
This means that mmap() allocations, if we treat them as returning an
array, are not compliant with the sections 6.5.8 of the C standard
(C99) which states that: "If the expression P points to an element of
an array object and the expression Q points to the last element of the
same array object, the pointer expression Q+1 compares greater than P".
Redefine TASK_SIZE_32 to address the issue.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
[will: fixed typo in comment]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -57,7 +57,15 @@
#define TASK_SIZE_64 (UL(1) << vabits_user)
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES
+/*
+ * With CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES enabled, the last page is occupied
+ * by the compat vectors page.
+ */
#define TASK_SIZE_32 UL(0x100000000)
+#else
+#define TASK_SIZE_32 (UL(0x100000000) - PAGE_SIZE)
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES */
#define TASK_SIZE (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64)
#define TASK_SIZE_OF(tsk) (test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_32BIT) ? \
From: Shirish S <[email protected]>
commit 30aa3d26edb0f3d7992757287eec0ca588a5c259 upstream.
The MC4_MISC thresholding quirk needs to be applied during S5 -> S0 and
S3 -> S0 state transitions, which follow different code paths. Carve it
out into a separate function and call it mce_amd_feature_init() where
the two code paths of the state transitions converge.
[ bp: massage commit message and the carved out function. ]
Signed-off-by: Shirish S <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 29 -----------------------------
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
@@ -545,6 +545,40 @@ out:
return offset;
}
+/*
+ * Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding banks on all family 0x15 models since
+ * they're not supported there.
+ */
+void disable_err_thresholding(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int i;
+ u64 hwcr;
+ bool need_toggle;
+ u32 msrs[] = {
+ 0x00000413, /* MC4_MISC0 */
+ 0xc0000408, /* MC4_MISC1 */
+ };
+
+ if (c->x86 != 0x15)
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
+
+ /* McStatusWrEn has to be set */
+ need_toggle = !(hwcr & BIT(18));
+
+ if (need_toggle)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr | BIT(18));
+
+ /* Clear CntP bit safely */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs); i++)
+ msr_clear_bit(msrs[i], 62);
+
+ /* restore old settings */
+ if (need_toggle)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
+}
+
/* cpu init entry point, called from mce.c with preempt off */
void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
@@ -552,6 +586,8 @@ void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo
unsigned int bank, block, cpu = smp_processor_id();
int offset = -1;
+ disable_err_thresholding(c);
+
for (bank = 0; bank < mca_cfg.banks; ++bank) {
if (mce_flags.smca)
smca_configure(bank, cpu);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -1612,35 +1612,6 @@ static int __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks(str
if (c->x86 == 0x15 && c->x86_model <= 0xf)
mce_flags.overflow_recov = 1;
- /*
- * Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding banks on all models since
- * they're not supported there.
- */
- if (c->x86 == 0x15) {
- int i;
- u64 hwcr;
- bool need_toggle;
- u32 msrs[] = {
- 0x00000413, /* MC4_MISC0 */
- 0xc0000408, /* MC4_MISC1 */
- };
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
-
- /* McStatusWrEn has to be set */
- need_toggle = !(hwcr & BIT(18));
-
- if (need_toggle)
- wrmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr | BIT(18));
-
- /* Clear CntP bit safely */
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs); i++)
- msr_clear_bit(msrs[i], 62);
-
- /* restore old settings */
- if (need_toggle)
- wrmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
- }
}
if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit edaf28e996af69222b2cb40455dbb5459c2b875a upstream.
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
salsa20-generic doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to the alignmask
being removed by commit b62b3db76f73 ("crypto: salsa20-generic - cleanup
and convert to skcipher API").
Since salsa20-generic does not update the IV and does not need any IV
alignment, update it to use req->iv instead of walk.iv.
Fixes: 2407d60872dd ("[CRYPTO] salsa20: Salsa20 stream cipher")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int salsa20_crypt(struct skcipher
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
- salsa20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv);
+ salsa20_init(state, ctx, req->iv);
while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
From: Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
commit 25baaf8e2c93197d063b372ef7b62f2767c7ac0b upstream.
Commit 8efd972ef96a ("crypto: testmgr - support checking skcipher output IV")
caused the crypto4xx driver to produce the following error:
| ctr-aes-ppc4xx encryption test failed (wrong output IV)
| on test vector 0, cfg="in-place"
This patch fixes this by reworking the crypto4xx_setkey_aes()
function to:
- not save the iv for ECB (as per 18.2.38 CRYP0_SA_CMD_0:
"This bit mut be cleared for DES ECB mode or AES ECB mode,
when no IV is used.")
- instruct the hardware to save the generated IV for all
other modes of operations that have IV and then supply
it back to the callee in pretty much the same way as we
do it for cbc-aes already.
- make it clear that the DIR_(IN|OUT)BOUND is the important
bit that tells the hardware to encrypt or decrypt the data.
(this is cosmetic - but it hopefully prevents me from
getting confused again).
- don't load any bogus hash when we don't use any hash
operation to begin with.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: f2a13e7cba9e ("crypto: crypto4xx - enable AES RFC3686, ECB, CFB and OFB offloads")
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_alg.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_alg.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_alg.c
@@ -141,9 +141,10 @@ static int crypto4xx_setkey_aes(struct c
/* Setup SA */
sa = ctx->sa_in;
- set_dynamic_sa_command_0(sa, SA_NOT_SAVE_HASH, (cm == CRYPTO_MODE_CBC ?
- SA_SAVE_IV : SA_NOT_SAVE_IV),
- SA_LOAD_HASH_FROM_SA, SA_LOAD_IV_FROM_STATE,
+ set_dynamic_sa_command_0(sa, SA_NOT_SAVE_HASH, (cm == CRYPTO_MODE_ECB ?
+ SA_NOT_SAVE_IV : SA_SAVE_IV),
+ SA_NOT_LOAD_HASH, (cm == CRYPTO_MODE_ECB ?
+ SA_LOAD_IV_FROM_SA : SA_LOAD_IV_FROM_STATE),
SA_NO_HEADER_PROC, SA_HASH_ALG_NULL,
SA_CIPHER_ALG_AES, SA_PAD_TYPE_ZERO,
SA_OP_GROUP_BASIC, SA_OPCODE_DECRYPT,
@@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ static int crypto4xx_setkey_aes(struct c
memcpy(ctx->sa_out, ctx->sa_in, ctx->sa_len * 4);
sa = ctx->sa_out;
sa->sa_command_0.bf.dir = DIR_OUTBOUND;
+ /*
+ * SA_OPCODE_ENCRYPT is the same value as SA_OPCODE_DECRYPT.
+ * it's the DIR_(IN|OUT)BOUND that matters
+ */
+ sa->sa_command_0.bf.opcode = SA_OPCODE_ENCRYPT;
return 0;
}
From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
commit 9274c78305e12c5f461bec15f49c38e0f32ca705 upstream.
The ACEPC T8 and T11 Cherry Trail Z8350 mini PCs use an AXP288 and as PCs,
rather then portables, they does not have a battery. Still for some
reason the AXP288 not only thinks there is a battery, it actually
thinks it is discharging while the PC is running, slowly going to
0% full, causing userspace to shutdown the system due to the battery
being critically low after a while.
This commit adds the ACEPC T8 and T11 to the axp288 fuel-gauge driver
blacklist, so that we stop reporting bogus battery readings on this device.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1690852
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c
+++ b/drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c
@@ -696,6 +696,26 @@ intr_failed:
*/
static const struct dmi_system_id axp288_fuel_gauge_blacklist[] = {
{
+ /* ACEPC T8 Cherry Trail Z8350 mini PC */
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "To be filled by O.E.M."),
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "Cherry Trail CR"),
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_SKU, "T8"),
+ /* also match on somewhat unique bios-version */
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "1.000"),
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ /* ACEPC T11 Cherry Trail Z8350 mini PC */
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "To be filled by O.E.M."),
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "Cherry Trail CR"),
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_SKU, "T11"),
+ /* also match on somewhat unique bios-version */
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "1.000"),
+ },
+ },
+ {
/* Intel Cherry Trail Compute Stick, Windows version */
.matches = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"),
From: Wen Yang <[email protected]>
commit 629266bf7229cd6a550075f5961f95607b823b59 upstream.
The call to of_get_next_child returns a node pointer with refcount
incremented thus it must be explicitly decremented after the last
usage.
Detected by coccinelle with warnings like:
arch/arm/mach-exynos/firmware.c:201:2-8: ERROR: missing of_node_put;
acquired a node pointer with refcount incremented on line 193,
but without a corresponding object release within this function.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Wen Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/mach-exynos/firmware.c | 1 +
arch/arm/mach-exynos/suspend.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm/mach-exynos/firmware.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-exynos/firmware.c
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ bool __init exynos_secure_firmware_avail
return false;
addr = of_get_address(nd, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ of_node_put(nd);
if (!addr) {
pr_err("%s: No address specified.\n", __func__);
return false;
--- a/arch/arm/mach-exynos/suspend.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-exynos/suspend.c
@@ -639,8 +639,10 @@ void __init exynos_pm_init(void)
if (WARN_ON(!of_find_property(np, "interrupt-controller", NULL))) {
pr_warn("Outdated DT detected, suspend/resume will NOT work\n");
+ of_node_put(np);
return;
}
+ of_node_put(np);
pm_data = (const struct exynos_pm_data *) match->data;
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
commit c3422ad5f84a66739ec6a37251ca27638c85b6be upstream.
Currently there is no check on platform_get_irq() return value
in case it fails, hence never actually reporting any errors and
causing unexpected behavior when using such value as argument
for function regmap_irq_get_virq().
Fix this by adding a proper check, a message reporting any errors
and returning *pirq*
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1443940 ("Improper use of negative value")
Fixes: 843735b788a4 ("power: axp288_charger: axp288 charger driver")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c
+++ b/drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c
@@ -833,6 +833,10 @@ static int axp288_charger_probe(struct p
/* Register charger interrupts */
for (i = 0; i < CHRG_INTR_END; i++) {
pirq = platform_get_irq(info->pdev, i);
+ if (pirq < 0) {
+ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to get IRQ: %d\n", pirq);
+ return pirq;
+ }
info->irq[i] = regmap_irq_get_virq(info->regmap_irqc, pirq);
if (info->irq[i] < 0) {
dev_warn(&info->pdev->dev,
From: Sylwester Nawrocki <[email protected]>
commit 9b23e1a3e8fde76e8cc0e366ab1ed4ffb4440feb upstream.
The name of CODEC input widget to which microphone is connected through
the "Headphone" jack is "IN12" not "IN1". This fixes microphone support
on Odroid XU3.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Sylwester Nawrocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
"Headphone Jack", "HPL",
"Headphone Jack", "HPR",
"Headphone Jack", "MICBIAS",
- "IN1", "Headphone Jack",
+ "IN12", "Headphone Jack",
"Speakers", "SPKL",
"Speakers", "SPKR";
From: Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
commit b7ed69d67ff0788d8463e599dd5dd1b45c701a7e upstream.
Fix the interrupt information for the GPIO lines with a shared EINT
interrupt.
Fixes: 16d7ff2642e7 ("ARM: dts: add dts files for exynos5260 SoC")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stuart Menefy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
wakeup-interrupt-controller {
compatible = "samsung,exynos4210-wakeup-eint";
interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
- interrupts = <GIC_SPI 32 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+ interrupts = <GIC_SPI 48 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
};
From: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
commit 71a84402b93e5fbd8f817f40059c137e10171788 upstream.
AMD family 17h Models 10h-2Fh may report a high number of L1 BTB MCA
errors under certain conditions. The errors are benign and can safely be
ignored. However, the high error rate may cause the MCA threshold
counter to overflow causing a high rate of thresholding interrupts.
In addition, users may see the errors reported through the AMD MCE
decoder module, even with the interrupt disabled, due to MCA polling.
Clear the "Counter Present" bit in the Instruction Fetch bank's
MCA_MISC0 register. This will prevent enabling MCA thresholding on this
bank which will prevent the high interrupt rate due to this error.
Define an AMD-specific function to filter these errors from the MCE
event pool so that they don't get reported during early boot.
Rename filter function in EDAC/mce_amd to avoid a naming conflict, while
at it.
[ bp: Move function prototype to the internal header and
massage/cleanup, fix typos. ]
Reported-by: Rafał Miłecki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morse <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Cc: Pu Wen <[email protected]>
Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <[email protected]>
Cc: Shirish S <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Cc: linux-edac <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.0.x: c95b323dcd35: x86/MCE/AMD: Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding on all family 0x15 models
Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.0.x: 30aa3d26edb0: x86/MCE/AMD: Carve out the MC4_MISC thresholding quirk
Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.0.x: 9308fd407455: x86/MCE: Group AMD function prototypes in <asm/mce.h>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.0.x
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h | 6 ++++
drivers/edac/mce_amd.c | 4 +-
4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
@@ -545,33 +545,59 @@ out:
return offset;
}
+bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ enum smca_bank_types bank_type = smca_get_bank_type(m->bank);
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+ u8 xec = (m->status >> 16) & 0x3F;
+
+ /* See Family 17h Models 10h-2Fh Erratum #1114. */
+ if (c->x86 == 0x17 &&
+ c->x86_model >= 0x10 && c->x86_model <= 0x2F &&
+ bank_type == SMCA_IF && xec == 10)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
- * Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding banks on all family 0x15 models since
- * they're not supported there.
+ * Turn off thresholding banks for the following conditions:
+ * - MC4_MISC thresholding is not supported on Family 0x15.
+ * - Prevent possible spurious interrupts from the IF bank on Family 0x17
+ * Models 0x10-0x2F due to Erratum #1114.
*/
-void disable_err_thresholding(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+void disable_err_thresholding(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int bank)
{
- int i;
+ int i, num_msrs;
u64 hwcr;
bool need_toggle;
- u32 msrs[] = {
- 0x00000413, /* MC4_MISC0 */
- 0xc0000408, /* MC4_MISC1 */
- };
+ u32 msrs[NR_BLOCKS];
- if (c->x86 != 0x15)
+ if (c->x86 == 0x15 && bank == 4) {
+ msrs[0] = 0x00000413; /* MC4_MISC0 */
+ msrs[1] = 0xc0000408; /* MC4_MISC1 */
+ num_msrs = 2;
+ } else if (c->x86 == 0x17 &&
+ (c->x86_model >= 0x10 && c->x86_model <= 0x2F)) {
+
+ if (smca_get_bank_type(bank) != SMCA_IF)
+ return;
+
+ msrs[0] = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank);
+ num_msrs = 1;
+ } else {
return;
+ }
rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
/* McStatusWrEn has to be set */
need_toggle = !(hwcr & BIT(18));
-
if (need_toggle)
wrmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr | BIT(18));
/* Clear CntP bit safely */
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < num_msrs; i++)
msr_clear_bit(msrs[i], 62);
/* restore old settings */
@@ -586,12 +612,12 @@ void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo
unsigned int bank, block, cpu = smp_processor_id();
int offset = -1;
- disable_err_thresholding(c);
-
for (bank = 0; bank < mca_cfg.banks; ++bank) {
if (mce_flags.smca)
smca_configure(bank, cpu);
+ disable_err_thresholding(c, bank);
+
for (block = 0; block < NR_BLOCKS; ++block) {
address = get_block_address(address, low, high, bank, block);
if (!address)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -1773,6 +1773,9 @@ static void __mcheck_cpu_init_timer(void
bool filter_mce(struct mce *m)
{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ return amd_filter_mce(m);
+
return false;
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
@@ -176,4 +176,10 @@ extern struct mca_msr_regs msr_ops;
/* Decide whether to add MCE record to MCE event pool or filter it out. */
extern bool filter_mce(struct mce *m);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_AMD
+extern bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m);
+#else
+static inline bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m) { return false; };
+#endif
+
#endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
--- a/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c
+++ b/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c
@@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ static inline void amd_decode_err_code(u
/*
* Filter out unwanted MCE signatures here.
*/
-static bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m)
+static bool ignore_mce(struct mce *m)
{
/*
* NB GART TLB error reporting is disabled by default.
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ amd_decode_mce(struct notifier_block *nb
unsigned int fam = x86_family(m->cpuid);
int ecc;
- if (amd_filter_mce(m))
+ if (ignore_mce(m))
return NOTIFY_STOP;
pr_emerg(HW_ERR "%s\n", decode_error_status(m));
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 5e27f38f1f3f45a0c938299c3a34a2d2db77165a upstream.
If the rfc7539 template is instantiated with specific implementations,
e.g. "rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic)" rather than
"rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", then the implementation names end up
included in the instance's cra_name. This is incorrect because it then
prevents all users from allocating "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", if the
highest priority implementations of chacha20 and poly1305 were selected.
Also, the self-tests aren't run on an instance allocated in this way.
Fix it by setting the instance's cra_name from the underlying
algorithms' actual cra_names, rather than from the requested names.
This matches what other templates do.
Fixes: 71ebc4d1b27d ("crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Add a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction, RFC7539")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.2+
Cc: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -645,8 +645,8 @@ static int chachapoly_create(struct cryp
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha_name,
- poly_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ "%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha->base.cra_name,
+ poly->cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto out_drop_chacha;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha->base.cra_driver_name,
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851 upstream.
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and unconditionally accessing walk.iv has caused a
real problem in other algorithms. Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to start
checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().
Fixes: 1abee99eafab ("crypto: arm64/aes - reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ static int __xts_crypt(struct skcipher_r
int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
kernel_neon_begin();
neon_aes_ecb_encrypt(walk.iv, walk.iv, ctx->twkey, ctx->key.rounds, 1);
From: Hui Wang <[email protected]>
commit 8c2e6728c2bf95765b724e07d0278ae97cd1ee0d upstream.
The driver will check the monitor presence when resuming from suspend,
starting poll or interrupt triggers. In these 3 situations, the
jack_dirty will be set to 1 first, then the hda_jack.c reads the
pin_sense from register, after reading the register, the jack_dirty
will be set to 0. But hdmi_repoll_work() is enabled in these 3
situations, It will read the pin_sense a couple of times subsequently,
since the jack_dirty is 0 now, It does not read the register anymore,
instead it uses the shadow pin_sense which is read at the first time.
It is meaningless to check the shadow pin_sense a couple of times,
we need to read the register to check the real plugging state, so
we set the jack_dirty to 1 in the hdmi_repoll_work().
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
@@ -1660,6 +1660,11 @@ static void hdmi_repoll_eld(struct work_
container_of(to_delayed_work(work), struct hdmi_spec_per_pin, work);
struct hda_codec *codec = per_pin->codec;
struct hdmi_spec *spec = codec->spec;
+ struct hda_jack_tbl *jack;
+
+ jack = snd_hda_jack_tbl_get(codec, per_pin->pin_nid);
+ if (jack)
+ jack->jack_dirty = 1;
if (per_pin->repoll_count++ > 6)
per_pin->repoll_count = 0;
From: Hui Wang <[email protected]>
commit 7f641e26a6df9269cb25dd7a4b0a91d6586ed441 upstream.
On the machines with AMD GPU or Nvidia GPU, we often meet this issue:
after s3, there are 4 HDMI/DP audio devices in the gnome-sound-setting
even there is no any monitors plugged.
When this problem happens, we check the /proc/asound/cardX/eld#N.M, we
will find the monitor_present=1, eld_valid=0.
The root cause is BIOS or GPU driver makes the PRESENCE valid even no
monitor plugged, and of course the driver will not get the valid
eld_data subsequently.
In this situation, we should not report the jack_plugged event, to do
so, let us change the function hdmi_present_sense_via_verbs(). In this
function, it reads the pin_sense via snd_hda_pin_sense(), after
calling this function, the jack_dirty is 0, and before exiting
via_verbs(), we change the shadow pin_sense according to both
monitor_present and eld_valid, then in the snd_hda_jack_report_sync(),
since the jack_dirty is still 0, it will report jack event according
to this modified shadow pin_sense.
After this change, the driver will not report Jack_is_plugged event
through hdmi_present_sense_via_verbs() if monitor_present is 1 and
eld_valid is 0.
