2022-10-30 06:25:47

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 000/108] KVM TDX basic feature support

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

KVM TDX basic feature support

Hello. This is v10 the patch series vof KVM TDX support. This is based on
v6.2-rc2 + the following patch series with minor update like compile fix. I'd
like to settle down KVM hardware initialization. Any thoughts/suggestions?

* kvm hardware initialization: Currently Sean concluded the proposed approach
didn't work and would post other approach.
Only few patches in this patch series are affected. Once the direction is settled down, I'll
update it. Or I can go back to v8 way and let's address the initialization
issue indepdently after this patch series.

Related patch series:
- fd-based approach for supporing KVM v9
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
- TDX host kernel support v6
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
- kvm hardware initialization v5
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Based on it, updated those patches.

The tree can be found at https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream
How to run/test: It's describe at https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM

Major changes from v9:
- rebased to v6.1-rc2
- Integrated fd-based private page v9 as prerequisite.
- Integrated TDX host kernel support v6
- TDP MMU: Make handle_change_spte() return value.
- TDX: removed seamcall_lock and return -EAGAIN so that TDP MMU can retry

Thanks,
Isaku Yamahata

Changes from v8:
- rebased to v6.0-rc7
- Integrated with kvm hardware initialization. Check all packages has at least
one online CPU when creating guest TD and refuse cpu offline during guest TDs
are running.
- Integrated fd-based private page v8 as prerequisite.
- TDP MMU: Introduced more callbacks instead of single callback.

Changes from v7:
- Use xarray to track whether GFN is private or shared. Drop SPTE_SHARED_MASK.
The complex state machine with SPTE_SHARED_MASK was ditched.
- Large page support is implemented. But will be posted as independent RFC patch.
- fd-based private page v7 is integrated. This is mostly same to Chao's patches.
It's in github.

Changes from v6:
- rebased to v5.19

Changes from v5:
- export __seamcall and use it
- move mutex lock from callee function of smp_call_on_cpu to the caller.
- rename mmu_prezap => flush_shadow_all_private() and tdx_mmu_release_hkid
- updated comment
- drop the use of tdh_mng_key.reclaimid(): as the function is for backward
compatibility to only return success
- struct kvm_tdx_cmd: metadata => flags, added __u64 error.
- make this ioctl systemwide ioctl
- ABI change to struct kvm_init_vm
- guest_tsc_khz: use kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz
- rename BUILD_BUG_ON_MEMCPY to MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE
- drop exporting kvm_set_tsc_khz().
- fix kvm_tdp_page_fault() for mtrr emulation
- rename it to kvm_gfn_shared_mask(), dropped kvm_gpa_shared_mask()
- drop kvm_is_private_gfn(), kept kvm_is_private_gpa()
keep kvm_{gfn, gpa}_private(), kvm_gpa_private()
- update commit message
- rename shadow_init_value => shadow_nonprsent_value
- added ept_violation_ve_test mode
- shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in tdp_mmu.c
- legacy MMU case
=> - mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(), kvm_mmu_create()
- FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
- #VE warning:
- rename: REMOVED_SPTE => __REMOVED_SPTE, SHADOW_REMOVED_SPTE => REMOVED_SPTE
- merge into Like we discussed, this patch should be merged with patch
"KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero init value for shadow PTE".
- fix pointed by Sagi. check !is_private check => (kvm_gfn_shared_mask && !is_private)
- introduce kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, gfn)
- add only_shared argument to kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn()
- use kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported()
- rename SPTE_PRIVATE_PROHIBIT to SPTE_SHARED_MASK.
- rename: is_private_prohibit_spte() => spte_shared_mask()
- fix: shadow_nonpresent_value => SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in comment
- dropped this patch as the change was merged into kvm/queue
- update vt_apicv_post_state_restore()
- use is_64_bit_hypercall()
- comment: expand MSMI -> Machine Check System Management Interrupt
- fixed TDX_SEPT_PFERR
- tdvmcall_p[1234]_{write, read}() => tdvmcall_a[0123]_{read,write}()
- rename tdmvcall_exit_readon() => tdvmcall_leaf()
- remove optional zero check of argument.
- do a check for static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE)
in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi and __apic_accept_irq.
- WARN_ON_ONCE in tdx_smi_allowed and tdx_enable_smi_window.
- introduce vcpu_deliver_init to x86_ops
- sprinkeled KVM_BUG_ON()

Changes from v4:
- rebased to TDX host kernel patch series.
- include all the patches to make this patch series working.
- add [MARKER] patches to mark the patch layer clear.

---
* What's TDX?
TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions, which extends Intel Virtual Machines
Extensions (VMX) to introduce a kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust
Domain (TD) for confidential computing.

A TD runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of its
memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the hosting
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), unless explicitly shared by the TD itself.

We have more detailed explanations below (***).
We have the high-level design of TDX KVM below (****).

In this patch series, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the
current "VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today.


* The organization of this patch series
This patch series is on top of the patches series "TDX host kernel support":
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

this patch series is available at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/releases/tag/kvm-upstream
The corresponding patches to qemu are available at
https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx/commits/tdx-upstream

The relations of the layers are depicted as follows.
The arrows below show the order of patch reviews we would like to have.

The below layers are chosen so that the device model, for example, qemu can
exercise each layering step by step. Check if TDX is supported, create TD VM,
create TD vcpu, allow vcpu running, populate TD guest private memory, and handle
vcpu exits/hypercalls/interrupts to run TD fully.

TDX vcpu
interrupt/exits/hypercall<------------\
^ |
| |
TD finalization |
^ |
| |
TDX EPT violation<------------\ |
^ | |
| | |
TD vcpu enter/exit | |
^ | |
| | |
TD vcpu creation/destruction | \-------KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
^ | ^
| | |
TD VM creation/destruction \---------------KVM TDP MMU hooks
^ ^
| |
TDX architectural definitions KVM TDP refactoring for TDX
^ ^
| |
TDX, VMX <--------TDX host kernel KVM MMU GPA stolen bits
coexistence support


The followings are explanations of each layer. Each layer has a dummy commit
that starts with [MARKER] in subject. It is intended to help to identify where
each layer starts.

TDX host kernel support:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
The guts of system-wide initialization of TDX module. There is an
independent patch series for host x86. TDX KVM patches call functions
this patch series provides to initialize the TDX module.

TDX, VMX coexistence:
Infrastructure to allow TDX to coexist with VMX and trigger the
initialization of the TDX module.
This layer starts with
"KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX"
TDX architectural definitions:
Add TDX architectural definitions and helper functions
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions".
TD VM creation/destruction:
Guest TD creation/destroy allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction".
TD vcpu creation/destruction:
guest TD creation/destroy Allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
measurement.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction"
TDX EPT violation:
Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. Handle
secure EPT violations to populate guest pages with TDX SEAMCALLs.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation"
TD vcpu enter/exit:
Allow TDX vcpu to enter into TD and exit from TD. Save CPU state before
entering into TD. Restore CPU state after exiting from TD.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit"
TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:
Handle various exits/hypercalls and allow interrupts to be injected so
that TD vcpu can continue running.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls"

KVM MMU GPA shared bit:
Introduce framework to handle shared bit repurposed bit of GPA TDX
repurposed a bit of GPA to indicate shared or private. If it's shared,
it's the same as the conventional VMX EPT case. VMM can access shared
guest pages. If it's private, it's handled by Secure-EPT and the guest
page is encrypted.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bits"
KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:
TDX Secure EPT requires different constants. e.g. initial value EPT
entry value etc. Various refactoring for those differences.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX"
KVM TDP MMU hooks:
Introduce framework to TDP MMU to add hooks in addition to direct EPT
access TDX added Secure EPT which is an enhancement to VMX EPT. Unlike
conventional VMX EPT, CPU can't directly read/write Secure EPT. Instead,
use TDX SEAMCALLs to operate on Secure EPT.
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks"
KVM TDP MMU MapGPA:
Introduce framework to handle switching guest pages from private/shared
to shared/private. For a given GPA, a guest page can be assigned to a
private GPA or a shared GPA exclusively. With TDX MapGPA hypercall,
guest TD converts GPA assignments from private (or shared) to shared (or
private).
This layer starts with
"[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA "

KVM guest private memory: (not shown in the above diagram)
[PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private
memory: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395
Guest private memory requires different memory management in KVM. The
patch proposes a way for it. Integration with TDX KVM.

(***)
* TDX module
A CPU-attested software module called the "TDX module" is designed to implement
the TDX architecture, and it is loaded by the UEFI firmware today. It can be
loaded by the kernel or driver at runtime, but in this patch series we assume
that the TDX module is already loaded and initialized.

The TDX module provides two main new logical modes of operation built upon the
new SEAM (Secure Arbitration Mode) root and non-root CPU modes added to the VMX
architecture. TDX root mode is mostly identical to the VMX root operation mode,
and the TDX functions (described later) are triggered by the new SEAMCALL
instruction with the desired interface function selected by an input operand
(leaf number, in RAX). TDX non-root mode is used for TD guest operation. TDX
non-root operation (i.e. "guest TD" mode) is similar to the VMX non-root
operation (i.e. guest VM), with changes and restrictions to better assure that
no other software or hardware has direct visibility of the TD memory and state.

TDX transitions between TDX root operation and TDX non-root operation include TD
Entries, from TDX root to TDX non-root mode, and TD Exits from TDX non-root to
TDX root mode. A TD Exit might be asynchronous, triggered by some external
event (e.g., external interrupt or SMI) or an exception, or it might be
synchronous, triggered by a TDCALL (TDG.VP.VMCALL) function.

TD VCPUs can be entered using SEAMCALL(TDH.VP.ENTER) by KVM. TDH.VP.ENTER is one
of the TDX interface functions as mentioned above, and "TDH" stands for Trust
Domain Host. Those host-side TDX interface functions are categorized into
various areas just for better organization, such as SYS (TDX module management),
MNG (TD management), VP (VCPU), PHYSMEM (physical memory), MEM (private memory),
etc. For example, SEAMCALL(TDH.SYS.INFO) returns the TDX module information.

TDCS (Trust Domain Control Structure) is the main control structure of a guest
TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high
level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole,
execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc that KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR
bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the
same value for all VCPUs of the same TD.

Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a
TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds
the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and
DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as
TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures,
such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc.

Several VMX control structures (such as Shared EPT and Posted interrupt
descriptor) are directly managed and accessed by the host VMM. These control
structures are pointed to by fields in the TD VMCS.

The above means that 1) KVM needs to allocate different data structures for TDs,
2) KVM can reuse the existing code for TDs for some operations, 3) it needs to
define TD-specific handling for others. 3) Redirect operations to . 3)
Redirect operations to the TDX specific callbacks, like "if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
tdx_callback() else vmx_callback();".

*TD Private Memory
TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU
using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption
keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a
Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the
encryption keys.

In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by
allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical
address. The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME
accesses and private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared
HKID on the host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.

During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified
as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest
Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT
(Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in host
VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same as
with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data exchange
needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current EPT
functionality even for TDs.

* Secure EPT and Minoring using the TDP code
The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT
pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private
key. Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX
interface functions, and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT (why
"subset"). Since execution of such interface functions takes much longer time
than accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to minor the
Secure EPT for the TD.

This way, we can effectively walk Secure EPT without using the TDX interface
functions.

* VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
The userspace VMM, such as QEMU, needs to build and treat TDs differently. For
example, a TD needs to boot in private memory, and the host software cannot copy
the initial image to private memory.

* TSC Virtualization
The TDX module helps TDs maintain reliable TSC (Time Stamp Counter) values
(e.g. consistent among the TD VCPUs) and the virtual TSC frequency is determined
by TD configuration, i.e. when the TD is created, not per VCPU. The current KVM
owns TSC virtualization for VMs, but the TDX module does for TDs.

* MCE support for TDs
The TDX module doesn't allow VMM to inject MCE. Instead PV way is needed for TD
to communicate with VMM. For now, KVM silently ignores MCE request by VMM. MSRs
related to MCE (e.g, MCE bank registers) can be naturally emulated by
paravirtualizing MSR access.

[1] For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are
available.

* Restrictions or future work
Some features are not included to reduce patch size. Those features are
addressed as future independent patch series.
- large page (2M, 1G)
- qemu gdb stub
- guest PMU
- and more

* Prerequisites
It's required to load the TDX module and initialize it. It's out of the scope
of this patch series. Another independent patch for the common x86 code is
planned. It defines CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST and this patch series uses
CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST. It's assumed that With CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=y, the TDX
module is initialized and ready for KVM to use the TDX module APIs for TDX guest
life cycle like tdh.mng.init are ready to use.

Concretely Global initialization, LP (Logical Processor) initialization, global
configuration, the key configuration, and TDMR and PAMT initialization are done.
The state of the TDX module is SYS_READY. Please refer to the TDX module
specification, the chapter Intel TDX Module Lifecycle State Machine

** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability
and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID
(HKID) assigned to guest TD.
The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
- int seamrr_enabled()
Check if required cpu feature (SEAM mode) is available. This only check CPU
feature availability. At this point, the TDX module may not be ready for KVM
to use.
- int init_tdx(void);
Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
- const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX
isn't initialized.
- u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void);
Return global key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
- int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
Allocate HKID for guest TD.
- void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
Free HKID for guest TD.

(****)
* TDX KVM high-level design
- Host key ID management
Host Key ID (HKID) needs to be assigned to each TDX guest for memory encryption.
It is assumed The TDX host patch series implements necessary functions,
u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void), int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) and,
void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid).

- Data structures and VM type
Because TDX is different from VMX, define its own VM/VCPU structures, struct
kvm_tdx and struct vcpu_tdx instead of struct kvm_vmx and struct vcpu_vmx. To
identify the VM, introduce VM-type to specify which VM type, VMX (default) or
TDX, is used.

- VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
Re-purpose the existing KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to add TDX specific operations.
New commands are used to get the TDX system parameters, set TDX specific VM/VCPU
parameters, set initial guest memory and measurement.

The creation of TDX VM requires five additional operations in addition to the
conventional VM creation.
- Get KVM system capability to check if TDX VM type is supported
- VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM)
- New: Get the TDX specific system parameters. KVM_TDX_GET_CAPABILITY.
- New: Set TDX specific VM parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
- VCPU creation (KVM_CREATE_VCPU)
- New: Set TDX specific VCPU parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU.
- New: Initialize guest memory as boot state and extend the measurement with
the memory. KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
- New: Finalize VM. KVM_TDX_FINALIZE. Complete measurement of the initial
TDX VM contents.
- VCPU RUN (KVM_VCPU_RUN)

- Protected guest state
Because the guest state (CPU state and guest memory) is protected, the KVM VMM
can't operate on them. For example, accessing CPU registers, injecting
exceptions, and accessing guest memory. Those operations are handled as
silently ignored, returning zero or initial reset value when it's requested via
KVM API ioctls.

VM/VCPU state and callbacks for TDX specific operations.
Define tdx specific VM state and VCPU state instead of VMX ones. Redirect
operations to TDX specific callbacks. "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()".

Operations on the CPU state
silently ignore operations on the guest state. For example, the write to
CPU registers is ignored and the read from CPU registers returns 0.

. ignore access to CPU registers except for allowed ones.
. TSC: add a check if tsc is immutable and return an error. Because the KVM
implementation updates the internal tsc state and it's difficult to back
out those changes. Instead, skip the logic.
. dirty logging: add check if dirty logging is supported.
. exceptions/SMI/MCE/SIPI/INIT: silently ignore

Note: virtual external interrupt and NMI can be injected into TDX guests.

- KVM MMU integration
One bit of the guest physical address (bit 51 or 47) is repurposed to indicate if
the guest physical address is private (the bit is cleared) or shared (the bit is
set). The bits are called stolen bits.

- Stolen bits framework
systematically tracks which guest physical address, shared or private, is
used.

- Shared EPT and secure EPT
There are two EPTs. Shared EPT (the conventional one) and Secure
EPT(the new one). Shared EPT is handled the same for the stolen
bit set. Secure EPT points to private guest pages. To resolve
EPT violation, KVM walks one of two EPTs based on faulted GPA.
Because it's costly to access secure EPT during walking EPTs with
SEAMCALLs for the private guest physical address, another private
EPT is used as a shadow of Secure-EPT with the existing logic at
the cost of extra memory.

The following depicts the relationship.

KVM | TDX module
| | |
-------------+---------- | |
| | | |
V V | |
shared GPA private GPA | |
CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT pointer
| | | |
| | | |
V V | V
shared EPT private EPT--------mirror----->Secure EPT
| | | |
| \--------------------+------\ |
| | | |
V | V V
shared guest page | private guest page
|
|
non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
|

- Operating on Secure EPT
Use the TDX module APIs to operate on Secure EPT. To call the TDX API
during resolving EPT violation, add hooks to additional operation and wiring
it to TDX backend.

* References

[1] TDX specification
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
[2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
[4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-module-1.0-public-spec-v0.931.pdf
[5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
[6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
[7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.01.pdf
[8] intel public github
kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
qemu TDX https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx
[9] TDVF
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
This was merged into EDK2 main branch. https://github.com/tianocore/edk2

Chao Gao (1):
KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o
wrmsr

Chao Peng (1):
KVM: TDX: Use private memory for TDX

Isaku Yamahata (83):
KVM: x86: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions
KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure
x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about
TDX module
KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel
module
KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural
definitions
KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module
KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction
x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id
KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package
KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
KVM: Support KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS for KVM_ENABLE_CAP
KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
creation/destruction
KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits
KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU
KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of
GPA
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for
TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Make sync_page not use hard-coded 0 as the initial SPTE
value
KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to shadow_mmio_{value, mask}
KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis
KVM: TDX: Enable mmio spte caching always for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA
KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at
allocation
KVM: x86/mmu: Require TDP MMU for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role
KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page
KVM: Add flags to struct kvm_gfn_range
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Make handle_changed_spte() return value
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation
KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow dirty logging for x86 TDX
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs
KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD
KVM: x86/VMX: introduce vmx tlb_remote_flush and
tlb_remote_flush_with_range
KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
KVM: Add functions to set GFN to private or shared
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization
KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory
KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit
KVM: TDX: Add helper assembly function to TDX vcpu
KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path
KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)
KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD
KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs
[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
exits/interrupts/hypercalls
KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit
KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit
KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor
KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched
behavior
KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c
KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection
KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit
KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit
KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT
KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls
(TDG.VP.VMCALL)
KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall
KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV report fatal error hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV map_gpa hypercall
KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall
KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request
KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI
Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)
KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU
[MARKER] the end of (the first phase of) TDX KVM patch series

Sean Christopherson (21):
KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate default VMs from
confidential VMs
KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes
KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters
KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed
SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases
KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function
KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code
KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX
KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX
KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC
KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced
KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function
argument
KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper
KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function
KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

Xiaoyao Li (1):
KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

Yuan Yao (1):
KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT

Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 30 +-
Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst | 2 +
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst | 345 ++++
Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 417 ++++
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 13 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 77 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 73 +
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 14 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 93 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 5 +-
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 +
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/x86/kvm/irq.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 40 +-
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 41 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 284 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 135 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 20 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 30 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 14 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 539 ++++-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 10 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 7 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 174 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1080 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 46 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 43 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 13 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 2568 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 271 +++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 166 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 38 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 21 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 218 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 5 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 157 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 768 +++----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 52 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 243 +++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 212 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 +
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S | 2 +
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 44 +-
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 52 -
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 20 +-
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 +
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 95 +
tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 113 +-
56 files changed, 7862 insertions(+), 784 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h


base-commit: 247f34f7b80357943234f93f247a1ae6b6c3a740
prerequisite-patch-id: e22c1e326a8e039a46d1bbd9845446593c17ecfe
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prerequisite-patch-id: 09f316ac900e1bdc897a6c3640f06b835351845b
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prerequisite-patch-id: 0c8ad1e182ae96d7c270c1b014dd5525622ed25f
prerequisite-patch-id: 2c1c39cec04e0ab9aec270b61f3c621a219f8ed4
prerequisite-patch-id: 9ee1d29487898da3d884ca1aedcecaa104047ae3
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prerequisite-patch-id: 76bd91b1fa25e5a530d42e1a3eee69c45ad671f9
prerequisite-patch-id: c2473cf2ab01635712dcc846a57a846d894900cc
prerequisite-patch-id: 2bf8540eed2c2401869528294ac289c593856644
prerequisite-patch-id: ae93d8297c0c040fb0677191e096a96e6bbce3ce
prerequisite-patch-id: f65a128583c37bb4b60d8df4777ef81cae62b799
prerequisite-patch-id: dd047ef40756d45a5b83e338e689063b223c2eeb
prerequisite-patch-id: f56b210aae8cd2903941b56ec5a88f4e915ce09c
prerequisite-patch-id: 4fb24e304bb801a2747ac3b2d0cdc0896983e933
prerequisite-patch-id: 3b5f1b6376a52349e651b7ec6fd381218fa189ac
prerequisite-patch-id: f1b5fa8f225d4495b30a6d2f9b41ac18fb7cb45e
prerequisite-patch-id: c43ff2f80fe1b97e7cb29468f58f7a5b1ab5b7ce
prerequisite-patch-id: cc68241485a9f6b43bab7a10820e48e70acebe55
prerequisite-patch-id: 8c65e63620f0efe25f912ef34c0d0e228c87195b
prerequisite-patch-id: 9c5911b1e3e7c1a5ae14fd786102b6e4780dc38f
prerequisite-patch-id: 9dff3ef4baef7b9c854e41f6fd0ece9fe64e71ea
prerequisite-patch-id: ee523ddb61285609492f1b4c571b34c51a06ae26
prerequisite-patch-id: 17191391add96fa6232eff79a1b1c597ab7dff59
prerequisite-patch-id: 59c0f28dc80648db929d6aafa51e1120c63ace6a
prerequisite-patch-id: 87f8252ae760226dd3c58a392fb96d44570c10db
prerequisite-patch-id: c8e9603fbf84aea69187731932a9c65f9febba6e
prerequisite-patch-id: d0a71fc6ae91999a93703727e682532fe5d12c9a
--
2.25.1



2022-10-30 06:25:49

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 002/108] KVM: x86: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Currently, KVM VMX module initialization/exit functions are a single
function each. Refactor KVM VMX module initialization functions into KVM
common part and VMX part so that TDX specific part can be added cleanly.
Opportunistically refactor module exit function as well.

The current module initialization flow is, 1.) calculate the sizes of VMX
kvm structure and VMX vcpu structure, 2.) hyper-v specific initialization
3.) report those sizes to the KVM common layer and KVM common
initialization, and 4.) VMX specific system-wide initialization.

Refactor the KVM VMX module initialization function into functions with a
wrapper function to separate VMX logic in vmx.c from a file, main.c, common
among VMX and TDX. We have a wrapper function, "vt_init() {vmx kvm/vcpu
size calculation; hv_vp_assist_page_init(); kvm_init(); vmx_init(); }" in
main.c, and hv_vp_assist_page_init() and vmx_init() in vmx.c.
hv_vp_assist_page_init() initializes hyper-v specific assist pages,
kvm_init() does system-wide initialization of the KVM common layer, and
vmx_init() does system-wide VMX initialization.

The KVM architecture common layer allocates struct kvm with reported size
for architecture-specific code. The KVM VMX module defines its structure
as struct vmx_kvm { struct kvm; VMX specific members;} and uses it as
struct vmx kvm. Similar for vcpu structure. TDX KVM patches will define
TDX specific kvm and vcpu structures, add tdx_pre_kvm_init() to report the
sizes of them to the KVM common layer.

The current module exit function is also a single function, a combination
of VMX specific logic and common KVM logic. Refactor it into VMX specific
logic and KVM common logic. This is just refactoring to keep the VMX
specific logic in vmx.c from main.c.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 37 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 5 ++
3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 381059631e4b..4c7e71ec3e1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -153,3 +153,40 @@ struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
.runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,
.pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
};
+
+static int __init vt_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int vcpu_size, vcpu_align;
+ int r;
+
+ vt_x86_ops.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx);
+ vcpu_size = sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx);
+ vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx);
+
+ hv_vp_assist_page_init();
+
+ r = kvm_init(&vt_init_ops, vcpu_size, vcpu_align, THIS_MODULE);
+ if (r)
+ goto err_vmx_post_exit;
+
+ r = vmx_init();
+ if (r)
+ goto err_kvm_exit;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_kvm_exit:
+ kvm_exit();
+err_vmx_post_exit:
+ hv_vp_assist_page_exit();
+ return r;
+}
+module_init(vt_init);
+
+static void vt_exit(void)
+{
+ vmx_exit();
+ kvm_exit();
+ hv_vp_assist_page_exit();
+}
+module_exit(vt_exit);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 0080d88ded20..1963b28a2ea5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -8263,48 +8263,8 @@ static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
}

-static void vmx_exit(void)
+void __init hv_vp_assist_page_init(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
- RCU_INIT_POINTER(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss, NULL);
- synchronize_rcu();
-#endif
-
- kvm_exit();
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) {
- int cpu;
- struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap;
- /*
- * Reset everything to support using non-enlightened VMCS
- * access later (e.g. when we reload the module with
- * enlightened_vmcs=0)
- */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- vp_ap = hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu);
-
- if (!vp_ap)
- continue;
-
- vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 0;
- vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = 0;
- vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 0;
- }
-
- static_branch_disable(&enable_evmcs);
- }
-#endif
- vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
-
- allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = false;
-}
-module_exit(vmx_exit);
-
-static int __init vmx_init(void)
-{
- int r, cpu;
-
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
/*
* Enlightened VMCS usage should be recommended and the host needs
@@ -8315,6 +8275,7 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
ms_hyperv.hints & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED &&
(ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_VERSION) >=
KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) {
+ int cpu;

/* Check that we have assist pages on all online CPUs */
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
@@ -8337,11 +8298,38 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
enlightened_vmcs = false;
}
#endif
+}

- r = kvm_init(&vt_init_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
- __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
- if (r)
- return r;
+void hv_vp_assist_page_exit(void)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) {
+ int cpu;
+ struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap;
+ /*
+ * Reset everything to support using non-enlightened VMCS
+ * access later (e.g. when we reload the module with
+ * enlightened_vmcs=0)
+ */
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ vp_ap = hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu);
+
+ if (!vp_ap)
+ continue;
+
+ vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 0;
+ vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = 0;
+ vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 0;
+ }
+
+ static_branch_disable(&enable_evmcs);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+int __init vmx_init(void)
+{
+ int r, cpu;

/*
* Must be called after kvm_init() so enable_ept is properly set
@@ -8351,10 +8339,8 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
* mitigation mode.
*/
r = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vmentry_l1d_flush_param);
- if (r) {
- vmx_exit();
+ if (r)
return r;
- }

vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl();

@@ -8380,4 +8366,15 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)

return 0;
}
-module_init(vmx_init);
+
+void vmx_exit(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss, NULL);
+ synchronize_rcu();
+#endif
+
+ vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
+
+ allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = false;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 8cc2182fc6d7..83efb7f92a58 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@

#include "x86.h"

+void __init hv_vp_assist_page_init(void);
+void hv_vp_assist_page_exit(void);
+int __init vmx_init(void);
+void vmx_exit(void);
+
__init int vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support(void);
__init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void);
__init int vmx_hardware_setup(void);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:25:55

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 003/108] KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add placeholders TDX VM/vcpu structure that overlays with VMX VM/vcpu
structures. Initialize VM structure size and vcpu size/align so that x86
KVM common code knows those size irrespective of VMX or TDX. Those
structures will be populated as guest creation logic develops.

Add helper functions to check if the VM is guest TD and add conversion
functions between KVM VM/VCPU and TDX VM/VCPU.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 8 +++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 4c7e71ec3e1d..a7d4af73228e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include "vmx.h"
#include "nested.h"
#include "pmu.h"
+#include "tdx.h"

struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = "kvm_intel",
@@ -159,9 +160,10 @@ static int __init vt_init(void)
unsigned int vcpu_size, vcpu_align;
int r;

- vt_x86_ops.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx);
- vcpu_size = sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx);
- vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx);
+ vt_x86_ops.vm_size = max(sizeof(struct kvm_vmx), sizeof(struct kvm_tdx));
+ vcpu_size = max(sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx), sizeof(struct vcpu_tdx));
+ vcpu_align = max(__alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx),
+ __alignof__(struct vcpu_tdx));

hv_vp_assist_page_init();

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..060bf48ec3d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_H
+#define __KVM_X86_TDX_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+struct kvm_tdx {
+ struct kvm kvm;
+ /* TDX specific members follow. */
+};
+
+struct vcpu_tdx {
+ struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+ /* TDX specific members follow. */
+};
+
+static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ /*
+ * TDX VM type isn't defined yet.
+ * return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
+ */
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_td_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return is_td(vcpu->kvm);
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_tdx *to_kvm_tdx(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return container_of(kvm, struct kvm_tdx, kvm);
+}
+
+static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
+}
+#else
+struct kvm_tdx {
+ struct kvm kvm;
+};
+
+struct vcpu_tdx {
+ struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+};
+
+static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; }
+static inline bool is_td_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
+static inline struct kvm_tdx *to_kvm_tdx(struct kvm *kvm) { return NULL; }
+static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return NULL; }
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:25:56

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 004/108] x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about TDX module

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX KVM needs system-wide information about the TDX module, struct
tdsysinfo_struct. Add a helper function tdx_get_sysinfo() to return it
instead of KVM getting it with various error checks. Move out the struct
definition about it to common place arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 16 +++++++++--
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 52 -----------------------------------
3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
index d568f17da742..5cff7ed5b11e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
@@ -131,9 +131,64 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+struct tdx_cpuid_config {
+ u32 leaf;
+ u32 sub_leaf;
+ u32 eax;
+ u32 ebx;
+ u32 ecx;
+ u32 edx;
+} __packed;
+
+#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE 1024
+#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT 1024
+
+struct tdsysinfo_struct {
+ /* TDX-SEAM Module Info */
+ u32 attributes;
+ u32 vendor_id;
+ u32 build_date;
+ u16 build_num;
+ u16 minor_version;
+ u16 major_version;
+ u8 reserved0[14];
+ /* Memory Info */
+ u16 max_tdmrs;
+ u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr;
+ u16 pamt_entry_size;
+ u8 reserved1[10];
+ /* Control Struct Info */
+ u16 tdcs_base_size;
+ u8 reserved2[2];
+ u16 tdvps_base_size;
+ u8 tdvps_xfam_dependent_size;
+ u8 reserved3[9];
+ /* TD Capabilities */
+ u64 attributes_fixed0;
+ u64 attributes_fixed1;
+ u64 xfam_fixed0;
+ u64 xfam_fixed1;
+ u8 reserved4[32];
+ u32 num_cpuid_config;
+ /*
+ * The actual number of CPUID_CONFIG depends on above
+ * 'num_cpuid_config'. The size of 'struct tdsysinfo_struct'
+ * is 1024B defined by TDX architecture. Use a union with
+ * specific padding to make 'sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct)'
+ * equal to 1024.
+ */
+ union {
+ struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
+ u8 reserved5[892];
+ };
+} __packed __aligned(TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT);
+
+const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
bool platform_tdx_enabled(void);
int tdx_enable(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
+struct tdsysinfo_struct;
+static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void) { return NULL; }
static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) { return false; }
static inline int tdx_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
index 68ec1ebecb49..6fb630fa7d09 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static int check_cmrs(struct cmr_info *cmr_array, int *actual_cmr_num)
return 0;
}

-static int tdx_get_sysinfo(void)
+static int __tdx_get_sysinfo(void)
{
struct tdx_module_output out;
int ret;
@@ -530,6 +530,18 @@ static int tdx_get_sysinfo(void)
return check_cmrs(tdx_cmr_array, &tdx_cmr_num);
}

+const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void)
+{
+ const struct tdsysinfo_struct *r = NULL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_module_lock);
+ if (tdx_module_status == TDX_MODULE_INITIALIZED)
+ r = &tdx_sysinfo;
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_module_lock);
+ return r;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_get_sysinfo);
+
/* Check whether the first range is the subrange of the second */
static bool is_subrange(u64 r1_start, u64 r1_end, u64 r2_start, u64 r2_end)
{
@@ -1238,7 +1250,7 @@ static int init_tdx_module(void)
if (ret)
goto out;

- ret = tdx_get_sysinfo();
+ ret = __tdx_get_sysinfo();
if (ret)
goto out;

diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
index 891691b1ea50..5ce3bd38ce08 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h
@@ -31,58 +31,6 @@ struct cmr_info {
#define MAX_CMRS 32
#define CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMENT 512

-struct cpuid_config {
- u32 leaf;
- u32 sub_leaf;
- u32 eax;
- u32 ebx;
- u32 ecx;
- u32 edx;
-} __packed;
-
-#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_SIZE 1024
-#define TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT 1024
-
-struct tdsysinfo_struct {
- /* TDX-SEAM Module Info */
- u32 attributes;
- u32 vendor_id;
- u32 build_date;
- u16 build_num;
- u16 minor_version;
- u16 major_version;
- u8 reserved0[14];
- /* Memory Info */
- u16 max_tdmrs;
- u16 max_reserved_per_tdmr;
- u16 pamt_entry_size;
- u8 reserved1[10];
- /* Control Struct Info */
- u16 tdcs_base_size;
- u8 reserved2[2];
- u16 tdvps_base_size;
- u8 tdvps_xfam_dependent_size;
- u8 reserved3[9];
- /* TD Capabilities */
- u64 attributes_fixed0;
- u64 attributes_fixed1;
- u64 xfam_fixed0;
- u64 xfam_fixed1;
- u8 reserved4[32];
- u32 num_cpuid_config;
- /*
- * The actual number of CPUID_CONFIG depends on above
- * 'num_cpuid_config'. The size of 'struct tdsysinfo_struct'
- * is 1024B defined by TDX architecture. Use a union with
- * specific padding to make 'sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct)'
- * equal to 1024.
- */
- union {
- struct cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
- u8 reserved5[892];
- };
-} __packed __aligned(TDSYSINFO_STRUCT_ALIGNMENT);
-
struct tdmr_reserved_area {
u64 offset;
u64 size;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:26:04

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 001/108] KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

KVM accesses Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) with VMX instructions
to operate on VM. TDX doesn't allow VMM to operate VMCS directly.
Instead, TDX has its own data structures, and TDX SEAMCALL APIs for VMM to
indirectly operate those data structures. This means we must have a TDX
version of kvm_x86_ops.

The existing global struct kvm_x86_ops already defines an interface which
fits with TDX. But kvm_x86_ops is system-wide, not per-VM structure. To
allow VMX to coexist with TDs, the kvm_x86_ops callbacks will have wrappers
"if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()" to switch VMX or TDX at run time.

To split the runtime switch, the VMX implementation, and the TDX
implementation, add main.c, and move out the vmx_x86_ops hooks in
preparation for adding TDX, which can coexist with VMX, i.e. KVM can run
both VMs and TDs. Use 'vt' for the naming scheme as a nod to VT-x and as a
concatenation of VmxTdx.

The current code looks as follows.
In vmx.c
static vmx_op() { ... }
static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops = {
.op = vmx_op,
initialization code

The eventually converted code will look like
In vmx.c, keep the VMX operations.
vmx_op() { ... }
VMX initialization
In tdx.c, define the TDX operations.
tdx_op() { ... }
TDX initialization
In x86_ops.h, declare the VMX and TDX operations.
vmx_op();
tdx_op();
In main.c, define common wrappers for VMX and TDX.
static vt_ops() { if (tdx) tdx_ops() else vmx_ops() }
static struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops = {
.op = vt_op,
initialization to call VMX and TDX initialization

Opportunistically, fix the name inconsistency from vmx_create_vcpu() and
vmx_free_vcpu() to vmx_vcpu_create() and vxm_vcpu_free().

Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 363 +++++++++++--------------------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 125 +++++++++++++
4 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 259 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index 30f244b64523..ee4d0999f20f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += mmu/tdp_iter.o mmu/tdp_mmu.o
kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o

kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
- vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o
+ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o
kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o

kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..381059631e4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+
+#include "x86_ops.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+#include "nested.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+
+struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
+ .name = "kvm_intel",
+
+ .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
+ .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility,
+
+ .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
+ .hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
+ .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
+
+ .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
+ .vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
+ .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
+
+ .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
+ .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
+ .vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
+ .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
+
+ .prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
+ .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
+ .vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
+
+ .update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
+ .get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
+ .get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
+ .set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
+ .get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
+ .get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
+ .set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
+ .get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
+ .get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
+ .set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
+ .is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
+ .set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
+ .set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
+ .get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
+ .set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
+ .get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
+ .set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
+ .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
+ .cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
+ .get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
+ .set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
+ .get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,
+
+ .flush_tlb_all = vmx_flush_tlb_all,
+ .flush_tlb_current = vmx_flush_tlb_current,
+ .flush_tlb_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
+ .flush_tlb_guest = vmx_flush_tlb_guest,
+
+ .vcpu_pre_run = vmx_vcpu_pre_run,
+ .vcpu_run = vmx_vcpu_run,
+ .handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
+ .skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
+ .update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
+ .set_interrupt_shadow = vmx_set_interrupt_shadow,
+ .get_interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow,
+ .patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
+ .inject_irq = vmx_inject_irq,
+ .inject_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
+ .inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
+ .cancel_injection = vmx_cancel_injection,
+ .interrupt_allowed = vmx_interrupt_allowed,
+ .nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
+ .get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
+ .set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
+ .enable_nmi_window = vmx_enable_nmi_window,
+ .enable_irq_window = vmx_enable_irq_window,
+ .update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
+ .set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
+ .set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
+ .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
+ .load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
+ .apicv_post_state_restore = vmx_apicv_post_state_restore,
+ .check_apicv_inhibit_reasons = vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
+ .hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
+ .hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
+ .guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
+ .sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
+ .deliver_interrupt = vmx_deliver_interrupt,
+ .dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
+
+ .set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
+ .set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
+ .get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
+
+ .get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
+
+ .vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
+
+ .has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
+
+ .get_l2_tsc_offset = vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset,
+ .get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
+ .write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
+ .write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,
+
+ .load_mmu_pgd = vmx_load_mmu_pgd,
+
+ .check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
+ .handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
+
+ .request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
+
+ .sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
+
+ .cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_ENTITY_NUM,
+ .update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
+
+ .nested_ops = &vmx_nested_ops,
+
+ .pi_update_irte = vmx_pi_update_irte,
+ .pi_start_assignment = vmx_pi_start_assignment,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ .set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
+ .cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
+#endif
+
+ .setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
+
+ .smi_allowed = vmx_smi_allowed,
+ .enter_smm = vmx_enter_smm,
+ .leave_smm = vmx_leave_smm,
+ .enable_smi_window = vmx_enable_smi_window,
+
+ .can_emulate_instruction = vmx_can_emulate_instruction,
+ .apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+ .migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
+
+ .msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
+ .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
+
+ .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+};
+
+struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
+ .cpu_has_kvm_support = vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support,
+ .disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
+ .hardware_setup = vmx_hardware_setup,
+ .handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL,
+
+ .runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,
+ .pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 7cc06ca0efc2..0080d88ded20 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include "vmcs12.h"
#include "vmx.h"
#include "x86.h"
+#include "x86_ops.h"

MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
@@ -1386,7 +1387,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
* Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put(), but assumes
* vcpu mutex is already taken.
*/
-static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
}

-static void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu);

@@ -1451,7 +1452,7 @@ void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
}

-static bool vmx_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+bool vmx_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF;
}
@@ -1557,8 +1558,8 @@ static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
return 0;
}

-static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
- void *insn, int insn_len)
+bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len)
{
/*
* Emulation of instructions in SGX enclaves is impossible as RIP does
@@ -1642,7 +1643,7 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* Recognizes a pending MTF VM-exit and records the nested state for later
* delivery.
*/
-static void vmx_update_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_update_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -1673,7 +1674,7 @@ static void vmx_update_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}

-static int vmx_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+int vmx_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
vmx_update_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
@@ -1692,7 +1693,7 @@ static void vmx_clear_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
}

-static void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
@@ -1813,12 +1814,12 @@ u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
}

-static void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
+void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
{
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset);
}

-static void vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 multiplier)
+void vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 multiplier)
{
vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, multiplier);
}
@@ -1842,7 +1843,7 @@ static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return !(val & ~valid_bits);
}

-static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
{
switch (msr->index) {
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
@@ -1862,7 +1863,7 @@ static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
* Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
* Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
*/
-static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
@@ -2039,7 +2040,7 @@ static u64 vcpu_supported_debugctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
* Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
*/
-static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
@@ -2373,7 +2374,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
return ret;
}

-static void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
{
unsigned long guest_owned_bits;

@@ -2416,12 +2417,12 @@ static void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
}
}

-static __init int cpu_has_kvm_support(void)
+__init int vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support(void)
{
return cpu_has_vmx();
}

-static __init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void)
+__init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void)
{
return !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL) ||
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX);
@@ -2447,7 +2448,7 @@ static int kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 vmxon_pointer)
return -EFAULT;
}

-static int vmx_hardware_enable(void)
+int vmx_hardware_enable(void)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
@@ -2488,7 +2489,7 @@ static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
__loaded_vmcs_clear(v);
}

-static void vmx_hardware_disable(void)
+void vmx_hardware_disable(void)
{
vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss();

@@ -3025,7 +3026,7 @@ static void exit_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

#endif

-static void vmx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -3055,7 +3056,7 @@ static inline int vmx_get_current_vpid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid;
}

-static void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
u64 root_hpa = mmu->root.hpa;
@@ -3071,7 +3072,7 @@ static void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
}

-static void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
+void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
{
/*
* vpid_sync_vcpu_addr() is a nop if vpid==0, see the comment in
@@ -3080,7 +3081,7 @@ static void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu), addr);
}

-static void vmx_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
* vpid_sync_context() is a nop if vpid==0, e.g. if enable_vpid==0 or a
@@ -3235,8 +3236,7 @@ u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level)
return eptp;
}

-static void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
- int root_level)
+void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level)
{
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
bool update_guest_cr3 = true;
@@ -3264,8 +3264,7 @@ static void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
}

-
-static bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
/*
* We operate under the default treatment of SMM, so VMX cannot be
@@ -3381,7 +3380,7 @@ void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
var->g = (ar >> 15) & 1;
}

-static u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
{
struct kvm_segment s;

@@ -3461,14 +3460,14 @@ void __vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(var));
}

-static void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);

to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
}

-static void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
{
u32 ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(to_vmx(vcpu), VCPU_SREG_CS);

@@ -3476,25 +3475,25 @@ static void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
*l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
}

-static void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
}

-static void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, dt->address);
}

-static void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);
}

-static void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, dt->address);
@@ -3992,7 +3991,7 @@ void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}

-static bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
void *vapic_page;
@@ -4012,7 +4011,7 @@ static bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return ((rvi & 0xf0) > (vppr & 0xf0));
}

-static void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 i;
@@ -4153,8 +4152,8 @@ static int vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
return 0;
}

-static void vmx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
- int trig_mode, int vector)
+void vmx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;

@@ -4316,7 +4315,7 @@ static u32 vmx_vmexit_ctrl(void)
~(VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL | VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
}

-static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -4574,7 +4573,7 @@ static int vmx_alloc_ipiv_pid_table(struct kvm *kvm)
return 0;
}

-static int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
+int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return vmx_alloc_ipiv_pid_table(kvm);
}
@@ -4726,7 +4725,7 @@ static void __vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
}

-static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -4785,12 +4784,12 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
}

-static void vmx_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
}

-static void vmx_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!enable_vnmi ||
vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
@@ -4801,7 +4800,7 @@ static void vmx_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
}

-static void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
+void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
uint32_t intr;
@@ -4829,7 +4828,7 @@ static void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
}

-static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -4907,7 +4906,7 @@ bool vmx_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
}

-static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
{
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
return -EBUSY;
@@ -4929,7 +4928,7 @@ bool vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
}

-static int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
{
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
return -EBUSY;
@@ -4944,7 +4943,7 @@ static int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
return !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu);
}

-static int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
+int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
{
void __user *ret;

@@ -4964,7 +4963,7 @@ static int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
return init_rmode_tss(kvm, ret);
}

-static int vmx_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
+int vmx_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
{
to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr = ident_addr;
return 0;
@@ -5245,8 +5244,7 @@ static int handle_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
}

-static void
-vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
+void vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
{
/*
* Patch in the VMCALL instruction:
@@ -5456,7 +5454,7 @@ static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
}

-static void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
@@ -5475,7 +5473,7 @@ static void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6);
}

-static void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
{
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
}
@@ -5746,7 +5744,7 @@ static int handle_invalid_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}

-static int vmx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+int vmx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(vcpu)) {
kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
@@ -6010,9 +6008,8 @@ static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);

-static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
- u64 *info1, u64 *info2,
- u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -6455,7 +6452,7 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
return 0;
}

-static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
+int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
{
int ret = __vmx_handle_exit(vcpu, exit_fastpath);

@@ -6543,7 +6540,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
: "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
}

-static void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
int tpr_threshold;
@@ -6613,7 +6610,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu);
}

-static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct page *page;

@@ -6641,7 +6638,7 @@ static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
put_page(page);
}

-static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr)
+void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr)
{
u16 status;
u8 old;
@@ -6675,7 +6672,7 @@ static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
}
}

-static void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
+void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
{
/*
* When running L2, updating RVI is only relevant when
@@ -6689,7 +6686,7 @@ static void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
}

-static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int max_irr;
@@ -6735,7 +6732,7 @@ static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return max_irr;
}

-static void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
+void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
{
if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
return;
@@ -6746,7 +6743,7 @@ static void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
}

-static void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -6819,7 +6816,7 @@ static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
}

-static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -6836,7 +6833,7 @@ static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
* VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
*/
-static bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
+bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
{
switch (index) {
case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
@@ -6957,7 +6954,7 @@ static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
}

-static void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
__vmx_complete_interrupts(vcpu,
vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
@@ -7091,7 +7088,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
guest_state_exit_irqoff();
}

-static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long cr3, cr4;
@@ -7257,7 +7254,7 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu);
}

-static void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -7268,7 +7265,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
}

-static int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vmx_uret_msr *tsx_ctrl;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
@@ -7377,7 +7374,7 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"

-static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
if (!ple_gap)
kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
@@ -7408,7 +7405,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
return 0;
}

-static int vmx_check_processor_compatibility(void)
+int vmx_check_processor_compatibility(void)
{
struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
struct vmx_capability vmx_cap;
@@ -7433,7 +7430,7 @@ static int vmx_check_processor_compatibility(void)
return 0;
}

-static u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
+u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
{
u8 cache;

@@ -7605,7 +7602,7 @@ static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
}

-static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -7715,7 +7712,7 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
}

-static void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
to_vmx(vcpu)->req_immediate_exit = true;
}
@@ -7754,10 +7751,10 @@ static int vmx_check_intercept_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return intercept ? X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}

-static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct x86_instruction_info *info,
- enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
- struct x86_exception *exception)
+int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+ enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
+ struct x86_exception *exception)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);

@@ -7822,8 +7819,8 @@ static inline int u64_shl_div_u64(u64 a, unsigned int shift,
return 0;
}

-static int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
- bool *expired)
+int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
+ bool *expired)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
u64 tscl, guest_tscl, delta_tsc, lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
@@ -7862,13 +7859,13 @@ static int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
return 0;
}

-static void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
to_vmx(vcpu)->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
}
#endif

-static void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
@@ -7894,7 +7891,7 @@ void vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML);
}

-static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
@@ -7904,7 +7901,7 @@ static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
~FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
}

-static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
{
/* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
@@ -7912,7 +7909,7 @@ static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
return !is_smm(vcpu);
}

-static int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
+int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

@@ -7933,7 +7930,7 @@ static int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
return 0;
}

-static int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
+int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int ret;
@@ -7954,17 +7951,17 @@ static int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
return 0;
}

-static void vmx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* RSM will cause a vmexit anyway. */
}

-static bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon && !is_guest_mode(vcpu);
}

-static void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
struct hrtimer *timer = &to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer;
@@ -7974,7 +7971,7 @@ static void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}

-static void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void)
+void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void)
{
kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(NULL);

@@ -7984,7 +7981,7 @@ static void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void)
free_kvm_area();
}

-static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason)
+bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason)
{
ulong supported = BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE) |
BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT) |
@@ -7996,151 +7993,13 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason)
return supported & BIT(reason);
}

-static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);

free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table, vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
}

-static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
- .name = "kvm_intel",
-
- .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
-
- .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility,
- .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
- .hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
- .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
-
- .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
- .vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
- .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
-
- .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
- .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
- .vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
- .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
-
- .prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
- .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
- .vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
-
- .update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
- .get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
- .get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
- .set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
- .get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
- .get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
- .set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
- .get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
- .get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
- .set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
- .is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
- .set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
- .set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
- .get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
- .set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
- .get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
- .set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
- .set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
- .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
- .cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
- .get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
- .set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
- .get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,
-
- .flush_tlb_all = vmx_flush_tlb_all,
- .flush_tlb_current = vmx_flush_tlb_current,
- .flush_tlb_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
- .flush_tlb_guest = vmx_flush_tlb_guest,
-
- .vcpu_pre_run = vmx_vcpu_pre_run,
- .vcpu_run = vmx_vcpu_run,
- .handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
- .skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
- .update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
- .set_interrupt_shadow = vmx_set_interrupt_shadow,
- .get_interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow,
- .patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
- .inject_irq = vmx_inject_irq,
- .inject_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
- .inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
- .cancel_injection = vmx_cancel_injection,
- .interrupt_allowed = vmx_interrupt_allowed,
- .nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
- .get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
- .set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
- .enable_nmi_window = vmx_enable_nmi_window,
- .enable_irq_window = vmx_enable_irq_window,
- .update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
- .set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
- .set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
- .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
- .load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
- .apicv_post_state_restore = vmx_apicv_post_state_restore,
- .check_apicv_inhibit_reasons = vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
- .hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
- .hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
- .guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
- .sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
- .deliver_interrupt = vmx_deliver_interrupt,
- .dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
-
- .set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
- .set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
- .get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
-
- .get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
-
- .vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
-
- .has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
-
- .get_l2_tsc_offset = vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset,
- .get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
- .write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
- .write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,
-
- .load_mmu_pgd = vmx_load_mmu_pgd,
-
- .check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
- .handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
-
- .request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
-
- .sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
-
- .cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_ENTITY_NUM,
- .update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
-
- .nested_ops = &vmx_nested_ops,
-
- .pi_update_irte = vmx_pi_update_irte,
- .pi_start_assignment = vmx_pi_start_assignment,
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- .set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
- .cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
-#endif
-
- .setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
-
- .smi_allowed = vmx_smi_allowed,
- .enter_smm = vmx_enter_smm,
- .leave_smm = vmx_leave_smm,
- .enable_smi_window = vmx_enable_smi_window,
-
- .can_emulate_instruction = vmx_can_emulate_instruction,
- .apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
- .migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
-
- .msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
- .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
-
- .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
-};
-
static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr(void)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kvm_get_running_vcpu();
@@ -8206,9 +8065,7 @@ static void __init vmx_setup_me_spte_mask(void)
kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(0, me_mask);
}

-static struct kvm_x86_init_ops vmx_init_ops __initdata;
-
-static __init int hardware_setup(void)
+__init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
{
unsigned long host_bndcfgs;
struct desc_ptr dt;
@@ -8272,16 +8129,16 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
* using the APIC_ACCESS_ADDR VMCS field.
*/
if (!flexpriority_enabled)
- vmx_x86_ops.set_apic_access_page_addr = NULL;
+ vt_x86_ops.set_apic_access_page_addr = NULL;

if (!cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow())
- vmx_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept = NULL;
+ vt_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept = NULL;

#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_GUEST_MAPPING_FLUSH
&& enable_ept) {
- vmx_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush = hv_remote_flush_tlb;
- vmx_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush_with_range =
+ vt_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush = hv_remote_flush_tlb;
+ vt_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush_with_range =
hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range;
}
#endif
@@ -8297,7 +8154,7 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
if (!cpu_has_vmx_apicv())
enable_apicv = 0;
if (!enable_apicv)
- vmx_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;
+ vt_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;

if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv())
enable_ipiv = false;
@@ -8333,7 +8190,7 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
enable_pml = 0;

if (!enable_pml)
- vmx_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size = 0;
+ vt_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size = 0;

if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
enable_preemption_timer = false;
@@ -8358,9 +8215,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
}

if (!enable_preemption_timer) {
- vmx_x86_ops.set_hv_timer = NULL;
- vmx_x86_ops.cancel_hv_timer = NULL;
- vmx_x86_ops.request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit;
+ vt_x86_ops.set_hv_timer = NULL;
+ vt_x86_ops.cancel_hv_timer = NULL;
+ vt_x86_ops.request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit;
}

kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap |= MCG_LMCE_P;
@@ -8371,9 +8228,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
if (!enable_ept || !enable_pmu || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt())
pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
- vmx_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr;
+ vt_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr;
else
- vmx_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL;
+ vt_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL;

setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash();

@@ -8396,16 +8253,6 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
return r;
}

-static struct kvm_x86_init_ops vmx_init_ops __initdata = {
- .cpu_has_kvm_support = cpu_has_kvm_support,
- .disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
- .hardware_setup = hardware_setup,
- .handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL,
-
- .runtime_ops = &vmx_x86_ops,
- .pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
-};
-
static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
{
if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
@@ -8483,7 +8330,7 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
}

if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH)
- vmx_x86_ops.enable_direct_tlbflush
+ vt_x86_ops.enable_direct_tlbflush
= hv_enable_direct_tlbflush;

} else {
@@ -8491,8 +8338,8 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
}
#endif

- r = kvm_init(&vmx_init_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
- __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
+ r = kvm_init(&vt_init_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
+ __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
if (r)
return r;

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8cc2182fc6d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include <asm/virtext.h>
+
+#include "x86.h"
+
+__init int vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support(void);
+__init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void);
+__init int vmx_hardware_setup(void);
+
+extern struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata;
+extern struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata;
+
+void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);
+int vmx_check_processor_compatibility(void);
+int vmx_hardware_enable(void);
+void vmx_hardware_disable(void);
+int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm);
+int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
+void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
+void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath);
+void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_update_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
+int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
+int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate);
+int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate);
+void vmx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len);
+int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+ enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
+ struct x86_exception *exception);
+bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason);
+void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr);
+void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr);
+bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector);
+void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index);
+void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr);
+int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
+u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg);
+void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
+void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
+int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l);
+void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
+void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
+void vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
+bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
+int vmx_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
+void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
+void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
+unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
+bool vmx_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr);
+void vmx_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask);
+u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall);
+void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected);
+void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
+int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
+bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
+void vmx_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr);
+void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap);
+int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr);
+int vmx_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr);
+u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
+void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code);
+u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset);
+void vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 multiplier);
+void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
+void vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
+ bool *expired);
+void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+#endif
+void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:26:12

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX requires several initialization steps for KVM to create guest TDs.
Detect CPU feature, enable VMX (TDX is based on VMX), detect the TDX module
availability, and initialize it. This patch implements those steps.

There are several options on when to initialize the TDX module. A.) kernel
module loading time, B.) the first guest TD creation time. A.) was chosen.
With B.), a user may hit an error of the TDX initialization when trying to
create the first guest TD. The machine that fails to initialize the TDX
module can't boot any guest TD further. Such failure is undesirable and a
surprise because the user expects that the machine can accommodate guest
TD, but actually not. So A.) is better than B.).

Introduce a module parameter, enable_tdx, to explicitly enable TDX KVM
support. It's off by default to keep same behavior for those who don't use
TDX. Implement hardware_setup method to detect TDX feature of CPU.
Because TDX requires all present CPUs to enable VMX (VMXON). The x86
specific kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup overrides the existing weak
symbol of kvm_arch_post_hardware_enable_setup which is called at the KVM
module initialization.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 18 ++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 39 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 9 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 32 +++++++-----
6 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index ee4d0999f20f..e2c05195cb95 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o
kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o
kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o
+kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o

kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index a7d4af73228e..a5cbf3ca2055 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -7,6 +7,22 @@
#include "pmu.h"
#include "tdx.h"

+static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST);
+module_param_named(tdx, enable_tdx, bool, 0444);
+
+static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = vmx_hardware_setup();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup(&vt_x86_ops);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = "kvm_intel",

@@ -148,7 +164,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
.cpu_has_kvm_support = vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support,
.disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
- .hardware_setup = vmx_hardware_setup,
+ .hardware_setup = vt_hardware_setup,
.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL,

.runtime_ops = &vt_x86_ops,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6213a5c6b637
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
+
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "x86_ops.h"
+#include "tdx.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tdx: " fmt
+
+#define TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS \
+ ((sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) - \
+ offsetof(struct tdsysinfo_struct, cpuid_configs)) \
+ / sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config))
+
+struct tdx_capabilities {
+ u8 tdcs_nr_pages;
+ u8 tdvpx_nr_pages;
+
+ u64 attrs_fixed0;
+ u64 attrs_fixed1;
+ u64 xfam_fixed0;
+ u64 xfam_fixed1;
+
+ u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
+ struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS];
+};
+
+/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */
+static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;
+
+static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
+{
+ const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*tdsysinfo) != 1024);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS != 37);
+
+ ret = tdx_enable();
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_info("Failed to initialize TDX module.\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ tdsysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();
+ if (tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config > TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ tdx_caps = (struct tdx_capabilities) {
+ .tdcs_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdcs_base_size / PAGE_SIZE,
+ /*
+ * TDVPS = TDVPR(4K page) + TDVPX(multiple 4K pages).
+ * -1 for TDVPR.
+ */
+ .tdvpx_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdvps_base_size / PAGE_SIZE - 1,
+ .attrs_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed0,
+ .attrs_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed1,
+ .xfam_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed0,
+ .xfam_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed1,
+ .nr_cpuid_configs = tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config,
+ };
+ if (!memcpy(tdx_caps.cpuid_configs, tdsysinfo->cpuid_configs,
+ tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config *
+ sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ pr_info("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n",
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!enable_ept) {
+ pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* MOVDIR64B instruction is needed. */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) {
+ pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with MOVDIR64B supported ");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ /* TDX requires VMX. */
+ r = vmxon_all();
+ if (!r)
+ r = tdx_module_setup();
+ vmxoff_all();
+
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 1963b28a2ea5..68aef67c5eb7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2479,6 +2479,35 @@ int vmx_hardware_enable(void)
return 0;
}

+static void __init vmxon(void *arg)
+{
+ int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+ u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
+ atomic_t *failed = arg;
+ int r;
+
+ if (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE) {
+ r = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
+out:
+ if (r)
+ atomic_inc(failed);
+}
+
+int __init vmxon_all(void)
+{
+ atomic_t failed = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+ on_each_cpu(vmxon, &failed, 1);
+
+ if (atomic_read(&failed))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
@@ -2499,6 +2528,16 @@ void vmx_hardware_disable(void)
intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
}

+static void __init vmxoff(void *junk)
+{
+ cpu_vmxoff();
+}
+
+void __init vmxoff_all(void)
+{
+ on_each_cpu(vmxoff, NULL, 1);
+}
+
/*
* There is no X86_FEATURE for SGX yet, but anyway we need to query CPUID
* directly instead of going through cpu_has(), to ensure KVM is trapping
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 83efb7f92a58..6196d651a00a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ __init int vmx_cpu_has_kvm_support(void);
__init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void);
__init int vmx_hardware_setup(void);

+int __init vmxon_all(void);
+void __init vmxoff_all(void);
+
extern struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata;
extern struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata;

@@ -127,4 +130,10 @@ void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
#endif
void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
+#else
+static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
+#endif
+
#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 769b3a9a3151..715a53d4fc3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12244,6 +12244,16 @@ static void hardware_enable(void *arg)
atomic_inc(failed);
}

+static int kvm_hardware_enable_all(void)
+{
+ atomic_t failed = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+ on_each_cpu(hardware_enable, &failed, 1);
+ if (atomic_read(&failed))
+ return -EBUSY;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void hardware_disable(void *junk)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(preemptible());
@@ -12251,29 +12261,29 @@ static void hardware_disable(void *junk)
drop_user_return_notifiers();
}

+static void kvm_hardware_disable_all(void)
+{
+ on_each_cpu(hardware_disable, NULL, 1);
+}
+
/*
* Called after the VM is otherwise initialized, but just before adding it to
* the vm_list.
*/
int kvm_arch_add_vm(struct kvm *kvm, int usage_count)
{
- atomic_t failed = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
- int r = 0;
+ int r;

if (usage_count != 1)
return kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(kvm);

- on_each_cpu(hardware_enable, &failed, 1);
-
- if (atomic_read(&failed)) {
- r = -EBUSY;
- goto err;
- }
+ r = kvm_hardware_enable_all();
+ if (r)
+ return r;

r = kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(kvm);
-err:
if (r)
- on_each_cpu(hardware_disable, NULL, 1);
+ kvm_hardware_disable_all();
return r;
}

@@ -12288,7 +12298,7 @@ int kvm_arch_drop_vm(int usage_count)
if (usage_count)
return 0;

- on_each_cpu(hardware_disable, NULL, 1);
+ kvm_hardware_disable_all();
return 0;
}

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:26:34

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 009/108] KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Define architectural definitions for KVM to issue the TDX SEAMCALLs.

Structures and values that are architecturally defined in the TDX module
specifications the chapter of ABI Reference.

Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 166 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 166 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..18604734fb14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* architectural constants/data definitions for TDX SEAMCALLs */
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H
+#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * TDX SEAMCALL API function leaves
+ */
+#define TDH_VP_ENTER 0
+#define TDH_MNG_ADDCX 1
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD 2
+#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD 3
+#define TDH_VP_ADDCX 4
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_RELOCATE 5
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG 6
+#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK 7
+#define TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG 8
+#define TDH_MNG_CREATE 9
+#define TDH_VP_CREATE 10
+#define TDH_MNG_RD 11
+#define TDH_MR_EXTEND 16
+#define TDH_MR_FINALIZE 17
+#define TDH_VP_FLUSH 18
+#define TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE 19
+#define TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID 20
+#define TDH_MNG_INIT 21
+#define TDH_VP_INIT 22
+#define TDH_VP_RD 26
+#define TDH_MNG_KEY_RECLAIMID 27
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM 28
+#define TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE 29
+#define TDH_MEM_SEPT_REMOVE 30
+#define TDH_MEM_TRACK 38
+#define TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK 39
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB 40
+#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD 41
+#define TDH_VP_WR 43
+#define TDH_SYS_LP_SHUTDOWN 44
+
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO 0x10000
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_QUOTE 0x10002
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR 0x10003
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SETUP_EVENT_NOTIFY_INTERRUPT 0x10004
+
+/* TDX control structure (TDR/TDCS/TDVPS) field access codes */
+#define TDX_NON_ARCH BIT_ULL(63)
+#define TDX_CLASS_SHIFT 56
+#define TDX_FIELD_MASK GENMASK_ULL(31, 0)
+
+#define __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(non_arch, class, field) \
+ (((non_arch) ? TDX_NON_ARCH : 0) | \
+ ((u64)(class) << TDX_CLASS_SHIFT) | \
+ ((u64)(field) & TDX_FIELD_MASK))
+
+#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD(class, field) \
+ __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(false, (class), (field))
+
+#define BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(class, field) \
+ __BUILD_TDX_FIELD(true, (class), (field))
+
+
+/* Class code for TD */
+#define TD_CLASS_EXECUTION_CONTROLS 17ULL
+
+/* Class code for TDVPS */
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_VMCS 0ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_GUEST_GPR 16ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST 17ULL
+#define TDVPS_CLASS_MANAGEMENT 32ULL
+
+enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control {
+ TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET = 10,
+};
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_tdcs_execution_control */
+#define TDCS_EXEC(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TD_CLASS_EXECUTION_CONTROLS, (field))
+
+/* @field is the VMCS field encoding */
+#define TDVPS_VMCS(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_VMCS, (field))
+
+enum tdx_vcpu_guest_other_state {
+ TD_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS_NON_ARCH = 0x100,
+};
+
+union tdx_vcpu_state_details {
+ struct {
+ u64 vmxip : 1;
+ u64 reserved : 63;
+ };
+ u64 full;
+};
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_guest_other_state */
+#define TDVPS_STATE(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST, (field))
+#define TDVPS_STATE_NON_ARCH(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD_NON_ARCH(TDVPS_CLASS_OTHER_GUEST, (field))
+
+/* Management class fields */
+enum tdx_vcpu_guest_management {
+ TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI = 11,
+};
+
+/* @field is any of enum tdx_vcpu_guest_management */
+#define TDVPS_MANAGEMENT(field) BUILD_TDX_FIELD(TDVPS_CLASS_MANAGEMENT, (field))
+
+#define TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE 256
+
+struct tdx_cpuid_value {
+ u32 eax;
+ u32 ebx;
+ u32 ecx;
+ u32 edx;
+} __packed;
+
+#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG BIT_ULL(0)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PKS BIT_ULL(30)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_KL BIT_ULL(31)
+#define TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON BIT_ULL(63)
+
+/*
+ * TD_PARAMS is provided as an input to TDH_MNG_INIT, the size of which is 1024B.
+ */
+struct td_params {
+ u64 attributes;
+ u64 xfam;
+ u32 max_vcpus;
+ u32 reserved0;
+
+ u64 eptp_controls;
+ u64 exec_controls;
+ u16 tsc_frequency;
+ u8 reserved1[38];
+
+ u64 mrconfigid[6];
+ u64 mrowner[6];
+ u64 mrownerconfig[6];
+ u64 reserved2[4];
+
+ union {
+ struct tdx_cpuid_value cpuid_values[0];
+ u8 reserved3[768];
+ };
+} __packed __aligned(1024);
+
+/*
+ * Guest uses MAX_PA for GPAW when set.
+ * 0: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[47]
+ * 1: GPA.SHARED bit is GPA[51]
+ */
+#define TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW BIT_ULL(0)
+
+/*
+ * TDX requires the frequency to be defined in units of 25MHz, which is the
+ * frequency of the core crystal clock on TDX-capable platforms, i.e. the TDX
+ * module can only program frequencies that are multiples of 25MHz. The
+ * frequency must be between 100mhz and 10ghz (inclusive).
+ */
+#define TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ(tsc_in_khz) ((tsc_in_khz) / (25 * 1000))
+#define TDX_TSC_25MHZ_TO_KHZ(tsc_in_25mhz) ((tsc_in_25mhz) * (25 * 1000))
+#define TDX_MIN_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ (100 * 1000)
+#define TDX_MAX_TSC_FREQUENCY_KHZ (10 * 1000 * 1000)
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ARCH_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:26:37

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 013/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD VM
creation/destruction.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index b7a14bc73853..5e0deaebf843 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ Patch Layer status
------------------
Patch layer Status
* TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied
-* TDX architectural definitions: Applying
-* TD VM creation/destruction: Not yet
+* TDX architectural definitions: Applied
+* TD VM creation/destruction: Applying
* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Not yet
* TDX EPT violation: Not yet
* TD finalization: Not yet
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:26:49

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 010/108] KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add error codes for the TDX SEAMCALLs both for TDX VMM side for TDH
SEAMCALL and TDX guest side for TDG.VP.VMCALL. KVM issues the TDX
SEAMCALLs and checks its error code. KVM handles hypercall from the TDX
guest and may return an error. So error code for the TDX guest is also
needed.

TDX SEAMCALL uses bits 31:0 to return more information, so these error
codes will only exactly match RAX[63:32]. Error codes for TDG.VP.VMCALL is
defined by TDX Guest-Host-Communication interface spec.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ce246ba62454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* architectural status code for SEAMCALL */
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
+#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
+
+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL
+
+/*
+ * TDX SEAMCALL Status Codes (returned in RAX)
+ */
+#define TDX_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL
+#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU 0x4000000100000000ULL
+#define TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE 0x8000000300000000ULL
+#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL
+#define TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED 0x8000070200000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED 0x8000080000000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_STATE_INCORRECT 0xC000081100000000ULL
+#define TDX_KEY_CONFIGURED 0x0000081500000000ULL
+#define TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE 0x0000082100000000ULL
+#define TDX_EPT_WALK_FAILED 0xC0000B0000000000ULL
+
+/*
+ * TDG.VP.VMCALL Status Codes (returned in R10)
+ */
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY 0x0000000000000001ULL
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND 0x8000000000000000ULL
+#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_TDREPORT_FAILED 0x8000000000000001ULL
+
+/*
+ * TDX module operand ID, appears in 31:0 part of error code as
+ * detail information
+ */
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX 0x01
+#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT 0x92
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:27:19

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign
TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and
allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated
pages, and HKID.

Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the
guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add
flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down private page tables
for it.

Add a second kvm_x86_ops hook in kvm_arch_destroy_vm() to support TDX's
destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a teardown state,
then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM resources.

Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 411 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 11 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +
7 files changed, 467 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 8a5c5ae70bc5..3a29a6b31ee8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
KVM_X86_OP(vm_init)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 2a41a93a80f3..2870155ce6fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1472,7 +1472,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);
unsigned int vm_size;
int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
+ void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);
void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
+ void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);

/* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */
int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 0900ff2f2390..d01a946a18cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -29,18 +29,44 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
return 0;
}

+static void vt_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+ tdx_hardware_unsetup();
+ vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+}
+
static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
if (is_td(kvm))
- return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */
+ return tdx_vm_init(kvm);

return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
}

+static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
+}
+
+static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_vm_destroy(kvm);
+}
+
+static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
+}
+
struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = "kvm_intel",

- .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
+ .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup,
.check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility,

.hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
@@ -50,7 +76,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
.vm_init = vt_vm_init,
- .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
+ .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private,
+ .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
+ .vm_free = vt_vm_free,

.vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
.vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 530e72f85762..ec88dde0d300 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -32,6 +32,401 @@ struct tdx_capabilities {
/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */
static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;

+/*
+ * Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB,
+ * TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a global lock
+ * internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is returned without
+ * spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's caller's
+ * responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use this mutex
+ * to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about scheduling.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock);
+static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock;
+
+static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
+{
+ return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
+{
+ return kvm_tdx->tdr.added;
+}
+
+static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
+{
+ tdx_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
+{
+ return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0;
+}
+
+static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page)
+{
+ const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ /*
+ * Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i:
+ * when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is
+ * required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity
+ * error when read on the page with new keyid.
+ *
+ * The cache line could be poisoned (even without MKTME-i), clear the
+ * poison bit.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += 64)
+ movdir64b((void *)(page + i), zero_page);
+ /*
+ * MOVDIR64B store uses WC buffer. Prevent following memory reads
+ * from seeing potentially poisoned cache.
+ */
+ __mb();
+}
+
+static int tdx_reclaim_page(unsigned long va, hpa_t pa, bool do_wb, u16 hkid)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
+ u64 err;
+
+ do {
+ err = tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(pa, &out);
+ /*
+ * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM is allowed only when TD is shutdown.
+ * state. i.e. destructing TD.
+ * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM requires TDR and target page.
+ * Because we're destructing TD, it's rare to contend with TDR.
+ */
+ } while (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX));
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, err, &out);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ if (do_wb) {
+ /*
+ * Only TDR page gets into this path. No contention is expected
+ * because the last page of TD.
+ */
+ err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(set_hkid_to_hpa(pa, hkid));
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err, NULL);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tdx_clear_page(va);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_alloc_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
+{
+ page->va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!page->va)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ page->pa = __pa(page->va);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void tdx_mark_td_page_added(struct tdx_td_page *page)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(page->added);
+ page->added = true;
+}
+
+static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
+{
+ if (page->added) {
+ /*
+ * TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID
+ * assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD
+ * was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So
+ * cache doesn't need to be flushed again.
+ */
+ if (tdx_reclaim_page(page->va, page->pa, false, 0))
+ return;
+
+ page->added = false;
+ }
+ if (page->va) {
+ free_page(page->va);
+ page->va = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb(void *param)
+{
+ u64 err = 0;
+
+ do {
+ err = tdh_phymem_cache_wb(!!err);
+ } while (err == TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE);
+
+ /* Other thread may have done for us. */
+ if (err == TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE)
+ err = TDX_SUCCESS;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, err, NULL);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ cpumask_var_t packages;
+ bool cpumask_allocated;
+ u64 err;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
+ return;
+
+ if (!is_td_created(kvm_tdx))
+ goto free_hkid;
+
+ cpumask_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL);
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ for_each_online_cpu(i) {
+ if (cpumask_allocated &&
+ cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i),
+ packages))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * We can destroy multiple the guest TDs simultaneously.
+ * Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning TDX_BUSY by
+ * serialization.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
+ ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb, NULL, 1);
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ free_cpumask_var(packages);
+
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
+ err = tdh_mng_key_freeid(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, err, NULL);
+ pr_err("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n",
+ kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ return;
+ }
+
+free_hkid:
+ tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
+}
+
+void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ int i;
+
+ /* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */
+ if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
+ return;
+
+ if (kvm_tdx->tdcs) {
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++)
+ tdx_reclaim_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
+ kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may access TDR
+ * while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS). Cache flush with
+ * TDX global HKID is needed.
+ */
+ if (kvm_tdx->tdr.added &&
+ tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va, kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true,
+ tdx_global_keyid))
+ return;
+
+ free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
+}
+
+static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)
+{
+ hpa_t *tdr_p = param;
+ u64 err;
+
+ do {
+ err = tdh_mng_key_config(*tdr_p);
+
+ /*
+ * If it failed to generate a random key, retry it because this
+ * is typically caused by an entropy error of the CPU's random
+ * number generator.
+ */
+ } while (err == TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED);
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, err, NULL);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ cpumask_var_t packages;
+ int ret, i;
+ u64 err;
+
+ ret = tdx_keyid_alloc();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ kvm_tdx->hkid = ret;
+
+ ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdr);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_hkid;
+
+ kvm_tdx->tdcs = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages, sizeof(*kvm_tdx->tdcs),
+ GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs)
+ goto free_tdr;
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
+ ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_tdcs;
+ }
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_tdcs;
+ }
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ /*
+ * Need at least one CPU of the package to be online in order to
+ * program all packages for host key id. Check it.
+ */
+ for_each_present_cpu(i)
+ cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
+ for_each_online_cpu(i)
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(packages)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ /*
+ * Because it's hard for human operator to figure out the
+ * reason, warn it.
+ */
+ pr_warn("All packages need to have online CPU to create TD. Online CPU and retry.\n");
+ goto free_packages;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY:
+ * TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key Owner
+ * Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It doesn't spin
+ * to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead, and let the
+ * caller to handle the contention. This is because of time limitation
+ * usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better about process
+ * scheduling.
+ *
+ * APIs to acquire the lock of KOT:
+ * TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE, and
+ * TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
+ err = tdh_mng_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_CREATE, err, NULL);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto free_packages;
+ }
+ tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdr);
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(i) {
+ int pkg = topology_physical_package_id(i);
+
+ if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(pkg, packages))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Program the memory controller in the package with an
+ * encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id
+ * assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory
+ * controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by
+ * mutex.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]);
+ ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config,
+ &kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true);
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ free_cpumask_var(packages);
+ if (ret)
+ goto teardown;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
+ err = tdh_mng_addcx(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].pa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, err, NULL);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto teardown;
+ }
+ tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated
+ * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD.
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD
+ * varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred.
+ * Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice
+ * with partial initialization.
+ */
+teardown:
+ tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
+ tdx_vm_free(kvm);
+ return ret;
+
+free_packages:
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ free_cpumask_var(packages);
+free_tdcs:
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
+ if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va)
+ continue;
+ free_page(kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va);
+ }
+ kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
+ kvm_tdx->tdcs = NULL;
+free_tdr:
+ if (kvm_tdx->tdr.va) {
+ free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
+ kvm_tdx->tdr.added = false;
+ kvm_tdx->tdr.va = 0;
+ kvm_tdx->tdr.pa = 0;
+ }
+free_hkid:
+ if (kvm_tdx->hkid != -1)
+ tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
{
const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
@@ -82,6 +477,8 @@ bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)

int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
{
+ int max_pkgs;
+ int i;
int r;

if (!enable_ept) {
@@ -95,6 +492,14 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
return -ENODEV;
}

+ max_pkgs = topology_max_packages();
+ tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs, sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tdx_mng_key_config_lock)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ for (i = 0; i < max_pkgs; i++)
+ mutex_init(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[i]);
+
/* TDX requires VMX. */
r = vmxon_all();
if (!r)
@@ -103,3 +508,9 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)

return r;
}
+
+void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+ /* kfree accepts NULL. */
+ kfree(tdx_mng_key_config_lock);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 98999bf3f188..938314635b47 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {

struct tdx_td_page tdr;
struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
+
+ int hkid;
};

struct vcpu_tdx {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index ac1688b0b0e3..95da978c9aa9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -133,9 +133,20 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
+void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
+
+int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
+void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
#else
static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
+static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
+
+static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
+static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) {}
+static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}
#endif

#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 91053fdc4512..4b22196cb12c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12702,6 +12702,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
kvm_page_track_cleanup(kvm);
kvm_xen_destroy_vm(kvm);
kvm_hv_destroy_vm(kvm);
+ static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm);
}

static void memslot_rmap_free(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
@@ -13012,6 +13013,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,

void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
{
+ /*
+ * kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables. Before
+ * tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to
+ * be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Invoke
+ * kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this.
+ */
+ static_call_cond(kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm);
kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
}

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:27:51

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 029/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of GPA

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX repurposes one GPA bit (51 bit or 47 bit based on configuration) to
indicate the GPA is private(if cleared) or shared (if set) with VMM. If
GPA.shared is set, GPA is covered by the existing conventional EPT pointed
by EPTP. If GPA.shared bit is cleared, GPA is covered by TDX module.
VMM has to issue SEAMCALLs to operate.