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c
@@ -1548,9 +1548,11 @@ static bool hdmi_present_sense_via_verbs
ret = !repoll || !eld->monitor_present || eld->eld_valid;
jack = snd_hda_jack_tbl_get(codec, pin_nid);
- if (jack)
+ if (jack) {
jack->block_report = !ret;
-
+ jack->pin_sense = (eld->monitor_present && eld->eld_valid) ?
+ AC_PINSENSE_PRESENCE : 0;
+ }
mutex_unlock(&per_pin->lock);
return ret;
}
From: Shirish S <[email protected]>
commit c95b323dcd3598dd7ef5005d6723c1ba3b801093 upstream.
MC4_MISC thresholding is not supported on all family 0x15 processors,
hence skip the x86_model check when applying the quirk.
[ bp: massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Shirish S <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -1613,11 +1613,10 @@ static int __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks(str
mce_flags.overflow_recov = 1;
/*
- * Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding banks on those models since
+ * Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding banks on all models since
* they're not supported there.
*/
- if (c->x86 == 0x15 &&
- (c->x86_model >= 0x10 && c->x86_model <= 0x1f)) {
+ if (c->x86 == 0x15) {
int i;
u64 hwcr;
bool need_toggle;
From: Kai Shen <[email protected]>
commit 2bf753e64b4a702e27ce26ff520c59563c62f96b upstream.
spinlock recursion happened when do LTP test:
#!/bin/bash
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
./runltp -p -f hugetlb &
The dtor returned by get_compound_page_dtor in __put_compound_page may be
the function of free_huge_page which will lock the hugetlb_lock, so don't
put_page in lock of hugetlb_lock.
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, hugemmap05/1079
lock: hugetlb_lock+0x0/0x18, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: hugemmap05/1079, .owner_cpu: 0
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198
show_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc
spin_dump+0x84/0xa8
do_raw_spin_lock+0xd0/0x108
_raw_spin_lock+0x20/0x30
free_huge_page+0x9c/0x260
__put_compound_page+0x44/0x50
__put_page+0x2c/0x60
alloc_surplus_huge_page.constprop.19+0xf0/0x140
hugetlb_acct_memory+0x104/0x378
hugetlb_reserve_pages+0xe0/0x250
hugetlbfs_file_mmap+0xc0/0x140
mmap_region+0x3e8/0x5b0
do_mmap+0x280/0x460
vm_mmap_pgoff+0xf4/0x128
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0xb4/0x258
__arm64_sys_mmap+0x34/0x48
el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
el0_svc+0x8/0xc
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 9980d744a0 ("mm, hugetlb: get rid of surplus page accounting tricks")
Signed-off-by: Kai Shen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Feilong Lin <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Wang Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/hugetlb.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -1573,8 +1573,9 @@ static struct page *alloc_surplus_huge_p
*/
if (h->surplus_huge_pages >= h->nr_overcommit_huge_pages) {
SetPageHugeTemporary(page);
+ spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
put_page(page);
- page = NULL;
+ return NULL;
} else {
h->surplus_huge_pages++;
h->surplus_huge_pages_node[page_to_nid(page)]++;
From: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]>
commit 2b75ebeea6f4937d4d05ec4982c471cef9a29b7f upstream.
It was observed that reads crossing 4K address boundary are failing.
This limitation is mentioned in Intel documents:
Intel(R) 9 Series Chipset Family Platform Controller Hub (PCH) Datasheet:
"5.26.3 Flash Access
Program Register Access:
* Program Register Accesses are not allowed to cross a 4 KB boundary..."
Enhanced Serial Peripheral Interface (eSPI)
Interface Base Specification (for Client and Server Platforms):
"5.1.4 Address
For other memory transactions, the address may start or end at any byte
boundary. However, the address and payload length combination must not
cross the naturally aligned address boundary of the corresponding Maximum
Payload Size. It must not cross a 4 KB address boundary."
Avoid this by splitting an operation crossing the boundary into two
operations.
Fixes: 8afda8b26d01 ("spi-nor: Add support for Intel SPI serial flash controller")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Romain Porte <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pascal Fabreges <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/intel-spi.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/intel-spi.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/intel-spi.c
@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ static ssize_t intel_spi_read(struct spi
while (len > 0) {
block_size = min_t(size_t, len, INTEL_SPI_FIFO_SZ);
+ /* Read cannot cross 4K boundary */
+ block_size = min_t(loff_t, from + block_size,
+ round_up(from + 1, SZ_4K)) - from;
+
writel(from, ispi->base + FADDR);
val = readl(ispi->base + HSFSTS_CTL);
@@ -685,6 +689,10 @@ static ssize_t intel_spi_write(struct sp
while (len > 0) {
block_size = min_t(size_t, len, INTEL_SPI_FIFO_SZ);
+ /* Write cannot cross 4K boundary */
+ block_size = min_t(loff_t, to + block_size,
+ round_up(to + 1, SZ_4K)) - to;
+
writel(to, ispi->base + FADDR);
val = readl(ispi->base + HSFSTS_CTL);
From: Christoph Muellner <[email protected]>
commit 7bda9482e7ed4d27d83c1f9cb5cbe3b34ddac3e8 upstream.
Direct commands (DCMDs) are an optional feature of eMMC 5.1's command
queue engine (CQE). The Arasan eMMC 5.1 controller uses the CQHCI,
which exposes a control register bit to enable the feature.
The current implementation sets this bit unconditionally.
This patch allows to suppress the feature activation,
by specifying the property disable-cqe-dcmd.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Muellner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Tomsich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Fixes: 84362d79f436 ("mmc: sdhci-of-arasan: Add CQHCI support for arasan,sdhci-5.1")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-arasan.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-arasan.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-arasan.c
@@ -832,7 +832,10 @@ static int sdhci_arasan_probe(struct pla
host->mmc_host_ops.start_signal_voltage_switch =
sdhci_arasan_voltage_switch;
sdhci_arasan->has_cqe = true;
- host->mmc->caps2 |= MMC_CAP2_CQE | MMC_CAP2_CQE_DCMD;
+ host->mmc->caps2 |= MMC_CAP2_CQE;
+
+ if (!of_property_read_bool(np, "disable-cqe-dcmd"))
+ host->mmc->caps2 |= MMC_CAP2_CQE_DCMD;
}
ret = sdhci_arasan_add_host(sdhci_arasan);
From: Christoph Muellner <[email protected]>
commit a3eec13b8fd2b9791a21fa16e38dfea8111579bf upstream.
When using direct commands (DCMDs) on an RK3399, we get spurious
CQE completion interrupts for the DCMD transaction slot (#31):
[ 931.196520] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 931.201702] mmc1: cqhci: spurious TCN for tag 31
[ 931.206906] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1433 at /usr/src/kernel/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci.c:725 cqhci_irq+0x2e4/0x490
[ 931.206909] Modules linked in:
[ 931.206918] CPU: 0 PID: 1433 Comm: irq/29-mmc1 Not tainted 4.19.8-rt6-funkadelic #1
[ 931.206920] Hardware name: Theobroma Systems RK3399-Q7 SoM (DT)
[ 931.206924] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 931.206927] pc : cqhci_irq+0x2e4/0x490
[ 931.206931] lr : cqhci_irq+0x2e4/0x490
[ 931.206933] sp : ffff00000e54bc80
[ 931.206934] x29: ffff00000e54bc80 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 931.206939] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: ffff000008f217e8
[ 931.206944] x25: ffff8000f02ef030 x24: ffff0000091417b0
[ 931.206948] x23: ffff0000090aa000 x22: ffff8000f008b000
[ 931.206953] x21: 0000000000000002 x20: 000000000000001f
[ 931.206957] x19: ffff8000f02ef018 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 931.206961] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 931.206966] x15: ffff0000090aa6c8 x14: 0720072007200720
[ 931.206970] x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072007200720
[ 931.206975] x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720
[ 931.206980] x9 : 0720072007200720 x8 : 0720072007200720
[ 931.206984] x7 : 0720073107330720 x6 : 00000000000005a0
[ 931.206988] x5 : ffff00000860d4b0 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 931.206993] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000001
[ 931.206997] x1 : 1bde3a91b0d4d900 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 931.207001] Call trace:
[ 931.207005] cqhci_irq+0x2e4/0x490
[ 931.207009] sdhci_arasan_cqhci_irq+0x5c/0x90
[ 931.207013] sdhci_irq+0x98/0x930
[ 931.207019] irq_forced_thread_fn+0x2c/0xa0
[ 931.207023] irq_thread+0x114/0x1c0
[ 931.207027] kthread+0x128/0x130
[ 931.207032] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 931.207035] ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]---
The driver shows this message only for the first spurious interrupt
by using WARN_ONCE(). Changing this to WARN() shows, that this is
happening quite frequently (up to once a second).
Since the eMMC 5.1 specification, where CQE and CQHCI are specified,
does not mention that spurious TCN interrupts for DCMDs can be simply
ignored, we must assume that using this feature is not working reliably.
The current implementation uses DCMD for REQ_OP_FLUSH only, and
I could not see any performance/power impact when disabling
this optional feature for RK3399.
Therefore this patch disables DCMDs for RK3399.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Muellner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Tomsich <[email protected]>
Fixes: 84362d79f436 ("mmc: sdhci-of-arasan: Add CQHCI support for arasan,sdhci-5.1")
Cc: [email protected]
[the corresponding code changes are queued for 5.2 so doing that as well]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi
@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@
phys = <&emmc_phy>;
phy-names = "phy_arasan";
power-domains = <&power RK3399_PD_EMMC>;
+ disable-cqe-dcmd;
status = "disabled";
};
From: Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
commit f3e35357cd460a8aeb48b8113dc4b761a7d5c828 upstream.
David Bauer reported that the VDSL modem (attached via PCIe)
on his AVM Fritz!Box 7530 was complaining about not having
enough space in the BAR. A closer inspection of the old
qcom-ipq40xx.dtsi pulled from the GL-iNet repository listed:
| qcom,pcie@80000 {
| compatible = "qcom,msm_pcie";
| reg = <0x80000 0x2000>,
| <0x99000 0x800>,
| <0x40000000 0xf1d>,
| <0x40000f20 0xa8>,
| <0x40100000 0x1000>,
| <0x40200000 0x100000>,
| <0x40300000 0xd00000>;
| reg-names = "parf", "phy", "dm_core", "elbi",
| "conf", "io", "bars";
Matching the reg-names with the listed reg leads to
<0xd00000> as the size for the "bars".
Cc: [email protected]
BugLink: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg45212.html
Reported-by: David Bauer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/qcom-ipq4019.dtsi | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/qcom-ipq4019.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/qcom-ipq4019.dtsi
@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;
- ranges = <0x81000000 0 0x40200000 0x40200000 0 0x00100000
- 0x82000000 0 0x40300000 0x40300000 0 0x400000>;
+ ranges = <0x81000000 0 0x40200000 0x40200000 0 0x00100000>,
+ <0x82000000 0 0x40300000 0x40300000 0 0x00d00000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 141 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>;
interrupt-names = "msi";
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 580e295178402d14bbf598a5702f8e01fc59dbaa upstream.
The arm64 gcm-aes-ce algorithm is failing the extra crypto self-tests
following my patches to test the !may_use_simd() code paths, which
previously were untested. The problem is that in the !may_use_simd()
case, an odd number of AES blocks can be processed within each step of
the skcipher_walk. However, the skcipher_walk is being done with a
"stride" of 2 blocks and is advanced by an even number of blocks after
each step. This causes the encryption to produce the wrong ciphertext
and authentication tag, and causes the decryption to incorrectly fail.
Fix it by only processing an even number of blocks per step.
Fixes: c2b24c36e0a3 ("crypto: arm64/aes-gcm-ce - fix scatterwalk API violation")
Fixes: 71e52c278c54 ("crypto: arm64/aes-ce-gcm - operate on two input blocks at a time")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c
@@ -418,9 +418,11 @@ static int gcm_encrypt(struct aead_reque
put_unaligned_be32(2, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE);
while (walk.nbytes >= (2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
- int blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ const int blocks =
+ walk.nbytes / (2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) * 2;
u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr;
+ int remaining = blocks;
do {
__aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc,
@@ -430,9 +432,9 @@ static int gcm_encrypt(struct aead_reque
dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- } while (--blocks > 0);
+ } while (--remaining > 0);
- ghash_do_update(walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dg,
+ ghash_do_update(blocks, dg,
walk.dst.virt.addr, &ctx->ghash_key,
NULL);
@@ -553,7 +555,7 @@ static int gcm_decrypt(struct aead_reque
put_unaligned_be32(2, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE);
while (walk.nbytes >= (2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
- int blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ int blocks = walk.nbytes / (2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) * 2;
u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr;
From: Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
commit 92cd1667d579af5c3ef383680598a112da3695df upstream.
ddr_signaling is set to true for DDR50 and DDR52 modes but is
not set back to false for other modes. This programs incorrect
host clock when mode change happens from DDR52/DDR50 to other
SDR or HS modes like incase of mmc_retune where it switches
from HS400 to HS DDR and then from HS DDR to HS mode and then
to HS200.
This patch fixes the ddr_signaling to set properly for non DDR
modes.
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.20 +
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-tegra.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-tegra.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-tegra.c
@@ -675,6 +675,7 @@ static void tegra_sdhci_set_uhs_signalin
bool set_dqs_trim = false;
bool do_hs400_dll_cal = false;
+ tegra_host->ddr_signaling = false;
switch (timing) {
case MMC_TIMING_UHS_SDR50:
case MMC_TIMING_UHS_SDR104:
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit f699594d436960160f6d5ba84ed4a222f20d11cd upstream.
GCM instances can be created by either the "gcm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "gcm(aes)"; or by "gcm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and ghash implementations, e.g.
"gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)".
However, a "gcm_base" instance prevents a "gcm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "gcm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "gcm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "gcm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"gcm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "gcm" instances, e.g.
"gcm(aes)" instead of "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
algorithm. It also requires starting to verify that the algorithms are
really ctr and ghash, not something else entirely. But it would be
bizarre if anyone were actually using non-gcm-compatible algorithms with
gcm_base, so this shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: d00aa19b507b ("[CRYPTO] gcm: Allow block cipher parameter")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/gcm.c | 34 +++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -597,7 +597,6 @@ static void crypto_gcm_free(struct aead_
static int crypto_gcm_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct rtattr **tb,
- const char *full_name,
const char *ctr_name,
const char *ghash_name)
{
@@ -638,7 +637,8 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create_common(stru
goto err_free_inst;
err = -EINVAL;
- if (ghash->digestsize != 16)
+ if (strcmp(ghash->base.cra_name, "ghash") != 0 ||
+ ghash->digestsize != 16)
goto err_drop_ghash;
crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ctx->ctr, aead_crypto_instance(inst));
@@ -650,24 +650,24 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create_common(stru
ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ctx->ctr);
- /* We only support 16-byte blocks. */
+ /* The skcipher algorithm must be CTR mode, using 16-byte blocks. */
err = -EINVAL;
- if (crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(ctr) != 16)
+ if (strncmp(ctr->base.cra_name, "ctr(", 4) != 0 ||
+ crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(ctr) != 16 ||
+ ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
goto out_put_ctr;
- /* Not a stream cipher? */
- if (ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
+ err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "gcm(%s", ctr->base.cra_name + 4) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto out_put_ctr;
- err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"gcm_base(%s,%s)", ctr->base.cra_driver_name,
ghash_alg->cra_driver_name) >=
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto out_put_ctr;
- memcpy(inst->alg.base.cra_name, full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
-
inst->alg.base.cra_flags = (ghash->base.cra_flags |
ctr->base.cra_flags) & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = (ghash->base.cra_priority +
@@ -709,7 +709,6 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create(struct cryp
{
const char *cipher_name;
char ctr_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
- char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(cipher_name))
@@ -719,12 +718,7 @@ static int crypto_gcm_create(struct cryp
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
- if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "gcm(%s)", cipher_name) >=
- CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-
- return crypto_gcm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name,
- ctr_name, "ghash");
+ return crypto_gcm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, "ghash");
}
static struct crypto_template crypto_gcm_tmpl = {
@@ -738,7 +732,6 @@ static int crypto_gcm_base_create(struct
{
const char *ctr_name;
const char *ghash_name;
- char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
ctr_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(ctr_name))
@@ -748,12 +741,7 @@ static int crypto_gcm_base_create(struct
if (IS_ERR(ghash_name))
return PTR_ERR(ghash_name);
- if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "gcm_base(%s,%s)",
- ctr_name, ghash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-
- return crypto_gcm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name,
- ctr_name, ghash_name);
+ return crypto_gcm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, ghash_name);
}
static struct crypto_template crypto_gcm_base_tmpl = {
From: Libin Yang <[email protected]>
commit 01c8327667c249818d3712c3e25c7ad2aca7f389 upstream.
In resume from S3, HDAC HDMI codec driver dapm event callback may be
operated before HDMI codec driver turns on the display audio power
domain because of the contest between display driver and hdmi codec driver.
This patch adds the device_link between soc card device (consumer) and
hdmi codec device (supplier) to make sure the sequence is always correct.
Signed-off-by: Libin Yang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/soc/codecs/hdac_hdmi.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/hdac_hdmi.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/hdac_hdmi.c
@@ -1872,6 +1872,17 @@ static int hdmi_codec_probe(struct snd_s
hdmi->card = dapm->card->snd_card;
/*
+ * Setup a device_link between card device and HDMI codec device.
+ * The card device is the consumer and the HDMI codec device is
+ * the supplier. With this setting, we can make sure that the audio
+ * domain in display power will be always turned on before operating
+ * on the HDMI audio codec registers.
+ * Let's use the flag DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER. This can make
+ * sure the device link is freed when the machine driver is removed.
+ */
+ device_link_add(component->card->dev, &hdev->dev, DL_FLAG_RPM_ACTIVE |
+ DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER);
+ /*
* hdac_device core already sets the state to active and calls
* get_noresume. So enable runtime and set the device to suspend.
*/
From: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
commit ecb2795c08bc825ebd604997e5be440b060c5b18 upstream.
The max98090 driver defines 3 DAPM muxes; one for the right line output
(LINMOD Mux), one for the left headphone mixer source (MIXHPLSEL Mux)
and one for the right headphone mixer source (MIXHPRSEL Mux). The same
bit is used for the mux as well as the DAPM enable, and although the mux
can be correctly configured, after playback has completed, the mux will
be reset during the disable phase. This is preventing the state of these
muxes from being saved and restored correctly on system reboot. Fix this
by marking these muxes as SND_SOC_NOPM.
Note this has been verified this on the Tegra124 Nyan Big which features
the MAX98090 codec.
Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/max98090.c
@@ -1209,14 +1209,14 @@ static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget
&max98090_right_rcv_mixer_controls[0],
ARRAY_SIZE(max98090_right_rcv_mixer_controls)),
- SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("LINMOD Mux", M98090_REG_LOUTR_MIXER,
- M98090_LINMOD_SHIFT, 0, &max98090_linmod_mux),
+ SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("LINMOD Mux", SND_SOC_NOPM, 0, 0,
+ &max98090_linmod_mux),
- SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("MIXHPLSEL Mux", M98090_REG_HP_CONTROL,
- M98090_MIXHPLSEL_SHIFT, 0, &max98090_mixhplsel_mux),
+ SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("MIXHPLSEL Mux", SND_SOC_NOPM, 0, 0,
+ &max98090_mixhplsel_mux),
- SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("MIXHPRSEL Mux", M98090_REG_HP_CONTROL,
- M98090_MIXHPRSEL_SHIFT, 0, &max98090_mixhprsel_mux),
+ SND_SOC_DAPM_MUX("MIXHPRSEL Mux", SND_SOC_NOPM, 0, 0,
+ &max98090_mixhprsel_mux),
SND_SOC_DAPM_PGA("HP Left Out", M98090_REG_OUTPUT_ENABLE,
M98090_HPLEN_SHIFT, 0, NULL, 0),
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit fce86ff5802bac3a7b19db171aa1949ef9caac31 upstream.
Starting with c6f3c5ee40c1 ("mm/huge_memory.c: fix modifying of page
protection by insert_pfn_pmd()") vmf_insert_pfn_pmd() internally calls
pmdp_set_access_flags(). That helper enforces a pmd aligned @address
argument via VM_BUG_ON() assertion.
Update the implementation to take a 'struct vm_fault' argument directly
and apply the address alignment fixup internally to fix crash signatures
like:
kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:515!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 51 PID: 43713 Comm: java Tainted: G OE 4.19.35 #1
[..]
RIP: 0010:pmdp_set_access_flags+0x48/0x50
[..]
Call Trace:
vmf_insert_pfn_pmd+0x198/0x350
dax_iomap_fault+0xe82/0x1190
ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x103/0x1f0
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
__handle_mm_fault+0x3f6/0x1370
? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
handle_mm_fault+0xda/0x200
__do_page_fault+0x249/0x4f0
do_page_fault+0x32/0x110
? page_fault+0x8/0x30
page_fault+0x1e/0x30
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155741946350.372037.11148198430068238140.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Fixes: c6f3c5ee40c1 ("mm/huge_memory.c: fix modifying of page protection by insert_pfn_pmd()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Piotr Balcer <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yan Ma <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Chandan Rajendra <[email protected]>
Cc: Souptick Joarder <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/dax/device.c | 6 ++----
fs/dax.c | 6 ++----
include/linux/huge_mm.h | 6 ++----
mm/huge_memory.c | 16 ++++++++++------
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/dax/device.c
+++ b/drivers/dax/device.c
@@ -325,8 +325,7 @@ static vm_fault_t __dev_dax_pmd_fault(st
*pfn = phys_to_pfn_t(phys, dax_region->pfn_flags);
- return vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf->vma, vmf->address, vmf->pmd, *pfn,
- vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
+ return vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf, *pfn, vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD
@@ -376,8 +375,7 @@ static vm_fault_t __dev_dax_pud_fault(st
*pfn = phys_to_pfn_t(phys, dax_region->pfn_flags);
- return vmf_insert_pfn_pud(vmf->vma, vmf->address, vmf->pud, *pfn,
- vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
+ return vmf_insert_pfn_pud(vmf, *pfn, vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
}
#else
static vm_fault_t __dev_dax_pud_fault(struct dev_dax *dev_dax,
--- a/fs/dax.c
+++ b/fs/dax.c
@@ -1577,8 +1577,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(st
}
trace_dax_pmd_insert_mapping(inode, vmf, PMD_SIZE, pfn, entry);
- result = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pmd, pfn,
- write);
+ result = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf, pfn, write);
break;
case IOMAP_UNWRITTEN:
case IOMAP_HOLE:
@@ -1688,8 +1687,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *
ret = vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite(vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD
else if (order == PMD_ORDER)
- ret = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf->vma, vmf->address, vmf->pmd,
- pfn, true);
+ ret = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf, pfn, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
#endif
else
ret = VM_FAULT_FALLBACK;
--- a/include/linux/huge_mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/huge_mm.h
@@ -47,10 +47,8 @@ extern bool move_huge_pmd(struct vm_area
extern int change_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, pgprot_t newprot,
int prot_numa);
-vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
- pmd_t *pmd, pfn_t pfn, bool write);
-vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pud(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
- pud_t *pud, pfn_t pfn, bool write);
+vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, bool write);
+vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pud(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, bool write);
enum transparent_hugepage_flag {
TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_FLAG,
TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_REQ_MADV_FLAG,
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -791,11 +791,13 @@ out_unlock:
pte_free(mm, pgtable);
}
-vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
- pmd_t *pmd, pfn_t pfn, bool write)
+vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, bool write)
{
+ unsigned long addr = vmf->address & PMD_MASK;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
pgprot_t pgprot = vma->vm_page_prot;
pgtable_t pgtable = NULL;
+
/*
* If we had pmd_special, we could avoid all these restrictions,
* but we need to be consistent with PTEs and architectures that
@@ -818,7 +820,7 @@ vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(struct vm_
track_pfn_insert(vma, &pgprot, pfn);
- insert_pfn_pmd(vma, addr, pmd, pfn, pgprot, write, pgtable);
+ insert_pfn_pmd(vma, addr, vmf->pmd, pfn, pgprot, write, pgtable);
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vmf_insert_pfn_pmd);
@@ -867,10 +869,12 @@ out_unlock:
spin_unlock(ptl);
}
-vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pud(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
- pud_t *pud, pfn_t pfn, bool write)
+vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pud(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, bool write)
{
+ unsigned long addr = vmf->address & PUD_MASK;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
pgprot_t pgprot = vma->vm_page_prot;
+
/*
* If we had pud_special, we could avoid all these restrictions,
* but we need to be consistent with PTEs and architectures that
@@ -887,7 +891,7 @@ vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_pud(struct vm_
track_pfn_insert(vma, &pgprot, pfn);
- insert_pfn_pud(vma, addr, pud, pfn, pgprot, write);
+ insert_pfn_pud(vma, addr, vmf->pud, pfn, pgprot, write);
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vmf_insert_pfn_pud);
From: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
commit 45d4b7b9cb88526f6d5bd4c03efab88d75d10e4f upstream.
Some systems may report spurious MCA errors. In general, spurious MCA
errors may be disabled by clearing a particular bit in MCA_CTL. However,
clearing a bit in MCA_CTL may not be recommended for some errors, so the
only option is to ignore them.
An MCA error is printed and handled after it has been added to the MCE
event pool. So an MCA error can be ignored by not adding it to that pool
in the first place.
Add such a filtering function.
[ bp: Move function prototype to the internal header and massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Pu Wen <[email protected]>
Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Cc: Shirish S <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.0.x
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 5 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/genpool.c | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -1801,6 +1801,11 @@ static void __mcheck_cpu_init_timer(void
mce_start_timer(t);
}
+bool filter_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
/* Handle unconfigured int18 (should never happen) */
static void unexpected_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/genpool.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/genpool.c
@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ int mce_gen_pool_add(struct mce *mce)
{
struct mce_evt_llist *node;
+ if (filter_mce(mce))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!mce_evt_pool)
return -EINVAL;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
@@ -173,4 +173,7 @@ struct mca_msr_regs {
extern struct mca_msr_regs msr_ops;
+/* Decide whether to add MCE record to MCE event pool or filter it out. */
+extern bool filter_mce(struct mce *m);
+
#endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
From: Boyang Zhou <[email protected]>
commit f08cae2f28db24d95be5204046b60618d8de4ddc upstream.
The file offset argument to the arm64 sys_mmap() implementation is
scaled from bytes to pages by shifting right by PAGE_SHIFT.
Unfortunately, the offset is passed in as a signed 'off_t' type and
therefore large offsets (i.e. with the top bit set) are incorrectly
sign-extended by the shift. This has been observed to cause false mmap()
failures when mapping GPU doorbells on an arm64 server part.
Change the type of the file offset argument to sys_mmap() from 'off_t'
to 'unsigned long' so that the shifting scales the value as expected.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boyang Zhou <[email protected]>
[will: rewrote commit message]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mmap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, len,
unsigned long, prot, unsigned long, flags,
- unsigned long, fd, off_t, off)
+ unsigned long, fd, unsigned long, off)
{
if (offset_in_page(off) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
From: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
commit 9308fd4074551f222f30322d1ee8c5aff18e9747 upstream.
There are two groups of "ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_AMD" function prototypes
in <asm/mce.h>. Merge these two groups.
No functional change.
[ bp: align vertically. ]
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Pu Wen <[email protected]>
Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h | 25 +++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h
@@ -209,16 +209,6 @@ static inline void cmci_rediscover(void)
static inline void cmci_recheck(void) {}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_AMD
-void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
-int umc_normaddr_to_sysaddr(u64 norm_addr, u16 nid, u8 umc, u64 *sys_addr);
-#else
-static inline void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { }
-static inline int umc_normaddr_to_sysaddr(u64 norm_addr, u16 nid, u8 umc, u64 *sys_addr) { return -EINVAL; };
-#endif
-
-static inline void mce_hygon_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { return mce_amd_feature_init(c); }
-
int mce_available(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
bool mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m);
bool mce_is_correctable(struct mce *m);
@@ -338,12 +328,19 @@ extern bool amd_mce_is_memory_error(stru
extern int mce_threshold_create_device(unsigned int cpu);
extern int mce_threshold_remove_device(unsigned int cpu);
-#else
+void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+int umc_normaddr_to_sysaddr(u64 norm_addr, u16 nid, u8 umc, u64 *sys_addr);
-static inline int mce_threshold_create_device(unsigned int cpu) { return 0; };
-static inline int mce_threshold_remove_device(unsigned int cpu) { return 0; };
-static inline bool amd_mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m) { return false; };
+#else
+static inline int mce_threshold_create_device(unsigned int cpu) { return 0; };
+static inline int mce_threshold_remove_device(unsigned int cpu) { return 0; };
+static inline bool amd_mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m) { return false; };
+static inline void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { }
+static inline int
+umc_normaddr_to_sysaddr(u64 norm_addr, u16 nid, u8 umc, u64 *sys_addr) { return -EINVAL; };
#endif
+static inline void mce_hygon_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { return mce_amd_feature_init(c); }
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MCE_H */
From: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
commit c3f3ce049f7d97cc7ec9c01cb51d9ec74e0f37c2 upstream.
The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds
rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner.
get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() failing fork()
---- ---
task = mm->owner
mm->owner = NULL;
free(task)
if (task) *task; /* use after free */
The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure
case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path. That
is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm()
(left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing
the task structure.
An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the
userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to
succeed. Such a change would require more changes because it would
create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to
be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be
safe. This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code
to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by
mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing. The userfaultfd methods
can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor
will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland.
This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build
time.
[[email protected]: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Tested-by: zhong jiang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: zhong jiang <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/fork.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -953,6 +953,15 @@ static void mm_init_aio(struct mm_struct
#endif
}
+static __always_inline void mm_clear_owner(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ struct task_struct *p)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
+ if (mm->owner == p)
+ WRITE_ONCE(mm->owner, NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
@@ -1332,6 +1341,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct t
free_pt:
/* don't put binfmt in mmput, we haven't got module yet */
mm->binfmt = NULL;
+ mm_init_owner(mm, NULL);
mmput(mm);
fail_nomem:
@@ -1663,6 +1673,21 @@ static inline void rcu_copy_process(stru
#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_TASKS_RCU */
}
+static void __delayed_free_task(struct rcu_head *rhp)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = container_of(rhp, struct task_struct, rcu);
+
+ free_task(tsk);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void delayed_free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG))
+ call_rcu(&tsk->rcu, __delayed_free_task);
+ else
+ free_task(tsk);
+}
+
/*
* This creates a new process as a copy of the old one,
* but does not actually start it yet.
@@ -2124,8 +2149,10 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_io:
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
- if (p->mm)
+ if (p->mm) {
+ mm_clear_owner(p->mm, p);
mmput(p->mm);
+ }
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
free_signal_struct(p->signal);
@@ -2156,7 +2183,7 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_count:
bad_fork_free:
p->state = TASK_DEAD;
put_task_stack(p);
- free_task(p);
+ delayed_free_task(p);
fork_out:
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
hlist_del_init(&delayed.node);
From: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
commit 874e163759f27e0a9988c5d1f4605e3f25564fd2 upstream.
The MAC hash key might be passed to us on stack. Copy it to
a slab buffer before mapping to gurantee proper DMA mapping.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct cc_hash_alg {
struct hash_key_req_ctx {
u32 keylen;
dma_addr_t key_dma_addr;
+ u8 *key;
};
/* hash per-session context */
@@ -730,13 +731,20 @@ static int cc_hash_setkey(struct crypto_
ctx->key_params.keylen = keylen;
ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr = 0;
ctx->is_hmac = true;
+ ctx->key_params.key = NULL;
if (keylen) {
+ ctx->key_params.key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->key_params.key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr =
- dma_map_single(dev, (void *)key, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ dma_map_single(dev, (void *)ctx->key_params.key, keylen,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr)) {
dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
- key, keylen);
+ ctx->key_params.key, keylen);
+ kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "mapping key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
@@ -887,6 +895,9 @@ out:
dev_dbg(dev, "Unmapped key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
&ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr, ctx->key_params.keylen);
}
+
+ kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+
return rc;
}
@@ -913,11 +924,16 @@ static int cc_xcbc_setkey(struct crypto_
ctx->key_params.keylen = keylen;
+ ctx->key_params.key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->key_params.key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr =
- dma_map_single(dev, (void *)key, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ dma_map_single(dev, ctx->key_params.key, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr)) {
dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
key, keylen);
+ kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "mapping key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
@@ -969,6 +985,8 @@ static int cc_xcbc_setkey(struct crypto_
dev_dbg(dev, "Unmapped key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
&ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr, ctx->key_params.keylen);
+ kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+
return rc;
}
From: Chris Packham <[email protected]>
commit d41970097f10d898cef0eb04bf53d786efd6bbbc upstream.
When the physmap_of_core.c code was merged into physmap-core.c the
ability to use MTD_PHYSMAP_OF with only MTD_RAM selected was lost.
Restore this by adding MTD_RAM to the dependencies of MTD_PHYSMAP.
Fixes: commit 642b1e8dbed7 ("mtd: maps: Merge physmap_of.c into physmap-core.c")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hamish Martin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/mtd/maps/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/mtd/maps/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/mtd/maps/Kconfig
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ config MTD_COMPLEX_MAPPINGS
config MTD_PHYSMAP
tristate "Flash device in physical memory map"
- depends on MTD_CFI || MTD_JEDECPROBE || MTD_ROM || MTD_LPDDR
+ depends on MTD_CFI || MTD_JEDECPROBE || MTD_ROM || MTD_RAM || MTD_LPDDR
help
This provides a 'mapping' driver which allows the NOR Flash and
ROM driver code to communicate with chips which are mapped
From: Kamlakant Patel <[email protected]>
commit 55be8658c7e2feb11a5b5b33ee031791dbd23a69 upstream.
According to ipmi spec, block number is a number that is incremented,
starting with 0, for each new block of message data returned using the
middle transaction.
Here, the 'blocknum' is data[0] which always starts from zero(0) and
'ssif_info->multi_pos' starts from 1.
So, we need to add +1 to blocknum while comparing with multi_pos.
Fixes: 7d6380cd40f79 ("ipmi:ssif: Fix handling of multi-part return messages").
Reported-by: Kiran Kolukuluru <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamlakant Patel <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
[Also added a debug log if the block numbers don't match.]
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.4
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
@@ -690,12 +690,16 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif
/* End of read */
len = ssif_info->multi_len;
data = ssif_info->data;
- } else if (blocknum != ssif_info->multi_pos) {
+ } else if (blocknum + 1 != ssif_info->multi_pos) {
/*
* Out of sequence block, just abort. Block
* numbers start at zero for the second block,
* but multi_pos starts at one, so the +1.
*/
+ if (ssif_info->ssif_debug & SSIF_DEBUG_MSG)
+ dev_dbg(&ssif_info->client->dev,
+ "Received message out of sequence, expected %u, got %u\n",
+ ssif_info->multi_pos - 1, blocknum);
result = -EIO;
} else {
ssif_inc_stat(ssif_info, received_message_parts);
From: Liang Chen <[email protected]>
commit a4b732a248d12cbdb46999daf0bf288c011335eb upstream.
There is a race between cache device register and cache set unregister.
For an already registered cache device, register_bcache will call
bch_is_open to iterate through all cachesets and check every cache
there. The race occurs if cache_set_free executes at the same time and
clears the caches right before ca is dereferenced in bch_is_open_cache.
To close the race, let's make sure the clean up work is protected by
the bch_register_lock as well.
This issue can be reproduced as follows,
while true; do echo /dev/XXX> /sys/fs/bcache/register ; done&
while true; do echo 1> /sys/block/XXX/bcache/set/unregister ; done &
and results in the following oops,
[ +0.000053] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000998
[ +0.000457] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
[ +0.000464] PGD 800000003ca9d067 P4D 800000003ca9d067 PUD 3ca9c067 PMD 0
[ +0.000388] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ +0.000269] CPU: 1 PID: 3266 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.0.0+ #6
[ +0.000346] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.fc28 04/01/2014
[ +0.000472] RIP: 0010:register_bcache+0x1829/0x1990 [bcache]
[ +0.000344] Code: b0 48 83 e8 50 48 81 fa e0 e1 10 c0 0f 84 a9 00 00 00 48 89 c6 48 89 ca 0f b7 ba 54 04 00 00 4c 8b 82 60 0c 00 00 85 ff 74 2f <49> 3b a8 98 09 00 00 74 4e 44 8d 47 ff 31 ff 49 c1 e0 03 eb 0d
[ +0.000839] RSP: 0018:ffff92ee804cbd88 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ +0.000328] RAX: ffffffffc010e190 RBX: ffff918b5c6b5000 RCX: ffff918b7d8e0000
[ +0.000399] RDX: ffff918b7d8e0000 RSI: ffffffffc010e190 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ +0.000398] RBP: ffff918b7d318340 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffb9bd2d7a
[ +0.000385] R10: ffff918b7eb253c0 R11: ffffb95980f51200 R12: ffffffffc010e1a0
[ +0.000411] R13: fffffffffffffff2 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffff918b7e232620
[ +0.000384] FS: 00007f955bec2740(0000) GS:ffff918b7eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000420] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000801] CR2: 0000000000000998 CR3: 000000003cad6000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
[ +0.000837] Call Trace:
[ +0.000682] ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x20
[ +0.000691] ? __kmalloc+0x131/0x1b0
[ +0.000710] kernfs_fop_write+0xfa/0x170
[ +0.000733] __vfs_write+0x2e/0x190
[ +0.000688] ? inode_security+0x10/0x30
[ +0.000698] ? selinux_file_permission+0xd2/0x120
[ +0.000752] ? security_file_permission+0x2b/0x100
[ +0.000753] vfs_write+0xa8/0x1a0
[ +0.000676] ksys_write+0x4d/0xb0
[ +0.000699] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xf0
[ +0.000692] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Signed-off-by: Liang Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c
@@ -1516,6 +1516,7 @@ static void cache_set_free(struct closur
bch_btree_cache_free(c);
bch_journal_free(c);
+ mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock);
for_each_cache(ca, c, i)
if (ca) {
ca->set = NULL;
@@ -1534,7 +1535,6 @@ static void cache_set_free(struct closur
mempool_exit(&c->search);
kfree(c->devices);
- mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock);
list_del(&c->list);
mutex_unlock(&bch_register_lock);
From: Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
commit 3499efbeed39d114873267683b9e776bcb34b058 upstream.
During power management suspend the driver need to prepare the device
for the power down operation and as a last indication write to the
HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN register which signals to the hardware that
The ccree is ready for power down.
Signed-off-by: Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_pm.c
@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ int cc_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
int rc;
dev_dbg(dev, "set HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN\n");
- cc_iowrite(drvdata, CC_REG(HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN), POWER_DOWN_ENABLE);
rc = cc_suspend_req_queue(drvdata);
if (rc) {
dev_err(dev, "cc_suspend_req_queue (%x)\n", rc);
return rc;
}
fini_cc_regs(drvdata);
+ cc_iowrite(drvdata, CC_REG(HOST_POWER_DOWN_EN), POWER_DOWN_ENABLE);
cc_clk_off(drvdata);
return 0;
}
From: Sergei Trofimovich <[email protected]>
commit 46ca3f735f345c9d87383dd3a09fa5d43870770e upstream.