Add a member to remember GPA shared bit for each guest TDs, add address
conversion functions between private GPA and shared GPA and test if GPA
is private.

Because struct kvm_arch (or struct kvm which includes struct kvm_arch. See
kvm_arch_alloc_vm() that passes __GPF_ZERO) is zero-cleared when allocated,
the new member to remember GPA shared bit is guaranteed to be zero with
this patch unless it's initialized explicitly.

Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 829a07d23909..3374ec0d6d90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1372,6 +1372,10 @@ struct kvm_arch {
*/
#define SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS (SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE + 1)
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache split_desc_cache;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+ gfn_t gfn_shared_mask;
+#endif
};

struct kvm_vm_stat {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 6bdaacb6faa0..a45f7a96b821 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -278,4 +278,36 @@ static inline gpa_t kvm_translate_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return gpa;
return translate_nested_gpa(vcpu, gpa, access, exception);
}
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_shared_mask(const struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+ return kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask;
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_shared(const struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ return gfn | kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+}
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_private(const struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ return gfn & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+}
+
+static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_private(const struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+ return gpa & ~gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm));
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_is_private_gpa(const struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+ gfn_t mask = kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+
+ return mask && !(gpa_to_gfn(gpa) & mask);
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index fd9210cb4f36..e80f9cf79b2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -785,6 +785,11 @@ static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
kvm_tdx->attributes = td_params->attributes;
kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam;

+ if (td_params->exec_controls & TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW)
+ kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask = gpa_to_gfn(BIT_ULL(51));
+ else
+ kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask = gpa_to_gfn(BIT_ULL(47));
+
out:
/* kfree() accepts NULL. */
kfree(init_vm);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:29:03

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 038/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX requires special handling to support large private page. For
simplicity, only support 4K page for TD guest for now. Add per-VM maximum
page level support to support different maximum page sizes for TD guest and
conventional VMX guest.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index a1c801ca61d3..2e0b23422d63 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1156,6 +1156,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {
unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;
unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;
unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
+ int tdp_max_page_level;
u8 mmu_valid_gen;
struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES];
struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 09defac49bf0..0001e921154e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -6092,6 +6092,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.kmem_cache = pte_list_desc_cache;
kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;

+ kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL;
return 0;
}

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index 5cdff5ca546c..57e3ea2b52cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
.nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled =
is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm),

- .max_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
+ .max_level = vcpu->kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level,
.req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
.goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
};
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:29:24

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 021/108] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

From: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>

TDX requires additional parameters for TDX VM for confidential execution to
protect its confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from
any other software, including VMM. When creating guest TD VM before
creating vcpu, the number of vcpu, TSC frequency (that is same among
vcpus. and it can't be changed.) CPUIDs which is emulated by the TDX
module. It means guest can trust those CPUIDs. and sha384 values for
measurement.

Add new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, to pass parameters for TDX guest. It
assigns encryption key to the TDX guest for memory encryption. TDX
encrypts memory per-guest bases. It assigns device model passes per-VM
parameters for the TDX guest. The maximum number of vcpus, tsc frequency
(TDX guest has fised VM-wide TSC frequency. not per-vcpu. The TDX guest
can not change it.), attributes (production or debug), available extended
features (which is reflected into guest XCR0, IA32_XSS MSR), cpuids, sha384
measurements, and etc.

This subcommand is called before creating vcpu and KVM_SET_CPUID2, i.e.
cpuids configurations aren't available yet. So CPUIDs configuration values
needs to be passed in struct kvm_init_vm. It's device model responsibility
to make this cpuid config for KVM_TDX_INIT_VM and KVM_SET_CPUID2.

Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 31 +++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 22 ++
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++
5 files changed, 347 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
index cd304d323d33..05ac4bfc8f8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+
+/* -1 indicates CPUID leaf with no sub-leaves. */
+#define TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ((u32)-1)
struct tdx_cpuid_config {
u32 leaf;
u32 sub_leaf;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 2ad9666e02a5..26661879c031 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,

KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
};
@@ -583,4 +584,34 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
};

+struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
+ __u64 attributes;
+ __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
+ union {
+ /*
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before
+ * KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed.
+ *
+ * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.
+ * The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent
+ * with this values.
+ * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256)
+ * = 8KB.
+ */
+ struct {
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+ /* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[];
+ };
+ /*
+ * For future extensibility.
+ * The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB.
+ * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
+ */
+ __u64 reserved[2029];
+ };
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index d77709a6da51..54045e0576e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -284,6 +284,205 @@ static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)
int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * This function initializes only KVM software construct. It doesn't
+ * initialize TDX stuff, e.g. TDCS, TDR, TDCX, HKID etc.
+ * It is handled by KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, __tdx_td_init().
+ */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
+ sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
+ * mem_enc_ioctl().
+ */
+ if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
+ if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (caps.nr_cpuid_configs < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ caps = (struct kvm_tdx_capabilities) {
+ .attrs_fixed0 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed0,
+ .attrs_fixed1 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed1,
+ .xfam_fixed0 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed0,
+ .xfam_fixed1 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed1,
+ .nr_cpuid_configs = tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs,
+ .padding = 0,
+ };
+
+ if (copy_to_user(user_caps, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid_configs, &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs,
+ tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs *
+ sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cpuid entry lookup in TDX cpuid config way.
+ * The difference is how to specify index(subleaves).
+ * Specify index to TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF for CPUID leaf with no-subleaves.
+ */
+static const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *tdx_find_cpuid_entry(const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+ u32 function, u32 index)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* In TDX CPU CONFIG, TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF means index = 0. */
+ if (index == TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF)
+ index = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cpuid->nent; i++) {
+ const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e = &cpuid->entries[i];
+
+ if (e->function == function &&
+ (e->index == index ||
+ !(e->flags & KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX)))
+ return e;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int setup_tdparams(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params,
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm)
+{
+ const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid = &init_vm->cpuid;
+ const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+ u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
+ u64 guest_supported_xss;
+ int max_pa;
+ int i;
+
+ if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+ return -EBUSY;
+ td_params->max_vcpus = kvm->max_vcpus;
+ td_params->attributes = init_vm->attributes;
+ if (td_params->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON) {
+ /*
+ * TODO: save/restore PMU related registers around TDENTER.
+ * Once it's done, remove this guard.
+ */
+ pr_warn("TD doesn't support perfmon yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
+ "host perf registers properly.\n");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs; i++) {
+ const struct tdx_cpuid_config *config = &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs[i];
+ const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry =
+ tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, config->leaf, config->sub_leaf);
+ struct tdx_cpuid_value *value = &td_params->cpuid_values[i];
+
+ if (!entry)
+ continue;
+
+ value->eax = entry->eax & config->eax;
+ value->ebx = entry->ebx & config->ebx;
+ value->ecx = entry->ecx & config->ecx;
+ value->edx = entry->edx & config->edx;
+ }
+
+ max_pa = 36;
+ entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0x80000008, 0);
+ if (entry)
+ max_pa = entry->eax & 0xff;
+
+ td_params->eptp_controls = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
+ /*
+ * No CPU supports 4-level && max_pa > 48.
+ * "5-level paging and 5-level EPT" section 4.1 4-level EPT
+ * "4-level EPT is limited to translating 48-bit guest-physical
+ * addresses."
+ * cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() check is just in case.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() && max_pa > 48) {
+ td_params->eptp_controls |= VMX_EPTP_PWL_5;
+ td_params->exec_controls |= TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW;
+ } else {
+ td_params->eptp_controls |= VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
+ }
+
+ /* Setup td_params.xfam */
+ entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0xd, 0);
+ if (entry)
+ guest_supported_xcr0 = (entry->eax | ((u64)entry->edx << 32));
+ else
+ guest_supported_xcr0 = 0;
+ guest_supported_xcr0 &= kvm_caps.supported_xcr0;
+
+ entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0xd, 1);
+ if (entry)
+ guest_supported_xss = (entry->ecx | ((u64)entry->edx << 32));
+ else
+ guest_supported_xss = 0;
+ /* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */
+ guest_supported_xss &= (kvm_caps.supported_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_PT);
+
+ td_params->xfam = guest_supported_xcr0 | guest_supported_xss;
+ if (td_params->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_LBR) {
+ /*
+ * TODO: once KVM supports LBR(save/restore LBR related
+ * registers around TDENTER), remove this guard.
+ */
+ pr_warn("TD doesn't support LBR yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
+ "IA32_LBR_DEPTH properly.\n");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ if (td_params->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) {
+ /*
+ * TODO: once KVM supports AMX(save/restore AMX related
+ * registers around TDENTER), remove this guard.
+ */
+ pr_warn("TD doesn't support AMX yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
+ "IA32_XFD, IA32_XFD_ERR properly.\n");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ td_params->tsc_frequency =
+ TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz);
+
+#define MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(dst, src) \
+ do { \
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dst) != sizeof(src)); \
+ memcpy((dst), (src), sizeof(dst)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrconfigid, init_vm->mrconfigid);
+ MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrowner, init_vm->mrowner);
+ MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrownerconfig, init_vm->mrownerconfig);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
cpumask_var_t packages;
int ret, i;
u64 err;
@@ -390,10 +589,13 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
}

- /*
- * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated
- * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD.
- */
+ err = tdh_mng_init(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, __pa(td_params), &out);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_INIT, err, &out);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto teardown;
+ }
+
return 0;

/*
@@ -431,50 +633,65 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
return ret;
}

-int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
+static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
{
- struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
- struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
- struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm = NULL;
+ struct td_params *td_params = NULL;
+ void *entries_end;
+ int ret;

- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
- sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*init_vm) != 16 * 1024);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(*init_vm) - offsetof(typeof(*init_vm), entries)) /
+ sizeof(init_vm->entries[0]) < KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct td_params) != 1024);

- if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
- return -EFAULT;
- if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
+ if (is_td_initialized(kvm))
return -EINVAL;
- /*
- * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
- * mem_enc_ioctl().
- */
- if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
+
+ if (cmd->flags)
return -EINVAL;

- user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
- if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ init_vm = kzalloc(sizeof(*init_vm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy_from_user(init_vm, (void __user *)cmd->data, sizeof(*init_vm))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }

- if (caps.nr_cpuid_configs < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs)
- return -E2BIG;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (init_vm->cpuid.padding)
+ goto out;
+ /* init_vm->entries shouldn't overrun. */
+ entries_end = init_vm->entries + init_vm->cpuid.nent;
+ if (entries_end > (void *)(init_vm + 1))
+ goto out;
+ /* Unused part must be zero. */
+ if (memchr_inv(entries_end, 0, (void *)(init_vm + 1) - entries_end))
+ goto out;

- caps = (struct kvm_tdx_capabilities) {
- .attrs_fixed0 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed0,
- .attrs_fixed1 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed1,
- .xfam_fixed0 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed0,
- .xfam_fixed1 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed1,
- .nr_cpuid_configs = tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs,
- .padding = 0,
- };
+ td_params = kzalloc(sizeof(struct td_params), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!td_params) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }

- if (copy_to_user(user_caps, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
- return -EFAULT;
- if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid_configs, &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs,
- tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs *
- sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ ret = setup_tdparams(kvm, td_params, init_vm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;

- return 0;
+ ret = __tdx_td_init(kvm, td_params);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ kvm_tdx->tsc_offset = td_tdcs_exec_read64(kvm_tdx, TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET);
+ kvm_tdx->attributes = td_params->attributes;
+ kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam;
+
+out:
+ /* kfree() accepts NULL. */
+ kfree(init_vm);
+ kfree(td_params);
+ return ret;
}

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
@@ -490,6 +707,9 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);

switch (tdx_cmd.id) {
+ case KVM_TDX_INIT_VM:
+ r = tdx_td_init(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 938314635b47..ff0ea9cad347 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
struct tdx_td_page tdr;
struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;

+ u64 attributes;
+ u64 xfam;
int hkid;
+
+ u64 tsc_offset;
};

struct vcpu_tdx {
@@ -48,6 +52,11 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
}

+static inline bool is_td_initialized(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return to_kvm_tdx(kvm)->hkid > 0;
+}
+
static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
{
#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
@@ -148,6 +157,19 @@ TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, STATE_NON_ARCH, state_non_arch);
TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(8, MANAGEMENT, management);

+static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
+ u64 err;
+
+ err = tdh_mng_rd(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, TDCS_EXEC(field), &out);
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ pr_err("TDH_MNG_RD[EXEC.0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", field, err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return out.r8;
+}
+
#else
struct kvm_tdx {
struct kvm kvm;
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 2ad9666e02a5..531a0033e530 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,

KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
};
@@ -583,4 +584,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
};

+struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
+ __u64 attributes;
+ __u32 max_vcpus;
+ __u32 padding;
+ __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
+ union {
+ /*
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before
+ * KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed.
+ *
+ * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.
+ * The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent
+ * with this values.
+ * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256)
+ * = 8KB.
+ */
+ struct {
+ struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+ /* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[];
+ };
+ /*
+ * For future extensibility.
+ * The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB.
+ * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
+ */
+ __u64 reserved[2028];
+ };
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:29:26

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 040/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM TDP MMU
hooks.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index df003d2ed89e..d5cace00c433 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@ Patch Layer status
* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet

* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied
-* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applying
-* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Not yet
+* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applied
+* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Applying
* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:29:28

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 043/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Require TDP MMU for TDX

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Require the TDP MMU for guest TDs, the so called "shadow" MMU does not
support mapping guest private memory, i.e. does not support Secure-EPT.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index c6be76f9849c..1bf58288ea79 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -18,8 +18,12 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct workqueue_struct *wq;

+ /*
+ * Because only the TDP MMU supports TDX, require the TDP MMU for guest
+ * TDs.
+ */
if (!tdp_enabled || !READ_ONCE(tdp_mmu_enabled))
- return 0;
+ return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0;

wq = alloc_workqueue("kvm", WQ_UNBOUND|WQ_MEM_RECLAIM|WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE, 0);
if (!wq)
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:29:52

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 047/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX supports only write-back(WB) memory type for private memory
architecturally so that (virtualized) memory type change doesn't make sense
for private memory. Also currently, page migration isn't supported for TDX
yet. (TDX architecturally supports page migration. it's KVM and kernel
implementation issue.)

Regarding memory type change (mtrr virtualization and lapic page mapping
change), pages are zapped by kvm_zap_gfn_range(). On the next KVM page
fault, the SPTE entry with a new memory type for the page is populated.
Regarding page migration, pages are zapped by the mmu notifier. On the next
KVM page fault, the new migrated page is populated. Don't zap private
pages on unmapping for those two cases.

When deleting/moving a KVM memory slot, zap private pages. Typically
tearing down VM. Don't invalidate private page tables. i.e. zap only leaf
SPTEs for KVM mmu that has a shared bit mask. The existing
kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots() depends on role.invalid with read-lock
of mmu_lock so that other vcpu can operate on KVM mmu concurrently. It
marks the root page table invalid and zaps SPTEs of the root page
tables. The TDX module doesn't allow to unlink a protected root page table
from the hardware and then allocate a new one for it. i.e. replacing a
protected root page table. Instead, zap only leaf SPTEs for KVM mmu with a
shared bit mask set.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 24 ++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 5 ++-
3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index faf69774c7ce..0237e143299c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -1577,8 +1577,38 @@ bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
flush = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_zap_rmap);

- if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm))
- flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush);
+ if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
+ bool zap_private;
+
+ if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot)) {
+ if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_RESTRICTED_MEM)
+ /*
+ * For private slot, the callback is triggered
+ * via falloc. Mode can be allocation or punch
+ * hole. Because the private-shared conversion
+ * is done via
+ * KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG/UNREG_REGION, we can
+ * ignore the request from restrictedmem.
+ */
+ return flush;
+ else if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_SET_MEM_ATTR) {
+ if (range->attr == KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED)
+ zap_private = true;
+ else {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(range->attr != KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE);
+ zap_private = false;
+ }
+ } else
+ /*
+ * kvm_unmap_gfn_range() is called via mmu
+ * notifier. For now page migration for private
+ * page isn't supported yet, don't zap private
+ * pages.
+ */
+ zap_private = false;
+ }
+ flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush, zap_private);
+ }

return flush;
}
@@ -6066,11 +6096,48 @@ static bool kvm_has_zapped_obsolete_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
return unlikely(!list_empty_careful(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages));
}

+static void kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+ bool flush = false;
+
+ write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Zapping non-leaf SPTEs, a.k.a. not-last SPTEs, isn't required, worst
+ * case scenario we'll have unused shadow pages lying around until they
+ * are recycled due to age or when the VM is destroyed.
+ */
+ if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
+ struct kvm_gfn_range range = {
+ .slot = slot,
+ .start = slot->base_gfn,
+ .end = slot->base_gfn + slot->npages,
+ .may_block = false,
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * this handles both private gfn and shared gfn.
+ * All private page should be zapped on memslot deletion.
+ */
+ flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &range, flush, true);
+ } else {
+ flush = slot_handle_level(kvm, slot, __kvm_zap_rmap, PG_LEVEL_4K,
+ KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL, true);
+ }
+ if (flush)
+ kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+
+ write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
static void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_pages_in_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node)
{
- kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
+ if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
+ kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(kvm, slot);
+ else
+ kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
}

int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -6173,8 +6240,18 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)

if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++)
+ /*
+ * zap_private = true. Zap both private/shared pages.
+ *
+ * kvm_zap_gfn_range() is used when PAT memory type was
+ * changed. Later on the next kvm page fault, populate
+ * it with updated spte entry.
+ * Because only WB is supported for private pages, don't
+ * care of private pages.
+ */
flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, i, gfn_start,
- gfn_end, true, flush);
+ gfn_end, true, flush,
+ true);
}

if (flush)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index b2f56110d62d..85d990ec149e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -948,7 +948,8 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
* operation can cause a soft lockup.
*/
static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
- gfn_t start, gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush)
+ gfn_t start, gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush,
+ bool zap_private)
{
struct tdp_iter iter;

@@ -956,6 +957,10 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,

lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);

+ WARN_ON_ONCE(zap_private && !is_private_sp(root));
+ if (!zap_private && is_private_sp(root))
+ return false;
+
rcu_read_lock();

for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, PG_LEVEL_4K, start, end) {
@@ -988,12 +993,13 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
* more SPTEs were zapped since the MMU lock was last acquired.
*/
bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
- bool can_yield, bool flush)
+ bool can_yield, bool flush, bool zap_private)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *root;

for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, as_id)
- flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, start, end, can_yield, flush);
+ flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, start, end, can_yield, flush,
+ zap_private && is_private_sp(root));

return flush;
}
@@ -1053,6 +1059,12 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm)

lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
list_for_each_entry(root, &kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots, link) {
+ /*
+ * Skip private root since private page table
+ * is only torn down when VM is destroyed.
+ */
+ if (is_private_sp(root))
+ continue;
if (!root->role.invalid &&
!WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(root))) {
root->role.invalid = true;
@@ -1245,11 +1257,13 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
return ret;
}

+/* Used by mmu notifier via kvm_unmap_gfn_range() */
bool kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
- bool flush)
+ bool flush, bool zap_private)
{
return kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, range->slot->as_id, range->start,
- range->end, range->may_block, flush);
+ range->end, range->may_block, flush,
+ zap_private);
}

typedef bool (*tdp_handler_t)(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
index c163f7cc23ca..c98c7df449a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
bool shared);

bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t start,
- gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush);
+ gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush,
+ bool zap_private);
bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots(struct kvm *kvm);
int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);

bool kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
- bool flush);
+ bool flush, bool zap_private);
bool kvm_tdp_mmu_age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
bool kvm_tdp_mmu_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
bool kvm_tdp_mmu_set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:30:09

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 046/108] KVM: Add flags to struct kvm_gfn_range

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

kvm_unmap_gfn_range() needs to know the reason of the callback for TDX.
mmu notifier, set memattr ioctl or restrictedmem notifier. Based on the
reason, TDX changes the behavior. For mmu notifier, it's the operation on
shared memory slot to zap shared PTE. For set memattr, private<->shared
conversion, zap the original PTE. For restrictedmem, it's a hint that TDX
can ignore.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 8 +++++++-
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 839d98d56632..b658803ea2c7 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -247,12 +247,18 @@ int kvm_async_pf_wakeup_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);


#if defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER) || defined(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM)
+#define KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_RESTRICTED_MEM BIT(0)
+#define KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_SET_MEM_ATTR BIT(1)
struct kvm_gfn_range {
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
gfn_t start;
gfn_t end;
- pte_t pte;
+ union {
+ pte_t pte;
+ int attr;
+ };
bool may_block;
+ unsigned int flags;
};
bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
#endif
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 3b05a3396f89..dda2f2ec4faa 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static __always_inline int __kvm_handle_hva_range(struct kvm *kvm,
gfn_range.start = hva_to_gfn_memslot(hva_start, slot);
gfn_range.end = hva_to_gfn_memslot(hva_end + PAGE_SIZE - 1, slot);
gfn_range.slot = slot;
+ gfn_range.flags = 0;

if (!locked) {
locked = true;
@@ -947,8 +948,9 @@ static void kvm_unmap_mem_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
int i;
int r = 0;

- gfn_range.pte = __pte(0);
+ gfn_range.attr = attr;
gfn_range.may_block = true;
+ gfn_range.flags = KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_SET_MEM_ATTR;

for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
@@ -1074,6 +1076,7 @@ static void kvm_restrictedmem_invalidate_begin(struct restrictedmem_notifier *no
gfn_range.slot = slot;
gfn_range.pte = __pte(0);
gfn_range.may_block = true;
+ gfn_range.flags = KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_RESTRICTED_MEM;

if (kvm_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &gfn_range))
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:31:15

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 065/108] KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

To protect the initial contents of the guest TD, the TDX module measures
the guest TD during the build process as SHA-384 measurement. The
measurement of the guest TD contents needs to be completed to make the
guest TD ready to run.

Add a new subcommand, KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM, for VM-scoped
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to finalize the measurement and mark the TDX VM ready
to run.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 6ae52926e05a..a8e3945a3ea2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -541,6 +541,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
+ KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,

KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 7c00f71d42af..cce6ccd4a0be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1236,6 +1236,34 @@ static int tdx_init_mem_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
return ret;
}

+static int tdx_td_finalizemr(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ u64 err;
+
+ if (!is_td_initialized(kvm) || is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = tdh_mr_finalize(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, err, NULL);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Blindly do TDH_MEM_TRACK after finalizing the measurement to handle
+ * the case where SEPT entries were zapped/blocked, e.g. from failed
+ * NUMA balancing, after they were added to the TD via
+ * tdx_init_mem_region(). TDX module doesn't allow TDH_MEM_TRACK prior
+ * to TDH.MR.FINALIZE, and conversely requires TDH.MEM.TRACK for entries
+ * that were TDH.MEM.RANGE.BLOCK'd prior to TDH.MR.FINALIZE.
+ */
+ (void)tdh_mem_track(to_kvm_tdx(kvm)->tdr.pa);
+
+ kvm_tdx->finalized = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;
@@ -1255,6 +1283,9 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
case KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION:
r = tdx_init_mem_region(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
break;
+ case KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM:
+ r = tdx_td_finalizemr(kvm);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 37e713ffab72..0aeb4639be89 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -541,6 +541,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
+ KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,

KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
};
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:31:45

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 069/108] KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

On entering/exiting TDX vcpu, Preserved or clobbered CPU state is different
from VMX case. Add TDX hooks to save/restore host/guest CPU state.
Save/restore kernel GS base MSR.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++--
6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 5f9634c130d0..b225cdfac4bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2080,6 +2080,7 @@ int kvm_pv_send_ipi(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long ipi_bitmap_low,

int kvm_add_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
int kvm_find_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
+void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(void);
int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);

static inline bool kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 252c33820271..379b3343557b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -100,6 +100,30 @@ static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
return vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
}

+static void vt_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * All host state is saved/restored across SEAMCALL/SEAMRET, and the
+ * guest state of a TD is obviously off limits. Deferring MSRs and DRs
+ * is pointless because the TDX module needs to load *something* so as
+ * not to expose guest state.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+}
+
static int vt_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -214,9 +238,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vcpu_free = vt_vcpu_free,
.vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset,

- .prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
+ .prepare_switch_to_guest = vt_prepare_switch_to_guest,
.vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
- .vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
+ .vcpu_put = vt_vcpu_put,

.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 2f57f62eb103..021040fdd630 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_context.h>

#include <asm/tdx.h>

@@ -329,6 +330,8 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)

int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
/* TDX only supports x2APIC, which requires an in-kernel local APIC. */
if (!vcpu->arch.apic)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -345,9 +348,46 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
!(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG);

+ tdx->host_state_need_save = true;
+ tdx->host_state_need_restore = false;
+
return 0;
}

+void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu();
+ if (!tdx->host_state_need_save)
+ return;
+
+ if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm)))
+ tdx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
+ else
+ tdx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
+
+ tdx->host_state_need_save = false;
+}
+
+static void tdx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ tdx->host_state_need_save = true;
+ if (!tdx->host_state_need_restore)
+ return;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, tdx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
+ tdx->host_state_need_restore = false;
+}
+
+void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu);
+ tdx_prepare_switch_to_host(vcpu);
+}
+
void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
@@ -438,6 +478,8 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);

+ tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
+
vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 064e1f2f61d5..e5f973b2d752 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {

bool vcpu_initialized;

+ bool host_state_need_save;
+ bool host_state_need_restore;
+ u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base;
+
/*
* Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory.
* TODO: Support PMU for TDX. Future work.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index ccae338dcfdd..a4e50c5a4bf5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -171,6 +173,8 @@ static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; }
+static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 3662f64f3b5e..65541bfebb37 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int kvm_find_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_user_return_msr);

-static void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs)
+static void __kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs)
{
u64 value;
int i;
@@ -434,12 +434,18 @@ static void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs)
msrs->initialized = true;
}

+void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(void)
+{
+ __kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu);
+
int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
{
struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
int err;

- kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(msrs);
+ __kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(msrs);

value = (value & mask) | (msrs->values[slot].host & ~mask);
if (value == msrs->values[slot].curr)
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:32:12

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 074/108] KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This corresponds to VMX __vmx_complete_interrupts(). Because TDX
virtualize vAPIC, KVM only needs to care NMI injection.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index f35ccf2b502d..af13c19af339 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -456,6 +456,14 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
}

+static void tdx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* Avoid costly SEAMCALL if no nmi was injected */
+ if (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected)
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = td_management_read8(to_tdx(vcpu),
+ TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI);
+}
+
struct tdx_uret_msr {
u32 msr;
unsigned int slot;
@@ -524,6 +532,8 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);

+ tdx_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
+
return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
}

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:53:27

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 044/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because TDX support introduces private mapping, add a new member in union
kvm_mmu_page_role with access functions to check the member.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 2e0b23422d63..ee01add57a6b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -335,7 +335,12 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
unsigned ad_disabled:1;
unsigned guest_mode:1;
unsigned passthrough:1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+ unsigned is_private:1;
+ unsigned :4;
+#else
unsigned :5;
+#endif

/*
* This is left at the top of the word so that
@@ -347,6 +352,28 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
};
};

+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+ return !!role.is_private;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_page_role_set_private(union kvm_mmu_page_role *role)
+{
+ role->is_private = 1;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_page_role_set_private(union kvm_mmu_page_role *role)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* kvm_mmu_extended_role complements kvm_mmu_page_role, tracking properties
* relevant to the current MMU configuration. When loading CR0, CR4, or EFER,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index 57e3ea2b52cc..b0c4a78404b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -142,6 +142,17 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_page_as_id(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
return kvm_mmu_role_as_id(sp->role);
}

+static inline bool is_private_sp(const struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+ return kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(sp->role);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_private_sptep(u64 *sptep)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!sptep);
+ return is_private_sp(sptep_to_sp(sptep));
+}
+
static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
/*
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:56:20

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 106/108] Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add documentation to Intel Trusted Domain Extensions(TDX) support.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 +-
Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst | 2 +
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst | 345 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 355 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index b6f08e8a8320..3d819b2ceb78 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -1426,6 +1426,9 @@ It is recommended to use this API instead of the KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION ioctl.
The KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION does not allow fine grained control over memory
allocation and is deprecated.

+For TDX guest, deleting/moving memory region loses guest memory contents.
+Read only region isn't supported. Only as-id 0 is supported.
+

4.36 KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR
---------------------
@@ -4714,7 +4717,7 @@ H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.

:Capability: basic
:Architectures: x86
-:Type: vm
+:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
:Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error

@@ -4726,6 +4729,10 @@ Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
(SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst.

+Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Trusted Domain Extensions
+(TDX) commands on Intel Processors. The TDX commands are defined in
+Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst.
+
4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
-----------------------------------

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
index e0a2c74e1043..cdb8b43ce797 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ KVM
locking
vcpu-requests
review-checklist
+
+ intel-tdx
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6999b0f4f6c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================
+Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)
+===================================
+
+Overview
+========
+TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions which isolates VMs from
+the virtual-machine manager (VMM)/hypervisor and any other software on
+the platform. For details, see the specifications [1]_, whitepaper [2]_,
+architectural extensions specification [3]_, module documentation [4]_,
+loader interface specification [5]_, guest-hypervisor communication
+interface [6]_, virtual firmware design guide [7]_, and other resources
+([8]_, [9]_, [10]_, [11]_, and [12]_).
+
+
+API description
+===============
+
+KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+---------------------
+:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
+
+For TDX operations, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP is re-purposed to be generic
+ioctl with TDX specific sub ioctl command.
+
+::
+
+ /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
+ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
+ KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
+ KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,
+
+ KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
+ /* enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id */
+ __u32 id;
+ /* flags for sub-commend. If sub-command doesn't use this, set zero. */
+ __u32 flags;
+ /*
+ * data for each sub-command. An immediate or a pointer to the actual
+ * data in process virtual address. If sub-command doesn't use it,
+ * set zero.
+ */
+ __u64 data;
+ /*
+ * Auxiliary error code. The sub-command may return TDX SEAMCALL
+ * status code in addition to -Exxx.
+ * Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd.
+ */
+ __u64 error;
+ /* Reserved: Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd. */
+ __u64 unused;
+ };
+
+KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES
+--------------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Subset of TDSYSINFO_STRCUCT retrieved by TDH.SYS.INFO TDX SEAM call will be
+returned. Which describes about Intel TDX module.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES
+- flags: must be 0
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_capabilities
+- error: must be 0
+- unused: must be 0
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config {
+ __u32 leaf;
+ __u32 sub_leaf;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+ };
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
+ __u64 attrs_fixed0;
+ __u64 attrs_fixed1;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed0;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed1;
+
+ __u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
+ struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_VM
+---------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Does additional VM initialization specific to TDX which corresponds to
+TDH.MNG.INIT TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VM
+- flags: must be 0
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_init_vm
+- error: must be 0
+- unused: must be 0
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
+ __u32 max_vcpus;
+ __u32 reserved;
+ __u64 attributes;
+ __u64 cpuid; /* pointer to struct kvm_cpuid2 */
+ __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
+ __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
+ __u64 reserved[43]; /* must be zero for future extensibility */
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+-----------------
+:Type: vcpu ioctl
+
+Does additional VCPU initialization specific to TDX which corresponds to
+TDH.VP.INIT TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+- flags: must be 0
+- data: initial value of the guest TD VCPU RCX
+- error: must be 0
+- unused: must be 0
+
+KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION
+-----------------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Encrypt a memory continuous region which corresponding to TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD
+TDX SEAM call.
+If KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION flag is specified, it also extends measurement
+which corresponds to TDH.MR.EXTEND TDX SEAM call.
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
+- flags: flags
+ currently only KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION is defined
+- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region
+- error: must be 0
+- unused: must be 0
+
+::
+
+ #define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION (1UL << 0)
+
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+ __u64 source_addr;
+ __u64 gpa;
+ __u64 nr_pages;
+ };
+
+
+KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM
+-------------------
+:Type: vm ioctl
+
+Complete measurement of the initial TD contents and mark it ready to run
+which corresponds to TDH.MR.FINALIZE
+
+- id: KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM
+- flags: must be 0
+- data: must be 0
+- error: must be 0
+- unused: must be 0
+
+KVM TDX creation flow
+=====================
+In addition to KVM normal flow, new TDX ioctls need to be called. The control flow
+looks like as follows.
+
+#. system wide capability check
+
+ * KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES: check if VM type is supported and if TDX_VM_TYPE is
+ supported.
+
+#. creating VM
+
+ * KVM_CREATE_VM
+ * KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES: query if TDX is supported on the platform.
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM: pass TDX specific VM parameters.
+
+#. creating VCPU
+
+ * KVM_CREATE_VCPU
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU: pass TDX specific VCPU parameters.
+
+#. initializing guest memory
+
+ * allocate guest memory and initialize page same to normal KVM case
+ In TDX case, parse and load TDVF into guest memory in addition.
+ * KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION to add and measure guest pages.
+ If the pages has contents above, those pages need to be added.
+ Otherwise the contents will be lost and guest sees zero pages.
+ * KVM_TDX_FINALIAZE_VM: Finalize VM and measurement
+ This must be after KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
+
+#. run vcpu
+
+Design discussion
+=================
+
+Coexistence of normal(VMX) VM and TD VM
+---------------------------------------
+It's required to allow both legacy(normal VMX) VMs and new TD VMs to
+coexist. Otherwise the benefits of VM flexibility would be eliminated.
+The main issue for it is that the logic of kvm_x86_ops callbacks for
+TDX is different from VMX. On the other hand, the variable,
+kvm_x86_ops, is global single variable. Not per-VM, not per-vcpu.
+
+Several points to be considered:
+
+ * No or minimal overhead when TDX is disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n).
+ * Avoid overhead of indirect call via function pointers.
+ * Contain the changes under arch/x86/kvm/vmx directory and share logic
+ with VMX for maintenance.
+ Even though the ways to operation on VM (VMX instruction vs TDX
+ SEAM call) is different, the basic idea remains same. So, many
+ logic can be shared.
+ * Future maintenance
+ The huge change of kvm_x86_ops in (near) future isn't expected.
+ a centralized file is acceptable.
+
+- Wrapping kvm x86_ops: The current choice
+
+ Introduce dedicated file for arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c (the name,
+ main.c, is just chosen to show main entry points for callbacks.) and
+ wrapper functions around all the callbacks with
+ "if (is-tdx) tdx-callback() else vmx-callback()".
+
+ Pros:
+
+ - No major change in common x86 KVM code. The change is (mostly)
+ contained under arch/x86/kvm/vmx/.
+ - When TDX is disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n), the overhead is
+ optimized out.
+ - Micro optimization by avoiding function pointer.
+
+ Cons:
+
+ - Many boiler plates in arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c.
+
+KVM MMU Changes
+---------------
+KVM MMU needs to be enhanced to handle Secure/Shared-EPT. The
+high-level execution flow is mostly same to normal EPT case.
+EPT violation/misconfiguration -> invoke TDP fault handler ->
+resolve TDP fault -> resume execution. (or emulate MMIO)
+The difference is, that S-EPT is operated(read/write) via TDX SEAM
+call which is expensive instead of direct read/write EPT entry.
+One bit of GPA (51 or 47 bit) is repurposed so that it means shared
+with host(if set to 1) or private to TD(if cleared to 0).
+
+- The current implementation
+
+ * Reuse the existing MMU code with minimal update. Because the
+ execution flow is mostly same. But additional operation, TDX call
+ for S-EPT, is needed. So add hooks for it to kvm_x86_ops.
+ * For performance, minimize TDX SEAM call to operate on S-EPT. When
+ getting corresponding S-EPT pages/entry from faulting GPA, don't
+ use TDX SEAM call to read S-EPT entry. Instead create shadow copy
+ in host memory.
+ Repurpose the existing kvm_mmu_page as shadow copy of S-EPT and
+ associate S-EPT to it.
+ * Treats share bit as attributes. mask/unmask the bit where
+ necessary to keep the existing traversing code works.
+ Introduce kvm.arch.gfn_shared_mask and use "if (gfn_share_mask)"
+ for special case.
+
+ * 0 : for non-TDX case
+ * 51 or 47 bit set for TDX case.
+
+ Pros:
+
+ - Large code reuse with minimal new hooks.
+ - Execution path is same.
+
+ Cons:
+
+ - Complicates the existing code.
+ - Repurpose kvm_mmu_page as shadow of Secure-EPT can be confusing.
+
+New KVM API, ioctl (sub)command, to manage TD VMs
+-------------------------------------------------
+Additional KVM API are needed to control TD VMs. The operations on TD
+VMs are specific to TDX.
+
+- Piggyback and repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+
+ Although not all operation isn't memory encryption, repupose to get
+ TDX specific ioctls.
+
+ Pros:
+
+ - No major change in common x86 KVM code.
+
+ Cons:
+
+ - The operations aren't actually memory encryption, but operations
+ on TD VMs.
+
+References
+==========
+
+.. [1] TDX specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
+.. [2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-whitepaper-final9-17.pdf
+.. [3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
+.. [4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 EAS
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-module-1eas.pdf
+.. [5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
+.. [6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface.pdf
+.. [7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
+ https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.
+.. [8] intel public github
+
+ * kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
+ * TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
+
+.. [9] tdvf
+ https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
+.. [10] KVM forum 2020: Intel Virtualization Technology Extensions to
+ Enable Hardware Isolated VMs
+ https://osseu2020.sched.com/event/eDzm/intel-virtualization-technology-extensions-to-enable-hardware-isolated-vms-sean-christopherson-intel
+.. [11] Linux Security Summit EU 2020:
+ Architectural Extensions for Hardware Virtual Machine Isolation
+ to Advance Confidential Computing in Public Clouds - Ravi Sahita
+ & Jun Nakajima, Intel Corporation
+ https://osseu2020.sched.com/event/eDOx/architectural-extensions-for-hardware-virtual-machine-isolation-to-advance-confidential-computing-in-public-clouds-ravi-sahita-jun-nakajima-intel-corporation
+.. [12] [RFCv2,00/16] KVM protected memory extension
+ https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/10/20/66
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:57:19

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 033/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

For TD guest, the current way to emulate MMIO doesn't work any more, as KVM
is not able to access the private memory of TD guest and do the emulation.
Instead, TD guest expects to receive #VE when it accesses the MMIO and then
it can explicitly makes hypercall to KVM to get the expected information.

To achieve this, the TDX module always enables "EPT-violation #VE" in the
VMCS control. And accordingly, KVM needs to configure the MMIO spte to
trigger EPT violation (instead of misconfiguration) and at the same time,
also clear the "suppress #VE" bit so the TD guest can get the #VE instead
of causing actual EPT violation to KVM.

In order for KVM to be able to have chance to set up the correct SPTE for
MMIO for TD guest, the default non-present SPTE must have the "suppress
guest accesses the MMIO. Also, when TD guest accesses the actual shared
memory, it should continue to trigger EPT violation to the KVM instead of
receiving the #VE (the TDX module guarantees KVM will receive EPT violation
for private memory access). This means for the shared memory, the SPTE
also must have the "suppress #VE" bit set for the non-present SPTE.

Add "suppress VE" bit (bit 63) to SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE and REMOVED_SPTE.
Unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit (which is bit 63) for both AMD
and Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit when present bit is off;
2) for normal VMX guest, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS
control and "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 8 ++++++++
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 498dc600bd5c..cdbf12c1a83c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
#define VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT (1ull << 6)
#define VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT (1ull << 8)
#define VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT (1ull << 9)
+#define VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT (1ull << 63)
#define VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK (VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK | \
VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK | \
VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 2e08b2a45361..0b97a045c5f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -419,7 +419,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
shadow_dirty_mask = has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull;
shadow_nx_mask = 0ull;
shadow_x_mask = VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
- shadow_present_mask = has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
+ /* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */
+ shadow_present_mask =
+ (has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT;
/*
* EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired
* memtype directly into the SPTEs. Note, this mask is just the mask
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 42ecaa75da15..7e0f79e8f45b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -148,7 +148,22 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);

#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)

+/*
+ * non-present SPTE value for both VMX and SVM for TDP MMU.
+ * For SVM NPT, for non-present spte (bit 0 = 0), other bits are ignored.
+ * For VMX EPT, bit 63 is ignored if #VE is disabled. (EPT_VIOLATION_VE=0)
+ * bit 63 is #VE suppress if #VE is enabled. (EPT_VIOLATION_VE=1)
+ * For TDX:
+ * Secure-EPT: TDX module sets EPT_VIOLATION_VE for Secure-EPT
+ * private EPT: "suppress #VE" bit is ignored. CPU doesn't walk it.
+ * conventional EPT: "suppress #VE" bit must be set to get EPT violation
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE BIT_ULL(63)
+static_assert(!(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
+#else
#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE 0ULL
+#endif

extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
@@ -189,13 +204,18 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
* non-present intermediate value. Other threads which encounter this value
* should not modify the SPTE.
*
+ * For X86_64 case, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, "suppress #VE" bit, is set because
+ * "EPT violation #VE" in the secondary VM execution control may be enabled.
+ * Because TDX module sets "EPT violation #VE" for TD, "suppress #VE" bit for
+ * the conventional EPT needs to be set.
+ *
* Use a semi-arbitrary value that doesn't set RWX bits, i.e. is not-present on
* bot AMD and Intel CPUs, and doesn't set PFN bits, i.e. doesn't create a L1TF
* vulnerability. Use only low bits to avoid 64-bit immediates.
*
* Only used by the TDP MMU.
*/
-#define REMOVED_SPTE 0x5a0ULL
+#define REMOVED_SPTE (SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE | 0x5a0ULL)

/* Removed SPTEs must not be misconstrued as shadow present PTEs. */
static_assert(!(REMOVED_SPTE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 38bc4c2f0f1f..1eee9c159958 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -693,6 +693,14 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
* overwrite the special removed SPTE value. No bookkeeping is needed
* here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present. Use
* the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits.
+ *
+ * Set non-present value to SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, rather than 0.
+ * It is because when TDX is enabled, TDX module always
+ * enables "EPT-violation #VE", so KVM needs to set
+ * "suppress #VE" bit in EPT table entries, in order to get
+ * real EPT violation, rather than TDVMCALL. KVM sets
+ * SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE (which sets "suppress #VE" bit) so it
+ * can be set when EPT table entries are zapped.
*/
__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:57:52

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 051/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow dirty logging for x86 TDX

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX doesn't support dirty logging. Report dirty logging isn't supported so
that device model, for example qemu, can properly handle it.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +++++
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 +
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 10 +++++++++-
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index ba4a9ce0ee80..24d9bfd4c582 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -13862,6 +13862,11 @@ int kvm_sev_es_string_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_sev_es_string_io);

+bool kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
+}
+
bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index b658803ea2c7..a0b64308d240 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -1477,6 +1477,7 @@ int kvm_arch_drop_vm(int usage_count);
void kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
int kvm_arch_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm);
bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm);
+bool kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(struct kvm *kvm);

#ifndef __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_VM_ALLOC
/*
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 8c996f40b544..9f82b03a8118 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1869,10 +1869,18 @@ bool __weak kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
return false;
}

+bool __weak kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_user_mem_region *mem)
{
- u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
+ u32 valid_flags = 0;
+
+ if (kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm))
+ valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;

#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
if (kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm))
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:58:30

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 080/108] KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

As TDX will use posted_interrupt.c, the use of struct vcpu_vmx is a
blocker. Because the members of struct pi_desc pi_desc and struct
list_head pi_wakeup_list are only used in posted_interrupt.c, introduce
common structure, struct vcpu_pi, make vcpu_vmx and vcpu_tdx has same
layout in the top of structure.

To minimize the diff size, avoid code conversion like,
vmx->pi_desc => vmx->common->pi_desc. Instead add compile time check
if the layout is expected.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 11 +++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 8 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 14 +++++++-----
5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
index 1b56c5e5c9fb..62caf74753bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include "posted_intr.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "vmx.h"
+#include "tdx.h"

/*
* Maintain a per-CPU list of vCPUs that need to be awakened by wakeup_handler()
@@ -29,9 +30,29 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu);
*/
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(raw_spinlock_t, wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock);

+/*
+ * The layout of the head of struct vcpu_vmx and struct vcpu_tdx must match with
+ * struct vcpu_pi.
+ */
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_pi, pi_desc) ==
+ offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, pi_desc));
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_pi, pi_wakeup_list) ==
+ offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, pi_wakeup_list));
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_pi, pi_desc) ==
+ offsetof(struct vcpu_tdx, pi_desc));
+static_assert(offsetof(struct vcpu_pi, pi_wakeup_list) ==
+ offsetof(struct vcpu_tdx, pi_wakeup_list));
+#endif
+
+static inline struct vcpu_pi *vcpu_to_pi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return (struct vcpu_pi *)vcpu;
+}
+
static inline struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- return &(to_vmx(vcpu)->pi_desc);
+ return &vcpu_to_pi(vcpu)->pi_desc;
}

static int pi_try_set_control(struct pi_desc *pi_desc, u64 *pold, u64 new)
@@ -50,8 +71,8 @@ static int pi_try_set_control(struct pi_desc *pi_desc, u64 *pold, u64 new)

void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
- struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_pi *vcpu_pi = vcpu_to_pi(vcpu);
+ struct pi_desc *pi_desc = &vcpu_pi->pi_desc;
struct pi_desc old, new;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int dest;
@@ -88,7 +109,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
*/
if (pi_desc->nv == POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR) {
raw_spin_lock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
- list_del(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list);
+ list_del(&vcpu_pi->pi_wakeup_list);
raw_spin_unlock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
}

@@ -143,15 +164,15 @@ static bool vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(struct kvm *kvm)
*/
static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_pi *vcpu_pi = vcpu_to_pi(vcpu);
+ struct pi_desc *pi_desc = &vcpu_pi->pi_desc;
struct pi_desc old, new;
unsigned long flags;

local_irq_save(flags);

raw_spin_lock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
- list_add_tail(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list,
+ list_add_tail(&vcpu_pi->pi_wakeup_list,
&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu, vcpu->cpu));
raw_spin_unlock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));

@@ -188,7 +209,8 @@ static bool vmx_needs_pi_wakeup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* notification vector is switched to the one that calls
* back to the pi_wakeup_handler() function.
*/
- return vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu) || vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm);
+ return (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu) && !is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) ||
+ vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm);
}

void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -198,7 +220,8 @@ void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!vmx_needs_pi_wakeup(vcpu))
return;

- if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
+ if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) &&
+ (is_td_vcpu(vcpu) || !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu)))
pi_enable_wakeup_handler(vcpu);

/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
index 26992076552e..2fe8222308b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
@@ -94,6 +94,17 @@ static inline bool pi_test_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
}

+struct vcpu_pi {
+ struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+
+ /* Posted interrupt descriptor */
+ struct pi_desc pi_desc;
+
+ /* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
+ struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
+ /* Until here common layout betwwn vcpu_vmx and vcpu_tdx. */
+};
+
void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void pi_wakeup_handler(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 19a9263e5788..8d0eb1d405d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected = true;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tdx->pi_wakeup_list);

vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index c02073102a5f..64e9b864e20e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST

+#include "posted_intr.h"
#include "pmu_intel.h"
#include "tdx_ops.h"

@@ -65,6 +66,13 @@ union tdx_exit_reason {
struct vcpu_tdx {
struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;

+ /* Posted interrupt descriptor */
+ struct pi_desc pi_desc;
+
+ /* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
+ struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
+ /* Until here same layout to struct vcpu_pi. */
+
struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 1813caeb24d8..0a7ab0a7d604 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -245,6 +245,14 @@ struct nested_vmx {

struct vcpu_vmx {
struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+
+ /* Posted interrupt descriptor */
+ struct pi_desc pi_desc;
+
+ /* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
+ struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
+ /* Until here same layout to struct vcpu_pi. */
+
u8 fail;
u8 x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode;

@@ -314,12 +322,6 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {

union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason;

- /* Posted interrupt descriptor */
- struct pi_desc pi_desc;
-
- /* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
- struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
-
/* Support for a guest hypervisor (nested VMX) */
struct nested_vmx nested;

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:59:01

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 062/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX Guest-Hypervisor communication interface(GHCI) specification
defines MapGPA hypercall for guest TD to request the host VMM to map given
GPA range as private or shared.

It means the guest TD uses the GPA as shared (or private). The GPA
won't be used as private (or shared). VMM should enforce GPA usage. VMM
doesn't have to map the GPA on the hypercall request.

- Zap the aliased region.
If shared (or private) GPA is requested, zap private (or shared) GPA
(modulo shared bit).
- Record the request GPA is shared (or private) by kvm.mem_attr_array.
- Don't map GPA. The GPA is mapped on the next EPT violation.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 5 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 3 ++
4 files changed, 103 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index e2a0dfbee56d..e1641fa5a862 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -219,6 +219,11 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end);

int kvm_arch_write_log_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

+int __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
+ bool map_private);
+int kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
+ bool map_private);
+
int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 168c84c99de3..37b378bf60df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -6778,6 +6778,66 @@ void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen)
}
}

+int __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
+ bool map_private)
+{
+ gfn_t start = *startp;
+ int attr;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ attr = map_private ? KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE : KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED;
+ start = start & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+ end = end & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+
+ /*
+ * To make the following kvm_vm_set_mem_attr() success within spinlock
+ * without memory allocation.
+ */
+ ret = kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(kvm, start, end);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
+ gfn_t s = start;
+
+ ret = kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(kvm, &s, end, map_private);
+ if (!ret) {
+ KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, end), kvm);
+ } else if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
+ KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, s), kvm);
+ start = s;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+ write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+ if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
+ if (map_private)
+ *startp = kvm_gfn_private(kvm, start);
+ else
+ *startp = kvm_gfn_shared(kvm, start);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_mmu_map_gpa);
+
+int kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
+ bool map_private)
+{
+ struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+
+ if (!VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa) || !VALID_PAGE(mmu->private_root_hpa))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(vcpu->kvm, startp, end, map_private);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_map_gpa);
+
static unsigned long
mmu_shrink_scan(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 4b207ce83ffe..d3bab382ceaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -2156,6 +2156,41 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
return spte_set;
}

+int kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm,
+ gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end, bool map_private)
+{
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+ gfn_t start = *startp;
+ bool flush = false;
+ int i;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ KVM_BUG_ON(start & kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm), kvm);
+ KVM_BUG_ON(end & kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm), kvm);
+
+ kvm_mmu_invalidate_begin(kvm, start, end);
+ for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
+ for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, i) {
+ if (is_private_sp(root) == map_private)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: If necessary, return to the caller with -EAGAIN
+ * instead of yield-and-resume within
+ * tdp_mmu_zap_leafs().
+ */
+ flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, start, end,
+ /*can_yield=*/true, flush,
+ /*zap_private=*/is_private_sp(root));
+ }
+ }
+ if (flush)
+ kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_address(kvm, start, end - start);
+ kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm, start, end);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Return the level of the lowest level SPTE added to sptes.
* That SPTE may be non-present.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
index 695175c921a5..cb13bc1c3679 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
int target_level, bool shared);

+int kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm,
+ gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end, bool map_private);
+
static inline void kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_begin(void)
{
rcu_read_lock();
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 06:59:45

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 045/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

For private GPA, CPU refers a private page table whose contents are
encrypted. The dedicated APIs to operate on it (e.g. updating/reading its
PTE entry) are used and their cost is expensive.

When KVM resolves KVM page fault, it walks the page tables. To reuse the
existing KVM MMU code and mitigate the heavy cost to directly walk
protected (encrypted) page table, allocate one more page to copy the
protected page table for KVM MMU code to directly walk. Resolve KVM page
fault with the existing code, and do additional operations necessary for
the protected page table. To distinguish such cases, the existing KVM page
table is called a shared page table (i.e. not associated with protected
page table), and the page table with protected page table is called a
private page table. The relationship is depicted below.

Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page for protected page table and
add helper functions to allocate/initialize/free a protected page table
page.

KVM page fault |
| |
V |
-------------+---------- |
| | |
V V |
shared GPA private GPA |
| | |
V V |
shared PT root private PT root | protected PT root
| | | |
V V | V
shared PT private PT ----propagate----> protected PT
| | | |
| \-----------------+------\ |
| | | |
V | V V
shared guest page | private guest page
|
non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
|
PT: page table
- Shared PT is visible to KVM and it is used by CPU.
- Protected PT is used by CPU but it is invisible to KVM.
- Private PT is visible to KVM but not used by CPU. It is used to
propagate PT change to the actual protected PT which is used by CPU.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 7 +++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 8 +++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index ee01add57a6b..381df2c8136d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -754,6 +754,13 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_shadow_page_cache;
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_shadowed_info_cache;
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_page_header_cache;
+ /*
+ * This cache is to allocate private page table. E.g. Secure-EPT used
+ * by the TDX module. Because the TDX module doesn't trust VMM and
+ * initializes the pages itself, KVM doesn't initialize them. Allocate
+ * pages with garbage and give them to the TDX module.
+ */
+ struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_private_spt_cache;

/*
* QEMU userspace and the guest each have their own FPU state.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 0001e921154e..faf69774c7ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -653,6 +653,13 @@ static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc = &vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache;
int start, end, i, r;

+ if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache,
+ PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ }
+
start = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(mc, PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);

@@ -702,6 +709,7 @@ static void mmu_free_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache);
kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache);
kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadowed_info_cache);
+ kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache);
kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache);
}

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index b0c4a78404b2..4c013124534b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -87,7 +87,23 @@ struct kvm_mmu_page {
int root_count;
refcount_t tdp_mmu_root_count;
};
- unsigned int unsync_children;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ unsigned int unsync_children;
+ /*
+ * Number of writes since the last time traversal
+ * visited this page.
+ */
+ atomic_t write_flooding_count;
+ };
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+ /*
+ * Associated private shadow page table, e.g. Secure-EPT page
+ * passed to the TDX module.
+ */
+ void *private_spt;
+#endif
+ };
union {
struct kvm_rmap_head parent_ptes; /* rmap pointers to parent sptes */
tdp_ptep_t ptep;
@@ -109,9 +125,6 @@ struct kvm_mmu_page {
int clear_spte_count;
#endif

- /* Number of writes since the last time traversal visited this page. */
- atomic_t write_flooding_count;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Used for freeing the page asynchronously if it is a TDP MMU page. */
struct rcu_head rcu_head;
@@ -153,6 +166,75 @@ static inline bool is_private_sptep(u64 *sptep)
return is_private_sp(sptep_to_sp(sptep));
}

+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+static inline void *kvm_mmu_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+ return sp->private_spt;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_init_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, void *private_spt)
+{
+ sp->private_spt = private_spt;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *private_spt_cache,
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+ /*
+ * vcpu == NULL means non-root SPT:
+ * vcpu == NULL is used to split a large SPT into smaller SPT. Root SPT
+ * is not a large SPT.
+ */
+ bool is_root = vcpu &&
+ vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root_role.level == sp->role.level;
+
+ if (vcpu)
+ private_spt_cache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache;
+ KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(sp->role), vcpu->kvm);
+ if (is_root)
+ /*
+ * Because TDX module assigns root Secure-EPT page and set it to
+ * Secure-EPTP when TD vcpu is created, secure page table for
+ * root isn't needed.
+ */
+ sp->private_spt = NULL;
+ else {
+ sp->private_spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(private_spt_cache);
+ /*
+ * Because mmu_private_spt_cache is topped up before staring kvm
+ * page fault resolving, the allocation above shouldn't fail.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->private_spt);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+ if (sp->private_spt)
+ free_page((unsigned long)sp->private_spt);
+}
+#else
+static inline void *kvm_mmu_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_init_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, void *private_spt)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *private_spt_cache,
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 1bf58288ea79..b2f56110d62d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm)

static void tdp_mmu_free_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
+ kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(sp);
free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
kmem_cache_free(mmu_page_header_cache, sp);
}
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:03:31

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 050/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TDX EPT
violation.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index d5cace00c433..c3e675bea802 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ Patch Layer status
* TDX architectural definitions: Applied
* TD VM creation/destruction: Applied
* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applied
-* TDX EPT violation: Not yet
+* TDX EPT violation: Applying
* TD finalization: Not yet
* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet

* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied
* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applied
-* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Applying
+* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Applied
* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:12:11

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 024/108] KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The next step of TDX guest creation is to create vcpu. Allocate TDX vcpu
structures, initialize it. Allocate pages of TDX vcpu for the TDX module.

In the case of the conventional case, cpuid is empty at the initialization.
and cpuid is configured after the vcpu initialization. Because TDX
supports only X2APIC mode, cpuid is forcibly initialized to support X2APIC
on the vcpu initialization.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 40 +++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 8 +++
3 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index b4e4c6c677f6..c125b2e3e8b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -63,6 +63,38 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
}

+static int vt_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_precreate(kvm);
+}
+
+static int vt_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
+}
+
static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -89,10 +121,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
.vm_free = vt_vm_free,

- .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
- .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
- .vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
- .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
+ .vcpu_precreate = vt_vcpu_precreate,
+ .vcpu_create = vt_vcpu_create,
+ .vcpu_free = vt_vcpu_free,
+ .vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset,

.prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
.vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 54045e0576e7..0625c354b341 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
}

+static inline bool is_td_vcpu_created(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
+{
+ return tdx->tdvpr.added;
+}
+
static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
{
return kvm_tdx->tdr.added;
@@ -296,6 +301,139 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
return 0;
}

+int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ int ret, i;
+
+ /* TDX only supports x2APIC, which requires an in-kernel local APIC. */
+ if (!vcpu->arch.apic)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
+
+ ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ tdx->tdvpx = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages, sizeof(*tdx->tdvpx),
+ GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!tdx->tdvpx) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_tdvpr;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_tdvpx;
+ }
+
+ vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
+
+ vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
+ vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
+
+ vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->tsc_offset;
+ vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
+ vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
+ !(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG);
+
+ return 0;
+
+free_tdvpx:
+ /* @i points at the TDVPX page that failed allocation. */
+ for (--i; i >= 0; i--)
+ free_page(tdx->tdvpx[i].va);
+ kfree(tdx->tdvpx);
+ tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
+free_tdvpr:
+ free_page(tdx->tdvpr.va);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ int i;
+
+ /* Can't reclaim or free pages if teardown failed. */
+ if (is_hkid_assigned(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)))
+ return;
+
+ if (tdx->tdvpx) {
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++)
+ tdx_reclaim_td_page(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
+ kfree(tdx->tdvpx);
+ tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
+ }
+ tdx_reclaim_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
+}
+
+void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
+ u64 err;
+ int i;
+
+ /* TDX doesn't support INIT event. */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(init_event))
+ goto td_bugged;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu_created(tdx)))
+ goto td_bugged;
+
+ err = tdh_vp_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, tdx->tdvpr.pa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_CREATE, err, NULL);
+ goto td_bugged;
+ }
+ tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpr);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ err = tdh_vp_addcx(tdx->tdvpr.pa, tdx->tdvpx[i].pa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_ADDCX, err, NULL);
+ goto td_bugged;
+ }
+ tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (!vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries) {
+ /*
+ * On cpu creation, cpuid entry is blank. Forcibly enable
+ * X2APIC feature to allow X2APIC.
+ */
+ struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e;
+
+ e = kvmalloc_array(1, sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ *e = (struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) {
+ .function = 1, /* Features for X2APIC */
+ .index = 0,
+ .eax = 0,
+ .ebx = 0,
+ .ecx = 1ULL << 21, /* X2APIC */
+ .edx = 0,
+ };
+ vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries = e;
+ vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent = 1;
+ }
+ apic_base_msr.data = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC;
+ if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
+ apic_base_msr.data |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
+ apic_base_msr.host_initiated = true;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, &apic_base_msr)))
+ goto td_bugged;
+
+ vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+
+ return;
+
+td_bugged:
+ vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
+}
+
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 93ffe2deb8e8..f6841c3dd12d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -141,6 +141,10 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);

+int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
+
int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
#else
static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
@@ -154,6 +158,10 @@ static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) {}
static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}

+static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
+
static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
#endif

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:15:02

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 019/108] KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add a place holder function for TDX specific VM-scoped ioctl as mem_enc_op.
TDX specific sub-commands will be added to retrieve/pass TDX specific
parameters.

KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP was introduced for VM-scoped operations specific for
guest state-protected VM. It defined subcommands for technology-specific
operations under KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. Despite its name, the subcommands
are not limited to memory encryption, but various technology-specific
operations are defined. It's natural to repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
for TDX specific operations and define subcommands.

TDX requires VM-scoped TDX-specific operations for device model, for
example, qemu. Getting system-wide parameters, TDX-specific VM
initialization.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 +++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index aedba5acb8eb..b4e4c6c677f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
}

+static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+ if (!is_td(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ return tdx_vm_ioctl(kvm, argp);
+}
+
struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = "kvm_intel",

@@ -205,6 +213,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,

.dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl,
+ .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,
};

struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 5a3ed8217a54..d77709a6da51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -477,6 +477,32 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
return 0;
}

+int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;
+ int r;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&tdx_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (tdx_cmd.error || tdx_cmd.unused)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ switch (tdx_cmd.id) {
+ default:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(argp, &tdx_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cmd)))
+ r = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+ return r;
+}
+
static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
{
const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 057f2be3d818..93ffe2deb8e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp);
int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
#else
static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) {}
static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}
+
+static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
#endif

#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:15:02

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 053/108] KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

The difference of TDX EPT violation is how to retrieve information, GPA,
and exit qualification. To share the code to handle EPT violation, split
out the guts of EPT violation handler so that VMX/TDX exit handler can call
it after retrieving GPA and exit qualification.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 25 +++----------------------
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..235908f3e044
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "mmu.h"
+
+static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+ unsigned long exit_qualification)
+{
+ u64 error_code;
+
+ /* Is it a read fault? */
+ error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
+ ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+ /* Is it a write fault? */
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
+ ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
+ /* Is it a fetch fault? */
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
+ ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
+ /* ept page table entry is present? */
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK)
+ ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) != 0 ?
+ PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+
+ return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index dd3fde9d3c32..2ff7af959e30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <asm/vmx.h>

#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "common.h"
#include "cpuid.h"
#include "evmcs.h"
#include "hyperv.h"
@@ -5702,11 +5703,8 @@ static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
+ unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
gpa_t gpa;
- u64 error_code;
-
- exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);

/*
* EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI,
@@ -5721,23 +5719,6 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
-
- /* Is it a read fault? */
- error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
- ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
- /* Is it a write fault? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
- ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
- /* Is it a fetch fault? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
- ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
- /* ept page table entry is present? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK)
- ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
-
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) != 0 ?
- PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
-
vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;

/*
@@ -5751,7 +5732,7 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (unlikely(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, gpa)))
return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);

- return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+ return __vmx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
}

static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:15:12

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX will use a different shadow PTE entry value for MMIO from VMX. Add
members to kvm_arch and track value for MMIO per-VM instead of global
variables. By using the per-VM EPT entry value for MMIO, the existing VMX
logic is kept working. To untangle the logic to initialize
shadow_mmio_access_mask, introduce a separate setter function.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 7 ++++---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 11 +++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +++---
6 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 3374ec0d6d90..a1c801ca61d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1171,6 +1171,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {
*/
spinlock_t mmu_unsync_pages_lock;

+ u64 shadow_mmio_value;
+
struct list_head assigned_dev_head;
struct iommu_domain *iommu_domain;
bool iommu_noncoherent;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index a45f7a96b821..50d240d52697 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static inline u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)
}

void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask);
+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value);
void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask);
void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only);

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index e7e11f51f8b4..0d3fa29ccccc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -2421,7 +2421,7 @@ static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
return kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, child,
invalid_list);
}
- } else if (is_mmio_spte(pte)) {
+ } else if (is_mmio_spte(kvm, pte)) {
mmu_spte_clear_no_track(spte);
}
return 0;
@@ -4081,7 +4081,7 @@ static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)
if (WARN_ON(reserved))
return -EINVAL;

- if (is_mmio_spte(spte)) {
+ if (is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, spte)) {
gfn_t gfn = get_mmio_spte_gfn(spte);
unsigned int access = get_mmio_spte_access(spte);

@@ -4578,7 +4578,7 @@ static unsigned long get_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static bool sync_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn,
unsigned int access)
{
- if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(*sptep))) {
+ if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, *sptep))) {
if (gfn != get_mmio_spte_gfn(*sptep)) {
mmu_spte_clear_no_track(sptep);
return true;
@@ -6061,6 +6061,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node = &kvm->arch.mmu_sp_tracker;
int r;

+ kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = shadow_mmio_value;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 5d5c06d4fd89..8f468ee2b985 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;

- WARN_ON_ONCE(!shadow_mmio_value);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value);

access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
- spte |= shadow_mmio_value | access;
+ spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access;
spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask)
<< SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte)
void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
{
BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask);
+
WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);

/*
@@ -401,6 +402,12 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);

+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value)
+{
+ kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value);
+
void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask)
{
/* shadow_me_value must be a subset of shadow_me_mask */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 7e0f79e8f45b..82f0d5c08b77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -241,9 +241,9 @@ static inline int spte_index(u64 *sptep)
*/
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;

-static inline bool is_mmio_spte(u64 spte)
+static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
{
- return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == shadow_mmio_value &&
+ return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
likely(enable_mmio_caching);
}

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 1eee9c159958..e07f14351d14 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -580,8 +580,8 @@ static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
* impact the guest since both the former and current SPTEs
* are nonpresent.
*/
- if (WARN_ON(!is_mmio_spte(old_spte) &&
- !is_mmio_spte(new_spte) &&
+ if (WARN_ON(!is_mmio_spte(kvm, old_spte) &&
+ !is_mmio_spte(kvm, new_spte) &&
!is_removed_spte(new_spte)))
pr_err("Unexpected SPTE change! Nonpresent SPTEs\n"
"should not be replaced with another,\n"
@@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}

/* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */
- if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(new_spte))) {
+ if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, new_spte))) {
vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;
trace_mark_mmio_spte(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep), iter->gfn,
new_spte);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:15:38

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 041/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Factor out non-leaf SPTE population logic from kvm_tdp_mmu_map(). MapGPA
hypercall needs to populate non-leaf SPTE to record which GPA, private or
shared, is allowed in the leaf EPT entry.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 3325633b1cb5..11b0ec8aebe2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -1157,6 +1157,24 @@ static int tdp_mmu_link_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
return 0;
}

+static int tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+ bool account_nx)
+{
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+ int ret;
+
+ KVM_BUG_ON(is_shadow_present_pte(iter->old_spte), vcpu->kvm);
+ KVM_BUG_ON(is_removed_spte(iter->old_spte), vcpu->kvm);
+
+ sp = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu);
+ tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(sp, iter);
+
+ ret = tdp_mmu_link_sp(vcpu->kvm, iter, sp, account_nx, true);
+ if (ret)
+ tdp_mmu_free_sp(sp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Handle a TDP page fault (NPT/EPT violation/misconfiguration) by installing
* page tables and SPTEs to translate the faulting guest physical address.
@@ -1165,7 +1183,6 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
struct tdp_iter iter;
- struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
int ret;

kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, fault);
@@ -1211,13 +1228,8 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
if (is_removed_spte(iter.old_spte))
break;

- sp = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu);
- tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(sp, &iter);
-
- if (tdp_mmu_link_sp(vcpu->kvm, &iter, sp, account_nx, true)) {
- tdp_mmu_free_sp(sp);
+ if (tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf(vcpu, &iter, account_nx))
break;
- }
}
}

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:15:52

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 017/108] KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

In order to reclaim TDX host key id, (i.e. when deleting guest TD), needs
to call TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.WBINVD on all packages. If we have used TDX host
key id, refuse to offline the last online cpu.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 27 ++++++++++++--------
6 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 3a29a6b31ee8..0ceb8e58a6c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ BUILD_BUG_ON(1)
KVM_X86_OP(hardware_enable)
KVM_X86_OP(hardware_disable)
KVM_X86_OP(hardware_unsetup)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(offline_cpu)
KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 2870155ce6fb..50b39d0071ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1466,6 +1466,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*hardware_enable)(void);
void (*hardware_disable)(void);
void (*hardware_unsetup)(void);
+ int (*offline_cpu)(void);
bool (*has_emulated_msr)(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index);
void (*vcpu_after_set_cpuid)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index d01a946a18cf..0918d1e6d2f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = "kvm_intel",

.hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup,
+ .offline_cpu = tdx_offline_cpu,
.check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility,

.hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index ec88dde0d300..64229c3b3c5a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock);
static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock;
+static atomic_t nr_configured_hkid;

static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
{
@@ -222,7 +223,8 @@ void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
pr_err("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n",
kvm_tdx->hkid);
return;
- }
+ } else
+ atomic_dec(&nr_configured_hkid);

free_hkid:
tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
@@ -371,6 +373,8 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
if (ret)
break;
}
+ if (!ret)
+ atomic_inc(&nr_configured_hkid);
cpus_read_unlock();
free_cpumask_var(packages);
if (ret)
@@ -514,3 +518,37 @@ void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void)
/* kfree accepts NULL. */
kfree(tdx_mng_key_config_lock);
}
+
+int tdx_offline_cpu(void)
+{
+ int curr_cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ cpumask_var_t packages;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!atomic_read(&nr_configured_hkid))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * To reclaim hkid, need to call TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.WBINVD on all packages.
+ * If this is the last online cpu on the package, refuse offline.
+ */
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(i) {
+ if (i != curr_cpu)
+ cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
+ }
+ if (!cpumask_test_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(curr_cpu), packages))
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ free_cpumask_var(packages);
+ if (ret)
+ /*
+ * Because it's hard for human operator to understand the
+ * reason, warn it.
+ */
+ pr_warn("TDX requires all packages to have an online CPU. "
+ "Delete all TDs in order to offline all CPUs of a package.\n");
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 95da978c9aa9..b2cb5786830a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
+int tdx_offline_cpu(void);

int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -142,6 +143,7 @@ void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
+static inline int tdx_offline_cpu(void) { return 0; }

static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 4b22196cb12c..25c30c8c2d9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12337,16 +12337,23 @@ int kvm_arch_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu, int usage_count)

int kvm_arch_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu, int usage_count)
{
- if (usage_count) {
- /*
- * arch callback kvm_arch_hardware_disable() assumes that
- * preemption is disabled for historical reason. Disable
- * preemption until all arch callbacks are fixed.
- */
- preempt_disable();
- hardware_disable(NULL);
- preempt_enable();
- }
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!usage_count)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = static_call(kvm_x86_offline_cpu)();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * arch callback kvm_arch_hardware_disable() assumes that preemption is
+ * disabled for historical reason. Disable preemption until all arch
+ * callbacks are fixed.
+ */
+ preempt_disable();
+ hardware_disable(NULL);
+ preempt_enable();
return 0;
}

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:16:28

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 071/108] KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr

From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>

Several MSRs are constant and only used in userspace(ring 3). But VMs may
have different values. KVM uses kvm_set_user_return_msr() to switch to
guest's values and leverages user return notifier to restore them when the
kernel is to return to userspace. To eliminate unnecessary wrmsr, KVM also
caches the value it wrote to an MSR last time.

TDX module unconditionally resets some of these MSRs to architectural INIT
state on TD exit. It makes the cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs are
inconsistent with values in hardware. This inconsistency needs to be
fixed. Otherwise, it may mislead kvm_on_user_return() to skip restoring
some MSRs to the host's values. kvm_set_user_return_msr() can help correct
this case, but it is not optimal as it always does a wrmsr. So, introduce
a variation of kvm_set_user_return_msr() to update cached values and skip
that wrmsr.

Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b225cdfac4bc..fdb00d96e954 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2082,6 +2082,7 @@ int kvm_add_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
int kvm_find_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(void);
int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
+void kvm_user_return_update_cache(unsigned int index, u64 val);

static inline bool kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 65541bfebb37..4d4b71c4cdb1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -440,6 +440,15 @@ void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(void)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu);

+static void kvm_user_return_register_notifier(struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs)
+{
+ if (!msrs->registered) {
+ msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
+ user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
+ msrs->registered = true;
+ }
+}
+
int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
{
struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
@@ -455,15 +464,22 @@ int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
return 1;

msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
- if (!msrs->registered) {
- msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
- user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
- msrs->registered = true;
- }
+ kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_user_return_msr);

+/* Update the cache, "curr", and register the notifier */
+void kvm_user_return_update_cache(unsigned int slot, u64 value)
+{
+ struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!msrs->initialized);
+ msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
+ kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_user_return_update_cache);
+
static void drop_user_return_notifiers(void)
{
struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:16:29

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 093/108] KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX Guest-Host communication interface (GHCI) specification defines
the ABI for the guest TD to issue hypercall. It reserves vendor specific
arguments for VMM specific use. Use it as KVM hypercall and handle it.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 65d9b88f1d50..f6477d577001 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -782,8 +782,39 @@ static int tdx_handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}

+static int tdx_emulate_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;
+
+ /*
+ * ABI for KVM tdvmcall argument:
+ * In Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface(GHCI) specification,
+ * Non-zero leaf number (R10 != 0) is defined to indicate
+ * vendor-specific. KVM uses this for KVM hypercall. NOTE: KVM
+ * hypercall number starts from one. Zero isn't used for KVM hypercall
+ * number.
+ *
+ * R10: KVM hypercall number
+ * arguments: R11, R12, R13, R14.
+ */
+ nr = kvm_r10_read(vcpu);
+ a0 = kvm_r11_read(vcpu);
+ a1 = kvm_r12_read(vcpu);
+ a2 = kvm_r13_read(vcpu);
+ a3 = kvm_r14_read(vcpu);
+
+ ret = __kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu, nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, true);
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, ret);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
+ return tdx_emulate_vmcall(vcpu);
+
switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
default:
break;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:17:27

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 087/108] KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up handle_exit and handle_exit_irqoff methods and add a place holder
to handle VM exit. Add helper functions to get exit info, exit
qualification, etc.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 33 +++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 10 +++++
3 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 510bffb3e2f6..74c561e3eb46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -178,6 +178,23 @@ static bool vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu);
}

+static int vt_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_handle_exit(vcpu, fastpath);
+
+ return vmx_handle_exit(vcpu, fastpath);
+}
+
+static void vt_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(vcpu);
+
+ vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -379,6 +396,16 @@ static void vt_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_request_immediate_exit(vcpu);
}

+static void vt_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_get_exit_info(vcpu, reason, info1, info2, intr_info,
+ error_code);
+
+ return vmx_get_exit_info(vcpu, reason, info1, info2, intr_info, error_code);
+}
+
static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -455,7 +482,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {

.vcpu_pre_run = vt_vcpu_pre_run,
.vcpu_run = vt_vcpu_run,
- .handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
+ .handle_exit = vt_handle_exit,
.skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
.set_interrupt_shadow = vt_set_interrupt_shadow,
@@ -490,7 +517,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
.get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,

- .get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
+ .get_exit_info = vt_get_exit_info,

.vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,

@@ -504,7 +531,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.load_mmu_pgd = vt_load_mmu_pgd,

.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
- .handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
+ .handle_exit_irqoff = vt_handle_exit_irqoff,

.request_immediate_exit = vt_request_immediate_exit,

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 9805308079f1..b0b193cc180e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -65,6 +65,26 @@ static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
}

+static __always_inline unsigned long tdexit_exit_qual(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long tdexit_ext_exit_qual(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long tdexit_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_r8_read(vcpu);
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long tdexit_intr_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_r9_read(vcpu);
+}
+
static inline bool is_td_vcpu_created(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
{
return tdx->tdvpr.added;
@@ -683,6 +703,25 @@ void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
td_management_write8(to_tdx(vcpu), TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI, 1);
}

+void tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ u16 exit_reason = tdx->exit_reason.basic;
+
+ if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
+ vmx_handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, tdexit_intr_info(vcpu));
+ else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+ vmx_handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu,
+ tdexit_intr_info(vcpu));
+}
+
+static int tdx_handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
+ vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
{
td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
@@ -1007,6 +1046,51 @@ void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
__vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &tdx->pi_desc, vector);
}

+int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
+{
+ union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_tdx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
+
+ if (unlikely(exit_reason.non_recoverable || exit_reason.error)) {
+ if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT)
+ return tdx_handle_triple_fault(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_pr_unimpl("TD exit 0x%llx, %d hkid 0x%x hkid pa 0x%llx\n",
+ exit_reason.full, exit_reason.basic,
+ to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->hkid,
+ set_hkid_to_hpa(0, to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->hkid));
+ goto unhandled_exit;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE);
+
+ switch (exit_reason.basic) {
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+unhandled_exit:
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
+ vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
+ vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason.full;
+ vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ *reason = tdx->exit_reason.full;
+
+ *info1 = tdexit_exit_qual(vcpu);
+ *info2 = tdexit_ext_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+ *intr_info = tdexit_intr_info(vcpu);
+ *error_code = 0;
+}
+
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index ba4e51446e41..d02619f64b6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -153,10 +153,15 @@ void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath);

void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
int trig_mode, int vector);
void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+ u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -186,10 +191,15 @@ static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
static inline bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
+static inline void tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath) { return 0; }

static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
int trig_mode, int vector) {}
static inline void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason, u64 *info1,
+ u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code) {}

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:17:34

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 020/108] KVM: Support KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS for KVM_ENABLE_CAP

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX attestation includes the maximum number of vcpu that the guest can
accommodate. For that, the maximum number of vcpu needs to be specified
instead of constant, KVM_MAX_VCPUS. Make KVM_ENABLE_CAP support
KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS.

Suggested-by: Sagi Shahar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index b9c270f97c88..3b05a3396f89 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -4967,6 +4967,27 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap_generic(struct kvm *kvm,
case KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING:
case KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL:
return kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_dirty_log_ring(kvm, cap->args[0]);
+ case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS: {
+ int r;
+
+ if (cap->flags || cap->args[0] == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (cap->args[0] > kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(kvm, KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS))
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+ /* Only decreasing is allowed. */
+ if (cap->args[0] > kvm->max_vcpus)
+ r = -E2BIG;
+ else if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+ r = -EBUSY;
+ else {
+ kvm->max_vcpus = cap->args[0];
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+ return r;
+ }
default:
return kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(kvm, cap);
}
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:17:59

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 026/108] KVM: TDX: Use private memory for TDX

From: Chao Peng <[email protected]>

Override kvm_arch_has_private_mem() to use fd-based private memory.
Return true when a VM has a type of KVM_X86_TDX_VM.

Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index a811d643f71c..ba4a9ce0ee80 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -13862,6 +13862,11 @@ int kvm_sev_es_string_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_sev_es_string_io);

+bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
+}
+
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_entry);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:18:03

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 042/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Refactor tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() and tdp_mmu_init_sp and eliminate
tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(). Currently tdp_mmu_init_sp() (or
tdp_mmu_init_child_sp()) sets kvm_mmu_page.role after tdp_mmu_alloc_sp()
allocating struct kvm_mmu_page and its page table page. This patch makes
tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() initialize kvm_mmu_page.role instead of
tdp_mmu_init_sp().

To handle private page tables, argument of is_private needs to be passed
down. Given that already page level is passed down, it would be cumbersome
to add one more parameter about sp. Instead replace the level argument with
union kvm_mmu_page_role. Thus the number of argument won't be increased
and more info about sp can be passed down.

For private sp, secure page table will be also allocated in addition to
struct kvm_mmu_page and page table (spt member). The allocation functions
(tdp_mmu_alloc_sp() and __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split()) need to know if the
allocation is for the conventional page table or private page table. Pass
union kvm_mmu_role to those functions and initialize role member of struct
kvm_mmu_page.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 12 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++---------------------
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
index f0af385c56e0..9e56a5b1024c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
@@ -115,4 +115,16 @@ void tdp_iter_start(struct tdp_iter *iter, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
void tdp_iter_next(struct tdp_iter *iter);
void tdp_iter_restart(struct tdp_iter *iter);

+static inline union kvm_mmu_page_role tdp_iter_child_role(struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role child_role;
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *parent_sp;
+
+ parent_sp = sptep_to_sp(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep));
+
+ child_role = parent_sp->role;
+ child_role.level--;
+ return child_role;
+}
+
#endif /* __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_ITER_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 11b0ec8aebe2..c6be76f9849c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -271,22 +271,28 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_next_root(struct kvm *kvm,
kvm_mmu_page_as_id(_root) != _as_id) { \
} else

-static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;

sp = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache);
sp->spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache);
+ sp->role = role;

return sp;
}

static void tdp_mmu_init_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
- gfn_t gfn, union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+ gfn_t gfn)
{
set_page_private(virt_to_page(sp->spt), (unsigned long)sp);

- sp->role = role;
+ /*
+ * role must be set before calling this function. At least role.level
+ * is not 0 (PG_LEVEL_NONE).
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->role.word);
sp->gfn = gfn;
sp->ptep = sptep;
sp->tdp_mmu_page = true;
@@ -294,20 +300,6 @@ static void tdp_mmu_init_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
trace_kvm_mmu_get_page(sp, true);
}

-static void tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *child_sp,
- struct tdp_iter *iter)
-{
- struct kvm_mmu_page *parent_sp;
- union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
-
- parent_sp = sptep_to_sp(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep));
-
- role = parent_sp->role;
- role.level--;
-
- tdp_mmu_init_sp(child_sp, iter->sptep, iter->gfn, role);
-}
-
hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
union kvm_mmu_page_role role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role;
@@ -326,8 +318,8 @@ hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
goto out;
}

- root = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu);
- tdp_mmu_init_sp(root, NULL, 0, role);
+ root = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu, role);
+ tdp_mmu_init_sp(root, NULL, 0);

refcount_set(&root->tdp_mmu_root_count, 1);

@@ -1166,8 +1158,8 @@ static int tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct tdp_iter *iter
KVM_BUG_ON(is_shadow_present_pte(iter->old_spte), vcpu->kvm);
KVM_BUG_ON(is_removed_spte(iter->old_spte), vcpu->kvm);

- sp = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu);
- tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(sp, iter);
+ sp = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu, tdp_iter_child_role(iter));
+ tdp_mmu_init_sp(sp, iter->sptep, iter->gfn);

ret = tdp_mmu_link_sp(vcpu->kvm, iter, sp, account_nx, true);
if (ret)
@@ -1435,7 +1427,7 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_wrprot_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
return spte_set;
}

-static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp)
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp, union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;

@@ -1445,6 +1437,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp)
if (!sp)
return NULL;

+ sp->role = role;
sp->spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
if (!sp->spt) {
kmem_cache_free(mmu_page_header_cache, sp);
@@ -1458,6 +1451,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm,
struct tdp_iter *iter,
bool shared)
{
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role role = tdp_iter_child_role(iter);
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;

/*
@@ -1469,7 +1463,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm,
* If this allocation fails we drop the lock and retry with reclaim
* allowed.
*/
- sp = __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_ACCOUNT);
+ sp = __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_ACCOUNT, role);
if (sp)
return sp;

@@ -1481,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm,
write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);

iter->yielded = true;
- sp = __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ sp = __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, role);

if (shared)
read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
@@ -1500,7 +1494,7 @@ static int tdp_mmu_split_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
const int level = iter->level;
int ret, i;

- tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(sp, iter);
+ tdp_mmu_init_sp(sp, iter->sptep, iter->gfn);

/*
* No need for atomics when writing to sp->spt since the page table has
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:18:25

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 048/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Make handle_changed_spte() return value

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX operation can fail with TDX_OPERAND_BUSY when multiple vcpu try to
operation on same TDX resource like Secure EPT. It doesn't spin and returns
busy error to VMM so that VMM has to take action, e.g. retry or whatever.

Because TDP MMU uses read spin lock for scalability, spinlock around seam
call busts TDP MMU effort. The other option is to let SEAMCALL fail and
page fault handler should retry. Make handle_changed_spte() and its caller
return values so that kvm page fault handler can return on such cases. This
patch makes it return only zero.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 85d990ec149e..bdb50c26849f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -336,9 +336,9 @@ hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return __pa(root->spt);
}

-static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
- u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
- bool shared);
+static int __must_check handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
+ u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
+ bool shared);

static void handle_changed_spte_acc_track(u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level)
{
@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = sptep_to_sp(rcu_dereference(pt));
int level = sp->role.level;
gfn_t base_gfn = sp->gfn;
+ int ret;
int i;

trace_kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(sp);
@@ -498,8 +499,14 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte,
REMOVED_SPTE, level);
}
- handle_changed_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), gfn,
- old_spte, REMOVED_SPTE, level, shared);
+ ret = handle_changed_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), gfn,
+ old_spte, REMOVED_SPTE, level, shared);
+ /*
+ * We are removing page tables. Because in TDX case we don't
+ * zap private page tables except tearing down VM. It means
+ * no race condition.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
}

call_rcu(&sp->rcu_head, tdp_mmu_free_sp_rcu_callback);
@@ -520,9 +527,9 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
* Handle bookkeeping that might result from the modification of a SPTE.
* This function must be called for all TDP SPTE modifications.
*/
-static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
- u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
- bool shared)
+static int __must_check __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
+ u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
+ bool shared)
{
bool was_present = is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte);
bool is_present = is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte);
@@ -558,7 +565,7 @@ static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
}

if (old_spte == new_spte)
- return;
+ return 0;

trace_kvm_tdp_mmu_spte_changed(as_id, gfn, level, old_spte, new_spte);

@@ -587,7 +594,7 @@ static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
"a temporary removed SPTE.\n"
"as_id: %d gfn: %llx old_spte: %llx new_spte: %llx level: %d",
as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level);
- return;
+ return 0;
}

if (is_leaf != was_leaf)
@@ -606,17 +613,25 @@ static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
if (was_present && !was_leaf &&
(is_leaf || !is_present || WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn_changed)))
handle_removed_pt(kvm, spte_to_child_pt(old_spte, level), shared);
+
+ return 0;
}

-static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
- u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
- bool shared)
+static int __must_check handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
+ u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
+ bool shared)
{
- __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level,
- shared);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level,
+ shared);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
handle_changed_spte_acc_track(old_spte, new_spte, level);
handle_changed_spte_dirty_log(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte,
new_spte, level);
+ return 0;
}

/*
@@ -635,12 +650,14 @@ static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
* * -EBUSY - If the SPTE cannot be set. In this case this function will have
* no side-effects other than setting iter->old_spte to the last
* known value of the spte.
+ * * -EAGAIN - Same to -EBUSY. But the source is from callbacks for private spt
*/
-static inline int tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct tdp_iter *iter,
- u64 new_spte)
+static inline int __must_check tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct tdp_iter *iter,
+ u64 new_spte)
{
u64 *sptep = rcu_dereference(iter->sptep);
+ int ret;

/*
* The caller is responsible for ensuring the old SPTE is not a REMOVED
@@ -659,15 +676,16 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
if (!try_cmpxchg64(sptep, &iter->old_spte, new_spte))
return -EBUSY;

- __handle_changed_spte(kvm, iter->as_id, iter->gfn, iter->old_spte,
- new_spte, iter->level, true);
- handle_changed_spte_acc_track(iter->old_spte, new_spte, iter->level);
+ ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, iter->as_id, iter->gfn, iter->old_spte,
+ new_spte, iter->level, true);
+ if (!ret)
+ handle_changed_spte_acc_track(iter->old_spte, new_spte, iter->level);

- return 0;
+ return ret;
}

-static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct tdp_iter *iter)
+static inline int __must_check tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct tdp_iter *iter)
{
int ret;

@@ -732,6 +750,8 @@ static u64 __tdp_mmu_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, gfn_t gfn, int level,
bool record_acc_track, bool record_dirty_log)
{
+ int ret;
+
lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);

/*
@@ -745,7 +765,9 @@ static u64 __tdp_mmu_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, tdp_ptep_t sptep,

old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte, new_spte, level);

- __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level, false);
+ ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level, false);
+ /* Because write spin lock is held, no race. It should success. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);

if (record_acc_track)
handle_changed_spte_acc_track(old_spte, new_spte, level);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:18:29

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 063/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD finalization.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index 5797d172176d..53897312699f 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ Patch Layer status
* TD VM creation/destruction: Applied
* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applied
* TDX EPT violation: Applied
-* TD finalization: Not yet
+* TD finalization: Applying
* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet

* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied
* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applied
* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Applied
-* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
+* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Applied
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:18:43

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 108/108] [MARKER] the end of (the first phase of) TDX KVM patch series

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the end of (the first phase of) patch series
of TDX KVM support.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
.../virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 33 -------------------
1 file changed, 33 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
deleted file mode 100644
index 1cec14213f69..000000000000
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-
-===================================
-Intel Trust Dodmain Extensions(TDX)
-===================================
-
-Layer status
-============
-What qemu can do
-----------------
-- TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
-- Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.
-- Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.
-- Qemu can populate initial guest memory image.
-- Qemu can finalize guest TD.
-- Qemu can start to run vcpu. But vcpu can not make progress yet.
-
-Patch Layer status
-------------------
- Patch layer Status
-* TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied
-* TDX architectural definitions: Applied
-* TD VM creation/destruction: Applied
-* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applied
-* TDX EPT violation: Applied
-* TD finalization: Applied
-* TD vcpu enter/exit: Applied
-* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet
-
-* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied
-* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applied
-* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Applied
-* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Applied
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:19:03

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 008/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TDX architectural
definitions.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
.../virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b7a14bc73853
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===================================
+Intel Trust Dodmain Extensions(TDX)
+===================================
+
+Layer status
+============
+What qemu can do
+----------------
+- TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
+- Qemu can try to create VM of TDX VM type and then fails.
+
+Patch Layer status
+------------------
+ Patch layer Status
+* TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied
+* TDX architectural definitions: Applying
+* TD VM creation/destruction: Not yet
+* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Not yet
+* TDX EPT violation: Not yet
+* TD finalization: Not yet
+* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
+* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet
+
+* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Not yet
+* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Not yet
+* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Not yet
+* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:19:14

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 037/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX requires TDX SEAMCALL to operate Secure EPT instead of direct memory
access and TDX SEAMCALL is heavy operation. Fast page fault on private GPA
doesn't make sense. Disallow fast page fault on private GPA.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 9098f77cdaa4..09defac49bf0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -3238,8 +3238,16 @@ static int handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fau
return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
}

-static bool page_fault_can_be_fast(struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+static bool page_fault_can_be_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
+ /*
+ * TDX private mapping doesn't support fast page fault because the EPT
+ * entry is read/written with TDX SEAMCALLs instead of direct memory
+ * access.
+ */
+ if (kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, fault->addr))
+ return false;
+
/*
* Page faults with reserved bits set, i.e. faults on MMIO SPTEs, only
* reach the common page fault handler if the SPTE has an invalid MMIO
@@ -3349,7 +3357,7 @@ static int fast_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
u64 *sptep = NULL;
uint retry_count = 0;

- if (!page_fault_can_be_fast(fault))
+ if (!page_fault_can_be_fast(vcpu->kvm, fault))
return ret;

walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(vcpu);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:19:30

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 057/108] KVM: x86/VMX: introduce vmx tlb_remote_flush and tlb_remote_flush_with_range

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This is preparation for TDX to define its own tlb_remote_flush and
tlb_remote_flush_with_range. Currently vmx code defines tlb_remote_flush
and tlb_remote_flush_with_range defined as NULL by default and only when
nested hyper-v guest case, they are defined to non-NULL methods.

To make TDX code to override those two methods consistently with other
methods, define vmx_tlb_remote_flush and vmx_tlb_remote_flush_with_range
as nop and call hyper-v code only when nested hyper-v guest case.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c | 5 ++++-
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 3 +++
7 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c
index ee4f696a0782..d43518da1c0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c
@@ -93,11 +93,14 @@ int hv_remote_flush_tlb(struct kvm *kvm)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_remote_flush_tlb);

+bool hv_use_remote_flush_tlb __ro_after_init;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_use_remote_flush_tlb);
+
void hv_track_root_tdp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_tdp)
{
struct kvm_arch *kvm_arch = &vcpu->kvm->arch;

- if (kvm_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush == hv_remote_flush_tlb) {
+ if (hv_use_remote_flush_tlb) {
spin_lock(&kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp_lock);
vcpu->arch.hv_root_tdp = root_tdp;
if (root_tdp != kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h
index 287e98ef9df3..9a07a34666fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
int hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_tlb_range *range);
int hv_remote_flush_tlb(struct kvm *kvm);
+extern bool hv_use_remote_flush_tlb __ro_after_init;
void hv_track_root_tdp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_tdp);
#else /* !CONFIG_HYPERV */
static inline void hv_track_root_tdp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_tdp)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index efc3b3f2dd12..08923b64dcc8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
{
int ret = -ENOTSUPP;

- if (range && kvm_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush_with_range)
+ if (range && kvm_available_flush_tlb_with_range())
ret = static_call(kvm_x86_tlb_remote_flush_with_range)(kvm, range);

if (ret)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h
index e2fc59380465..b3cd61c62305 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static inline void svm_hv_hardware_setup(void)
svm_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush = hv_remote_flush_tlb;
svm_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush_with_range =
hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range;
+ hv_use_remote_flush_tlb = true;
}

if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 974e00fd3260..fe9583b640fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {

.flush_tlb_all = vmx_flush_tlb_all,
.flush_tlb_current = vmx_flush_tlb_current,
+ .tlb_remote_flush = vmx_tlb_remote_flush,
+ .tlb_remote_flush_with_range = vmx_tlb_remote_flush_with_range,
.flush_tlb_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
.flush_tlb_guest = vmx_flush_tlb_guest,

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b5c3652c3cc4..f2887dbde700 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -3126,6 +3126,33 @@ void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
}

+int vmx_tlb_remote_flush(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+ if (hv_use_remote_flush_tlb)
+ return hv_remote_flush_tlb(kvm);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * fallback to KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH.
+ * See kvm_arch_flush_remote_tlb() and kvm_flush_remote_tlbs().
+ */
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+int vmx_tlb_remote_flush_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_tlb_range *range)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+ if (hv_use_remote_flush_tlb)
+ return hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(kvm, range);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * fallback to tlb_remote_flush. See
+ * kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_range()
+ */
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
{
/*
@@ -8223,11 +8250,8 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)

#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_GUEST_MAPPING_FLUSH
- && enable_ept) {
- vt_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush = hv_remote_flush_tlb;
- vt_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush_with_range =
- hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range;
- }
+ && enable_ept)
+ hv_use_remote_flush_tlb = true;
#endif

if (!cpu_has_vmx_ple()) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index dd05991afbad..cf7e0c6c65ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
bool vmx_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_tlb_remote_flush(struct kvm *kvm);
+int vmx_tlb_remote_flush_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_tlb_range *range);
void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr);
void vmx_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:20:20

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 105/108] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX protects TDX guest state from VMM. Implements to access methods for
TDX guest state to ignore them or return zero.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 463 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 55 ++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 17 ++
3 files changed, 490 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index d776d5d169d0..4381ef503540 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -258,6 +258,46 @@ static void vt_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_enable_smi_window(vcpu);
}

+static bool vt_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, emul_type, insn, insn_len);
+}
+
+static int vt_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+ enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
+ struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+ /*
+ * This call back is triggered by the x86 instruction emulator. TDX
+ * doesn't allow guest memory inspection.
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+ return vmx_check_intercept(vcpu, info, stage, exception);
+}
+
+static bool vt_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ return vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_set_virtual_apic_mode(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -266,6 +306,31 @@ static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
memset(pi->pir, 0, sizeof(pi->pir));
}

+static void vt_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ return vmx_hwapic_irr_update(vcpu, max_irr);
+}
+
+static void vt_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(kvm_get_running_vcpu()))
+ return;
+
+ return vmx_hwapic_isr_update(max_isr);
+}
+
+static bool vt_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* TDX doesn't support L2 at the moment. */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return false;
+
+ return vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
static int vt_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -305,6 +370,177 @@ static void vt_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(vcpu);
}

+static void vt_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vt_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return tdx_get_segment_base(vcpu, seg);
+
+ return vmx_get_segment_base(vcpu, seg);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var,
+ int seg)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return tdx_get_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+
+ vmx_get_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var,
+ int seg)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+}
+
+static int vt_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return tdx_get_cpl(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_get_cpl(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(vcpu, db, l);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_set_efer(vcpu, efer);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm)) {
+ memset(dt, 0, sizeof(*dt));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_get_idt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_idt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm)) {
+ memset(dt, 0, sizeof(*dt));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_get_gdt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_gdt(vcpu, dt);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_dr7(vcpu, val);
+}
+
+static void vt_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * MOV-DR exiting is always cleared for TD guest, even in debug mode.
+ * Thus KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT can never be set and it should never
+ * reach here for TD vcpu.
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_cache_reg(vcpu, reg);
+
+ return vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, reg);
+}
+
+static unsigned long vt_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_get_rflags(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_get_rflags(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+}
+
+static bool vt_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return vmx_get_if_flag(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -438,6 +674,15 @@ static u32 vt_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu);
}

+static void vt_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned char *hypercall)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_patch_hypercall(vcpu, hypercall);
+}
+
static void vt_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -446,6 +691,14 @@ static void vt_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
vmx_inject_irq(vcpu, reinjected);
}

+static void vt_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_inject_exception(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -478,6 +731,130 @@ static void vt_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_request_immediate_exit(vcpu);
}

+static void vt_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu, tpr, irr);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(vcpu, eoi_exit_bitmap);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_set_tss_addr(kvm, addr);
+}
+
+static int vt_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
+}
+
+static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ if (is_mmio)
+ return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+ return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+ }
+
+ return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
+}
+
+static u64 vt_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* TDX doesn't support L2 guest at the moment. */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vt_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* TDX doesn't support L2 guest at the moment. */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
+{
+ /* In TDX, tsc offset can't be changed. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset);
+}
+
+static void vt_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 multiplier)
+{
+ /* In TDX, tsc multiplier can't be changed. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu, multiplier);
+}
+
+static void vt_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(vcpu);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int vt_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
+ bool *expired)
+{
+ /* VMX-preemption timer isn't available for TDX. */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return vmx_set_hv_timer(vcpu, guest_deadline_tsc, expired);
+}
+
+static void vt_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* VMX-preemption timer can't be set. Set vt_set_hv_timer(). */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_cancel_hv_timer(vcpu);
+}
+#endif
+
static void vt_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
{
@@ -531,29 +908,29 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vcpu_load = vt_vcpu_load,
.vcpu_put = vt_vcpu_put,

- .update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
+ .update_exception_bitmap = vt_update_exception_bitmap,
.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
.get_msr = vt_get_msr,
.set_msr = vt_set_msr,
- .get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
- .get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
- .set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
- .get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
- .get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
- .set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
+ .get_segment_base = vt_get_segment_base,
+ .get_segment = vt_get_segment,
+ .set_segment = vt_set_segment,
+ .get_cpl = vt_get_cpl,
+ .get_cs_db_l_bits = vt_get_cs_db_l_bits,
+ .set_cr0 = vt_set_cr0,
.is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
- .set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
- .set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
- .get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
- .set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
- .get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
- .set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
- .set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
- .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
- .cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
- .get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
- .set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
- .get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,
+ .set_cr4 = vt_set_cr4,
+ .set_efer = vt_set_efer,
+ .get_idt = vt_get_idt,
+ .set_idt = vt_set_idt,
+ .get_gdt = vt_get_gdt,
+ .set_gdt = vt_set_gdt,
+ .set_dr7 = vt_set_dr7,
+ .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vt_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
+ .cache_reg = vt_cache_reg,
+ .get_rflags = vt_get_rflags,
+ .set_rflags = vt_set_rflags,
+ .get_if_flag = vt_get_if_flag,

.flush_tlb_all = vt_flush_tlb_all,
.flush_tlb_current = vt_flush_tlb_current,
@@ -569,10 +946,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
.set_interrupt_shadow = vt_set_interrupt_shadow,
.get_interrupt_shadow = vt_get_interrupt_shadow,
- .patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
+ .patch_hypercall = vt_patch_hypercall,
.inject_irq = vt_inject_irq,
.inject_nmi = vt_inject_nmi,
- .inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
+ .inject_exception = vt_inject_exception,
.cancel_injection = vt_cancel_injection,
.interrupt_allowed = vt_interrupt_allowed,
.nmi_allowed = vt_nmi_allowed,
@@ -580,39 +957,39 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_nmi_mask = vt_set_nmi_mask,
.enable_nmi_window = vt_enable_nmi_window,
.enable_irq_window = vt_enable_irq_window,
- .update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
- .set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
- .set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
- .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
- .load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
+ .update_cr8_intercept = vt_update_cr8_intercept,
+ .set_virtual_apic_mode = vt_set_virtual_apic_mode,
+ .set_apic_access_page_addr = vt_set_apic_access_page_addr,
+ .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vt_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
+ .load_eoi_exitmap = vt_load_eoi_exitmap,
.apicv_post_state_restore = vt_apicv_post_state_restore,
.check_apicv_inhibit_reasons = vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
- .hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
- .hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
- .guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
+ .hwapic_irr_update = vt_hwapic_irr_update,
+ .hwapic_isr_update = vt_hwapic_isr_update,
+ .guest_apic_has_interrupt = vt_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
.sync_pir_to_irr = vt_sync_pir_to_irr,
.deliver_interrupt = vt_deliver_interrupt,
.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
.protected_apic_has_interrupt = vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt,

- .set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
- .set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
- .get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
+ .set_tss_addr = vt_set_tss_addr,
+ .set_identity_map_addr = vt_set_identity_map_addr,
+ .get_mt_mask = vt_get_mt_mask,

.get_exit_info = vt_get_exit_info,

- .vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
+ .vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vt_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,

.has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,

- .get_l2_tsc_offset = vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset,
- .get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
- .write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
- .write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,
+ .get_l2_tsc_offset = vt_get_l2_tsc_offset,
+ .get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vt_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
+ .write_tsc_offset = vt_write_tsc_offset,
+ .write_tsc_multiplier = vt_write_tsc_multiplier,

.load_mmu_pgd = vt_load_mmu_pgd,

- .check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
+ .check_intercept = vt_check_intercept,
.handle_exit_irqoff = vt_handle_exit_irqoff,

.request_immediate_exit = vt_request_immediate_exit,
@@ -620,7 +997,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.sched_in = vt_sched_in,

.cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_ENTITY_NUM,
- .update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
+ .update_cpu_dirty_logging = vt_update_cpu_dirty_logging,

.nested_ops = &vmx_nested_ops,

@@ -628,8 +1005,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.pi_start_assignment = vmx_pi_start_assignment,

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- .set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
- .cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
+ .set_hv_timer = vt_set_hv_timer,
+ .cancel_hv_timer = vt_cancel_hv_timer,
#endif

.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
@@ -639,8 +1016,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.leave_smm = vt_leave_smm,
.enable_smi_window = vt_enable_smi_window,

- .can_emulate_instruction = vmx_can_emulate_instruction,
- .apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+ .can_emulate_instruction = vt_can_emulate_instruction,
+ .apic_init_signal_blocked = vt_apic_init_signal_blocked,
.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,

.msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 111027724e06..2ea010e96414 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/mmu_context.h>

#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
+#include <asm/virtext.h>
#include <asm/tdx.h>

#include "capabilities.h"
@@ -493,8 +494,15 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->tsc_offset;
vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
- vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
- !(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG);
+ /*
+ * TODO: support off-TD debug. If TD DEBUG is enabled, guest state
+ * can be accessed. guest_state_protected = false. and kvm ioctl to
+ * access CPU states should be usable for user space VMM (e.g. qemu).
+ *
+ * vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
+ * !(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG);
+ */
+ vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;

tdx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
tdx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
@@ -1687,6 +1695,49 @@ void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.smi_pending = false;
}

+void tdx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* Only x2APIC mode is supported for TD. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu) != LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC);
+}
+
+int tdx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+ kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);
+ switch (reg) {
+ case VCPU_REGS_RSP:
+ case VCPU_REGS_RIP:
+ case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
+ case VCPU_EXREG_CR0:
+ case VCPU_EXREG_CR3:
+ case VCPU_EXREG_CR4:
+ break;
+ default:
+ KVM_BUG_ON(1, vcpu->kvm);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+unsigned long tdx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u64 tdx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+ memset(var, 0, sizeof(*var));
+}
+
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index d4ffbf580bc5..1341787f1378 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -169,6 +169,14 @@ int tdx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
int tdx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate);
int tdx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate);
void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+int tdx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
+unsigned long tdx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write);
+u64 tdx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg);
+void tdx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -210,10 +218,19 @@ static inline void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason, u64 *in
static inline bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write) { return false; }
static inline int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
static inline int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
+
static inline int tdx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection) { return false; }
static inline int tdx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate) { return 0; }
static inline int tdx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate) { return 0; }
static inline void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+
+static inline int tdx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; }
+static inline void tdx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg) {}
+static inline unsigned long tdx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; }
+static inline u64 tdx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg) { return 0; }
+static inline void tdx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var,
+ int seg) {}

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:20:32

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 059/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM TDP MMU
MapGPA.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index c3e675bea802..5797d172176d 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ What qemu can do
- TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
- Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.
- Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.
+- Qemu can populate initial guest memory image.

Patch Layer status
------------------
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ Patch Layer status
* TDX architectural definitions: Applied
* TD VM creation/destruction: Applied
* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applied
-* TDX EPT violation: Applying
+* TDX EPT violation: Applied
* TD finalization: Not yet
* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:21:20

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 039/108] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM programs
to inject #VE conditionally and set #VE suppress bit in EPT entry. For VMX
case, #VE isn't used. If #VE happens for VMX, it's a bug. To be
defensive (test that VMX case isn't broken), introduce option
ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, set error.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 12 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 5 +++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 6 +++-
4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index cdbf12c1a83c..752d53652007 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(ENCLS_EXITING)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(RDSEED_EXITING)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PAGE_MOD_LOGGING)
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PT_CONCEAL_VMX)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(XSAVES)
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC)
@@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {
VMREAD_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x00002027,
VMWRITE_BITMAP = 0x00002028,
VMWRITE_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x00002029,
+ VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS = 0x0000202A,
+ VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x0000202B,
XSS_EXIT_BITMAP = 0x0000202C,
XSS_EXIT_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x0000202D,
ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP = 0x0000202E,
@@ -628,4 +631,13 @@ enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {

extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation;

+struct vmx_ve_information {
+ u32 exit_reason;
+ u32 delivery;
+ u64 exit_qualification;
+ u64 guest_linear_address;
+ u64 guest_physical_address;
+ u16 eptp_index;
+};
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index ac290a44a693..9277676057a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline bool is_nm_fault(u32 intr_info)
return is_exception_n(intr_info, NM_VECTOR);
}

+static inline bool is_ve_fault(u32 intr_info)
+{
+ return is_exception_n(intr_info, VE_VECTOR);
+}
+
/* Undocumented: icebp/int1 */
static inline bool is_icebp(u32 intr_info)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f890191e8580..dd3fde9d3c32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ module_param(error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config, bool, 0444);
static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);

+static bool __read_mostly ept_violation_ve_test;
+module_param(ept_violation_ve_test, bool, 0444);
+
#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1
#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2

@@ -783,6 +786,13 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
(1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
+ /*
+ * #VE isn't used for VMX, but for TDX. To test against unexpected
+ * change related to #VE for VMX, intercept unexpected #VE and warn on
+ * it.
+ */
+ if (ept_violation_ve_test)
+ eb |= 1u << VE_VECTOR;
/*
* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
@@ -2644,6 +2654,9 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control))
return -EIO;
}
+ if (!ept_violation_ve_test)
+ _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
+
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
@@ -2668,6 +2681,7 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
return -EIO;

vmx_cap->ept = 0;
+ _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
}
if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
vmx_cap->vpid) {
@@ -4510,6 +4524,7 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
if (!enable_ept) {
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
+ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
}
if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
@@ -4637,8 +4652,40 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)

exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));

- if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+ if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
+ if (secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
+ if (!vmx->ve_info) {
+ /* ve_info must be page aligned. */
+ struct page *page;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*vmx->ve_info) > PAGE_SIZE);
+ page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (page)
+ vmx->ve_info = page_to_virt(page);
+ }
+ if (vmx->ve_info) {
+ /*
+ * Allow #VE delivery. CPU sets this field to
+ * 0xFFFFFFFF on #VE delivery. Another #VE can
+ * occur only if software clears the field.
+ */
+ vmx->ve_info->delivery = 0;
+ vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS,
+ __pa(vmx->ve_info));
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Because SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE is
+ * used only when ept_violation_ve_test is true,
+ * it's okay to go with the bit disabled.
+ */
+ pr_err("Failed to allocate ve_info. disabling EPT_VIOLATION_VE.\n");
+ secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE);
+ }
+ }
+ }

if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx));
@@ -5118,6 +5165,12 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
return handle_ud(vcpu);

+ /*
+ * #VE isn't supposed to happen. Although vcpu can send
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_ve_fault(intr_info), vcpu->kvm))
+ return -EIO;
+
error_code = 0;
if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
@@ -6306,6 +6359,18 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
+ if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
+ struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
+
+ pr_err("VE info address = 0x%016llx\n",
+ vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));
+ ve_info = __va(vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));
+ pr_err("ve_info: 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%04x\n",
+ ve_info->exit_reason, ve_info->delivery,
+ ve_info->exit_qualification,
+ ve_info->guest_linear_address,
+ ve_info->guest_physical_address, ve_info->eptp_index);
+ }
}

/*
@@ -7302,6 +7367,8 @@ void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+ if (vmx->ve_info)
+ free_page((unsigned long)vmx->ve_info);
}

int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index d49d0ace9fb8..1813caeb24d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -359,6 +359,9 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
} shadow_msr_intercept;
+
+ /* ve_info must be page aligned. */
+ struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
};

struct kvm_vmx {
@@ -570,7 +573,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING | \
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING | \
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE)

#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL 0
#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL \
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:22:41

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 056/108] KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX doesn't need APIC page depending on vapic and its callback is
WARN_ON_ONCE(is_tdx). To avoid unnecessary overhead and WARN_ON_ONCE(),
skip requesting KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD when TD.

WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:696 vt_set_apic_access_page_addr+0x3c/0x50 [kvm_intel]
RIP: 0010:vt_set_apic_access_page_addr+0x3c/0x50 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
vcpu_enter_guest+0x145d/0x24d0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x25d/0xcc0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x414/0xa30 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xc0/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 3868605462ed..5dadd0f9a10e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10487,7 +10487,9 @@ void kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range(struct kvm *kvm,
* Update it when it becomes invalid.
*/
apic_address = gfn_to_hva(kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (start <= apic_address && apic_address < end)
+ /* TDX doesn't need APIC page. */
+ if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_TDX_VM &&
+ start <= apic_address && apic_address < end)
kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD);
}

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:22:50

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 104/108] KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX module API doesn't provide API for VMM to inject INIT IPI and SIPI.
Instead it defines the different protocols to boot application processors.
Ignore INIT and SIPI events for the TDX guest.

There are two options. 1) (silently) ignore INIT/SIPI request or 2) return
error to guest TDs somehow. Given that TDX guest is paravirtualized to
boot AP, the option 1 is chosen for simplicity.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 17c3828d42a3..4e9b96480716 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(migrate_timers)
KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed)
KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
+KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_init)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
KVM_X86_OP(check_processor_compatibility)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 094fff5414e1..df67ca7b23d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1706,6 +1706,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*complete_emulated_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err);

void (*vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
+ void (*vcpu_deliver_init)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

/*
* Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons
@@ -1914,6 +1915,7 @@ int kvm_emulate_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
int kvm_load_segment_descriptor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 selector, int seg);
void kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
+void kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int idt_index,
int reason, bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 7a1d612bd138..7393d858ed72 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -3035,6 +3035,16 @@ int kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data, unsigned long len)
return 0;
}

+void kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
+ if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu))
+ vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+ else
+ vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_deliver_init);
+
int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
@@ -3066,13 +3076,8 @@ int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}

- if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events)) {
- kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
- if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(apic->vcpu))
- vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
- else
- vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
- }
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events))
+ static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_deliver_init)(vcpu);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events)) {
if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
/* evaluate pending_events before reading the vector */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 2bcf2e1a5271..5d56b0f1f595 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4857,6 +4857,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,

.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+ .vcpu_deliver_init = kvm_vcpu_deliver_init,
.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
};

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 4acba8d8cb27..d776d5d169d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -286,6 +286,25 @@ static void vt_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
vmx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
}

+static void vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
+}
+
+static void vt_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ /* TDX doesn't support INIT. Ignore INIT event */
+ vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -627,7 +646,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,

- .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+ .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+ .vcpu_deliver_init = vt_vcpu_deliver_init,

.dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl,
.mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:23:32

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 092/108] KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls (TDG.VP.VMCALL)

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX module specification defines TDG.VP.VMCALL API (TDVMCALL for short)
for the guest TD to call hypercall to VMM. When the guest TD issues
TDG.VP.VMCALL, the guest TD exits to VMM with a new exit reason of
TDVMCALL. The arguments from the guest TD and returned values from the VMM
are passed in the guest registers. The guest RCX registers indicates which
registers are used. Define helper functions to access those registers as
ABI.

Define the TDVMCALL exit reason, which is carved out from the VMX exit
reason namespace as the TDVMCALL exit from TDX guest to TDX-SEAM is really
just a VM-Exit. Add a place holder to handle TDVMCALL exit.

Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 4 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 13 ++++++++
3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
index b3a30ef3efdd..f0f4a4cf84a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
#define EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE 68
#define EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK 74
#define EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY 75
+#define EXIT_REASON_TDCALL 77

#define VMX_EXIT_REASONS \
{ EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI, "EXCEPTION_NMI" }, \
@@ -156,7 +157,8 @@
{ EXIT_REASON_UMWAIT, "UMWAIT" }, \
{ EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE, "TPAUSE" }, \
{ EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK, "BUS_LOCK" }, \
- { EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY, "NOTIFY" }
+ { EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY, "NOTIFY" }, \
+ { EXIT_REASON_TDCALL, "TDCALL" }

#define VMX_EXIT_REASON_FLAGS \
{ VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY, "FAILED_VMENTRY" }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 3b973a2f1381..65d9b88f1d50 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -85,6 +85,41 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long tdexit_intr_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_r9_read(vcpu);
}

+#define BUILD_TDVMCALL_ACCESSORS(param, gpr) \
+static __always_inline \
+unsigned long tdvmcall_##param##_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) \
+{ \
+ return kvm_##gpr##_read(vcpu); \
+} \
+static __always_inline void tdvmcall_##param##_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, \
+ unsigned long val) \
+{ \
+ kvm_##gpr##_write(vcpu, val); \
+}
+BUILD_TDVMCALL_ACCESSORS(a0, r12);
+BUILD_TDVMCALL_ACCESSORS(a1, r13);
+BUILD_TDVMCALL_ACCESSORS(a2, r14);
+BUILD_TDVMCALL_ACCESSORS(a3, r15);
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long tdvmcall_exit_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_r10_read(vcpu);
+}
+static __always_inline unsigned long tdvmcall_leaf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_r11_read(vcpu);
+}
+static __always_inline void tdvmcall_set_return_code(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ long val)
+{
+ kvm_r10_write(vcpu, val);
+}
+static __always_inline void tdvmcall_set_return_val(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned long val)
+{
+ kvm_r11_write(vcpu, val);
+}
+
static inline bool is_td_vcpu_created(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
{
return tdx->tdvpr.added;
@@ -662,7 +697,8 @@ static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
{
guest_enter_irqoff();
- tdx->exit_reason.full = __tdx_vcpu_run(tdx->tdvpr.pa, vcpu->arch.regs, 0);
+ tdx->exit_reason.full = __tdx_vcpu_run(tdx->tdvpr.pa, vcpu->arch.regs,
+ tdx->tdvmcall.regs_mask);
guest_exit_irqoff();
}

@@ -695,6 +731,11 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

tdx_complete_interrupts(vcpu);

+ if (tdx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_TDCALL)
+ tdx->tdvmcall.rcx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
+ else
+ tdx->tdvmcall.rcx = 0;
+
return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
}

@@ -741,6 +782,17 @@ static int tdx_handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}

+static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+}
+
void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
{
td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
@@ -1133,6 +1185,8 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
return tdx_handle_exception(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return tdx_handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_TDCALL:
+ return handle_tdvmcall(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
return tdx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 64e9b864e20e..eac341e08c9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -78,6 +78,19 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {

struct list_head cpu_list;

+ union {
+ struct {
+ union {
+ struct {
+ u16 gpr_mask;
+ u16 xmm_mask;
+ };
+ u32 regs_mask;
+ };
+ u32 reserved;
+ };
+ u64 rcx;
+ } tdvmcall;
union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason;

bool vcpu_initialized;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:23:37

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 070/108] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

On exiting from the guest TD, xsave state is clobbered. Restore xsave
state on TD exit.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 021040fdd630..3ec465cbaeef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/mmu_context.h>

+#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
#include <asm/tdx.h>

#include "capabilities.h"
@@ -455,6 +456,22 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
}

+static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+ host_xcr0 != (kvm_tdx->xfam & kvm_caps.supported_xcr0))
+ xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ /* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */
+ host_xss != (kvm_tdx->xfam & (kvm_caps.supported_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_PT)))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+ (kvm_tdx->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU))
+ write_pkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
+}
+
u64 __tdx_vcpu_run(hpa_t tdvpr, void *regs, u32 regs_mask);

static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -478,6 +495,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);

+ tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;

vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:23:38

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 081/108] KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX supports interrupt inject into vcpu with posted interrupt. Wire up the
corresponding kvm x86 operations to posted interrupt. Move
kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt() from vmx.c to common.h to share the
code.

VMX can inject interrupt by setting interrupt information field,
VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, of VMCS. TDX supports interrupt injection only
by posted interrupt. Ignore the execution path to access
VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD.

As cpu state is protected and apicv is enabled for the TDX guest, VMM can
inject interrupt by updating posted interrupt descriptor. Treat interrupt
can be injected always.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 25 +++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 67 +-----------------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 7 ++-
7 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
index 235908f3e044..747f993cf7de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@

#include <linux/kvm_host.h>

+#include "posted_intr.h"
#include "mmu.h"

static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
@@ -30,4 +31,74 @@ static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
}

+static inline void kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ int pi_vec)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
+ /*
+ * The vector of the virtual has already been set in the PIR.
+ * Send a notification event to deliver the virtual interrupt
+ * unless the vCPU is the currently running vCPU, i.e. the
+ * event is being sent from a fastpath VM-Exit handler, in
+ * which case the PIR will be synced to the vIRR before
+ * re-entering the guest.
+ *
+ * When the target is not the running vCPU, the following
+ * possibilities emerge:
+ *
+ * Case 1: vCPU stays in non-root mode. Sending a notification
+ * event posts the interrupt to the vCPU.
+ *
+ * Case 2: vCPU exits to root mode and is still runnable. The
+ * PIR will be synced to the vIRR before re-entering the guest.
+ * Sending a notification event is ok as the host IRQ handler
+ * will ignore the spurious event.
+ *
+ * Case 3: vCPU exits to root mode and is blocked. vcpu_block()
+ * has already synced PIR to vIRR and never blocks the vCPU if
+ * the vIRR is not empty. Therefore, a blocked vCPU here does
+ * not wait for any requested interrupts in PIR, and sending a
+ * notification event also results in a benign, spurious event.
+ */
+
+ if (vcpu != kvm_get_running_vcpu())
+ apic->send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * The vCPU isn't in the guest; wake the vCPU in case it is blocking,
+ * otherwise do nothing as KVM will grab the highest priority pending
+ * IRQ via ->sync_pir_to_irr() in vcpu_enter_guest().
+ */
+ kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send interrupt to vcpu via posted interrupt way.
+ * 1. If target vcpu is running(non-root mode), send posted interrupt
+ * notification to vcpu and hardware will sync PIR to vIRR atomically.
+ * 2. If target vcpu isn't running(root mode), kick it to pick up the
+ * interrupt from PIR in next vmentry.
+ */
+static inline void __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct pi_desc *pi_desc, int vector)
+{
+ if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, pi_desc))
+ return;
+
+ /* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do. */
+ if (pi_test_and_set_on(pi_desc))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * The implied barrier in pi_test_and_set_on() pairs with the smp_mb_*()
+ * after setting vcpu->mode in vcpu_enter_guest(), thus the vCPU is
+ * guaranteed to see PID.ON=1 and sync the PIR to IRR if triggering a
+ * posted interrupt "fails" because vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.
+ */
+ kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+}
+
#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 1dfffc6c1533..13ad1278bef2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -178,6 +178,34 @@ static bool vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu);
}

+static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+ pi_clear_on(pi);
+ memset(pi->pir, 0, sizeof(pi->pir));
+}
+
+static int vt_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return -1;
+
+ return vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(apic->vcpu)) {
+ tdx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode,
+ vector);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vmx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
+}
+
static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -244,6 +272,53 @@ static void vt_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
vmx_sched_in(vcpu, cpu);
}

+static void vt_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+ vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, mask);
+}
+
+static u32 vt_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ return vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_inject_irq(vcpu, reinjected);
+}
+
+static void vt_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_cancel_injection(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ return vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu, for_injection);
+}
+
+static void vt_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_enable_irq_window(vcpu);
+}
+
static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -323,31 +398,31 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
.skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
- .set_interrupt_shadow = vmx_set_interrupt_shadow,
- .get_interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow,
+ .set_interrupt_shadow = vt_set_interrupt_shadow,
+ .get_interrupt_shadow = vt_get_interrupt_shadow,
.patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
- .inject_irq = vmx_inject_irq,
+ .inject_irq = vt_inject_irq,
.inject_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
.inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
- .cancel_injection = vmx_cancel_injection,
- .interrupt_allowed = vmx_interrupt_allowed,
+ .cancel_injection = vt_cancel_injection,
+ .interrupt_allowed = vt_interrupt_allowed,
.nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
.get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
.set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
.enable_nmi_window = vmx_enable_nmi_window,
- .enable_irq_window = vmx_enable_irq_window,
+ .enable_irq_window = vt_enable_irq_window,
.update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
.set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
.set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
.load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
- .apicv_post_state_restore = vmx_apicv_post_state_restore,
+ .apicv_post_state_restore = vt_apicv_post_state_restore,
.check_apicv_inhibit_reasons = vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
.hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
.hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
.guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
- .sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
- .deliver_interrupt = vmx_deliver_interrupt,
+ .sync_pir_to_irr = vt_sync_pir_to_irr,
+ .deliver_interrupt = vt_deliver_interrupt,
.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
.protected_apic_has_interrupt = vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt,

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
index 62caf74753bc..91ea3396463d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static inline struct vcpu_pi *vcpu_to_pi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return (struct vcpu_pi *)vcpu;
}

-static inline struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return &vcpu_to_pi(vcpu)->pi_desc;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
index 2fe8222308b2..0f9983b6910b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ struct vcpu_pi {
/* Until here common layout betwwn vcpu_vmx and vcpu_tdx. */
};

+struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void pi_wakeup_handler(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 8d0eb1d405d7..7dad75b3b4a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@

#include "capabilities.h"
#include "x86_ops.h"
+#include "common.h"
#include "tdx.h"
#include "vmx.h"
#include "x86.h"
@@ -440,6 +441,9 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
!(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG);

+ tdx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+ tdx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
+
tdx->host_state_need_save = true;
tdx->host_state_need_restore = false;

@@ -450,6 +454,7 @@ void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);

+ vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
if (vcpu->cpu == cpu)
return;

@@ -652,6 +657,12 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

trace_kvm_entry(vcpu);

+ if (pi_test_on(&tdx->pi_desc)) {
+ apic->send_IPI_self(POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+
+ kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+ }
+
tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);

tdx_user_return_update_cache();
@@ -981,6 +992,16 @@ static int tdx_sept_remove_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
return tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
}

+void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ /* TDX supports only posted interrupt. No lapic emulation. */
+ __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &tdx->pi_desc, vector);
+}
+
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
@@ -1652,6 +1673,10 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
if (ret)
return ret;

+ td_vmcs_write16(tdx, POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+ td_vmcs_write64(tdx, POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa(&tdx->pi_desc));
+ td_vmcs_setbit32(tdx, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR);
+
tdx->vcpu_initialized = true;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f2887dbde700..b4c65eb17cc2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4120,50 +4120,6 @@ void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
}

-static inline void kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- int pi_vec)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
- if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
- /*
- * The vector of the virtual has already been set in the PIR.
- * Send a notification event to deliver the virtual interrupt
- * unless the vCPU is the currently running vCPU, i.e. the
- * event is being sent from a fastpath VM-Exit handler, in
- * which case the PIR will be synced to the vIRR before
- * re-entering the guest.
- *
- * When the target is not the running vCPU, the following
- * possibilities emerge:
- *
- * Case 1: vCPU stays in non-root mode. Sending a notification
- * event posts the interrupt to the vCPU.
- *
- * Case 2: vCPU exits to root mode and is still runnable. The
- * PIR will be synced to the vIRR before re-entering the guest.
- * Sending a notification event is ok as the host IRQ handler
- * will ignore the spurious event.
- *
- * Case 3: vCPU exits to root mode and is blocked. vcpu_block()
- * has already synced PIR to vIRR and never blocks the vCPU if
- * the vIRR is not empty. Therefore, a blocked vCPU here does
- * not wait for any requested interrupts in PIR, and sending a
- * notification event also results in a benign, spurious event.
- */
-
- if (vcpu != kvm_get_running_vcpu())
- apic->send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
- return;
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * The vCPU isn't in the guest; wake the vCPU in case it is blocking,
- * otherwise do nothing as KVM will grab the highest priority pending
- * IRQ via ->sync_pir_to_irr() in vcpu_enter_guest().
- */
- kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
-}
-
static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int vector)
{
@@ -4216,20 +4172,7 @@ static int vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
if (!vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)
return -1;

- if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
- return 0;
-
- /* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do. */
- if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * The implied barrier in pi_test_and_set_on() pairs with the smp_mb_*()
- * after setting vcpu->mode in vcpu_enter_guest(), thus the vCPU is
- * guaranteed to see PID.ON=1 and sync the PIR to IRR if triggering a
- * posted interrupt "fails" because vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.
- */
- kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+ __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &vmx->pi_desc, vector);
return 0;
}

@@ -6855,14 +6798,6 @@ void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
}

-void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
- memset(vmx->pi_desc.pir, 0, sizeof(vmx->pi_desc.pir));
-}
-
void vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(unsigned long entry);

static void handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 6bdd956b44c2..01fac8ba8c50 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason);
void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr);
void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr);
@@ -155,6 +154,9 @@ void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

+void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector);
+
int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);

@@ -184,6 +186,9 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
static inline bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }

+static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+ int trig_mode, int vector) {}
+
static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:23:44

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 028/108] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

To keep the case of non TDX intact, introduce a new config option for
private KVM MMU support. At the moment, this is synonym for
CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST && CONFIG_KVM_INTEL. The config makes it clear
that the config is only for x86 KVM MMU.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 73fdfa429b20..6bafdb2ce284 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -133,4 +133,8 @@ config KVM_XEN
config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
bool

+config KVM_MMU_PRIVATE
+ def_bool y
+ depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST && KVM_INTEL
+
endif # VIRTUALIZATION
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:24:00

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 075/108] KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because debug store is clobbered, restore it on TD exit.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
index 7839507b3844..5c310a951a0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
@@ -2340,3 +2340,4 @@ void perf_restore_debug_store(void)

wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DS_AREA, (unsigned long)ds);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_restore_debug_store);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index af13c19af339..5807a2f564af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -526,6 +526,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);

tdx_user_return_update_cache();
+ perf_restore_debug_store();
tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:24:13

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 049/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Allocate protected page table for private page table, and add hooks to
operate on protected page table. This patch adds allocation/free of
protected page tables and hooks. When calling hooks to update SPTE entry,
freeze the entry, call hooks and unfree the entry to allow concurrent
updates on page tables. Which is the advantage of TDP MMU. As
kvm_gfn_shared_mask() returns false always, those hooks aren't called yet
with this patch.

When the faulting GPA is private, the KVM fault is called private. When
resolving private KVM, allocate protected page table and call hooks to
operate on protected page table. On the change of the private PTE entry,
invoke kvm_x86_ops hook in __handle_changed_spte() to propagate the change
to protected page table. The following depicts the relationship.

private KVM page fault |
| |
V |
private GPA | CPU protected EPTP
| | |
V | V
private PT root | protected PT root
| | |
V | V
private PT --hook to propagate-->protected PT
| | |
\--------------------+------\ |
| | |
| V V
| private guest page
|
|
non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
|
PT: page table

The existing KVM TDP MMU code uses atomic update of SPTE. On populating
the EPT entry, atomically set the entry. However, it requires TLB
shootdown to zap SPTE. To address it, the entry is frozen with the special
SPTE value that clears the present bit. After the TLB shootdown, the entry
is set to the eventual value (unfreeze).

For protected page table, hooks are called to update protected page table
in addition to direct access to the private SPTE. For the zapping case, it
works to freeze the SPTE. It can call hooks in addition to TLB shootdown.
For populating the private SPTE entry, there can be a race condition
without further protection

vcpu 1: populating 2M private SPTE
vcpu 2: populating 4K private SPTE
vcpu 2: TDX SEAMCALL to update 4K protected SPTE => error
vcpu 1: TDX SEAMCALL to update 2M protected SPTE

To avoid the race, the frozen SPTE is utilized. Instead of atomic update
of the private entry, freeze the entry, call the hook that update protected
SPTE, set the entry to the final value.

Support 4K page only at this stage. 2M page support can be done in future
patches.

Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 11 ++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 15 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 32 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 2 +-
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 1 +
8 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index f28c9fd72ac4..1b01dc2098b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_tss_addr)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_identity_map_addr)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(get_mt_mask)
KVM_X86_OP(load_mmu_pgd)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(link_private_spt)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(free_private_spt)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(set_private_spte)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(remove_private_spte)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(zap_private_spte)
KVM_X86_OP(has_wbinvd_exit)
KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_offset)
KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_multiplier)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 381df2c8136d..5f9634c130d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -467,6 +467,7 @@ struct kvm_mmu {
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
void (*invlpg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, hpa_t root_hpa);
struct kvm_mmu_root_info root;
+ hpa_t private_root_hpa;
union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role;
union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role;

@@ -1613,6 +1614,16 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*load_mmu_pgd)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
int root_level);

+ int (*link_private_spt)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
+ void *private_spt);
+ int (*free_private_spt)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
+ void *private_spt);
+ int (*set_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+ int (*remove_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+ int (*zap_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level);
+
bool (*has_wbinvd_exit)(void);

u64 (*get_l2_tsc_offset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 0237e143299c..02e7b5cf3231 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -3646,7 +3646,12 @@ static int mmu_alloc_direct_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
goto out_unlock;

if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) {
- root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu);
+ if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm) &&
+ !VALID_PAGE(mmu->private_root_hpa)) {
+ root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu, true);
+ mmu->private_root_hpa = root;
+ }
+ root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu, false);
mmu->root.hpa = root;
} else if (shadow_root_level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
root = mmu_alloc_root(vcpu, 0, 0, shadow_root_level);
@@ -4357,7 +4362,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
unsigned long mmu_seq;
int r;

- fault->gfn = fault->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ fault->gfn = gpa_to_gfn(fault->addr) & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm);
fault->slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault->gfn);

if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, fault))
@@ -5893,6 +5898,7 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)

mmu->root.hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
mmu->root.pgd = 0;
+ mmu->private_root_hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
mmu->prev_roots[i] = KVM_MMU_ROOT_INFO_INVALID;

@@ -6116,7 +6122,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
};

/*
- * this handles both private gfn and shared gfn.
+ * This handles both private gfn and shared gfn.
* All private page should be zapped on memslot deletion.
*/
flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &range, flush, true);
@@ -6919,6 +6925,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init(void)
void kvm_mmu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
+ if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
+ mmu_free_root_page(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.mmu->private_root_hpa,
+ NULL);
free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.root_mmu);
free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.guest_mmu);
mmu_free_memory_caches(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index 4c013124534b..508e8402c07a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/kvm_host.h>

+#include "mmu.h"
+
#undef MMU_DEBUG

#ifdef MMU_DEBUG
@@ -209,11 +211,29 @@ static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
}

+static inline int kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ gfp &= ~__GFP_ZERO;
+ sp->private_spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
+ if (!sp->private_spt)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline void kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
if (sp->private_spt)
free_page((unsigned long)sp->private_spt);
}
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_for_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+ gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ if (is_private_sp(root))
+ return kvm_gfn_private(kvm, gfn);
+ else
+ return kvm_gfn_shared(kvm, gfn);
+}
#else
static inline void *kvm_mmu_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
@@ -230,9 +250,20 @@ static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
{
}

+static inline int kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
static inline void kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
}
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_for_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+ gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ return gfn;
+}
#endif

static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
@@ -367,6 +398,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
.is_tdp = likely(vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault == kvm_tdp_page_fault),
.nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled =
is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm),
+ .is_private = kvm_is_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, cr2_or_gpa),

.max_level = vcpu->kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level,
.req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
index 9e56a5b1024c..eab62baf8549 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct tdp_iter {
tdp_ptep_t pt_path[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL];
/* A pointer to the current SPTE */
tdp_ptep_t sptep;
- /* The lowest GFN mapped by the current SPTE */
+ /* The lowest GFN (shared bits included) mapped by the current SPTE */
gfn_t gfn;
/* The level of the root page given to the iterator */
int root_level;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index bdb50c26849f..0e053b96444a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
sp->spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache);
sp->role = role;

+ if (kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role))
+ kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(vcpu, NULL, sp);
+
return sp;
}

@@ -305,7 +308,8 @@ static void tdp_mmu_init_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
trace_kvm_mmu_get_page(sp, true);
}

-hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ bool private)
{
union kvm_mmu_page_role role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
@@ -317,6 +321,8 @@ hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* Check for an existing root before allocating a new one. Note, the
* role check prevents consuming an invalid root.
*/
+ if (private)
+ kvm_mmu_page_role_set_private(&role);
for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, kvm_mmu_role_as_id(role)) {
if (root->role.word == role.word &&
kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(root))
@@ -333,11 +339,17 @@ hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
spin_unlock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);

out:
- return __pa(root->spt);
+ return root;
+}
+
+hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool private)
+{
+ return __pa(kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root(vcpu, private)->spt);
}

static int __must_check handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
- u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
+ u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role role,
bool shared);

static void handle_changed_spte_acc_track(u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level)
@@ -364,6 +376,8 @@ static void handle_changed_spte_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,

if ((!is_writable_pte(old_spte) || pfn_changed) &&
is_writable_pte(new_spte)) {
+ /* For memory slot operations, use GFN without aliasing */
+ gfn = gfn & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
slot = __gfn_to_memslot(__kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id), gfn);
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, slot, gfn);
}
@@ -500,7 +514,8 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
REMOVED_SPTE, level);
}
ret = handle_changed_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), gfn,
- old_spte, REMOVED_SPTE, level, shared);
+ old_spte, REMOVED_SPTE, sp->role,
+ shared);
/*
* We are removing page tables. Because in TDX case we don't
* zap private page tables except tearing down VM. It means
@@ -509,9 +524,81 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
}

+ if (is_private_sp(sp) &&
+ WARN_ON(static_call(kvm_x86_free_private_spt)(kvm, sp->gfn, sp->role.level,
+ kvm_mmu_private_spt(sp)))) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to unlink Secure EPT page and there is nothing to do
+ * further. Intentionally leak the page to prevent the kernel
+ * from accessing the encrypted page.
+ */
+ kvm_mmu_init_private_spt(sp, NULL);
+ }
+
call_rcu(&sp->rcu_head, tdp_mmu_free_sp_rcu_callback);
}

+static void *get_private_spt(gfn_t gfn, u64 new_spte, int level)
+{
+ if (is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte) && !is_last_spte(new_spte, level)) {
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = to_shadow_page(pfn_to_hpa(spte_to_pfn(new_spte)));
+ void *private_spt = kvm_mmu_private_spt(sp);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!private_spt);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level + 1 != level);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->gfn != gfn);
+ return private_spt;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int __must_check handle_changed_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
+ int level)
+{
+ bool was_present = is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte);
+ bool is_present = is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte);
+ bool was_leaf = was_present && is_last_spte(old_spte, level);
+ bool is_leaf = is_present && is_last_spte(new_spte, level);
+ kvm_pfn_t old_pfn = spte_to_pfn(old_spte);
+ kvm_pfn_t new_pfn = spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
+ int ret;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ if (is_present) {
+ /* TDP MMU doesn't change present -> present */
+ KVM_BUG_ON(was_present, kvm);
+
+ /*
+ * Use different call to either set up middle level
+ * private page table, or leaf.
+ */
+ if (is_leaf)
+ ret = static_call(kvm_x86_set_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, new_pfn);
+ else {
+ void *private_spt = get_private_spt(gfn, new_spte, level);
+
+ KVM_BUG_ON(!private_spt, kvm);
+ ret = static_call(kvm_x86_link_private_spt)(kvm, gfn, level, private_spt);
+ }
+ } else if (was_leaf) {
+ /* non-present -> non-present doesn't make sense. */
+ KVM_BUG_ON(!was_present, kvm);
+ /*
+ * Zap private leaf SPTE. Zapping private table is done
+ * below in handle_removed_tdp_mmu_page().
+ */
+ lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ ret = static_call(kvm_x86_zap_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ret = static_call(kvm_x86_remove_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, old_pfn);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* __handle_changed_spte - handle bookkeeping associated with an SPTE change
* @kvm: kvm instance
@@ -519,7 +606,7 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
* @gfn: the base GFN that was mapped by the SPTE
* @old_spte: The value of the SPTE before the change
* @new_spte: The value of the SPTE after the change
- * @level: the level of the PT the SPTE is part of in the paging structure
+ * @role: the role of the PT the SPTE is part of in the paging structure
* @shared: This operation may not be running under the exclusive use of
* the MMU lock and the operation must synchronize with other
* threads that might be modifying SPTEs.
@@ -528,14 +615,18 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
* This function must be called for all TDP SPTE modifications.
*/
static int __must_check __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
- u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
- bool shared)
+ u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role role, bool shared)
{
+ bool is_private = kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role);
+ int level = role.level;
bool was_present = is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte);
bool is_present = is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte);
bool was_leaf = was_present && is_last_spte(old_spte, level);
bool is_leaf = is_present && is_last_spte(new_spte, level);
- bool pfn_changed = spte_to_pfn(old_spte) != spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
+ kvm_pfn_t old_pfn = spte_to_pfn(old_spte);
+ kvm_pfn_t new_pfn = spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
+ bool pfn_changed = old_pfn != new_pfn;

WARN_ON(level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
WARN_ON(level < PG_LEVEL_4K);
@@ -602,7 +693,7 @@ static int __must_check __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t

if (was_leaf && is_dirty_spte(old_spte) &&
(!is_present || !is_dirty_spte(new_spte) || pfn_changed))
- kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte_to_pfn(old_spte));
+ kvm_set_pfn_dirty(old_pfn);

/*
* Recursively handle child PTs if the change removed a subtree from
@@ -611,26 +702,42 @@ static int __must_check __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t
* pages are kernel allocations and should never be migrated.
*/
if (was_present && !was_leaf &&
- (is_leaf || !is_present || WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn_changed)))
+ (is_leaf || !is_present || WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn_changed))) {
+ KVM_BUG_ON(is_private != is_private_sptep(spte_to_child_pt(old_spte, level)),
+ kvm);
handle_removed_pt(kvm, spte_to_child_pt(old_spte, level), shared);
+ }

+ /*
+ * Special handling for the private mapping. We are either
+ * setting up new mapping at middle level page table, or leaf,
+ * or tearing down existing mapping.
+ *
+ * This is after handling lower page table by above
+ * handle_remove_tdp_mmu_page(). Secure-EPT requires to remove
+ * Secure-EPT tables after removing children.
+ */
+ if (is_private &&
+ /* Ignore change of software only bits. e.g. host_writable */
+ (was_leaf != is_leaf || was_present != is_present || pfn_changed))
+ return handle_changed_private_spte(kvm, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, role.level);
return 0;
}

static int __must_check handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
- u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
+ u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role role,
bool shared)
{
int ret;

- ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level,
- shared);
+ ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, role, shared);
if (ret)
return ret;

- handle_changed_spte_acc_track(old_spte, new_spte, level);
+ handle_changed_spte_acc_track(old_spte, new_spte, role.level);
handle_changed_spte_dirty_log(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte,
- new_spte, level);
+ new_spte, role.level);
return 0;
}

@@ -656,6 +763,24 @@ static inline int __must_check tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
struct tdp_iter *iter,
u64 new_spte)
{
+ /*
+ * For conventional page table, the update flow is
+ * - update STPE with atomic operation
+ * - handle changed SPTE. __handle_changed_spte()
+ * NOTE: __handle_changed_spte() (and functions) must be safe against
+ * concurrent update. It is an exception to zap SPTE. See
+ * tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic().
+ *
+ * For private page table, callbacks are needed to propagate SPTE
+ * change into the protected page table. In order to atomically update
+ * both the SPTE and the protected page tables with callbacks, utilize
+ * freezing SPTE.
+ * - Freeze the SPTE. Set entry to REMOVED_SPTE.
+ * - Trigger callbacks for protected page tables. __handle_changed_spte()
+ * - Unfreeze the SPTE. Set the entry to new_spte.
+ */
+ bool freeze_spte = is_private_sptep(iter->sptep) && !is_removed_spte(new_spte);
+ u64 tmp_spte = freeze_spte ? REMOVED_SPTE : new_spte;
u64 *sptep = rcu_dereference(iter->sptep);
int ret;

@@ -673,14 +798,24 @@ static inline int __must_check tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
* Note, fast_pf_fix_direct_spte() can also modify TDP MMU SPTEs and
* does not hold the mmu_lock.
*/
- if (!try_cmpxchg64(sptep, &iter->old_spte, new_spte))
+ if (!try_cmpxchg64(sptep, &iter->old_spte, tmp_spte))
return -EBUSY;

ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, iter->as_id, iter->gfn, iter->old_spte,
- new_spte, iter->level, true);
+ new_spte, sptep_to_sp(sptep)->role, true);
if (!ret)
handle_changed_spte_acc_track(iter->old_spte, new_spte, iter->level);

+ if (ret) {
+ /*
+ * !freeze_spte means this fault isn't private. No call to
+ * operation on Secure EPT.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!freeze_spte);
+ __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, iter->old_spte);
+ } else if (freeze_spte)
+ __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, new_spte);
+
return ret;
}

@@ -750,6 +885,7 @@ static u64 __tdp_mmu_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, gfn_t gfn, int level,
bool record_acc_track, bool record_dirty_log)
{
+ union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
int ret;

lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
@@ -765,7 +901,9 @@ static u64 __tdp_mmu_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, tdp_ptep_t sptep,

old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte, new_spte, level);

- ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level, false);
+ role = sptep_to_sp(sptep)->role;
+ role.level = level;
+ ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, role, false);
/* Because write spin lock is held, no race. It should success. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);

@@ -819,8 +957,11 @@ static inline void tdp_mmu_set_spte_no_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm,
continue; \
else

-#define tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(_iter, _mmu, _start, _end) \
- for_each_tdp_pte(_iter, to_shadow_page(_mmu->root.hpa), _start, _end)
+#define tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(_iter, _mmu, _private, _start, _end) \
+ for_each_tdp_pte(_iter, \
+ to_shadow_page((_private) ? _mmu->private_root_hpa : \
+ _mmu->root.hpa), \
+ _start, _end)

/*
* Yield if the MMU lock is contended or this thread needs to return control
@@ -983,6 +1124,14 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
if (!zap_private && is_private_sp(root))
return false;

+ /*
+ * start and end doesn't have GFN shared bit. This function zaps
+ * a region including alias. Adjust shared bit of [start, end) if the
+ * root is shared.
+ */
+ start = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, start);
+ end = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, end);
+
rcu_read_lock();

for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, PG_LEVEL_4K, start, end) {
@@ -1111,10 +1260,19 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
WARN_ON(sp->role.level != fault->goal_level);
if (unlikely(!fault->slot))
new_spte = make_mmio_spte(vcpu, iter->gfn, ACC_ALL);
- else
- wrprot = make_spte(vcpu, sp, fault->slot, ACC_ALL, iter->gfn,
- fault->pfn, iter->old_spte, fault->prefetch, true,
- fault->map_writable, &new_spte);
+ else {
+ unsigned long pte_access = ACC_ALL;
+ gfn_t gfn_unalias = iter->gfn & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm);
+
+ /* TDX shared GPAs are no executable, enforce this for the SDV. */
+ if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm) && !fault->is_private)
+ pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
+
+ wrprot = make_spte(vcpu, sp, fault->slot, pte_access,
+ gfn_unalias, fault->pfn, iter->old_spte,
+ fault->prefetch, true, fault->map_writable,
+ &new_spte);
+ }

if (new_spte == iter->old_spte)
ret = RET_PF_SPURIOUS;
@@ -1214,6 +1372,8 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
struct tdp_iter iter;
+ gfn_t raw_gfn;
+ bool is_private = fault->is_private;
int ret;

kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, fault);
@@ -1222,7 +1382,17 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)

rcu_read_lock();

- tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, fault->gfn, fault->gfn + 1) {
+ raw_gfn = gpa_to_gfn(fault->addr);
+
+ if (is_error_noslot_pfn(fault->pfn) ||
+ !kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(fault->pfn)) {
+ if (is_private) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, is_private, raw_gfn, raw_gfn + 1) {
if (fault->nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled)
disallowed_hugepage_adjust(fault, iter.old_spte, iter.level);

@@ -1238,6 +1408,12 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
is_large_pte(iter.old_spte)) {
if (tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(vcpu->kvm, &iter))
break;
+ /*
+ * TODO: large page support.
+ * Doesn't support large page for TDX now
+ */
+ KVM_BUG_ON(is_private_sptep(iter.sptep), vcpu->kvm);
+

/*
* The iter must explicitly re-read the spte here
@@ -1480,6 +1656,12 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp, union kvm_mm

sp->role = role;
sp->spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
+ if (kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role)) {
+ if (kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(sp, gfp)) {
+ free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
+ sp->spt = NULL;
+ }
+ }
if (!sp->spt) {
kmem_cache_free(mmu_page_header_cache, sp);
return NULL;
@@ -1495,6 +1677,11 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm,
union kvm_mmu_page_role role = tdp_iter_child_role(iter);
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;

+ KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role) !=
+ is_private_sptep(iter->sptep), kvm);
+ /* TODO: Large page isn't supported for private SPTE yet. */
+ KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role), kvm);
+
/*
* Since we are allocating while under the MMU lock we have to be
* careful about GFP flags. Use GFP_NOWAIT to avoid blocking on direct
@@ -1929,7 +2116,7 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)))
return leaf;

- tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, gfn, gfn + 1) {
+ tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, false, gfn, gfn + 1) {
leaf = iter.level;
sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;
}
@@ -1956,7 +2143,10 @@ u64 *kvm_tdp_mmu_fast_pf_get_last_sptep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr,
gfn_t gfn = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
tdp_ptep_t sptep = NULL;

- tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, gfn, gfn + 1) {
+ /* fast page fault for private GPA isn't supported. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_is_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, addr));
+
+ tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, false, gfn, gfn + 1) {
*spte = iter.old_spte;
sptep = iter.sptep;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
index c98c7df449a8..695175c921a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@

#include <linux/kvm_host.h>

-hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool private);

__must_check static inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(struct kvm_mmu_page *root)
{
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index dda2f2ec4faa..8c996f40b544 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ struct page *kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(kvm_pfn_t pfn)

return NULL;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page);

/*
* Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put()
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:24:21

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 076/108] KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

For vcpu migration, in the case of VMX, VCMS is flushed on the source pcpu,
and load it on the target pcpu. There are corresponding TDX SEAMCALL APIs,
call them on vcpu migration. The logic is mostly same as VMX except the
TDX SEAMCALLs are used.