The bug manifests as an attempt to access deallocated memory:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff9c8735448000
#PF error: [PROT] [WRITE]
PGD 288a05067 P4D 288a05067 PUD 288a07067 PMD 7f60c2063 PTE 80000007f5448161
Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 388 Comm: loadkeys Tainted: G C 5.0.0-rc6-00153-g5ded5871030e #91
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M-D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013
RIP: 0010:__memmove+0x81/0x1a0
Code: 4c 89 4f 10 4c 89 47 18 48 8d 7f 20 73 d4 48 83 c2 20 e9 a2 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 d1 4c 8b 5c 16 f8 4c 8d 54 17 f8 48 c1 e9 03 <f3> 48 a5 4d 89 1a e9 0c 01 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 d1 4c 8b 1e 49
RSP: 0018:ffffa1b9002d7d08 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: ffff9c873541af43 RBX: ffff9c873541af43 RCX: 00000c6f105cd6bf
RDX: 0000637882e986b6 RSI: ffff9c8735447ffb RDI: ffff9c8735447ffb
RBP: ffff9c8739cd3800 R08: ffff9c873b802f00 R09: 00000000fffff73b
R10: ffffffffb82b35f1 R11: 00505b1b004d5b1b R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff9c873541af3d R14: 000000000000000b R15: 000000000000000c
FS: 00007f450c390580(0000) GS:ffff9c873f180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff9c8735448000 CR3: 00000007e213c002 CR4: 00000000000606e0
Call Trace:
vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl+0x34d/0x440
vt_ioctl+0xba3/0x1190
? __bpf_prog_run32+0x39/0x60
? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x7b/0x4e0
tty_ioctl+0x23f/0x920
? preempt_count_sub+0x98/0xe0
? __seccomp_filter+0x67/0x600
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6a0
? syscall_trace_enter+0x192/0x2d0
ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The bug manifests on systemd systems with multiple vtcon devices:
# cat /sys/devices/virtual/vtconsole/vtcon0/name
(S) dummy device
# cat /sys/devices/virtual/vtconsole/vtcon1/name
(M) frame buffer device
There systemd runs 'loadkeys' tool in tapallel for each vtcon
instance. This causes two parallel ioctl(KDSKBSENT) calls to
race into adding the same entry into 'func_table' array at:
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl()
The function has no locking around writes to 'func_table'.
The simplest reproducer is to have initrams with the following
init on a 8-CPU machine x86_64:
#!/bin/sh
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
loadkeys -q windowkeys ru4 &
wait
The change adds lock on write path only. Reads are still racy.
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/2/17/256
Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ static const int NR_TYPES = ARRAY_SIZE(m
static struct input_handler kbd_handler;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kbd_event_lock);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(led_lock);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(func_buf_lock); /* guard 'func_buf' and friends */
static unsigned long key_down[BITS_TO_LONGS(KEY_CNT)]; /* keyboard key bitmap */
static unsigned char shift_down[NR_SHIFT]; /* shift state counters.. */
static bool dead_key_next;
@@ -1990,11 +1991,12 @@ int vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kb
char *p;
u_char *q;
u_char __user *up;
- int sz;
+ int sz, fnw_sz;
int delta;
char *first_free, *fj, *fnw;
int i, j, k;
int ret;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
perm = 0;
@@ -2037,7 +2039,14 @@ int vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kb
goto reterr;
}
+ fnw = NULL;
+ fnw_sz = 0;
+ /* race aginst other writers */
+ again:
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&func_buf_lock, flags);
q = func_table[i];
+
+ /* fj pointer to next entry after 'q' */
first_free = funcbufptr + (funcbufsize - funcbufleft);
for (j = i+1; j < MAX_NR_FUNC && !func_table[j]; j++)
;
@@ -2045,10 +2054,12 @@ int vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kb
fj = func_table[j];
else
fj = first_free;
-
+ /* buffer usage increase by new entry */
delta = (q ? -strlen(q) : 1) + strlen(kbs->kb_string);
+
if (delta <= funcbufleft) { /* it fits in current buf */
if (j < MAX_NR_FUNC) {
+ /* make enough space for new entry at 'fj' */
memmove(fj + delta, fj, first_free - fj);
for (k = j; k < MAX_NR_FUNC; k++)
if (func_table[k])
@@ -2061,20 +2072,28 @@ int vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kb
sz = 256;
while (sz < funcbufsize - funcbufleft + delta)
sz <<= 1;
- fnw = kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
- if(!fnw) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto reterr;
+ if (fnw_sz != sz) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&func_buf_lock, flags);
+ kfree(fnw);
+ fnw = kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+ fnw_sz = sz;
+ if (!fnw) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto reterr;
+ }
+ goto again;
}
if (!q)
func_table[i] = fj;
+ /* copy data before insertion point to new location */
if (fj > funcbufptr)
memmove(fnw, funcbufptr, fj - funcbufptr);
for (k = 0; k < j; k++)
if (func_table[k])
func_table[k] = fnw + (func_table[k] - funcbufptr);
+ /* copy data after insertion point to new location */
if (first_free > fj) {
memmove(fnw + (fj - funcbufptr) + delta, fj, first_free - fj);
for (k = j; k < MAX_NR_FUNC; k++)
@@ -2087,7 +2106,9 @@ int vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kb
funcbufleft = funcbufleft - delta + sz - funcbufsize;
funcbufsize = sz;
}
+ /* finally insert item itself */
strcpy(func_table[i], kbs->kb_string);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&func_buf_lock, flags);
break;
}
ret = 0;
From: Singh, Brijesh <[email protected]>
commit f5a2aeb8b254c764772729a6e48d4e0c914bb56a upstream.
Currently, we free the psp_master if the PLATFORM_INIT fails during the
SEV FW probe. If psp_master is freed then driver does not invoke the PSP
FW. As per SEV FW spec, there are several commands (PLATFORM_RESET,
PLATFORM_STATUS, GET_ID etc) which can be executed in the UNINIT state
We should not free the psp_master when PLATFORM_INIT fails.
Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add SEV support")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Gary Hook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.19.y
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ void psp_pci_init(void)
rc = sev_platform_init(&error);
if (rc) {
dev_err(sp->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error);
- goto err;
+ return;
}
dev_info(sp->dev, "SEV API:%d.%d build:%d\n", psp_master->api_major,
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit bfc61c36260ca990937539cd648ede3cd749bc10 upstream.
When finding out which inodes have references on a particular extent, done
by backref.c:iterate_extent_inodes(), from the BTRFS_IOC_LOGICAL_INO (both
v1 and v2) ioctl and from scrub we use the transaction join API to grab a
reference on the currently running transaction, since in order to give
accurate results we need to inspect the delayed references of the currently
running transaction.
However, if there is currently no running transaction, the join operation
will create a new transaction. This is inefficient as the transaction will
eventually be committed, doing unnecessary IO and introducing a potential
point of failure that will lead to a transaction abort due to -ENOSPC, as
recently reported [1].
That's because the join, creates the transaction but does not reserve any
space, so when attempting to update the root item of the root passed to
btrfs_join_transaction(), during the transaction commit, we can end up
failling with -ENOSPC. Users of a join operation are supposed to actually
do some filesystem changes and reserve space by some means, which is not
the case of iterate_extent_inodes(), it is a read-only operation for all
contextes from which it is called.
The reported [1] -ENOSPC failure stack trace is the following:
heisenberg kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
heisenberg kernel: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
heisenberg kernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 at fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:136 btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 4.19.0-4-amd64 #1 Debian 4.19.28-2
heisenberg kernel: Hardware name: FUJITSU LIFEBOOK U757/FJNB2A5, BIOS Version 1.21 03/19/2018
heisenberg kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb5448828bd40 EFLAGS: 00010286
heisenberg kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ed56bccef50 RCX: 0000000000000006
heisenberg kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff8ed6bda166a0
heisenberg kernel: RBP: 00000000ffffffe4 R08: 00000000000003df R09: 0000000000000007
heisenberg kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8ed63396a078
heisenberg kernel: R13: ffff8ed092d7c800 R14: ffff8ed64f5db028 R15: ffff8ed6bd03d068
heisenberg kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ed6bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
heisenberg kernel: CR2: 00007f46f75f8000 CR3: 0000000310a0a002 CR4: 00000000003606f0
heisenberg kernel: DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
heisenberg kernel: Call Trace:
heisenberg kernel: commit_fs_roots+0x166/0x1d0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xac/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x2bd/0x870 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? start_transaction+0x9d/0x3f0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: transaction_kthread+0x147/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x530/0x530 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: kthread+0x112/0x130
heisenberg kernel: ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
heisenberg kernel: ---[ end trace 05de912e30e012d9 ]---
So fix that by using the attach API, which does not create a transaction
when there is currently no running transaction.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected] # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/backref.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/backref.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/backref.c
@@ -1910,13 +1910,19 @@ int iterate_extent_inodes(struct btrfs_f
extent_item_objectid);
if (!search_commit_root) {
- trans = btrfs_join_transaction(fs_info->extent_root);
- if (IS_ERR(trans))
- return PTR_ERR(trans);
+ trans = btrfs_attach_transaction(fs_info->extent_root);
+ if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(trans) != -ENOENT &&
+ PTR_ERR(trans) != -EROFS)
+ return PTR_ERR(trans);
+ trans = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (trans)
btrfs_get_tree_mod_seq(fs_info, &tree_mod_seq_elem);
- } else {
+ else
down_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
- }
ret = btrfs_find_all_leafs(trans, fs_info, extent_item_objectid,
tree_mod_seq_elem.seq, &refs,
@@ -1949,7 +1955,7 @@ int iterate_extent_inodes(struct btrfs_f
free_leaf_list(refs);
out:
- if (!search_commit_root) {
+ if (trans) {
btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq(fs_info, &tree_mod_seq_elem);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans);
} else {
From: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
commit 310a997fd74de778b9a4848a64be9cda9f18764a upstream.
It is never possible, that number of block groups decreases,
since only online grow is supported.
But after a growing occured, we have to zero inode tables
for just created new block groups.
Fixes: 19c5246d2516 ("ext4: add new online resize interface")
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ mext_out:
if (err == 0)
err = err2;
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
- if (!err && (o_group > EXT4_SB(sb)->s_groups_count) &&
+ if (!err && (o_group < EXT4_SB(sb)->s_groups_count) &&
ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) &&
test_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE))
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, o_group);
From: Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
commit c9f804d64bb93c8dbf957df1d7e9de11380e522d upstream.
Or else xen_domain() returns false despite xen_pvh being set.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ void __init xen_pvh_init(void)
u64 pfn;
xen_pvh = 1;
+ xen_domain_type = XEN_HVM_DOMAIN;
xen_start_flags = pvh_start_info.flags;
msr = cpuid_ebx(xen_cpuid_base() + 2);
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
commit c4703ce11c23423d4b46e3d59aef7979814fd608 upstream.
Users have reported intermittent occurrences of DIMM initialization
failures due to duplicate allocations of address capacity detected in
the labels, or errors of the form below, both have the same root cause.
nd namespace1.4: failed to track label: 0
WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 1381 at drivers/nvdimm/label.c:863
RIP: 0010:__pmem_label_update+0x56c/0x590 [libnvdimm]
Call Trace:
? nd_pmem_namespace_label_update+0xd6/0x160 [libnvdimm]
nd_pmem_namespace_label_update+0xd6/0x160 [libnvdimm]
uuid_store+0x17e/0x190 [libnvdimm]
kernfs_fop_write+0xf0/0x1a0
vfs_write+0xb7/0x1b0
ksys_write+0x57/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210
Unfortunately those reports were typically with a busy parallel
namespace creation / destruction loop making it difficult to see the
components of the bug. However, Jane provided a simple reproducer using
the work-in-progress sub-section implementation.
When ndctl is reconfiguring a namespace it may take an existing defunct
/ disabled namespace and reconfigure it with a new uuid and other
parameters. Critically namespace_update_uuid() takes existing address
resources and renames them for the new namespace to use / reconfigure as
it sees fit. The bug is that this rename only happens in the resource
tracking tree. Existing labels with the old uuid are not reaped leading
to a scenario where multiple active labels reference the same span of
address range.
Teach namespace_update_uuid() to flag any references to the old uuid for
reaping at the next label update attempt.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Fixes: bf9bccc14c05 ("libnvdimm: pmem label sets and namespace instantiation")
Link: https://github.com/pmem/ndctl/issues/91
Reported-by: Jane Chu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Erwin Tsaur <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/nvdimm/label.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
drivers/nvdimm/nd.h | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/label.c
+++ b/drivers/nvdimm/label.c
@@ -753,6 +753,17 @@ static const guid_t *to_abstraction_guid
return &guid_null;
}
+static void reap_victim(struct nd_mapping *nd_mapping,
+ struct nd_label_ent *victim)
+{
+ struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd = to_ndd(nd_mapping);
+ u32 slot = to_slot(ndd, victim->label);
+
+ dev_dbg(ndd->dev, "free: %d\n", slot);
+ nd_label_free_slot(ndd, slot);
+ victim->label = NULL;
+}
+
static int __pmem_label_update(struct nd_region *nd_region,
struct nd_mapping *nd_mapping, struct nd_namespace_pmem *nspm,
int pos, unsigned long flags)
@@ -760,9 +771,9 @@ static int __pmem_label_update(struct nd
struct nd_namespace_common *ndns = &nspm->nsio.common;
struct nd_interleave_set *nd_set = nd_region->nd_set;
struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd = to_ndd(nd_mapping);
- struct nd_label_ent *label_ent, *victim = NULL;
struct nd_namespace_label *nd_label;
struct nd_namespace_index *nsindex;
+ struct nd_label_ent *label_ent;
struct nd_label_id label_id;
struct resource *res;
unsigned long *free;
@@ -831,18 +842,10 @@ static int __pmem_label_update(struct nd
list_for_each_entry(label_ent, &nd_mapping->labels, list) {
if (!label_ent->label)
continue;
- if (memcmp(nspm->uuid, label_ent->label->uuid,
- NSLABEL_UUID_LEN) != 0)
- continue;
- victim = label_ent;
- list_move_tail(&victim->list, &nd_mapping->labels);
- break;
- }
- if (victim) {
- dev_dbg(ndd->dev, "free: %d\n", slot);
- slot = to_slot(ndd, victim->label);
- nd_label_free_slot(ndd, slot);
- victim->label = NULL;
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(ND_LABEL_REAP, &label_ent->flags)
+ || memcmp(nspm->uuid, label_ent->label->uuid,
+ NSLABEL_UUID_LEN) == 0)
+ reap_victim(nd_mapping, label_ent);
}
/* update index */
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c
+++ b/drivers/nvdimm/namespace_devs.c
@@ -1247,12 +1247,27 @@ static int namespace_update_uuid(struct
for (i = 0; i < nd_region->ndr_mappings; i++) {
struct nd_mapping *nd_mapping = &nd_region->mapping[i];
struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd = to_ndd(nd_mapping);
+ struct nd_label_ent *label_ent;
struct resource *res;
for_each_dpa_resource(ndd, res)
if (strcmp(res->name, old_label_id.id) == 0)
sprintf((void *) res->name, "%s",
new_label_id.id);
+
+ mutex_lock(&nd_mapping->lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(label_ent, &nd_mapping->labels, list) {
+ struct nd_namespace_label *nd_label = label_ent->label;
+ struct nd_label_id label_id;
+
+ if (!nd_label)
+ continue;
+ nd_label_gen_id(&label_id, nd_label->uuid,
+ __le32_to_cpu(nd_label->flags));
+ if (strcmp(old_label_id.id, label_id.id) == 0)
+ set_bit(ND_LABEL_REAP, &label_ent->flags);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&nd_mapping->lock);
}
kfree(*old_uuid);
out:
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/nd.h
+++ b/drivers/nvdimm/nd.h
@@ -113,8 +113,12 @@ struct nd_percpu_lane {
spinlock_t lock;
};
+enum nd_label_flags {
+ ND_LABEL_REAP,
+};
struct nd_label_ent {
struct list_head list;
+ unsigned long flags;
struct nd_namespace_label *label;
};
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 9f89d5de8631c7930898a601b6612e271aa2261c upstream.
When we set a subvolume to read-only mode we do not flush dellaloc for any
of its inodes (except if the filesystem is mounted with -o flushoncommit),
since it does not affect correctness for any subsequent operations - except
for a future send operation. The send operation will not be able to see the
delalloc data since the respective file extent items, inode item updates,
backreferences, etc, have not hit yet the subvolume and extent trees.
Effectively this means data loss, since the send stream will not contain
any data from existing delalloc. Another problem from this is that if the
writeback starts and finishes while the send operation is in progress, we
have the subvolume tree being being modified concurrently which can result
in send failing unexpectedly with EIO or hitting runtime errors, assertion
failures or hitting BUG_ONs, etc.
Simple reproducer:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ btrfs subvolume create /mnt/sv
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xea 0 108K" /mnt/sv/foo
$ btrfs property set /mnt/sv ro true
$ btrfs send -f /tmp/send.stream /mnt/sv
$ od -t x1 -A d /mnt/sv/foo
0000000 ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea ea
*
0110592
$ umount /mnt
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc
$ mount /dev/sdc /mnt
$ btrfs receive -f /tmp/send.stream /mnt
$ echo $?
0
$ od -t x1 -A d /mnt/sv/foo
0000000
# ---> empty file
Since this a problem that affects send only, fix it in send by flushing
dellaloc for all the roots used by the send operation before send starts
to process the commit roots.
This is a problem that affects send since it was introduced (commit
31db9f7c23fbf7 ("Btrfs: introduce BTRFS_IOC_SEND for btrfs send/receive"))
but backporting it to older kernels has some dependencies:
- For kernels between 3.19 and 4.20, it depends on commit 3cd24c698004d2
("btrfs: use tagged writepage to mitigate livelock of snapshot") because
the function btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot() does not exist before that
commit. So one has to either pick that commit or replace the calls to
btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot() in this patch with calls to
btrfs_start_delalloc_inodes().
- For kernels older than 3.19 it also requires commit e5fa8f865b3324
("Btrfs: ensure send always works on roots without orphans") because
it depends on the function ensure_commit_roots_uptodate() which that
commits introduced.
- No dependencies for 5.0+ kernels.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
CC: [email protected] # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/send.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/send.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c
@@ -6579,6 +6579,38 @@ commit_trans:
return btrfs_commit_transaction(trans);
}
+/*
+ * Make sure any existing dellaloc is flushed for any root used by a send
+ * operation so that we do not miss any data and we do not race with writeback
+ * finishing and changing a tree while send is using the tree. This could
+ * happen if a subvolume is in RW mode, has delalloc, is turned to RO mode and
+ * a send operation then uses the subvolume.
+ * After flushing delalloc ensure_commit_roots_uptodate() must be called.
+ */
+static int flush_delalloc_roots(struct send_ctx *sctx)
+{
+ struct btrfs_root *root = sctx->parent_root;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (root) {
+ ret = btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot(root);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ btrfs_wait_ordered_extents(root, U64_MAX, 0, U64_MAX);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sctx->clone_roots_cnt; i++) {
+ root = sctx->clone_roots[i].root;
+ ret = btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot(root);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ btrfs_wait_ordered_extents(root, U64_MAX, 0, U64_MAX);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void btrfs_root_dec_send_in_progress(struct btrfs_root* root)
{
spin_lock(&root->root_item_lock);
@@ -6803,6 +6835,10 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_f
NULL);
sort_clone_roots = 1;
+ ret = flush_delalloc_roots(sctx);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
ret = ensure_commit_roots_uptodate(sctx);
if (ret)
goto out;
From: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
commit 57a0da28ced8707cb9f79f071a016b9d005caf5a upstream.
Unaligned AIO must be serialized because the zeroing of partial blocks
of unaligned AIO can result in data corruption in case it's overlapping
another in flight IO.
Currently we wait for all unwritten extents before we submit unaligned
AIO which protects data in case of unaligned AIO is following overlapping
IO. However if a unaligned AIO is followed by overlapping aligned AIO we
can still end up corrupting data.
To fix this, we must make sure that the unaligned AIO is the only IO in
flight by waiting for unwritten extents conversion not just before the
IO submission, but right after it as well.
This problem can be reproduced by xfstest generic/538
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/file.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/file.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/file.c
@@ -264,6 +264,13 @@ ext4_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb,
}
ret = __generic_file_write_iter(iocb, from);
+ /*
+ * Unaligned direct AIO must be the only IO in flight. Otherwise
+ * overlapping aligned IO after unaligned might result in data
+ * corruption.
+ */
+ if (ret == -EIOCBQUEUED && unaligned_aio)
+ ext4_unwritten_wait(inode);
inode_unlock(inode);
if (ret > 0)
From: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
commit ddccb6dbe780d68133191477571cb7c69e17bb8c upstream.