When shutting down the machine, (VMX or TDX) vcpus needs to be shutdown on
each pcpu. Do the similar for TDX with TDX SEAMCALL APIs.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 43 +++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 ++
4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 379b3343557b..6d46ae9c5dce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -17,6 +17,25 @@ static bool vt_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
(enable_tdx && tdx_is_vm_type_supported(type));
}

+static int vt_hardware_enable(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = vmx_hardware_enable();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ tdx_hardware_enable();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void vt_hardware_disable(void)
+{
+ /* Note, TDX *and* VMX need to be disabled if TDX is enabled. */
+ tdx_hardware_disable();
+ vmx_hardware_disable();
+}
+
static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
{
int ret;
@@ -141,6 +160,14 @@ static fastpath_t vt_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return vmx_vcpu_run(vcpu);
}

+static void vt_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+}
+
static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -199,6 +226,14 @@ static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
vmx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
}

+static void vt_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_sched_in(vcpu, cpu);
+}
+
static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -222,8 +257,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.offline_cpu = tdx_offline_cpu,
.check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility,

- .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
- .hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
+ .hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable,
+ .hardware_disable = vt_hardware_disable,
.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,

.is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
@@ -239,7 +274,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset,

.prepare_switch_to_guest = vt_prepare_switch_to_guest,
- .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
+ .vcpu_load = vt_vcpu_load,
.vcpu_put = vt_vcpu_put,

.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
@@ -327,7 +362,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {

.request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,

- .sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
+ .sched_in = vt_sched_in,

.cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_ENTITY_NUM,
.update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 5807a2f564af..fc4de83a2df8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock);
static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock;
static atomic_t nr_configured_hkid;

+/*
+ * A per-CPU list of TD vCPUs associated with a given CPU. Used when a CPU
+ * is brought down to invoke TDH_VP_FLUSH on the approapriate TD vCPUS.
+ * Protected by interrupt mask. This list is manipulated in process context
+ * of vcpu and IPI callback. See tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu().
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, associated_tdvcpus);
+
static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
{
return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
@@ -82,6 +90,36 @@ static inline bool is_td_finalized(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
return kvm_tdx->finalized;
}

+static inline void tdx_disassociate_vp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ list_del(&to_tdx(vcpu)->cpu_list);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure tdx->cpu_list is updated is before setting vcpu->cpu to -1,
+ * otherwise, a different CPU can see vcpu->cpu = -1 and add the vCPU
+ * to its list before its deleted from this CPUs list.
+ */
+ smp_wmb();
+
+ vcpu->cpu = -1;
+}
+
+void tdx_hardware_enable(void)
+{
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, raw_smp_processor_id()));
+}
+
+void tdx_hardware_disable(void)
+{
+ int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+ struct list_head *tdvcpus = &per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, cpu);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, *tmp;
+
+ /* Safe variant needed as tdx_disassociate_vp() deletes the entry. */
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(tdx, tmp, tdvcpus, cpu_list)
+ tdx_disassociate_vp(&tdx->vcpu);
+}
+
static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page)
{
const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
@@ -176,6 +214,41 @@ static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
}
}

+static void tdx_flush_vp(void *arg)
+{
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = arg;
+ u64 err;
+
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
+ /* Task migration can race with CPU offlining. */
+ if (vcpu->cpu != raw_smp_processor_id())
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * No need to do TDH_VP_FLUSH if the vCPU hasn't been initialized. The
+ * list tracking still needs to be updated so that it's correct if/when
+ * the vCPU does get initialized.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu_created(to_tdx(vcpu))) {
+ err = tdh_vp_flush(to_tdx(vcpu)->tdvpr.pa);
+ if (unlikely(err && err != TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err))
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_FLUSH, err, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ tdx_disassociate_vp(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->cpu == -1))
+ return;
+
+ smp_call_function_single(vcpu->cpu, tdx_flush_vp, vcpu, 1);
+}
+
static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb(void *param)
{
u64 err = 0;
@@ -200,6 +273,8 @@ void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
cpumask_var_t packages;
bool cpumask_allocated;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ unsigned long j;
u64 err;
int ret;
int i;
@@ -210,6 +285,19 @@ void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
if (!is_td_created(kvm_tdx))
goto free_hkid;

+ kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm)
+ tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(vcpu);
+
+ mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
+ err = tdh_mng_vpflushdone(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);
+ mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE, err, NULL);
+ pr_err("tdh_mng_vpflushdone failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n",
+ kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ return;
+ }
+
cpumask_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL);
cpus_read_lock();
for_each_online_cpu(i) {
@@ -355,6 +443,26 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}

+void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ if (vcpu->cpu == cpu)
+ return;
+
+ tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(vcpu);
+
+ local_irq_disable();
+ /*
+ * Pairs with the smp_wmb() in tdx_disassociate_vp() to ensure
+ * vcpu->cpu is read before tdx->cpu_list.
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ list_add(&tdx->cpu_list, &per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, cpu));
+ local_irq_enable();
+}
+
void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
@@ -405,6 +513,19 @@ void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
}
tdx_reclaim_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
+
+ /*
+ * kvm_free_vcpus()
+ * -> kvm_unload_vcpu_mmu()
+ *
+ * does vcpu_load() for every vcpu after they already disassociated
+ * from the per cpu list when tdx_vm_teardown(). So we need to
+ * disassociate them again, otherwise the freed vcpu data will be
+ * accessed when do list_{del,add}() on associated_tdvcpus list
+ * later.
+ */
+ tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(vcpu);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->cpu != -1);
}

void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index e5f973b2d752..c02073102a5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;

+ struct list_head cpu_list;
+
union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason;

bool vcpu_initialized;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index a4e50c5a4bf5..d4fcb6b29ffe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
int tdx_offline_cpu(void);
+void tdx_hardware_enable(void);
+void tdx_hardware_disable(void);
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp);

int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -150,6 +152,7 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -162,6 +165,8 @@ static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
static inline int tdx_offline_cpu(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void tdx_hardware_enable(void) {}
+static inline void tdx_hardware_disable(void) {}
static inline int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; };

static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
@@ -175,6 +180,7 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; }
static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:24:22

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 022/108] KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because TDX KVM doesn't support PMU yet (it's future work of TDX KVM
support as another patch series) and pmu_intel.c touches vmx specific
structure in vcpu initialization, as workaround add dummy structure to
struct vcpu_tdx and pmu_intel.c can ignore TDX case.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 7 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 32 +------------------------
5 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
index 25b70a85bef5..41e97c21f0d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include "lapic.h"
#include "nested.h"
#include "pmu.h"
+#include "tdx.h"

#define MSR_PMC_FULL_WIDTH_BIT (MSR_IA32_PMC0 - MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)

@@ -35,6 +36,26 @@ static struct kvm_event_hw_type_mapping intel_arch_events[] = {
/* mapping between fixed pmc index and intel_arch_events array */
static int fixed_pmc_events[] = {1, 0, 7};

+struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return &to_tdx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
+#endif
+
+ return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
+}
+
+struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return &to_tdx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.records;
+#endif
+
+ return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.records;
+}
+
static void reprogram_fixed_counters(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u64 data)
{
struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
@@ -167,6 +188,23 @@ static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_fw_gp_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr)
return get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PMC0);
}

+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+ return cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct x86_pmu_lbr *lbr = vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu);
+
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return lbr->nr && (vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu) & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT);
+}
+
static bool intel_pmu_is_valid_lbr_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index)
{
struct x86_pmu_lbr *records = vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu);
@@ -277,6 +315,9 @@ int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER,
};

+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return 0;
+
if (unlikely(lbr_desc->event)) {
__set_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use);
return 0;
@@ -586,7 +627,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters);

perf_capabilities = vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu);
- if (cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu) &&
+ if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(vcpu) &&
(perf_capabilities & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
x86_perf_get_lbr(&lbr_desc->records);
else
@@ -643,6 +684,9 @@ static void intel_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm_pmc *pmc = NULL;
int i;

+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
for (i = 0; i < INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC; i++) {
pmc = &pmu->gp_counters[i];

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..66bba47c1269
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H
+
+struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+struct lbr_desc {
+ /* Basic info about guest LBR records. */
+ struct x86_pmu_lbr records;
+
+ /*
+ * Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the
+ * per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu.
+ *
+ * The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR.
+ */
+ struct perf_event *event;
+
+ /* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */
+ bool msr_passthrough;
+};
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_PMU_INTEL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index ff0ea9cad347..5aea69716278 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST

+#include "pmu_intel.h"
#include "tdx_ops.h"

struct tdx_td_page {
@@ -30,6 +31,12 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {

struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;
+
+ /*
+ * Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory.
+ * TODO: Support PMU for TDX. Future work.
+ */
+ struct lbr_desc lbr_desc;
};

static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 68aef67c5eb7..f890191e8580 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2341,7 +2341,7 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
if ((data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) !=
(vmx_get_perf_capabilities() & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
return 1;
- if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu))
+ if (!intel_pmu_lbr_is_compatible(vcpu))
return 1;
}
if (data & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index a3da84f4ea45..d49d0ace9fb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "capabilities.h"
#include "../kvm_cache_regs.h"
#include "posted_intr.h"
+#include "pmu_intel.h"
#include "vmcs.h"
#include "vmx_ops.h"
#include "../cpuid.h"
@@ -105,22 +106,6 @@ static inline bool intel_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(struct kvm_pmu *pmu)
return pmu->version > 1;
}

-struct lbr_desc {
- /* Basic info about guest LBR records. */
- struct x86_pmu_lbr records;
-
- /*
- * Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the
- * per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu.
- *
- * The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR.
- */
- struct perf_event *event;
-
- /* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */
- bool msr_passthrough;
-};
-
/*
* The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need
* for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu.
@@ -650,21 +635,6 @@ static inline struct vcpu_vmx *to_vmx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu);
}

-static inline struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
-}
-
-static inline struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return &vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu)->records;
-}
-
-static inline bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return !!vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu)->nr;
-}
-
void intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check(struct kvm_pmu *pmu);
int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:24:23

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 103/108] KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX doesn't support system-management mode (SMM) and system-management
interrupt (SMI) in guest TDs. Because guest state (vcpu state, memory
state) is protected, it must go through the TDX module APIs to change guest
state, injecting SMI and changing vcpu mode into SMM. The TDX module
doesn't provide a way for VMM to inject SMI into guest TD and a way for VMM
to switch guest vcpu mode into SMM.

We have two options in KVM when handling SMM or SMI in the guest TD or the
device model (e.g. QEMU): 1) silently ignore the request or 2) return a
meaningful error.

For simplicity, we implemented the option 1).

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 7 +++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 8 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++-
5 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 8d894c3959c8..7a1d612bd138 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -1171,8 +1171,11 @@ static int __apic_accept_irq(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,

case APIC_DM_SMI:
result = 1;
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
- kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+ if (static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(vcpu->kvm,
+ MSR_IA32_SMBASE)) {
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
+ kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+ }
break;

case APIC_DM_NMI:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 3a8a4fdf1ce7..4acba8d8cb27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -223,6 +223,41 @@ static int vt_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
return vmx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
}

+static int vt_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_smi_allowed(vcpu, for_injection);
+
+ return vmx_smi_allowed(vcpu, for_injection);
+}
+
+static int vt_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
+{
+ if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return tdx_enter_smm(vcpu, smstate);
+
+ return vmx_enter_smm(vcpu, smstate);
+}
+
+static int vt_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
+{
+ if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return tdx_leave_smm(vcpu, smstate);
+
+ return vmx_leave_smm(vcpu, smstate);
+}
+
+static void vt_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+ tdx_enable_smi_window(vcpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* RSM will cause a vmexit anyway. */
+ vmx_enable_smi_window(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -580,10 +615,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {

.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,

- .smi_allowed = vmx_smi_allowed,
- .enter_smm = vmx_enter_smm,
- .leave_smm = vmx_leave_smm,
- .enable_smi_window = vmx_enable_smi_window,
+ .smi_allowed = vt_smi_allowed,
+ .enter_smm = vt_enter_smm,
+ .leave_smm = vt_leave_smm,
+ .enable_smi_window = vt_enable_smi_window,

.can_emulate_instruction = vmx_can_emulate_instruction,
.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 8e8ac1081ce4..111027724e06 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1660,6 +1660,33 @@ int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
return 1;
}

+int tdx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ /* SMI isn't supported for TDX. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return false;
+}
+
+int tdx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
+{
+ /* smi_allowed() is always false for TDX as above. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tdx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* SMI isn't supported for TDX. Silently discard SMI request. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ vcpu->arch.smi_pending = false;
+}
+
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 8b9399b154f3..d4ffbf580bc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -165,6 +165,10 @@ void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write);
int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
+int tdx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
+int tdx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate);
+int tdx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate);
+void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -206,6 +210,10 @@ static inline void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason, u64 *in
static inline bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write) { return false; }
static inline int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
static inline int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
+static inline int tdx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection) { return false; }
+static inline int tdx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate) { return 0; }
+static inline int tdx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate) { return 0; }
+static inline void tdx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 5304b27f2566..d07563d0e204 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4936,7 +4936,8 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
+ if (static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(vcpu->kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE))
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);

return 0;
}
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:24:39

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 025/108] KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TD guest vcpu need to be configured before ready to run which requests
addtional information from Device model (e.g. qemu), one 64bit value is
passed to vcpu's RCX as an initial value. Repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
to vcpu-scope and add new sub-commands KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU under it for such
additional vcpu configuration.

Add callback for kvm vCPU-scoped operations of KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP and
add a new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU, for further vcpu initialization.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 4 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
9 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 4425564647cb..f28c9fd72ac4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(leave_smm)
KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(dev_mem_enc_ioctl)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_ioctl)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_copy_enc_context_from)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 1fced310ec63..829a07d23909 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1628,6 +1628,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {

int (*dev_mem_enc_ioctl)(void __user *argp);
int (*mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+ int (*vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
int (*mem_enc_register_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
int (*mem_enc_unregister_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
int (*vm_copy_enc_context_from)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 26661879c031..80db152430e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,

KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index c125b2e3e8b4..0d5ca65e9997 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -103,6 +103,14 @@ static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
return tdx_vm_ioctl(kvm, argp);
}

+static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
+{
+ if (!is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return tdx_vcpu_ioctl(vcpu, argp);
+}
+
struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = "kvm_intel",

@@ -246,6 +254,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {

.dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl,
.mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,
+ .vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl,
};

struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 0625c354b341..fd9210cb4f36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0;
}

+static inline bool is_td_finalized(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
+{
+ return kvm_tdx->finalized;
+}
+
static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page)
{
const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
@@ -303,31 +308,12 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)

int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
- int ret, i;
-
/* TDX only supports x2APIC, which requires an in-kernel local APIC. */
if (!vcpu->arch.apic)
return -EINVAL;

fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);

- ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- tdx->tdvpx = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages, sizeof(*tdx->tdvpx),
- GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!tdx->tdvpx) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto free_tdvpr;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
- ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
- if (ret)
- goto free_tdvpx;
- }
-
vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;

vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
@@ -339,17 +325,6 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
!(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG);

return 0;
-
-free_tdvpx:
- /* @i points at the TDVPX page that failed allocation. */
- for (--i; i >= 0; i--)
- free_page(tdx->tdvpx[i].va);
- kfree(tdx->tdvpx);
- tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
-free_tdvpr:
- free_page(tdx->tdvpr.va);
-
- return ret;
}

void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -372,34 +347,14 @@ void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
{
- struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
- struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
- u64 err;
- int i;

/* TDX doesn't support INIT event. */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(init_event))
goto td_bugged;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu_created(tdx)))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu_created(to_tdx(vcpu))))
goto td_bugged;

- err = tdh_vp_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, tdx->tdvpr.pa);
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
- pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_CREATE, err, NULL);
- goto td_bugged;
- }
- tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpr);
-
- for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
- err = tdh_vp_addcx(tdx->tdvpr.pa, tdx->tdvpx[i].pa);
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
- pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_ADDCX, err, NULL);
- goto td_bugged;
- }
- tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
- }
-
if (!vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries) {
/*
* On cpu creation, cpuid entry is blank. Forcibly enable
@@ -419,6 +374,8 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries = e;
vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent = 1;
}
+
+ /* TDX rquires X2APIC. */
apic_base_msr.data = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC;
if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
apic_base_msr.data |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
@@ -426,7 +383,10 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, &apic_base_msr)))
goto td_bugged;

- vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+ /*
+ * Don't update mp_state to runnable because more initialization
+ * is needed by TDX_VCPU_INIT.
+ */

return;

@@ -861,6 +821,108 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
return r;
}

+static int tdx_td_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vcpu_rcx)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ int ret, i;
+ u64 err;
+
+ if (is_td_vcpu_created(tdx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ tdx->tdvpx = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages, sizeof(*tdx->tdvpx),
+ GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!tdx->tdvpx) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_tdvpr;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_tdvpx;
+ }
+
+ err = tdh_vp_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, tdx->tdvpr.pa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_CREATE, err, NULL);
+ goto td_bugged;
+ }
+ tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpr);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
+ err = tdh_vp_addcx(tdx->tdvpr.pa, tdx->tdvpx[i].pa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_ADDCX, err, NULL);
+ goto td_bugged;
+ }
+ tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
+ }
+
+ err = tdh_vp_init(tdx->tdvpr.pa, vcpu_rcx);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_INIT, err, NULL);
+ goto td_bugged;
+ }
+
+ vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+
+ return 0;
+
+td_bugged:
+ vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
+ return ret;
+
+free_tdvpx:
+ /* @i points at the TDVPX page that failed allocation. */
+ for (--i; i >= 0; i--)
+ free_page(tdx->tdvpx[i].va);
+ kfree(tdx->tdvpx);
+ tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
+free_tdvpr:
+ free_page(tdx->tdvpr.va);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (tdx->vcpu_initialized)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!is_td_initialized(vcpu->kvm) || is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (cmd.error || cmd.unused)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Currently only KVM_TDX_INTI_VCPU is defined for vcpu operation. */
+ if (cmd.flags || cmd.id != KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = tdx_td_vcpu_init(vcpu, (u64)cmd.data);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ tdx->vcpu_initialized = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
{
const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 5aea69716278..a95f25845f24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
u64 xfam;
int hkid;

+ bool finalized;
+
u64 tsc_offset;
};

@@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;

+ bool vcpu_initialized;
+
/*
* Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory.
* TODO: Support PMU for TDX. Future work.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index f6841c3dd12d..fda1b2eaebc6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
#else
static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
@@ -163,6 +164,7 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
#endif

#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index ddcbbcf13a55..a811d643f71c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -5963,6 +5963,12 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR:
r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_device_attr(vcpu, ioctl, argp);
break;
+ case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP:
+ r = -ENOTTY;
+ if (!kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl)
+ goto out;
+ r = kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(vcpu, argp);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 531a0033e530..35e3b4aa2e96 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,

KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
};
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:24:52

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 107/108] KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add a high level design document on TDX changes to TDP MMU.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 417 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 417 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2d91c94e6d8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Design of TDP MMU for TDX support
+=================================
+This document describes a (high level) design for TDX support of KVM TDP MMU of
+x86 KVM.
+
+In this document, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the current
+"VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today.
+
+
+Background of TDX
+=================
+TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU
+using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption
+keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a
+Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the
+encryption keys.
+
+In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by
+allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical address.
+The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME accesses and
+private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared HKID on the
+host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.
+
+During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified
+as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest
+Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT
+(Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in the
+host VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same
+as with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data
+exchange needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current
+EPT functionality even for TDs.
+
+The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT
+pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private key.
+Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX interface
+functions (SEAMCALLs), and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT
+because not all functionalities are available.
+
+Since the execution of such interface functions takes much longer time than
+accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to mirror the
+Secure EPT for the TD. And we think there are at least two options today in
+terms of the timing for executing such SEAMCALLs:
+
+1. synchronous, i.e. while walking the TDP page tables, or
+2. post-walk, i.e. record what needs to be done to the real Secure EPT during
+ the walk, and execute SEAMCALLs later.
+
+The option 1 seems to be more intuitive and simpler, but the Secure EPT
+concurrency rules are different from the ones of the TDP or EPT. For example,
+MEM.SEPT.RD acquire shared access to the whole Secure EPT tree of the target
+
+Secure EPT(SEPT) operations
+---------------------------
+Secure EPT is an Extended Page Table for GPA-to-HPA translation of TD private
+HPA. A Secure EPT is designed to be encrypted with the TD's ephemeral private
+key. SEPT pages are allocated by the host VMM via Intel TDX functions, but their
+content is intended to be hidden and is not architectural.
+
+Unlike the conventional EPT, the CPU can't directly read/write its entry.
+Instead, TDX SEAMCALL API is used. Several SEAMCALLs correspond to operation on
+the EPT entry.
+
+* TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD():
+
+ Add a secure EPT page from the secure EPT tree. This corresponds to updating
+ the non-leaf EPT entry with present bit set
+
+* TDH.MEM.SEPT.REMOVE():
+
+ Remove the secure page from the secure EPT tree. There is no corresponding
+ to the EPT operation.
+
+* TDH.MEM.SEPT.RD():
+
+ Read the secure EPT entry. This corresponds to reading the EPT entry as
+ memory. Please note that this is much slower than direct memory reading.
+
+* TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD() and TDH.MEM.PAGE.AUG():
+
+ Add a private page to the secure EPT tree. This corresponds to updating the
+ leaf EPT entry with present bit set.
+
+* THD.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE():
+
+ Remove a private page from the secure EPT tree. There is no corresponding
+ to the EPT operation.
+
+* TDH.MEM.RANGE.BLOCK():
+
+ This (mostly) corresponds to clearing the present bit of the leaf EPT entry.
+ Note that the private page is still linked in the secure EPT. To remove it
+ from the secure EPT, TDH.MEM.SEPT.REMOVE() and TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE() needs to
+ be called.
+
+* TDH.MEM.TRACK():
+
+ Increment the TLB epoch counter. This (mostly) corresponds to EPT TLB flush.
+ Note that the private page is still linked in the secure EPT. To remove it
+ from the secure EPT, tdh_mem_page_remove() needs to be called.
+
+
+Adding private page
+-------------------
+The procedure of populating the private page looks as follows.
+
+1. TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD(512G level)
+2. TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD(1G level)
+3. TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD(2M level)
+4. TDH.MEM.PAGE.AUG(4K level)
+
+Those operations correspond to updating the EPT entries.
+
+Dropping private page and TLB shootdown
+---------------------------------------
+The procedure of dropping the private page looks as follows.
+
+1. TDH.MEM.RANGE.BLOCK(4K level)
+
+ This mostly corresponds to clear the present bit in the EPT entry. This
+ prevents (or blocks) TLB entry from creating in the future. Note that the
+ private page is still linked in the secure EPT tree and the existing cache
+ entry in the TLB isn't flushed.
+
+2. TDH.MEM.TRACK(range) and TLB shootdown
+
+ This mostly corresponds to the EPT TLB shootdown. Because all vcpus share
+ the same Secure EPT, all vcpus need to flush TLB.
+
+ * TDH.MEM.TRACK(range) by one vcpu. It increments the global internal TLB
+ epoch counter.
+
+ * send IPI to remote vcpus
+ * Other vcpu exits to VMM from guest TD and then re-enter. TDH.VP.ENTER().
+ * TDH.VP.ENTER() checks the TLB epoch counter and If its TLB is old, flush
+ TLB.
+
+ Note that only single vcpu issues tdh_mem_track().
+
+ Note that the private page is still linked in the secure EPT tree, unlike the
+ conventional EPT.
+
+3. TDH.MEM.PAGE.PROMOTE, TDH.MEM.PAGEDEMOTE(), TDH.MEM.PAGE.RELOCATE(), or
+ TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE()
+
+ There is no corresponding operation to the conventional EPT.
+
+ * When changing page size (e.g. 4K <-> 2M) TDH.MEM.PAGE.PROMOTE() or
+ TDH.MEM.PAGE.DEMOTE() is used. During those operation, the guest page is
+ kept referenced in the Secure EPT.
+
+ * When migrating page, TDH.MEM.PAGE.RELOCATE(). This requires both source
+ page and destination page.
+ * when destroying TD, TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE() removes the private page from the
+ secure EPT tree. In this case TLB shootdown is not needed because vcpus
+ don't run any more.
+
+The basic idea for TDX support
+==============================
+Because shared EPT is the same as the existing EPT, use the existing logic for
+shared EPT. On the other hand, secure EPT requires additional operations
+instead of directly reading/writing of the EPT entry.
+
+On EPT violation, The KVM mmu walks down the EPT tree from the root, determines
+the EPT entry to operate, and updates the entry. If necessary, a TLB shootdown
+is done. Because it's very slow to directly walk secure EPT by TDX SEAMCALL,
+TDH.MEM.SEPT.RD(), the mirror of secure EPT is created and maintained. Add
+hooks to KVM MMU to reuse the existing code.
+
+EPT violation on shared GPA
+---------------------------
+(1) EPT violation on shared GPA or zapping shared GPA
+ ::
+
+ walk down shared EPT tree (the existing code)
+ |
+ |
+ V
+ shared EPT tree (CPU refers.)
+
+(2) update the EPT entry. (the existing code)
+
+ TLB shootdown in the case of zapping.
+
+
+EPT violation on private GPA
+----------------------------
+(1) EPT violation on private GPA or zapping private GPA
+ ::
+
+ walk down the mirror of secure EPT tree (mostly same as the existing code)
+ |
+ |
+ V
+ mirror of secure EPT tree (KVM MMU software only. reuse of the existing code)
+
+(2) update the (mirrored) EPT entry. (mostly same as the existing code)
+
+(3) call the hooks with what EPT entry is changed
+ ::
+
+ |
+ NEW: hooks in KVM MMU
+ |
+ V
+ secure EPT root(CPU refers)
+
+(4) the TDX backend calls necessary TDX SEAMCALLs to update real secure EPT.
+
+The major modification is to add hooks for the TDX backend for additional
+operations and to pass down which EPT, shared EPT, or private EPT is used, and
+twist the behavior if we're operating on private EPT.
+
+The following depicts the relationship.
+::
+
+ KVM | TDX module
+ | | |
+ -------------+---------- | |
+ | | | |
+ V V | |
+ shared GPA private GPA | |
+ CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT pointer
+ | | | |
+ | | | |
+ V V | V
+ shared EPT private EPT<-------mirror----->Secure EPT
+ | | | |
+ | \--------------------+------\ |
+ | | | |
+ V | V V
+ shared guest page | private guest page
+ |
+ |
+ non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
+ |
+
+shared EPT: CPU and KVM walk with shared GPA
+ Maintained by the existing code
+private EPT: KVM walks with private GPA
+ Maintained by the twisted existing code
+secure EPT: CPU walks with private GPA.
+ Maintained by TDX module with TDX SEAMCALLs via hooks
+
+
+Tracking private EPT page
+=========================
+Shared EPT pages are managed by struct kvm_mmu_page. They are linked in a list
+structure. When necessary, the list is traversed to operate on. Private EPT
+pages have different characteristics. For example, private pages can't be
+swapped out. When shrinking memory, we'd like to traverse only shared EPT pages
+and skip private EPT pages. Likewise, page migration isn't supported for
+private pages (yet). Introduce an additional list to track shared EPT pages and
+track private EPT pages independently.
+
+At the beginning of EPT violation, the fault handler knows fault GPA, thus it
+knows which EPT to operate on, private or shared. If it's private EPT,
+an additional task is done. Something like "if (private) { callback a hook }".
+Since the fault handler has deep function calls, it's cumbersome to hold the
+information of which EPT is operating. Options to mitigate it are
+
+1. Pass the information as an argument for the function call.
+2. Record the information in struct kvm_mmu_page somehow.
+3. Record the information in vcpu structure.
+
+Option 2 was chosen. Because option 1 requires modifying all the functions. It
+would affect badly to the normal case. Option 3 doesn't work well because in
+some cases, we need to walk both private and shared EPT.
+
+The role of the EPT page can be utilized and one bit can be curved out from
+unused bits in struct kvm_mmu_page_role. When allocating the EPT page,
+initialize the information. Mostly struct kvm_mmu_page is available because
+we're operating on EPT pages.
+
+
+The conversion of private GPA and shared GPA
+============================================
+A page of a given GPA can be assigned to only private GPA xor shared GPA at one
+time. The GPA can't be accessed simultaneously via both private GPA and shared
+GPA. On guest startup, all the GPAs are assigned as private. Guest converts
+the range of GPA to shared (or private) from private (or shared) by MapGPA
+hypercall. MapGPA hypercall takes the start GPA and the size of the region. If
+the given start GPA is shared, VMM converts the region into shared (if it's
+already shared, nop). If the start GPA is private, VMM converts the region into
+private. It implies the guest won't access the unmapped region. private(or
+shared) region after converting to shared(or private).
+
+If the guest TD triggers an EPT violation on the already converted region, the
+access won't be allowed (loop in EPT violation) until other vcpu converts back
+the region.
+
+KVM MMU records which GPA is allowed to access, private or shared by xarray.
+
+
+The original TDP MMU and race condition
+=======================================
+Because vcpus share the EPT, once the EPT entry is zapped, we need to shootdown
+TLB. Send IPI to remote vcpus. Remote vcpus flush their down TLBs. Until TLB
+shootdown is done, vcpus may reference the zapped guest page.
+
+TDP MMU uses read lock of mmu_lock to mitigate vcpu contention. When read lock
+is obtained, it depends on the atomic update of the EPT entry. (On the other
+hand legacy MMU uses write lock.) When vcpu is populating/zapping the EPT entry
+with a read lock held, other vcpu may be populating or zapping the same EPT
+entry at the same time.
+
+To avoid the race condition, the entry is frozen. It means the EPT entry is set
+to the special value, REMOVED_SPTE which clears the present bit. And then after
+TLB shootdown, update the EPT entry to the final value.
+
+Concurrent zapping
+------------------
+1. read lock
+2. freeze the EPT entry (atomically set the value to REMOVED_SPTE)
+ If other vcpu froze the entry, restart page fault.
+3. TLB shootdown
+
+ * send IPI to remote vcpus
+ * TLB flush (local and remote)
+
+ For each entry update, TLB shootdown is needed because of the
+ concurrency.
+4. atomically set the EPT entry to the final value
+5. read unlock
+
+Concurrent populating
+---------------------
+In the case of populating the non-present EPT entry, atomically update the EPT
+entry.
+
+1. read lock
+
+2. atomically update the EPT entry
+ If other vcpu frozen the entry or updated the entry, restart page fault.
+
+3. read unlock
+
+In the case of updating the present EPT entry (e.g. page migration), the
+operation is split into two. Zapping the entry and populating the entry.
+
+1. read lock
+2. zap the EPT entry. follow the concurrent zapping case.
+3. populate the non-present EPT entry.
+4. read unlock
+
+Non-concurrent batched zapping
+------------------------------
+In some cases, zapping the ranges is done exclusively with a write lock held.
+In this case, the TLB shootdown is batched into one.
+
+1. write lock
+2. zap the EPT entries by traversing them
+3. TLB shootdown
+4. write unlock
+
+For Secure EPT, TDX SEAMCALLs are needed in addition to updating the mirrored
+EPT entry.
+
+TDX concurrent zapping
+----------------------
+Add a hook for TDX SEAMCALLs at the step of the TLB shootdown.
+
+1. read lock
+2. freeze the EPT entry(set the value to REMOVED_SPTE)
+3. TLB shootdown via a hook
+
+ * TLB.MEM.RANGE.BLOCK()
+ * TLB.MEM.TRACK()
+ * send IPI to remote vcpus
+
+4. set the EPT entry to the final value
+5. read unlock
+
+TDX concurrent populating
+-------------------------
+TDX SEAMCALLs are required in addition to operating the mirrored EPT entry. The
+frozen entry is utilized by following the zapping case to avoid the race
+condition. A hook can be added.
+
+1. read lock
+2. freeze the EPT entry
+3. hook
+
+ * TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD() for non-leaf or TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG() for leaf.
+
+4. set the EPT entry to the final value
+5. read unlock
+
+Without freezing the entry, the following race can happen. Suppose two vcpus
+are faulting on the same GPA and the 2M and 4K level entries aren't populated
+yet.
+
+* vcpu 1: update 2M level EPT entry
+* vcpu 2: update 4K level EPT entry
+* vcpu 2: TDX SEAMCALL to update 4K secure EPT entry => error
+* vcpu 1: TDX SEAMCALL to update 2M secure EPT entry
+
+
+TDX non-concurrent batched zapping
+----------------------------------
+For simplicity, the procedure of concurrent populating is utilized. The
+procedure can be optimized later.
+
+
+Co-existing with unmapping guest private memory
+===============================================
+TODO. This needs to be addressed.
+
+
+Restrictions or future work
+===========================
+The following features aren't supported yet at the moment.
+
+* optimizing non-concurrent zap
+* Large page
+* Page migration
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:25:02

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 066/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD vcpu
enter/exit.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index 53897312699f..b51e8e6b1541 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ What qemu can do
- Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.
- Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.
- Qemu can populate initial guest memory image.
+- Qemu can finalize guest TD.

Patch Layer status
------------------
@@ -21,8 +22,8 @@ Patch Layer status
* TD VM creation/destruction: Applied
* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applied
* TDX EPT violation: Applied
-* TD finalization: Applying
-* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
+* TD finalization: Applied
+* TD vcpu enter/exit: Applying
* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet

* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:25:06

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 058/108] KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Implement hooks of TDP MMU for TDX backend. TLB flush, TLB shootdown,
propagating the change private EPT entry to Secure EPT and freeing Secure
EPT page. TLB flush handles both shared EPT and private EPT. It flushes
shared EPT same as VMX. It also waits for the TDX TLB shootdown. For the
hook to free Secure EPT page, unlinks the Secure EPT page from the Secure
EPT so that the page can be freed to OS.

Propagate the entry change to Secure EPT. The possible entry changes are
present -> non-present(zapping) and non-present -> present(population). On
population just link the Secure EPT page or the private guest page to the
Secure EPT by TDX SEAMCALL. Because TDP MMU allows concurrent
zapping/population, zapping requires synchronous TLB shoot down with the
frozen EPT entry. It zaps the secure entry, increments TLB counter, sends
IPI to remote vcpus to trigger TLB flush, and then unlinks the private
guest page from the Secure EPT. For simplicity, batched zapping with
exclude lock is handled as concurrent zapping. Although it's inefficient,
it can be optimized in the future.

For MMIO SPTE, the spte value changes as follows.
initial value (suppress VE bit is set)
-> Guest issues MMIO and triggers EPT violation
-> KVM updates SPTE value to MMIO value (suppress VE bit is cleared)
-> Guest MMIO resumes. It triggers VE exception in guest TD
-> Guest VE handler issues TDG.VP.VMCALL<MMIO>
-> KVM handles MMIO
-> Guest VE handler resumes its execution after MMIO instruction

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 61 +++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 299 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 7 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 4 +
6 files changed, 368 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 8f468ee2b985..3167c12d9c74 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;

- WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
+ !kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm));

access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index fe9583b640fb..3163915e2e3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -100,6 +100,55 @@ static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
return vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
}

+static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+
+ vmx_flush_tlb_all(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+
+ vmx_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_tlb_remote_flush(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_sept_tlb_remote_flush(kvm);
+
+ return vmx_tlb_remote_flush(kvm);
+}
+
+static int vt_tlb_remote_flush_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_tlb_range *range)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* fall back to tlb_remote_flush */
+
+ return vmx_tlb_remote_flush_with_range(kvm, range);
+}
+
+static void vt_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
+{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_flush_tlb_gva(vcpu, addr);
+}
+
+static void vt_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
int pgd_level)
{
@@ -176,12 +225,12 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
.get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,

- .flush_tlb_all = vmx_flush_tlb_all,
- .flush_tlb_current = vmx_flush_tlb_current,
- .tlb_remote_flush = vmx_tlb_remote_flush,
- .tlb_remote_flush_with_range = vmx_tlb_remote_flush_with_range,
- .flush_tlb_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
- .flush_tlb_guest = vmx_flush_tlb_guest,
+ .flush_tlb_all = vt_flush_tlb_all,
+ .flush_tlb_current = vt_flush_tlb_current,
+ .tlb_remote_flush = vt_tlb_remote_flush,
+ .tlb_remote_flush_with_range = vt_tlb_remote_flush_with_range,
+ .flush_tlb_gva = vt_flush_tlb_gva,
+ .flush_tlb_guest = vt_flush_tlb_guest,

.vcpu_pre_run = vmx_vcpu_pre_run,
.vcpu_run = vmx_vcpu_run,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 6328eaa65126..5378d2c35e27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@
#include "capabilities.h"
#include "x86_ops.h"
#include "tdx.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
#include "x86.h"
+#include "mmu.h"

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tdx: " fmt
@@ -295,6 +297,22 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);

+ /*
+ * Because guest TD is protected, VMM can't parse the instruction in TD.
+ * Instead, guest uses MMIO hypercall. For unmodified device driver,
+ * #VE needs to be injected for MMIO and #VE handler in TD converts MMIO
+ * instruction into MMIO hypercall.
+ *
+ * SPTE value for MMIO needs to be setup so that #VE is injected into
+ * TD instead of triggering EPT MISCONFIG.
+ * - RWX=0 so that EPT violation is triggered.
+ * - suppress #VE bit is cleared to inject #VE.
+ */
+ kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(kvm, 0);
+
+ /* TODO: Enable 2mb and 1gb large page support. */
+ kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+
kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;

/*
@@ -399,6 +417,258 @@ void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
}

+static void tdx_unpin(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+ put_page(page);
+}
+
+static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ hpa_t hpa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
+ u64 err;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) ||
+ !kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(pfn)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* TODO: handle large pages. */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* To prevent page migration, do nothing on mmu notifier. */
+ get_page(pfn_to_page(pfn));
+
+ if (likely(is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx))) {
+ err = tdh_mem_page_aug(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, gpa, hpa, &out);
+ if (err == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY) {
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, err, &out);
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: tdh_mem_page_add() comes here */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ int tdx_level = pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(level);
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+ hpa_t hpa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
+ hpa_t hpa_with_hkid;
+ u64 err;
+
+ /* TODO: handle large pages. */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx)) {
+ /*
+ * The HKID assigned to this TD was already freed and cache
+ * was already flushed. We don't have to flush again.
+ */
+ err = tdx_reclaim_page((unsigned long)__va(hpa), hpa, false, 0);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm))
+ return -EIO;
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ /*
+ * When zapping private page, write lock is held. So no race
+ * condition with other vcpu sept operation. Race only with
+ * TDH.VP.ENTER.
+ */
+ err = tdh_mem_page_remove(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, gpa, tdx_level, &out);
+ } while (err == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, err, &out);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ hpa_with_hkid = set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa, (u16)kvm_tdx->hkid);
+ do {
+ /*
+ * TDX_OPERAND_BUSY can happen on locking PAMT entry. Because
+ * this page was removed above, other thread shouldn't be
+ * repeatedly operating on this page. Just retry loop.
+ */
+ err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(hpa_with_hkid);
+ } while (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX));
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err, NULL);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_sept_link_private_spt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, void *private_spt)
+{
+ int tdx_level = pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(level);
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+ hpa_t hpa = __pa(private_spt);
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
+ u64 err;
+
+ err = tdh_mem_sept_add(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, gpa, tdx_level, hpa, &out);
+ if (err == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, err, &out);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_sept_zap_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level)
+{
+ int tdx_level = pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(level);
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
+ u64 err;
+
+ /* For now large page isn't supported yet. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ err = tdh_mem_range_block(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, gpa, tdx_level, &out);
+ if (err == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, err, &out);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * TLB shoot down procedure:
+ * There is a global epoch counter and each vcpu has local epoch counter.
+ * - TDH.MEM.RANGE.BLOCK(TDR. level, range) on one vcpu
+ * This blocks the subsequenct creation of TLB translation on that range.
+ * This corresponds to clear the present bit(all RXW) in EPT entry
+ * - TDH.MEM.TRACK(TDR): advances the epoch counter which is global.
+ * - IPI to remote vcpus
+ * - TDExit and re-entry with TDH.VP.ENTER on remote vcpus
+ * - On re-entry, TDX module compares the local epoch counter with the global
+ * epoch counter. If the local epoch counter is older than the global epoch
+ * counter, update the local epoch counter and flushes TLB.
+ */
+static void tdx_track(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
+{
+ u64 err;
+
+ KVM_BUG_ON(!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx), &kvm_tdx->kvm);
+ /* If TD isn't finalized, it's before any vcpu running. */
+ if (unlikely(!is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx)))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * tdx_flush_tlb() waits for this function to issue TDH.MEM.TRACK() by
+ * the counter. The counter is used instead of bool because multiple
+ * TDH_MEM_TRACK() can be issued concurrently by multiple vcpus.
+ */
+ atomic_inc(&kvm_tdx->tdh_mem_track);
+ /*
+ * KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH waits for the empty IPI handler, ack_flush(), with
+ * KVM_REQUEST_WAIT.
+ */
+ kvm_make_all_cpus_request(&kvm_tdx->kvm, KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH);
+
+ do {
+ /*
+ * kvm_flush_remote_tlbs() doesn't allow to return error and
+ * retry.
+ */
+ err = tdh_mem_track(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);
+ } while ((err & TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK) == TDX_OPERAND_BUSY);
+
+ /* Release remote vcpu waiting for TDH.MEM.TRACK in tdx_flush_tlb(). */
+ atomic_dec(&kvm_tdx->tdh_mem_track);
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, &kvm_tdx->kvm))
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_TRACK, err, NULL);
+
+}
+
+static int tdx_sept_free_private_spt(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, void *private_spt)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+
+ /*
+ * The HKID assigned to this TD was already freed and cache was
+ * already flushed. We don't have to flush again.
+ */
+ if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
+ return tdx_reclaim_page((unsigned long)private_spt,
+ __pa(private_spt), false, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * free_private_spt() is (obviously) called when a shadow page is being
+ * zapped. KVM doesn't (yet) zap private SPs while the TD is active.
+ * Note: This function is for private shadow page. Not for private
+ * guest page. private guest page can be zapped during TD is active.
+ * shared <-> private conversion and slot move/deletion.
+ */
+ KVM_BUG_ON(is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx), kvm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int tdx_sept_tlb_remote_flush(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx;
+
+ if (!is_td(kvm))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
+ tdx_track(kvm_tdx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_sept_remove_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+ enum pg_level level, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+ /*
+ * TDX requires TLB tracking before dropping private page. Do
+ * it here, although it is also done later.
+ * If hkid isn't assigned, the guest is destroying and no vcpu
+ * runs further. TLB shootdown isn't needed.
+ *
+ * TODO: implement with_range version for optimization.
+ * kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_address(kvm, gfn, 1);
+ * => tdx_sept_tlb_remote_flush_with_range(kvm, gfn,
+ * KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level));
+ */
+ if (is_hkid_assigned(to_kvm_tdx(kvm)))
+ kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+
+ return tdx_sept_drop_private_spte(kvm, gfn, level, pfn);
+}
+
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
@@ -802,6 +1072,25 @@ static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
return ret;
}

+void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+ struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+ u64 root_hpa = mmu->root.hpa;
+
+ /* Flush the shared EPTP, if it's valid. */
+ if (VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
+ ept_sync_context(construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa,
+ mmu->root_role.level));
+
+ /*
+ * See tdx_track(). Wait for tlb shootdown initiater to finish
+ * TDH_MEM_TRACK() so that TLB is flushed on the next TDENTER.
+ */
+ while (atomic_read(&kvm_tdx->tdh_mem_track))
+ cpu_relax();
+}
+
int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;
@@ -1011,8 +1300,16 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
if (!r)
r = tdx_module_setup();
vmxoff_all();
+ if (r)
+ return r;

- return r;
+ x86_ops->link_private_spt = tdx_sept_link_private_spt;
+ x86_ops->free_private_spt = tdx_sept_free_private_spt;
+ x86_ops->set_private_spte = tdx_sept_set_private_spte;
+ x86_ops->remove_private_spte = tdx_sept_remove_private_spte;
+ x86_ops->zap_private_spte = tdx_sept_zap_private_spte;
+
+ return 0;
}

void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index a95f25845f24..80d595c5f96f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
int hkid;

bool finalized;
+ atomic_t tdh_mem_track;

u64 tsc_offset;
};
@@ -181,6 +182,12 @@ static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 fiel
return out.r8;
}

+static __always_inline int pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(enum pg_level level)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(level == PG_LEVEL_NONE);
+ return level - 1;
+}
+
#else
struct kvm_tdx {
struct kvm kvm;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
index 8cc2f01c509b..35e285ae6f9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@

void pr_tdx_error(u64 op, u64 error_code, const struct tdx_module_output *out);

+#define TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT)
+
static inline u64 tdh_mng_addcx(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t addr)
{
clflush_cache_range(__va(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index cf7e0c6c65ac..5fccd98be06e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);

+void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int tdx_sept_tlb_remote_flush(struct kvm *kvm);
void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
#else
static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
@@ -171,6 +173,8 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }

+static inline void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline int tdx_sept_tlb_remote_flush(struct kvm *kvm) { return 0; }
static inline void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level) {}
#endif

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:25:47

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 072/108] KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Several user ret MSRs are clobbered on TD exit. Restore those values on
TD exit and before returning to ring 3.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 3ec465cbaeef..f35ccf2b502d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -456,6 +456,28 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
}

+struct tdx_uret_msr {
+ u32 msr;
+ unsigned int slot;
+ u64 defval;
+};
+
+static struct tdx_uret_msr tdx_uret_msrs[] = {
+ {.msr = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,},
+ {.msr = MSR_STAR,},
+ {.msr = MSR_LSTAR,},
+ {.msr = MSR_TSC_AUX,},
+};
+
+static void tdx_user_return_update_cache(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++)
+ kvm_user_return_update_cache(tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot,
+ tdx_uret_msrs[i].defval);
+}
+
static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
@@ -495,6 +517,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);

+ tdx_user_return_update_cache();
tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;

@@ -1558,6 +1581,26 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
return -ENODEV;
}

+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++) {
+ /*
+ * Here it checks if MSRs (tdx_uret_msrs) can be saved/restored
+ * before returning to user space.
+ *
+ * this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs)->registered isn't checked
+ * because the registration is done at vcpu runtime by
+ * kvm_set_user_return_msr().
+ * Here is setting up cpu feature before running vcpu,
+ * registered is alreays false.
+ */
+ tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot = kvm_find_user_return_msr(tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);
+ if (tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot == -1) {
+ /* If any MSR isn't supported, it is a KVM bug */
+ pr_err("MSR %x isn't included by kvm_find_user_return_msr\n",
+ tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
max_pkgs = topology_max_packages();
tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs, sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock),
GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:25:52

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 091/108] KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because guest TD state is protected, exceptions in guest TDs can't be
intercepted. TDX VMM doesn't need to handle exceptions.
tdx_handle_exit_irqoff() handles NMI and machine check. Ignore NMI and
machine check and continue guest TD execution.

For external interrupt, increment stats same to the VMX case.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 4a95db961f82..3b973a2f1381 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -715,6 +715,25 @@ void tdx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
tdexit_intr_info(vcpu));
}

+static int tdx_handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u32 intr_info = tdexit_intr_info(vcpu);
+
+ if (is_nmi(intr_info) || is_machine_check(intr_info))
+ return 1;
+
+ kvm_pr_unimpl("unexpected exception 0x%x(exit_reason 0x%llx qual 0x%lx)\n",
+ intr_info,
+ to_tdx(vcpu)->exit_reason.full, tdexit_exit_qual(vcpu));
+ return -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static int tdx_handle_external_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ ++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int tdx_handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
@@ -1110,6 +1129,10 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
WARN_ON_ONCE(fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE);

switch (exit_reason.basic) {
+ case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
+ return tdx_handle_exception(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
+ return tdx_handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
return tdx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:26:52

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 082/108] KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Now we are able to inject interrupts into TDX vcpu, it's ready to block TDX
vcpu. Wire up kvm x86 methods for blocking/unblocking vcpu for TDX. To
unblock on pending events, request immediate exit methods is also needed.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 13ad1278bef2..3e9007a7edfb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -319,6 +319,14 @@ static void vt_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_enable_irq_window(vcpu);
}

+static void vt_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return __kvm_request_immediate_exit(vcpu);
+
+ vmx_request_immediate_exit(vcpu);
+}
+
static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -446,7 +454,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,

- .request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
+ .request_immediate_exit = vt_request_immediate_exit,

.sched_in = vt_sched_in,

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:26:52

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 036/108] KVM: TDX: Enable mmio spte caching always for TDX

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX needs to set shared spte for MMIO GFN to !SUPPRES_VE_BIT | !RWX so that
guest TD can get #VE and then issue TDG.VP.VMCALL<MMIO>. Enable mmio
caching always for TDX irrelevant the module parameter enable_mmio_caching.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 7 +++++++
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 0d3fa29ccccc..9098f77cdaa4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -3229,7 +3229,8 @@ static int handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fau
* and only if L1's MAXPHYADDR is inaccurate with respect to
* the hardware's).
*/
- if (unlikely(!enable_mmio_caching) ||
+ if (unlikely(!enable_mmio_caching &&
+ !kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)) ||
unlikely(fault->gfn > kvm_mmu_max_gfn()))
return RET_PF_EMULATE;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 82f0d5c08b77..fecfdcb5f321 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
{
return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
- likely(enable_mmio_caching);
+ likely(enable_mmio_caching || kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm));
}

static inline bool is_shadow_present_pte(u64 pte)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index e07f14351d14..3325633b1cb5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -1875,6 +1875,13 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,

*root_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level;

+ /*
+ * mmio page fault isn't supported for protected guest because
+ * instructions in protected guest memory can't be parsed by VMM.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)))
+ return leaf;
+
tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, gfn, gfn + 1) {
leaf = iter.level;
sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:26:57

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 060/108] KVM: Add functions to set GFN to private or shared

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX KVM support needs to track whether GFN is private or shared. Introduce
functions to set whether GFN is private or shared and pre-allocate memory
for xarray.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index a0b64308d240..fac07886ab39 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -2307,9 +2307,20 @@ static inline void kvm_account_pgtable_pages(void *virt, int nr)
#define KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE 0x0002

#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_UPDATE_MEM_ATTR
+/* memory attr on [start, end) */
+int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
+int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
void kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
unsigned int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
#else
+static inline int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+static inline int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
static inline void kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
unsigned int attr,
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 9f82b03a8118..f0e77b65939b 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1121,6 +1121,80 @@ static inline void kvm_restrictedmem_unregister(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
&slot->notifier);
}

+/*
+ * Reserve memory for [start, end) so that the next set oepration won't fail
+ * with -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+ gfn_t gfn;
+
+ xa_lock(&kvm->mem_attr_array);
+ for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
+ r = __xa_insert(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn, NULL, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (r == -EBUSY)
+ r = 0;
+ if (r)
+ break;
+ }
+ xa_unlock(&kvm->mem_attr_array);
+
+ return r;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr);
+
+/* Set memory attr for [start, end) */
+int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
+{
+ void *entry;
+ gfn_t gfn;
+ int r;
+ int i;
+
+ /* By default, the entry is private. */
+ switch (attr) {
+ case KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE:
+ entry = NULL;
+ break;
+ case KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED:
+ entry = xa_mk_value(KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED);
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(start >= end);
+ for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
+ r = xa_err(xa_store(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn, entry,
+ GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT));
+ if (r)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (start >= gfn)
+ return r;
+
+ end = gfn;
+ for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
+ struct kvm_memslot_iter iter;
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+ struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+
+ slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
+ kvm_for_each_memslot_in_gfn_range(&iter, slots, start, end) {
+ gfn_t s = max(start, slot->base_gfn);
+ gfn_t e = min(end, slot->base_gfn + slot->npages);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(s >= e);
+ kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(kvm, slot, attr, s, e);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr);
+
#else /* !CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM */

static inline void kvm_restrictedmem_register(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:27:30

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 011/108] KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

A VMM interacts with the TDX module using a new instruction (SEAMCALL). A
TDX VMM uses SEAMCALLs where a VMX VMM would have directly interacted with
VMX instructions. For instance, a TDX VMM does not have full access to the
VM control structure corresponding to VMX VMCS. Instead, a VMM induces the
TDX module to act on behalf via SEAMCALLs.

Export __seamcall and define C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs for
readability. Some SEAMCALL APIs donates pages to TDX module or guest TD.
The pages are encrypted with TDX private host key id set in high bits of
physical address. If any modified cache lines may exit for these pages,
flush them to memory by clflush_cache_range().

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S | 2 +
3 files changed, 189 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
index 5cff7ed5b11e..ba2e4c69fb9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ struct tdsysinfo_struct {
const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
bool platform_tdx_enabled(void);
int tdx_enable(void);
+u64 __seamcall(u64 op, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out);
#else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
struct tdsysinfo_struct;
static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void) { return NULL; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..85adbf49c277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* constants/data definitions for TDX SEAMCALLs */
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_OPS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_TDX_OPS_H
+
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "tdx_errno.h"
+#include "tdx_arch.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mng_addcx(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t addr)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(__va(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, addr, tdr, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_add(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa, hpa_t source,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, gpa, tdr, hpa, source, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level, hpa_t page,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(__va(page), PAGE_SIZE);
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, gpa | level, tdr, page, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_remove(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_SEPT_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_vp_addcx(hpa_t tdvpr, hpa_t addr)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(__va(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
+ return __seamcall(TDH_VP_ADDCX, addr, tdvpr, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_relocate(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_RELOCATE, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_range_block(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mng_key_config(hpa_t tdr)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mng_create(hpa_t tdr, int hkid)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(__va(tdr), PAGE_SIZE);
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_CREATE, tdr, hkid, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_vp_create(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t tdvpr)
+{
+ clflush_cache_range(__va(tdvpr), PAGE_SIZE);
+ return __seamcall(TDH_VP_CREATE, tdvpr, tdr, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mng_rd(hpa_t tdr, u64 field, struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_RD, tdr, field, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mr_extend(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MR_EXTEND, gpa, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mr_finalize(hpa_t tdr)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_vp_flush(hpa_t tdvpr)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_VP_FLUSH, tdvpr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mng_vpflushdone(hpa_t tdr)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mng_key_freeid(hpa_t tdr)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mng_init(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t td_params,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_INIT, tdr, td_params, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_vp_init(hpa_t tdvpr, u64 rcx)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_VP_INIT, tdvpr, rcx, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_vp_rd(hpa_t tdvpr, u64 field,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_VP_RD, tdvpr, field, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mng_key_reclaimid(hpa_t tdr)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_RECLAIMID, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(hpa_t page,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, page, 0, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_sys_lp_shutdown(void)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_SYS_LP_SHUTDOWN, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_track(hpa_t tdr)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_TRACK, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_mem_range_unblock(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, resume ? 1 : 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(hpa_t page)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, page, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdh_vp_wr(hpa_t tdvpr, u64 field, u64 val, u64 mask,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ return __seamcall(TDH_VP_WR, tdvpr, field, val, mask, out);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_OPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
index f81be6b9c133..b90a7fe05494 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>

#include "tdxcall.S"
@@ -50,3 +51,4 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall)
FRAME_END
RET
SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__seamcall)
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:28:02

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 073/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD vcpu
exits, interrupts, and hypercalls.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index b51e8e6b1541..1cec14213f69 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ What qemu can do
- Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.
- Qemu can populate initial guest memory image.
- Qemu can finalize guest TD.
+- Qemu can start to run vcpu. But vcpu can not make progress yet.

Patch Layer status
------------------
@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ Patch Layer status
* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applied
* TDX EPT violation: Applied
* TD finalization: Applied
-* TD vcpu enter/exit: Applying
+* TD vcpu enter/exit: Applied
* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet

* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:28:04

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 085/108] KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX mostly handles NMI/exception exit mostly the same to VMX case. The
difference is how to retrieve exit qualification. To share the code with
TDX, move NMI/exception to a common header, common.h.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 79 ++++-----------------------------------
2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
index 747f993cf7de..04836d88baaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
@@ -4,8 +4,78 @@

#include <linux/kvm_host.h>

+#include <asm/traps.h>
+
#include "posted_intr.h"
#include "mmu.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+
+extern unsigned long vmx_host_idt_base;
+void vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(unsigned long entry);
+
+static inline void vmx_handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned long entry)
+{
+ bool is_nmi = entry == (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
+
+ kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, is_nmi ? KVM_HANDLING_NMI : KVM_HANDLING_IRQ);
+ vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(entry);
+ kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline void vmx_handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * Save xfd_err to guest_fpu before interrupt is enabled, so the
+ * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
+ * has chance to consume it.
+ *
+ * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
+ * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
+ * support xfd at all.
+ *
+ * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
+ * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
+ *
+ * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
+ */
+ if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
+}
+
+static inline void vmx_handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ u32 intr_info)
+{
+ const unsigned long nmi_entry = (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
+
+ /* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
+ if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
+ vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+ /* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
+ else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
+ vmx_handle_nm_fault_irqoff(vcpu);
+ /* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
+ else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
+ kvm_machine_check();
+ /* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
+ else if (is_nmi(intr_info))
+ vmx_handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, nmi_entry);
+}
+
+static inline void vmx_handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ u32 intr_info)
+{
+ unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+ gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)vmx_host_idt_base + vector;
+
+ if (KVM_BUG(!is_external_intr(intr_info), vcpu->kvm,
+ "KVM: unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, gate_offset(desc));
+ vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
+}

static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
unsigned long exit_qualification)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 79d8d6a89516..ee2705707266 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static inline void vmx_segment_cache_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
}

-static unsigned long host_idt_base;
+unsigned long vmx_host_idt_base;

#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
static bool __read_mostly enlightened_vmcs = true;
@@ -4236,7 +4236,7 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8); /* 22.2.4 */

- vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, host_idt_base); /* 22.2.4 */
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, vmx_host_idt_base); /* 22.2.4 */

vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, (unsigned long)vmx_vmexit); /* 22.2.5 */

@@ -5120,10 +5120,10 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);

if (is_machine_check(intr_info) || is_nmi(intr_info))
- return 1; /* handled by handle_exception_nmi_irqoff() */
+ return 1; /* handled by vmx_handle_exception_nmi_irqoff() */

/*
- * Queue the exception here instead of in handle_nm_fault_irqoff().
+ * Queue the exception here instead of in vmx_handle_nm_fault_irqoff().
* This ensures the nested_vmx check is not skipped so vmexit can
* be reflected to L1 (when it intercepts #NM) before reaching this
* point.
@@ -6798,70 +6798,6 @@ void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
}

-void vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(unsigned long entry);
-
-static void handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- unsigned long entry)
-{
- bool is_nmi = entry == (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
-
- kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, is_nmi ? KVM_HANDLING_NMI : KVM_HANDLING_IRQ);
- vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(entry);
- kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
-}
-
-static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- /*
- * Save xfd_err to guest_fpu before interrupt is enabled, so the
- * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
- * has chance to consume it.
- *
- * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
- * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
- * support xfd at all.
- *
- * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
- * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
- *
- * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
- */
- if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
-}
-
-static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 intr_info)
-{
- const unsigned long nmi_entry = (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
-
- /* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
- if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
- vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
- /* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
- else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
- handle_nm_fault_irqoff(vcpu);
- /* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
- else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
- kvm_machine_check();
- /* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
- else if (is_nmi(intr_info))
- handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, nmi_entry);
-}
-
-static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u32 intr_info)
-{
- unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
- gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;
-
- if (KVM_BUG(!is_external_intr(intr_info), vcpu->kvm,
- "KVM: unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
- return;
-
- handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, gate_offset(desc));
- vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
-}
-
void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -6870,9 +6806,10 @@ void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return;

if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
- handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
+ vmx_handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu,
+ vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
- handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
+ vmx_handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
}

/*
@@ -8120,7 +8057,7 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
int r;

store_idt(&dt);
- host_idt_base = dt.address;
+ vmx_host_idt_base = dt.address;

vmx_setup_user_return_msrs();

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:28:18

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 084/108] KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function argument

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

TDX uses different ABI to get information about VM exit. Pass intr_info to
the NMI and INTR handlers instead of pulling it from vcpu_vmx in
preparation for sharing the bulk of the handlers with TDX.

When the guest TD exits to VMM, RAX holds status and exit reason, RCX holds
exit qualification etc rather than the VMCS fields because VMM doesn't have
access to the VMCS. The eventual code will be

VMX:
- get exit reason, intr_info, exit_qualification, and etc from VMCS
- call NMI/INTR handlers (common code)

TDX:
- get exit reason, intr_info, exit_qualification, and etc from guest
registers
- call NMI/INTR handlers (common code)

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 ++++++++---------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b4c65eb17cc2..79d8d6a89516 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6830,28 +6830,27 @@ static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
}

-static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 intr_info)
{
const unsigned long nmi_entry = (unsigned long)asm_exc_nmi_noist;
- u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(&vmx->vcpu);

/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
- vmx->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+ vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
/* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
- handle_nm_fault_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu);
+ handle_nm_fault_irqoff(vcpu);
/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
kvm_machine_check();
/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
else if (is_nmi(intr_info))
- handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu, nmi_entry);
+ handle_interrupt_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, nmi_entry);
}

-static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ u32 intr_info)
{
- u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;

@@ -6871,9 +6870,9 @@ void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return;

if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
- handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu);
+ handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
- handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vmx);
+ handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vcpu, vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu));
}

/*
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:28:18

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 014/108] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Stub in kvm_tdx, vcpu_tdx, and their various accessors. TDX defines
SEAMCALL APIs to access TDX control structures corresponding to the VMX
VMCS. Introduce helper accessors to hide its SEAMCALL ABI details.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 116 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 473013265bd8..98999bf3f188 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -3,14 +3,27 @@
#define __KVM_X86_TDX_H

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+
+#include "tdx_ops.h"
+
+struct tdx_td_page {
+ unsigned long va;
+ hpa_t pa;
+ bool added;
+};
+
struct kvm_tdx {
struct kvm kvm;
- /* TDX specific members follow. */
+
+ struct tdx_td_page tdr;
+ struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
};

struct vcpu_tdx {
struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
- /* TDX specific members follow. */
+
+ struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
+ struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;
};

static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -32,6 +45,107 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
}
+
+static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
+{
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL 0x0UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH 0x1UL
+#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)
+
+ /* TDX is 64bit only. HIGH field isn't supported. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+ VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH,
+ "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported");
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);
+
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK GENMASK(14, 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT (0UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT (1UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT (2UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL (3UL << 13)
+#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
+
+ /* TDX is 64bit only. i.e. natural width = 64bit. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+ (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT ||
+ VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL),
+ "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field");
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+ VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT,
+ "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field");
+ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
+ VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT,
+ "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
+}
+
+static __always_inline void tdvps_state_non_arch_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
+static __always_inline void tdvps_management_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
+
+#define TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(bits, uclass, lclass) \
+static __always_inline u##bits td_##lclass##_read##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
+ u32 field) \
+{ \
+ struct tdx_module_output out; \
+ u64 err; \
+ \
+ tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
+ err = tdh_vp_rd(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), &out); \
+ if (unlikely(err)) { \
+ pr_err("TDH_VP_RD["#uclass".0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", \
+ field, err); \
+ return 0; \
+ } \
+ return (u##bits)out.r8; \
+} \
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_write##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
+ u32 field, u##bits val) \
+{ \
+ struct tdx_module_output out; \
+ u64 err; \
+ \
+ tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
+ err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), val, \
+ GENMASK_ULL(bits - 1, 0), &out); \
+ if (unlikely(err)) \
+ pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] = 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
+ field, (u64)val, err); \
+} \
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_setbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
+ u32 field, u64 bit) \
+{ \
+ struct tdx_module_output out; \
+ u64 err; \
+ \
+ tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
+ err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), bit, bit, \
+ &out); \
+ if (unlikely(err)) \
+ pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] |= 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
+ field, bit, err); \
+} \
+static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_clearbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
+ u32 field, u64 bit) \
+{ \
+ struct tdx_module_output out; \
+ u64 err; \
+ \
+ tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
+ err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), 0, bit, \
+ &out); \
+ if (unlikely(err)) \
+ pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] &= ~0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
+ field, bit, err); \
+}
+
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(16, VMCS, vmcs);
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(32, VMCS, vmcs);
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
+
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, STATE_NON_ARCH, state_non_arch);
+TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(8, MANAGEMENT, management);
+
#else
struct kvm_tdx {
struct kvm kvm;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:28:32

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 090/108] KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

On EPT violation, call a common function, __vmx_handle_ept_violation() to
trigger x86 MMU code. On EPT misconfiguration, exit to ring 3 with
KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN. because EPT misconfiguration can't happen as MMIO is
trigged by TDG.VP.VMCALL. No point to set a misconfiguration value for the
fast path.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 68d9d590ca8f..4a95db961f82 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1046,6 +1046,48 @@ void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
__vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &tdx->pi_desc, vector);
}

+static int tdx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long exit_qual;
+
+ if (kvm_is_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, tdexit_gpa(vcpu))) {
+ /*
+ * Always treat SEPT violations as write faults. Ignore the
+ * EXIT_QUALIFICATION reported by TDX-SEAM for SEPT violations.
+ * TD private pages are always RWX in the SEPT tables,
+ * i.e. they're always mapped writable. Just as importantly,
+ * treating SEPT violations as write faults is necessary to
+ * avoid COW allocations, which will cause TDAUGPAGE failures
+ * due to aliasing a single HPA to multiple GPAs.
+ */
+#define TDX_SEPT_VIOLATION_EXIT_QUAL EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE
+ exit_qual = TDX_SEPT_VIOLATION_EXIT_QUAL;
+ } else {
+ exit_qual = tdexit_exit_qual(vcpu);
+ if (exit_qual & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR) {
+ pr_warn("kvm: TDX instr fetch to shared GPA = 0x%lx @ RIP = 0x%lx\n",
+ tdexit_gpa(vcpu), kvm_rip_read(vcpu));
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
+ vcpu->run->ex.exception = PF_VECTOR;
+ vcpu->run->ex.error_code = exit_qual;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, tdexit_gpa(vcpu), exit_qual);
+ return __vmx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu, tdexit_gpa(vcpu), exit_qual);
+}
+
+static int tdx_handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
+ vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
{
union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_tdx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
@@ -1068,6 +1110,10 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
WARN_ON_ONCE(fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE);

switch (exit_reason.basic) {
+ case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
+ return tdx_handle_ept_violation(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
+ return tdx_handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI:
/*
* If reach here, it's not a Machine Check System Management
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:28:33

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 030/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM TDP
refactoring for TDX.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index 6e3f71ab6b59..df003d2ed89e 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Patch Layer status
* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet

-* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applying
-* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Not yet
+* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applied
+* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Applying
* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Not yet
* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:28:42

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 027/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of KVM MMU GPA
shared bits.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index 3e8efde3e3f3..6e3f71ab6b59 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ What qemu can do
----------------
- TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
- Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.
+- Qemu can create/destroy vcpu of TDX vm type.

Patch Layer status
------------------
@@ -17,13 +18,13 @@ Patch Layer status
* TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied
* TDX architectural definitions: Applied
* TD VM creation/destruction: Applied
-* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applying
+* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applied
* TDX EPT violation: Not yet
* TD finalization: Not yet
* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
* TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Not yet

-* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Not yet
+* KVM MMU GPA shared bits: Applying
* KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: Not yet
* KVM TDP MMU hooks: Not yet
* KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Not yet
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:28:58

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 077/108] KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add a flag, KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCHED_GUEST, to skip saving/restoring DRs
irrespective of any other flags. TDX-SEAM unconditionally saves and
restores guest DRs and reset to architectural INIT state on TD exit.
So, KVM needs to save host DRs before TD enter without restoring guest DRs
and restore host DRs after TD exit.

Opportunistically convert the KVM_DEBUGREG_* definitions to use BIT().