Fix compile error below when using BUFFER_TRACE.
fs/ext4/inode.c: In function ‘ext4_expand_extra_isize’:
fs/ext4/inode.c:5979:19: error: request for member ‘bh’ in something not a structure or union
BUFFER_TRACE(iloc.bh, "get_write_access");
Fixes: c03b45b853f58 ("ext4, project: expand inode extra size if possible")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -6006,7 +6006,7 @@ int ext4_expand_extra_isize(struct inode
ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand);
- BUFFER_TRACE(iloc.bh, "get_write_access");
+ BUFFER_TRACE(iloc->bh, "get_write_access");
error = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, iloc->bh);
if (error) {
brelse(iloc->bh);
From: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
commit c9e716eb9b3455a83ed7c5f5a81256a3da779a95 upstream.
Don't update the superblock s_rev_level during mount if it isn't
actually necessary, only if superblock features are being set by
the kernel. This was originally added for ext3 since it always
set the INCOMPAT_RECOVER and HAS_JOURNAL features during mount,
but this is not needed since no journal mode was added to ext4.
That will allow Geert to mount his 20-year-old ext2 rev 0.0 m68k
filesystem, as a testament of the backward compatibility of ext4.
Fixes: 0390131ba84f ("ext4: Allow ext4 to run without a journal")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/ext4.h | 6 +++++-
fs/ext4/inode.c | 1 -
fs/ext4/super.c | 1 -
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -1665,6 +1665,8 @@ static inline void ext4_clear_state_flag
#define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_INLINE_DATA 0x8000 /* data in inode */
#define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ENCRYPT 0x10000
+extern void ext4_update_dynamic_rev(struct super_block *sb);
+
#define EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_FUNCS(name, flagname) \
static inline bool ext4_has_feature_##name(struct super_block *sb) \
{ \
@@ -1673,6 +1675,7 @@ static inline bool ext4_has_feature_##na
} \
static inline void ext4_set_feature_##name(struct super_block *sb) \
{ \
+ ext4_update_dynamic_rev(sb); \
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_feature_compat |= \
cpu_to_le32(EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_##flagname); \
} \
@@ -1690,6 +1693,7 @@ static inline bool ext4_has_feature_##na
} \
static inline void ext4_set_feature_##name(struct super_block *sb) \
{ \
+ ext4_update_dynamic_rev(sb); \
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_feature_ro_compat |= \
cpu_to_le32(EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_##flagname); \
} \
@@ -1707,6 +1711,7 @@ static inline bool ext4_has_feature_##na
} \
static inline void ext4_set_feature_##name(struct super_block *sb) \
{ \
+ ext4_update_dynamic_rev(sb); \
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_feature_incompat |= \
cpu_to_le32(EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_##flagname); \
} \
@@ -2675,7 +2680,6 @@ do { \
#endif
-extern void ext4_update_dynamic_rev(struct super_block *sb);
extern int ext4_update_compat_feature(handle_t *handle, struct super_block *sb,
__u32 compat);
extern int ext4_update_rocompat_feature(handle_t *handle,
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -5355,7 +5355,6 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
- ext4_update_dynamic_rev(sb);
ext4_set_feature_large_file(sb);
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb);
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -2259,7 +2259,6 @@ static int ext4_setup_super(struct super
es->s_max_mnt_count = cpu_to_le16(EXT4_DFL_MAX_MNT_COUNT);
le16_add_cpu(&es->s_mnt_count, 1);
ext4_update_tstamp(es, s_mtime);
- ext4_update_dynamic_rev(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal)
ext4_set_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb);
From: Jeremy Soller <[email protected]>
commit 891afcf2462d2cc4ef7caf94215358ca61fa32cb upstream.
A mistake was made in the identification of the four variants of the
System76 Gazelle (gaze14). This patch corrects the PCI ID of the
17-inch, GTX 1660 Ti variant from 0x8560 to 0x8551. This patch also
adds the correct fixups for the 15-inch and 17-inch GTX 1650 variants
with PCI IDs 0x8560 and 0x8561.
Tests were done on all four variants ensuring full audio capability.
Fixes: 80a5052db751 ("ALSA: hdea/realtek - Headset fixup for System76 Gazelle (gaze14)")
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Soller <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -6931,7 +6931,9 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xb171, "Cubi N 8GL (MS-B171)", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x1325, "System76 Darter Pro (darp5)", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x8550, "System76 Gazelle (gaze14)", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
- SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x8560, "System76 Gazelle (gaze14)", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x8551, "System76 Gazelle (gaze14)", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x8560, "System76 Gazelle (gaze14)", ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x8561, "System76 Gazelle (gaze14)", ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x1036, "Lenovo P520", ALC233_FIXUP_LENOVO_MULTI_CODECS),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x20f2, "Thinkpad SL410/510", ALC269_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x215e, "Thinkpad L512", ALC269_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE),
From: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
commit dad3197da7a3817f27bb24f7fd3c135ffa707202 upstream.
Dell platform with ALC298.
system enter to runtime suspend. Headphone had noise.
Let Headset Mic not shutup will solve this issue.
[ Fixed minor coding style issues by tiwai ]
Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -477,12 +477,45 @@ static void alc_auto_setup_eapd(struct h
set_eapd(codec, *p, on);
}
+static int find_ext_mic_pin(struct hda_codec *codec);
+
+static void alc_headset_mic_no_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec)
+{
+ const struct hda_pincfg *pin;
+ int mic_pin = find_ext_mic_pin(codec);
+ int i;
+
+ /* don't shut up pins when unloading the driver; otherwise it breaks
+ * the default pin setup at the next load of the driver
+ */
+ if (codec->bus->shutdown)
+ return;
+
+ snd_array_for_each(&codec->init_pins, i, pin) {
+ /* use read here for syncing after issuing each verb */
+ if (pin->nid != mic_pin)
+ snd_hda_codec_read(codec, pin->nid, 0,
+ AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL, 0);
+ }
+
+ codec->pins_shutup = 1;
+}
+
static void alc_shutup_pins(struct hda_codec *codec)
{
struct alc_spec *spec = codec->spec;
- if (!spec->no_shutup_pins)
- snd_hda_shutup_pins(codec);
+ switch (codec->core.vendor_id) {
+ case 0x10ec0286:
+ case 0x10ec0288:
+ case 0x10ec0298:
+ alc_headset_mic_no_shutup(codec);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (!spec->no_shutup_pins)
+ snd_hda_shutup_pins(codec);
+ break;
+ }
}
/* generic shutup callback;
@@ -2923,27 +2956,6 @@ static int alc269_parse_auto_config(stru
return alc_parse_auto_config(codec, alc269_ignore, ssids);
}
-static int find_ext_mic_pin(struct hda_codec *codec);
-
-static void alc286_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec)
-{
- const struct hda_pincfg *pin;
- int i;
- int mic_pin = find_ext_mic_pin(codec);
- /* don't shut up pins when unloading the driver; otherwise it breaks
- * the default pin setup at the next load of the driver
- */
- if (codec->bus->shutdown)
- return;
- snd_array_for_each(&codec->init_pins, i, pin) {
- /* use read here for syncing after issuing each verb */
- if (pin->nid != mic_pin)
- snd_hda_codec_read(codec, pin->nid, 0,
- AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL, 0);
- }
- codec->pins_shutup = 1;
-}
-
static void alc269vb_toggle_power_output(struct hda_codec *codec, int power_up)
{
alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x04, 1 << 11, power_up ? (1 << 11) : 0);
@@ -7705,7 +7717,6 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec
case 0x10ec0286:
case 0x10ec0288:
spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC286;
- spec->shutup = alc286_shutup;
break;
case 0x10ec0298:
spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC298;
From: Chengguang Xu <[email protected]>
commit 0d52154bb0a700abb459a2cbce0a30fc2549b67e upstream.
When failing from creating cache jbd2_inode_cache, we will destroy the
previously created cache jbd2_handle_cache twice. This patch fixes
this by moving each cache initialization/destruction to its own
separate, individual function.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
fs/jbd2/revoke.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 8 +++++---
include/linux/jbd2.h | 8 +++++---
4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
@@ -2389,22 +2389,19 @@ static struct kmem_cache *jbd2_journal_h
static atomic_t nr_journal_heads = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
#endif
-static int jbd2_journal_init_journal_head_cache(void)
+static int __init jbd2_journal_init_journal_head_cache(void)
{
- int retval;
-
- J_ASSERT(jbd2_journal_head_cache == NULL);
+ J_ASSERT(!jbd2_journal_head_cache);
jbd2_journal_head_cache = kmem_cache_create("jbd2_journal_head",
sizeof(struct journal_head),
0, /* offset */
SLAB_TEMPORARY | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU,
NULL); /* ctor */
- retval = 0;
if (!jbd2_journal_head_cache) {
- retval = -ENOMEM;
printk(KERN_EMERG "JBD2: no memory for journal_head cache\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
- return retval;
+ return 0;
}
static void jbd2_journal_destroy_journal_head_cache(void)
@@ -2650,28 +2647,38 @@ static void __exit jbd2_remove_jbd_stats
struct kmem_cache *jbd2_handle_cache, *jbd2_inode_cache;
+static int __init jbd2_journal_init_inode_cache(void)
+{
+ J_ASSERT(!jbd2_inode_cache);
+ jbd2_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(jbd2_inode, 0);
+ if (!jbd2_inode_cache) {
+ pr_emerg("JBD2: failed to create inode cache\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int __init jbd2_journal_init_handle_cache(void)
{
+ J_ASSERT(!jbd2_handle_cache);
jbd2_handle_cache = KMEM_CACHE(jbd2_journal_handle, SLAB_TEMPORARY);
- if (jbd2_handle_cache == NULL) {
+ if (!jbd2_handle_cache) {
printk(KERN_EMERG "JBD2: failed to create handle cache\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
- jbd2_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(jbd2_inode, 0);
- if (jbd2_inode_cache == NULL) {
- printk(KERN_EMERG "JBD2: failed to create inode cache\n");
- kmem_cache_destroy(jbd2_handle_cache);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
return 0;
}
+static void jbd2_journal_destroy_inode_cache(void)
+{
+ kmem_cache_destroy(jbd2_inode_cache);
+ jbd2_inode_cache = NULL;
+}
+
static void jbd2_journal_destroy_handle_cache(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(jbd2_handle_cache);
jbd2_handle_cache = NULL;
- kmem_cache_destroy(jbd2_inode_cache);
- jbd2_inode_cache = NULL;
}
/*
@@ -2682,21 +2689,27 @@ static int __init journal_init_caches(vo
{
int ret;
- ret = jbd2_journal_init_revoke_caches();
+ ret = jbd2_journal_init_revoke_record_cache();
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = jbd2_journal_init_revoke_table_cache();
if (ret == 0)
ret = jbd2_journal_init_journal_head_cache();
if (ret == 0)
ret = jbd2_journal_init_handle_cache();
if (ret == 0)
+ ret = jbd2_journal_init_inode_cache();
+ if (ret == 0)
ret = jbd2_journal_init_transaction_cache();
return ret;
}
static void jbd2_journal_destroy_caches(void)
{
- jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_caches();
+ jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_record_cache();
+ jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_table_cache();
jbd2_journal_destroy_journal_head_cache();
jbd2_journal_destroy_handle_cache();
+ jbd2_journal_destroy_inode_cache();
jbd2_journal_destroy_transaction_cache();
jbd2_journal_destroy_slabs();
}
--- a/fs/jbd2/revoke.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/revoke.c
@@ -178,33 +178,41 @@ static struct jbd2_revoke_record_s *find
return NULL;
}
-void jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_caches(void)
+void jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_record_cache(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(jbd2_revoke_record_cache);
jbd2_revoke_record_cache = NULL;
+}
+
+void jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_table_cache(void)
+{
kmem_cache_destroy(jbd2_revoke_table_cache);
jbd2_revoke_table_cache = NULL;
}
-int __init jbd2_journal_init_revoke_caches(void)
+int __init jbd2_journal_init_revoke_record_cache(void)
{
J_ASSERT(!jbd2_revoke_record_cache);
- J_ASSERT(!jbd2_revoke_table_cache);
-
jbd2_revoke_record_cache = KMEM_CACHE(jbd2_revoke_record_s,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_TEMPORARY);
- if (!jbd2_revoke_record_cache)
- goto record_cache_failure;
+ if (!jbd2_revoke_record_cache) {
+ pr_emerg("JBD2: failed to create revoke_record cache\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __init jbd2_journal_init_revoke_table_cache(void)
+{
+ J_ASSERT(!jbd2_revoke_table_cache);
jbd2_revoke_table_cache = KMEM_CACHE(jbd2_revoke_table_s,
SLAB_TEMPORARY);
- if (!jbd2_revoke_table_cache)
- goto table_cache_failure;
- return 0;
-table_cache_failure:
- jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_caches();
-record_cache_failure:
+ if (!jbd2_revoke_table_cache) {
+ pr_emerg("JBD2: failed to create revoke_table cache\n");
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
static struct jbd2_revoke_table_s *jbd2_journal_init_revoke_table(int hash_size)
--- a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c
@@ -42,9 +42,11 @@ int __init jbd2_journal_init_transaction
0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_TEMPORARY,
NULL);
- if (transaction_cache)
- return 0;
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!transaction_cache) {
+ pr_emerg("JBD2: failed to create transaction cache\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
void jbd2_journal_destroy_transaction_cache(void)
--- a/include/linux/jbd2.h
+++ b/include/linux/jbd2.h
@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ extern void __wait_on_journal (journal_
/* Transaction cache support */
extern void jbd2_journal_destroy_transaction_cache(void);
-extern int jbd2_journal_init_transaction_cache(void);
+extern int __init jbd2_journal_init_transaction_cache(void);
extern void jbd2_journal_free_transaction(transaction_t *);
/*
@@ -1446,8 +1446,10 @@ static inline void jbd2_free_inode(struc
/* Primary revoke support */
#define JOURNAL_REVOKE_DEFAULT_HASH 256
extern int jbd2_journal_init_revoke(journal_t *, int);
-extern void jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_caches(void);
-extern int jbd2_journal_init_revoke_caches(void);
+extern void jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_record_cache(void);
+extern void jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke_table_cache(void);
+extern int __init jbd2_journal_init_revoke_record_cache(void);
+extern int __init jbd2_journal_init_revoke_table_cache(void);
extern void jbd2_journal_destroy_revoke(journal_t *);
extern int jbd2_journal_revoke (handle_t *, unsigned long long, struct buffer_head *);
From: Barret Rhoden <[email protected]>
commit 7bc04c5c2cc467c5b40f2b03ba08da174a0d5fa7 upstream.
When remounting with debug_want_extra_isize, we were not performing the
same checks that we do during a normal mount. That allowed us to set a
value for s_want_extra_isize that reached outside the s_inode_size.
Fixes: e2b911c53584 ("ext4: clean up feature test macros with predicate functions")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/super.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -3514,6 +3514,37 @@ int ext4_calculate_overhead(struct super
return 0;
}
+static void ext4_clamp_want_extra_isize(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+ struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
+
+ /* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
+ if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE &&
+ sbi->s_want_extra_isize == 0) {
+ sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
+ EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
+ if (ext4_has_feature_extra_isize(sb)) {
+ if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
+ le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
+ sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
+ le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
+ if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
+ le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
+ sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
+ le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check if enough inode space is available */
+ if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
+ sbi->s_inode_size) {
+ sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
+ EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
+ ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "required extra inode space not available");
+ }
+}
+
static void ext4_set_resv_clusters(struct super_block *sb)
{
ext4_fsblk_t resv_clusters;
@@ -4388,30 +4419,7 @@ no_journal:
} else if (ret)
goto failed_mount4a;
- /* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
- if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE &&
- sbi->s_want_extra_isize == 0) {
- sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
- EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
- if (ext4_has_feature_extra_isize(sb)) {
- if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
- le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
- sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
- le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
- if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
- le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
- sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
- le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
- }
- }
- /* Check if enough inode space is available */
- if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
- sbi->s_inode_size) {
- sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
- EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
- ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
- "available");
- }
+ ext4_clamp_want_extra_isize(sb);
ext4_set_resv_clusters(sb);
@@ -5195,6 +5203,8 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_blo
goto restore_opts;
}
+ ext4_clamp_want_extra_isize(sb);
+
if ((old_opts.s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) ^
test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "changing journal_checksum "
From: Pan Bian <[email protected]>
commit 8c380ab4b7b59c0c602743810be1b712514eaebc upstream.
The reference to iloc.bh has been dropped in ext4_mark_iloc_dirty.
However, the reference is dropped again if error occurs during
ext4_handle_dirty_metadata, which may result in use-after-free bugs.
Fixes: fb265c9cb49e("ext4: add ext4_sb_bread() to disambiguate ENOMEM cases")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/resize.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/resize.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c
@@ -874,6 +874,7 @@ static int add_new_gdb(handle_t *handle,
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, gdb_bh);
if (unlikely(err)) {
ext4_std_error(sb, err);
+ iloc.bh = NULL;
goto errout;
}
brelse(dind);
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 03628cdbc64db6262e50d0357960a4e9562676a1 upstream.
During fiemap, for regular extents (non inline) we need to check if they
are shared and if they are, set the shared bit. Checking if an extent is
shared requires checking the delayed references of the currently running
transaction, since some reference might have not yet hit the extent tree
and be only in the in-memory delayed references.
However we were using a transaction join for this, which creates a new
transaction when there is no transaction currently running. That means
that two more potential failures can happen: creating the transaction and
committing it. Further, if no write activity is currently happening in the
system, and fiemap calls keep being done, we end up creating and
committing transactions that do nothing.
In some extreme cases this can result in the commit of the transaction
created by fiemap to fail with ENOSPC when updating the root item of a
subvolume tree because a join does not reserve any space, leading to a
trace like the following:
heisenberg kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------
heisenberg kernel: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
heisenberg kernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 at fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:136 btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7137 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 4.19.0-4-amd64 #1 Debian 4.19.28-2
heisenberg kernel: Hardware name: FUJITSU LIFEBOOK U757/FJNB2A5, BIOS Version 1.21 03/19/2018
heisenberg kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_root+0x22b/0x320 [btrfs]
(...)
heisenberg kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb5448828bd40 EFLAGS: 00010286
heisenberg kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ed56bccef50 RCX: 0000000000000006
heisenberg kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff8ed6bda166a0
heisenberg kernel: RBP: 00000000ffffffe4 R08: 00000000000003df R09: 0000000000000007
heisenberg kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8ed63396a078
heisenberg kernel: R13: ffff8ed092d7c800 R14: ffff8ed64f5db028 R15: ffff8ed6bd03d068
heisenberg kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ed6bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
heisenberg kernel: CR2: 00007f46f75f8000 CR3: 0000000310a0a002 CR4: 00000000003606f0
heisenberg kernel: DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
heisenberg kernel: DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
heisenberg kernel: Call Trace:
heisenberg kernel: commit_fs_roots+0x166/0x1d0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xac/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: btrfs_commit_transaction+0x2bd/0x870 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? start_transaction+0x9d/0x3f0 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: transaction_kthread+0x147/0x180 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x530/0x530 [btrfs]
heisenberg kernel: kthread+0x112/0x130
heisenberg kernel: ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
heisenberg kernel: ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
heisenberg kernel: ---[ end trace 05de912e30e012d9 ]---
Since fiemap (and btrfs_check_shared()) is a read-only operation, do not do
a transaction join to avoid the overhead of creating a new transaction (if
there is currently no running transaction) and introducing a potential
point of failure when the new transaction gets committed, instead use a
transaction attach to grab a handle for the currently running transaction
if any.
Reported-by: Christoph Anton Mitterer <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Fixes: afce772e87c36c ("btrfs: fix check_shared for fiemap ioctl")
CC: [email protected] # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/backref.c | 16 ++++++++++------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/backref.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/backref.c
@@ -1454,8 +1454,8 @@ int btrfs_find_all_roots(struct btrfs_tr
* callers (such as fiemap) which want to know whether the extent is
* shared but do not need a ref count.
*
- * This attempts to allocate a transaction in order to account for
- * delayed refs, but continues on even when the alloc fails.
+ * This attempts to attach to the running transaction in order to account for
+ * delayed refs, but continues on even when no running transaction exists.
*
* Return: 0 if extent is not shared, 1 if it is shared, < 0 on error.
*/
@@ -1478,13 +1478,16 @@ int btrfs_check_shared(struct btrfs_root
tmp = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
roots = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
if (!tmp || !roots) {
- ulist_free(tmp);
- ulist_free(roots);
- return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
- trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
+ trans = btrfs_attach_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(trans) != -ENOENT && PTR_ERR(trans) != -EROFS) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
+ goto out;
+ }
trans = NULL;
down_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
} else {
@@ -1517,6 +1520,7 @@ int btrfs_check_shared(struct btrfs_root
} else {
up_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
}
+out:
ulist_free(tmp);
ulist_free(roots);
return ret;
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 62d54f3a7fa27ef6a74d6cdf643ce04beba3afa7 upstream.
Send operates on read only trees and expects them to never change while it
is using them. This is part of its initial design, and this expection is
due to two different reasons:
1) When it was introduced, no operations were allowed to modifiy read-only
subvolumes/snapshots (including defrag for example).
2) It keeps send from having an impact on other filesystem operations.
Namely send does not need to keep locks on the trees nor needs to hold on
to transaction handles and delay transaction commits. This ends up being
a consequence of the former reason.
However the deduplication feature was introduced later (on September 2013,
while send was introduced in July 2012) and it allowed for deduplication
with destination files that belong to read-only trees (subvolumes and
snapshots).
That means that having a send operation (either full or incremental) running
in parallel with a deduplication that has the destination inode in one of
the trees used by the send operation, can result in tree nodes and leaves
getting freed and reused while send is using them. This problem is similar
to the problem solved for the root nodes getting freed and reused when a
snapshot is made against one tree that is currenly being used by a send
operation, fixed in commits [1] and [2]. These commits explain in detail
how the problem happens and the explanation is valid for any node or leaf
that is not the root of a tree as well. This problem was also discussed
and explained recently in a thread [3].
The problem is very easy to reproduce when using send with large trees
(snapshots) and just a few concurrent deduplication operations that target
files in the trees used by send. A stress test case is being sent for
fstests that triggers the issue easily. The most common error to hit is
the send ioctl return -EIO with the following messages in dmesg/syslog:
[1631617.204075] BTRFS error (device sdc): did not find backref in send_root. inode=63292, offset=0, disk_byte=5228134400 found extent=5228134400
[1631633.251754] BTRFS error (device sdc): parent transid verify failed on 32243712 wanted 24 found 27
The first one is very easy to hit while the second one happens much less
frequently, except for very large trees (in that test case, snapshots
with 100000 files having large xattrs to get deep and wide trees).
Less frequently, at least one BUG_ON can be hit:
[1631742.130080] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[1631742.130625] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1806!
[1631742.131188] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
[1631742.131726] CPU: 1 PID: 13394 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G B D W 5.0.0-rc8-btrfs-next-45 #1
[1631742.132265] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[1631742.133399] RIP: 0010:read_node_slot+0x122/0x130 [btrfs]
(...)
[1631742.135061] RSP: 0018:ffffb530021ebaa0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[1631742.135615] RAX: ffff93ac8912e000 RBX: 000000000000009d RCX: 0000000000000002
[1631742.136173] RDX: 000000000000009d RSI: ffff93ac564b0d08 RDI: ffff93ad5b48c000
[1631742.136759] RBP: ffffb530021ebb7d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffb530021ebb7d
[1631742.137324] R10: ffffb530021eba70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff93ac87d0a708
[1631742.137900] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[1631742.138455] FS: 00007f4cdb1528c0(0000) GS:ffff93ad76a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[1631742.139010] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1631742.139568] CR2: 00007f5acb3d0420 CR3: 000000012be3e006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[1631742.140131] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[1631742.140719] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[1631742.141272] Call Trace:
[1631742.141826] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0
[1631742.142390] tree_advance+0x173/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[1631742.142948] btrfs_compare_trees+0x268/0x690 [btrfs]
[1631742.143533] ? process_extent+0x1070/0x1070 [btrfs]
[1631742.144088] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x1037/0x1270 [btrfs]
[1631742.144645] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x80/0x110 [btrfs]
[1631742.145161] ? trace_sched_stick_numa+0xe0/0xe0
[1631742.145685] btrfs_ioctl+0x13fe/0x3120 [btrfs]
[1631742.146179] ? account_entity_enqueue+0xd3/0x100
[1631742.146662] ? reweight_entity+0x154/0x1a0
[1631742.147135] ? update_curr+0x20/0x2a0
[1631742.147593] ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x103/0x250
[1631742.148053] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6f0
[1631742.148510] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs]
[1631742.148942] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x6f0
[1631742.149361] ? __fget+0x113/0x200
[1631742.149767] ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
[1631742.150159] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[1631742.150543] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0
[1631742.150931] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[1631742.151326] RIP: 0033:0x7f4cd9f5add7
(...)
[1631742.152509] RSP: 002b:00007ffe91017708 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[1631742.152892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000105 RCX: 00007f4cd9f5add7
[1631742.153268] RDX: 00007ffe91017790 RSI: 0000000040489426 RDI: 0000000000000007
[1631742.153633] RBP: 0000000000000007 R08: 00007f4cd9e79700 R09: 00007f4cd9e79700
[1631742.153999] R10: 00007f4cd9e799d0 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003
[1631742.154365] R13: 0000555dfae53020 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
(...)
[1631742.156696] ---[ end trace 5dac9f96dcc3fd6b ]---
That BUG_ON happens because while send is using a node, that node is COWed
by a concurrent deduplication, gets freed and gets reused as a leaf (because
a transaction commit happened in between), so when it attempts to read a
slot from the extent buffer, at ctree.c:read_node_slot(), the extent buffer
contents were wiped out and it now matches a leaf (which can even belong to
some other tree now), hitting the BUG_ON(level == 0).
Fix this concurrency issue by not allowing send and deduplication to run
in parallel if both operate on the same readonly trees, returning EAGAIN
to user space and logging an exlicit warning in dmesg/syslog.
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=be6821f82c3cc36e026f5afd10249988852b35ea
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6f2f0b394b54e2b159ef969a0b5274e9bbf82ff2
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAL3q7H7iqSEEyFaEtpRZw3cp613y+4k2Q8b4W7mweR3tZA05bQ@mail.gmail.com/
CC: [email protected] # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 6 ++++++
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
fs/btrfs/send.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
@@ -1316,6 +1316,12 @@ struct btrfs_root {
* manipulation with the read-only status via SUBVOL_SETFLAGS
*/
int send_in_progress;
+ /*
+ * Number of currently running deduplication operations that have a
+ * destination inode belonging to this root. Protected by the lock
+ * root_item_lock.
+ */
+ int dedupe_in_progress;
struct btrfs_subvolume_writers *subv_writers;
atomic_t will_be_snapshotted;
atomic_t snapshot_force_cow;
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -3275,6 +3275,19 @@ static int btrfs_extent_same(struct inod
int ret;
int num_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(BTRFS_MAX_DEDUPE_LEN) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
u64 i, tail_len, chunk_count;
+ struct btrfs_root *root_dst = BTRFS_I(dst)->root;
+
+ spin_lock(&root_dst->root_item_lock);
+ if (root_dst->send_in_progress) {
+ btrfs_warn_rl(root_dst->fs_info,
+"cannot deduplicate to root %llu while send operations are using it (%d in progress)",
+ root_dst->root_key.objectid,
+ root_dst->send_in_progress);
+ spin_unlock(&root_dst->root_item_lock);
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ root_dst->dedupe_in_progress++;
+ spin_unlock(&root_dst->root_item_lock);
/* don't make the dst file partly checksummed */
if ((BTRFS_I(src)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM) !=
@@ -3293,7 +3306,7 @@ static int btrfs_extent_same(struct inod
ret = btrfs_extent_same_range(src, loff, BTRFS_MAX_DEDUPE_LEN,
dst, dst_loff);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto out;
loff += BTRFS_MAX_DEDUPE_LEN;
dst_loff += BTRFS_MAX_DEDUPE_LEN;
@@ -3302,6 +3315,10 @@ static int btrfs_extent_same(struct inod
if (tail_len > 0)
ret = btrfs_extent_same_range(src, loff, tail_len, dst,
dst_loff);
+out:
+ spin_lock(&root_dst->root_item_lock);
+ root_dst->dedupe_in_progress--;
+ spin_unlock(&root_dst->root_item_lock);
return ret;
}
--- a/fs/btrfs/send.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c
@@ -6626,6 +6626,13 @@ static void btrfs_root_dec_send_in_progr
spin_unlock(&root->root_item_lock);
}
+static void dedupe_in_progress_warn(const struct btrfs_root *root)
+{
+ btrfs_warn_rl(root->fs_info,
+"cannot use root %llu for send while deduplications on it are in progress (%d in progress)",
+ root->root_key.objectid, root->dedupe_in_progress);
+}
+
long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args *arg)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -6649,6 +6656,11 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_f
* making it RW. This also protects against deletion.
*/
spin_lock(&send_root->root_item_lock);
+ if (btrfs_root_readonly(send_root) && send_root->dedupe_in_progress) {
+ dedupe_in_progress_warn(send_root);
+ spin_unlock(&send_root->root_item_lock);
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
send_root->send_in_progress++;
spin_unlock(&send_root->root_item_lock);
@@ -6783,6 +6795,13 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_f
ret = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
+ if (clone_root->dedupe_in_progress) {
+ dedupe_in_progress_warn(clone_root);
+ spin_unlock(&clone_root->root_item_lock);
+ srcu_read_unlock(&fs_info->subvol_srcu, index);
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ goto out;
+ }
clone_root->send_in_progress++;
spin_unlock(&clone_root->root_item_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&fs_info->subvol_srcu, index);
@@ -6817,6 +6836,13 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_f
ret = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
+ if (sctx->parent_root->dedupe_in_progress) {
+ dedupe_in_progress_warn(sctx->parent_root);
+ spin_unlock(&sctx->parent_root->root_item_lock);
+ srcu_read_unlock(&fs_info->subvol_srcu, index);
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ goto out;
+ }
spin_unlock(&sctx->parent_root->root_item_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&fs_info->subvol_srcu, index);
From: Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
commit 897ab2316910a66bb048f1c9cefa25e6a592dcd7 upstream.
Adds function that checks if cryptocell tee fips error occurred
and in such case triggers system error through kernel panic.
Change fips function to use this new routine.
Signed-off-by: Ofir Drang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_fips.c | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_fips.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_fips.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_fips.c
@@ -72,20 +72,28 @@ static inline void tee_fips_error(struct
dev_err(dev, "TEE reported error!\n");
}
+/*
+ * This function check if cryptocell tee fips error occurred
+ * and in such case triggers system error
+ */
+void cc_tee_handle_fips_error(struct cc_drvdata *p_drvdata)
+{
+ struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(p_drvdata);
+
+ if (!cc_get_tee_fips_status(p_drvdata))
+ tee_fips_error(dev);
+}
+
/* Deferred service handler, run as interrupt-fired tasklet */
static void fips_dsr(unsigned long devarg)
{
struct cc_drvdata *drvdata = (struct cc_drvdata *)devarg;
- struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
- u32 irq, state, val;
+ u32 irq, val;
irq = (drvdata->irq & (CC_GPR0_IRQ_MASK));
if (irq) {
- state = cc_ioread(drvdata, CC_REG(GPR_HOST));
-
- if (state != (CC_FIPS_SYNC_TEE_STATUS | CC_FIPS_SYNC_MODULE_OK))
- tee_fips_error(dev);
+ cc_tee_handle_fips_error(drvdata);
}
/* after verifing that there is nothing to do,
@@ -113,8 +121,7 @@ int cc_fips_init(struct cc_drvdata *p_dr
dev_dbg(dev, "Initializing fips tasklet\n");
tasklet_init(&fips_h->tasklet, fips_dsr, (unsigned long)p_drvdata);
- if (!cc_get_tee_fips_status(p_drvdata))
- tee_fips_error(dev);
+ cc_tee_handle_fips_error(p_drvdata);
return 0;
}
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_fips.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_fips.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ int cc_fips_init(struct cc_drvdata *p_dr
void cc_fips_fini(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata);
void fips_handler(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata);
void cc_set_ree_fips_status(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata, bool ok);
+void cc_tee_handle_fips_error(struct cc_drvdata *p_drvdata);
#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS */
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ static inline void cc_fips_fini(struct c
static inline void cc_set_ree_fips_status(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata,
bool ok) {}
static inline void fips_handler(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata) {}
+static inline void cc_tee_handle_fips_error(struct cc_drvdata *p_drvdata) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS */
From: Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
commit 72813bfbf0276a97c82af038efb5f02dcdd9e310 upstream.
This involves initializing the boot params EFI related fields and the
efi global variable.
Without this fix a PVH dom0 doesn't detect when booted from EFI, and
thus doesn't support accessing any of the EFI related data.
Reported-by: PGNet Dev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 12 ++++++------
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c | 6 +++++-
arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h | 4 ++--
5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ void __init __weak mem_map_via_hcall(str
static void __init init_pvh_bootparams(bool xen_guest)
{
- memset(&pvh_bootparams, 0, sizeof(pvh_bootparams));
-
if ((pvh_start_info.version > 0) && (pvh_start_info.memmap_entries)) {
struct hvm_memmap_table_entry *ep;
int i;
@@ -103,7 +101,7 @@ static void __init init_pvh_bootparams(b
* If we are trying to boot a Xen PVH guest, it is expected that the kernel
* will have been configured to provide the required override for this routine.
*/
-void __init __weak xen_pvh_init(void)
+void __init __weak xen_pvh_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)
{
xen_raw_printk("Error: Missing xen PVH initialization\n");
BUG();
@@ -112,7 +110,7 @@ void __init __weak xen_pvh_init(void)
static void hypervisor_specific_init(bool xen_guest)
{
if (xen_guest)
- xen_pvh_init();
+ xen_pvh_init(&pvh_bootparams);
}
/*
@@ -131,6 +129,8 @@ void __init xen_prepare_pvh(void)
BUG();
}
+ memset(&pvh_bootparams, 0, sizeof(pvh_bootparams));
+
hypervisor_specific_init(xen_guest);
init_pvh_bootparams(xen_guest);
--- a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_
return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
}
-void __init xen_efi_init(void)
+void __init xen_efi_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)
{
efi_system_table_t *efi_systab_xen;
@@ -167,12 +167,12 @@ void __init xen_efi_init(void)
if (efi_systab_xen == NULL)
return;
- strncpy((char *)&boot_params.efi_info.efi_loader_signature, "Xen",
- sizeof(boot_params.efi_info.efi_loader_signature));
- boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab = (__u32)__pa(efi_systab_xen);
- boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi = (__u32)(__pa(efi_systab_xen) >> 32);
+ strncpy((char *)&boot_params->efi_info.efi_loader_signature, "Xen",
+ sizeof(boot_params->efi_info.efi_loader_signature));
+ boot_params->efi_info.efi_systab = (__u32)__pa(efi_systab_xen);
+ boot_params->efi_info.efi_systab_hi = (__u32)(__pa(efi_systab_xen) >> 32);
- boot_params.secure_boot = xen_efi_get_secureboot();
+ boot_params->secure_boot = xen_efi_get_secureboot();
set_bit(EFI_BOOT, &efi.flags);
set_bit(EFI_PARAVIRT, &efi.flags);
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_sta
/* We need this for printk timestamps */
xen_setup_runstate_info(0);
- xen_efi_init();
+ xen_efi_init(&boot_params);
/* Start the world */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#include <xen/interface/memory.h>
+#include "xen-ops.h"
+
/*
* PVH variables.
*
@@ -21,7 +23,7 @@
*/
bool xen_pvh __attribute__((section(".data"))) = 0;
-void __init xen_pvh_init(void)
+void __init xen_pvh_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)
{
u32 msr;
u64 pfn;
@@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ void __init xen_pvh_init(void)
msr = cpuid_ebx(xen_cpuid_base() + 2);
pfn = __pa(hypercall_page);
wrmsr_safe(msr, (u32)pfn, (u32)(pfn >> 32));
+
+ xen_efi_init(boot_params);
}
void __init mem_map_via_hcall(struct boot_params *boot_params_p)
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ static inline void __init xen_init_vga(c
void __init xen_init_apic(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_EFI
-extern void xen_efi_init(void);
+extern void xen_efi_init(struct boot_params *boot_params);
#else
-static inline void __init xen_efi_init(void)
+static inline void __init xen_efi_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)
{
}
#endif
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 170417c8c7bb2cbbdd949bf5c443c0c8f24a203b upstream.
Commit 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using
block_validity") failed to add an exception for the journal inode in
ext4_check_blockref(), which is the function used by ext4_get_branch()
for indirect blocks. This caused attempts to read from the ext3-style
journals to fail with:
[ 848.968550] EXT4-fs error (device sdb7): ext4_get_branch:171: inode #8: block 30343695: comm jbd2/sdb7-8: invalid block
Fix this by adding the missing exception check.
Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity")
Reported-by: Arthur Marsh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
@@ -276,6 +276,11 @@ int ext4_check_blockref(const char *func
__le32 *bref = p;
unsigned int blk;
+ if (ext4_has_feature_journal(inode->i_sb) &&
+ (inode->i_ino ==
+ le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+ return 0;
+
while (bref < p+max) {
blk = le32_to_cpu(*bref++);
if (blk &&
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 2c1d0e3631e5732dba98ef49ac0bec1388776793 upstream.
Handling of aborted journal is a special code path different from
standard ext4_error() one and it can call panic() as well. Commit
1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot") forgot to update
this path so fix that omission.
Fixes: 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 5.1
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/ext4/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ void __ext4_abort(struct super_block *sb
jbd2_journal_abort(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, -EIO);
save_error_info(sb, function, line);
}
- if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC)) {
+ if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC) && !system_going_down()) {
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal &&
!(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal->j_flags & JBD2_REC_ERR))
return;
From: Michał Wadowski <[email protected]>
commit 56df90b631fc027fe28b70d41352d820797239bb upstream.
Add patch for realtek codec in Lenovo B50-70 that fixes inverted
internal microphone channel.
Device IdeaPad Y410P has the same PCI SSID as Lenovo B50-70,
but first one is about fix the noise and it didn't seem help in a
later kernel version.
So I replaced IdeaPad Y410P device description with B50-70 and apply
inverted microphone fix.
Bugzilla: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/alsa-driver/+bug/1524215
Signed-off-by: Michał Wadowski <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -6988,7 +6988,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x313c, "ThinkCentre Station", ALC294_FIXUP_LENOVO_MIC_LOCATION),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3902, "Lenovo E50-80", ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC_THINKPAD_ACPI),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3977, "IdeaPad S210", ALC283_FIXUP_INT_MIC),
- SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3978, "IdeaPad Y410P", ALC269_FIXUP_NO_SHUTUP),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3978, "Lenovo B50-70", ALC269_FIXUP_DMIC_THINKPAD_ACPI),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x5013, "Thinkpad", ALC269_FIXUP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x501a, "Thinkpad", ALC283_FIXUP_INT_MIC),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x501e, "Thinkpad L440", ALC292_FIXUP_TPT440_DOCK),
From: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
commit 4ddc9204572c33f2eb91fbdb1d99d8078388b67d upstream.
kvm_dirty_bitmap_bytes() will return the size of the dirty bitmap of
the memslot rather than the size of bitmap passed over from the ioctl.
Here for KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG we should only copy exactly the size of
bitmap that covers kvm_clear_dirty_log.num_pages.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 2a31b9db153530df4aa02dac8c32837bf5f47019
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ int kvm_clear_dirty_log_protect(struct k
if (!dirty_bitmap)
return -ENOENT;
- n = kvm_dirty_bitmap_bytes(memslot);
+ n = ALIGN(log->num_pages, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (log->first_page > memslot->npages ||
log->num_pages > memslot->npages - log->first_page)
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
commit 8968c67a82ab7501bc3b9439c3624a49b42fe54c upstream.