Reported-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 +++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 ++++++++---
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index fdb00d96e954..082e94f78c66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -583,8 +583,13 @@ struct kvm_pmu {
struct kvm_pmu_ops;

enum {
- KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = 1,
- KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = 2,
+ KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = BIT(0),
+ KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = BIT(1),
+ /*
+ * Guest debug registers are saved/restored by hardware on exit from
+ * or enter guest. KVM needn't switch them.
+ */
+ KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH = BIT(2),
};

struct kvm_mtrr_range {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index fc4de83a2df8..57767ef3353b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;

+ vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs = KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH;
vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 4d4b71c4cdb1..ad7b227b68dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10779,7 +10779,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);

- if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & ~KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH)) {
set_debugreg(0, 7);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
@@ -10822,6 +10822,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
+ WARN_ON(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH);
static_call(kvm_x86_sync_dirty_debug_regs)(vcpu);
kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
@@ -10834,8 +10835,12 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* care about the messed up debug address registers. But if
* we have some of them active, restore the old state.
*/
- if (hw_breakpoint_active())
- hw_breakpoint_restore();
+ if (hw_breakpoint_active()) {
+ if (!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH))
+ hw_breakpoint_restore();
+ else
+ set_debugreg(__this_cpu_read(cpu_dr7), 7);
+ }

vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu = vcpu->cpu;
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc());
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:29:16

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 012/108] KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Add helper functions to print out errors from the TDX module in a uniform
manner.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index e2c05195cb95..f1ad445df505 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o
kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o vmx/main.o
kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o
-kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o
+kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST) += vmx/tdx.o vmx/tdx_error.o

kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..574b72d34e1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* functions to record TDX SEAMCALL error */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+
+#include "tdx_ops.h"
+
+void pr_tdx_error(u64 op, u64 error_code, const struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+ if (!out) {
+ pr_err_ratelimited("SEAMCALL[%lld] failed: 0x%llx\n",
+ op, error_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pr_err_ratelimited("SEAMCALL[%lld] failed: 0x%llx RCX 0x%llx, RDX 0x%llx,"
+ " R8 0x%llx, R9 0x%llx, R10 0x%llx, R11 0x%llx\n",
+ op, error_code,
+ out->rcx, out->rdx, out->r8, out->r9, out->r10, out->r11);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
index 85adbf49c277..8cc2f01c509b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
@@ -9,12 +9,15 @@
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>

#include "tdx_errno.h"
#include "tdx_arch.h"

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST

+void pr_tdx_error(u64 op, u64 error_code, const struct tdx_module_output *out);
+
static inline u64 tdh_mng_addcx(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t addr)
{
clflush_cache_range(__va(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:29:16

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 018/108] KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Implement a system-scoped ioctl to get system-wide parameters for TDX.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++++
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 154 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 0ceb8e58a6c0..4425564647cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(smi_allowed)
KVM_X86_OP(enter_smm)
KVM_X86_OP(leave_smm)
KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(dev_mem_enc_ioctl)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_ioctl)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 50b39d0071ff..1fced310ec63 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1626,6 +1626,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*leave_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate);
void (*enable_smi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

+ int (*dev_mem_enc_ioctl)(void __user *argp);
int (*mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int (*mem_enc_register_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
int (*mem_enc_unregister_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 54b08789c402..2ad9666e02a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -535,4 +535,52 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
#define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM 0
#define KVM_X86_TDX_VM 1

+/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
+enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
+ KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+
+ KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
+ /* enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id */
+ __u32 id;
+ /* flags for sub-commend. If sub-command doesn't use this, set zero. */
+ __u32 flags;
+ /*
+ * data for each sub-command. An immediate or a pointer to the actual
+ * data in process virtual address. If sub-command doesn't use it,
+ * set zero.
+ */
+ __u64 data;
+ /*
+ * Auxiliary error code. The sub-command may return TDX SEAMCALL
+ * status code in addition to -Exxx.
+ * Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd.
+ */
+ __u64 error;
+ /* Reserved: Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd. */
+ __u64 unused;
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config {
+ __u32 leaf;
+ __u32 sub_leaf;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
+ __u64 attrs_fixed0;
+ __u64 attrs_fixed1;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed0;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed1;
+
+ __u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
+ __u32 padding;
+ struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 0918d1e6d2f3..aedba5acb8eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,

.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+
+ .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl,
};

struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 64229c3b3c5a..5a3ed8217a54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -431,6 +431,52 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
return ret;
}

+int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
+ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
+ struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
+ sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
+ * mem_enc_ioctl().
+ */
+ if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
+ if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (caps.nr_cpuid_configs < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ caps = (struct kvm_tdx_capabilities) {
+ .attrs_fixed0 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed0,
+ .attrs_fixed1 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed1,
+ .xfam_fixed0 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed0,
+ .xfam_fixed1 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed1,
+ .nr_cpuid_configs = tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs,
+ .padding = 0,
+ };
+
+ if (copy_to_user(user_caps, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid_configs, &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs,
+ tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs *
+ sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
{
const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index b2cb5786830a..057f2be3d818 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
int tdx_offline_cpu(void);
+int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp);

int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -144,6 +145,7 @@ static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
static inline int tdx_offline_cpu(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; };

static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 25c30c8c2d9b..ddcbbcf13a55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4678,6 +4678,12 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
r = kvm_x86_dev_has_attr(&attr);
break;
}
+ case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (!kvm_x86_ops.dev_mem_enc_ioctl)
+ goto out;
+ r = static_call(kvm_x86_dev_mem_enc_ioctl)(argp);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
break;
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 54b08789c402..2ad9666e02a5 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -535,4 +535,52 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
#define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM 0
#define KVM_X86_TDX_VM 1

+/* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
+enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
+ KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
+
+ KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
+ /* enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id */
+ __u32 id;
+ /* flags for sub-commend. If sub-command doesn't use this, set zero. */
+ __u32 flags;
+ /*
+ * data for each sub-command. An immediate or a pointer to the actual
+ * data in process virtual address. If sub-command doesn't use it,
+ * set zero.
+ */
+ __u64 data;
+ /*
+ * Auxiliary error code. The sub-command may return TDX SEAMCALL
+ * status code in addition to -Exxx.
+ * Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd.
+ */
+ __u64 error;
+ /* Reserved: Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd. */
+ __u64 unused;
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config {
+ __u32 leaf;
+ __u32 sub_leaf;
+ __u32 eax;
+ __u32 ebx;
+ __u32 ecx;
+ __u32 edx;
+};
+
+struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
+ __u64 attrs_fixed0;
+ __u64 attrs_fixed1;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed0;
+ __u64 xfam_fixed1;
+
+ __u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
+ __u32 padding;
+ struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:29:30

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 089/108] KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

If the control reaches EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI, #SMI is delivered and
handled right after returning from the TDX module to KVM nothing needs to
be done in KVM. Continue TDX vcpu execution.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
index a5faf6d88f1b..b3a30ef3efdd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#define EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT 2
#define EXIT_REASON_INIT_SIGNAL 3
#define EXIT_REASON_SIPI_SIGNAL 4
+#define EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI 6

#define EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW 7
#define EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW 8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 088e98232227..68d9d590ca8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1068,6 +1068,13 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
WARN_ON_ONCE(fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE);

switch (exit_reason.basic) {
+ case EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI:
+ /*
+ * If reach here, it's not a Machine Check System Management
+ * Interrupt(MSMI). #SMI is delivered and handled right after
+ * SEAMRET, nothing needs to be done in KVM.
+ */
+ return 1;
default:
break;
}
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:30:13

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 032/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Make sync_page not use hard-coded 0 as the initial SPTE value

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

FNAME(sync_page) in arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h assumes that the initial
shadow page table entry (SPTE) is zero. Remove the assumption by using
SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE that will be updated from 0 to non-zero value.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 5ab5f94dcb6f..6db3f2b5563a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -1036,7 +1036,8 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
gpa_t pte_gpa;
gfn_t gfn;

- if (!sp->spt[i])
+ /* spt[i] has initial value of shadow page table allocation */
+ if (sp->spt[i] == SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE)
continue;

pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i * sizeof(pt_element_t);
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:30:14

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 098/108] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Implements set_msr/get_msr/has_emulated_msr methods for TDX to handle
hypercall from guest TD for paravirtualized rdmsr and wrmsr. The TDX
module virtualizes MSRs. For some MSRs, it injects #VE to the guest TD
upon RDMSR or WRMSR. The exact list of such MSRs are defined in the spec.

Upon #VE, the guest TD may execute hypercalls,
TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.RDMSR> and TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.WRMSR>,
which are defined in GHCI (Guest-Host Communication Interface) so that the
host VMM (e.g. KVM) can virtualizes the MSRs.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 -
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++
5 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 74c561e3eb46..3a8a4fdf1ce7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -195,6 +195,34 @@ static void vt_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(vcpu);
}

+static int vt_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+ if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return tdx_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+ return vmx_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
+ * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
+ */
+static bool vt_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
+{
+ if (kvm && is_td(kvm))
+ return tdx_is_emulated_msr(index, true);
+
+ return vmx_has_emulated_msr(kvm, index);
+}
+
+static int vt_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+ if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return tdx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+ return vmx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+}
+
static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
@@ -431,7 +459,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {

.hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable,
.hardware_disable = vt_hardware_disable,
- .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
+ .has_emulated_msr = vt_has_emulated_msr,

.is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
@@ -451,8 +479,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {

.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
- .get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
- .set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
+ .get_msr = vt_get_msr,
+ .set_msr = vt_set_msr,
.get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
.get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
.set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 50e9352464a9..b820475ce0ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1489,6 +1489,69 @@ void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
*error_code = 0;
}

+bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
+{
+ switch (index) {
+ case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
+ case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+ case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
+ case MSR_MTRRcap:
+ case 0x200 ... 0x26f:
+ /* IA32_MTRR_PHYS{BASE, MASK}, IA32_MTRR_FIX*_* */
+ case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+ case MSR_MTRRdefType:
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
+ case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
+ case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
+ case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
+ case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
+ case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
+ case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+ case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+ case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+ /* MSR_IA32_MCx_{CTL, STATUS, ADDR, MISC, CTL2} */
+ return true;
+ case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff:
+ /*
+ * x2APIC registers that are virtualized by the CPU can't be
+ * emulated, KVM doesn't have access to the virtual APIC page.
+ */
+ switch (index) {
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR + APIC_ISR_NR):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR + APIC_ISR_NR):
+ case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR + APIC_ISR_NR):
+ return false;
+ default:
+ return true;
+ }
+ case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
+ case MSR_EFER:
+ return !write;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ if (tdx_is_emulated_msr(msr->index, false))
+ return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+ if (tdx_is_emulated_msr(msr->index, true))
+ return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+ return 1;
+}
+
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index d02619f64b6e..8b9399b154f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code);
+bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write);
+int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
+int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -200,6 +203,9 @@ static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mo
static inline void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason, u64 *info1,
u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code) {}
+static inline bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write) { return false; }
+static inline int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
+static inline int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 2eacc4929d5d..5304b27f2566 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@
#include "trace.h"

#define MAX_IO_MSRS 256
-#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32

struct kvm_caps kvm_caps __read_mostly = {
.supported_mce_cap = MCG_CTL_P | MCG_SER_P,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 829d3134c1eb..1d77c39821ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
#include "kvm_emulate.h"

+#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
+
struct kvm_caps {
/* control of guest tsc rate supported? */
bool has_tsc_control;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:30:17

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 095/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV HLT hypercall to the KVM backend function.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 4b83d7a81433..03b08b3f1ff6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -528,7 +528,32 @@ void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)

bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- return pi_has_pending_interrupt(vcpu);
+ bool ret = pi_has_pending_interrupt(vcpu);
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ if (ret || vcpu->arch.mp_state != KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED)
+ return true;
+
+ if (tdx->interrupt_disabled_hlt)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * This is for the case where the virtual interrupt is recognized,
+ * i.e. set in vmcs.RVI, between the STI and "HLT". KVM doesn't have
+ * access to RVI and the interrupt is no longer in the PID (because it
+ * was "recognized". It doesn't get delivered in the guest because the
+ * TDCALL completes before interrupts are enabled.
+ *
+ * TDX modules sets RVI while in an STI interrupt shadow.
+ * - TDExit(typically TDG.VP.VMCALL<HLT>) from the guest to TDX module.
+ * The interrupt shadow at this point is gone.
+ * - It knows that there is an interrupt that can be delivered
+ * (RVI > PPR && EFLAGS.IF=1, the other conditions of 29.2.2 don't
+ * matter)
+ * - It forwards the TDExit nevertheless, to a clueless hypervisor that
+ * has no way to glean either RVI or PPR.
+ */
+ return !!xchg(&tdx->buggy_hlt_workaround, 0);
}

void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -830,6 +855,17 @@ static int tdx_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}

+static int tdx_emulate_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ /* See tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt() to avoid heavy seamcall */
+ tdx->interrupt_disabled_hlt = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+ return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
+}
+
static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -838,6 +874,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
return tdx_emulate_cpuid(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
+ return tdx_emulate_hlt(vcpu);
default:
break;
}
@@ -1166,6 +1204,8 @@ void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);

+ /* See comment in tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(). */
+ tdx->buggy_hlt_workaround = 1;
/* TDX supports only posted interrupt. No lapic emulation. */
__vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, &tdx->pi_desc, vector);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index eac341e08c9a..685184aa10e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
bool host_state_need_restore;
u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base;

+ bool interrupt_disabled_hlt;
+ unsigned int buggy_hlt_workaround;
+
/*
* Dummy to make pmu_intel not corrupt memory.
* TODO: Support PMU for TDX. Future work.
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:30:24

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 067/108] KVM: TDX: Add helper assembly function to TDX vcpu

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX defines an API to run TDX vcpu with its own ABI. Define an assembly
helper function to run TDX vcpu to hide the special ABI so that C code can
call it with function call ABI.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 157 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 8477d8bdd69c..9066eea1ede5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
@@ -31,6 +32,13 @@
#define VCPU_R15 __VCPU_REGS_R15 * WORD_SIZE
#endif

+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+#define TDENTER 0
+#define EXIT_REASON_TDCALL 77
+#define TDENTER_ERROR_BIT 63
+#define seamcall .byte 0x66,0x0f,0x01,0xcf
+#endif
+
.section .noinstr.text, "ax"

/**
@@ -350,3 +358,152 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff)
pop %_ASM_BP
RET
SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
+
+.pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax"
+
+/**
+ * __tdx_vcpu_run - Call SEAMCALL(TDENTER) to run a TD vcpu
+ * @tdvpr: physical address of TDVPR
+ * @regs: void * (to registers of TDVCPU)
+ * @gpr_mask: non-zero if guest registers need to be loaded prior to TDENTER
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * TD-Exit Reason
+ *
+ * Note: KVM doesn't support using XMM in its hypercalls, it's the HyperV
+ * code's responsibility to save/restore XMM registers on TDVMCALL.
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(__tdx_vcpu_run)
+ push %rbp
+ mov %rsp, %rbp
+
+ push %r15
+ push %r14
+ push %r13
+ push %r12
+ push %rbx
+
+ /* Save @regs, which is needed after TDENTER to capture output. */
+ push %rsi
+
+ /* Load @tdvpr to RCX */
+ mov %rdi, %rcx
+
+ /* No need to load guest GPRs if the last exit wasn't a TDVMCALL. */
+ test %dx, %dx
+ je 1f
+
+ /* Load @regs to RAX, which will be clobbered with $TDENTER anyways. */
+ mov %rsi, %rax
+
+ mov VCPU_RBX(%rax), %rbx
+ mov VCPU_RDX(%rax), %rdx
+ mov VCPU_RBP(%rax), %rbp
+ mov VCPU_RSI(%rax), %rsi
+ mov VCPU_RDI(%rax), %rdi
+
+ mov VCPU_R8 (%rax), %r8
+ mov VCPU_R9 (%rax), %r9
+ mov VCPU_R10(%rax), %r10
+ mov VCPU_R11(%rax), %r11
+ mov VCPU_R12(%rax), %r12
+ mov VCPU_R13(%rax), %r13
+ mov VCPU_R14(%rax), %r14
+ mov VCPU_R15(%rax), %r15
+
+ /* Load TDENTER to RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */
+1: mov $TDENTER, %rax
+
+2: seamcall
+
+ /*
+ * Use same return value convention to tdxcall.S.
+ * TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID doesn't conflict with any TDX status code.
+ */
+ jnc 3f
+ mov $TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID, %rax
+ jmp 5f
+3:
+
+ /* Skip to the exit path if TDENTER failed. */
+ bt $TDENTER_ERROR_BIT, %rax
+ jc 5f
+
+ /* Temporarily save the TD-Exit reason. */
+ push %rax
+
+ /* check if TD-exit due to TDVMCALL */
+ cmp $EXIT_REASON_TDCALL, %ax
+
+ /* Reload @regs to RAX. */
+ mov 8(%rsp), %rax
+
+ /* Jump on non-TDVMCALL */
+ jne 4f
+
+ /* Save all output from SEAMCALL(TDENTER) */
+ mov %rbx, VCPU_RBX(%rax)
+ mov %rbp, VCPU_RBP(%rax)
+ mov %rsi, VCPU_RSI(%rax)
+ mov %rdi, VCPU_RDI(%rax)
+ mov %r10, VCPU_R10(%rax)
+ mov %r11, VCPU_R11(%rax)
+ mov %r12, VCPU_R12(%rax)
+ mov %r13, VCPU_R13(%rax)
+ mov %r14, VCPU_R14(%rax)
+ mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%rax)
+
+4: mov %rcx, VCPU_RCX(%rax)
+ mov %rdx, VCPU_RDX(%rax)
+ mov %r8, VCPU_R8 (%rax)
+ mov %r9, VCPU_R9 (%rax)
+
+ /*
+ * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
+ * speculative use of the guest's values.
+ */
+ xor %rbx, %rbx
+ xor %rcx, %rcx
+ xor %rdx, %rdx
+ xor %rsi, %rsi
+ xor %rdi, %rdi
+ xor %rbp, %rbp
+ xor %r8, %r8
+ xor %r9, %r9
+ xor %r10, %r10
+ xor %r11, %r11
+ xor %r12, %r12
+ xor %r13, %r13
+ xor %r14, %r14
+ xor %r15, %r15
+
+ /* Restore the TD-Exit reason to RAX for return. */
+ pop %rax
+
+ /* "POP" @regs. */
+5: add $8, %rsp
+ pop %rbx
+ pop %r12
+ pop %r13
+ pop %r14
+ pop %r15
+
+ pop %rbp
+ RET
+
+6: cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+ je 1f
+ mov $TDX_SW_ERROR, %r12
+ orq %r12, %rax
+ jmp 5b
+1: ud2
+ /* Use FAULT version to know what fault happened. */
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(2b, 6b)
+
+SYM_FUNC_END(__tdx_vcpu_run)
+
+.popsection
+
+#endif
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:30:37

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 031/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The TDX support will need the "suppress #VE" bit (bit 63) set as the
initial value for SPTE. To reduce code change size, introduce a new macro
SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE for the initial value for the shadow page table
entry (SPTE) and replace hard-coded value 0 for it. Initialize shadow page
tables with their value.

The plan is to unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit for both AMD and
Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for conventional VMX
guests, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and
"suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 15 ++++++------
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 10017a9f26ee..e7e11f51f8b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -538,9 +538,9 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)

if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte) ||
!spte_has_volatile_bits(old_spte))
- __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
+ __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
else
- old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, 0ull);
+ old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);

if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
return old_spte;
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
*/
static void mmu_spte_clear_no_track(u64 *sptep)
{
- __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
+ __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
}

static u64 mmu_spte_get_lockless(u64 *sptep)
@@ -642,6 +642,39 @@ static void walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}

+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline void kvm_init_shadow_page(void *page)
+{
+ memset64(page, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, 4096 / 8);
+}
+
+static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc = &vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache;
+ int start, end, i, r;
+
+ start = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
+ r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(mc, PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+
+ /*
+ * Note, topup may have allocated objects even if it failed to allocate
+ * the minimum number of objects required to make forward progress _at
+ * this time_. Initialize newly allocated objects even on failure, as
+ * userspace can free memory and rerun the vCPU in response to -ENOMEM.
+ */
+ end = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
+ for (i = start; i < end; i++)
+ kvm_init_shadow_page(mc->objects[i]);
+ return r;
+}
+#else
+static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
+ PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
{
int r;
@@ -651,8 +684,7 @@ static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
1 + PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + PTE_PREFETCH_NUM);
if (r)
return r;
- r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
- PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+ r = mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(vcpu);
if (r)
return r;
if (maybe_indirect) {
@@ -5870,7 +5902,13 @@ int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.kmem_cache = mmu_page_header_cache;
vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;

- vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+ /*
+ * When X86_64, initial SEPT entries are initialized with
+ * SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE. Otherwise zeroed. See
+ * mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache().
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+ vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;

vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 7670c13ce251..42ecaa75da15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);

#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)

+#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE 0ULL
+
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index eab765442d0b..38bc4c2f0f1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
* here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present. Use
* the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits.
*/
- __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, 0);
+ __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);

return 0;
}
@@ -871,8 +871,8 @@ static void __tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
continue;

if (!shared)
- tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
- else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, 0))
+ tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
+ else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE))
goto retry;
}
}
@@ -928,8 +928,9 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)))
return false;

- __tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte, 0,
- sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1, true, true);
+ __tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte,
+ SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1,
+ true, true);

return true;
}
@@ -963,7 +964,7 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
!is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))
continue;

- tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
+ tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
flush = true;
}

@@ -1328,7 +1329,7 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
* invariant that the PFN of a present * leaf SPTE can never change.
* See __handle_changed_spte().
*/
- tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter, 0);
+ tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);

if (!pte_write(range->pte)) {
new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte,
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:30:49

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 100/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV report fatal error hypercall

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV report fatal error hypercall to KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_CRASH KVM
exit event.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index e3062c245e70..16f168f4f21a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1068,6 +1068,24 @@ static int tdx_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}

+static int tdx_report_fatal_error(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * Exit to userspace device model for teardown.
+ * Because guest TD is already panicing, returning an error to guerst TD
+ * doesn't make sense. No argument check is done.
+ */
+
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
+ vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_TDX;
+ vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 3;
+ vcpu->run->system_event.data[0] = TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR;
+ vcpu->run->system_event.data[1] = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+ vcpu->run->system_event.data[2] = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1086,6 +1104,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return tdx_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return tdx_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+ case TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR:
+ return tdx_report_fatal_error(vcpu);
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 49386e4de8b8..504a8f73284b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ struct kvm_run {
#define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_WAKEUP 4
#define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND 5
#define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM 6
+#define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_TDX 7
__u32 type;
__u32 ndata;
union {
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:30:53

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 102/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Implement TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall. If the input value is
zero, return success code and zero in output registers.

TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall is a subleaf of TDG.VP.VMCALL to
enumerate which TDG.VP.VMCALL sub leaves are supported. This hypercall is
for future enhancement of the Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI)
specification. The GHCI version of 344426-001US defines it to require
input R12 to be zero and to return zero in output registers, R11, R12, R13,
and R14 so that guest TD enumerates no enhancement.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 4db552b60271..8e8ac1081ce4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1068,6 +1068,20 @@ static int tdx_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}

+static int tdx_get_td_vm_call_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu))
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ else {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+ kvm_r11_write(vcpu, 0);
+ tdvmcall_a0_write(vcpu, 0);
+ tdvmcall_a1_write(vcpu, 0);
+ tdvmcall_a2_write(vcpu, 0);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int tdx_report_fatal_error(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
@@ -1135,6 +1149,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return tdx_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return tdx_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+ case TDG_VP_VMCALL_GET_TD_VM_CALL_INFO:
+ return tdx_get_td_vm_call_info(vcpu);
case TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR:
return tdx_report_fatal_error(vcpu);
case TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA:
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:30:53

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 101/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV map_gpa hypercall

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV map_gpa hypercall to the kvm/mmu backend.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 16f168f4f21a..4db552b60271 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1086,6 +1086,37 @@ static int tdx_report_fatal_error(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}

+static int tdx_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+ gpa_t gpa = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+ gpa_t size = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+ gpa_t end = gpa + size;
+ gfn_t s = gpa_to_gfn(gpa) & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+ gfn_t e = gpa_to_gfn(end) & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
+ bool map_private = kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, gpa);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(gpa, 4096) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 4096) ||
+ end < gpa ||
+ end > kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm) << (PAGE_SHIFT + 1) ||
+ kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, gpa) != kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, end)) {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = kvm_mmu_map_gpa(vcpu, &s, e, map_private);
+ if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY);
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, gfn_to_gpa(s));
+ } else if (ret)
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ else
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1106,6 +1137,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return tdx_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
case TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR:
return tdx_report_fatal_error(vcpu);
+ case TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA:
+ return tdx_map_gpa(vcpu);
default:
break;
}
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:31:18

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 052/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Some KVM MMU operations (dirty page logging, page migration, aging page)
aren't supported for private GFNs (yet) with the first generation of TDX.
Silently return on unsupported TDX KVM MMU operations.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 3 ++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++
3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 02e7b5cf3231..efc3b3f2dd12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -6588,6 +6588,9 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep) {
sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);

+ /* Private page dirty logging is not supported yet. */
+ KVM_BUG_ON(is_private_sptep(sptep), kvm);
+
/*
* We cannot do huge page mapping for indirect shadow pages,
* which are found on the last rmap (level = 1) when not using
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 0e053b96444a..4b207ce83ffe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -1469,7 +1469,8 @@ typedef bool (*tdp_handler_t)(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,

static __always_inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
- tdp_handler_t handler)
+ tdp_handler_t handler,
+ bool only_shared)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
struct tdp_iter iter;
@@ -1480,9 +1481,23 @@ static __always_inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
* into this helper allow blocking; it'd be dead, wasteful code.
*/
for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, range->slot->as_id) {
+ gfn_t start;
+ gfn_t end;
+
+ if (only_shared && is_private_sp(root))
+ continue;
+
rcu_read_lock();

- tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, range->start, range->end)
+ /*
+ * For TDX shared mapping, set GFN shared bit to the range,
+ * so the handler() doesn't need to set it, to avoid duplicated
+ * code in multiple handler()s.
+ */
+ start = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, range->start);
+ end = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, range->end);
+
+ tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, start, end)
ret |= handler(kvm, &iter, range);

rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -1526,7 +1541,12 @@ static bool age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,

bool kvm_tdp_mmu_age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
{
- return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, age_gfn_range);
+ /*
+ * First TDX generation doesn't support clearing A bit for private
+ * mapping, since there's no secure EPT API to support it. However
+ * it's a legitimate request for TDX guest.
+ */
+ return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, age_gfn_range, true);
}

static bool test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
@@ -1537,7 +1557,8 @@ static bool test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,

bool kvm_tdp_mmu_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
{
- return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, test_age_gfn);
+ /* The first TDX generation doesn't support A bit. */
+ return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, test_age_gfn, true);
}

static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
@@ -1582,8 +1603,11 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
* No need to handle the remote TLB flush under RCU protection, the
* target SPTE _must_ be a leaf SPTE, i.e. cannot result in freeing a
* shadow page. See the WARN on pfn_changed in __handle_changed_spte().
+ *
+ * .change_pte() callback should not happen for private page, because
+ * for now TDX private pages are pinned during VM's life time.
*/
- return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, set_spte_gfn);
+ return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, set_spte_gfn, true);
}

/*
@@ -1637,6 +1661,14 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_wrprot_slot(struct kvm *kvm,

lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);

+ /*
+ * Because first TDX generation doesn't support write protecting private
+ * mappings and kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm) = false, it's a bug
+ * to reach here for guest TD.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm)))
+ return false;
+
for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, true)
spte_set |= wrprot_gfn_range(kvm, root, slot->base_gfn,
slot->base_gfn + slot->npages, min_level);
@@ -1902,6 +1934,14 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_slot(struct kvm *kvm,

lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);

+ /*
+ * First TDX generation doesn't support clearing dirty bit,
+ * since there's no secure EPT API to support it. It is a
+ * bug to reach here for TDX guest.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm)))
+ return false;
+
for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, true)
spte_set |= clear_dirty_gfn_range(kvm, root, slot->base_gfn,
slot->base_gfn + slot->npages);
@@ -1968,6 +2008,13 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_mmu_page *root;

lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ /*
+ * First TDX generation doesn't support clearing dirty bit,
+ * since there's no secure EPT API to support it. For now silently
+ * ignore KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG.
+ */
+ if (!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm))
+ return;
for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, slot->as_id)
clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, root, gfn, mask, wrprot);
}
@@ -2034,6 +2081,13 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,

lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);

+ /*
+ * This should only be reachable when diryt-log is supported. It's a
+ * bug to reach here.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm)))
+ return;
+
for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, true)
zap_collapsible_spte_range(kvm, root, slot);
}
@@ -2087,6 +2141,15 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
bool spte_set = false;

lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * First TDX generation doesn't support write protecting private
+ * mappings, silently ignore the request. KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG etc
+ * can reach here, no warning.
+ */
+ if (!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm))
+ return false;
+
for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, slot->as_id)
spte_set |= write_protect_gfn(kvm, root, gfn, min_level);

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 24d9bfd4c582..3868605462ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12897,6 +12897,9 @@ static void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
u32 new_flags = new ? new->flags : 0;
bool log_dirty_pages = new_flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;

+ if (!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm) && log_dirty_pages)
+ return;
+
/*
* Update CPU dirty logging if dirty logging is being toggled. This
* applies to all operations.
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:31:20

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 055/108] KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

For virtual IO, the guest TD shares guest pages with VMM without
encryption. Shared EPT is used to map guest pages in unprotected way.

Add the VMCS field encoding for the shared EPTP, which will be used by
TDX to have separate EPT walks for private GPAs (existing EPTP) versus
shared GPAs (new shared EPTP).

Set shared EPT pointer value for the TDX guest to initialize TDX MMU.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 11 ++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 +++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 4 ++++
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 752d53652007..1205018b5b6b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
TSC_MULTIPLIER_HIGH = 0x00002033,
TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL = 0x00002034,
TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL_HIGH = 0x00002035,
+ SHARED_EPT_POINTER = 0x0000203C,
PID_POINTER_TABLE = 0x00002042,
PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH = 0x00002043,
GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS = 0x00002400,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 9fb6eb626a9a..974e00fd3260 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -100,6 +100,15 @@ static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
return vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
}

+static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
+ int pgd_level)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
+
+ vmx_load_mmu_pgd(vcpu, root_hpa, pgd_level);
+}
+
static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
if (!is_td(kvm))
@@ -219,7 +228,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
.write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,

- .load_mmu_pgd = vmx_load_mmu_pgd,
+ .load_mmu_pgd = vt_load_mmu_pgd,

.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index e80f9cf79b2e..6328eaa65126 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -394,6 +394,11 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
}

+void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
+{
+ td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
+}
+
int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index fda1b2eaebc6..dd05991afbad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
+
+void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
#else
static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
@@ -165,6 +167,8 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+
+static inline void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level) {}
#endif

#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:31:32

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 034/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to shadow_mmio_{value, mask}

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because TDX will need shadow_mmio_mask to be VMX_SUPPRESS_VE | RWX and
shadow_mmio_value to be 0, make VMX EPT case use same value for TDX
shadow_mmio_mask. For VMX, VMX_SUPPRESS_VE doesn't matter, it doesn't
affect VMX logic to add the bit to shadow_mmio_{value, mask}. Note that
shadow_mmio_value will be per-VM value.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 0b97a045c5f0..5d5c06d4fd89 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -437,8 +437,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
* EPT Misconfigurations are generated if the value of bits 2:0
* of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
*/
- kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE,
- VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0);
+ kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT,
+ VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:31:35

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 078/108] KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add flag and hook to KVM's local APIC management to support determining
whether or not a TDX guest as a pending IRQ. For TDX vCPUs, the virtual
APIC page is owned by the TDX module and cannot be accessed by KVM. As a
result, registers that are virtualized by the CPU, e.g. PPR, cannot be
read or written by KVM. To deliver interrupts for TDX guests, KVM must
send an IRQ to the CPU on the posted interrupt notification vector. And
to determine if TDX vCPU has a pending interrupt, KVM must check if there
is an outstanding notification.

Return "no interrupt" in kvm_apic_has_interrupt() if the guest APIC is
protected to short-circuit the various other flows that try to pull an
IRQ out of the vAPIC, the only valid operation is querying _if_ an IRQ is
pending, KVM can't do anything based on _which_ IRQ is pending.

Intentionally omit sanity checks from other flows, e.g. PPR update, so as
not to degrade non-TDX guests with unnecessary checks. A well-behaved KVM
and userspace will never reach those flows for TDX guests, but reaching
them is not fatal if something does go awry.

Note, this doesn't handle interrupts that have been delivered to the vCPU
but not yet recognized by the core, i.e. interrupts that are sitting in
vmcs.GUEST_INTR_STATUS. Querying that state requires a SEAMCALL and will
be supported in a future patch.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/irq.c | 3 +++
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 3 +++
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 11 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++
8 files changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 1b01dc2098b0..17c3828d42a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(pi_update_irte)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(pi_start_assignment)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(apicv_post_state_restore)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(protected_apic_has_interrupt)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(set_hv_timer)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(cancel_hv_timer)
KVM_X86_OP(setup_mce)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 082e94f78c66..70549018987d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1671,6 +1671,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*pi_start_assignment)(struct kvm *kvm);
void (*apicv_post_state_restore)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool (*dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ bool (*protected_apic_has_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

int (*set_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
bool *expired);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
index f371f1292ca3..56e52eef0269 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v))
return 1;

+ if (lapic_in_kernel(v) && v->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected)
+ return static_call(kvm_x86_protected_apic_has_interrupt)(v);
+
return kvm_apic_has_interrupt(v) != -1; /* LAPIC */
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_has_interrupt);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index d7639d126e6c..bcf339d02c0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -2624,6 +2624,9 @@ int kvm_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
return -1;

+ if (apic->guest_apic_protected)
+ return -1;
+
__apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr);
return apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr(apic, ppr);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
index a5ac4a5a5179..44a9b5131323 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ struct kvm_lapic {
bool sw_enabled;
bool irr_pending;
bool lvt0_in_nmi_mode;
+ /* Select registers in the vAPIC cannot be read/written. */
+ bool guest_apic_protected;
/* Number of bits set in ISR. */
s16 isr_count;
/* The highest vector set in ISR; if -1 - invalid, must scan ISR. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 6d46ae9c5dce..1dfffc6c1533 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)

enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup(&vt_x86_ops);

+ if (!enable_tdx)
+ vt_x86_ops.protected_apic_has_interrupt = NULL;
+
if (enable_ept)
kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
@@ -168,6 +171,13 @@ static void vt_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
return vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
}

+static bool vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ KVM_BUG_ON(!is_td_vcpu(vcpu), vcpu->kvm);
+
+ return tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -339,6 +349,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
.deliver_interrupt = vmx_deliver_interrupt,
.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
+ .protected_apic_has_interrupt = vt_protected_apic_has_interrupt,

.set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 57767ef3353b..19a9263e5788 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return -EINVAL;

fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
+ vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected = true;

vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;

@@ -464,6 +465,11 @@ void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
local_irq_enable();
}

+bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return pi_has_pending_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index d4fcb6b29ffe..6bdd956b44c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
+bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -181,6 +182,7 @@ static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTP
static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
+static inline bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:31:56

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 088/108] KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT

From: Yuan Yao <[email protected]>

TDX module internally uses locks to protect internal resources. It tries
to acquire the locks. If it fails to obtain the lock, it returns
TDX_OPERAND_BUSY error without spin because its execution time limitation.

TDX SEAMCALL API reference describes what resources are used. It's known
which TDX SEAMCALL can cause contention with which resources. VMM can
avoid contention inside the TDX module by avoiding contentious TDX SEAMCALL
with, for example, spinlock. Because OS knows better its process
scheduling and its scalability, a lock at OS/VMM layer would work better
than simply retrying TDX SEAMCALLs.

TDH.MEM.* API except for TDH.MEM.TRACK operates on a secure EPT tree and
the TDX module internally tries to acquire the lock of the secure EPT tree.
They return TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT in case of failure to
get the lock. TDX KVM allows sept callbacks to return error so that TDP
MMU layer can retry.

TDH.VP.ENTER is an exception with zero-step attack mitigation. Normally
TDH.VP.ENTER uses only TD vcpu resources and it doesn't cause contention.
When a zero-step attack is suspected, it obtains a secure EPT tree lock and
tracks the GPAs causing a secure EPT fault. Thus TDG.VP.ENTER may result
in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT. Also TDH.MEM.* SEAMCALLs may
result in TDX_OPERAN_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT.

Retry TDX TDH.MEM.* API and TDH.VP.ENTER on the error because the error is
a rare event caused by zero-step attack mitigation and spinlock can not be
used for TDH.VP.ENTER due to indefinite time execution.

Signed-off-by: Yuan Yao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index b0b193cc180e..088e98232227 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1050,6 +1050,10 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath)
{
union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_tdx(vcpu)->exit_reason;

+ /* See the comment of tdh_sept_seamcall(). */
+ if (unlikely(exit_reason.full == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT)))
+ return 1;
+
if (unlikely(exit_reason.non_recoverable || exit_reason.error)) {
if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT)
return tdx_handle_triple_fault(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
index 35e285ae6f9e..86330d0e4b22 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
@@ -18,7 +18,35 @@

void pr_tdx_error(u64 op, u64 error_code, const struct tdx_module_output *out);

-#define TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT)
+/*
+ * TDX module acquires its internal lock for resources. It doesn't spin to get
+ * locks because of its restrictions of allowed execution time. Instead, it
+ * returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with an operand id.
+ *
+ * Multiple VCPUs can operate on SEPT. Also with zero-step attack mitigation,
+ * TDH.VP.ENTER may rarely acquire SEPT lock and release it when zero-step
+ * attack is suspected. It results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT
+ * with TDH.MEM.* operation. Note: TDH.MEM.TRACK is an exception.
+ *
+ * Because TDP MMU uses read lock for scalability, spin lock around SEAMCALL
+ * spoils TDP MMU effort. Retry several times with the assumption that SEPT
+ * lock contention is rare. But don't loop forever to avoid lockup. Let TDP
+ * MMU retry.
+ */
+#define TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT)
+
+static inline u64 seamcall_sept(u64 op, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
+ struct tdx_module_output *out)
+{
+#define SEAMCALL_RETRY_MAX 16
+ int retry = SEAMCALL_RETRY_MAX;
+ u64 ret;
+
+ do {
+ ret = __seamcall(op, rcx, rdx, r8, r9, out);
+ } while (ret == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY && retry-- > 0);
+ return ret;
+}

static inline u64 tdh_mng_addcx(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t addr)
{
@@ -30,14 +58,14 @@ static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_add(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa, hpa_t source
struct tdx_module_output *out)
{
clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
- return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, gpa, tdr, hpa, source, out);
+ return seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, gpa, tdr, hpa, source, out);
}

static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level, hpa_t page,
struct tdx_module_output *out)
{
clflush_cache_range(__va(page), PAGE_SIZE);
- return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, gpa | level, tdr, page, 0, out);
+ return seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, gpa | level, tdr, page, 0, out);
}

static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_remove(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
@@ -63,13 +91,13 @@ static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa,
struct tdx_module_output *out)
{
clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
- return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
+ return seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
}

static inline u64 tdh_mem_range_block(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
struct tdx_module_output *out)
{
- return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+ return seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
}

static inline u64 tdh_mng_key_config(hpa_t tdr)
@@ -151,7 +179,7 @@ static inline u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(hpa_t page,
static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
struct tdx_module_output *out)
{
- return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+ return seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
}

static inline u64 tdh_sys_lp_shutdown(void)
@@ -167,7 +195,7 @@ static inline u64 tdh_mem_track(hpa_t tdr)
static inline u64 tdh_mem_range_unblock(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
struct tdx_module_output *out)
{
- return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
+ return seamcall_sept(TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0, 0, out);
}

static inline u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume)
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:31:58

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 083/108] KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX vcpu control structure defines one bit for pending NMI for VMM to
inject NMI by setting the bit without knowing TDX vcpu NMI states. Because
the vcpu state is protected, VMM can't know about NMI states of TDX vcpu.
The TDX module handles actual injection and NMI states transition.

Add methods for NMI and treat NMI can be injected always.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 +++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++
3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 3e9007a7edfb..510bffb3e2f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -255,6 +255,58 @@ static void vt_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu);
}

+static void vt_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_inject_nmi(vcpu);
+
+ vmx_inject_nmi(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vt_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+ /*
+ * The TDX module manages NMI windows and NMI reinjection, and hides NMI
+ * blocking, all KVM can do is throw an NMI over the wall.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return true;
+
+ return vmx_nmi_allowed(vcpu, for_injection);
+}
+
+static bool vt_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * Assume NMIs are always unmasked. KVM could query PEND_NMI and treat
+ * NMIs as masked if a previous NMI is still pending, but SEAMCALLs are
+ * expensive and the end result is unchanged as the only relevant usage
+ * of get_nmi_mask() is to limit the number of pending NMIs, i.e. it
+ * only changes whether KVM or the TDX module drops an NMI.
+ */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ return vmx_get_nmi_mask(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vt_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, masked);
+}
+
+static void vt_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ /* Refer the comment in vt_get_nmi_mask(). */
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_enable_nmi_window(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
int pgd_level)
{
@@ -410,14 +462,14 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.get_interrupt_shadow = vt_get_interrupt_shadow,
.patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
.inject_irq = vt_inject_irq,
- .inject_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
+ .inject_nmi = vt_inject_nmi,
.inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
.cancel_injection = vt_cancel_injection,
.interrupt_allowed = vt_interrupt_allowed,
- .nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
- .get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
- .set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
- .enable_nmi_window = vmx_enable_nmi_window,
+ .nmi_allowed = vt_nmi_allowed,
+ .get_nmi_mask = vt_get_nmi_mask,
+ .set_nmi_mask = vt_set_nmi_mask,
+ .enable_nmi_window = vt_enable_nmi_window,
.enable_irq_window = vt_enable_irq_window,
.update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
.set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 7dad75b3b4a6..9805308079f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -678,6 +678,11 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
}

+void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ td_management_write8(to_tdx(vcpu), TD_VCPU_PEND_NMI, 1);
+}
+
void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
{
td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 01fac8ba8c50..ba4e51446e41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
int trig_mode, int vector);
+void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -188,6 +189,7 @@ static inline bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { ret

static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
int trig_mode, int vector) {}
+static inline void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:32:09

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 086/108] KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

By necessity, TDX will use a different register ABI for hypercalls.
Break out the core functionality so that it may be reused for TDX.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 70549018987d..094fff5414e1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2004,6 +2004,10 @@ static inline void kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(struct kvm *kvm,
kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, reason, false);
}

+unsigned long __kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long nr,
+ unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
+ unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3,
+ int op_64_bit);
int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index ad7b227b68dd..fad5108dff1e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9684,26 +9684,15 @@ static int complete_hypercall_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}

-int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+unsigned long __kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long nr,
+ unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
+ unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3,
+ int op_64_bit)
{
- unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;
- int op_64_bit;
-
- if (kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
- return kvm_xen_hypercall(vcpu);
-
- if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu))
- return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
-
- nr = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
- a0 = kvm_rbx_read(vcpu);
- a1 = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
- a2 = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
- a3 = kvm_rsi_read(vcpu);
+ unsigned long ret;

trace_kvm_hypercall(nr, a0, a1, a2, a3);

- op_64_bit = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
if (!op_64_bit) {
nr &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
a0 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
@@ -9712,11 +9701,6 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
a3 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
}

- if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0) {
- ret = -KVM_EPERM;
- goto out;
- }
-
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;

switch (nr) {
@@ -9775,6 +9759,34 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
break;
}
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_emulate_hypercall);
+
+int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;
+ int op_64_bit;
+
+ if (kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
+ return kvm_xen_hypercall(vcpu);
+
+ if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu))
+ return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
+
+ nr = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+ a0 = kvm_rbx_read(vcpu);
+ a1 = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+ a2 = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
+ a3 = kvm_rsi_read(vcpu);
+ op_64_bit = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
+
+ if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0) {
+ ret = -KVM_EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = __kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu, nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, op_64_bit);
out:
if (!op_64_bit)
ret = (u32)ret;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:32:21

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 094/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV CPUID hypercall to the KVM backend function.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index f6477d577001..4b83d7a81433 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -810,12 +810,34 @@ static int tdx_emulate_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}

+static int tdx_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ /* EAX and ECX for cpuid is stored in R12 and R13. */
+ eax = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+ ecx = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_cpuid(vcpu, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, false);
+
+ tdvmcall_a0_write(vcpu, eax);
+ tdvmcall_a1_write(vcpu, ebx);
+ tdvmcall_a2_write(vcpu, ecx);
+ tdvmcall_a3_write(vcpu, edx);
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
return tdx_emulate_vmcall(vcpu);

switch (tdvmcall_leaf(vcpu)) {
+ case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
+ return tdx_emulate_cpuid(vcpu);
default:
break;
}
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:32:36

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 064/108] KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Because the guest memory is protected in TDX, the creation of the initial
guest memory requires a dedicated TDX module API, tdh_mem_page_add, instead
of directly copying the memory contents into the guest memory in the case
of the default VM type. KVM MMU page fault handler callback,
private_page_add, handles it.

Define new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION, of VM-scoped
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. It assigns the guest page, copies the initial
memory contents into the guest memory, encrypts the guest memory. At the
same time, optionally it extends memory measurement of the TDX guest. It
calls the KVM MMU page fault(EPT-violation) handler to trigger the
callbacks for it.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 9 ++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 +
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 9 ++
5 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 80db152430e4..6ae52926e05a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,

KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
};
@@ -615,4 +616,12 @@ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
};
};

+#define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION (1UL << 0)
+
+struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+ __u64 source_addr;
+ __u64 gpa;
+ __u64 nr_pages;
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 37b378bf60df..8e24dd0e3c3c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -5492,6 +5492,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
out:
return r;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_mmu_load);

void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 5378d2c35e27..7c00f71d42af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -417,6 +417,21 @@ void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
}

+static void tdx_measure_page(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, hpa_t gpa)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
+ u64 err;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += TDX_EXTENDMR_CHUNKSIZE) {
+ err = tdh_mr_extend(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, gpa + i, &out);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, &kvm_tdx->kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_EXTEND, err, &out);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static void tdx_unpin(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
@@ -431,20 +446,23 @@ static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
hpa_t hpa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
struct tdx_module_output out;
+ hpa_t source_pa;
+ bool measure;
u64 err;

if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) ||
!kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(pfn)))
return 0;

- /* TODO: handle large pages. */
- if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
- return -EINVAL;
-
/* To prevent page migration, do nothing on mmu notifier. */
get_page(pfn_to_page(pfn));

+ /* Build-time faults are induced and handled via TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD. */
if (likely(is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx))) {
+ /* TODO: handle large pages. */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
err = tdh_mem_page_aug(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, gpa, hpa, &out);
if (err == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY) {
tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
@@ -453,11 +471,50 @@ static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, err, &out);
tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+ return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}

- /* TODO: tdh_mem_page_add() comes here */
+ /*
+ * KVM_INIT_MEM_REGION, tdx_init_mem_region(), supports only 4K page
+ * because tdh_mem_page_add() supports only 4K page.
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(level != PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * In case of TDP MMU, fault handler can run concurrently. Note
+ * 'source_pa' is a TD scope variable, meaning if there are multiple
+ * threads reaching here with all needing to access 'source_pa', it
+ * will break. However fortunately this won't happen, because below
+ * TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD code path is only used when VM is being created
+ * before it is running, using KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION ioctl (which
+ * always uses vcpu 0's page table and protected by vcpu->mutex).
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_tdx->source_pa == INVALID_PAGE, kvm)) {
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ source_pa = kvm_tdx->source_pa & ~KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION;
+ measure = kvm_tdx->source_pa & KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION;
+ kvm_tdx->source_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
+
+ do {
+ err = tdh_mem_page_add(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, gpa, hpa, source_pa,
+ &out);
+ /*
+ * This path is executed during populating initial guest memory
+ * image. i.e. before running any vcpu. Race is rare.
+ */
+ } while (err == TDX_ERROR_SEPT_BUSY);
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
+ pr_tdx_error(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, err, &out);
+ tdx_unpin(kvm, pfn);
+ return -EIO;
+ } else if (measure)
+ tdx_measure_page(kvm_tdx, gpa);

return 0;
}
@@ -1091,6 +1148,94 @@ void tdx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
cpu_relax();
}

+#define TDX_SEPT_PFERR PFERR_WRITE_MASK
+
+static int tdx_init_mem_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region region;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ struct page *page;
+ kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+ int idx, ret = 0;
+
+ /* The BSP vCPU must be created before initializing memory regions. */
+ if (!atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (cmd->flags & ~KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&region, (void __user *)cmd->data, sizeof(region)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(region.source_addr, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(region.gpa, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+ !region.nr_pages ||
+ region.gpa + (region.nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) <= region.gpa ||
+ !kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, region.gpa) ||
+ !kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, region.gpa + (region.nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0);
+ if (mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ vcpu_load(vcpu);
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+ kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
+
+ while (region.nr_pages) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
+
+
+ /* Pin the source page. */
+ ret = get_user_pages_fast(region.source_addr, 1, 0, &page);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ break;
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kvm_tdx->source_pa = pfn_to_hpa(page_to_pfn(page)) |
+ (cmd->flags & KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION);
+
+ pfn = kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page(vcpu, region.gpa, TDX_SEPT_PFERR,
+ PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) || kvm->vm_bugged)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ ret = 0;
+
+ put_page(page);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ region.source_addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ region.gpa += PAGE_SIZE;
+ region.nr_pages--;
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+ vcpu_put(vcpu);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)cmd->data, &region, sizeof(region)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;
@@ -1107,6 +1252,9 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
case KVM_TDX_INIT_VM:
r = tdx_td_init(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
break;
+ case KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION:
+ r = tdx_init_mem_region(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 80d595c5f96f..686da2321683 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
u64 xfam;
int hkid;

+ hpa_t source_pa;
+
bool finalized;
atomic_t tdh_mem_track;

diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 35e3b4aa2e96..37e713ffab72 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
+ KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,

KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
};
@@ -617,4 +618,12 @@ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
};
};

+#define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION (1UL << 0)
+
+struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
+ __u64 source_addr;
+ __u64 gpa;
+ __u64 nr_pages;
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:32:47

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 097/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Export kvm_io_bus_read and kvm_mmio tracepoint and wire up TDX PV MMIO
hypercall to the KVM backend functions.

kvm_io_bus_read/write() searches KVM device emulated in kernel of the given
MMIO address and emulates the MMIO. As TDX PV MMIO also needs it, export
kvm_io_bus_read(). kvm_io_bus_write() is already exported. TDX PV MMIO
emulates some of MMIO itself. To add trace point consistently with x86
kvm, export kvm_mmio tracepoint.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 +
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +
3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 69a3e7007e83..50e9352464a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -921,6 +921,118 @@ static int tdx_emulate_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return ret;
}

+static int tdx_complete_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long val = 0;
+ gpa_t gpa;
+ int size;
+
+ KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->mmio_needed != 1, vcpu->kvm);
+ vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+
+ if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write) {
+ gpa = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa;
+ size = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len;
+
+ memcpy(&val, vcpu->run->mmio.data, size);
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, size, gpa, &val);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static inline int tdx_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int size,
+ unsigned long val)
+{
+ if (kvm_iodevice_write(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.apic->dev, gpa, size, &val) &&
+ kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, gpa, size, &val))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, size, gpa, &val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int tdx_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int size)
+{
+ unsigned long val;
+
+ if (kvm_iodevice_read(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.apic->dev, gpa, size, &val) &&
+ kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, gpa, size, &val))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, size, gpa, &val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+ int size, write, r;
+ unsigned long val;
+ gpa_t gpa;
+
+ KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->mmio_needed, vcpu->kvm);
+
+ size = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+ write = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+ gpa = tdvmcall_a2_read(vcpu);
+ val = write ? tdvmcall_a3_read(vcpu) : 0;
+
+ if (size != 1 && size != 2 && size != 4 && size != 8)
+ goto error;
+ if (write != 0 && write != 1)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Strip the shared bit, allow MMIO with and without it set. */
+ gpa = gpa & ~gfn_to_gpa(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm));
+
+ if (size > 8u || ((gpa + size - 1) ^ gpa) & PAGE_MASK)
+ goto error;
+
+ slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+ if (slot && !(slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
+ trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (write)
+ r = tdx_mmio_write(vcpu, gpa, size, val);
+ else
+ r = tdx_mmio_read(vcpu, gpa, size);
+ if (!r) {
+ /* Kernel completed device emulation. */
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Request the device emulation to userspace device model. */
+ vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
+ vcpu->mmio_is_write = write;
+ vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_mmio;
+
+ vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
+ vcpu->run->mmio.len = size;
+ vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = write;
+ vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
+
+ if (write) {
+ memcpy(vcpu->run->mmio.data, &val, size);
+ } else {
+ vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa = gpa;
+ vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len = size;
+ trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, size, gpa, NULL);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -933,6 +1045,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return tdx_emulate_hlt(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return tdx_emulate_io(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
+ return tdx_emulate_mmio(vcpu);
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index fad5108dff1e..2eacc4929d5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -13919,6 +13919,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm)

EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_entry);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmio);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_inj_virq);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_fault);
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index f0e77b65939b..6953da8b74d3 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -2815,6 +2815,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot *kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn

return NULL;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot);

bool kvm_is_visible_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
{
@@ -5822,6 +5823,7 @@ int kvm_io_bus_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_bus bus_idx, gpa_t addr,
r = __kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, bus, &range, val);
return r < 0 ? r : 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_io_bus_read);

/* Caller must hold slots_lock. */
int kvm_io_bus_register_dev(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx, gpa_t addr,
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:32:58

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 054/108] KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

EPT MMU masks are used commonly for VMX and TDX. The value needs to be
initialized in common code before both VMX/TDX-specific initialization
code.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 5 +++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 4 ----
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 0d5ca65e9997..9fb6eb626a9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include "x86_ops.h"
#include "vmx.h"
#include "nested.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
#include "pmu.h"
#include "tdx.h"

@@ -26,6 +27,10 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)

enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup(&vt_x86_ops);

+ if (enable_ept)
+ kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
+ cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
+
return 0;
}

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 2ff7af959e30..b5c3652c3cc4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -8256,10 +8256,6 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)

set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */

- if (enable_ept)
- kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
- cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
-
/*
* Setup shadow_me_value/shadow_me_mask to include MKTME KeyID
* bits to shadow_zero_check.
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:33:23

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 061/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Introduce a helper to directly (pun intended) fault-in a TDP page
without having to go through the full page fault path. This allows
TDX to get the resulting pfn and also allows the RET_PF_* enums to
stay in mmu.c where they belong.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 50d240d52697..e2a0dfbee56d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -154,6 +154,9 @@ static inline void kvm_mmu_load_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level);
}

+kvm_pfn_t kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+ u32 error_code, int max_level);
+
/*
* Check if a given access (described through the I/D, W/R and U/S bits of a
* page fault error code pfec) causes a permission fault with the given PTE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 08923b64dcc8..168c84c99de3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4485,6 +4485,45 @@ int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
return direct_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
}

+kvm_pfn_t kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+ u32 error_code, int max_level)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct kvm_page_fault fault = (struct kvm_page_fault) {
+ .addr = gpa,
+ .error_code = error_code,
+ .exec = error_code & PFERR_FETCH_MASK,
+ .write = error_code & PFERR_WRITE_MASK,
+ .present = error_code & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK,
+ .rsvd = error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK,
+ .user = error_code & PFERR_USER_MASK,
+ .prefetch = false,
+ .is_tdp = true,
+ .nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled = is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm),
+ .is_private = kvm_is_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa),
+ };
+
+ if (mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu, false))
+ return KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT;
+
+ /*
+ * Loop on the page fault path to handle the case where an mmu_notifier
+ * invalidation triggers RET_PF_RETRY. In the normal page fault path,
+ * KVM needs to resume the guest in case the invalidation changed any
+ * of the page fault properties, i.e. the gpa or error code. For this
+ * path, the gpa and error code are fixed by the caller, and the caller
+ * expects failure if and only if the page fault can't be fixed.
+ */
+ do {
+ fault.max_level = max_level;
+ fault.req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+ fault.goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+ r = direct_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
+ } while (r == RET_PF_RETRY && !is_error_noslot_pfn(fault.pfn));
+ return fault.pfn;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page);
+
static void nonpaging_init_context(struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
context->page_fault = nonpaging_page_fault;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:33:45

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 007/108] KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

NOTE: This patch is in position of the patch series for developers to be
able to test codes during the middle of the patch series although this
patch series doesn't provide functional features until the all the patches
of this patch series. When merging this patch series, this patch can be
moved to the end.

As first step TDX VM support, return that TDX VM type supported to device
model, e.g. qemu. The callback to create guest TD is vm_init callback for
KVM_CREATE_VM.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 -----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 22bf49afc761..0900ff2f2390 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@
static bool __read_mostly enable_tdx = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST);
module_param_named(tdx, enable_tdx, bool, 0444);

+static bool vt_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
+{
+ return type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM ||
+ (enable_tdx && tdx_is_vm_type_supported(type));
+}
+
static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
{
int ret;
@@ -23,6 +29,14 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
return 0;
}

+static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (is_td(kvm))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */
+
+ return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
+}
+
struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = "kvm_intel",

@@ -33,9 +47,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,

- .is_vm_type_supported = vmx_is_vm_type_supported,
+ .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
- .vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
+ .vm_init = vt_vm_init,
.vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,

.vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 6213a5c6b637..530e72f85762 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -74,6 +74,12 @@ static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
return 0;
}

+bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
+{
+ /* enable_tdx check is done by the caller. */
+ return type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
+}
+
int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
{
int r;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index dc05b78e0a1e..68aef67c5eb7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7410,11 +7410,6 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return err;
}

-bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
-{
- return type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM;
-}
-
#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index d4877f4f93de..ac1688b0b0e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);
int vmx_check_processor_compatibility(void);
int vmx_hardware_enable(void);
void vmx_hardware_disable(void);
-bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm);
@@ -133,8 +132,10 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
+bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
#else
static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
+static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
#endif

#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:34:04

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 099/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall to the KVM backend function.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index b820475ce0ab..e3062c245e70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1033,6 +1033,41 @@ static int tdx_emulate_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}

+static int tdx_emulate_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u32 index = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+ u64 data;
+
+ if (!kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ) ||
+ kvm_get_msr(vcpu, index, &data)) {
+ trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(index);
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ trace_kvm_msr_read(index, data);
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, data);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u32 index = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+ u64 data = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+
+ if (!kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE) ||
+ kvm_set_msr(vcpu, index, data)) {
+ trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(index, data);
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ trace_kvm_msr_write(index, data);
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -1047,6 +1082,10 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return tdx_emulate_io(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
return tdx_emulate_mmio(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
+ return tdx_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
+ return tdx_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
default:
break;
}
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:34:05

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 006/108] KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate default VMs from confidential VMs

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Unlike default VMs, confidential VMs (Intel TDX and AMD SEV-ES) don't allow
some operations (e.g., memory read/write, register state access, etc).

Introduce vm_type to track the type of the VM to x86 KVM. Other arch KVMs
already use vm_type, KVM_INIT_VM accepts vm_type, and x86 KVM callback
vm_init accepts vm_type. So follow them. Further, a different policy can
be made based on vm_type. Define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM for default VM as
default and define KVM_X86_TDX_VM for Intel TDX VM. The wrapper function
will be defined as "bool is_td(kvm) { return vm_type == VM_TYPE_TDX; }"

Add a capability KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES to effectively allow device model,
e.g. qemu, to query what VM types are supported by KVM. This (introduce a
new capability and add vm_type) is chosen to align with other arch KVMs
that have VM types already. Other arch KVMs uses different name to query
supported vm types and there is no common name for it, so new name was
chosen.

Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 6 +-----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++++++++-
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 3 +++
tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
13 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 08253cf498d1..b6f08e8a8320 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -147,10 +147,31 @@ described as 'basic' will be available.
The new VM has no virtual cpus and no memory.
You probably want to use 0 as machine type.

+X86:
+^^^^
+
+Supported vm type can be queried from KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES, which returns the
+bitmap of supported vm types. The 1-setting of bit @n means vm type with
+value @n is supported.
+
+S390:
+^^^^^
+
In order to create user controlled virtual machines on S390, check
KVM_CAP_S390_UCONTROL and use the flag KVM_VM_S390_UCONTROL as
privileged user (CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

+MIPS:
+^^^^^
+
+To use hardware assisted virtualization on MIPS (VZ ASE) rather than
+the default trap & emulate implementation (which changes the virtual
+memory layout to fit in user mode), check KVM_CAP_MIPS_VZ and use the
+flag KVM_VM_MIPS_VZ.
+
+ARM64:
+^^^^^^
+
On arm64, the physical address size for a VM (IPA Size limit) is limited
to 40bits by default. The limit can be configured if the host supports the
extension KVM_CAP_ARM_VM_IPA_SIZE. When supported, use
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 15c1515a0760..8a5c5ae70bc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(hardware_disable)
KVM_X86_OP(hardware_unsetup)
KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
+KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
KVM_X86_OP(vm_init)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 66b1ff1cec61..2a41a93a80f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1151,6 +1151,7 @@ enum kvm_apicv_inhibit {
};

struct kvm_arch {
+ unsigned long vm_type;
unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;
unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;
unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;
@@ -1468,6 +1469,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
bool (*has_emulated_msr)(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index);
void (*vcpu_after_set_cpuid)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

+ bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);
unsigned int vm_size;
int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 46de10a809ec..54b08789c402 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -532,4 +532,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
#define KVM_VCPU_TSC_CTRL 0 /* control group for the timestamp counter (TSC) */
#define KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET 0 /* attribute for the TSC offset */

+#define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM 0
+#define KVM_X86_TDX_VM 1
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index aaf5f0623011..2bcf2e1a5271 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4713,6 +4713,11 @@ static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
sev_vm_destroy(kvm);
}

+static bool svm_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
+{
+ return type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM;
+}
+
static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh)
@@ -4740,6 +4745,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vcpu_free = svm_vcpu_free,
.vcpu_reset = svm_vcpu_reset,

+ .is_vm_type_supported = svm_is_vm_type_supported,
.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_svm),
.vm_init = svm_vm_init,
.vm_destroy = svm_vm_destroy,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index a5cbf3ca2055..22bf49afc761 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,

+ .is_vm_type_supported = vmx_is_vm_type_supported,
.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
.vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
.vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 060bf48ec3d6..473013265bd8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -15,11 +15,7 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {

static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- /*
- * TDX VM type isn't defined yet.
- * return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
- */
- return false;
+ return kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;
}

static inline bool is_td_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 68aef67c5eb7..dc05b78e0a1e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7410,6 +7410,11 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return err;
}

+bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
+{
+ return type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM;
+}
+
#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 6196d651a00a..d4877f4f93de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);
int vmx_check_processor_compatibility(void);
int vmx_hardware_enable(void);
void vmx_hardware_disable(void);
+bool vmx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 715a53d4fc3d..91053fdc4512 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4520,6 +4520,11 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
case KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT:
r = kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit;
break;
+ case KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES:
+ r = BIT(KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM);
+ if (static_call(kvm_x86_is_vm_type_supported)(KVM_X86_TDX_VM))
+ r |= BIT(KVM_X86_TDX_VM);
+ break;
default:
break;
}
@@ -12507,9 +12512,11 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
int ret;
unsigned long flags;

- if (type)
+ if (!static_call(kvm_x86_is_vm_type_supported)(type))
return -EINVAL;

+ kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
+
ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
if (ret)
goto out;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index fa60b032a405..49386e4de8b8 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1216,6 +1216,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
#define KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY 222
#define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL 223
#define KVM_CAP_PRIVATE_MEM 224
+#define KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES 225

#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING

diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 46de10a809ec..54b08789c402 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -532,4 +532,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
#define KVM_VCPU_TSC_CTRL 0 /* control group for the timestamp counter (TSC) */
#define KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET 0 /* attribute for the TSC offset */

+#define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM 0
+#define KVM_X86_TDX_VM 1
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 0d5d4419139a..812b771d8702 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1178,6 +1178,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
#define KVM_CAP_S390_ZPCI_OP 221
#define KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY 222
#define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING_ACQ_REL 223
+#define KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES 225

#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:40:00

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 079/108] KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

If APIC state is protected, i.e. the vCPU is a TDX guest, assume a timer
IRQ was injected when deciding whether or not to busy wait in the "timer
advanced" path. The "real" vIRR is not readable/writable, so trying to
query for a pending timer IRQ will return garbage.

Note, TDX can scour the PIR if it wants to be more precise and skip the
"wait" call entirely.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index bcf339d02c0a..8d894c3959c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -1606,8 +1606,17 @@ static void apic_update_lvtt(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
static bool lapic_timer_int_injected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
- u32 reg = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT);
+ u32 reg;

+ /*
+ * Assume a timer IRQ was "injected" if the APIC is protected. KVM's
+ * copy of the vIRR is bogus, it's the responsibility of the caller to
+ * precisely check whether or not a timer IRQ is pending.
+ */
+ if (apic->guest_apic_protected)
+ return true;
+
+ reg = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT);
if (kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic)) {
int vec = reg & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
void *bitmap = apic->regs + APIC_ISR;
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:42:57

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 015/108] x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

TDX private host key id is assigned to guest TD. The memory controller
encrypts guest TD memory with the assigned TDX private host key id (HIKD).
Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id so that TDX
KVM manage it.

Also export the global TDX private host key id that is used to encrypt TDX
module, its memory and some dynamic data (TDR). When VMM releasing
encrypted page to reuse it, the page needs to be flushed with the used host
key id. VMM needs the global TDX private host key id to flush such pages
TDX module accesses with the global TDX private host key id.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
index ba2e4c69fb9f..cd304d323d33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
@@ -186,6 +186,17 @@ struct tdsysinfo_struct {
const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
bool platform_tdx_enabled(void);
int tdx_enable(void);
+
+/*
+ * Key id globally used by TDX module: TDX module maps TDR with this TDX global
+ * key id. TDR includes key id assigned to the TD. Then TDX module maps other
+ * TD-related pages with the assigned key id. TDR requires this TDX global key
+ * id for cache flush unlike other TD-related pages.
+ */
+extern u32 tdx_global_keyid __read_mostly;
+int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
+void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
+
u64 __seamcall(u64 op, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
struct tdx_module_output *out);
#else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
@@ -193,6 +204,8 @@ struct tdsysinfo_struct;
static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void) { return NULL; }
static inline bool platform_tdx_enabled(void) { return false; }
static inline int tdx_enable(void) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+static inline void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */

#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
index 6fb630fa7d09..0625ced219d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ static struct cmr_info tdx_cmr_array[MAX_CMRS] __aligned(CMR_INFO_ARRAY_ALIGNMEN
static int tdx_cmr_num;

/* TDX module global KeyID. Used in TDH.SYS.CONFIG ABI. */
-static u32 tdx_global_keyid;
+u32 tdx_global_keyid __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_global_keyid);

/*
* Detect TDX private KeyIDs to see whether TDX has been enabled by the
@@ -113,6 +114,31 @@ static void __init clear_tdx(void)
tdx_keyid_start = tdx_keyid_num = 0;
}

+/* TDX KeyID pool */
+static DEFINE_IDA(tdx_keyid_pool);
+
+int tdx_keyid_alloc(void)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tdx_keyid_start || !tdx_keyid_num))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* The first keyID is reserved for the global key. */
+ return ida_alloc_range(&tdx_keyid_pool, tdx_keyid_start + 1,
+ tdx_keyid_start + tdx_keyid_num - 1,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_keyid_alloc);
+
+void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid)
+{
+ /* keyid = 0 is reserved. */
+ if (!keyid || keyid <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ ida_free(&tdx_keyid_pool, keyid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_keyid_free);
+
static void __init tdx_memory_destroy(void)
{
while (!list_empty(&tdx_memlist)) {
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:46:58

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 068/108] KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This patch implements running TDX vcpu. Once vcpu runs on the logical
processor (LP), the TDX vcpu is associated with it. When the TDX vcpu
moves to another LP, the TDX vcpu needs to flush its status on the LP.
When destroying TDX vcpu, it needs to complete flush and flush cpu memory
cache. Track which LP the TDX vcpu run and flush it as necessary.

Do nothing on sched_in event as TDX doesn't support pause loop.

TDX vcpu execution requires restoring PMU debug store after returning back
to KVM because the TDX module unconditionally resets the value. To reuse
the existing code, export perf_restore_debug_store.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index 3163915e2e3d..252c33820271 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -100,6 +100,23 @@ static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
return vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
}

+static int vt_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ /* Unconditionally continue to vcpu_run(). */
+ return 1;
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_pre_run(vcpu);
+}
+
+static fastpath_t vt_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_vcpu_run(vcpu);
+
+ return vmx_vcpu_run(vcpu);
+}
+
static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
@@ -232,8 +249,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
.flush_tlb_gva = vt_flush_tlb_gva,
.flush_tlb_guest = vt_flush_tlb_guest,

- .vcpu_pre_run = vmx_vcpu_pre_run,
- .vcpu_run = vmx_vcpu_run,
+ .vcpu_pre_run = vt_vcpu_pre_run,
+ .vcpu_run = vt_vcpu_run,
.handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
.skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index cce6ccd4a0be..2f57f62eb103 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
#include "x86.h"
#include "mmu.h"

+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+#include "trace.h"
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tdx: " fmt

@@ -412,6 +415,35 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
}

+u64 __tdx_vcpu_run(hpa_t tdvpr, void *regs, u32 regs_mask);
+
+static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
+{
+ guest_enter_irqoff();
+ tdx->exit_reason.full = __tdx_vcpu_run(tdx->tdvpr.pa, vcpu->arch.regs, 0);
+ guest_exit_irqoff();
+}
+
+fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
+ if (unlikely(vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged)) {
+ tdx->exit_reason.full = TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU;
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+ }
+
+ trace_kvm_entry(vcpu);
+
+ tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);
+
+ vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
+ trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+}
+
void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int pgd_level)
{
td_vmcs_write64(to_tdx(vcpu), SHARED_EPT_POINTER, root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
index 686da2321683..064e1f2f61d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
@@ -31,12 +31,45 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
u64 tsc_offset;
};

+union tdx_exit_reason {
+ struct {
+ /* 31:0 mirror the VMX Exit Reason format */
+ u64 basic : 16;
+ u64 reserved16 : 1;
+ u64 reserved17 : 1;
+ u64 reserved18 : 1;
+ u64 reserved19 : 1;
+ u64 reserved20 : 1;
+ u64 reserved21 : 1;
+ u64 reserved22 : 1;
+ u64 reserved23 : 1;
+ u64 reserved24 : 1;
+ u64 reserved25 : 1;
+ u64 bus_lock_detected : 1;
+ u64 enclave_mode : 1;
+ u64 smi_pending_mtf : 1;
+ u64 smi_from_vmx_root : 1;
+ u64 reserved30 : 1;
+ u64 failed_vmentry : 1;
+
+ /* 63:32 are TDX specific */
+ u64 details_l1 : 8;
+ u64 class : 8;
+ u64 reserved61_48 : 14;
+ u64 non_recoverable : 1;
+ u64 error : 1;
+ };
+ u64 full;
+};
+
struct vcpu_tdx {
struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;

struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;

+ union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason;
+
bool vcpu_initialized;

/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 5fccd98be06e..ccae338dcfdd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
+fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
@@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}
static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
+static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; }

static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 5dadd0f9a10e..3662f64f3b5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ const struct kvm_stats_header kvm_vcpu_stats_header = {
};

u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_xcr0);

static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache;

--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:49:20

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 096/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

Wire up TDX PV port IO hypercall to the KVM backend function.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 57 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 03b08b3f1ff6..69a3e7007e83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -866,6 +866,61 @@ static int tdx_emulate_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
}

+static int tdx_complete_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+ unsigned long val = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.pio.count != 1);
+
+ ret = ctxt->ops->pio_in_emulated(ctxt, vcpu->arch.pio.size,
+ vcpu->arch.pio.port, &val, 1);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!ret);
+
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tdx_emulate_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+ unsigned long val = 0;
+ unsigned int port;
+ int size, ret;
+ bool write;
+
+ ++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
+
+ size = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
+ write = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
+ port = tdvmcall_a2_read(vcpu);
+
+ if (size != 1 && size != 2 && size != 4) {
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (write) {
+ val = tdvmcall_a3_read(vcpu);
+ ret = ctxt->ops->pio_out_emulated(ctxt, size, port, &val, 1);
+
+ /* No need for a complete_userspace_io callback. */
+ vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+ } else {
+ ret = ctxt->ops->pio_in_emulated(ctxt, size, port, &val, 1);
+ if (!ret)
+ vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = tdx_complete_pio_in;
+ else
+ tdvmcall_set_return_val(vcpu, val);
+ }
+ if (ret)
+ tdvmcall_set_return_code(vcpu, TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
@@ -876,6 +931,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return tdx_emulate_cpuid(vcpu);
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return tdx_emulate_hlt(vcpu);
+ case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
+ return tdx_emulate_io(vcpu);
default:
break;
}
--
2.25.1


2022-10-30 07:51:12

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 023/108] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

This empty commit is to mark the start of patch series of TD vcpu
creation/destruction.

Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
index 5e0deaebf843..3e8efde3e3f3 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ Layer status
What qemu can do
----------------
- TDX VM TYPE is exposed to Qemu.
-- Qemu can try to create VM of TDX VM type and then fails.
+- Qemu can create/destroy guest of TDX vm type.

Patch Layer status
------------------
Patch layer Status
* TDX, VMX coexistence: Applied
* TDX architectural definitions: Applied
-* TD VM creation/destruction: Applying
-* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Not yet
+* TD VM creation/destruction: Applied
+* TD vcpu creation/destruction: Applying
* TDX EPT violation: Not yet
* TD finalization: Not yet
* TD vcpu enter/exit: Not yet
--
2.25.1


2022-10-31 09:56:50

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 010/108] KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes


On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> Add error codes for the TDX SEAMCALLs both for TDX VMM side for TDH
> SEAMCALL and TDX guest side for TDG.VP.VMCALL. KVM issues the TDX
> SEAMCALLs and checks its error code. KVM handles hypercall from the TDX
> guest and may return an error. So error code for the TDX guest is also
> needed.
>
> TDX SEAMCALL uses bits 31:0 to return more information, so these error
> codes will only exactly match RAX[63:32]. Error codes for TDG.VP.VMCALL is
> defined by TDX Guest-Host-Communication interface spec.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..ce246ba62454
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/* architectural status code for SEAMCALL */
> +
> +#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
> +#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
> +
> +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL
> +
> +/*
> + * TDX SEAMCALL Status Codes (returned in RAX)
> + */
> +#define TDX_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL
> +#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU 0x4000000100000000ULL
> +#define TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE 0x8000000300000000ULL
> +#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL

one minor format issue, spaces are used  instread of tabs this line.