Prefetch-with-intent-to-write is currently part of the XADD mapping in
the AArch64 JIT and follows the kernel's implementation of atomic_add.
This may interfere with other threads executing the LDXR/STXR loop,
leading to potential starvation and fairness issues. Drop the optional
prefetch instruction.
Fixes: 85f68fe89832 ("bpf, arm64: implement jiting of BPF_XADD")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h | 6 ------
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 -
2 files changed, 7 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit.h
@@ -100,12 +100,6 @@
#define A64_STXR(sf, Rt, Rn, Rs) \
A64_LSX(sf, Rt, Rn, Rs, STORE_EX)
-/* Prefetch */
-#define A64_PRFM(Rn, type, target, policy) \
- aarch64_insn_gen_prefetch(Rn, AARCH64_INSN_PRFM_TYPE_##type, \
- AARCH64_INSN_PRFM_TARGET_##target, \
- AARCH64_INSN_PRFM_POLICY_##policy)
-
/* Add/subtract (immediate) */
#define A64_ADDSUB_IMM(sf, Rd, Rn, imm12, type) \
aarch64_insn_gen_add_sub_imm(Rd, Rn, imm12, \
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -739,7 +739,6 @@ emit_cond_jmp:
case BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW:
emit_a64_mov_i(1, tmp, off, ctx);
emit(A64_ADD(1, tmp, tmp, dst), ctx);
- emit(A64_PRFM(tmp, PST, L1, STRM), ctx);
emit(A64_LDXR(isdw, tmp2, tmp), ctx);
emit(A64_ADD(isdw, tmp2, tmp2, src), ctx);
emit(A64_STXR(isdw, tmp2, tmp, tmp3), ctx);
From: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
commit d1874a0c2805fcfa9162c972d6b7541e57adb542 upstream.
Change the way how pgd_offset, p4d_offset, pud_offset and pmd_offset
walk the page tables. pgd_offset now always calculates the index for
the top-level page table and adds it to the pgd, this is either a
segment table offset for a 2-level setup, a region-3 offset for 3-levels,
region-2 offset for 4-levels, or a region-1 offset for a 5-level setup.
The other three functions p4d_offset, pud_offset and pmd_offset will
only add the respective offset if they dereference the passed pointer.
With the new way of walking the page tables a sequence like this from
mm/gup.c now works:
pgdp = pgd_offset(current->mm, addr);
pgd = READ_ONCE(*pgdp);
p4dp = p4d_offset(&pgd, addr);
p4d = READ_ONCE(*p4dp);
pudp = pud_offset(&p4d, addr);
pud = READ_ONCE(*pudp);
pmdp = pmd_offset(&pud, addr);
pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
arch/s390/mm/gup.c | 33 +++++++------------
2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1203,42 +1203,67 @@ static inline pte_t mk_pte(struct page *
#define pmd_index(address) (((address) >> PMD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PMD-1))
#define pte_index(address) (((address) >> PAGE_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PTE-1))
-#define pgd_offset(mm, address) ((mm)->pgd + pgd_index(address))
-#define pgd_offset_k(address) pgd_offset(&init_mm, address)
-#define pgd_offset_raw(pgd, addr) ((pgd) + pgd_index(addr))
-
#define pmd_deref(pmd) (pmd_val(pmd) & _SEGMENT_ENTRY_ORIGIN)
#define pud_deref(pud) (pud_val(pud) & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN)
#define p4d_deref(pud) (p4d_val(pud) & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN)
#define pgd_deref(pgd) (pgd_val(pgd) & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN)
-static inline p4d_t *p4d_offset(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)
+/*
+ * The pgd_offset function *always* adds the index for the top-level
+ * region/segment table. This is done to get a sequence like the
+ * following to work:
+ * pgdp = pgd_offset(current->mm, addr);
+ * pgd = READ_ONCE(*pgdp);
+ * p4dp = p4d_offset(&pgd, addr);
+ * ...
+ * The subsequent p4d_offset, pud_offset and pmd_offset functions
+ * only add an index if they dereferenced the pointer.
+ */
+static inline pgd_t *pgd_offset_raw(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)
{
- p4d_t *p4d = (p4d_t *) pgd;
+ unsigned long rste;
+ unsigned int shift;
- if ((pgd_val(*pgd) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) == _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R1)
- p4d = (p4d_t *) pgd_deref(*pgd);
- return p4d + p4d_index(address);
+ /* Get the first entry of the top level table */
+ rste = pgd_val(*pgd);
+ /* Pick up the shift from the table type of the first entry */
+ shift = ((rste & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) >> 2) * 11 + 20;
+ return pgd + ((address >> shift) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1));
}
-static inline pud_t *pud_offset(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long address)
+#define pgd_offset(mm, address) pgd_offset_raw(READ_ONCE((mm)->pgd), address)
+#define pgd_offset_k(address) pgd_offset(&init_mm, address)
+
+static inline p4d_t *p4d_offset(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)
{
- pud_t *pud = (pud_t *) p4d;
+ if ((pgd_val(*pgd) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) >= _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R1)
+ return (p4d_t *) pgd_deref(*pgd) + p4d_index(address);
+ return (p4d_t *) pgd;
+}
- if ((p4d_val(*p4d) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) == _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R2)
- pud = (pud_t *) p4d_deref(*p4d);
- return pud + pud_index(address);
+static inline pud_t *pud_offset(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long address)
+{
+ if ((p4d_val(*p4d) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) >= _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R2)
+ return (pud_t *) p4d_deref(*p4d) + pud_index(address);
+ return (pud_t *) p4d;
}
static inline pmd_t *pmd_offset(pud_t *pud, unsigned long address)
{
- pmd_t *pmd = (pmd_t *) pud;
+ if ((pud_val(*pud) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) >= _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R3)
+ return (pmd_t *) pud_deref(*pud) + pmd_index(address);
+ return (pmd_t *) pud;
+}
- if ((pud_val(*pud) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) == _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R3)
- pmd = (pmd_t *) pud_deref(*pud);
- return pmd + pmd_index(address);
+static inline pte_t *pte_offset(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long address)
+{
+ return (pte_t *) pmd_deref(*pmd) + pte_index(address);
}
+#define pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address) pte_offset(pmd, address)
+#define pte_offset_map(pmd, address) pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address)
+#define pte_unmap(pte) do { } while (0)
+
#define pfn_pte(pfn,pgprot) mk_pte_phys(__pa((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT),(pgprot))
#define pte_pfn(x) (pte_val(x) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
#define pte_page(x) pfn_to_page(pte_pfn(x))
@@ -1248,12 +1273,6 @@ static inline pmd_t *pmd_offset(pud_t *p
#define p4d_page(p4d) pfn_to_page(p4d_pfn(p4d))
#define pgd_page(pgd) pfn_to_page(pgd_pfn(pgd))
-/* Find an entry in the lowest level page table.. */
-#define pte_offset(pmd, addr) ((pte_t *) pmd_deref(*(pmd)) + pte_index(addr))
-#define pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address) pte_offset(pmd,address)
-#define pte_offset_map(pmd, address) pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address)
-#define pte_unmap(pte) do { } while (0)
-
static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)
{
pmd_val(pmd) &= ~_SEGMENT_ENTRY_WRITE;
--- a/arch/s390/mm/gup.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/gup.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
* inlines everything into a single function which results in too much
* register pressure.
*/
-static inline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
+static inline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t *p
mask = (write ? _PAGE_PROTECT : 0) | _PAGE_INVALID | _PAGE_SPECIAL;
- ptep = ((pte_t *) pmd_deref(pmd)) + pte_index(addr);
+ ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr);
do {
pte = *ptep;
barrier();
@@ -93,16 +93,13 @@ static inline int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t *pm
}
-static inline int gup_pmd_range(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud, unsigned long addr,
+static inline int gup_pmd_range(pud_t pud, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
unsigned long next;
pmd_t *pmdp, pmd;
- pmdp = (pmd_t *) pudp;
- if ((pud_val(pud) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) == _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R3)
- pmdp = (pmd_t *) pud_deref(pud);
- pmdp += pmd_index(addr);
+ pmdp = pmd_offset(&pud, addr);
do {
pmd = *pmdp;
barrier();
@@ -120,7 +117,7 @@ static inline int gup_pmd_range(pud_t *p
if (!gup_huge_pmd(pmdp, pmd, addr, next,
write, pages, nr))
return 0;
- } else if (!gup_pte_range(pmdp, pmd, addr, next,
+ } else if (!gup_pte_range(pmd, addr, next,
write, pages, nr))
return 0;
} while (pmdp++, addr = next, addr != end);
@@ -166,16 +163,13 @@ static int gup_huge_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud
return 1;
}
-static inline int gup_pud_range(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d, unsigned long addr,
+static inline int gup_pud_range(p4d_t p4d, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
unsigned long next;
pud_t *pudp, pud;
- pudp = (pud_t *) p4dp;
- if ((p4d_val(p4d) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) == _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R2)
- pudp = (pud_t *) p4d_deref(p4d);
- pudp += pud_index(addr);
+ pudp = pud_offset(&p4d, addr);
do {
pud = *pudp;
barrier();
@@ -186,7 +180,7 @@ static inline int gup_pud_range(p4d_t *p
if (!gup_huge_pud(pudp, pud, addr, next, write, pages,
nr))
return 0;
- } else if (!gup_pmd_range(pudp, pud, addr, next, write, pages,
+ } else if (!gup_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, write, pages,
nr))
return 0;
} while (pudp++, addr = next, addr != end);
@@ -194,23 +188,20 @@ static inline int gup_pud_range(p4d_t *p
return 1;
}
-static inline int gup_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd, unsigned long addr,
+static inline int gup_p4d_range(pgd_t pgd, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
unsigned long next;
p4d_t *p4dp, p4d;
- p4dp = (p4d_t *) pgdp;
- if ((pgd_val(pgd) & _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_MASK) == _REGION_ENTRY_TYPE_R1)
- p4dp = (p4d_t *) pgd_deref(pgd);
- p4dp += p4d_index(addr);
+ p4dp = p4d_offset(&pgd, addr);
do {
p4d = *p4dp;
barrier();
next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
if (p4d_none(p4d))
return 0;
- if (!gup_pud_range(p4dp, p4d, addr, next, write, pages, nr))
+ if (!gup_pud_range(p4d, addr, next, write, pages, nr))
return 0;
} while (p4dp++, addr = next, addr != end);
@@ -253,7 +244,7 @@ int __get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long
next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pgd_none(pgd))
break;
- if (!gup_p4d_range(pgdp, pgd, addr, next, write, pages, &nr))
+ if (!gup_p4d_range(pgd, addr, next, write, pages, &nr))
break;
} while (pgdp++, addr = next, addr != end);
local_irq_restore(flags);
From: Jeremy Soller <[email protected]>
commit 80a5052db75131423b67f38b21958555d7d970e4 upstream.
On the System76 Gazelle (gaze14), there is a headset microphone input
attached to 0x1a that does not have a jack detect. In order to get it
working, the pin configuration needs to be set correctly, and the
ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MODE_NO_HP_MIC fixup needs to be applied. This is
identical to the patch already applied for the System76 Darter Pro
(darp5).
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Soller <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -6930,6 +6930,8 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xb120, "MSI Cubi MS-B120", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xb171, "Cubi N 8GL (MS-B171)", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x1325, "System76 Darter Pro (darp5)", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x8550, "System76 Gazelle (gaze14)", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x8560, "System76 Gazelle (gaze14)", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x1036, "Lenovo P520", ALC233_FIXUP_LENOVO_MULTI_CODECS),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x20f2, "Thinkpad SL410/510", ALC269_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x215e, "Thinkpad L512", ALC269_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE),
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit 75a19a0202db21638a1c2b424afb867e1f9a2376 upstream.
When executing clock_gettime(), either in the vDSO or via a system call,
we need to ensure that the read of the counter register occurs within
the seqlock reader critical section. This ensures that updates to the
clocksource parameters (e.g. the multiplier) are consistent with the
counter value and therefore avoids the situation where time appears to
go backwards across multiple reads.
Extend the vDSO logic so that the seqlock critical section covers the
read of the counter register as well as accesses to the data page. Since
reads of the counter system registers are not ordered by memory barrier
instructions, introduce dependency ordering from the counter read to a
subsequent memory access so that the seqlock memory barriers apply to
the counter access in both the vDSO and the system call paths.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gettimeofday.S | 15 +++++++++++----
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h
@@ -148,18 +148,47 @@ static inline void arch_timer_set_cntkct
isb();
}
+/*
+ * Ensure that reads of the counter are treated the same as memory reads
+ * for the purposes of ordering by subsequent memory barriers.
+ *
+ * This insanity brought to you by speculative system register reads,
+ * out-of-order memory accesses, sequence locks and Thomas Gleixner.
+ *
+ * http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2019-February/631195.html
+ */
+#define arch_counter_enforce_ordering(val) do { \
+ u64 tmp, _val = (val); \
+ \
+ asm volatile( \
+ " eor %0, %1, %1\n" \
+ " add %0, sp, %0\n" \
+ " ldr xzr, [%0]" \
+ : "=r" (tmp) : "r" (_val)); \
+} while (0)
+
static inline u64 arch_counter_get_cntpct(void)
{
+ u64 cnt;
+
isb();
- return arch_timer_reg_read_stable(cntpct_el0);
+ cnt = arch_timer_reg_read_stable(cntpct_el0);
+ arch_counter_enforce_ordering(cnt);
+ return cnt;
}
static inline u64 arch_counter_get_cntvct(void)
{
+ u64 cnt;
+
isb();
- return arch_timer_reg_read_stable(cntvct_el0);
+ cnt = arch_timer_reg_read_stable(cntvct_el0);
+ arch_counter_enforce_ordering(cnt);
+ return cnt;
}
+#undef arch_counter_enforce_ordering
+
static inline int arch_timer_arch_init(void)
{
return 0;
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gettimeofday.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gettimeofday.S
@@ -73,6 +73,13 @@ x_tmp .req x8
movn x_tmp, #0xff00, lsl #48
and \res, x_tmp, \res
mul \res, \res, \mult
+ /*
+ * Fake address dependency from the value computed from the counter
+ * register to subsequent data page accesses so that the sequence
+ * locking also orders the read of the counter.
+ */
+ and x_tmp, \res, xzr
+ add vdso_data, vdso_data, x_tmp
.endm
/*
@@ -147,12 +154,12 @@ ENTRY(__kernel_gettimeofday)
/* w11 = cs_mono_mult, w12 = cs_shift */
ldp w11, w12, [vdso_data, #VDSO_CS_MONO_MULT]
ldp x13, x14, [vdso_data, #VDSO_XTIME_CLK_SEC]
- seqcnt_check fail=1b
get_nsec_per_sec res=x9
lsl x9, x9, x12
get_clock_shifted_nsec res=x15, cycle_last=x10, mult=x11
+ seqcnt_check fail=1b
get_ts_realtime res_sec=x10, res_nsec=x11, \
clock_nsec=x15, xtime_sec=x13, xtime_nsec=x14, nsec_to_sec=x9
@@ -211,13 +218,13 @@ realtime:
/* w11 = cs_mono_mult, w12 = cs_shift */
ldp w11, w12, [vdso_data, #VDSO_CS_MONO_MULT]
ldp x13, x14, [vdso_data, #VDSO_XTIME_CLK_SEC]
- seqcnt_check fail=realtime
/* All computations are done with left-shifted nsecs. */
get_nsec_per_sec res=x9
lsl x9, x9, x12
get_clock_shifted_nsec res=x15, cycle_last=x10, mult=x11
+ seqcnt_check fail=realtime
get_ts_realtime res_sec=x10, res_nsec=x11, \
clock_nsec=x15, xtime_sec=x13, xtime_nsec=x14, nsec_to_sec=x9
clock_gettime_return, shift=1
@@ -231,7 +238,6 @@ monotonic:
ldp w11, w12, [vdso_data, #VDSO_CS_MONO_MULT]
ldp x13, x14, [vdso_data, #VDSO_XTIME_CLK_SEC]
ldp x3, x4, [vdso_data, #VDSO_WTM_CLK_SEC]
- seqcnt_check fail=monotonic
/* All computations are done with left-shifted nsecs. */
lsl x4, x4, x12
@@ -239,6 +245,7 @@ monotonic:
lsl x9, x9, x12
get_clock_shifted_nsec res=x15, cycle_last=x10, mult=x11
+ seqcnt_check fail=monotonic
get_ts_realtime res_sec=x10, res_nsec=x11, \
clock_nsec=x15, xtime_sec=x13, xtime_nsec=x14, nsec_to_sec=x9
@@ -253,13 +260,13 @@ monotonic_raw:
/* w11 = cs_raw_mult, w12 = cs_shift */
ldp w12, w11, [vdso_data, #VDSO_CS_SHIFT]
ldp x13, x14, [vdso_data, #VDSO_RAW_TIME_SEC]
- seqcnt_check fail=monotonic_raw
/* All computations are done with left-shifted nsecs. */
get_nsec_per_sec res=x9
lsl x9, x9, x12
get_clock_shifted_nsec res=x15, cycle_last=x10, mult=x11
+ seqcnt_check fail=monotonic_raw
get_ts_clock_raw res_sec=x10, res_nsec=x11, \
clock_nsec=x15, nsec_to_sec=x9
From: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
commit d574b707c873d6ef1a2a155f8cfcfecd821e9a2e upstream.
Fix a memory leak on the error path of IV generation code.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_ivgen.c | 9 +++------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_ivgen.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_ivgen.c
@@ -154,9 +154,6 @@ void cc_ivgen_fini(struct cc_drvdata *dr
}
ivgen_ctx->pool = NULL_SRAM_ADDR;
-
- /* release "this" context */
- kfree(ivgen_ctx);
}
/*!
@@ -174,10 +171,12 @@ int cc_ivgen_init(struct cc_drvdata *drv
int rc;
/* Allocate "this" context */
- ivgen_ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ivgen_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ ivgen_ctx = devm_kzalloc(device, sizeof(*ivgen_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ivgen_ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
+ drvdata->ivgen_handle = ivgen_ctx;
+
/* Allocate pool's header for initial enc. key/IV */
ivgen_ctx->pool_meta = dma_alloc_coherent(device, CC_IVPOOL_META_SIZE,
&ivgen_ctx->pool_meta_dma,
@@ -196,8 +195,6 @@ int cc_ivgen_init(struct cc_drvdata *drv
goto out;
}
- drvdata->ivgen_handle = ivgen_ctx;
-
return cc_init_iv_sram(drvdata);
out:
From: Steve Twiss <[email protected]>
commit 6b4814a9451add06d457e198be418bf6a3e6a990 upstream.
Mismatch between what is found in the Datasheets for DA9063 and DA9063L
provided by Dialog Semiconductor, and the register names provided in the
MFD registers file. The changes are for the OTP (one-time-programming)
control registers. The two naming errors are OPT instead of OTP, and
COUNT instead of CONT (i.e. control).
Cc: Stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve Twiss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/mfd/da9063/registers.h | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/mfd/da9063/registers.h
+++ b/include/linux/mfd/da9063/registers.h
@@ -215,9 +215,9 @@
/* DA9063 Configuration registers */
/* OTP */
-#define DA9063_REG_OPT_COUNT 0x101
-#define DA9063_REG_OPT_ADDR 0x102
-#define DA9063_REG_OPT_DATA 0x103
+#define DA9063_REG_OTP_CONT 0x101
+#define DA9063_REG_OTP_ADDR 0x102
+#define DA9063_REG_OTP_DATA 0x103
/* Customer Trim and Configuration */
#define DA9063_REG_T_OFFSET 0x104
From: Curtis Malainey <[email protected]>
commit a46eb523220e242affb9a6bc9bb8efc05f4f7459 upstream.
The current algorithm allows 3 types of transfers, 16bit, 32bit and
burst. According to Realtek, 16bit transfers have a special restriction
in that it is restricted to the memory region of
0x18020000 ~ 0x18021000. This region is the memory location of the I2C
registers. The current algorithm does not uphold this restriction and
therefore fails to complete writes.