> +#define TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED 0x8000070200000000ULL
> +#define TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED 0x8000080000000000ULL
> +#define TDX_KEY_STATE_INCORRECT 0xC000081100000000ULL
> +#define TDX_KEY_CONFIGURED 0x0000081500000000ULL
> +#define TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE 0x0000082100000000ULL
> +#define TDX_EPT_WALK_FAILED 0xC0000B0000000000ULL
> +
> +/*
> + * TDG.VP.VMCALL Status Codes (returned in R10)
> + */
> +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL
> +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY 0x0000000000000001ULL
> +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_INVALID_OPERAND 0x8000000000000000ULL
> +#define TDG_VP_VMCALL_TDREPORT_FAILED 0x8000000000000001ULL
> +
> +/*
> + * TDX module operand ID, appears in 31:0 part of error code as
> + * detail information
> + */
> +#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX 0x01
> +#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT 0x92
> +
> +#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H */

2022-10-31 12:28:14

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 014/108] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers


On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> Stub in kvm_tdx, vcpu_tdx, and their various accessors. TDX defines
> SEAMCALL APIs to access TDX control structures corresponding to the VMX
> VMCS. Introduce helper accessors to hide its SEAMCALL ABI details.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 116 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> index 473013265bd8..98999bf3f188 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> @@ -3,14 +3,27 @@
> #define __KVM_X86_TDX_H
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +
> +#include "tdx_ops.h"
> +
> +struct tdx_td_page {
> + unsigned long va;
> + hpa_t pa;
> + bool added;
> +};
> +
> struct kvm_tdx {
> struct kvm kvm;
> - /* TDX specific members follow. */
> +
> + struct tdx_td_page tdr;
> + struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
> };
>
> struct vcpu_tdx {
> struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
> - /* TDX specific members follow. */
> +
> + struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
> + struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;
> };
>
> static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
> @@ -32,6 +45,107 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
> }
> +
> +static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
> +{
> +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
> +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL 0x0UL
> +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH 0x1UL
> +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)
> +
> + /* TDX is 64bit only. HIGH field isn't supported. */
> + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> + VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH,
> + "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported");
> +
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);
> +
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK GENMASK(14, 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT (0UL << 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT (1UL << 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT (2UL << 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL (3UL << 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
> +
> + /* TDX is 64bit only. i.e. natural width = 64bit. */
> + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> + (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT ||
> + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL),
> + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field");
> + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT,
> + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field");
> + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT,
> + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
> +}
> +
> +static __always_inline void tdvps_state_non_arch_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
> +static __always_inline void tdvps_management_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
> +
> +#define TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(bits, uclass, lclass) \
> +static __always_inline u##bits td_##lclass##_read##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> + u32 field) \
> +{ \
> + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> + u64 err; \
> + \
> + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> + err = tdh_vp_rd(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), &out); \
> + if (unlikely(err)) { \
> + pr_err("TDH_VP_RD["#uclass".0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> + field, err); \
> + return 0; \
> + } \
> + return (u##bits)out.r8; \
> +} \
> +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_write##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> + u32 field, u##bits val) \
> +{ \
> + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> + u64 err; \
> + \
> + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), val, \
> + GENMASK_ULL(bits - 1, 0), &out); \
> + if (unlikely(err)) \
> + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] = 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> + field, (u64)val, err); \
> +} \
> +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_setbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> + u32 field, u64 bit) \
> +{ \
> + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> + u64 err; \
> + \
> + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), bit, bit, \
> + &out); \
> + if (unlikely(err)) \
> + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] |= 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> + field, bit, err); \
> +} \
> +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_clearbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> + u32 field, u64 bit) \
> +{ \
> + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> + u64 err; \
> + \
> + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), 0, bit, \
> + &out); \
> + if (unlikely(err)) \
> + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] &= ~0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> + field, bit, err); \
> +}

For the set of accessors, although there will be kernel errer message
when tdh_vp_{rd,wr} fails,
the caller doesn't know these function calls succeed or not. Won't this
cause any unexpected
behavior?


> +
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(16, VMCS, vmcs);
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(32, VMCS, vmcs);
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
> +
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, STATE_NON_ARCH, state_non_arch);
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(8, MANAGEMENT, management);
> +
> #else
> struct kvm_tdx {
> struct kvm kvm;

2022-11-01 10:55:12

by Xiaoyao Li

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 060/108] KVM: Add functions to set GFN to private or shared

On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> TDX KVM support needs to track whether GFN is private or shared. Introduce
> functions to set whether GFN is private or shared and pre-allocate memory
> for xarray.
>
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++
> virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index a0b64308d240..fac07886ab39 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -2307,9 +2307,20 @@ static inline void kvm_account_pgtable_pages(void *virt, int nr)
> #define KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE 0x0002
>
> #ifdef __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_UPDATE_MEM_ATTR
> +/* memory attr on [start, end) */
> +int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> +int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> void kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> unsigned int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> #else
> +static inline int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +static inline int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> static inline void kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm,
> struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> unsigned int attr,
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> index 9f82b03a8118..f0e77b65939b 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> @@ -1121,6 +1121,80 @@ static inline void kvm_restrictedmem_unregister(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> &slot->notifier);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Reserve memory for [start, end) so that the next set oepration won't fail
> + * with -ENOMEM.
> + */
> +int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + int r = 0;
> + gfn_t gfn;
> +
> + xa_lock(&kvm->mem_attr_array);
> + for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
> + r = __xa_insert(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn, NULL, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (r == -EBUSY)
> + r = 0;
> + if (r)
> + break;
> + }
> + xa_unlock(&kvm->mem_attr_array);
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr);
> +
> +/* Set memory attr for [start, end) */
> +int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + void *entry;
> + gfn_t gfn;
> + int r;
> + int i;
> +
> + /* By default, the entry is private. */
> + switch (attr) {
> + case KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE:
> + entry = NULL;
> + break;
> + case KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED:
> + entry = xa_mk_value(KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED);
> + break;
> + default:
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(start >= end);
> + for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
> + r = xa_err(xa_store(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn, entry,
> + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT));
> + if (r)
> + break;
> + }
> + if (start >= gfn)
> + return r;
> +
> + end = gfn;
> + for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
> + struct kvm_memslot_iter iter;
> + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> + struct kvm_memslots *slots;
> +
> + slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
> + kvm_for_each_memslot_in_gfn_range(&iter, slots, start, end) {

slot needs to be set as

slot = iter.slot;

> + gfn_t s = max(start, slot->base_gfn);
> + gfn_t e = min(end, slot->base_gfn + slot->npages);
> +
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(s >= e);
> + kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(kvm, slot, attr, s, e);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr);
> +
> #else /* !CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM */
>
> static inline void kvm_restrictedmem_register(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)


2022-11-02 08:16:07

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 017/108] KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package


On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> In order to reclaim TDX host key id, (i.e. when deleting guest TD), needs
> to call TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.WBINVD on all packages. If we have used TDX host
> key id, refuse to offline the last online cpu.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 27 ++++++++++++--------
> 6 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index 3a29a6b31ee8..0ceb8e58a6c0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ BUILD_BUG_ON(1)
> KVM_X86_OP(hardware_enable)
> KVM_X86_OP(hardware_disable)
> KVM_X86_OP(hardware_unsetup)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(offline_cpu)
> KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
> KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
> KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 2870155ce6fb..50b39d0071ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1466,6 +1466,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> int (*hardware_enable)(void);
> void (*hardware_disable)(void);
> void (*hardware_unsetup)(void);
> + int (*offline_cpu)(void);
> bool (*has_emulated_msr)(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index);
> void (*vcpu_after_set_cpuid)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index d01a946a18cf..0918d1e6d2f3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .name = "kvm_intel",
>
> .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup,
> + .offline_cpu = tdx_offline_cpu,
> .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility,
>
> .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index ec88dde0d300..64229c3b3c5a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;
> */
> static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock);
> static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock;
> +static atomic_t nr_configured_hkid;
>
> static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
> {
> @@ -222,7 +223,8 @@ void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
> pr_err("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n",
> kvm_tdx->hkid);
> return;
> - }
> + } else
> + atomic_dec(&nr_configured_hkid);
>
> free_hkid:
> tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
> @@ -371,6 +373,8 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> if (ret)
> break;
> }
> + if (!ret)
> + atomic_inc(&nr_configured_hkid);
> cpus_read_unlock();
> free_cpumask_var(packages);
> if (ret)
> @@ -514,3 +518,37 @@ void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void)
> /* kfree accepts NULL. */
> kfree(tdx_mng_key_config_lock);
> }
> +
> +int tdx_offline_cpu(void)
> +{
> + int curr_cpu = smp_processor_id();
> + cpumask_var_t packages;
> + int ret = 0;
> + int i;
> +
> + if (!atomic_read(&nr_configured_hkid))
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * To reclaim hkid, need to call TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.WBINVD on all packages.
> + * If this is the last online cpu on the package, refuse offline.
> + */
> + if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL))
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + for_each_online_cpu(i) {
> + if (i != curr_cpu)
> + cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
> + }
> + if (!cpumask_test_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(curr_cpu), packages))
> + ret = -EBUSY;
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> + if (ret)
> + /*
> + * Because it's hard for human operator to understand the
> + * reason, warn it.
> + */
> + pr_warn("TDX requires all packages to have an online CPU. "
> + "Delete all TDs in order to offline all CPUs of a package.\n");
> + return ret;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> index 95da978c9aa9..b2cb5786830a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
> bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
> void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
> +int tdx_offline_cpu(void);
>
> int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
> void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
> @@ -142,6 +143,7 @@ void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
> static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
> static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
> static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
> +static inline int tdx_offline_cpu(void) { return 0; }
>
> static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 4b22196cb12c..25c30c8c2d9b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -12337,16 +12337,23 @@ int kvm_arch_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu, int usage_count)
>
> int kvm_arch_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu, int usage_count)
> {
> - if (usage_count) {
> - /*
> - * arch callback kvm_arch_hardware_disable() assumes that
> - * preemption is disabled for historical reason. Disable
> - * preemption until all arch callbacks are fixed.
> - */
> - preempt_disable();
> - hardware_disable(NULL);
> - preempt_enable();
> - }
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!usage_count)
> + return 0;
> +
> + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_offline_cpu)();

Use static_call_cond instead?
Seems the new interface for x86 is only implemented for Intel.


> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * arch callback kvm_arch_hardware_disable() assumes that preemption is
> + * disabled for historical reason. Disable preemption until all arch
> + * callbacks are fixed.
> + */
> + preempt_disable();
> + hardware_disable(NULL);
> + preempt_enable();
> return 0;
> }
>

2022-11-03 01:02:48

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 010/108] KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes

On Mon, Oct 31, 2022 at 05:22:13PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> >
> > Add error codes for the TDX SEAMCALLs both for TDX VMM side for TDH
> > SEAMCALL and TDX guest side for TDG.VP.VMCALL. KVM issues the TDX
> > SEAMCALLs and checks its error code. KVM handles hypercall from the TDX
> > guest and may return an error. So error code for the TDX guest is also
> > needed.
> >
> > TDX SEAMCALL uses bits 31:0 to return more information, so these error
> > codes will only exactly match RAX[63:32]. Error codes for TDG.VP.VMCALL is
> > defined by TDX Guest-Host-Communication interface spec.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..ce246ba62454
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > +/* architectural status code for SEAMCALL */
> > +
> > +#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
> > +#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H
> > +
> > +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * TDX SEAMCALL Status Codes (returned in RAX)
> > + */
> > +#define TDX_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL
> > +#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU 0x4000000100000000ULL
> > +#define TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE 0x8000000300000000ULL
> > +#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL
>
> one minor format issue, spaces are used  instread of tabs this line.

Thanks, fixed it locally. It will be include in the next respin.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-03 02:11:55

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 014/108] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers

On Mon, Oct 31, 2022 at 07:39:46PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> >
> > Stub in kvm_tdx, vcpu_tdx, and their various accessors. TDX defines
> > SEAMCALL APIs to access TDX control structures corresponding to the VMX
> > VMCS. Introduce helper accessors to hide its SEAMCALL ABI details.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 116 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> > index 473013265bd8..98999bf3f188 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> > @@ -3,14 +3,27 @@
> > #define __KVM_X86_TDX_H
> > #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> > +
> > +#include "tdx_ops.h"
> > +
> > +struct tdx_td_page {
> > + unsigned long va;
> > + hpa_t pa;
> > + bool added;
> > +};
> > +
> > struct kvm_tdx {
> > struct kvm kvm;
> > - /* TDX specific members follow. */
> > +
> > + struct tdx_td_page tdr;
> > + struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
> > };
> > struct vcpu_tdx {
> > struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
> > - /* TDX specific members follow. */
> > +
> > + struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
> > + struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;
> > };
> > static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
> > @@ -32,6 +45,107 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > {
> > return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
> > }
> > +
> > +static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
> > +{
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL 0x0UL
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH 0x1UL
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)
> > +
> > + /* TDX is 64bit only. HIGH field isn't supported. */
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> > + VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH,
> > + "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported");
> > +
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);
> > +
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK GENMASK(14, 13)
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT (0UL << 13)
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT (1UL << 13)
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT (2UL << 13)
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL (3UL << 13)
> > +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
> > +
> > + /* TDX is 64bit only. i.e. natural width = 64bit. */
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> > + (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT ||
> > + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL),
> > + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field");
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> > + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT,
> > + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field");
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> > + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT,
> > + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
> > +}
> > +
> > +static __always_inline void tdvps_state_non_arch_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
> > +static __always_inline void tdvps_management_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
> > +
> > +#define TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(bits, uclass, lclass) \
> > +static __always_inline u##bits td_##lclass##_read##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> > + u32 field) \
> > +{ \
> > + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> > + u64 err; \
> > + \
> > + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> > + err = tdh_vp_rd(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), &out); \
> > + if (unlikely(err)) { \
> > + pr_err("TDH_VP_RD["#uclass".0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> > + field, err); \
> > + return 0; \
> > + } \
> > + return (u##bits)out.r8; \
> > +} \
> > +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_write##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> > + u32 field, u##bits val) \
> > +{ \
> > + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> > + u64 err; \
> > + \
> > + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> > + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), val, \
> > + GENMASK_ULL(bits - 1, 0), &out); \
> > + if (unlikely(err)) \
> > + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] = 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> > + field, (u64)val, err); \
> > +} \
> > +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_setbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> > + u32 field, u64 bit) \
> > +{ \
> > + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> > + u64 err; \
> > + \
> > + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> > + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), bit, bit, \
> > + &out); \
> > + if (unlikely(err)) \
> > + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] |= 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> > + field, bit, err); \
> > +} \
> > +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_clearbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> > + u32 field, u64 bit) \
> > +{ \
> > + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> > + u64 err; \
> > + \
> > + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> > + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), 0, bit, \
> > + &out); \
> > + if (unlikely(err)) \
> > + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] &= ~0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> > + field, bit, err); \
> > +}
>
> For the set of accessors, although there will be kernel errer message when
> tdh_vp_{rd,wr} fails,
> the caller doesn't know these function calls succeed or not. Won't this
> cause any unexpected
> behavior?

Oh right. Basically tdh_vp_{rd, wr} should fail as long as parameters are correct.
So I'll add KVM_BUG_ON(). TDX module takes shared lock on TDVPR, TDR and TDCS.
It should fails with TDX_OPERAND_BUSY on run time. (At least with TDX module 1.0)

Thanks,
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-03 02:29:28

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 017/108] KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package

On Wed, Nov 02, 2022 at 04:06:20PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > index 4b22196cb12c..25c30c8c2d9b 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > @@ -12337,16 +12337,23 @@ int kvm_arch_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu, int usage_count)
> > int kvm_arch_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu, int usage_count)
> > {
> > - if (usage_count) {
> > - /*
> > - * arch callback kvm_arch_hardware_disable() assumes that
> > - * preemption is disabled for historical reason. Disable
> > - * preemption until all arch callbacks are fixed.
> > - */
> > - preempt_disable();
> > - hardware_disable(NULL);
> > - preempt_enable();
> > - }
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (!usage_count)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_offline_cpu)();
>
> Use static_call_cond instead?
> Seems the new interface for x86 is only implemented for Intel.

Not needed because KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(offline_cpu) is used.

Please remember
#define KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(func) \
static_call_update(kvm_x86_##func, (void *)kvm_x86_ops.func ? : \
(void *)__static_call_return0);
Thanks,
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-03 02:30:27

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 060/108] KVM: Add functions to set GFN to private or shared

On Tue, Nov 01, 2022 at 06:21:26PM +0800,
Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> wrote:

> On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > TDX KVM support needs to track whether GFN is private or shared. Introduce
> > functions to set whether GFN is private or shared and pre-allocate memory
> > for xarray.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++
> > virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > index a0b64308d240..fac07886ab39 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -2307,9 +2307,20 @@ static inline void kvm_account_pgtable_pages(void *virt, int nr)
> > #define KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE 0x0002
> > #ifdef __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_UPDATE_MEM_ATTR
> > +/* memory attr on [start, end) */
> > +int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> > +int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> > void kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> > unsigned int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> > #else
> > +static inline int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> > +{
> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +}
> > +static inline int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> > +{
> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +}
> > static inline void kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm,
> > struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> > unsigned int attr,
> > diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> > index 9f82b03a8118..f0e77b65939b 100644
> > --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> > +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> > @@ -1121,6 +1121,80 @@ static inline void kvm_restrictedmem_unregister(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> > &slot->notifier);
> > }
> > +/*
> > + * Reserve memory for [start, end) so that the next set oepration won't fail
> > + * with -ENOMEM.
> > + */
> > +int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> > +{
> > + int r = 0;
> > + gfn_t gfn;
> > +
> > + xa_lock(&kvm->mem_attr_array);
> > + for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
> > + r = __xa_insert(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn, NULL, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> > + if (r == -EBUSY)
> > + r = 0;
> > + if (r)
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + xa_unlock(&kvm->mem_attr_array);
> > +
> > + return r;
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr);
> > +
> > +/* Set memory attr for [start, end) */
> > +int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> > +{
> > + void *entry;
> > + gfn_t gfn;
> > + int r;
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + /* By default, the entry is private. */
> > + switch (attr) {
> > + case KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE:
> > + entry = NULL;
> > + break;
> > + case KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED:
> > + entry = xa_mk_value(KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED);
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + WARN_ON_ONCE(start >= end);
> > + for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
> > + r = xa_err(xa_store(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn, entry,
> > + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT));
> > + if (r)
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + if (start >= gfn)
> > + return r;
> > +
> > + end = gfn;
> > + for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
> > + struct kvm_memslot_iter iter;
> > + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> > + struct kvm_memslots *slots;
> > +
> > + slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
> > + kvm_for_each_memslot_in_gfn_range(&iter, slots, start, end) {
>
> slot needs to be set as
>
> slot = iter.slot;
>

Thanks, will fix it.

--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-03 08:21:08

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 031/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE


On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> The TDX support will need the "suppress #VE" bit (bit 63) set as the
> initial value for SPTE. To reduce code change size, introduce a new macro
> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE for the initial value for the shadow page table
> entry (SPTE) and replace hard-coded value 0 for it. Initialize shadow page
> tables with their value.
>
> The plan is to unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit for both AMD and
> Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for conventional VMX
> guests, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and
> "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 15 ++++++------
> 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index 10017a9f26ee..e7e11f51f8b4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -538,9 +538,9 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
>
> if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte) ||
> !spte_has_volatile_bits(old_spte))
> - __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
> + __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
> else
> - old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, 0ull);
> + old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>
> if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
> return old_spte;
> @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
> */
> static void mmu_spte_clear_no_track(u64 *sptep)
> {
> - __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
> + __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
> }
>
> static u64 mmu_spte_get_lockless(u64 *sptep)
> @@ -642,6 +642,39 @@ static void walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> }
> }
>

Why the changes in mmu_spte_clear_track_bits and mmu_spte_clear_no_track
are not handled differently for X86_64 and non X86_64 as the shadow page
init below?
It seems the two functions are the common code.


> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +static inline void kvm_init_shadow_page(void *page)
> +{
> + memset64(page, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, 4096 / 8);
> +}
> +
> +static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc = &vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache;
> + int start, end, i, r;
> +
> + start = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
> + r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(mc, PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
> +
> + /*
> + * Note, topup may have allocated objects even if it failed to allocate
> + * the minimum number of objects required to make forward progress _at
> + * this time_. Initialize newly allocated objects even on failure, as
> + * userspace can free memory and rerun the vCPU in response to -ENOMEM.
> + */
> + end = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
> + for (i = start; i < end; i++)
> + kvm_init_shadow_page(mc->objects[i]);
> + return r;
> +}
> +#else
> +static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
> + PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
> +
> static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
> {
> int r;
> @@ -651,8 +684,7 @@ static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
> 1 + PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + PTE_PREFETCH_NUM);
> if (r)
> return r;
> - r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
> - PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
> + r = mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(vcpu);
> if (r)
> return r;
> if (maybe_indirect) {
> @@ -5870,7 +5902,13 @@ int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.kmem_cache = mmu_page_header_cache;
> vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
>
> - vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
> + /*
> + * When X86_64, initial SEPT entries are initialized with
> + * SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE. Otherwise zeroed. See
> + * mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache().
> + */
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
> + vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
>
> vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
> vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> index 7670c13ce251..42ecaa75da15 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> @@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
>
> #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)
>
> +#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE 0ULL
> +
> extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
> extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
> extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> index eab765442d0b..38bc4c2f0f1f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
> * here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present. Use
> * the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits.
> */
> - __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, 0);
> + __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -871,8 +871,8 @@ static void __tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
> continue;
>
> if (!shared)
> - tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
> - else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, 0))
> + tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
> + else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE))
> goto retry;
> }
> }
> @@ -928,8 +928,9 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)))
> return false;
>
> - __tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte, 0,
> - sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1, true, true);
> + __tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte,
> + SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1,
> + true, true);
>
> return true;
> }
> @@ -963,7 +964,7 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
> !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))
> continue;
>
> - tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
> + tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
> flush = true;
> }
>
> @@ -1328,7 +1329,7 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
> * invariant that the PFN of a present * leaf SPTE can never change.
> * See __handle_changed_spte().
> */
> - tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter, 0);
> + tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>
> if (!pte_write(range->pte)) {
> new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte,

2022-11-03 09:10:30

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 031/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE


On 2022/11/3 15:17, Binbin Wu wrote:
>
> On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
>> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>>
>> The TDX support will need the "suppress #VE" bit (bit 63) set as the
>> initial value for SPTE.  To reduce code change size, introduce a new
>> macro
>> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE for the initial value for the shadow page table
>> entry (SPTE) and replace hard-coded value 0 for it.  Initialize
>> shadow page
>> tables with their value.
>>
>> The plan is to unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit for both
>> AMD and
>> Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for conventional VMX
>> guests, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and
>> "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c     | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>   arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h    |  2 ++
>>   arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 15 ++++++------
>>   3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
>> index 10017a9f26ee..e7e11f51f8b4 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
>> @@ -538,9 +538,9 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm
>> *kvm, u64 *sptep)
>>         if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte) ||
>>           !spte_has_volatile_bits(old_spte))
>> -        __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
>> +        __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>>       else
>> -        old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, 0ull);
>> +        old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep,
>> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>>         if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
>>           return old_spte;
>> @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm
>> *kvm, u64 *sptep)
>>    */
>>   static void mmu_spte_clear_no_track(u64 *sptep)
>>   {
>> -    __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
>> +    __update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>>   }
>>     static u64 mmu_spte_get_lockless(u64 *sptep)
>> @@ -642,6 +642,39 @@ static void walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(struct
>> kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>       }
>>   }
>
> Why the changes in mmu_spte_clear_track_bits and
> mmu_spte_clear_no_track are not handled differently for X86_64 and non
> X86_64 as the shadow page init below?
> It seems the two functions are the common code.

I see there are different definitions of SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE for
X86_64 and  non X86_64 in the following patch.
So got the answer now. : )


>
>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> +static inline void kvm_init_shadow_page(void *page)
>> +{
>> +    memset64(page, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, 4096 / 8);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> +    struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc =
>> &vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache;
>> +    int start, end, i, r;
>> +
>> +    start = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
>> +    r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(mc, PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
>> +
>> +    /*
>> +     * Note, topup may have allocated objects even if it failed to
>> allocate
>> +     * the minimum number of objects required to make forward
>> progress _at
>> +     * this time_.  Initialize newly allocated objects even on
>> failure, as
>> +     * userspace can free memory and rerun the vCPU in response to
>> -ENOMEM.
>> +     */
>> +    end = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
>> +    for (i = start; i < end; i++)
>> +        kvm_init_shadow_page(mc->objects[i]);
>> +    return r;
>> +}
>> +#else
>> +static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> +    return
>> kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
>> +                      PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
>> +}
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
>> +
>>   static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool
>> maybe_indirect)
>>   {
>>       int r;
>> @@ -651,8 +684,7 @@ static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct
>> kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
>>                          1 + PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + PTE_PREFETCH_NUM);
>>       if (r)
>>           return r;
>> -    r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
>> -                       PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
>> +    r = mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(vcpu);
>>       if (r)
>>           return r;
>>       if (maybe_indirect) {
>> @@ -5870,7 +5902,13 @@ int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>       vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.kmem_cache =
>> mmu_page_header_cache;
>>       vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
>>   -    vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
>> +    /*
>> +     * When X86_64, initial SEPT entries are initialized with
>> +     * SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE.  Otherwise zeroed.  See
>> +     * mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache().
>> +     */
>> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
>> +        vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
>>         vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
>>       vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
>> index 7670c13ce251..42ecaa75da15 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
>> @@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 &&
>> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
>>     #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS +
>> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)
>>   +#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE    0ULL
>> +
>>   extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
>>   extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
>>   extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
>> index eab765442d0b..38bc4c2f0f1f 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
>> @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct
>> kvm *kvm,
>>        * here since the SPTE is going from non-present to
>> non-present.  Use
>>        * the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on
>> volatile bits.
>>        */
>> -    __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, 0);
>> +    __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>>         return 0;
>>   }
>> @@ -871,8 +871,8 @@ static void __tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm,
>> struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
>>               continue;
>>             if (!shared)
>> -            tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
>> -        else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, 0))
>> +            tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>> +        else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter,
>> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE))
>>               goto retry;
>>       }
>>   }
>> @@ -928,8 +928,9 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct
>> kvm_mmu_page *sp)
>>       if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)))
>>           return false;
>>   -    __tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep,
>> old_spte, 0,
>> -               sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1, true, true);
>> +    __tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte,
>> +               SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1,
>> +               true, true);
>>         return true;
>>   }
>> @@ -963,7 +964,7 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm,
>> struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
>>               !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))
>>               continue;
>>   -        tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
>> +        tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>>           flush = true;
>>       }
>>   @@ -1328,7 +1329,7 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
>> struct tdp_iter *iter,
>>        * invariant that the PFN of a present * leaf SPTE can never
>> change.
>>        * See __handle_changed_spte().
>>        */
>> -    tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter, 0);
>> +    tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>>         if (!pte_write(range->pte)) {
>>           new_spte =
>> kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte,

2022-11-03 14:00:33

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 039/108] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE


On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM programs
> to inject #VE conditionally and set #VE suppress bit in EPT entry. For VMX
> case, #VE isn't used. If #VE happens for VMX, it's a bug. To be
> defensive (test that VMX case isn't broken), introduce option
> ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, set error.
>
> Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 12 +++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 5 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 6 +++-
> 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> index cdbf12c1a83c..752d53652007 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(ENCLS_EXITING)
> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(RDSEED_EXITING)
> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PAGE_MOD_LOGGING)
> +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PT_CONCEAL_VMX)
> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(XSAVES)
> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC)
> @@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {
> VMREAD_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x00002027,
> VMWRITE_BITMAP = 0x00002028,
> VMWRITE_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x00002029,
> + VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS = 0x0000202A,
> + VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x0000202B,
> XSS_EXIT_BITMAP = 0x0000202C,
> XSS_EXIT_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x0000202D,
> ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP = 0x0000202E,
> @@ -628,4 +631,13 @@ enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {
>
> extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation;
>
> +struct vmx_ve_information {
> + u32 exit_reason;
> + u32 delivery;
> + u64 exit_qualification;
> + u64 guest_linear_address;
> + u64 guest_physical_address;
> + u16 eptp_index;
> +};
> +
> #endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> index ac290a44a693..9277676057a7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> @@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline bool is_nm_fault(u32 intr_info)
> return is_exception_n(intr_info, NM_VECTOR);
> }
>
> +static inline bool is_ve_fault(u32 intr_info)
> +{
> + return is_exception_n(intr_info, VE_VECTOR);
> +}
> +
> /* Undocumented: icebp/int1 */
> static inline bool is_icebp(u32 intr_info)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index f890191e8580..dd3fde9d3c32 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ module_param(error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config, bool, 0444);
> static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
> module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);
>
> +static bool __read_mostly ept_violation_ve_test;
> +module_param(ept_violation_ve_test, bool, 0444);
> +
> #define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1
> #define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2
>
> @@ -783,6 +786,13 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
> (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
> + /*
> + * #VE isn't used for VMX, but for TDX. To test against unexpected
> + * change related to #VE for VMX, intercept unexpected #VE and warn on
> + * it.
> + */
> + if (ept_violation_ve_test)
> + eb |= 1u << VE_VECTOR;
> /*
> * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
> * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
> @@ -2644,6 +2654,9 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
> &_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control))
> return -EIO;
> }
> + if (!ept_violation_ve_test)
> + _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;

should be _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control


> +
> #ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
> if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
> @@ -2668,6 +2681,7 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
> return -EIO;
>
> vmx_cap->ept = 0;
> + _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
> }
> if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
> vmx_cap->vpid) {
> @@ -4510,6 +4524,7 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
> if (!enable_ept) {
> exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
> + exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
> enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
> }
> if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
> @@ -4637,8 +4652,40 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>
> exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
>
> - if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
> + if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
> secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
> + if (secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
> + SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
> + if (!vmx->ve_info) {
> + /* ve_info must be page aligned. */
> + struct page *page;
> +
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*vmx->ve_info) > PAGE_SIZE);
> + page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + if (page)
> + vmx->ve_info = page_to_virt(page);
> + }
> + if (vmx->ve_info) {
> + /*
> + * Allow #VE delivery. CPU sets this field to
> + * 0xFFFFFFFF on #VE delivery. Another #VE can
> + * occur only if software clears the field.
> + */
> + vmx->ve_info->delivery = 0;
> + vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS,
> + __pa(vmx->ve_info));
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * Because SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE is
> + * used only when ept_violation_ve_test is true,
> + * it's okay to go with the bit disabled.
> + */
> + pr_err("Failed to allocate ve_info. disabling EPT_VIOLATION_VE.\n");
> + secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
> + SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE);
> + }
> + }
> + }
>
> if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
> tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx));
> @@ -5118,6 +5165,12 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
> return handle_ud(vcpu);
>
> + /*
> + * #VE isn't supposed to happen. Although vcpu can send
> + */
> + if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_ve_fault(intr_info), vcpu->kvm))
> + return -EIO;
> +
> error_code = 0;
> if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
> error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
> @@ -6306,6 +6359,18 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
> pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
> vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
> + if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {
> + struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
> +
> + pr_err("VE info address = 0x%016llx\n",
> + vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));
> + ve_info = __va(vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS));
> + pr_err("ve_info: 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%04x\n",
> + ve_info->exit_reason, ve_info->delivery,
> + ve_info->exit_qualification,
> + ve_info->guest_linear_address,
> + ve_info->guest_physical_address, ve_info->eptp_index);
> + }
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -7302,6 +7367,8 @@ void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
> nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
> free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
> + if (vmx->ve_info)
> + free_page((unsigned long)vmx->ve_info);
> }
>
> int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> index d49d0ace9fb8..1813caeb24d8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> @@ -359,6 +359,9 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
> DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
> DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
> } shadow_msr_intercept;
> +
> + /* ve_info must be page aligned. */
> + struct vmx_ve_information *ve_info;
> };
>
> struct kvm_vmx {
> @@ -570,7 +573,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
> SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC | \
> SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION | \
> SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING | \
> - SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
> + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING | \
> + SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
>
> #define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL 0
> #define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL \

2022-11-03 20:48:54

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 039/108] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE

On Thu, Nov 03, 2022 at 09:41:44PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM programs
> > to inject #VE conditionally and set #VE suppress bit in EPT entry. For VMX
> > case, #VE isn't used. If #VE happens for VMX, it's a bug. To be
> > defensive (test that VMX case isn't broken), introduce option
> > ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, set error.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 12 +++++++
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 5 +++
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 6 +++-
> > 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> > index cdbf12c1a83c..752d53652007 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> > @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
> > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(ENCLS_EXITING)
> > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(RDSEED_EXITING)
> > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PAGE_MOD_LOGGING)
> > +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(EPT_VIOLATION_VE)
> > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(PT_CONCEAL_VMX)
> > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(XSAVES)
> > #define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC VMCS_CONTROL_BIT(MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC)
> > @@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ enum vmcs_field {
> > VMREAD_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x00002027,
> > VMWRITE_BITMAP = 0x00002028,
> > VMWRITE_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x00002029,
> > + VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS = 0x0000202A,
> > + VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x0000202B,
> > XSS_EXIT_BITMAP = 0x0000202C,
> > XSS_EXIT_BITMAP_HIGH = 0x0000202D,
> > ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP = 0x0000202E,
> > @@ -628,4 +631,13 @@ enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {
> > extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation;
> > +struct vmx_ve_information {
> > + u32 exit_reason;
> > + u32 delivery;
> > + u64 exit_qualification;
> > + u64 guest_linear_address;
> > + u64 guest_physical_address;
> > + u16 eptp_index;
> > +};
> > +
> > #endif
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> > index ac290a44a693..9277676057a7 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> > @@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline bool is_nm_fault(u32 intr_info)
> > return is_exception_n(intr_info, NM_VECTOR);
> > }
> > +static inline bool is_ve_fault(u32 intr_info)
> > +{
> > + return is_exception_n(intr_info, VE_VECTOR);
> > +}
> > +
> > /* Undocumented: icebp/int1 */
> > static inline bool is_icebp(u32 intr_info)
> > {
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index f890191e8580..dd3fde9d3c32 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ module_param(error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config, bool, 0444);
> > static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
> > module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);
> > +static bool __read_mostly ept_violation_ve_test;
> > +module_param(ept_violation_ve_test, bool, 0444);
> > +
> > #define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1
> > #define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2
> > @@ -783,6 +786,13 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
> > (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
> > + /*
> > + * #VE isn't used for VMX, but for TDX. To test against unexpected
> > + * change related to #VE for VMX, intercept unexpected #VE and warn on
> > + * it.
> > + */
> > + if (ept_violation_ve_test)
> > + eb |= 1u << VE_VECTOR;
> > /*
> > * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
> > * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
> > @@ -2644,6 +2654,9 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
> > &_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control))
> > return -EIO;
> > }
> > + if (!ept_violation_ve_test)
> > + _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE;
>
> should be _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control

Oops, thanks.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-08 02:30:17

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module


> +
> +#define TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS \
> + ((sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) - \
> + offsetof(struct tdsysinfo_struct, cpuid_configs)) \
> + / sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config))
> +
> +struct tdx_capabilities {
> + u8 tdcs_nr_pages;
> + u8 tdvpx_nr_pages;
> +
> + u64 attrs_fixed0;
> + u64 attrs_fixed1;
> + u64 xfam_fixed0;
> + u64 xfam_fixed1;
> +
> + u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
> + struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS];
> +};
> +
> +/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */
> +static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;

I think you can introduce this tdx_capabilities in another patch.

As claimed this patch can just focus on initializing the TDX module. Whether
you need this tdx_capabilities or tdx_sysinfo is enough can be done in the patch
when they are really needed. It makes review easier otherwise people won't be
able to tell why tdx_capabilities is needed here.

> +
> +static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
> +{
> + const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*tdsysinfo) != 1024);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS != 37);
> +
> + ret = tdx_enable();
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_info("Failed to initialize TDX module.\n");
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + tdsysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();
> + if (tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config > TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS)
> + return -EIO;
> +
> + tdx_caps = (struct tdx_capabilities) {
> + .tdcs_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdcs_base_size / PAGE_SIZE,
> + /*
> + * TDVPS = TDVPR(4K page) + TDVPX(multiple 4K pages).
> + * -1 for TDVPR.
> + */
> + .tdvpx_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdvps_base_size / PAGE_SIZE - 1,
> + .attrs_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed0,
> + .attrs_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed1,
> + .xfam_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed0,
> + .xfam_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed1,
> + .nr_cpuid_configs = tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config,
> + };
> + if (!memcpy(tdx_caps.cpuid_configs, tdsysinfo->cpuid_configs,
> + tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config *
> + sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
> + return -EIO;
> +
> + pr_info("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n",
> + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);

What''s the benefit of print out x86_phys_bits? Looks a little bit weird here.

TDX host code will print out TDX private KeyID range. I think that is useful
enough?

> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> +{
> + int r;
> +
> + if (!enable_ept) {
> + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + /* MOVDIR64B instruction is needed. */
> + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) {
> + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with MOVDIR64B supported ");
^
without
> + return -ENODEV;
> + }

I think you should explain why MOVDIR64B is required, otherwise this just comes
out of blue.

Btw, is this absolutely required? TDX also supports Li-mode, which doesn't have
integrity check. So theoretically with Li-mode, normal zeroing is also OK but
doesn't need to use MOVDIR64B.

That being said, do we have a way to tell whether TDX works in Ci or Li mode?



2022-11-08 09:22:31

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 015/108] x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> TDX private host key id is assigned to guest TD. The memory controller
> encrypts guest TD memory with the assigned TDX private host key id (HIKD).
^
HKID.

And since you already mentioned in the first sentence, you can put (HKID) part
there. And I think you can just use HKID in the rest places to save some typing
as this is the purpose of using (HKID) I suppose.

[...]

>
> +/* TDX KeyID pool */
> +static DEFINE_IDA(tdx_keyid_pool);
> +
> +int tdx_keyid_alloc(void)
> +{
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tdx_keyid_start || !tdx_keyid_num))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* The first keyID is reserved for the global key. */
> + return ida_alloc_range(&tdx_keyid_pool, tdx_keyid_start + 1,
> + tdx_keyid_start + tdx_keyid_num - 1,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_keyid_alloc);
> +
> +void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid)
> +{
> + /* keyid = 0 is reserved. */
> + if (!keyid || keyid <= 0)
> + return;

Double check of keyid == 0.

I think you can just use:

if (keyid <= tdx_keyid_start)
return;

And/or add a WARN() as it's a bug if above happens.

> +
> + ida_free(&tdx_keyid_pool, keyid);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_keyid_free);
> +
> static void __init tdx_memory_destroy(void)
> {
> while (!list_empty(&tdx_memlist)) {

2022-11-08 12:04:56

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 031/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> The plan is to unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit for both AMD and
> Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for conventional VMX
> guests, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and
> "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.

Hi Isaku,

"AMD hardware doesn't use this bit" is wrong:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m5ed59404da43677e99ac51dd1360dc22b964bcbb

2022-11-08 14:58:05

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 049/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU


On 2022/10/30 14:22, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata<[email protected]>
>
> Allocate protected page table for private page table, and add hooks to
> operate on protected page table. This patch adds allocation/free of
> protected page tables and hooks. When calling hooks to update SPTE entry,
> freeze the entry, call hooks and unfree

unfreeze


> the entry to allow concurrent
> updates on page tables. Which is the advantage of TDP MMU. As
> kvm_gfn_shared_mask() returns false always, those hooks aren't called yet
> with this patch.
>
> When the faulting GPA is private, the KVM fault is called private. When
> resolving private KVM,

private KVM fault?


> allocate protected page table and call hooks to
> operate on protected page table. On the change of the private PTE entry,
> invoke kvm_x86_ops hook in __handle_changed_spte() to propagate the change
> to protected page table. The following depicts the relationship.
>
> private KVM page fault |
> | |
> V |
> private GPA | CPU protected EPTP
> | | |
> V | V
> private PT root | protected PT root
> | | |
> V | V
> private PT --hook to propagate-->protected PT
> | | |
> \--------------------+------\ |
> | | |
> | V V
> | private guest page
> |
> |
> non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
> |
> PT: page table
>
> The existing KVM TDP MMU code uses atomic update of SPTE. On populating
> the EPT entry, atomically set the entry. However, it requires TLB
> shootdown to zap SPTE. To address it, the entry is frozen with the special
> SPTE value that clears the present bit. After the TLB shootdown, the entry
> is set to the eventual value (unfreeze).
>
> For protected page table, hooks are called to update protected page table
> in addition to direct access to the private SPTE. For the zapping case, it
> works to freeze the SPTE. It can call hooks in addition to TLB shootdown.
> For populating the private SPTE entry, there can be a race condition
> without further protection
>
> vcpu 1: populating 2M private SPTE
> vcpu 2: populating 4K private SPTE
> vcpu 2: TDX SEAMCALL to update 4K protected SPTE => error
> vcpu 1: TDX SEAMCALL to update 2M protected SPTE
>
> To avoid the race, the frozen SPTE is utilized. Instead of atomic update
> of the private entry, freeze the entry, call the hook that update protected
> SPTE, set the entry to the final value.
>
> Support 4K page only at this stage. 2M page support can be done in future
> patches.
>
> Co-developed-by: Kai Huang<[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang<[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata<[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 5 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 11 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 15 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 32 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 2 +-
> virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 1 +
> 8 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index f28c9fd72ac4..1b01dc2098b0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_tss_addr)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_identity_map_addr)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(get_mt_mask)
> KVM_X86_OP(load_mmu_pgd)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(link_private_spt)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(free_private_spt)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(set_private_spte)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(remove_private_spte)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(zap_private_spte)
> KVM_X86_OP(has_wbinvd_exit)
> KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_offset)
> KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_multiplier)
>
> @@ -509,9 +524,81 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
> WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
> }
>
> + if (is_private_sp(sp) &&
> + WARN_ON(static_call(kvm_x86_free_private_spt)(kvm, sp->gfn, sp->role.level,
> + kvm_mmu_private_spt(sp)))) {
> + /*
> + * Failed to unlink Secure EPT page and there is nothing to do
> + * further. Intentionally leak the page to prevent the kernel
> + * from accessing the encrypted page.
> + */
> + kvm_mmu_init_private_spt(sp, NULL);

Do you think is it better to add some statistics for the intentinal
leakage?


> + }
> +
> call_rcu(&sp->rcu_head, tdp_mmu_free_sp_rcu_callback);
> }
>
> pu, until a matching vcpu_put()

2022-11-08 19:14:35

by Sean Christopherson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

On Tue, Nov 08, 2022, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > +int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> > +{
> > + int r;
> > +
> > + if (!enable_ept) {
> > + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* MOVDIR64B instruction is needed. */
> > + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) {

Nit unrelated to Kai's comments: use boot_cpu_has(), not static_cpu_has(). This
is run-once code that's not a hot path so there's zero reason to trigger patching.

> > + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with MOVDIR64B supported ");
> ^
> without
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > + }
>
> I think you should explain why MOVDIR64B is required, otherwise this just comes
> out of blue.
>
> Btw, is this absolutely required? TDX also supports Li-mode, which doesn't have
> integrity check. So theoretically with Li-mode, normal zeroing is also OK but
> doesn't need to use MOVDIR64B.
>
> That being said, do we have a way to tell whether TDX works in Ci or Li mode?
>
>
>

2022-11-09 11:35:21

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 033/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> For TD guest, the current way to emulate MMIO doesn't work any more, as KVM
> is not able to access the private memory of TD guest and do the emulation.
> Instead, TD guest expects to receive #VE when it accesses the MMIO and then
> it can explicitly makes hypercall to KVM to get the expected information.
^
make
>
> To achieve this, the TDX module always enables "EPT-violation #VE" in the
> VMCS control. And accordingly, KVM needs to configure the MMIO spte to
> trigger EPT violation (instead of misconfiguration) and at the same time,
> also clear the "suppress #VE" bit so the TD guest can get the #VE instead
> of causing actual EPT violation to KVM.
>
> In order for KVM to be able to have chance to set up the correct SPTE for
> MMIO for TD guest, the default non-present SPTE must have the "suppress
> guest accesses the MMIO. 
>

The above sentence is broken.

> Also, when TD guest accesses the actual shared
> memory, it should continue to trigger EPT violation to the KVM instead of
> receiving the #VE (the TDX module guarantees KVM will receive EPT violation
> for private memory access). This means for the shared memory, the SPTE
> also must have the "suppress #VE" bit set for the non-present SPTE.
>
> Add "suppress VE" bit (bit 63) to SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE and REMOVED_SPTE.
> Unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit (which is bit 63) for both AMD
> and Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit when present bit is off;
> 2) for normal VMX guest, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS
> control and "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 4 +++-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 8 ++++++++
> 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> index 498dc600bd5c..cdbf12c1a83c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> @@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
> #define VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT (1ull << 6)
> #define VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT (1ull << 8)
> #define VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT (1ull << 9)
> +#define VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT (1ull << 63)
> #define VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK (VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK | \
> VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK | \
> VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> index 2e08b2a45361..0b97a045c5f0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> @@ -419,7 +419,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
> shadow_dirty_mask = has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull;
> shadow_nx_mask = 0ull;
> shadow_x_mask = VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
> - shadow_present_mask = has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
> + /* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */
> + shadow_present_mask =
> + (has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT;

I think this chunk can be in a separate patch since it doesn't handle fault from
non-present to present, which is claimed by the patch title and changelog.

Or I think you need to describe handling W or X fault part in the changelog.

> /*
> * EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired
> * memtype directly into the SPTEs. Note, this mask is just the mask
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> index 42ecaa75da15..7e0f79e8f45b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> @@ -148,7 +148,22 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
>
> #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)
>
> +/*
> + * non-present SPTE value for both VMX and SVM for TDP MMU.
^
Non-present

> + * For SVM NPT, for non-present spte (bit 0 = 0), other bits are ignored.
> + * For VMX EPT, bit 63 is ignored if #VE is disabled. (EPT_VIOLATION_VE=0)
> + * bit 63 is #VE suppress if #VE is enabled. (EPT_VIOLATION_VE=1)
> + * For TDX:
> + * Secure-EPT: TDX module sets EPT_VIOLATION_VE for Secure-EPT

"EPT-violation #VE" is a VMCS control, so it applies to both Secure-EPT and
shared-EPT. Looks "for Secure-EPT" is a little bit confusing.

> + * private EPT: "suppress #VE" bit is ignored. CPU doesn't walk it.

Looks "private EPT" just comes out of blue. I am not sure whether you need to
mention it here.

> + * conventional EPT: "suppress #VE" bit must be set to get EPT violation
> + */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE BIT_ULL(63)
> +static_assert(!(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
> +#else
> #define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE 0ULL
> +#endif
>
> extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
> extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
> @@ -189,13 +204,18 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
> * non-present intermediate value. Other threads which encounter this value
> * should not modify the SPTE.
> *
> + * For X86_64 case, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, "suppress #VE" bit, is set because
> + * "EPT violation #VE" in the secondary VM execution control may be enabled.
> + * Because TDX module sets "EPT violation #VE" for TD, "suppress #VE" bit for
> + * the conventional EPT needs to be set.
> + *

This comment looks duplicated with the above one. Not sure whether needed.

> * Use a semi-arbitrary value that doesn't set RWX bits, i.e. is not-present on
> * bot AMD and Intel CPUs, and doesn't set PFN bits, i.e. doesn't create a L1TF
> * vulnerability. Use only low bits to avoid 64-bit immediates.
> *
> * Only used by the TDP MMU.
> */
> -#define REMOVED_SPTE 0x5a0ULL
> +#define REMOVED_SPTE (SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE | 0x5a0ULL)
>
> /* Removed SPTEs must not be misconstrued as shadow present PTEs. */
> static_assert(!(REMOVED_SPTE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> index 38bc4c2f0f1f..1eee9c159958 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> @@ -693,6 +693,14 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
> * overwrite the special removed SPTE value. No bookkeeping is needed
> * here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present. Use
> * the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits.
> + *
> + * Set non-present value to SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, rather than 0.
> + * It is because when TDX is enabled, TDX module always
> + * enables "EPT-violation #VE", so KVM needs to set
> + * "suppress #VE" bit in EPT table entries, in order to get
> + * real EPT violation, rather than TDVMCALL. KVM sets
> + * SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE (which sets "suppress #VE" bit) so it
> + * can be set when EPT table entries are zapped.
> */
> __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
>

Ditto.

2022-11-09 11:38:13

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 032/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Make sync_page not use hard-coded 0 as the initial SPTE value

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> FNAME(sync_page) in arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h assumes that the initial
> shadow page table entry (SPTE) is zero. Remove the assumption by using
> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE that will be updated from 0 to non-zero value.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> index 5ab5f94dcb6f..6db3f2b5563a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> @@ -1036,7 +1036,8 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> gpa_t pte_gpa;
> gfn_t gfn;
>
> - if (!sp->spt[i])
> + /* spt[i] has initial value of shadow page table allocation */
> + if (sp->spt[i] == SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE)
> continue;
>
> pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i * sizeof(pt_element_t);

I think this patch can be merged to previous one? Looks there's no good reason
to keep it as standalone.

2022-11-09 11:55:32

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 034/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to shadow_mmio_{value, mask}

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Because TDX will need shadow_mmio_mask to be VMX_SUPPRESS_VE | RWX
> shadow_mmio_value to be 0, make VMX EPT case use same value for TDX
> shadow_mmio_mask.  
>

TDX need to use different mmio_mask/value doesn't mean they need to be changed
for VMX guest. I think the true purpose here is to still be able to use a
global shadow_mmio_mask for both TDX and VMX guests. So please explicitly call
out.


> For VMX, VMX_SUPPRESS_VE doesn't matter, it doesn't
> affect VMX logic to add the bit to shadow_mmio_{value, mask}. Note that
> shadow_mmio_value will be per-VM value.

Not sure why the last sentence matters.

>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> index 0b97a045c5f0..5d5c06d4fd89 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> @@ -437,8 +437,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
> * EPT Misconfigurations are generated if the value of bits 2:0
> * of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
> */
> - kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE,
> - VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0);
> + kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT,

Is "suppress #VE" bit required for mmio_value for VMX guest? Why adding it?

> + VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT, 0);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);
>

2022-11-09 12:36:57

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> TDX will use a different shadow PTE entry value for MMIO from VMX. Add
> members to kvm_arch and track value for MMIO per-VM instead of global
> variables. By using the per-VM EPT entry value for MMIO, the existing VMX
> logic is kept working. To untangle the logic to initialize
> shadow_mmio_access_mask, introduce a separate setter function.
>

It's weird to mention "shadow_mmio_access_mask" here (and this doesn't stand
anymore anyway as we have changed to only make mmio_value per-vm). Just say
something like "introduce a setter function to set mmio_value for the given
guest so that TDX guest can override later".

Also, seems it's worth to mention the same mmio_mask is used for both TDX guest
and VMX guest so we can still use global shadow_mmio_mask.

[...]

> void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
> {
> BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask);
> +
> WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);

Looks unnecessary change.


2022-11-09 12:57:18

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 036/108] KVM: TDX: Enable mmio spte caching always for TDX

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> TDX needs to set shared spte for MMIO GFN to !SUPPRES_VE_BIT | !RWX so that
> guest TD can get #VE and then issue TDG.VP.VMCALL<MMIO>. Enable mmio
> caching always for TDX irrelevant the module parameter enable_mmio_caching.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 3 ++-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 7 +++++++
> 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index 0d3fa29ccccc..9098f77cdaa4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -3229,7 +3229,8 @@ static int handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fau
> * and only if L1's MAXPHYADDR is inaccurate with respect to
> * the hardware's).
> */
> - if (unlikely(!enable_mmio_caching) ||
> + if (unlikely(!enable_mmio_caching &&
> + !kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)) ||
> unlikely(fault->gfn > kvm_mmu_max_gfn()))
> return RET_PF_EMULATE;
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> index 82f0d5c08b77..fecfdcb5f321 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
> static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
> {
> return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
> - likely(enable_mmio_caching);
> + likely(enable_mmio_caching || kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm));
> }


Sean suggested we can change to treat "mmio_value == 0" also as MMIO caching
being enabled:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/


>
> static inline bool is_shadow_present_pte(u64 pte)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> index e07f14351d14..3325633b1cb5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> @@ -1875,6 +1875,13 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
>
> *root_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level;
>
> + /*
> + * mmio page fault isn't supported for protected guest because
> + * instructions in protected guest memory can't be parsed by VMM.
> + */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)))
> + return leaf;
> +

It's weird to put this here.

I think the logic is, for TDX guest (or similar protected guests),
handle_mmio_page_fault() should not be reached at all. So I think we can just
add a WARN() against kvm_gfn_shared_mask(), or is_tdx_vm() at the very beginning
of handle_mmio_page_fault()?

> tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, gfn, gfn + 1) {
> leaf = iter.level;
> sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;

2022-11-09 13:51:24

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 060/108] KVM: Add functions to set GFN to private or shared


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> TDX KVM support needs to track whether GFN is private or shared. Introduce
> functions to set whether GFN is private or shared and pre-allocate memory
> for xarray.
>
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++
> virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index a0b64308d240..fac07886ab39 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -2307,9 +2307,20 @@ static inline void kvm_account_pgtable_pages(void *virt, int nr)
> #define KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE 0x0002
>
> #ifdef __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_UPDATE_MEM_ATTR
> +/* memory attr on [start, end) */
> +int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> +int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> void kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> unsigned int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end);
> #else
> +static inline int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +static inline int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> static inline void kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm,
> struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> unsigned int attr,
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> index 9f82b03a8118..f0e77b65939b 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> @@ -1121,6 +1121,80 @@ static inline void kvm_restrictedmem_unregister(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> &slot->notifier);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Reserve memory for [start, end) so that the next set oepration won't fail
> + * with -ENOMEM.
> + */
> +int kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + int r = 0;
> + gfn_t gfn;
> +
> + xa_lock(&kvm->mem_attr_array);
> + for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
> + r = __xa_insert(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn, NULL, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (r == -EBUSY)
> + r = 0;
> + if (r)
> + break;
> + }
> + xa_unlock(&kvm->mem_attr_array);
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr);
> +
> +/* Set memory attr for [start, end) */
> +int kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(struct kvm *kvm, int attr, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
> +{
> + void *entry;
> + gfn_t gfn;
> + int r;
> + int i;
> +
> + /* By default, the entry is private. */
> + switch (attr) {
> + case KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE:
> + entry = NULL;
> + break;
> + case KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED:
> + entry = xa_mk_value(KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED);
> + break;
> + default:
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(start >= end);
> + for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
> + r = xa_err(xa_store(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn, entry,
> + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT));
> + if (r)
> + break;
> + }
> + if (start >= gfn)
> + return r;
> +
> + end = gfn;
> + for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
> + struct kvm_memslot_iter iter;
> + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> + struct kvm_memslots *slots;
> +
> + slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
> + kvm_for_each_memslot_in_gfn_range(&iter, slots, start, end) {
> + gfn_t s = max(start, slot->base_gfn);
> + gfn_t e = min(end, slot->base_gfn + slot->npages);

slot is not inited.


> +
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(s >= e);
> + kvm_arch_update_mem_attr(kvm, slot, attr, s, e);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr);
> +
> #else /* !CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM */
>
> static inline void kvm_restrictedmem_register(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)

2022-11-09 15:56:29

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 062/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> The TDX Guest-Hypervisor communication interface(GHCI) specification
> defines MapGPA hypercall for guest TD to request the host VMM to map given
> GPA range as private or shared.
>
> It means the guest TD uses the GPA as shared (or private). The GPA
> won't be used as private (or shared). VMM should enforce GPA usage. VMM
> doesn't have to map the GPA on the hypercall request.
>
> - Zap the aliased region.
> If shared (or private) GPA is requested, zap private (or shared) GPA
> (modulo shared bit).
> - Record the request GPA is shared (or private) by kvm.mem_attr_array.
> - Don't map GPA. The GPA is mapped on the next EPT violation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 5 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 3 ++
> 4 files changed, 103 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> index e2a0dfbee56d..e1641fa5a862 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> @@ -219,6 +219,11 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end);
>
> int kvm_arch_write_log_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> +int __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> + bool map_private);
> +int kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> + bool map_private);
> +
> int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
> void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index 168c84c99de3..37b378bf60df 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -6778,6 +6778,66 @@ void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen)
> }
> }
>
> +int __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> + bool map_private)
> +{
> + gfn_t start = *startp;
> + int attr;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + attr = map_private ? KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE : KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED;
> + start = start & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> + end = end & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> +
> + /*
> + * To make the following kvm_vm_set_mem_attr() success within spinlock
> + * without memory allocation.
> + */
> + ret = kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(kvm, start, end);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {

How about moving the condition test to the beginning of the function to
make the code simpler?


> + gfn_t s = start;
> +
> + ret = kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(kvm, &s, end, map_private);
> + if (!ret) {
> + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, end), kvm);
> + } else if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
> + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, s), kvm);
> + start = s;
> + }
> + } else {
> + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> + write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> +
> + if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
> + if (map_private)
> + *startp = kvm_gfn_private(kvm, start);
> + else
> + *startp = kvm_gfn_shared(kvm, start);
> + }
> + return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_mmu_map_gpa);
> +
> +int kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> + bool map_private)
> +{
> + struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
> +
> + if (!VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa) || !VALID_PAGE(mmu->private_root_hpa))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(vcpu->kvm, startp, end, map_private);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_map_gpa);
> +
> static unsigned long
> mmu_shrink_scan(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> index 4b207ce83ffe..d3bab382ceaa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> @@ -2156,6 +2156,41 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
> return spte_set;
> }
>
> +int kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm,
> + gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end, bool map_private)
> +{
> + struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
> + gfn_t start = *startp;
> + bool flush = false;
> + int i;
> +
> + lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> + KVM_BUG_ON(start & kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm), kvm);
> + KVM_BUG_ON(end & kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm), kvm);
> +
> + kvm_mmu_invalidate_begin(kvm, start, end);
> + for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
> + for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, i) {
> + if (is_private_sp(root) == map_private)
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * TODO: If necessary, return to the caller with -EAGAIN
> + * instead of yield-and-resume within
> + * tdp_mmu_zap_leafs().
> + */
> + flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, start, end,
> + /*can_yield=*/true, flush,
> + /*zap_private=*/is_private_sp(root));
> + }
> + }
> + if (flush)
> + kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_address(kvm, start, end - start);
> + kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm, start, end);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Return the level of the lowest level SPTE added to sptes.
> * That SPTE may be non-present.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> index 695175c921a5..cb13bc1c3679 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> @@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
> gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
> int target_level, bool shared);
>
> +int kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm,
> + gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end, bool map_private);

Sugguest to add some description about the function to avoid confusion,
since the function name is quite generic but the usage is highly related
to TDX.


> +
> static inline void kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_begin(void)
> {
> rcu_read_lock();

2022-11-10 11:09:30

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> >
> > As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign
> > TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and
> > allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated
> > pages, and HKID.
> >
> > Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the
> > guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add
^
HKID

It's better to use consistent words throughout patch/series I guess.

> > flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down private page tables
> > for it.
> >
> > Add a second kvm_x86_ops hook in kvm_arch_destroy_vm() to support TDX's
> > destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a teardown state,
> > then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM resources.

Perhaps explicitly call out the hook is vm_free() and why the existing
vm_destroy() hook cannot meet TDX's purpose, so that people can understand
easily why you need vm_free().

[...]

> > +static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> > +{
> > + tdx_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid);
> > + kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;

Why -1? Can it be set to 0, which is the initial value when kvm_tdx is allocated
anyway?

> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> > +{
> > + return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page)
> > +{
> > + const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
> > + unsigned long i;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i:
> > + * when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is
> > + * required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity
> > + * error when read on the page with new keyid.
> > + *
> > + * The cache line could be poisoned (even without MKTME-i), clear the
> > + * poison bit.

Does this happen only when there's potential kernel bug?

> > + */
> > + for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += 64)
> > + movdir64b((void *)(page + i), zero_page);
> > + /*
> > + * MOVDIR64B store uses WC buffer. Prevent following memory reads
> > + * from seeing potentially poisoned cache.
> > + */
> > + __mb();
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int tdx_reclaim_page(unsigned long va, hpa_t pa, bool do_wb, u16 hkid)
> > +{
> > + struct tdx_module_output out;
> > + u64 err;
> > +
> > + do {
> > + err = tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(pa, &out);
> > + /*
> > + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM is allowed only when TD is shutdown.
> > + * state. i.e. destructing TD.
> > + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM requires TDR and target page.
> > + * Because we're destructing TD, it's rare to contend with TDR.
> > + */
> > + } while (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX));
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, err, &out);
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (do_wb) {
> > + /*
> > + * Only TDR page gets into this path. No contention is expected
> > + * because the last page of TD.
> > + */
> > + err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(set_hkid_to_hpa(pa, hkid));
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err, NULL);
> > + return -EIO;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + tdx_clear_page(va);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int tdx_alloc_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> > +{
> > + page->va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> > + if (!page->va)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + page->pa = __pa(page->va);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline void tdx_mark_td_page_added(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> > +{
> > + WARN_ON_ONCE(page->added);
> > + page->added = true;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> > +{
> > + if (page->added) {
> > + /*
> > + * TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID
> > + * assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD
> > + * was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So
> > + * cache doesn't need to be flushed again.
> > + */
> > + if (tdx_reclaim_page(page->va, page->pa, false, 0))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + page->added = false;
> > + }
> > + if (page->va) {
> > + free_page(page->va);
> > + page->va = 0;
> > + }
> > +}
> > +


I am wondering why this 'struct tdx_td_page' is needed?

It appears the page->pa is used by SEAMCALLs and page->va is used by
tdx_clear_page() as MOVDIR64B needs a virtual address.

But since GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT is used in memory allocation, so you can actually
just get the pa and va from the page easily (using page_to_phys() and __va()).
Also it's 64-bit kernel so you don't even need to consider HIGHMEM.

Also, it seems page->added can be replaced with simply checking whether page is
NULL, correct?

Btw, I think the introduce of 'struct tdx_td_page' and the new 'struct
tdx_td_page tdr' to 'struct kvm_tdx' should come together with this patch, but
not in the previous patch "KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and
VMCS helpers". This makes the code review easier.

The "accessors" can be introduced in later patch when they are needed -- it
doesn't seem any of them is used in this patch?


2022-11-10 11:57:03

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 014/108] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> Stub in kvm_tdx, vcpu_tdx, and their various accessors. TDX defines
> SEAMCALL APIs to access TDX control structures corresponding to the VMX
> VMCS. Introduce helper accessors to hide its SEAMCALL ABI details.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 116 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> index 473013265bd8..98999bf3f188 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> @@ -3,14 +3,27 @@
> #define __KVM_X86_TDX_H
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +
> +#include "tdx_ops.h"
> +
> +struct tdx_td_page {
> + unsigned long va;
> + hpa_t pa;
> + bool added;
> +};
> +
> struct kvm_tdx {
> struct kvm kvm;
> - /* TDX specific members follow. */
> +
> + struct tdx_td_page tdr;
> + struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
> };
>
> struct vcpu_tdx {
> struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
> - /* TDX specific members follow. */
> +
> + struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
> + struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;
> };

As replied to the patch "KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure", I think it's
better to introduce this part together with that patch to make reviewer easier.

If I am not seeing mistakenly, the "accessors" below are not used in that patch,
so they can be done in a later patch when needed.

>
> static inline bool is_td(struct kvm *kvm)
> @@ -32,6 +45,107 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
> }
> +
> +static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
> +{
> +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
> +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_FULL 0x0UL
> +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH 0x1UL
> +#define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK)
> +
> + /* TDX is 64bit only. HIGH field isn't supported. */
> + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> + VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE(field) == VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_HIGH,
> + "Read/Write to TD VMCS *_HIGH fields not supported");
> +
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(bits != 16 && bits != 32 && bits != 64);
> +
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK GENMASK(14, 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT (0UL << 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT (1UL << 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT (2UL << 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL (3UL << 13)
> +#define VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) ((field) & VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_MASK)
> +
> + /* TDX is 64bit only. i.e. natural width = 64bit. */
> + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 64 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> + (VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_64BIT ||
> + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_NATURAL),
> + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 64-bit field");
> + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 32 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_32BIT,
> + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 32-bit field");
> + BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(bits != 16 && __builtin_constant_p(field) &&
> + VMCS_ENC_WIDTH(field) == VMCS_ENC_WIDTH_16BIT,
> + "Invalid TD VMCS access for 16-bit field");
> +}
> +
> +static __always_inline void tdvps_state_non_arch_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
> +static __always_inline void tdvps_management_check(u64 field, u8 bits) {}
> +
> +#define TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(bits, uclass, lclass) \
> +static __always_inline u##bits td_##lclass##_read##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> + u32 field) \
> +{ \
> + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> + u64 err; \
> + \
> + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> + err = tdh_vp_rd(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), &out); \
> + if (unlikely(err)) { \
> + pr_err("TDH_VP_RD["#uclass".0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> + field, err); \
> + return 0; \
> + } \
> + return (u##bits)out.r8; \
> +} \
> +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_write##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> + u32 field, u##bits val) \
> +{ \
> + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> + u64 err; \
> + \
> + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), val, \
> + GENMASK_ULL(bits - 1, 0), &out); \
> + if (unlikely(err)) \
> + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] = 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> + field, (u64)val, err); \
> +} \
> +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_setbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> + u32 field, u64 bit) \
> +{ \
> + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> + u64 err; \
> + \
> + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), bit, bit, \
> + &out); \
> + if (unlikely(err)) \
> + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] |= 0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> + field, bit, err); \
> +} \
> +static __always_inline void td_##lclass##_clearbit##bits(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx, \
> + u32 field, u64 bit) \
> +{ \
> + struct tdx_module_output out; \
> + u64 err; \
> + \
> + tdvps_##lclass##_check(field, bits); \
> + err = tdh_vp_wr(tdx->tdvpr.pa, TDVPS_##uclass(field), 0, bit, \
> + &out); \
> + if (unlikely(err)) \
> + pr_err("TDH_VP_WR["#uclass".0x%x] &= ~0x%llx failed: 0x%llx\n", \
> + field, bit, err); \
> +}
> +
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(16, VMCS, vmcs);
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(32, VMCS, vmcs);
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
> +
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, STATE_NON_ARCH, state_non_arch);
> +TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(8, MANAGEMENT, management);
> +
>

2022-11-14 07:06:28

by Yuan Yao

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 024/108] KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:22:25PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> The next step of TDX guest creation is to create vcpu. Allocate TDX vcpu
> structures, initialize it. Allocate pages of TDX vcpu for the TDX module.
>
> In the case of the conventional case, cpuid is empty at the initialization.
> and cpuid is configured after the vcpu initialization. Because TDX
> supports only X2APIC mode, cpuid is forcibly initialized to support X2APIC
> on the vcpu initialization.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 40 +++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 8 +++
> 3 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index b4e4c6c677f6..c125b2e3e8b4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -63,6 +63,38 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> }
>
> +static int vt_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return vmx_vcpu_precreate(kvm);
> +}
> +
> +static int vt_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> + return tdx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
> +
> + return vmx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> + return tdx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
> +
> + return vmx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> +{
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> + return tdx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
> +
> + return vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
> +}
> +
> static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> {
> if (!is_td(kvm))
> @@ -89,10 +121,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
> .vm_free = vt_vm_free,
>
> - .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
> - .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
> - .vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
> - .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
> + .vcpu_precreate = vt_vcpu_precreate,
> + .vcpu_create = vt_vcpu_create,
> + .vcpu_free = vt_vcpu_free,
> + .vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset,
>
> .prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
> .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 54045e0576e7..0625c354b341 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
> return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
> }
>
> +static inline bool is_td_vcpu_created(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
> +{
> + return tdx->tdvpr.added;
> +}
> +
> static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> {
> return kvm_tdx->tdr.added;
> @@ -296,6 +301,139 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> + int ret, i;
> +
> + /* TDX only supports x2APIC, which requires an in-kernel local APIC. */
> + if (!vcpu->arch.apic)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
> +
> + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + tdx->tdvpx = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages, sizeof(*tdx->tdvpx),
> + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!tdx->tdvpx) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_tdvpr;
> + }
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
> + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
> + if (ret)
> + goto free_tdvpx;
> + }
> +
> + vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
> +
> + vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
> + vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
> +
> + vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->tsc_offset;
> + vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
> + vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
> + !(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG);
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +free_tdvpx:
> + /* @i points at the TDVPX page that failed allocation. */
> + for (--i; i >= 0; i--)
> + free_page(tdx->tdvpx[i].va);
> + kfree(tdx->tdvpx);
> + tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
> +free_tdvpr:
> + free_page(tdx->tdvpr.va);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> + int i;
> +
> + /* Can't reclaim or free pages if teardown failed. */
> + if (is_hkid_assigned(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)))
> + return;
> +
> + if (tdx->tdvpx) {
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++)
> + tdx_reclaim_td_page(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
> + kfree(tdx->tdvpx);
> + tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
> + }
> + tdx_reclaim_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
> +}
> +
> +void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
> + struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> + struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
> + u64 err;
> + int i;
> +
> + /* TDX doesn't support INIT event. */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(init_event))
> + goto td_bugged;
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu_created(tdx)))
> + goto td_bugged;
> +
> + err = tdh_vp_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, tdx->tdvpr.pa);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_CREATE, err, NULL);
> + goto td_bugged;
> + }
> + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpr);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
> + err = tdh_vp_addcx(tdx->tdvpr.pa, tdx->tdvpx[i].pa);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_ADDCX, err, NULL);
> + goto td_bugged;
> + }
> + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
> + }
> +
> + if (!vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries) {
> + /*
> + * On cpu creation, cpuid entry is blank. Forcibly enable
> + * X2APIC feature to allow X2APIC.
> + */
> + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e;
> +
> + e = kvmalloc_array(1, sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);

NULL checking is necessary for kvmalloc_array.

> + *e = (struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) {
> + .function = 1, /* Features for X2APIC */
> + .index = 0,
> + .eax = 0,
> + .ebx = 0,
> + .ecx = 1ULL << 21, /* X2APIC */
> + .edx = 0,
> + };
> + vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries = e;
> + vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent = 1;
> + }
> + apic_base_msr.data = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC;
> + if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
> + apic_base_msr.data |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
> + apic_base_msr.host_initiated = true;
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, &apic_base_msr)))
> + goto td_bugged;
> +
> + vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
> +
> + return;
> +
> +td_bugged:
> + vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
> +}
> +
> int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
> {
> struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> index 93ffe2deb8e8..f6841c3dd12d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> @@ -141,6 +141,10 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
> void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
> void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
>
> +int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
> +
> int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
> #else
> static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
> @@ -154,6 +158,10 @@ static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}
>
> +static inline int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> +static inline void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
> +static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
> +
> static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> #endif
>
> --
> 2.25.1
>

2022-11-14 08:50:11

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 072/108] KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Several user ret MSRs are clobbered on TD exit. Restore those values on
> TD exit and before returning to ring 3.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 3ec465cbaeef..f35ccf2b502d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -456,6 +456,28 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
> }
>
> +struct tdx_uret_msr {
> + u32 msr;
> + unsigned int slot;
> + u64 defval;
> +};
> +
> +static struct tdx_uret_msr tdx_uret_msrs[] = {
> + {.msr = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,},
> + {.msr = MSR_STAR,},
> + {.msr = MSR_LSTAR,},
> + {.msr = MSR_TSC_AUX,},
> +};
> +
> +static void tdx_user_return_update_cache(void)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++)
> + kvm_user_return_update_cache(tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot,
> + tdx_uret_msrs[i].defval);
> +}
> +
> static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
> @@ -495,6 +517,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);
>
> + tdx_user_return_update_cache();
> tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
> tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
>
> @@ -1558,6 +1581,26 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> return -ENODEV;
> }
>
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++) {
> + /*
> + * Here it checks if MSRs (tdx_uret_msrs) can be saved/restored
> + * before returning to user space.
> + *
> + * this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs)->registered isn't checked
> + * because the registration is done at vcpu runtime by
> + * kvm_set_user_return_msr().
> + * Here is setting up cpu feature before running vcpu,
> + * registered is alreays

typo, already or always?



> false.
> + */
> + tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot = kvm_find_user_return_msr(tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);
> + if (tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot == -1) {
> + /* If any MSR isn't supported, it is a KVM bug */
> + pr_err("MSR %x isn't included by kvm_find_user_return_msr\n",
> + tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> + }
> +
> max_pkgs = topology_max_packages();
> tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs, sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock),
> GFP_KERNEL);

2022-11-14 09:08:41

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 071/108] KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
>
> Several MSRs are constant and only used in userspace(ring 3). But VMs may
> have different values. KVM uses kvm_set_user_return_msr() to switch to
> guest's values and leverages user return notifier to restore them when the
> kernel is to return to userspace. To eliminate unnecessary wrmsr, KVM also
> caches the value it wrote to an MSR last time.
>
> TDX module unconditionally resets some of these MSRs to architectural INIT
> state on TD exit. It makes the cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs are
> inconsistent with values in hardware. This inconsistency needs to be
> fixed. Otherwise, it may mislead kvm_on_user_return() to skip restoring
> some MSRs to the host's values. kvm_set_user_return_msr() can help correct
> this case, but it is not optimal as it always does a wrmsr. So, introduce
> a variation of kvm_set_user_return_msr() to update cached values and skip
> that wrmsr.
>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index b225cdfac4bc..fdb00d96e954 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -2082,6 +2082,7 @@ int kvm_add_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
> int kvm_find_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
> void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(void);
> int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
> +void kvm_user_return_update_cache(unsigned int index, u64 val);
>
> static inline bool kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 65541bfebb37..4d4b71c4cdb1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -440,6 +440,15 @@ void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(void)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu);
>
> +static void kvm_user_return_register_notifier(struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs)
> +{
> + if (!msrs->registered) {
> + msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
> + user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
> + msrs->registered = true;
> + }
> +}
> +
> int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
> {
> struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
> @@ -455,15 +464,22 @@ int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
> return 1;
>
> msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
> - if (!msrs->registered) {
> - msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
> - user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
> - msrs->registered = true;
> - }
> + kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
> return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_user_return_msr);
>
> +/* Update the cache, "curr", and register the notifier */
> +void kvm_user_return_update_cache(unsigned int slot, u64 value)
> +{
> + struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
> +
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!msrs->initialized);
> + msrs->values[slot].curr = value;

If the value is the same as the cached one, can it just skip notifier
registration?


> + kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_user_return_update_cache);
> +
> static void drop_user_return_notifiers(void)
> {
> struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);

2022-11-15 00:07:16

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 01:29:46AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> > +
> > +#define TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS \
> > + ((sizeof(struct tdsysinfo_struct) - \
> > + offsetof(struct tdsysinfo_struct, cpuid_configs)) \
> > + / sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config))
> > +
> > +struct tdx_capabilities {
> > + u8 tdcs_nr_pages;
> > + u8 tdvpx_nr_pages;
> > +
> > + u64 attrs_fixed0;
> > + u64 attrs_fixed1;
> > + u64 xfam_fixed0;
> > + u64 xfam_fixed1;
> > +
> > + u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
> > + struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS];
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */
> > +static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;
>
> I think you can introduce this tdx_capabilities in another patch.
>
> As claimed this patch can just focus on initializing the TDX module. Whether
> you need this tdx_capabilities or tdx_sysinfo is enough can be done in the patch
> when they are really needed. It makes review easier otherwise people won't be
> able to tell why tdx_capabilities is needed here.

Ok, the previous patch ("x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return
system wide info about TDX module ") and this part will be moved right before the
first use of tdx_caps. "KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure"


> > +
> > +static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
> > +{
> > + const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
> > + int ret = 0;
> > +
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*tdsysinfo) != 1024);
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS != 37);
> > +
> > + ret = tdx_enable();
> > + if (ret) {
> > + pr_info("Failed to initialize TDX module.\n");
> > + return ret;
> > + }
> > +
> > + tdsysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();
> > + if (tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config > TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS)
> > + return -EIO;
> > +
> > + tdx_caps = (struct tdx_capabilities) {
> > + .tdcs_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdcs_base_size / PAGE_SIZE,
> > + /*
> > + * TDVPS = TDVPR(4K page) + TDVPX(multiple 4K pages).
> > + * -1 for TDVPR.
> > + */
> > + .tdvpx_nr_pages = tdsysinfo->tdvps_base_size / PAGE_SIZE - 1,
> > + .attrs_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed0,
> > + .attrs_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->attributes_fixed1,
> > + .xfam_fixed0 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed0,
> > + .xfam_fixed1 = tdsysinfo->xfam_fixed1,
> > + .nr_cpuid_configs = tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config,
> > + };
> > + if (!memcpy(tdx_caps.cpuid_configs, tdsysinfo->cpuid_configs,
> > + tdsysinfo->num_cpuid_config *
> > + sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
> > + return -EIO;
> > +
> > + pr_info("kvm: TDX is supported. x86 phys bits %d\n",
> > + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
>
> What''s the benefit of print out x86_phys_bits? Looks a little bit weird here.
>
> TDX host code will print out TDX private KeyID range. I think that is useful
> enough?

Ok, please make TDX host code print it. I will remove key id rane.


> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> > +{
> > + int r;
> > +
> > + if (!enable_ept) {
> > + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* MOVDIR64B instruction is needed. */
> > + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) {
> > + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with MOVDIR64B supported ");
> ^
> without
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > + }
>
> I think you should explain why MOVDIR64B is required, otherwise this just comes
> out of blue.
>
> Btw, is this absolutely required? TDX also supports Li-mode, which doesn't have
> integrity check. So theoretically with Li-mode, normal zeroing is also OK but
> doesn't need to use MOVDIR64B.
>
> That being said, do we have a way to tell whether TDX works in Ci or Li mode?

As long as I don't know. When clearing page, we can use
if (featuremovdir64b) movdir64b else memset(0).

--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-15 01:13:44

by Sagi Shahar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:24 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct. Assign
> TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory encryption and
> allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On destruction, free allocated
> pages, and HKID.
>
> Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources of the
> guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Add
> flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down private page tables
> for it.
>
> Add a second kvm_x86_ops hook in kvm_arch_destroy_vm() to support TDX's
> destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a teardown state,
> then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM resources.
>
> Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 411 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 11 +
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +
> 7 files changed, 467 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index 8a5c5ae70bc5..3a29a6b31ee8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
> KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
> KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
> KVM_X86_OP(vm_init)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
> KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create)
> KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 2a41a93a80f3..2870155ce6fb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1472,7 +1472,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);
> unsigned int vm_size;
> int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
> + void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);
> void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
> + void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);
>
> /* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */
> int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index 0900ff2f2390..d01a946a18cf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -29,18 +29,44 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static void vt_hardware_unsetup(void)
> +{
> + tdx_hardware_unsetup();
> + vmx_hardware_unsetup();
> +}
> +
> static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> if (is_td(kvm))
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */
> + return tdx_vm_init(kvm);
>
> return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
> }
>
> +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return;
> +
> + vmx_vm_destroy(kvm);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> +}
> +
> struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .name = "kvm_intel",
>
> - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
> + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup,
> .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compatibility,
>
> .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
> @@ -50,7 +76,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
> .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
> .vm_init = vt_vm_init,
> - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
> + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private,
> + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
> + .vm_free = vt_vm_free,
>
> .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
> .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 530e72f85762..ec88dde0d300 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,401 @@ struct tdx_capabilities {
> /* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */
> static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;
>
> +/*
> + * Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB,
> + * TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a global lock
> + * internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is returned without
> + * spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's caller's
> + * responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use this mutex
> + * to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about scheduling.
> + */
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock);
> +static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock;
> +
> +static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
> +{
> + return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> +{
> + return kvm_tdx->tdr.added;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> +{
> + tdx_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid);
> + kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> +{
> + return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page)
> +{
> + const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
> + unsigned long i;
> +
> + /*
> + * Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i:
> + * when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is
> + * required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity
> + * error when read on the page with new keyid.
> + *
> + * The cache line could be poisoned (even without MKTME-i), clear the
> + * poison bit.
> + */
> + for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += 64)
> + movdir64b((void *)(page + i), zero_page);
> + /*
> + * MOVDIR64B store uses WC buffer. Prevent following memory reads
> + * from seeing potentially poisoned cache.
> + */
> + __mb();
> +}
> +
> +static int tdx_reclaim_page(unsigned long va, hpa_t pa, bool do_wb, u16 hkid)
> +{
> + struct tdx_module_output out;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + do {
> + err = tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(pa, &out);
> + /*
> + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM is allowed only when TD is shutdown.
> + * state. i.e. destructing TD.
> + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM requires TDR and target page.
> + * Because we're destructing TD, it's rare to contend with TDR.
> + */
> + } while (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX));
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, err, &out);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + if (do_wb) {
> + /*
> + * Only TDR page gets into this path. No contention is expected
> + * because the last page of TD.
> + */
> + err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(set_hkid_to_hpa(pa, hkid));
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err, NULL);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + tdx_clear_page(va);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int tdx_alloc_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> +{
> + page->va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!page->va)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + page->pa = __pa(page->va);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void tdx_mark_td_page_added(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> +{
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(page->added);
> + page->added = true;
> +}
> +
> +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> +{
> + if (page->added) {
> + /*
> + * TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID
> + * assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD
> + * was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So
> + * cache doesn't need to be flushed again.
> + */
> + if (tdx_reclaim_page(page->va, page->pa, false, 0))
> + return;
> +
> + page->added = false;
> + }
> + if (page->va) {
> + free_page(page->va);
> + page->va = 0;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb(void *param)
> +{
> + u64 err = 0;
> +
> + do {
> + err = tdh_phymem_cache_wb(!!err);
> + } while (err == TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE);
> +
> + /* Other thread may have done for us. */
> + if (err == TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE)
> + err = TDX_SUCCESS;
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, err, NULL);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + cpumask_var_t packages;
> + bool cpumask_allocated;
> + u64 err;
> + int ret;
> + int i;
> +
> + if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
> + return;
> +
> + if (!is_td_created(kvm_tdx))
> + goto free_hkid;
> +
> + cpumask_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL);
> + cpus_read_lock();
> + for_each_online_cpu(i) {
> + if (cpumask_allocated &&
> + cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i),
> + packages))
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * We can destroy multiple the guest TDs simultaneously.
> + * Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning TDX_BUSY by
> + * serialization.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
> + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb, NULL, 1);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
> + if (ret)
> + break;
> + }
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> +
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
> + err = tdh_mng_key_freeid(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, err, NULL);
> + pr_err("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n",
> + kvm_tdx->hkid);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> +free_hkid:
> + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
> +}
> +
> +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + int i;
> +
> + /* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */
> + if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
> + return;
> +
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdcs) {
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++)
> + tdx_reclaim_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may access TDR
> + * while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS). Cache flush with
> + * TDX global HKID is needed.
> + */
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdr.added &&
> + tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va, kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true,
> + tdx_global_keyid))
> + return;
> +
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
> +}
> +
> +static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)
> +{
> + hpa_t *tdr_p = param;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + do {
> + err = tdh_mng_key_config(*tdr_p);
> +
> + /*
> + * If it failed to generate a random key, retry it because this
> + * is typically caused by an entropy error of the CPU's random
> + * number generator.
> + */
> + } while (err == TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED);
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, err, NULL);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + cpumask_var_t packages;
> + int ret, i;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + ret = tdx_keyid_alloc();

Can we skip the hkid allocation at such an early stage?
This makes intra-host migration more complicated as the hkid of the
destination VM is already allocated before we have a chance to migrate
the state from the source VM.

I remember you had an internal version that already did that in
https://github.com/intel/tdx/blob/552dd80c48f67ca01bcdd10667e0c11efd375177/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c#L508

> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + kvm_tdx->hkid = ret;
> +
> + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdr);
> + if (ret)
> + goto free_hkid;
> +
> + kvm_tdx->tdcs = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages, sizeof(*kvm_tdx->tdcs),
> + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs)
> + goto free_tdr;
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + if (ret)
> + goto free_tdcs;
> + }
> +
> + if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL)) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_tdcs;
> + }
> + cpus_read_lock();
> + /*
> + * Need at least one CPU of the package to be online in order to
> + * program all packages for host key id. Check it.
> + */
> + for_each_present_cpu(i)
> + cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
> + for_each_online_cpu(i)
> + cpumask_clear_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
> + if (!cpumask_empty(packages)) {
> + ret = -EIO;
> + /*
> + * Because it's hard for human operator to figure out the
> + * reason, warn it.
> + */
> + pr_warn("All packages need to have online CPU to create TD. Online CPU and retry.\n");
> + goto free_packages;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY:
> + * TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key Owner
> + * Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It doesn't spin
> + * to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead, and let the
> + * caller to handle the contention. This is because of time limitation
> + * usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better about process
> + * scheduling.
> + *
> + * APIs to acquire the lock of KOT:
> + * TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE, and
> + * TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
> + err = tdh_mng_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->hkid);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_CREATE, err, NULL);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto free_packages;
> + }
> + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdr);
> +
> + for_each_online_cpu(i) {
> + int pkg = topology_physical_package_id(i);
> +
> + if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(pkg, packages))
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * Program the memory controller in the package with an
> + * encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id
> + * assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory
> + * controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by
> + * mutex.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]);
> + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config,
> + &kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]);
> + if (ret)
> + break;
> + }
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> + if (ret)
> + goto teardown;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + err = tdh_mng_addcx(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].pa);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, err, NULL);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto teardown;
> + }
> + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated
> + * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD.
> + */
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD
> + * varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred.
> + * Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice
> + * with partial initialization.
> + */
> +teardown:
> + tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
> + tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> + return ret;
> +
> +free_packages:
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> +free_tdcs:
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va)
> + continue;
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va);
> + }
> + kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
> + kvm_tdx->tdcs = NULL;
> +free_tdr:
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdr.va) {
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.added = false;
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.va = 0;
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.pa = 0;
> + }
> +free_hkid:
> + if (kvm_tdx->hkid != -1)
> + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
> {
> const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
> @@ -82,6 +477,8 @@ bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
>
> int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> {
> + int max_pkgs;
> + int i;
> int r;
>
> if (!enable_ept) {
> @@ -95,6 +492,14 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> return -ENODEV;
> }
>
> + max_pkgs = topology_max_packages();
> + tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs, sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tdx_mng_key_config_lock)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + for (i = 0; i < max_pkgs; i++)
> + mutex_init(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[i]);
> +
> /* TDX requires VMX. */
> r = vmxon_all();
> if (!r)
> @@ -103,3 +508,9 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
>
> return r;
> }
> +
> +void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void)
> +{
> + /* kfree accepts NULL. */
> + kfree(tdx_mng_key_config_lock);
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> index 98999bf3f188..938314635b47 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
>
> struct tdx_td_page tdr;
> struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
> +
> + int hkid;
> };
>
> struct vcpu_tdx {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> index ac1688b0b0e3..95da978c9aa9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> @@ -133,9 +133,20 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
> bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
> +void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
> +
> +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
> +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
> +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
> #else
> static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
> static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
> +static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
> +
> +static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> +static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> +static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> +static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> #endif
>
> #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 91053fdc4512..4b22196cb12c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -12702,6 +12702,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> kvm_page_track_cleanup(kvm);
> kvm_xen_destroy_vm(kvm);
> kvm_hv_destroy_vm(kvm);
> + static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm);
> }
>
> static void memslot_rmap_free(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> @@ -13012,6 +13013,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
>
> void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> + /*
> + * kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page tables. Before
> + * tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD resources to
> + * be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc). Invoke
> + * kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this.
> + */
> + static_call_cond(kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm);
> kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
> }
>
> --
> 2.25.1
>

2022-11-15 02:04:38

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

On Mon, 2022-11-14 at 15:18 -0800, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> > > +struct tdx_capabilities {
> > > + u8 tdcs_nr_pages;
> > > + u8 tdvpx_nr_pages;
> > > +
> > > + u64 attrs_fixed0;
> > > + u64 attrs_fixed1;
> > > + u64 xfam_fixed0;
> > > + u64 xfam_fixed1;
> > > +
> > > + u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
> > > + struct tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[TDX_MAX_NR_CPUID_CONFIGS];
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > +/* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */
> > > +static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;
> >
> > I think you can introduce this tdx_capabilities in another patch.
> >
> > As claimed this patch can just focus on initializing the TDX module. 
> > Whether
> > you need this tdx_capabilities or tdx_sysinfo is enough can be done in the
> > patch
> > when they are really needed.  It makes review easier otherwise people won't
> > be
> > able to tell why tdx_capabilities is needed here.
>
> Ok, the previous patch ("x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return
> system wide info about TDX module ") and this part will be moved right before
> the
> first use of tdx_caps. "KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure"

I think it's OK to put all host dependency patches at the beginning of the
series, but just move 'tdx_capabilities' to the patch where it is needed.

2022-11-15 03:03:34

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 076/108] KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> For vcpu migration, in the case of VMX, VCMS

typo, VMCS


> is flushed on the source pcpu,
> and load it on the target pcpu. There are corresponding TDX SEAMCALL APIs,
> call them on vcpu migration. The logic is mostly same as VMX except the
> TDX SEAMCALLs are used.
>
> When shutting down the machine, (VMX or TDX) vcpus needs to be shutdown on
> each pcpu. Do the similar for TDX with TDX SEAMCALL APIs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 43 +++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 ++
> 4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
>
> @@ -176,6 +214,41 @@ static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> }
> }
>
> +static void tdx_flush_vp(void *arg)
> +{
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = arg;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> +
> + /* Task migration can race with CPU offlining. */
> + if (vcpu->cpu != raw_smp_processor_id())
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * No need to do TDH_VP_FLUSH if the vCPU hasn't been initialized. The
> + * list tracking still needs to be updated so that it's correct if/when
> + * the vCPU does get initialized.
> + */
> + if (is_td_vcpu_created(to_tdx(vcpu))) {
> + err = tdh_vp_flush(to_tdx(vcpu)->tdvpr.pa);

Need to retry here if tdh.vp.flush fails due to tdx operand busy?

If such failure occurs, the next vp enter will fail after the vCPU
migrated to another LP, how is it hanlded?



> + if (unlikely(err && err != TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED)) {
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err))
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_FLUSH, err, NULL);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + tdx_disassociate_vp(vcpu);
> +}
> +
> +static void tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(vcpu->cpu == -1))
> + return;
> +
> + smp_call_function_single(vcpu->cpu, tdx_flush_vp, vcpu, 1);
> +}
> +
> static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb(void *param)
> {
> u64 err = 0;
> @@ -200,6 +273,8 @@ void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
> struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> cpumask_var_t packages;
> bool cpumask_allocated;
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
> + unsigned long j;
> u64 err;
> int ret;
> int i;
> @@ -210,6 +285,19 @@ void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
> if (!is_td_created(kvm_tdx))
> goto free_hkid;
>
> + kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm)
> + tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(vcpu);
> +
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
> + err = tdh_mng_vpflushdone(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE, err, NULL);
> + pr_err("tdh_mng_vpflushdone failed. HKID %d is leaked.\n",
> + kvm_tdx->hkid);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> cpumask_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL);
> cpus_read_lock();
> for_each_online_cpu(i) {
> @@ -355,6 +443,26 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
> +{
> + struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> +
> + if (vcpu->cpu == cpu)
> + return;
> +
> + tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(vcpu);
> +
> + local_irq_disable();
> + /*
> + * Pairs with the smp_wmb() in tdx_disassociate_vp() to ensure
> + * vcpu->cpu is read before tdx->cpu_list.
> + */
> + smp_rmb();
> +
> + list_add(&tdx->cpu_list, &per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, cpu));
> + local_irq_enable();
> +}
> +
> void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> @@ -405,6 +513,19 @@ void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
> }
> tdx_reclaim_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
> +
> + /*
> + * kvm_free_vcpus()
> + * -> kvm_unload_vcpu_mmu()
> + *
> + * does vcpu_load() for every vcpu after they already disassociated
> + * from the per cpu list when tdx_vm_teardown(). So we need to
> + * disassociate them again, otherwise the freed vcpu data will be
> + * accessed when do list_{del,add}() on associated_tdvcpus list
> + * later.
> + */
> + tdx_flush_vp_on_cpu(vcpu);
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->cpu != -1);
> }
>
> void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> index e5f973b2d752..c02073102a5f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
> struct tdx_td_page tdvpr;
> struct tdx_td_page *tdvpx;
>
> + struct list_head cpu_list;
> +
> union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason;
>
> bool vcpu_initialized;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> index a4e50c5a4bf5..d4fcb6b29ffe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> @@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
> bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
> void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
> int tdx_offline_cpu(void);
> +void tdx_hardware_enable(void);
> +void tdx_hardware_disable(void);
> int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp);
>
> int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
> @@ -150,6 +152,7 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
> fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
>
> int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
> int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
> @@ -162,6 +165,8 @@ static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) { return 0; }
> static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type) { return false; }
> static inline void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
> static inline int tdx_offline_cpu(void) { return 0; }
> +static inline void tdx_hardware_enable(void) {}
> +static inline void tdx_hardware_disable(void) {}
> static inline int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; };
>
> static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> @@ -175,6 +180,7 @@ static inline void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) {}
> static inline fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE; }
> static inline void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
> static inline void tdx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
> +static inline void tdx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
>
> static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }

2022-11-15 13:08:46

by Erdem Aktas

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 3:18 PM Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]> wrote:
> > I think you should explain why MOVDIR64B is required, otherwise this just comes
> > out of blue.
> >
> > Btw, is this absolutely required? TDX also supports Li-mode, which doesn't have
> > integrity check. So theoretically with Li-mode, normal zeroing is also OK but
> > doesn't need to use MOVDIR64B.
> >
> > That being said, do we have a way to tell whether TDX works in Ci or Li mode?
>
> As long as I don't know. When clearing page, we can use
> if (featuremovdir64b) movdir64b else memset(0).

-- sorry for resending the same email, for some reason my previous
email was not in plain text mode--
As far as I know, Li mode and Ci mode both are working very similarly
and require movdir64b to clear any poison bit previously set. Why
would movdir64b is not supported in a tdx capable cpu?

> --
> Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-16 01:52:23

by Chenyi Qiang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 049/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU


On 10/30/2022 2:22 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Allocate protected page table for private page table, and add hooks to
> operate on protected page table. This patch adds allocation/free of
> protected page tables and hooks. When calling hooks to update SPTE entry,
> freeze the entry, call hooks and unfree the entry to allow concurrent
> updates on page tables. Which is the advantage of TDP MMU. As
> kvm_gfn_shared_mask() returns false always, those hooks aren't called yet
> with this patch.
>
> When the faulting GPA is private, the KVM fault is called private. When
> resolving private KVM, allocate protected page table and call hooks to
> operate on protected page table. On the change of the private PTE entry,
> invoke kvm_x86_ops hook in __handle_changed_spte() to propagate the change
> to protected page table. The following depicts the relationship.
>
> private KVM page fault |
> | |
> V |
> private GPA | CPU protected EPTP
> | | |
> V | V
> private PT root | protected PT root
> | | |
> V | V
> private PT --hook to propagate-->protected PT
> | | |
> \--------------------+------\ |
> | | |
> | V V
> | private guest page
> |
> |
> non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
> |
> PT: page table
>
> The existing KVM TDP MMU code uses atomic update of SPTE. On populating
> the EPT entry, atomically set the entry. However, it requires TLB
> shootdown to zap SPTE. To address it, the entry is frozen with the special
> SPTE value that clears the present bit. After the TLB shootdown, the entry
> is set to the eventual value (unfreeze).
>
> For protected page table, hooks are called to update protected page table
> in addition to direct access to the private SPTE. For the zapping case, it
> works to freeze the SPTE. It can call hooks in addition to TLB shootdown.
> For populating the private SPTE entry, there can be a race condition
> without further protection
>
> vcpu 1: populating 2M private SPTE
> vcpu 2: populating 4K private SPTE
> vcpu 2: TDX SEAMCALL to update 4K protected SPTE => error
> vcpu 1: TDX SEAMCALL to update 2M protected SPTE
>
> To avoid the race, the frozen SPTE is utilized. Instead of atomic update
> of the private entry, freeze the entry, call the hook that update protected
> SPTE, set the entry to the final value.
>
> Support 4K page only at this stage. 2M page support can be done in future
> patches.
>
> Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 5 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 11 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 15 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 32 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 2 +-
> virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 1 +
> 8 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index f28c9fd72ac4..1b01dc2098b0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_tss_addr)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_identity_map_addr)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(get_mt_mask)
> KVM_X86_OP(load_mmu_pgd)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(link_private_spt)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(free_private_spt)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(set_private_spte)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(remove_private_spte)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(zap_private_spte)
> KVM_X86_OP(has_wbinvd_exit)
> KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_offset)
> KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_multiplier)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 381df2c8136d..5f9634c130d0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -467,6 +467,7 @@ struct kvm_mmu {
> struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
> void (*invlpg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, hpa_t root_hpa);
> struct kvm_mmu_root_info root;
> + hpa_t private_root_hpa;
> union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role;
> union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role;
>
> @@ -1613,6 +1614,16 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> void (*load_mmu_pgd)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
> int root_level);
>
> + int (*link_private_spt)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
> + void *private_spt);
> + int (*free_private_spt)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
> + void *private_spt);
> + int (*set_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn);
> + int (*remove_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level,
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn);
> + int (*zap_private_spte)(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, enum pg_level level);
> +
> bool (*has_wbinvd_exit)(void);
>
> u64 (*get_l2_tsc_offset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index 0237e143299c..02e7b5cf3231 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -3646,7 +3646,12 @@ static int mmu_alloc_direct_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> goto out_unlock;
>
> if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) {
> - root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu);
> + if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm) &&
> + !VALID_PAGE(mmu->private_root_hpa)) {
> + root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu, true);
> + mmu->private_root_hpa = root;
> + }
> + root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu, false);
> mmu->root.hpa = root;
> } else if (shadow_root_level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
> root = mmu_alloc_root(vcpu, 0, 0, shadow_root_level);
> @@ -4357,7 +4362,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
> unsigned long mmu_seq;
> int r;
>
> - fault->gfn = fault->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + fault->gfn = gpa_to_gfn(fault->addr) & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm);
> fault->slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault->gfn);
>
> if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, fault))
> @@ -5893,6 +5898,7 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
>
> mmu->root.hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
> mmu->root.pgd = 0;
> + mmu->private_root_hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
> for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
> mmu->prev_roots[i] = KVM_MMU_ROOT_INFO_INVALID;
>
> @@ -6116,7 +6122,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> };
>
> /*
> - * this handles both private gfn and shared gfn.
> + * This handles both private gfn and shared gfn.
> * All private page should be zapped on memslot deletion.
> */
> flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &range, flush, true);
> @@ -6919,6 +6925,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init(void)
> void kvm_mmu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
> + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
> + mmu_free_root_page(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.mmu->private_root_hpa,
> + NULL);
> free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.root_mmu);
> free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.guest_mmu);
> mmu_free_memory_caches(vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> index 4c013124534b..508e8402c07a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
> #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
> #include <asm/kvm_host.h>
>
> +#include "mmu.h"
> +
> #undef MMU_DEBUG
>
> #ifdef MMU_DEBUG
> @@ -209,11 +211,29 @@ static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> }
> }
>
> +static inline int kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gfp_t gfp)
> +{
> + gfp &= ~__GFP_ZERO;
> + sp->private_spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
> + if (!sp->private_spt)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline void kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> {
> if (sp->private_spt)
> free_page((unsigned long)sp->private_spt);
> }
> +
> +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_for_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
> + gfn_t gfn)
> +{
> + if (is_private_sp(root))
> + return kvm_gfn_private(kvm, gfn);
> + else
> + return kvm_gfn_shared(kvm, gfn);
> +}
> #else
> static inline void *kvm_mmu_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> {
> @@ -230,9 +250,20 @@ static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> {
> }
>
> +static inline int kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gfp_t gfp)
> +{
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +}
> +
> static inline void kvm_mmu_free_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> {
> }
> +
> +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_for_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
> + gfn_t gfn)
> +{
> + return gfn;
> +}
> #endif
>
> static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> @@ -367,6 +398,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
> .is_tdp = likely(vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault == kvm_tdp_page_fault),
> .nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled =
> is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm),
> + .is_private = kvm_is_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, cr2_or_gpa),
>
> .max_level = vcpu->kvm->arch.tdp_max_page_level,
> .req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
> index 9e56a5b1024c..eab62baf8549 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
> @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct tdp_iter {
> tdp_ptep_t pt_path[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL];
> /* A pointer to the current SPTE */
> tdp_ptep_t sptep;
> - /* The lowest GFN mapped by the current SPTE */
> + /* The lowest GFN (shared bits included) mapped by the current SPTE */
> gfn_t gfn;
> /* The level of the root page given to the iterator */
> int root_level;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> index bdb50c26849f..0e053b96444a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> @@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> sp->spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache);
> sp->role = role;
>
> + if (kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role))
> + kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(vcpu, NULL, sp);
> +
> return sp;
> }
>
> @@ -305,7 +308,8 @@ static void tdp_mmu_init_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
> trace_kvm_mmu_get_page(sp, true);
> }
>
> -hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + bool private)
> {
> union kvm_mmu_page_role role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role;
> struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> @@ -317,6 +321,8 @@ hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * Check for an existing root before allocating a new one. Note, the
> * role check prevents consuming an invalid root.
> */
> + if (private)
> + kvm_mmu_page_role_set_private(&role);
> for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, kvm_mmu_role_as_id(role)) {
> if (root->role.word == role.word &&
> kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(root))
> @@ -333,11 +339,17 @@ hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> spin_unlock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
>
> out:
> - return __pa(root->spt);
> + return root;
> +}
> +
> +hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool private)
> +{
> + return __pa(kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root(vcpu, private)->spt);
> }
>
> static int __must_check handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
> - u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
> + u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
> + union kvm_mmu_page_role role,
> bool shared);
>
> static void handle_changed_spte_acc_track(u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level)
> @@ -364,6 +376,8 @@ static void handle_changed_spte_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
>
> if ((!is_writable_pte(old_spte) || pfn_changed) &&
> is_writable_pte(new_spte)) {
> + /* For memory slot operations, use GFN without aliasing */
> + gfn = gfn & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> slot = __gfn_to_memslot(__kvm_memslots(kvm, as_id), gfn);
> mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, slot, gfn);
> }
> @@ -500,7 +514,8 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
> REMOVED_SPTE, level);
> }
> ret = handle_changed_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), gfn,
> - old_spte, REMOVED_SPTE, level, shared);
> + old_spte, REMOVED_SPTE, sp->role,
> + shared);
> /*
> * We are removing page tables. Because in TDX case we don't
> * zap private page tables except tearing down VM. It means
> @@ -509,9 +524,81 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
> WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
> }
>
> + if (is_private_sp(sp) &&
> + WARN_ON(static_call(kvm_x86_free_private_spt)(kvm, sp->gfn, sp->role.level,
> + kvm_mmu_private_spt(sp)))) {
> + /*
> + * Failed to unlink Secure EPT page and there is nothing to do
> + * further. Intentionally leak the page to prevent the kernel
> + * from accessing the encrypted page.
> + */
> + kvm_mmu_init_private_spt(sp, NULL);
> + }
> +
> call_rcu(&sp->rcu_head, tdp_mmu_free_sp_rcu_callback);
> }
>
> +static void *get_private_spt(gfn_t gfn, u64 new_spte, int level)
> +{
> + if (is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte) && !is_last_spte(new_spte, level)) {
> + struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = to_shadow_page(pfn_to_hpa(spte_to_pfn(new_spte)));
> + void *private_spt = kvm_mmu_private_spt(sp);
> +
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!private_spt);
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level + 1 != level);
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->gfn != gfn);
> + return private_spt;
> + }
> +
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static int __must_check handle_changed_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
> + u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
> + int level)
> +{
> + bool was_present = is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte);
> + bool is_present = is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte);
> + bool was_leaf = was_present && is_last_spte(old_spte, level);
> + bool is_leaf = is_present && is_last_spte(new_spte, level);
> + kvm_pfn_t old_pfn = spte_to_pfn(old_spte);
> + kvm_pfn_t new_pfn = spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
> + int ret;

int ret = 0;

> +
> + lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> + if (is_present) {
> + /* TDP MMU doesn't change present -> present */
> + KVM_BUG_ON(was_present, kvm);
> +
> + /*
> + * Use different call to either set up middle level
> + * private page table, or leaf.
> + */
> + if (is_leaf)
> + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_set_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, new_pfn);
> + else {
> + void *private_spt = get_private_spt(gfn, new_spte, level);
> +
> + KVM_BUG_ON(!private_spt, kvm);
> + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_link_private_spt)(kvm, gfn, level, private_spt);
> + }
> + } else if (was_leaf) {
> + /* non-present -> non-present doesn't make sense. */
> + KVM_BUG_ON(!was_present, kvm);
> + /*
> + * Zap private leaf SPTE. Zapping private table is done
> + * below in handle_removed_tdp_mmu_page().
> + */
> + lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_zap_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level);
> + if (!ret) {
> + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_remove_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, old_pfn);
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
> + }
> + }

Otherwise, "ret" may be returned without initialization. Then it will
trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE(ret) after handle_changed_spte() in patch 48.

> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * __handle_changed_spte - handle bookkeeping associated with an SPTE change
> * @kvm: kvm instance
> @@ -519,7 +606,7 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
> * @gfn: the base GFN that was mapped by the SPTE
> * @old_spte: The value of the SPTE before the change
> * @new_spte: The value of the SPTE after the change
> - * @level: the level of the PT the SPTE is part of in the paging structure
> + * @role: the role of the PT the SPTE is part of in the paging structure
> * @shared: This operation may not be running under the exclusive use of
> * the MMU lock and the operation must synchronize with other
> * threads that might be modifying SPTEs.
> @@ -528,14 +615,18 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
> * This function must be called for all TDP SPTE modifications.
> */
> static int __must_check __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
> - u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
> - bool shared)
> + u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
> + union kvm_mmu_page_role role, bool shared)
> {
> + bool is_private = kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role);
> + int level = role.level;
> bool was_present = is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte);
> bool is_present = is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte);
> bool was_leaf = was_present && is_last_spte(old_spte, level);
> bool is_leaf = is_present && is_last_spte(new_spte, level);
> - bool pfn_changed = spte_to_pfn(old_spte) != spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
> + kvm_pfn_t old_pfn = spte_to_pfn(old_spte);
> + kvm_pfn_t new_pfn = spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
> + bool pfn_changed = old_pfn != new_pfn;
>
> WARN_ON(level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
> WARN_ON(level < PG_LEVEL_4K);
> @@ -602,7 +693,7 @@ static int __must_check __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t
>
> if (was_leaf && is_dirty_spte(old_spte) &&
> (!is_present || !is_dirty_spte(new_spte) || pfn_changed))
> - kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte_to_pfn(old_spte));
> + kvm_set_pfn_dirty(old_pfn);
>
> /*
> * Recursively handle child PTs if the change removed a subtree from
> @@ -611,26 +702,42 @@ static int __must_check __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t
> * pages are kernel allocations and should never be migrated.
> */
> if (was_present && !was_leaf &&
> - (is_leaf || !is_present || WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn_changed)))
> + (is_leaf || !is_present || WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn_changed))) {
> + KVM_BUG_ON(is_private != is_private_sptep(spte_to_child_pt(old_spte, level)),
> + kvm);
> handle_removed_pt(kvm, spte_to_child_pt(old_spte, level), shared);
> + }
>
> + /*
> + * Special handling for the private mapping. We are either
> + * setting up new mapping at middle level page table, or leaf,
> + * or tearing down existing mapping.
> + *
> + * This is after handling lower page table by above
> + * handle_remove_tdp_mmu_page(). Secure-EPT requires to remove
> + * Secure-EPT tables after removing children.
> + */
> + if (is_private &&
> + /* Ignore change of software only bits. e.g. host_writable */
> + (was_leaf != is_leaf || was_present != is_present || pfn_changed))
> + return handle_changed_private_spte(kvm, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, role.level);
> return 0;
> }
>
> static int __must_check handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
> - u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
> + u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
> + union kvm_mmu_page_role role,
> bool shared)
> {
> int ret;
>
> - ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level,
> - shared);
> + ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, role, shared);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - handle_changed_spte_acc_track(old_spte, new_spte, level);
> + handle_changed_spte_acc_track(old_spte, new_spte, role.level);
> handle_changed_spte_dirty_log(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte,
> - new_spte, level);
> + new_spte, role.level);
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -656,6 +763,24 @@ static inline int __must_check tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
> struct tdp_iter *iter,
> u64 new_spte)
> {
> + /*
> + * For conventional page table, the update flow is
> + * - update STPE with atomic operation
> + * - handle changed SPTE. __handle_changed_spte()
> + * NOTE: __handle_changed_spte() (and functions) must be safe against
> + * concurrent update. It is an exception to zap SPTE. See
> + * tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic().
> + *
> + * For private page table, callbacks are needed to propagate SPTE
> + * change into the protected page table. In order to atomically update
> + * both the SPTE and the protected page tables with callbacks, utilize
> + * freezing SPTE.
> + * - Freeze the SPTE. Set entry to REMOVED_SPTE.
> + * - Trigger callbacks for protected page tables. __handle_changed_spte()
> + * - Unfreeze the SPTE. Set the entry to new_spte.
> + */
> + bool freeze_spte = is_private_sptep(iter->sptep) && !is_removed_spte(new_spte);
> + u64 tmp_spte = freeze_spte ? REMOVED_SPTE : new_spte;
> u64 *sptep = rcu_dereference(iter->sptep);
> int ret;
>
> @@ -673,14 +798,24 @@ static inline int __must_check tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
> * Note, fast_pf_fix_direct_spte() can also modify TDP MMU SPTEs and
> * does not hold the mmu_lock.
> */
> - if (!try_cmpxchg64(sptep, &iter->old_spte, new_spte))
> + if (!try_cmpxchg64(sptep, &iter->old_spte, tmp_spte))
> return -EBUSY;
>
> ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, iter->as_id, iter->gfn, iter->old_spte,
> - new_spte, iter->level, true);
> + new_spte, sptep_to_sp(sptep)->role, true);
> if (!ret)
> handle_changed_spte_acc_track(iter->old_spte, new_spte, iter->level);
>
> + if (ret) {
> + /*
> + * !freeze_spte means this fault isn't private. No call to
> + * operation on Secure EPT.
> + */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!freeze_spte);
> + __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, iter->old_spte);
> + } else if (freeze_spte)
> + __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, new_spte);
> +
> return ret;
> }
>
> @@ -750,6 +885,7 @@ static u64 __tdp_mmu_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
> u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, gfn_t gfn, int level,
> bool record_acc_track, bool record_dirty_log)
> {
> + union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
> int ret;
>
> lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> @@ -765,7 +901,9 @@ static u64 __tdp_mmu_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
>
> old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte, new_spte, level);
>
> - ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level, false);
> + role = sptep_to_sp(sptep)->role;
> + role.level = level;
> + ret = __handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, role, false);
> /* Because write spin lock is held, no race. It should success. */
> WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
>
> @@ -819,8 +957,11 @@ static inline void tdp_mmu_set_spte_no_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm,
> continue; \
> else
>
> -#define tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(_iter, _mmu, _start, _end) \
> - for_each_tdp_pte(_iter, to_shadow_page(_mmu->root.hpa), _start, _end)
> +#define tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(_iter, _mmu, _private, _start, _end) \
> + for_each_tdp_pte(_iter, \
> + to_shadow_page((_private) ? _mmu->private_root_hpa : \
> + _mmu->root.hpa), \
> + _start, _end)
>
> /*
> * Yield if the MMU lock is contended or this thread needs to return control
> @@ -983,6 +1124,14 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
> if (!zap_private && is_private_sp(root))
> return false;
>
> + /*
> + * start and end doesn't have GFN shared bit. This function zaps
> + * a region including alias. Adjust shared bit of [start, end) if the
> + * root is shared.
> + */
> + start = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, start);
> + end = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, end);
> +
> rcu_read_lock();
>
> for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, PG_LEVEL_4K, start, end) {
> @@ -1111,10 +1260,19 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> WARN_ON(sp->role.level != fault->goal_level);
> if (unlikely(!fault->slot))
> new_spte = make_mmio_spte(vcpu, iter->gfn, ACC_ALL);
> - else
> - wrprot = make_spte(vcpu, sp, fault->slot, ACC_ALL, iter->gfn,
> - fault->pfn, iter->old_spte, fault->prefetch, true,
> - fault->map_writable, &new_spte);
> + else {
> + unsigned long pte_access = ACC_ALL;
> + gfn_t gfn_unalias = iter->gfn & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm);
> +
> + /* TDX shared GPAs are no executable, enforce this for the SDV. */
> + if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm) && !fault->is_private)
> + pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
> +
> + wrprot = make_spte(vcpu, sp, fault->slot, pte_access,
> + gfn_unalias, fault->pfn, iter->old_spte,
> + fault->prefetch, true, fault->map_writable,
> + &new_spte);
> + }
>
> if (new_spte == iter->old_spte)
> ret = RET_PF_SPURIOUS;
> @@ -1214,6 +1372,8 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> {
> struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
> struct tdp_iter iter;
> + gfn_t raw_gfn;
> + bool is_private = fault->is_private;
> int ret;
>
> kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, fault);
> @@ -1222,7 +1382,17 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
>
> rcu_read_lock();
>
> - tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, fault->gfn, fault->gfn + 1) {
> + raw_gfn = gpa_to_gfn(fault->addr);
> +
> + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(fault->pfn) ||
> + !kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(fault->pfn)) {
> + if (is_private) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, is_private, raw_gfn, raw_gfn + 1) {
> if (fault->nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled)
> disallowed_hugepage_adjust(fault, iter.old_spte, iter.level);
>
> @@ -1238,6 +1408,12 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> is_large_pte(iter.old_spte)) {
> if (tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(vcpu->kvm, &iter))
> break;
> + /*
> + * TODO: large page support.
> + * Doesn't support large page for TDX now
> + */
> + KVM_BUG_ON(is_private_sptep(iter.sptep), vcpu->kvm);
> +
>
> /*
> * The iter must explicitly re-read the spte here
> @@ -1480,6 +1656,12 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp, union kvm_mm
>
> sp->role = role;
> sp->spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
> + if (kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role)) {
> + if (kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(sp, gfp)) {
> + free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
> + sp->spt = NULL;
> + }
> + }
> if (!sp->spt) {
> kmem_cache_free(mmu_page_header_cache, sp);
> return NULL;
> @@ -1495,6 +1677,11 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm,
> union kvm_mmu_page_role role = tdp_iter_child_role(iter);
> struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
>
> + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role) !=
> + is_private_sptep(iter->sptep), kvm);
> + /* TODO: Large page isn't supported for private SPTE yet. */
> + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role), kvm);
> +
> /*
> * Since we are allocating while under the MMU lock we have to be
> * careful about GFP flags. Use GFP_NOWAIT to avoid blocking on direct
> @@ -1929,7 +2116,7 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm)))
> return leaf;
>
> - tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, gfn, gfn + 1) {
> + tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, false, gfn, gfn + 1) {
> leaf = iter.level;
> sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;
> }
> @@ -1956,7 +2143,10 @@ u64 *kvm_tdp_mmu_fast_pf_get_last_sptep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr,
> gfn_t gfn = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> tdp_ptep_t sptep = NULL;
>
> - tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, gfn, gfn + 1) {
> + /* fast page fault for private GPA isn't supported. */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_is_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, addr));
> +
> + tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, false, gfn, gfn + 1) {
> *spte = iter.old_spte;
> sptep = iter.sptep;
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> index c98c7df449a8..695175c921a5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
>
> -hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool private);
>
> __must_check static inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(struct kvm_mmu_page *root)
> {
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> index dda2f2ec4faa..8c996f40b544 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ struct page *kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
>
> return NULL;
> }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page);
>
> /*
> * Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put()

2022-11-16 03:15:52

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 077/108] KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Add a flag, KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCHED_GUEST, to skip saving/restoring DRs
> irrespective of any other flags. TDX-SEAM unconditionally saves and
> restores guest DRs and reset to architectural INIT state on TD exit.
> So, KVM needs to save host DRs before TD enter without restoring guest DRs
> and restore host DRs after TD exit.
>
> Opportunistically convert the KVM_DEBUGREG_* definitions to use BIT().
>
> Reported-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Co-developed-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 +++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 ++++++++---
> 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index fdb00d96e954..082e94f78c66 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -583,8 +583,13 @@ struct kvm_pmu {
> struct kvm_pmu_ops;
>
> enum {
> - KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = 1,
> - KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = 2,
> + KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = BIT(0),
> + KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = BIT(1),
> + /*
> + * Guest debug registers are saved/restored by hardware on exit from
> + * or enter guest. KVM needn't switch them.
> + */
> + KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH = BIT(2),
> };
>
> struct kvm_mtrr_range {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index fc4de83a2df8..57767ef3353b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
>
> + vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs = KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH;
> vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
> vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 4d4b71c4cdb1..ad7b227b68dd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -10779,7 +10779,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
>
> - if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
> + if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & ~KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH)) {
> set_debugreg(0, 7);
> set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
> set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
> @@ -10822,6 +10822,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> */
> if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
> WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
> + WARN_ON(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH);
> static_call(kvm_x86_sync_dirty_debug_regs)(vcpu);
> kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
> kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
> @@ -10834,8 +10835,12 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * care about the messed up debug address registers. But if
> * we have some of them active, restore the old state.
> */
> - if (hw_breakpoint_active())
> - hw_breakpoint_restore();
> + if (hw_breakpoint_active()) {
> + if (!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH))
> + hw_breakpoint_restore();
> + else
> + set_debugreg(__this_cpu_read(cpu_dr7), 7);

Why only restore dr7 when TD exit?

According to the commit message, dr0~dr3 are also reset to architectural
INIT value on TD exit.



> + }
>
> vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu = vcpu->cpu;
> vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc());

2022-11-16 05:39:38

by Wang, Lei

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 021/108] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

On 10/30/2022 2:22 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
>
> TDX requires additional parameters for TDX VM for confidential execution to
> protect its confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from
> any other software, including VMM. When creating guest TD VM before
> creating vcpu, the number of vcpu, TSC frequency (that is same among
> vcpus. and it can't be changed.) CPUIDs which is emulated by the TDX
> module. It means guest can trust those CPUIDs. and sha384 values for
> measurement.
>
> Add new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, to pass parameters for TDX guest. It
> assigns encryption key to the TDX guest for memory encryption. TDX
> encrypts memory per-guest bases. It assigns device model passes per-VM
> parameters for the TDX guest. The maximum number of vcpus, tsc frequency
> (TDX guest has fised VM-wide TSC frequency. not per-vcpu. The TDX guest
> can not change it.), attributes (production or debug), available extended
> features (which is reflected into guest XCR0, IA32_XSS MSR), cpuids, sha384
> measurements, and etc.
>
> This subcommand is called before creating vcpu and KVM_SET_CPUID2, i.e.
> cpuids configurations aren't available yet. So CPUIDs configuration values
> needs to be passed in struct kvm_init_vm. It's device model responsibility
> to make this cpuid config for KVM_TDX_INIT_VM and KVM_SET_CPUID2.
>
> Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 31 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 22 ++
> tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++
> 5 files changed, 347 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> index cd304d323d33..05ac4bfc8f8a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> @@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
> #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +
> +/* -1 indicates CPUID leaf with no sub-leaves. */
> +#define TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ((u32)-1)
> struct tdx_cpuid_config {
> u32 leaf;
> u32 sub_leaf;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> index 2ad9666e02a5..26661879c031 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> @@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
> /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
> enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
> KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
> + KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
>
> KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
> };
> @@ -583,4 +584,34 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
> struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
> };
>
> +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
> + __u64 attributes;
> + __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
> + union {
> + /*
> + * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before
> + * KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed.
> + *
> + * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.
> + * The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent
> + * with this values.
> + * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256)
> + * = 8KB.
> + */
> + struct {
> + struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
> + /* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */
> + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[];
> + };
> + /*
> + * For future extensibility.
> + * The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB.
> + * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
> + */
> + __u64 reserved[2029];
> + };
> +};
> +
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index d77709a6da51..54045e0576e7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -284,6 +284,205 @@ static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)
> int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> +
> + kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
> +
> + /*
> + * This function initializes only KVM software construct. It doesn't
> + * initialize TDX stuff, e.g. TDCS, TDR, TDCX, HKID etc.
> + * It is handled by KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, __tdx_td_init().
> + */
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
> + struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
> + struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
> +
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
> + sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + /*
> + * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
> + * mem_enc_ioctl().
> + */
> + if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
> + if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (caps.nr_cpuid_configs < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs)
> + return -E2BIG;
> +
> + caps = (struct kvm_tdx_capabilities) {
> + .attrs_fixed0 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed0,
> + .attrs_fixed1 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed1,
> + .xfam_fixed0 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed0,
> + .xfam_fixed1 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed1,
> + .nr_cpuid_configs = tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs,
> + .padding = 0,
> + };
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(user_caps, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid_configs, &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs,
> + tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs *
> + sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * cpuid entry lookup in TDX cpuid config way.
> + * The difference is how to specify index(subleaves).
> + * Specify index to TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF for CPUID leaf with no-subleaves.
> + */
> +static const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *tdx_find_cpuid_entry(const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
> + u32 function, u32 index)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + /* In TDX CPU CONFIG, TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF means index = 0. */
> + if (index == TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF)
> + index = 0;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < cpuid->nent; i++) {
> + const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e = &cpuid->entries[i];
> +
> + if (e->function == function &&
> + (e->index == index ||
> + !(e->flags & KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX)))
> + return e;
> + }
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static int setup_tdparams(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params,
> + struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm)
> +{
> + const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid = &init_vm->cpuid;
> + const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
> + u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
> + u64 guest_supported_xss;
> + int max_pa;
> + int i;
> +
> + if (kvm->created_vcpus)
> + return -EBUSY;
> + td_params->max_vcpus = kvm->max_vcpus;
> + td_params->attributes = init_vm->attributes;
> + if (td_params->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON) {
> + /*
> + * TODO: save/restore PMU related registers around TDENTER.
> + * Once it's done, remove this guard.
> + */
> + pr_warn("TD doesn't support perfmon yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
> + "host perf registers properly.\n");
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs; i++) {
> + const struct tdx_cpuid_config *config = &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs[i];
> + const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry =
> + tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, config->leaf, config->sub_leaf);
> + struct tdx_cpuid_value *value = &td_params->cpuid_values[i];
> +
> + if (!entry)
> + continue;
> +
> + value->eax = entry->eax & config->eax;
> + value->ebx = entry->ebx & config->ebx;
> + value->ecx = entry->ecx & config->ecx;
> + value->edx = entry->edx & config->edx;
> + }
> +
> + max_pa = 36;
> + entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0x80000008, 0);
> + if (entry)
> + max_pa = entry->eax & 0xff;
> +
> + td_params->eptp_controls = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
> + /*
> + * No CPU supports 4-level && max_pa > 48.
> + * "5-level paging and 5-level EPT" section 4.1 4-level EPT
> + * "4-level EPT is limited to translating 48-bit guest-physical
> + * addresses."
> + * cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() check is just in case.
> + */
> + if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() && max_pa > 48) {
> + td_params->eptp_controls |= VMX_EPTP_PWL_5;
> + td_params->exec_controls |= TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW;
> + } else {
> + td_params->eptp_controls |= VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
> + }
> +
> + /* Setup td_params.xfam */
> + entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0xd, 0);
> + if (entry)
> + guest_supported_xcr0 = (entry->eax | ((u64)entry->edx << 32));
> + else
> + guest_supported_xcr0 = 0;
> + guest_supported_xcr0 &= kvm_caps.supported_xcr0;
> +
> + entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0xd, 1);
> + if (entry)
> + guest_supported_xss = (entry->ecx | ((u64)entry->edx << 32));
> + else
> + guest_supported_xss = 0;
> + /* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */
> + guest_supported_xss &= (kvm_caps.supported_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_PT);
> +
> + td_params->xfam = guest_supported_xcr0 | guest_supported_xss;
> + if (td_params->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_LBR) {
> + /*
> + * TODO: once KVM supports LBR(save/restore LBR related
> + * registers around TDENTER), remove this guard.
> + */
> + pr_warn("TD doesn't support LBR yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
> + "IA32_LBR_DEPTH properly.\n");
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +
> + if (td_params->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) {
> + /*
> + * TODO: once KVM supports AMX(save/restore AMX related
> + * registers around TDENTER), remove this guard.
> + */
> + pr_warn("TD doesn't support AMX yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
> + "IA32_XFD, IA32_XFD_ERR properly.\n");
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +
> + td_params->tsc_frequency =
> + TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz);
> +
> +#define MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(dst, src) \
> + do { \
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dst) != sizeof(src)); \
> + memcpy((dst), (src), sizeof(dst)); \
> + } while (0)
> +
> + MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrconfigid, init_vm->mrconfigid);
> + MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrowner, init_vm->mrowner);
> + MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrownerconfig, init_vm->mrownerconfig);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + struct tdx_module_output out;
> cpumask_var_t packages;
> int ret, i;
> u64 err;
> @@ -390,10 +589,13 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> }
>
> - /*
> - * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated
> - * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD.
> - */
> + err = tdh_mng_init(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, __pa(td_params), &out);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_INIT, err, &out);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto teardown;
> + }
> +
> return 0;
>
> /*
> @@ -431,50 +633,65 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> return ret;
> }
>
> -int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
> +static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
> {
> - struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
> - struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
> - struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm = NULL;
> + struct td_params *td_params = NULL;
> + void *entries_end;
> + int ret;
>
> - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
> - sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*init_vm) != 16 * 1024);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(*init_vm) - offsetof(typeof(*init_vm), entries)) /
> + sizeof(init_vm->entries[0]) < KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct td_params) != 1024);
>
> - if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
> - return -EFAULT;
> - if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
> + if (is_td_initialized(kvm))
> return -EINVAL;
> - /*
> - * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
> - * mem_enc_ioctl().
> - */
> - if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
> +
> + if (cmd->flags)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
> - if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
> - return -EFAULT;
> + init_vm = kzalloc(sizeof(*init_vm), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (copy_from_user(init_vm, (void __user *)cmd->data, sizeof(*init_vm))) {

Pointer 'init_vm' returned from call to function 'kzalloc' may be NULL and will
be dereferenced at this line.

Maybe a NULL-check here is needed?

> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> - if (caps.nr_cpuid_configs < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs)
> - return -E2BIG;
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + if (init_vm->cpuid.padding)
> + goto out;
> + /* init_vm->entries shouldn't overrun. */
> + entries_end = init_vm->entries + init_vm->cpuid.nent;
> + if (entries_end > (void *)(init_vm + 1))
> + goto out;
> + /* Unused part must be zero. */
> + if (memchr_inv(entries_end, 0, (void *)(init_vm + 1) - entries_end))
> + goto out;
>
> - caps = (struct kvm_tdx_capabilities) {
> - .attrs_fixed0 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed0,
> - .attrs_fixed1 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed1,
> - .xfam_fixed0 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed0,
> - .xfam_fixed1 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed1,
> - .nr_cpuid_configs = tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs,
> - .padding = 0,
> - };
> + td_params = kzalloc(sizeof(struct td_params), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!td_params) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> - if (copy_to_user(user_caps, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
> - return -EFAULT;
> - if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid_configs, &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs,
> - tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs *
> - sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
> - return -EFAULT;
> + ret = setup_tdparams(kvm, td_params, init_vm);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
>
> - return 0;
> + ret = __tdx_td_init(kvm, td_params);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> + kvm_tdx->tsc_offset = td_tdcs_exec_read64(kvm_tdx, TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET);
> + kvm_tdx->attributes = td_params->attributes;
> + kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam;
> +
> +out:
> + /* kfree() accepts NULL. */
> + kfree(init_vm);
> + kfree(td_params);
> + return ret;
> }
>
> int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> @@ -490,6 +707,9 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
>
> switch (tdx_cmd.id) {
> + case KVM_TDX_INIT_VM:
> + r = tdx_td_init(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
> + break;
> default:
> r = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> index 938314635b47..ff0ea9cad347 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> @@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
> struct tdx_td_page tdr;
> struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
>
> + u64 attributes;
> + u64 xfam;
> int hkid;
> +
> + u64 tsc_offset;
> };
>
> struct vcpu_tdx {
> @@ -48,6 +52,11 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
> }
>
> +static inline bool is_td_initialized(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + return to_kvm_tdx(kvm)->hkid > 0;
> +}
> +
> static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
> {
> #define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
> @@ -148,6 +157,19 @@ TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
> TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, STATE_NON_ARCH, state_non_arch);
> TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(8, MANAGEMENT, management);
>
> +static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field)
> +{
> + struct tdx_module_output out;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + err = tdh_mng_rd(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, TDCS_EXEC(field), &out);
> + if (unlikely(err)) {
> + pr_err("TDH_MNG_RD[EXEC.0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", field, err);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + return out.r8;
> +}
> +
> #else
> struct kvm_tdx {
> struct kvm kvm;
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> index 2ad9666e02a5..531a0033e530 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> @@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
> /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
> enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
> KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
> + KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
>
> KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
> };
> @@ -583,4 +584,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
> struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
> };
>
> +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
> + __u64 attributes;
> + __u32 max_vcpus;
> + __u32 padding;
> + __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
> + union {
> + /*
> + * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before
> + * KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed.
> + *
> + * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.
> + * The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent
> + * with this values.
> + * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256)
> + * = 8KB.
> + */
> + struct {
> + struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
> + /* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */
> + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[];
> + };
> + /*
> + * For future extensibility.
> + * The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB.
> + * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
> + */
> + __u64 reserved[2028];
> + };
> +};
> +
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */

2022-11-16 10:50:14

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 041/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Factor out non-leaf SPTE population logic from kvm_tdp_mmu_map(). MapGPA
> hypercall needs to populate non-leaf SPTE to record which GPA, private or
> shared, is allowed in the leaf EPT entry.

Is this patch still valid/needed since you have changed to use XArray to store
whether GFN is private or shared?

>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> index 3325633b1cb5..11b0ec8aebe2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> @@ -1157,6 +1157,24 @@ static int tdp_mmu_link_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct tdp_iter *iter,
> + bool account_nx)
> +{
> + struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
> + int ret;
> +
> + KVM_BUG_ON(is_shadow_present_pte(iter->old_spte), vcpu->kvm);
> + KVM_BUG_ON(is_removed_spte(iter->old_spte), vcpu->kvm);
> +
> + sp = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu);
> + tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(sp, iter);
> +
> + ret = tdp_mmu_link_sp(vcpu->kvm, iter, sp, account_nx, true);
> + if (ret)
> + tdp_mmu_free_sp(sp);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Handle a TDP page fault (NPT/EPT violation/misconfiguration) by installing
> * page tables and SPTEs to translate the faulting guest physical address.
> @@ -1165,7 +1183,6 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> {
> struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
> struct tdp_iter iter;
> - struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
> int ret;
>
> kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, fault);
> @@ -1211,13 +1228,8 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> if (is_removed_spte(iter.old_spte))
> break;
>
> - sp = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu);
> - tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(sp, &iter);
> -
> - if (tdp_mmu_link_sp(vcpu->kvm, &iter, sp, account_nx, true)) {
> - tdp_mmu_free_sp(sp);
> + if (tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf(vcpu, &iter, account_nx))
> break;
> - }
> }
> }
>

2022-11-16 11:03:48

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 045/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> For private GPA, CPU refers a private page table whose contents are
> encrypted. The dedicated APIs to operate on it (e.g. updating/reading its
> PTE entry) are used and their cost is expensive.
>
> When KVM resolves KVM page fault, it walks the page tables. To reuse the
> existing KVM MMU code and mitigate the heavy cost to directly walk
> protected (encrypted) page table, allocate one more page to copy the
> protected page table for KVM MMU code to directly walk. Resolve KVM page
> fault with the existing code, and do additional operations necessary for
> the protected page table. To distinguish such cases, the existing KVM page
> table is called a shared page table (i.e. not associated with protected
> page table), and the page table with protected page table is called a
> private page table. The relationship is depicted below.
>
> Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page for protected page table and
> add helper functions to allocate/initialize/free a protected page table
> page.
>
> KVM page fault |
> | |
> V |
> -------------+---------- |
> | | |
> V V |
> shared GPA private GPA |
> | | |
> V V |
> shared PT root private PT root | protected PT root
> | | | |
> V V | V
> shared PT private PT ----propagate----> protected PT
> | | | |
> | \-----------------+------\ |
> | | | |
> V | V V
> shared guest page | private guest page
> |
> non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
> |
> PT: page table
> - Shared PT is visible to KVM and it is used by CPU.
> - Protected PT is used by CPU but it is invisible to KVM.
> - Private PT is visible to KVM but not used by CPU. It is used to
> propagate PT change to the actual protected PT which is used by CPU.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 7 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 8 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index ee01add57a6b..381df2c8136d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -754,6 +754,13 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
> struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_shadow_page_cache;
> struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_shadowed_info_cache;
> struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_page_header_cache;
> + /*
> + * This cache is to allocate private page table. E.g. Secure-EPT used
> + * by the TDX module. Because the TDX module doesn't trust VMM and
> + * initializes the pages itself, KVM doesn't initialize them. Allocate
> + * pages with garbage and give them to the TDX module.
> + */

Perhaps put "Because ..." part to kvm_mmu_create() so people can see why there's
no initialization for mmu_private_spte_cache?

> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_private_spt_cache;

Nit:

In changelog you mentioned the page table used by CPU is actually "protected
PT". IIUC the sp->private_spt you allocated from this cache is the one that is
actually used by CPU. So looks there's some inconsistency here.


[...]


> +
> +static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *private_spt_cache,
> + struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)

This function is very weird in the context of this patch. _Only_ a new vcpu-
scope 'mmu_private_spte_cache' is added in this patch, but here you allow caller
to pass an additional argument of private_spt_cache. So there must be another
cache which is not introduced in this patch?

> +{
> + /*
> + * vcpu == NULL means non-root SPT:
> + * vcpu == NULL is used to split a large SPT into smaller SPT. Root SPT
> + * is not a large SPT.

I am guessing this "vcpu == NULL" case is for "Eager Splitting"?

If so, why not adding a global MMU cache for private_spt allocation, and make
vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache point to the global cache? In this case, in
the context where you only have 'kvm', you can use the global cache directly.
And in the context where you have a 'vcpu', you just use vcpu's cache.

> + */
> + bool is_root = vcpu &&
> + vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root_role.level == sp->role.level;
> +
> + if (vcpu)
> + private_spt_cache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache;
> + KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(sp->role), vcpu->kvm);
> + if (is_root)
> + /*
> + * Because TDX module assigns root Secure-EPT page and set it to
> + * Secure-EPTP when TD vcpu is created, secure page table for
> + * root isn't needed.
> + */
> + sp->private_spt = NULL;
> + else {
> + sp->private_spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(private_spt_cache);
> + /*
> + * Because mmu_private_spt_cache is topped up before staring kvm
> + * page fault resolving, the allocation above shouldn't fail.
> + */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->private_spt);
> + }
> +}
> +

2022-11-16 12:09:06

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 045/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page

On Wed, 2022-11-16 at 10:32 +0000, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > +
> > +static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > +      struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache
> > *private_spt_cache,
> > +      struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
>
> This function is very weird in the context of this patch.  _Only_ a new vcpu-
> scope 'mmu_private_spte_cache' is added in this patch, but here you allow
> caller
> to pass an additional argument of private_spt_cache.  So there must be another
> cache which is not introduced in this patch?
>
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * vcpu == NULL means non-root SPT:
> > + * vcpu == NULL is used to split a large SPT into smaller SPT. 
> > Root SPT
> > + * is not a large SPT.
>
> I am guessing this "vcpu == NULL" case is for "Eager Splitting"?
>
> If so, why not adding a global MMU cache for private_spt allocation, and make
> vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache point to the global cache?  In this case, in
> the context where you only have 'kvm', you can use the global cache directly.
> And in the context where you have a 'vcpu', you just use vcpu's cache.

So I went through all MMU related patches in this series, but I cannot find a
place where this function is called with 'vcpu == NULL' and a valid cache is
passed in, if I am reading correctly.

Also checked that "Eager Splitting" uses a kvm-scope cache for legacy MMU, but
just uses __get_free_page() for TDP MMU. And in later patch "KVM: x86/tdp_mmu:
Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU", __get_free_page() is also used to
allocate the private_spt (which is consistent with existing eager splitting
code).

So IIUC only legacy MMU code will call this function with 'vcpu == NULL' and a
valid cache. In this case, please remove the 'private_spt_cache' argument for
now, and make the function always allocate from the vcpu-
>arch.mmu_private_spt_cache.  

You can add the additional argument when TDX gets legacy MMU support.

Also, I think you need to move eager splitting support part (whether that
handling is correct is another story) from the later patch to this patch.
Otherwise this patch is not complete.


>  
> > + */
> > + bool is_root = vcpu &&
> > + vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root_role.level == sp->role.level;
> > +
> > + if (vcpu)
> > + private_spt_cache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache;
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(sp->role), vcpu->kvm);
> > + if (is_root)
> > + /*
> > + * Because TDX module assigns root Secure-EPT page and set
> > it to
> > + * Secure-EPTP when TD vcpu is created, secure page table
> > for
> > + * root isn't needed.
> > + */
> > + sp->private_spt = NULL;
> > + else {
> > + sp->private_spt =
> > kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(private_spt_cache);
> > + /*
> > + * Because mmu_private_spt_cache is topped up before
> > staring kvm
> > + * page fault resolving, the allocation above shouldn't
> > fail.
> > + */
> > + WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->private_spt);
> > + }
> > +}
> > +

2022-11-16 12:20:24

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 049/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU


>
> +static inline int kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gfp_t gfp)
> +{
> + gfp &= ~__GFP_ZERO;
> + sp->private_spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
> + if (!sp->private_spt)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
>
[...]

> @@ -1238,6 +1408,12 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> is_large_pte(iter.old_spte)) {
> if (tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(vcpu->kvm, &iter))
> break;
> + /*
> + * TODO: large page support.
> + * Doesn't support large page for TDX now
> + */
> + KVM_BUG_ON(is_private_sptep(iter.sptep), vcpu->kvm);
> +
>

So large page is not supported for private page, ...

> /*
> * The iter must explicitly re-read the spte here
> @@ -1480,6 +1656,12 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp, union kvm_mm
>
> sp->role = role;
> sp->spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
> + if (kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role)) {
> + if (kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(sp, gfp)) {
> + free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
> + sp->spt = NULL;
> + }
> + }

... then I don't think eager splitting could happen for private mapping?

If so, should we just KVM_BUG_ON() if role is private?

2022-11-17 17:53:30

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 04:22:13AM -0800,
Erdem Aktas <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 3:18 PM Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > I think you should explain why MOVDIR64B is required, otherwise this just comes
> > > out of blue.
> > >
> > > Btw, is this absolutely required? TDX also supports Li-mode, which doesn't have
> > > integrity check. So theoretically with Li-mode, normal zeroing is also OK but
> > > doesn't need to use MOVDIR64B.
> > >
> > > That being said, do we have a way to tell whether TDX works in Ci or Li mode?
> >
> > As long as I don't know. When clearing page, we can use
> > if (featuremovdir64b) movdir64b else memset(0).
>
> -- sorry for resending the same email, for some reason my previous
> email was not in plain text mode--
> As far as I know, Li mode and Ci mode both are working very similarly
> and require movdir64b to clear any poison bit previously set. Why
> would movdir64b is not supported in a tdx capable cpu?

In practice, movdir64b can be safely assumed to be supported, I think. Strictly
it's not guaranteed by SDM.
There are two options.

1. Assume modir64b. If it's not supported, KVM refuses to enable TDX.
+ Don't care CI-mode or Li-mode
- not strictly conforming to SDM. In practice, it won't matter.
2. Don't assume movdir64b. If movdir64b not supported, use memset(0).
+ strictly conforming to SDM
- needs to care Ci-mode or Li-mode.

So I'll choose option 1.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 17:54:03

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 015/108] x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id

On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 09:16:57AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > TDX private host key id is assigned to guest TD. The memory controller
> > encrypts guest TD memory with the assigned TDX private host key id (HIKD).
> ^
> HKID.
>
> And since you already mentioned in the first sentence, you can put (HKID) part
> there. And I think you can just use HKID in the rest places to save some typing
> as this is the purpose of using (HKID) I suppose.
>
> [...]
>
> >
> > +/* TDX KeyID pool */
> > +static DEFINE_IDA(tdx_keyid_pool);
> > +
> > +int tdx_keyid_alloc(void)
> > +{
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tdx_keyid_start || !tdx_keyid_num))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + /* The first keyID is reserved for the global key. */
> > + return ida_alloc_range(&tdx_keyid_pool, tdx_keyid_start + 1,
> > + tdx_keyid_start + tdx_keyid_num - 1,
> > + GFP_KERNEL);
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_keyid_alloc);
> > +
> > +void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid)
> > +{
> > + /* keyid = 0 is reserved. */
> > + if (!keyid || keyid <= 0)
> > + return;
>
> Double check of keyid == 0.
>
> I think you can just use:
>
> if (keyid <= tdx_keyid_start)
> return;
>
> And/or add a WARN() as it's a bug if above happens.

Ok. Will fix it with WARN().
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 17:55:35

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On Thu, Nov 10, 2022 at 11:04:25AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> > > flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down private page tables
> > > for it.
> > >
> > > Add a second kvm_x86_ops hook in kvm_arch_destroy_vm() to support TDX's
> > > destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a teardown state,
> > > then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM resources.
>
> Perhaps explicitly call out the hook is vm_free() and why the existing
> vm_destroy() hook cannot meet TDX's purpose, so that people can understand
> easily why you need vm_free().

Sure, will update the commit message.


> > > +static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> > > +{
> > > + tdx_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid);
> > > + kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
>
> Why -1? Can it be set to 0, which is the initial value when kvm_tdx is allocated
> anyway?

0 works. I'll replace it with 0.


> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> > > +{
> > > + return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page)
> > > +{
> > > + const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
> > > + unsigned long i;
> > > +
> > > + /*
> > > + * Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with MKTME-i:
> > > + * when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid, MOVDIR64B is
> > > + * required to clear/write the page with new keyid to prevent integrity
> > > + * error when read on the page with new keyid.
> > > + *
> > > + * The cache line could be poisoned (even without MKTME-i), clear the
> > > + * poison bit.
>
> Does this happen only when there's potential kernel bug?

That's right.


> > > +static int tdx_alloc_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> > > +{
> > > + page->va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> > > + if (!page->va)
> > > + return -ENOMEM;
> > > +
> > > + page->pa = __pa(page->va);
> > > + return 0;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static inline void tdx_mark_td_page_added(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> > > +{
> > > + WARN_ON_ONCE(page->added);
> > > + page->added = true;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> > > +{
> > > + if (page->added) {
> > > + /*
> > > + * TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX with HKID
> > > + * assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to the TD
> > > + * was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before here, So
> > > + * cache doesn't need to be flushed again.
> > > + */
> > > + if (tdx_reclaim_page(page->va, page->pa, false, 0))
> > > + return;
> > > +
> > > + page->added = false;
> > > + }
> > > + if (page->va) {
> > > + free_page(page->va);
> > > + page->va = 0;
> > > + }
> > > +}
> > > +
>
>
> I am wondering why this 'struct tdx_td_page' is needed?
>
> It appears the page->pa is used by SEAMCALLs and page->va is used by
> tdx_clear_page() as MOVDIR64B needs a virtual address.
>
> But since GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT is used in memory allocation, so you can actually
> just get the pa and va from the page easily (using page_to_phys() and __va()).
> Also it's 64-bit kernel so you don't even need to consider HIGHMEM.

Yes, page->va member can be dropped. Will drop it.


> Also, it seems page->added can be replaced with simply checking whether page is
> NULL, correct?

No. It's subtle. Anyway let me check it.


> Btw, I think the introduce of 'struct tdx_td_page' and the new 'struct
> tdx_td_page tdr' to 'struct kvm_tdx' should come together with this patch, but
> not in the previous patch "KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and
> VMCS helpers". This makes the code review easier.
>
> The "accessors" can be introduced in later patch when they are needed -- it
> doesn't seem any of them is used in this patch?

Ok, will move it to that patch.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 17:56:44

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 04:06:10PM -0800,
Sagi Shahar <[email protected]> wrote:

> > +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> > + cpumask_var_t packages;
> > + int ret, i;
> > + u64 err;
> > +
> > + ret = tdx_keyid_alloc();
>
> Can we skip the hkid allocation at such an early stage?
> This makes intra-host migration more complicated as the hkid of the
> destination VM is already allocated before we have a chance to migrate
> the state from the source VM.
>
> I remember you had an internal version that already did that in
> https://github.com/intel/tdx/blob/552dd80c48f67ca01bcdd10667e0c11efd375177/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c#L508

With the patch of "KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters",
the allocation code is split out into its own code with KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
I think that's what you want.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 18:02:17

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 033/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE

On Wed, Nov 09, 2022 at 11:24:12AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> > index 2e08b2a45361..0b97a045c5f0 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> > @@ -419,7 +419,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
> > shadow_dirty_mask = has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull;
> > shadow_nx_mask = 0ull;
> > shadow_x_mask = VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
> > - shadow_present_mask = has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
> > + /* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */
> > + shadow_present_mask =
> > + (has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT;
>
> I think this chunk can be in a separate patch since it doesn't handle fault from
> non-present to present, which is claimed by the patch title and changelog.
>
> Or I think you need to describe handling W or X fault part in the changelog.

Ok, let me try to split that hunk.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 18:09:11

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 031/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE

On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 11:33:12AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > The plan is to unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit for both AMD and
> > Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for conventional VMX
> > guests, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and
> > "suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.
>
> Hi Isaku,
>
> "AMD hardware doesn't use this bit" is wrong:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m5ed59404da43677e99ac51dd1360dc22b964bcbb

Oops. I'll update the commit message.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 18:24:28

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 032/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Make sync_page not use hard-coded 0 as the initial SPTE value

On Wed, Nov 09, 2022 at 11:24:44AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > FNAME(sync_page) in arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h assumes that the initial
> > shadow page table entry (SPTE) is zero. Remove the assumption by using
> > SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE that will be updated from 0 to non-zero value.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 ++-
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > index 5ab5f94dcb6f..6db3f2b5563a 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
> > @@ -1036,7 +1036,8 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> > gpa_t pte_gpa;
> > gfn_t gfn;
> >
> > - if (!sp->spt[i])
> > + /* spt[i] has initial value of shadow page table allocation */
> > + if (sp->spt[i] == SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE)
> > continue;
> >
> > pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i * sizeof(pt_element_t);
>
> I think this patch can be merged to previous one? Looks there's no good reason
> to keep it as standalone.

Yes, will squash it.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 18:26:17

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 021/108] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 01:34:46PM +0800,
"Wang, Lei" <[email protected]> wrote:

> > @@ -431,50 +633,65 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> > return ret;
> > }
> >
> > -int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
> > +static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
> > {
> > - struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
> > - struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
> > - struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
> > + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> > + struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm = NULL;
> > + struct td_params *td_params = NULL;
> > + void *entries_end;
> > + int ret;
> >
> > - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
> > - sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*init_vm) != 16 * 1024);
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(*init_vm) - offsetof(typeof(*init_vm), entries)) /
> > + sizeof(init_vm->entries[0]) < KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES);
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct td_params) != 1024);
> >
> > - if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
> > - return -EFAULT;
> > - if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
> > + if (is_td_initialized(kvm))
> > return -EINVAL;
> > - /*
> > - * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
> > - * mem_enc_ioctl().
> > - */
> > - if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
> > +
> > + if (cmd->flags)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > - user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
> > - if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
> > - return -EFAULT;
> > + init_vm = kzalloc(sizeof(*init_vm), GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (copy_from_user(init_vm, (void __user *)cmd->data, sizeof(*init_vm))) {
>
> Pointer 'init_vm' returned from call to function 'kzalloc' may be NULL and will
> be dereferenced at this line.
>
> Maybe a NULL-check here is needed?