Since this has been broken for some time it likely no one is using it.
Better to simply disable the 16 bit writes. This will allow users to
properly load firmware over SPI without data corruption.
Signed-off-by: Curtis Malainey <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
sound/soc/codecs/rt5677-spi.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/rt5677-spi.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/rt5677-spi.c
@@ -57,13 +57,15 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(spi_mutex);
* RT5677_SPI_READ/WRITE_32: Transfer 4 bytes
* RT5677_SPI_READ/WRITE_BURST: Transfer any multiples of 8 bytes
*
- * For example, reading 260 bytes at 0x60030002 uses the following commands:
- * 0x60030002 RT5677_SPI_READ_16 2 bytes
+ * Note:
+ * 16 Bit writes and reads are restricted to the address range
+ * 0x18020000 ~ 0x18021000
+ *
+ * For example, reading 256 bytes at 0x60030004 uses the following commands:
* 0x60030004 RT5677_SPI_READ_32 4 bytes
* 0x60030008 RT5677_SPI_READ_BURST 240 bytes
* 0x600300F8 RT5677_SPI_READ_BURST 8 bytes
* 0x60030100 RT5677_SPI_READ_32 4 bytes
- * 0x60030104 RT5677_SPI_READ_16 2 bytes
*
* Input:
* @read: true for read commands; false for write commands
@@ -78,15 +80,13 @@ static u8 rt5677_spi_select_cmd(bool rea
{
u8 cmd;
- if (align == 2 || align == 6 || remain == 2) {
- cmd = RT5677_SPI_READ_16;
- *len = 2;
- } else if (align == 4 || remain <= 6) {
+ if (align == 4 || remain <= 4) {
cmd = RT5677_SPI_READ_32;
*len = 4;
} else {
cmd = RT5677_SPI_READ_BURST;
- *len = min_t(u32, remain & ~7, RT5677_SPI_BURST_LEN);
+ *len = (((remain - 1) >> 3) + 1) << 3;
+ *len = min_t(u32, *len, RT5677_SPI_BURST_LEN);
}
return read ? cmd : cmd + 1;
}
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static void rt5677_spi_reverse(u8 *dst,
}
}
-/* Read DSP address space using SPI. addr and len have to be 2-byte aligned. */
+/* Read DSP address space using SPI. addr and len have to be 4-byte aligned. */
int rt5677_spi_read(u32 addr, void *rxbuf, size_t len)
{
u32 offset;
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ int rt5677_spi_read(u32 addr, void *rxbu
if (!g_spi)
return -ENODEV;
- if ((addr & 1) || (len & 1)) {
+ if ((addr & 3) || (len & 3)) {
dev_err(&g_spi->dev, "Bad read align 0x%x(%zu)\n", addr, len);
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -158,13 +158,13 @@ int rt5677_spi_read(u32 addr, void *rxbu
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rt5677_spi_read);
-/* Write DSP address space using SPI. addr has to be 2-byte aligned.
- * If len is not 2-byte aligned, an extra byte of zero is written at the end
+/* Write DSP address space using SPI. addr has to be 4-byte aligned.
+ * If len is not 4-byte aligned, then extra zeros are written at the end
* as padding.
*/
int rt5677_spi_write(u32 addr, const void *txbuf, size_t len)
{
- u32 offset, len_with_pad = len;
+ u32 offset;
int status = 0;
struct spi_transfer t;
struct spi_message m;
@@ -177,22 +177,19 @@ int rt5677_spi_write(u32 addr, const voi
if (!g_spi)
return -ENODEV;
- if (addr & 1) {
+ if (addr & 3) {
dev_err(&g_spi->dev, "Bad write align 0x%x(%zu)\n", addr, len);
return -EACCES;
}
- if (len & 1)
- len_with_pad = len + 1;
-
memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
t.tx_buf = buf;
t.speed_hz = RT5677_SPI_FREQ;
spi_message_init_with_transfers(&m, &t, 1);
- for (offset = 0; offset < len_with_pad;) {
+ for (offset = 0; offset < len;) {
spi_cmd = rt5677_spi_select_cmd(false, (addr + offset) & 7,
- len_with_pad - offset, &t.len);
+ len - offset, &t.len);
/* Construct SPI message header */
buf[0] = spi_cmd;
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 7aceaaef04eaaf6019ca159bc354d800559bba1d upstream.
The arm64 implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha are failing the extra
crypto self-tests following my patches to test the !may_use_simd() code
paths, which previously were untested. The problem is as follows:
When !may_use_simd(), the arm64 NEON implementations fall back to the
generic implementation, which uses the skcipher_walk API to iterate
through the src/dst scatterlists. Due to how the skcipher_walk API
works, walk.stride is set from the skcipher_alg actually being used,
which in this case is the arm64 NEON algorithm. Thus walk.stride is
5*CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, not CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE.
This unnecessarily large stride shouldn't cause an actual problem.
However, the generic implementation computes round_down(nbytes,
walk.stride). round_down() assumes the round amount is a power of 2,
which 5*CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE is not, so it gives the wrong result.
This causes the following case in skcipher_walk_done() to be hit,
causing a WARN() and failing the encryption operation:
if (WARN_ON(err)) {
/* unexpected case; didn't process all bytes */
err = -EINVAL;
goto finish;
}
Fix it by rounding down to CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE instead of walk.stride.
(Or we could replace round_down() with rounddown(), but that would add a
slow division operation every time, which I think we should avoid.)
Fixes: 2fe55987b262 ("crypto: arm64/chacha - use combined SIMD/ALU routine for more speed")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.0+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
crypto/chacha_generic.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypto/chacha_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha_generic.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skci
unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
if (nbytes < walk.total)
- nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
+ nbytes = round_down(nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
chacha_docrypt(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
nbytes, ctx->nrounds);
stable-rc/linux-5.0.y boot: 126 boots: 0 failed, 120 passed with 5 offline, 1 conflict (v5.0.17-124-gbb2772791a81)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-5.0.y/kernel/v5.0.17-124-gbb2772791a81/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-5.0.y/kernel/v5.0.17-124-gbb2772791a81/
Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-5.0.y
Git Describe: v5.0.17-124-gbb2772791a81
Git Commit: bb2772791a81b9bbda82fc5b02ac84b8b8b42628
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 72 unique boards, 24 SoC families, 14 builds out of 208
Boot Regressions Detected:
arm:
omap2plus_defconfig:
gcc-8:
omap4-panda:
lab-baylibre: new failure (last pass: v5.0.17-117-gc76436debfdf)
Offline Platforms:
arm:
multi_v7_defconfig:
gcc-8
stih410-b2120: 1 offline lab
arm64:
defconfig:
gcc-8
meson-axg-s400: 1 offline lab
meson-g12a-u200: 1 offline lab
meson-g12a-x96-max: 1 offline lab
meson-gxl-s905x-libretech-cc: 1 offline lab
Conflicting Boot Failure Detected: (These likely are not failures as other labs are reporting PASS. Needs review.)
arm:
omap2plus_defconfig:
omap4-panda:
lab-baylibre: FAIL (gcc-8)
lab-baylibre-seattle: PASS (gcc-8)
---
For more info write to <[email protected]>
On 20/05/2019 13:13, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.18 release.
> There are 123 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed 22 May 2019 11:50:46 AM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.18-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v5.0:
12 builds: 12 pass, 0 fail
22 boots: 22 pass, 0 fail
32 tests: 32 pass, 0 fail
Linux version: 5.0.18-rc1-gbb27727
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers
Jon
--
nvpublic
On 5/20/19 6:13 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.18 release.
> There are 123 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed 22 May 2019 11:50:46 AM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.18-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
> -------------
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
On Mon, 20 May 2019 at 17:56, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.18 release.
> There are 123 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed 22 May 2019 11:50:46 AM UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.18-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
5.0.18-rc2 report,
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 5.0.18-rc2
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-5.0.y
git commit: 5eaa7ad66ec7e9d1c3e1ef871ec29a5427d05ca7
git describe: v5.0.17-121-g5eaa7ad66ec7
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-5.0-oe/build/v5.0.17-121-g5eaa7ad66ec7
No regressions (compared to build v5.0.17)
No fixes (compared to build v5.0.17)
Ran 21429 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c
- i386
- juno-r2
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15
- x86
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 7:30 AM Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
>
> commit 1a42010cdc26bb7e5912984f3c91b8c6d55f089a upstream.
>
> Define the gup_fast_permitted to check against the asce_limit of the
> mm attached to the current task, then replace the s390 specific gup
> code with the generic implementation in mm/gup.c.
>
> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
While this code seems to work fine upstream, when backported to 5.0 it
fails to build:
BUILDSTDERR: In file included from ./include/linux/mm.h:98,
BUILDSTDERR: from mm/gup.c:6:
BUILDSTDERR: mm/gup.c: In function '__get_user_pages_fast':
BUILDSTDERR: ./arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h:1277:28: error: too
many arguments to function 'gup_fast_permitted'
BUILDSTDERR: #define gup_fast_permitted gup_fast_permitted
BUILDSTDERR: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUILDSTDERR: mm/gup.c:1856:6: note: in expansion of macro 'gup_fast_permitted'
BUILDSTDERR: if (gup_fast_permitted(start, nr_pages, write)) {
It is missing upstream commit ad8cfb9c42ef83ecf4079bc7d77e6557648e952b
mm/gup: Remove the 'write' parameter from gup_fast_permitted()
Justin
>
> ---
> arch/s390/Kconfig | 1
> arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 12 +
> arch/s390/mm/Makefile | 2
> arch/s390/mm/gup.c | 291 ----------------------------------------
> 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 292 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ config S390
> select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER
> select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
> select HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
> + select HAVE_GENERIC_GUP
> select HAVE_KERNEL_BZIP2
> select HAVE_KERNEL_GZIP
> select HAVE_KERNEL_LZ4
> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -1264,6 +1264,18 @@ static inline pte_t *pte_offset(pmd_t *p
> #define pte_offset_map(pmd, address) pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address)
> #define pte_unmap(pte) do { } while (0)
>
> +static inline bool gup_fast_permitted(unsigned long start, int nr_pages)
> +{
> + unsigned long len, end;
> +
> + len = (unsigned long) nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
> + end = start + len;
> + if (end < start)
> + return false;
> + return end <= current->mm->context.asce_limit;
> +}
> +#define gup_fast_permitted gup_fast_permitted
> +
> #define pfn_pte(pfn,pgprot) mk_pte_phys(__pa((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT),(pgprot))
> #define pte_pfn(x) (pte_val(x) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
> #define pte_page(x) pfn_to_page(pte_pfn(x))
> --- a/arch/s390/mm/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/s390/mm/Makefile
> @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
> #
>
> obj-y := init.o fault.o extmem.o mmap.o vmem.o maccess.o
> -obj-y += page-states.o gup.o pageattr.o pgtable.o pgalloc.o
> +obj-y += page-states.o pageattr.o pgtable.o pgalloc.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_CMM) += cmm.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE) += hugetlbpage.o
> --- a/arch/s390/mm/gup.c
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
> -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> -/*
> - * Lockless get_user_pages_fast for s390
> - *
> - * Copyright IBM Corp. 2010
> - * Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
> - */
> -#include <linux/sched.h>
> -#include <linux/mm.h>
> -#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
> -#include <linux/vmstat.h>
> -#include <linux/pagemap.h>
> -#include <linux/rwsem.h>
> -#include <asm/pgtable.h>
> -
> -/*
> - * The performance critical leaf functions are made noinline otherwise gcc
> - * inlines everything into a single function which results in too much
> - * register pressure.
> - */
> -static inline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> -{
> - struct page *head, *page;
> - unsigned long mask;
> - pte_t *ptep, pte;
> -
> - mask = (write ? _PAGE_PROTECT : 0) | _PAGE_INVALID | _PAGE_SPECIAL;
> -
> - ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr);
> - do {
> - pte = *ptep;
> - barrier();
> - /* Similar to the PMD case, NUMA hinting must take slow path */
> - if (pte_protnone(pte))
> - return 0;
> - if ((pte_val(pte) & mask) != 0)
> - return 0;
> - VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
> - page = pte_page(pte);
> - head = compound_head(page);
> - if (!page_cache_get_speculative(head))
> - return 0;
> - if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) {
> - put_page(head);
> - return 0;
> - }
> - VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
> - pages[*nr] = page;
> - (*nr)++;
> -
> - } while (ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
> -
> - return 1;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> -{
> - struct page *head, *page;
> - unsigned long mask;
> - int refs;
> -
> - mask = (write ? _SEGMENT_ENTRY_PROTECT : 0) | _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID;
> - if ((pmd_val(pmd) & mask) != 0)
> - return 0;
> - VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pmd_val(pmd) >> PAGE_SHIFT));
> -
> - refs = 0;
> - head = pmd_page(pmd);
> - page = head + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> - do {
> - VM_BUG_ON(compound_head(page) != head);
> - pages[*nr] = page;
> - (*nr)++;
> - page++;
> - refs++;
> - } while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
> -
> - if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
> - *nr -= refs;
> - return 0;
> - }
> -
> - if (unlikely(pmd_val(pmd) != pmd_val(*pmdp))) {
> - *nr -= refs;
> - while (refs--)
> - put_page(head);
> - return 0;
> - }
> -
> - return 1;
> -}
> -
> -
> -static inline int gup_pmd_range(pud_t pud, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> -{
> - unsigned long next;
> - pmd_t *pmdp, pmd;
> -
> - pmdp = pmd_offset(&pud, addr);
> - do {
> - pmd = *pmdp;
> - barrier();
> - next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
> - if (pmd_none(pmd))
> - return 0;
> - if (unlikely(pmd_large(pmd))) {
> - /*
> - * NUMA hinting faults need to be handled in the GUP
> - * slowpath for accounting purposes and so that they
> - * can be serialised against THP migration.
> - */
> - if (pmd_protnone(pmd))
> - return 0;
> - if (!gup_huge_pmd(pmdp, pmd, addr, next,
> - write, pages, nr))
> - return 0;
> - } else if (!gup_pte_range(pmd, addr, next,
> - write, pages, nr))
> - return 0;
> - } while (pmdp++, addr = next, addr != end);
> -
> - return 1;
> -}
> -
> -static int gup_huge_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> -{
> - struct page *head, *page;
> - unsigned long mask;
> - int refs;
> -
> - mask = (write ? _REGION_ENTRY_PROTECT : 0) | _REGION_ENTRY_INVALID;
> - if ((pud_val(pud) & mask) != 0)
> - return 0;
> - VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pud_pfn(pud)));
> -
> - refs = 0;
> - head = pud_page(pud);
> - page = head + ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> - do {
> - VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
> - pages[*nr] = page;
> - (*nr)++;
> - page++;
> - refs++;
> - } while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
> -
> - if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
> - *nr -= refs;
> - return 0;
> - }
> -
> - if (unlikely(pud_val(pud) != pud_val(*pudp))) {
> - *nr -= refs;
> - while (refs--)
> - put_page(head);
> - return 0;
> - }
> -
> - return 1;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int gup_pud_range(p4d_t p4d, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> -{
> - unsigned long next;
> - pud_t *pudp, pud;
> -
> - pudp = pud_offset(&p4d, addr);
> - do {
> - pud = *pudp;
> - barrier();
> - next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
> - if (pud_none(pud))
> - return 0;
> - if (unlikely(pud_large(pud))) {
> - if (!gup_huge_pud(pudp, pud, addr, next, write, pages,
> - nr))
> - return 0;
> - } else if (!gup_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, write, pages,
> - nr))
> - return 0;
> - } while (pudp++, addr = next, addr != end);
> -
> - return 1;
> -}
> -
> -static inline int gup_p4d_range(pgd_t pgd, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> -{
> - unsigned long next;
> - p4d_t *p4dp, p4d;
> -
> - p4dp = p4d_offset(&pgd, addr);
> - do {
> - p4d = *p4dp;
> - barrier();
> - next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
> - if (p4d_none(p4d))
> - return 0;
> - if (!gup_pud_range(p4d, addr, next, write, pages, nr))
> - return 0;
> - } while (p4dp++, addr = next, addr != end);
> -
> - return 1;
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Like get_user_pages_fast() except its IRQ-safe in that it won't fall
> - * back to the regular GUP.
> - * Note a difference with get_user_pages_fast: this always returns the
> - * number of pages pinned, 0 if no pages were pinned.
> - */
> -int __get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, int write,
> - struct page **pages)
> -{
> - struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> - unsigned long addr, len, end;
> - unsigned long next, flags;
> - pgd_t *pgdp, pgd;
> - int nr = 0;
> -
> - start &= PAGE_MASK;
> - addr = start;
> - len = (unsigned long) nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
> - end = start + len;
> - if ((end <= start) || (end > mm->context.asce_limit))
> - return 0;
> - /*
> - * local_irq_save() doesn't prevent pagetable teardown, but does
> - * prevent the pagetables from being freed on s390.
> - *
> - * So long as we atomically load page table pointers versus teardown,
> - * we can follow the address down to the the page and take a ref on it.
> - */
> - local_irq_save(flags);
> - pgdp = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
> - do {
> - pgd = *pgdp;
> - barrier();
> - next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
> - if (pgd_none(pgd))
> - break;
> - if (!gup_p4d_range(pgd, addr, next, write, pages, &nr))
> - break;
> - } while (pgdp++, addr = next, addr != end);
> - local_irq_restore(flags);
> -
> - return nr;
> -}
> -
> -/**
> - * get_user_pages_fast() - pin user pages in memory
> - * @start: starting user address
> - * @nr_pages: number of pages from start to pin
> - * @write: whether pages will be written to
> - * @pages: array that receives pointers to the pages pinned.
> - * Should be at least nr_pages long.
> - *
> - * Attempt to pin user pages in memory without taking mm->mmap_sem.
> - * If not successful, it will fall back to taking the lock and
> - * calling get_user_pages().
> - *
> - * Returns number of pages pinned. This may be fewer than the number
> - * requested. If nr_pages is 0 or negative, returns 0. If no pages
> - * were pinned, returns -errno.
> - */
> -int get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, int write,
> - struct page **pages)
> -{
> - int nr, ret;
> -
> - might_sleep();
> - start &= PAGE_MASK;
> - nr = __get_user_pages_fast(start, nr_pages, write, pages);
> - if (nr == nr_pages)
> - return nr;
> -
> - /* Try to get the remaining pages with get_user_pages */
> - start += nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
> - pages += nr;
> - ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(start, nr_pages - nr, pages,
> - write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0);
> - /* Have to be a bit careful with return values */
> - if (nr > 0)
> - ret = (ret < 0) ? nr : ret + nr;
> - return ret;
> -}
>
>
On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 04:46:16PM -0500, Justin Forbes wrote:
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 7:30 AM Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > From: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
> >
> > commit 1a42010cdc26bb7e5912984f3c91b8c6d55f089a upstream.
> >
> > Define the gup_fast_permitted to check against the asce_limit of the
> > mm attached to the current task, then replace the s390 specific gup
> > code with the generic implementation in mm/gup.c.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>
> While this code seems to work fine upstream, when backported to 5.0 it
> fails to build:
>
> BUILDSTDERR: In file included from ./include/linux/mm.h:98,
> BUILDSTDERR: from mm/gup.c:6:
> BUILDSTDERR: mm/gup.c: In function '__get_user_pages_fast':
> BUILDSTDERR: ./arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h:1277:28: error: too
> many arguments to function 'gup_fast_permitted'
> BUILDSTDERR: #define gup_fast_permitted gup_fast_permitted
> BUILDSTDERR: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> BUILDSTDERR: mm/gup.c:1856:6: note: in expansion of macro 'gup_fast_permitted'
> BUILDSTDERR: if (gup_fast_permitted(start, nr_pages, write)) {
>
> It is missing upstream commit ad8cfb9c42ef83ecf4079bc7d77e6557648e952b
> mm/gup: Remove the 'write' parameter from gup_fast_permitted()
Oops, thanks for catching this. I'll go queue this patch up now.
greg k-h