Yes, thank you for catching it.

Thanks,
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 18:40:27

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 041/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 09:42:34AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > Factor out non-leaf SPTE population logic from kvm_tdp_mmu_map(). MapGPA
> > hypercall needs to populate non-leaf SPTE to record which GPA, private or
> > shared, is allowed in the leaf EPT entry.
>
> Is this patch still valid/needed since you have changed to use XArray to store
> whether GFN is private or shared?

Because tdp_mmu_populate_nonleaf() won't be touched any more, this patch doesn't
have any benefit. Will drop it.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 19:31:44

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 034/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to shadow_mmio_{value, mask}

On Wed, Nov 09, 2022 at 11:48:30AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > Because TDX will need shadow_mmio_mask to be VMX_SUPPRESS_VE | RWX
> > shadow_mmio_value to be 0, make VMX EPT case use same value for TDX
> > shadow_mmio_mask.  
> >
>
> TDX need to use different mmio_mask/value doesn't mean they need to be changed
> for VMX guest. I think the true purpose here is to still be able to use a
> global shadow_mmio_mask for both TDX and VMX guests. So please explicitly call
> out.

That's right. With this change, per-VM shadow_mmio_{value, mask} can be avoided.
The common value can be used for both VMX and TDX.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 19:39:09

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 045/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 11:53:47AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Wed, 2022-11-16 at 10:32 +0000, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > +
> > > +static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > +      struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache
> > > *private_spt_cache,
> > > +      struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> >
> > This function is very weird in the context of this patch.  _Only_ a new vcpu-
> > scope 'mmu_private_spte_cache' is added in this patch, but here you allow
> > caller
> > to pass an additional argument of private_spt_cache.  So there must be another
> > cache which is not introduced in this patch?
> >
> > > +{
> > > + /*
> > > + * vcpu == NULL means non-root SPT:
> > > + * vcpu == NULL is used to split a large SPT into smaller SPT. 
> > > Root SPT
> > > + * is not a large SPT.
> >
> > I am guessing this "vcpu == NULL" case is for "Eager Splitting"?
> >
> > If so, why not adding a global MMU cache for private_spt allocation, and make
> > vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache point to the global cache?  In this case, in
> > the context where you only have 'kvm', you can use the global cache directly.
> > And in the context where you have a 'vcpu', you just use vcpu's cache.
>
> So I went through all MMU related patches in this series, but I cannot find a
> place where this function is called with 'vcpu == NULL' and a valid cache is
> passed in, if I am reading correctly.
>
> Also checked that "Eager Splitting" uses a kvm-scope cache for legacy MMU, but
> just uses __get_free_page() for TDP MMU. And in later patch "KVM: x86/tdp_mmu:
> Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU", __get_free_page() is also used to
> allocate the private_spt (which is consistent with existing eager splitting
> code).
>
> So IIUC only legacy MMU code will call this function with 'vcpu == NULL' and a
> valid cache. In this case, please remove the 'private_spt_cache' argument for
> now, and make the function always allocate from the vcpu-
> >arch.mmu_private_spt_cache.  
>
> You can add the additional argument when TDX gets legacy MMU support.
>
> Also, I think you need to move eager splitting support part (whether that
> handling is correct is another story) from the later patch to this patch.
> Otherwise this patch is not complete.

Yes, you're right. Somehow legacy mmu part is crept in. I'll remove those from
this patch series.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 19:42:13

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 049/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 09:40:38AM +0800,
Chenyi Qiang <[email protected]> wrote:

> > +static int __must_check handle_changed_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
> > + u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte,
> > + int level)
> > +{
> > + bool was_present = is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte);
> > + bool is_present = is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte);
> > + bool was_leaf = was_present && is_last_spte(old_spte, level);
> > + bool is_leaf = is_present && is_last_spte(new_spte, level);
> > + kvm_pfn_t old_pfn = spte_to_pfn(old_spte);
> > + kvm_pfn_t new_pfn = spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
> > + int ret;
>
> int ret = 0;
>
> > +
> > + lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> > + if (is_present) {
> > + /* TDP MMU doesn't change present -> present */
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(was_present, kvm);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Use different call to either set up middle level
> > + * private page table, or leaf.
> > + */
> > + if (is_leaf)
> > + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_set_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, new_pfn);
> > + else {
> > + void *private_spt = get_private_spt(gfn, new_spte, level);
> > +
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(!private_spt, kvm);
> > + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_link_private_spt)(kvm, gfn, level, private_spt);
> > + }
> > + } else if (was_leaf) {
> > + /* non-present -> non-present doesn't make sense. */
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(!was_present, kvm);
> > + /*
> > + * Zap private leaf SPTE. Zapping private table is done
> > + * below in handle_removed_tdp_mmu_page().
> > + */
> > + lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> > + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_zap_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level);
> > + if (!ret) {
> > + ret = static_call(kvm_x86_remove_private_spte)(kvm, gfn, level, old_pfn);
> > + WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
> > + }
> > + }
>
> Otherwise, "ret" may be returned without initialization. Then it will
> trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE(ret) after handle_changed_spte() in patch 48.

Thanks for catching it. Compiler didn't complain it. Maybe W=1 is needed.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 19:50:40

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 049/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 11:58:46AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> >
> > +static inline int kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gfp_t gfp)
> > +{
> > + gfp &= ~__GFP_ZERO;
> > + sp->private_spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
> > + if (!sp->private_spt)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> >
> [...]
>
> > @@ -1238,6 +1408,12 @@ int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> > is_large_pte(iter.old_spte)) {
> > if (tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(vcpu->kvm, &iter))
> > break;
> > + /*
> > + * TODO: large page support.
> > + * Doesn't support large page for TDX now
> > + */
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(is_private_sptep(iter.sptep), vcpu->kvm);
> > +
> >
>
> So large page is not supported for private page, ...
>
> > /*
> > * The iter must explicitly re-read the spte here
> > @@ -1480,6 +1656,12 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp, union kvm_mm
> >
> > sp->role = role;
> > sp->spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
> > + if (kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(role)) {
> > + if (kvm_alloc_private_spt_for_split(sp, gfp)) {
> > + free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
> > + sp->spt = NULL;
> > + }
> > + }
>
> ... then I don't think eager splitting could happen for private mapping?
>
> If so, should we just KVM_BUG_ON() if role is private?

Right, will remove this part from this patch series and move it to large page
support series.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 21:10:26

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 071/108] KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr

On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 03:36:27PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > index 65541bfebb37..4d4b71c4cdb1 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > @@ -440,6 +440,15 @@ void kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu(void)
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_user_return_msr_init_cpu);
> > +static void kvm_user_return_register_notifier(struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs)
> > +{
> > + if (!msrs->registered) {
> > + msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
> > + user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
> > + msrs->registered = true;
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
> > {
> > struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
> > @@ -455,15 +464,22 @@ int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
> > return 1;
> > msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
> > - if (!msrs->registered) {
> > - msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
> > - user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
> > - msrs->registered = true;
> > - }
> > + kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
> > return 0;
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_user_return_msr);
> > +/* Update the cache, "curr", and register the notifier */
> > +void kvm_user_return_update_cache(unsigned int slot, u64 value)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
> > +
> > + WARN_ON_ONCE(!msrs->initialized);
> > + msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
>
> If the value is the same as the cached one, can it just skip notifier
> registration?

We know tha the the user of the function (in the next patch) passes the
different value, the initial reset value in the return of TDH.VP.ENTER. So
such check isn't added.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 21:15:41

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 049/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU

On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 09:41:44PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> > index f28c9fd72ac4..1b01dc2098b0 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> > @@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_tss_addr)
> > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(set_identity_map_addr)
> > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(get_mt_mask)
> > KVM_X86_OP(load_mmu_pgd)
> > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(link_private_spt)
> > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(free_private_spt)
> > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(set_private_spte)
> > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(remove_private_spte)
> > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(zap_private_spte)
> > KVM_X86_OP(has_wbinvd_exit)
> > KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_offset)
> > KVM_X86_OP(get_l2_tsc_multiplier)
> >
> > @@ -509,9 +524,81 @@ static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
> > WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
> > }
> > + if (is_private_sp(sp) &&
> > + WARN_ON(static_call(kvm_x86_free_private_spt)(kvm, sp->gfn, sp->role.level,
> > + kvm_mmu_private_spt(sp)))) {
> > + /*
> > + * Failed to unlink Secure EPT page and there is nothing to do
> > + * further. Intentionally leak the page to prevent the kernel
> > + * from accessing the encrypted page.
> > + */
> > + kvm_mmu_init_private_spt(sp, NULL);
>
> Do you think is it better to add some statistics for the intentinal leakage?

No because this error case happens only when race condition bug(TDX_OPERAND_BUSY)
or TDX module was shutdown due to bug or attack. They are (should be) rare.

The race condition bug should be fixed. It's covered by WARN_ON(). In the case
of TDX module shutdown, the current TDX KVM implementation checks unexpected
error and mark it bugged, KVM_BUG_ON(), in vmx/tdx.c. So adding statistic
counter doesn't help. It's another story to harden the code against TDX module
shutdown.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 21:17:23

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 076/108] KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor

On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 10:28:20AM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > For vcpu migration, in the case of VMX, VCMS
>
> typo, VMCS
>
>
> > is flushed on the source pcpu,
> > and load it on the target pcpu. There are corresponding TDX SEAMCALL APIs,
> > call them on vcpu migration. The logic is mostly same as VMX except the
> > TDX SEAMCALLs are used.
> >
> > When shutting down the machine, (VMX or TDX) vcpus needs to be shutdown on
> > each pcpu. Do the similar for TDX with TDX SEAMCALL APIs.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 43 +++++++++++--
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 2 +
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 ++
> > 4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> >
> > @@ -176,6 +214,41 @@ static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> > }
> > }
> > +static void tdx_flush_vp(void *arg)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = arg;
> > + u64 err;
> > +
> > + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> > +
> > + /* Task migration can race with CPU offlining. */
> > + if (vcpu->cpu != raw_smp_processor_id())
> > + return;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * No need to do TDH_VP_FLUSH if the vCPU hasn't been initialized. The
> > + * list tracking still needs to be updated so that it's correct if/when
> > + * the vCPU does get initialized.
> > + */
> > + if (is_td_vcpu_created(to_tdx(vcpu))) {
> > + err = tdh_vp_flush(to_tdx(vcpu)->tdvpr.pa);
>
> Need to retry here if tdh.vp.flush fails due to tdx operand busy?
>
> If such failure occurs, the next vp enter will fail after the vCPU migrated
> to another LP, how is it hanlded?


No need to retry. TDX Resources needed for TDH.VP.FLUSH are, TDVPR as exclusive,
TDR as shared, and TDCS as shared.

This vp flush function is called when destructing vcpu/TD or vcpu migration. No
other thread uses TDVPR in those cases.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-17 21:40:04

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 072/108] KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs

On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 03:49:32PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > Several user ret MSRs are clobbered on TD exit. Restore those values on
> > TD exit and before returning to ring 3.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > index 3ec465cbaeef..f35ccf2b502d 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > @@ -456,6 +456,28 @@ void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> > vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged = true;
> > }
> > +struct tdx_uret_msr {
> > + u32 msr;
> > + unsigned int slot;
> > + u64 defval;
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct tdx_uret_msr tdx_uret_msrs[] = {
> > + {.msr = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,},
> > + {.msr = MSR_STAR,},
> > + {.msr = MSR_LSTAR,},
> > + {.msr = MSR_TSC_AUX,},
> > +};
> > +
> > +static void tdx_user_return_update_cache(void)
> > +{
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++)
> > + kvm_user_return_update_cache(tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot,
> > + tdx_uret_msrs[i].defval);
> > +}
> > +
> > static void tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > {
> > struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
> > @@ -495,6 +517,7 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, tdx);
> > + tdx_user_return_update_cache();
> > tdx_restore_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
> > tdx->host_state_need_restore = true;
> > @@ -1558,6 +1581,26 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> > return -ENODEV;
> > }
> > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++) {
> > + /*
> > + * Here it checks if MSRs (tdx_uret_msrs) can be saved/restored
> > + * before returning to user space.
> > + *
> > + * this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs)->registered isn't checked
> > + * because the registration is done at vcpu runtime by
> > + * kvm_set_user_return_msr().
> > + * Here is setting up cpu feature before running vcpu,
> > + * registered is alreays
>
> typo, already or always?

already. Thanks.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-18 00:00:59

by Sagi Shahar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On Thu, Nov 17, 2022 at 9:48 AM Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 04:06:10PM -0800,
> Sagi Shahar <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > > +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> > > +{
> > > + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> > > + cpumask_var_t packages;
> > > + int ret, i;
> > > + u64 err;
> > > +
> > > + ret = tdx_keyid_alloc();
> >
> > Can we skip the hkid allocation at such an early stage?
> > This makes intra-host migration more complicated as the hkid of the
> > destination VM is already allocated before we have a chance to migrate
> > the state from the source VM.
> >
> > I remember you had an internal version that already did that in
> > https://github.com/intel/tdx/blob/552dd80c48f67ca01bcdd10667e0c11efd375177/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c#L508
>
> With the patch of "KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters",
> the allocation code is split out into its own code with KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
> I think that's what you want.

Right, I missed that. Thanks.

> --
> Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-11-22 00:17:52

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 056/108] KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> TDX doesn't need APIC page depending on vapic and its callback is
> WARN_ON_ONCE(is_tdx). To avoid unnecessary overhead and WARN_ON_ONCE(),
> skip requesting KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD when TD.
>
> WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:696 vt_set_apic_access_page_addr+0x3c/0x50 [kvm_intel]
> RIP: 0010:vt_set_apic_access_page_addr+0x3c/0x50 [kvm_intel]
> Call Trace:
> vcpu_enter_guest+0x145d/0x24d0 [kvm]
> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x25d/0xcc0 [kvm]
> kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x414/0xa30 [kvm]
> __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc0/0x100
> do_syscall_64+0x39/0xc0
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 +++-
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 3868605462ed..5dadd0f9a10e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -10487,7 +10487,9 @@ void kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range(struct kvm *kvm,
> * Update it when it becomes invalid.
> */
> apic_address = gfn_to_hva(kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> - if (start <= apic_address && apic_address < end)
> + /* TDX doesn't need APIC page. */
> + if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_TDX_VM &&
> + start <= apic_address && apic_address < end)
> kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD);
> }
>

In patch "[PATCH v10 105/108] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU
state", you have:

+static void vt_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu);
+}

If you drop the WARN_ON_ONCE() above, you can just drop this patch.

For this particular case, I don't find it is quite necessary to change the
common x86 code as done in this patch. In fact, SVM doesn't have a
set_apic_access_page_addr() callback which is consistent with just return if VM
is TD in vt_set_apic_access_page_addr().

Also, I don't particularly like the idea of having a lot of "is_td(kvm)" in the
common x86 code as if similar technology happens in the future, you will need to
have another "is_td_similar_vm(kvm)" thing.

If modifying common x86 code is necessary, then it would make more sense to
introduce some common flag, and make TD guest set that flag.

Btw, this patch just comes out of blue from the middle of a bunch of MMU
patches. Shouldn't it be moved to "patches which handles interrupt related
staff"?

Btw2, by saying above, does it make sense to split patch "[PATCH v10 105/108]
KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state" based on category such as
MMU/interrupt, etc? Particularly, in that patch, some callbacks have WARN() or
KVM_BUG_ON() against TD guest, but some don't. The logic behind those decisions
highly depend on previous patches. To me, it makes more sense to just move
logic related things together.

2022-11-22 01:53:42

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 105/108] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:23 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> TDX protects TDX guest state from VMM. Implements to access methods for
> TDX guest state to ignore them or return zero.

IMHO this patch isn't reviewable -- too many things mixed together. And the
logic of whether to use WARN()/KVM_BUG_ON() against TD is hard to tell as they
depends on common x86 code logic. The relative parts (i.e. interrupt related
parts) should be put together as separate patches to make the whole thing
reviewable.

Hi Sean, do you have any comments?

2022-11-22 03:08:24

by Yan Zhao

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:22:36PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> TDX will use a different shadow PTE entry value for MMIO from VMX. Add
> members to kvm_arch and track value for MMIO per-VM instead of global
> variables. By using the per-VM EPT entry value for MMIO, the existing VMX
> logic is kept working. To untangle the logic to initialize
> shadow_mmio_access_mask, introduce a separate setter function.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 7 ++++---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 11 +++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +++---
> 6 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 3374ec0d6d90..a1c801ca61d3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1171,6 +1171,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {
> */
> spinlock_t mmu_unsync_pages_lock;
>
> + u64 shadow_mmio_value;
> +
> struct list_head assigned_dev_head;
> struct iommu_domain *iommu_domain;
> bool iommu_noncoherent;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> index a45f7a96b821..50d240d52697 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static inline u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)
> }
>
> void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask);
> +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value);
> void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask);
> void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only);
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index e7e11f51f8b4..0d3fa29ccccc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -2421,7 +2421,7 @@ static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
> return kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, child,
> invalid_list);
> }
> - } else if (is_mmio_spte(pte)) {
> + } else if (is_mmio_spte(kvm, pte)) {
> mmu_spte_clear_no_track(spte);
> }
> return 0;
> @@ -4081,7 +4081,7 @@ static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)
> if (WARN_ON(reserved))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - if (is_mmio_spte(spte)) {
> + if (is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, spte)) {
> gfn_t gfn = get_mmio_spte_gfn(spte);
> unsigned int access = get_mmio_spte_access(spte);
>
> @@ -4578,7 +4578,7 @@ static unsigned long get_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> static bool sync_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn,
> unsigned int access)
> {
> - if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(*sptep))) {
> + if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, *sptep))) {
> if (gfn != get_mmio_spte_gfn(*sptep)) {
> mmu_spte_clear_no_track(sptep);
> return true;
> @@ -6061,6 +6061,7 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node = &kvm->arch.mmu_sp_tracker;
> int r;
>
> + kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = shadow_mmio_value;
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages);
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> index 5d5c06d4fd89..8f468ee2b985 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> @@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
> u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
> u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> - WARN_ON_ONCE(!shadow_mmio_value);
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value);
>
> access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
> - spte |= shadow_mmio_value | access;
> + spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access;
> spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
> spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask)
> << SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;
> @@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte)
> void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
> {
> BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask);
> +
> WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);
>
> /*
> @@ -401,6 +402,12 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);
>
> +void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value)
> +{
> + kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
> +}
Also make enable_mmio_caching to be a per-VM value?
As if the shadow_mmio_value is 0, mmio_caching needs to be disabled.

> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value);
> +
> void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask)
> {
> /* shadow_me_value must be a subset of shadow_me_mask */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> index 7e0f79e8f45b..82f0d5c08b77 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
> @@ -241,9 +241,9 @@ static inline int spte_index(u64 *sptep)
> */
> extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
>
> -static inline bool is_mmio_spte(u64 spte)
> +static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
> {
> - return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == shadow_mmio_value &&
> + return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
> likely(enable_mmio_caching);
As above, also turn enable_mmio_caching to be per-vm ?

> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> index 1eee9c159958..e07f14351d14 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> @@ -580,8 +580,8 @@ static void __handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
> * impact the guest since both the former and current SPTEs
> * are nonpresent.
> */
> - if (WARN_ON(!is_mmio_spte(old_spte) &&
> - !is_mmio_spte(new_spte) &&
> + if (WARN_ON(!is_mmio_spte(kvm, old_spte) &&
> + !is_mmio_spte(kvm, new_spte) &&
> !is_removed_spte(new_spte)))
> pr_err("Unexpected SPTE change! Nonpresent SPTEs\n"
> "should not be replaced with another,\n"
> @@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> }
>
> /* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */
> - if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(new_spte))) {
> + if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(vcpu->kvm, new_spte))) {
> vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;
> trace_mark_mmio_spte(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep), iter->gfn,
> new_spte);
> --
> 2.25.1
>

2022-11-22 20:26:25

by Ackerley Tng

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 047/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 047/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private
pages for unsupported cases

> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> TDX supports only write-back(WB) memory type for private memory
> architecturally so that (virtualized) memory type change doesn't make sense
> for private memory. Also currently, page migration isn't supported for TDX
> yet. (TDX architecturally supports page migration. it's KVM and kernel
> implementation issue.)
>
> Regarding memory type change (mtrr virtualization and lapic page mapping
> change), pages are zapped by kvm_zap_gfn_range(). On the next KVM page
> fault, the SPTE entry with a new memory type for the page is populated.
> Regarding page migration, pages are zapped by the mmu notifier. On the next
> KVM page fault, the new migrated page is populated. Don't zap private
> pages on unmapping for those two cases.
>
> When deleting/moving a KVM memory slot, zap private pages. Typically
> tearing down VM. Don't invalidate private page tables. i.e. zap only leaf
> SPTEs for KVM mmu that has a shared bit mask. The existing
> kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots() depends on role.invalid with read-lock
> of mmu_lock so that other vcpu can operate on KVM mmu concurrently. It
> marks the root page table invalid and zaps SPTEs of the root page
> tables. The TDX module doesn't allow to unlink a protected root page table
> from the hardware and then allocate a new one for it. i.e. replacing a
> protected root page table. Instead, zap only leaf SPTEs for KVM mmu with a
> shared bit mask set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 24 ++++++++---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 5 ++-
> 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index faf69774c7ce..0237e143299c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -1577,8 +1577,38 @@ bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
> if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
> flush = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_zap_rmap);
>
> - if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm))
> - flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush);
> + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> + bool zap_private;

We should initialize zap_private to true, otherwise zap_private is
uninitialized in call

kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush, zap_private)

if the condition

if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot)) {

evaluates to false.

> +
> + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot)) {
> + if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_RESTRICTED_MEM)
> + /*
> + * For private slot, the callback is triggered
> + * via falloc. Mode can be allocation or punch
> + * hole. Because the private-shared conversion
> + * is done via
> + * KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG/UNREG_REGION, we can
> + * ignore the request from restrictedmem.
> + */
> + return flush;
> + else if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_SET_MEM_ATTR) {
> + if (range->attr == KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED)
> + zap_private = true;
> + else {
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(range->attr != KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE);
> + zap_private = false;
> + }
> + } else
> + /*
> + * kvm_unmap_gfn_range() is called via mmu
> + * notifier. For now page migration for private
> + * page isn't supported yet, don't zap private
> + * pages.
> + */
> + zap_private = false;
> + }
> + flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush, zap_private);
> + }
>
> return flush;
> }

2022-11-22 22:02:48

by Ackerley Tng

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 047/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

> TDX supports only write-back(WB) memory type for private memory
> architecturally so that (virtualized) memory type change doesn't make
> sense
> for private memory. Also currently, page migration isn't supported for
> TDX
> yet. (TDX architecturally supports page migration. it's KVM and kernel
> implementation issue.)

> Regarding memory type change (mtrr virtualization and lapic page mapping
> change), pages are zapped by kvm_zap_gfn_range(). On the next KVM page
> fault, the SPTE entry with a new memory type for the page is populated.
> Regarding page migration, pages are zapped by the mmu notifier. On the
> next
> KVM page fault, the new migrated page is populated. Don't zap private
> pages on unmapping for those two cases.

> When deleting/moving a KVM memory slot, zap private pages. Typically
> tearing down VM. Don't invalidate private page tables. i.e. zap only leaf
> SPTEs for KVM mmu that has a shared bit mask. The existing
> kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots() depends on role.invalid with read-lock
> of mmu_lock so that other vcpu can operate on KVM mmu concurrently. It
> marks the root page table invalid and zaps SPTEs of the root page
> tables. The TDX module doesn't allow to unlink a protected root page table
> from the hardware and then allocate a new one for it. i.e. replacing a
> protected root page table. Instead, zap only leaf SPTEs for KVM mmu with
> a
> shared bit mask set.

> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 24 ++++++++---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 5 ++-
> 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index faf69774c7ce..0237e143299c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -1577,8 +1577,38 @@ bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct
> kvm_gfn_range *range)
> if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
> flush = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_zap_rmap);

> - if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm))
> - flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush);
> + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> + bool zap_private;

We should initialize zap_private to true, otherwise zap_private is
uninitialized in call

kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush, zap_private)

if the condition

if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot)) {

evaluates to false.

> +
> + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot)) {
> + if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_RESTRICTED_MEM)
> + /*
> + * For private slot, the callback is triggered
> + * via falloc. Mode can be allocation or punch
> + * hole. Because the private-shared conversion
> + * is done via
> + * KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG/UNREG_REGION, we can
> + * ignore the request from restrictedmem.
> + */
> + return flush;
> + else if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_SET_MEM_ATTR) {
> + if (range->attr == KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED)
> + zap_private = true;
> + else {
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(range->attr != KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE);
> + zap_private = false;
> + }
> + } else
> + /*
> + * kvm_unmap_gfn_range() is called via mmu
> + * notifier. For now page migration for private
> + * page isn't supported yet, don't zap private
> + * pages.
> + */
> + zap_private = false;
> + }
> + flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush, zap_private);
> + }

> return flush;
> }

2022-11-23 10:55:51

by Zhi Wang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 011/108] KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module

On Sat, 29 Oct 2022 23:22:12 -0700
[email protected] wrote:

> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> A VMM interacts with the TDX module using a new instruction
> (SEAMCALL). A TDX VMM uses SEAMCALLs where a VMX VMM would have
> directly interacted with VMX instructions. For instance, a TDX VMM
> does not have full access to the VM control structure corresponding
> to VMX VMCS. Instead, a VMM induces the TDX module to act on behalf
> via SEAMCALLs.
>
> Export __seamcall and define C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs for
> readability. Some SEAMCALL APIs donates pages to TDX module or guest
> TD. The pages are encrypted with TDX private host key id set in high

It seems a little bit confusing here.

I guess you are talking about the host pages donated to TDX module will
be encrypted with TDX module global key id, which is used to
encrypted the pages only used by TDX module. For pages donated to the
TD guest, the pages are encrypted with TD guest prviate key id?

It might be better that you can talk about the actual reaason instead of
the key id stuff. For example Some SEMCALL APIs will zap or write the
pages donated by VMM via MOVDIR64B, which requires the VMM to flush the
cachelines.

> bits of physical address. If any modified cache lines may exit for

typo exit->exist

> these pages, flush them to memory by clflush_cache_range().
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 185
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S |
> 2 + 3 files changed, 189 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> index 5cff7ed5b11e..ba2e4c69fb9f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> @@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ struct tdsysinfo_struct {
> const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
> bool platform_tdx_enabled(void);
> int tdx_enable(void);
> +u64 __seamcall(u64 op, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out);
> #else /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
> struct tdsysinfo_struct;
> static inline const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void) {
> return NULL; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
> b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..85adbf49c277
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/* constants/data definitions for TDX SEAMCALLs */
> +
> +#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_OPS_H
> +#define __KVM_X86_TDX_OPS_H
> +
> +#include <linux/compiler.h>
> +
> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> +#include <asm/asm.h>
> +#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
> +
> +#include "tdx_errno.h"
> +#include "tdx_arch.h"
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mng_addcx(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t addr)
> +{
> + clflush_cache_range(__va(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, addr, tdr, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_add(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa,
> hpa_t source,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, gpa, tdr, hpa, source,
> out); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int level,
> hpa_t page,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + clflush_cache_range(__va(page), PAGE_SIZE);
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, gpa | level, tdr, page,
> 0, out); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_sept_remove(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int
> level,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_SEPT_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0,
> 0, out); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_vp_addcx(hpa_t tdvpr, hpa_t addr)
> +{
> + clflush_cache_range(__va(addr), PAGE_SIZE);
> + return __seamcall(TDH_VP_ADDCX, addr, tdvpr, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_relocate(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t
> hpa,
> + struct tdx_module_output
> *out) +{
> + clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_RELOCATE, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0,
> out); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + clflush_cache_range(__va(hpa), PAGE_SIZE);
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, gpa, tdr, hpa, 0, out);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_range_block(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int
> level,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, gpa | level, tdr, 0,
> 0, out); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mng_key_config(hpa_t tdr)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mng_create(hpa_t tdr, int hkid)
> +{
> + clflush_cache_range(__va(tdr), PAGE_SIZE);
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_CREATE, tdr, hkid, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_vp_create(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t tdvpr)
> +{
> + clflush_cache_range(__va(tdvpr), PAGE_SIZE);
> + return __seamcall(TDH_VP_CREATE, tdvpr, tdr, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mng_rd(hpa_t tdr, u64 field, struct
> tdx_module_output *out) +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_RD, tdr, field, 0, 0, out);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mr_extend(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MR_EXTEND, gpa, tdr, 0, 0, out);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mr_finalize(hpa_t tdr)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_vp_flush(hpa_t tdvpr)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_VP_FLUSH, tdvpr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mng_vpflushdone(hpa_t tdr)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mng_key_freeid(hpa_t tdr)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mng_init(hpa_t tdr, hpa_t td_params,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_INIT, tdr, td_params, 0, 0, out);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_vp_init(hpa_t tdvpr, u64 rcx)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_VP_INIT, tdvpr, rcx, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_vp_rd(hpa_t tdvpr, u64 field,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_VP_RD, tdvpr, field, 0, 0, out);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mng_key_reclaimid(hpa_t tdr)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_RECLAIMID, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(hpa_t page,
> + struct tdx_module_output
> *out) +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, page, 0, 0, 0,
> out); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int
> level,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, gpa | level, tdr, 0,
> 0, out); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_sys_lp_shutdown(void)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_SYS_LP_SHUTDOWN, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_track(hpa_t tdr)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_TRACK, tdr, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_mem_range_unblock(hpa_t tdr, gpa_t gpa, int
> level,
> + struct tdx_module_output
> *out) +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_MEM_RANGE_UNBLOCK, gpa | level, tdr,
> 0, 0, out); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, resume ? 1 : 0, 0, 0,
> 0, NULL); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(hpa_t page)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, page, 0, 0, 0,
> NULL); +}
> +
> +static inline u64 tdh_vp_wr(hpa_t tdvpr, u64 field, u64 val, u64
> mask,
> + struct tdx_module_output *out)
> +{
> + return __seamcall(TDH_VP_WR, tdvpr, field, val, mask, out);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
> +
> +#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_OPS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
> b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S index f81be6b9c133..b90a7fe05494
> 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S
> @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
> /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> #include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <asm/export.h>
> #include <asm/frame.h>
>
> #include "tdxcall.S"
> @@ -50,3 +51,4 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall)
> FRAME_END
> RET
> SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall)
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__seamcall)

2022-11-23 11:10:08

by Zhi Wang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On Sat, 29 Oct 2022 23:22:17 -0700
[email protected] wrote:

> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct.
> Assign TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory
> encryption and allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On
> destruction, free allocated pages, and HKID.
>
> Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources
> of the guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed,
> etc). Add flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down
> private page tables for it.
>
> Add a second kvm_x86_ops hook in kvm_arch_destroy_vm() to support
> TDX's destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a
> teardown state, then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM
> resources.
>
> Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 411
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h |
> 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 11 +
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +
> 7 files changed, 467 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h index 8a5c5ae70bc5..3a29a6b31ee8
> 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
> KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
> KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
> KVM_X86_OP(vm_init)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
> KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create)
> KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 2a41a93a80f3..2870155ce6fb
> 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1472,7 +1472,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);
> unsigned int vm_size;
> int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
> + void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);
> void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
> + void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);
>
> /* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */
> int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index 0900ff2f2390..d01a946a18cf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -29,18 +29,44 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static void vt_hardware_unsetup(void)
> +{
> + tdx_hardware_unsetup();
> + vmx_hardware_unsetup();
> +}
> +
> static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> if (is_td(kvm))
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Not ready to create
> guest TD yet. */
> + return tdx_vm_init(kvm);
>
> return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
> }
>
> +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return;
> +
> + vmx_vm_destroy(kvm);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> +}
> +
> struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .name = "kvm_intel",
>
> - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
> + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup,
> .check_processor_compatibility =
> vmx_check_processor_compatibility,
> .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
> @@ -50,7 +76,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
> .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
> .vm_init = vt_vm_init,
> - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
> + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private,
> + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
> + .vm_free = vt_vm_free,
>
> .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
> .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 530e72f85762..ec88dde0d300 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,401 @@ struct tdx_capabilities {
> /* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */
> static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;
>
> +/*
> + * Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB,
> + * TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a
> global lock
> + * internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is
> returned without
> + * spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's
> caller's
> + * responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use
> this mutex
> + * to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about
> scheduling.
> + */
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock);
> +static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock;
> +
> +static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
> +{
> + return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> +{
> + return kvm_tdx->tdr.added;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> +{
> + tdx_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid);
> + kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> +{
> + return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page)
> +{
> + const void *zero_page = (const void *)
> __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
> + unsigned long i;
> +
> + /*
> + * Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with
> MKTME-i:
> + * when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid,
> MOVDIR64B is
> + * required to clear/write the page with new keyid to
> prevent integrity
> + * error when read on the page with new keyid.
> + *
> + * The cache line could be poisoned (even without MKTME-i),
> clear the
> + * poison bit.
> + */
> + for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += 64)
> + movdir64b((void *)(page + i), zero_page);

In patch 11, the clflush is used on the movdir64b target. Should we
also use the clflush here?

I suppose the clflush is to prevent the unexpected cacheline writeback
after the movdir64b.

> + /*
> + * MOVDIR64B store uses WC buffer. Prevent following memory
> reads
> + * from seeing potentially poisoned cache.
> + */
> + __mb();
> +}
> +
> +static int tdx_reclaim_page(unsigned long va, hpa_t pa, bool do_wb,
> u16 hkid) +{
> + struct tdx_module_output out;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + do {
> + err = tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(pa, &out);
> + /*
> + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM is allowed only when TD
> is shutdown.
> + * state. i.e. destructing TD.
> + * TDH.PHYMEM.PAGE.RECLAIM requires TDR and target
> page.
> + * Because we're destructing TD, it's rare to
> contend with TDR.
> + */
> + } while (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX));
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, err, &out);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + if (do_wb) {
> + /*
> + * Only TDR page gets into this path. No contention
> is expected
> + * because the last page of TD.

because of

> + */
> + err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd(set_hkid_to_hpa(pa,
> hkid));
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, err,
> NULL);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + tdx_clear_page(va);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int tdx_alloc_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> +{
> + page->va = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!page->va)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + page->pa = __pa(page->va);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void tdx_mark_td_page_added(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> +{
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(page->added);
> + page->added = true;
> +}
> +
> +static void tdx_reclaim_td_page(struct tdx_td_page *page)
> +{
> + if (page->added) {
> + /*
> + * TDCX are being reclaimed. TDX module maps TDCX
> with HKID
> + * assigned to the TD. Here the cache associated to
> the TD
> + * was already flushed by TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB before
> here, So
> + * cache doesn't need to be flushed again.
> + */
> + if (tdx_reclaim_page(page->va, page->pa, false, 0))
> + return;
> +
> + page->added = false;
> + }
> + if (page->va) {
> + free_page(page->va);
> + page->va = 0;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static int tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb(void *param)
> +{
> + u64 err = 0;
> +
> + do {
> + err = tdh_phymem_cache_wb(!!err);
> + } while (err == TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE);
> +
> + /* Other thread may have done for us. */
> + if (err == TDX_NO_HKID_READY_TO_WBCACHE)
> + err = TDX_SUCCESS;
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, err, NULL);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + cpumask_var_t packages;
> + bool cpumask_allocated;
> + u64 err;
> + int ret;
> + int i;
> +
> + if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
> + return;
> +
> + if (!is_td_created(kvm_tdx))
> + goto free_hkid;
> +
> + cpumask_allocated = zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages,
> GFP_KERNEL);
> + cpus_read_lock();
> + for_each_online_cpu(i) {
> + if (cpumask_allocated &&
> +
> cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i),
> + packages))
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * We can destroy multiple the guest TDs
> simultaneously.
> + * Prevent tdh_phymem_cache_wb from returning
> TDX_BUSY by
> + * serialization.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
> + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_phymem_cache_wb,
> NULL, 1);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
> + if (ret)
> + break;
> + }
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> +
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
> + err = tdh_mng_key_freeid(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, err, NULL);
> + pr_err("tdh_mng_key_freeid failed. HKID %d is
> leaked.\n",
> + kvm_tdx->hkid);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> +free_hkid:
> + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
> +}
> +
> +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + int i;
> +
> + /* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */
> + if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
> + return;
> +
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdcs) {
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++)
> + tdx_reclaim_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may
> access TDR
> + * while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS).
> Cache flush with
> + * TDX global HKID is needed.
> + */
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdr.added &&
> + tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va, kvm_tdx->tdr.pa,
> true,
> + tdx_global_keyid))
> + return;
> +
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
> +}
> +
> +static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)
> +{
> + hpa_t *tdr_p = param;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + do {
> + err = tdh_mng_key_config(*tdr_p);
> +
> + /*
> + * If it failed to generate a random key, retry it
> because this
> + * is typically caused by an entropy error of the
> CPU's random
> + * number generator.
> + */
> + } while (err == TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED);
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, err, NULL);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + cpumask_var_t packages;
> + int ret, i;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + ret = tdx_keyid_alloc();
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + kvm_tdx->hkid = ret;
> +
> + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdr);
> + if (ret)
> + goto free_hkid;
> +
> + kvm_tdx->tdcs = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages,
> sizeof(*kvm_tdx->tdcs),
> + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs)
> + goto free_tdr;
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + if (ret)
> + goto free_tdcs;
> + }
> +
> + if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL)) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_tdcs;
> + }
> + cpus_read_lock();
> + /*
> + * Need at least one CPU of the package to be online in
> order to
> + * program all packages for host key id. Check it.
> + */
> + for_each_present_cpu(i)
> + cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i),
> packages);
> + for_each_online_cpu(i)
> + cpumask_clear_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i),
> packages);
> + if (!cpumask_empty(packages)) {
> + ret = -EIO;
> + /*
> + * Because it's hard for human operator to figure
> out the
> + * reason, warn it.
> + */
> + pr_warn("All packages need to have online CPU to
> create TD. Online CPU and retry.\n");
> + goto free_packages;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY:
> + * TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key
> Owner
> + * Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It
> doesn't spin
> + * to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead,
> and let the
> + * caller to handle the contention. This is because of time
> limitation
> + * usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better
> about process
> + * scheduling.
> + *
> + * APIs to acquire the lock of KOT:
> + * TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE,
> and
> + * TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
> + err = tdh_mng_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->hkid);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_CREATE, err, NULL);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto free_packages;
> + }
> + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdr);
> +
> + for_each_online_cpu(i) {
> + int pkg = topology_physical_package_id(i);
> +
> + if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(pkg, packages))
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * Program the memory controller in the package with
> an
> + * encryption key associated to a TDX private host
> key id
> + * assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on
> same memory
> + * controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid
> this race by
> + * mutex.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]);
> + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config,
> + &kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]);
> + if (ret)
> + break;
> + }
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> + if (ret)
> + goto teardown;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + err = tdh_mng_addcx(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa,
> kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].pa);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, err, NULL);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto teardown;
> + }
> + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT
> requires a dedicated
> + * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD.
> + */
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * The sequence for freeing resources from a partially
> initialized TD
> + * varies based on where in the initialization flow failure
> occurred.
> + * Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally
> play nice
> + * with partial initialization.
> + */
> +teardown:
> + tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
> + tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> + return ret;
> +
> +free_packages:
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> +free_tdcs:
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va)
> + continue;
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va);
> + }
> + kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
> + kvm_tdx->tdcs = NULL;
> +free_tdr:
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdr.va) {
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.added = false;
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.va = 0;
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.pa = 0;
> + }
> +free_hkid:
> + if (kvm_tdx->hkid != -1)
> + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static int __init tdx_module_setup(void)
> {
> const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdsysinfo;
> @@ -82,6 +477,8 @@ bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
>
> int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> {
> + int max_pkgs;
> + int i;
> int r;
>
> if (!enable_ept) {
> @@ -95,6 +492,14 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops
> *x86_ops) return -ENODEV;
> }
>
> + max_pkgs = topology_max_packages();
> + tdx_mng_key_config_lock = kcalloc(max_pkgs,
> sizeof(*tdx_mng_key_config_lock),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tdx_mng_key_config_lock)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + for (i = 0; i < max_pkgs; i++)
> + mutex_init(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[i]);
> +
> /* TDX requires VMX. */
> r = vmxon_all();
> if (!r)
> @@ -103,3 +508,9 @@ int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops
> *x86_ops)
> return r;
> }
> +
> +void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void)
> +{
> + /* kfree accepts NULL. */
> + kfree(tdx_mng_key_config_lock);
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> index 98999bf3f188..938314635b47 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
>
> struct tdx_td_page tdr;
> struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
> +
> + int hkid;
> };
>
> struct vcpu_tdx {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> index ac1688b0b0e3..95da978c9aa9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> @@ -133,9 +133,20 @@ void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops);
> bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type);
> +void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);
> +
> +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
> +void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm);
> +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm);
> #else
> static inline int tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops) {
> return 0; } static inline bool tdx_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long
> type) { return false; } +static inline void
> tdx_hardware_unsetup(void) {} +
> +static inline int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> } +static inline void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> +static inline void tdx_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> +static inline void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm) {}
> #endif
>
> #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 91053fdc4512..4b22196cb12c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -12702,6 +12702,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> kvm_page_track_cleanup(kvm);
> kvm_xen_destroy_vm(kvm);
> kvm_hv_destroy_vm(kvm);
> + static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_free)(kvm);
> }
>
> static void memslot_rmap_free(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> @@ -13012,6 +13013,13 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct
> kvm *kvm,
> void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> + /*
> + * kvm_mmu_zap_all() zaps both private and shared page
> tables. Before
> + * tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some TD
> resources to
> + * be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed, etc).
> Invoke
> + * kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private() for this.
> + */
> + static_call_cond(kvm_x86_flush_shadow_all_private)(kvm);
> kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
> }
>

2022-11-23 15:02:29

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 100/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV report fatal error hypercall


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Wire up TDX PV report fatal error hypercall to KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_CRASH KVM
> exit event.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index e3062c245e70..16f168f4f21a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -1068,6 +1068,24 @@ static int tdx_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return 1;
> }
>
> +static int tdx_report_fatal_error(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Exit to userspace device model for teardown.
> + * Because guest TD is already panicing

panicking


> , returning an error to guerst

typo, guest



> TD
> + * doesn't make sense. No argument check is done.
> + */
> +
> + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
> + vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_TDX;
> + vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 3;
> + vcpu->run->system_event.data[0] = TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR;
> + vcpu->run->system_event.data[1] = tdvmcall_a0_read(vcpu);
> + vcpu->run->system_event.data[2] = tdvmcall_a1_read(vcpu);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> if (tdvmcall_exit_type(vcpu))
> @@ -1086,6 +1104,8 @@ static int handle_tdvmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return tdx_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
> case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
> return tdx_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
> + case TDG_VP_VMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR:
> + return tdx_report_fatal_error(vcpu);
> default:
> break;
> }
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index 49386e4de8b8..504a8f73284b 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ struct kvm_run {
> #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_WAKEUP 4
> #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND 5
> #define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM 6
> +#define KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_TDX 7
> __u32 type;
> __u32 ndata;
> union {

2022-11-23 15:22:51

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 098/108] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Implements set_msr/get_msr/has_emulated_msr methods for TDX to handle
> hypercall from guest TD for paravirtualized rdmsr and wrmsr. The TDX
> module virtualizes MSRs. For some MSRs, it injects #VE to the guest TD
> upon RDMSR or WRMSR. The exact list of such MSRs are defined in the spec.

How does KVM handle the case that the userland wants to get the TD MSR list?

KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST will return the global KVM MSR list, which is
different from the TD version.


>
> Upon #VE, the guest TD may execute hypercalls,
> TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.RDMSR> and TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.WRMSR>,
> which are defined in GHCI (Guest-Host Communication Interface) so that the
> host VMM (e.g. KVM) can virtualizes
can virtualize



> the MSRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 6 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 -
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++
> 5 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index 74c561e3eb46..3a8a4fdf1ce7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -195,6 +195,34 @@ static void vt_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(vcpu);
> }
>
> +static int vt_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
> + return tdx_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
> +
> + return vmx_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
> + * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
> + */
> +static bool vt_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
> +{
> + if (kvm && is_td(kvm))
> + return tdx_is_emulated_msr(index, true);
> +
> + return vmx_has_emulated_msr(kvm, index);
> +}
> +
> +static int vt_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
> + return tdx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
> +
> + return vmx_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
> +}
> +
> static void vt_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct pi_desc *pi = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
> @@ -431,7 +459,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
>
> .hardware_enable = vt_hardware_enable,
> .hardware_disable = vt_hardware_disable,
> - .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
> + .has_emulated_msr = vt_has_emulated_msr,
>
> .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
> .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
> @@ -451,8 +479,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
>
> .update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
> .get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
> - .get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
> - .set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
> + .get_msr = vt_get_msr,
> + .set_msr = vt_set_msr,
> .get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
> .get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
> .set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 50e9352464a9..b820475ce0ab 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -1489,6 +1489,69 @@ void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
> *error_code = 0;
> }
>
> +bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
> +{
> + switch (index) {
> + case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
> + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
> + case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
> + case MSR_MTRRcap:
> + case 0x200 ... 0x26f:
> + /* IA32_MTRR_PHYS{BASE, MASK}, IA32_MTRR_FIX*_* */
> + case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
> + case MSR_MTRRdefType:
> + case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
> + case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
> + case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
> + case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
> + case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
> + case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
> + case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
> + case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
> + case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
> + case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
> + case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
> + case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
> + /* MSR_IA32_MCx_{CTL, STATUS, ADDR, MISC, CTL2} */
> + return true;
> + case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff:
> + /*
> + * x2APIC registers that are virtualized by the CPU can't be
> + * emulated, KVM doesn't have access to the virtual APIC page.
> + */
> + switch (index) {
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR + APIC_ISR_NR):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR + APIC_ISR_NR):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR + APIC_ISR_NR):
> + return false;
> + default:
> + return true;
> + }
> + case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
> + case MSR_EFER:
> + return !write;
> + default:
> + return false;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
> +{
> + if (tdx_is_emulated_msr(msr->index, false))
> + return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
> + return 1;
> +}
> +
> +int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
> +{
> + if (tdx_is_emulated_msr(msr->index, true))
> + return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
> + return 1;
> +}
> +
> int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
> {
> struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> index d02619f64b6e..8b9399b154f3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
> @@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
> void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
> u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code);
> +bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write);
> +int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
> +int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
>
> int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
> int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);
> @@ -200,6 +203,9 @@ static inline void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mo
> static inline void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
> static inline void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason, u64 *info1,
> u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code) {}
> +static inline bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write) { return false; }
> +static inline int tdx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
> +static inline int tdx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { return 1; }
>
> static inline int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> static inline int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 2eacc4929d5d..5304b27f2566 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -85,7 +85,6 @@
> #include "trace.h"
>
> #define MAX_IO_MSRS 256
> -#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
>
> struct kvm_caps kvm_caps __read_mostly = {
> .supported_mce_cap = MCG_CTL_P | MCG_SER_P,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index 829d3134c1eb..1d77c39821ae 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
> #include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
> #include "kvm_emulate.h"
>
> +#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
> +
> struct kvm_caps {
> /* control of guest tsc rate supported? */
> bool has_tsc_control;

2022-11-23 15:40:34

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 104/108] KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> The TDX module API doesn't provide API for VMM to inject INIT IPI and SIPI.
> Instead it defines the different protocols to boot application processors.
> Ignore INIT and SIPI events for the TDX guest.
>
> There are two options. 1) (silently) ignore INIT/SIPI request or 2) return
> error to guest TDs somehow. Given that TDX guest is paravirtualized to
> boot AP, the option 1 is chosen for simplicity.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
> 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index 17c3828d42a3..4e9b96480716 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(migrate_timers)
> KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed)
> KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr)
> KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
> +KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_init)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
> KVM_X86_OP(check_processor_compatibility)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 094fff5414e1..df67ca7b23d3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1706,6 +1706,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> int (*complete_emulated_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err);
>
> void (*vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
> + void (*vcpu_deliver_init)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> /*
> * Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons
> @@ -1914,6 +1915,7 @@ int kvm_emulate_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void kvm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
> int kvm_load_segment_descriptor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 selector, int seg);
> void kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
> +void kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int idt_index,
> int reason, bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> index 7a1d612bd138..7393d858ed72 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> @@ -3035,6 +3035,16 @@ int kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data, unsigned long len)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +void kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
> + if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu))
> + vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
> + else
> + vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_deliver_init);
> +
> int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
> @@ -3066,13 +3076,8 @@ int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return 0;
> }
>
> - if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events)) {
> - kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
> - if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(apic->vcpu))
> - vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
> - else
> - vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
> - }
> + if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events))
> + static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_deliver_init)(vcpu);
> if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events)) {
> if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
> /* evaluate pending_events before reading the vector */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 2bcf2e1a5271..5d56b0f1f595 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -4857,6 +4857,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,
>
> .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> + .vcpu_deliver_init = kvm_vcpu_deliver_init,
> .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
> };
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index 4acba8d8cb27..d776d5d169d0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -286,6 +286,25 @@ static void vt_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
> vmx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
> }
>
> +static void vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
> +{
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> + return;
> +
> + kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
> + /* TDX doesn't support INIT. Ignore INIT event */
> + vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(vcpu);
> +}
> +

Is it better to add WARN_ON_ONCE in the above two functions for TD case?


> static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> @@ -627,7 +646,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
> .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
>
> - .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> + .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> + .vcpu_deliver_init = vt_vcpu_deliver_init,
>
> .dev_mem_enc_ioctl = tdx_dev_ioctl,
> .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_mem_enc_ioctl,

2022-11-25 00:53:57

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 10:10 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> Also make enable_mmio_caching to be a per-VM value?
> As if the shadow_mmio_value is 0, mmio_caching needs to be disabled.

If I recall correctly, Sean said we can disable TDX guests if mmio_caching is
disabled (we also will need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to still be
true when mmio_value is 0).

SEV_ES has similar logic:

void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
{

...

/*
* SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
* instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
* instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
* (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
*/
if (!enable_mmio_caching)
goto out;

2022-11-25 00:58:43

by Yan Zhao

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:13:48AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 10:10 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > Also make enable_mmio_caching to be a per-VM value?
> > As if the shadow_mmio_value is 0, mmio_caching needs to be disabled.
>
> If I recall correctly, Sean said we can disable TDX guests if mmio_caching is
> disabled (we also will need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to still be
> true when mmio_value is 0).
>
> SEV_ES has similar logic:
>
> void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
> {
>
> ...
>
> /*
> * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
> * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
> * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
> * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
> */
> if (!enable_mmio_caching)
> goto out;
>

Would enabling mmio caching in per-VM basis be better?

2022-11-25 01:01:07

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Fri, 2022-11-25 at 08:12 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:13:48AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 10:10 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > Also make enable_mmio_caching to be a per-VM value?
> > > As if the shadow_mmio_value is 0, mmio_caching needs to be disabled.
> >
> > If I recall correctly, Sean said we can disable TDX guests if mmio_caching is
> > disabled (we also will need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to still be
> > true when mmio_value is 0).
> >
> > SEV_ES has similar logic:
> >
> > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
> > {
> >
> > ...
> >
> > /*
> > * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
> > * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
> > * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
> > * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
> > */
> > if (!enable_mmio_caching)
> > goto out;
> >
>
> Would enabling mmio caching in per-VM basis be better?
>

We need Paolo/Sean to decide.

The thing is TDX guests always require mmio_caching being enabled. For VMX
guests, normally we will always enable mmio_caching too. So I think per-VM
basis mmio_caching is not that useful.

2022-11-25 01:11:49

by Yan Zhao

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:45:01AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> On Fri, 2022-11-25 at 08:12 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:13:48AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 10:10 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > > Also make enable_mmio_caching to be a per-VM value?
> > > > As if the shadow_mmio_value is 0, mmio_caching needs to be disabled.
> > >
> > > If I recall correctly, Sean said we can disable TDX guests if mmio_caching is
> > > disabled (we also will need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to still be
> > > true when mmio_value is 0).
> > >
> > > SEV_ES has similar logic:
> > >
> > > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
> > > {
> > >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > /*
> > > * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
> > > * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
> > > * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
> > > * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
> > > */
> > > if (!enable_mmio_caching)
> > > goto out;
> > >
> >
> > Would enabling mmio caching in per-VM basis be better?
> >
>
> We need Paolo/Sean to decide.
>
> The thing is TDX guests always require mmio_caching being enabled. For VMX
> guests, normally we will always enable mmio_caching too. So I think per-VM
> basis mmio_caching is not that useful.
With per-VM basis enabling, I think we can get rid of the kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm)
in below code and also in handle_abnormal_pfn()

static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
{
return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
likely(enable_mmio_caching || kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm));
}

Thanks
Yan

2022-11-25 01:28:21

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Fri, 2022-11-25 at 08:37 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:45:01AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > On Fri, 2022-11-25 at 08:12 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:13:48AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > > On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 10:10 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > > > Also make enable_mmio_caching to be a per-VM value?
> > > > > As if the shadow_mmio_value is 0, mmio_caching needs to be disabled.
> > > >
> > > > If I recall correctly, Sean said we can disable TDX guests if mmio_caching is
> > > > disabled (we also will need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to still be
> > > > true when mmio_value is 0).
> > > >
> > > > SEV_ES has similar logic:
> > > >
> > > > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
> > > > {
> > > >
> > > > ...
> > > >
> > > > /*
> > > > * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
> > > > * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
> > > > * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
> > > > * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
> > > > */
> > > > if (!enable_mmio_caching)
> > > > goto out;
> > > >
> > >
> > > Would enabling mmio caching in per-VM basis be better?
> > >
> >
> > We need Paolo/Sean to decide.
> >
> > The thing is TDX guests always require mmio_caching being enabled. For VMX
> > guests, normally we will always enable mmio_caching too. So I think per-VM
> > basis mmio_caching is not that useful.
> With per-VM basis enabling, I think we can get rid of the kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm)
> in below code and also in handle_abnormal_pfn()
>
> static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
> {
> return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
> likely(enable_mmio_caching || kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm));
> }
>

It needs to go anyway regardless per-VM mmio_caching or not, as explained we
need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to be true even mmio_value is 0.

2022-11-25 02:11:06

by Yan Zhao

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 09:07:09AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> On Fri, 2022-11-25 at 08:37 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:45:01AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > On Fri, 2022-11-25 at 08:12 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:13:48AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > > > On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 10:10 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > > > > Also make enable_mmio_caching to be a per-VM value?
> > > > > > As if the shadow_mmio_value is 0, mmio_caching needs to be disabled.
> > > > >
> > > > > If I recall correctly, Sean said we can disable TDX guests if mmio_caching is
> > > > > disabled (we also will need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to still be
> > > > > true when mmio_value is 0).
> > > > >
> > > > > SEV_ES has similar logic:
> > > > >
> > > > > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
> > > > > {
> > > > >
> > > > > ...
> > > > >
> > > > > /*
> > > > > * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
> > > > > * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
> > > > > * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
> > > > > * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
> > > > > */
> > > > > if (!enable_mmio_caching)
> > > > > goto out;
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Would enabling mmio caching in per-VM basis be better?
> > > >
> > >
> > > We need Paolo/Sean to decide.
> > >
> > > The thing is TDX guests always require mmio_caching being enabled. For VMX
> > > guests, normally we will always enable mmio_caching too. So I think per-VM
> > > basis mmio_caching is not that useful.
> > With per-VM basis enabling, I think we can get rid of the kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm)
> > in below code and also in handle_abnormal_pfn()
> >
> > static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
> > {
> > return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
> > likely(enable_mmio_caching || kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm));
> > }
> >
>
> It needs to go anyway regardless per-VM mmio_caching or not, as explained we
> need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to be true even mmio_value is 0.

Or it's better to check enable_mmio_caching is true in
kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value() as below.

void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value)
{
WARN_ON(!enable_mmio_caching);
kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
}

2022-11-25 04:12:44

by Binbin Wu

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 106/108] Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)


On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Add documentation to Intel Trusted Domain Extensions(TDX) support.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 +-
> Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst | 2 +
> Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst | 345 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 355 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> index b6f08e8a8320..3d819b2ceb78 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> @@ -1426,6 +1426,9 @@ It is recommended to use this API instead of the KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION ioctl.
> The KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION does not allow fine grained control over memory
> allocation and is deprecated.
>
> +For TDX guest, deleting/moving memory region loses guest memory contents.
> +Read only region isn't supported. Only as-id 0 is supported.
> +
>
> 4.36 KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR
> ---------------------
> @@ -4714,7 +4717,7 @@ H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.
>
> :Capability: basic
> :Architectures: x86
> -:Type: vm
> +:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
> :Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
> :Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
>
> @@ -4726,6 +4729,10 @@ Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
> (SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
> Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst.
>
> +Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Trusted Domain Extensions
> +(TDX) commands on Intel Processors. The TDX commands are defined in
> +Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst.
> +
> 4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
> -----------------------------------
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
> index e0a2c74e1043..cdb8b43ce797 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
> @@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ KVM
> locking
> vcpu-requests
> review-checklist
> +
> + intel-tdx
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..6999b0f4f6c2
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +===================================
> +Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)
> +===================================
> +
> +Overview
> +========
> +TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions which isolates VMs from
> +the virtual-machine manager (VMM)/hypervisor and any other software on
> +the platform. For details, see the specifications [1]_, whitepaper [2]_,
> +architectural extensions specification [3]_, module documentation [4]_,
> +loader interface specification [5]_, guest-hypervisor communication
> +interface [6]_, virtual firmware design guide [7]_, and other resources
> +([8]_, [9]_, [10]_, [11]_, and [12]_).
> +
> +
> +API description
> +===============
> +
> +KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
> +---------------------
> +:Type: vm ioctl, vcpu ioctl
> +
> +For TDX operations, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP is re-purposed to be generic
> +ioctl with TDX specific sub ioctl command.
> +
> +::
> +
> + /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
> + enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
> + KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
> + KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
> + KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
> + KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION,
> + KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,
> +
> + KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
> + };
> +
> + struct kvm_tdx_cmd {
> + /* enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id */
> + __u32 id;
> + /* flags for sub-commend. If sub-command doesn't use this, set zero. */
> + __u32 flags;
> + /*
> + * data for each sub-command. An immediate or a pointer to the actual
> + * data in process virtual address. If sub-command doesn't use it,
> + * set zero.
> + */
> + __u64 data;
> + /*
> + * Auxiliary error code. The sub-command may return TDX SEAMCALL
> + * status code in addition to -Exxx.
> + * Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd.
> + */
> + __u64 error;
> + /* Reserved: Defined for consistency with struct kvm_sev_cmd. */
> + __u64 unused;
> + };
> +
> +KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES
> +--------------------
> +:Type: vm ioctl
> +
> +Subset of TDSYSINFO_STRCUCT retrieved by TDH.SYS.INFO TDX SEAM call will be
> +returned. Which describes about Intel TDX module.
> +
> +- id: KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES
> +- flags: must be 0
> +- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_capabilities
> +- error: must be 0
> +- unused: must be 0
> +
> +::
> +
> + struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config {
> + __u32 leaf;
> + __u32 sub_leaf;
> + __u32 eax;
> + __u32 ebx;
> + __u32 ecx;
> + __u32 edx;
> + };
> +
> + struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
> + __u64 attrs_fixed0;
> + __u64 attrs_fixed1;
> + __u64 xfam_fixed0;
> + __u64 xfam_fixed1;
> +
> + __u32 nr_cpuid_configs;
> + struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
> + };
> +
> +
> +KVM_TDX_INIT_VM
> +---------------
> +:Type: vm ioctl
> +
> +Does additional VM initialization specific to TDX which corresponds to
> +TDH.MNG.INIT TDX SEAM call.
> +
> +- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VM
> +- flags: must be 0
> +- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_init_vm
> +- error: must be 0
> +- unused: must be 0
> +
> +::
> +
> + struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
> + __u32 max_vcpus;
> + __u32 reserved;
> + __u64 attributes;
> + __u64 cpuid; /* pointer to struct kvm_cpuid2 */
> + __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
> + __u64 reserved[43]; /* must be zero for future extensibility */
> + };
> +
> +
> +KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
> +-----------------
> +:Type: vcpu ioctl
> +
> +Does additional VCPU initialization specific to TDX which corresponds to
> +TDH.VP.INIT TDX SEAM call.
> +
> +- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
> +- flags: must be 0
> +- data: initial value of the guest TD VCPU RCX
> +- error: must be 0
> +- unused: must be 0
> +
> +KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION
> +-----------------------
> +:Type: vm ioctl
> +
> +Encrypt a memory continuous region which corresponding to TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD
> +TDX SEAM call.
> +If KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION flag is specified, it also extends measurement
> +which corresponds to TDH.MR.EXTEND TDX SEAM call.
> +
> +- id: KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU
> +- flags: flags
> + currently only KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION is defined
> +- data: pointer to struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region
> +- error: must be 0
> +- unused: must be 0
> +
> +::
> +
> + #define KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION (1UL << 0)
> +
> + struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region {
> + __u64 source_addr;
> + __u64 gpa;
> + __u64 nr_pages;
> + };
> +
> +
> +KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM
> +-------------------
> +:Type: vm ioctl
> +
> +Complete measurement of the initial TD contents and mark it ready to run
> +which corresponds to TDH.MR.FINALIZE
> +
> +- id: KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM
> +- flags: must be 0
> +- data: must be 0
> +- error: must be 0
> +- unused: must be 0
> +
> +KVM TDX creation flow
> +=====================
> +In addition to KVM normal flow, new TDX ioctls need to be called. The control flow
> +looks like as follows.
> +
> +#. system wide capability check
> +
> + * KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES: check if VM type is supported and if TDX_VM_TYPE is
> + supported.
> +
> +#. creating VM
> +
> + * KVM_CREATE_VM
> + * KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES: query if TDX is supported on the platform.
> + * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM: pass TDX specific VM parameters.
> +
> +#. creating VCPU
> +
> + * KVM_CREATE_VCPU
> + * KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU: pass TDX specific VCPU parameters.
> +
> +#. initializing guest memory
> +
> + * allocate guest memory and initialize page same to normal KVM case
> + In TDX case, parse and load TDVF into guest memory in addition.
> + * KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION to add and measure guest pages.
> + If the pages has contents above, those pages need to be added.
> + Otherwise the contents will be lost and guest sees zero pages.
> + * KVM_TDX_FINALIAZE_VM: Finalize VM and measurement
> + This must be after KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
> +
> +#. run vcpu
> +
> +Design discussion
> +=================
> +
> +Coexistence of normal(VMX) VM and TD VM
> +---------------------------------------
> +It's required to allow both legacy(normal VMX) VMs and new TD VMs to
> +coexist. Otherwise the benefits of VM flexibility would be eliminated.
> +The main issue for it is that the logic of kvm_x86_ops callbacks for
> +TDX is different from VMX. On the other hand, the variable,
> +kvm_x86_ops, is global single variable. Not per-VM, not per-vcpu.
> +
> +Several points to be considered:
> +
> + * No or minimal overhead when TDX is disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n).
> + * Avoid overhead of indirect call via function pointers.
> + * Contain the changes under arch/x86/kvm/vmx directory and share logic
> + with VMX for maintenance.
> + Even though the ways to operation on VM (VMX instruction vs TDX
> + SEAM call) is

are


> different, the basic idea remains same.

remains the same


> So, many
> + logic can be shared.
> + * Future maintenance
> + The huge change of kvm_x86_ops in (near) future isn't expected.
> + a centralized file is acceptable.
> +
> +- Wrapping kvm x86_ops: The current choice
> +
> + Introduce dedicated file for arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c (the name,
> + main.c, is just chosen to show main entry points for callbacks.) and
> + wrapper functions around all the callbacks with
> + "if (is-tdx) tdx-callback() else vmx-callback()".
> +
> + Pros:
> +
> + - No major change in common x86 KVM code. The change is (mostly)
> + contained under arch/x86/kvm/vmx/.
> + - When TDX is disabled(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=n), the overhead is
> + optimized out.
> + - Micro optimization by avoiding function pointer.
> +
> + Cons:
> +
> + - Many boiler plates in arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c.
> +
> +KVM MMU Changes
> +---------------
> +KVM MMU needs to be enhanced to handle Secure/Shared-EPT. The
> +high-level execution flow is mostly same to normal EPT case.
> +EPT violation/misconfiguration -> invoke TDP fault handler ->
> +resolve TDP fault -> resume execution. (or emulate MMIO)
> +The difference is, that S-EPT is operated(read/write) via TDX SEAM
> +call which is expensive instead of direct read/write EPT entry.
> +One bit of GPA (51 or 47 bit) is repurposed so that it means shared
> +with host(if set to 1) or private to TD(if cleared to 0).
> +
> +- The current implementation
> +
> + * Reuse the existing MMU code with minimal update. Because the
> + execution flow is mostly same. But additional operation, TDX call
> + for S-EPT, is needed. So add hooks for it to kvm_x86_ops.
> + * For performance, minimize TDX SEAM call to operate on S-EPT. When
> + getting corresponding S-EPT pages/entry from faulting GPA, don't
> + use TDX SEAM call to read S-EPT entry. Instead create shadow copy
> + in host memory.
> + Repurpose the existing kvm_mmu_page as shadow copy of S-EPT and
> + associate S-EPT to it.
> + * Treats share bit as attributes. mask/unmask the bit where
> + necessary to keep the existing traversing code works.
> + Introduce kvm.arch.gfn_shared_mask and use "if (gfn_share_mask)"
> + for special case.
> +
> + * 0 : for non-TDX case
> + * 51 or 47 bit set for TDX case.
> +
> + Pros:
> +
> + - Large code reuse with minimal new hooks.
> + - Execution path is same.
> +
> + Cons:
> +
> + - Complicates the existing code.
> + - Repurpose kvm_mmu_page as shadow of Secure-EPT can be confusing.
> +
> +New KVM API, ioctl (sub)command, to manage TD VMs
> +-------------------------------------------------
> +Additional KVM API
API -> APIs
> are needed to control TD VMs. The operations on TD
> +VMs are specific to TDX.
> +
> +- Piggyback and repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
> +
> + Although not all operation isn't memory encryption,

How to understand it?


> repupose to get
> + TDX specific ioctls.
> +
> + Pros:
> +
> + - No major change in common x86 KVM code.
> +
> + Cons:
> +
> + - The operations aren't actually memory encryption, but operations
> + on TD VMs.
> +
> +References
> +==========
> +
> +.. [1] TDX specification
> + https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
> +.. [2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
> + https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-whitepaper-final9-17.pdf
> +.. [3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
> + https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
> +.. [4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 EAS
> + https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-module-1eas.pdf
> +.. [5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
> + https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
> +.. [6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
> + https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface.pdf
> +.. [7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
> + https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.
> +.. [8] intel public github
> +
> + * kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
> + * TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
> +
> +.. [9] tdvf
> + https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
> +.. [10] KVM forum 2020: Intel Virtualization Technology Extensions to
> + Enable Hardware Isolated VMs
> + https://osseu2020.sched.com/event/eDzm/intel-virtualization-technology-extensions-to-enable-hardware-isolated-vms-sean-christopherson-intel
> +.. [11] Linux Security Summit EU 2020:
> + Architectural Extensions for Hardware Virtual Machine Isolation
> + to Advance Confidential Computing in Public Clouds - Ravi Sahita
> + & Jun Nakajima, Intel Corporation
> + https://osseu2020.sched.com/event/eDOx/architectural-extensions-for-hardware-virtual-machine-isolation-to-advance-confidential-computing-in-public-clouds-ravi-sahita-jun-nakajima-intel-corporation
> +.. [12] [RFCv2,00/16] KVM protected memory extension
> + https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/10/20/66

2022-11-28 23:54:01

by Sean Christopherson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 035/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis

On Fri, Nov 25, 2022, Yan Zhao wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 09:07:09AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > On Fri, 2022-11-25 at 08:37 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:45:01AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 2022-11-25 at 08:12 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:13:48AM +0800, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > > > > On Tue, 2022-11-22 at 10:10 +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > > > > > > Also make enable_mmio_caching to be a per-VM value?
> > > > > > > As if the shadow_mmio_value is 0, mmio_caching needs to be disabled.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > If I recall correctly, Sean said we can disable TDX guests if mmio_caching is
> > > > > > disabled (we also will need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to still be
> > > > > > true when mmio_value is 0).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > SEV_ES has similar logic:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
> > > > > > {
> > > > > >
> > > > > > ...
> > > > > >
> > > > > > /*
> > > > > > * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
> > > > > > * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
> > > > > > * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
> > > > > > * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
> > > > > > */
> > > > > > if (!enable_mmio_caching)
> > > > > > goto out;
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Would enabling mmio caching in per-VM basis be better?
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > We need Paolo/Sean to decide.
> > > >
> > > > The thing is TDX guests always require mmio_caching being enabled. For VMX
> > > > guests, normally we will always enable mmio_caching too. So I think per-VM
> > > > basis mmio_caching is not that useful.
> > > With per-VM basis enabling, I think we can get rid of the kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm)
> > > in below code and also in handle_abnormal_pfn()
> > >
> > > static inline bool is_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
> > > {
> > > return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
> > > likely(enable_mmio_caching || kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm));
> > > }
> > >
> >
> > It needs to go anyway regardless per-VM mmio_caching or not, as explained we
> > need to change to allow enable_mmio_caching to be true even mmio_value is 0.

Yes, the kvm_gfn_shared_mask() in is_mmio_spte() should not exist.

> Or it's better to check enable_mmio_caching is true in
> kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value() as below.
>
> void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_value(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mmio_value)
> {
> WARN_ON(!enable_mmio_caching);
> kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;

Eh, if you're going to bother with that assert, capture the more subtle aspects
as well, e.g. that EPT is enabled and that shadow_mmio_mask has been set to the
expected value. I would also ditch the helper and just open code this in TDX
code, I doubt there's a use case outside of TDX+VMX coexistence.

2022-11-29 00:08:39

by Sean Christopherson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 034/108] KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to shadow_mmio_{value, mask}

On Thu, Nov 17, 2022, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 09, 2022 at 11:48:30AM +0000,
> "Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > Because TDX will need shadow_mmio_mask to be VMX_SUPPRESS_VE | RWX
> > > shadow_mmio_value to be 0, make VMX EPT case use same value for TDX
> > > shadow_mmio_mask. ?
> > >
> >
> > TDX need to use different mmio_mask/value doesn't mean they need to be changed
> > for VMX guest. I think the true purpose here is to still be able to use a
> > global shadow_mmio_mask for both TDX and VMX guests. So please explicitly call
> > out.
>
> That's right. With this change, per-VM shadow_mmio_{value, mask} can be avoided.
> The common value can be used for both VMX and TDX.

No, the mask can be global, but the value needs to be per-VM. VMX needs to
generate an EPT misconfig, but TDX needs to generate an EPT violation to get the
automagic #VE reflection.

2022-12-05 14:28:46

by Wang, Wei W

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: RE: [PATCH v10 052/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs

On Sunday, October 30, 2022 2:23 PM, Yamahata, Isaku wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> Some KVM MMU operations (dirty page logging, page migration, aging page)
> aren't supported for private GFNs (yet) with the first generation of TDX.
> Silently return on unsupported TDX KVM MMU operations.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 3 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 73
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++
> 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index
> 02e7b5cf3231..efc3b3f2dd12 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -6588,6 +6588,9 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct
> kvm *kvm,
> for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep) {
> sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
>
> + /* Private page dirty logging is not supported yet. */
> + KVM_BUG_ON(is_private_sptep(sptep), kvm);
> +
> /*
> * We cannot do huge page mapping for indirect shadow pages,
> * which are found on the last rmap (level = 1) when not using diff --git
> a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c index
> 0e053b96444a..4b207ce83ffe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> @@ -1469,7 +1469,8 @@ typedef bool (*tdp_handler_t)(struct kvm *kvm,
> struct tdp_iter *iter,
>
> static __always_inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
> struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
> - tdp_handler_t handler)
> + tdp_handler_t handler,
> + bool only_shared)
> {
> struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
> struct tdp_iter iter;
> @@ -1480,9 +1481,23 @@ static __always_inline bool
> kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
> * into this helper allow blocking; it'd be dead, wasteful code.
> */
> for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, range->slot->as_id) {
> + gfn_t start;
> + gfn_t end;
> +
> + if (only_shared && is_private_sp(root))
> + continue;
> +
> rcu_read_lock();
>
> - tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, range->start, range->end)
> + /*
> + * For TDX shared mapping, set GFN shared bit to the range,
> + * so the handler() doesn't need to set it, to avoid duplicated
> + * code in multiple handler()s.
> + */
> + start = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, range->start);
> + end = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, range->end);
> +
> + tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, start, end)
> ret |= handler(kvm, &iter, range);
>
> rcu_read_unlock();
> @@ -1526,7 +1541,12 @@ static bool age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct
> tdp_iter *iter,
>
> bool kvm_tdp_mmu_age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range
> *range) {
> - return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, age_gfn_range);
> + /*
> + * First TDX generation doesn't support clearing A bit for private
> + * mapping, since there's no secure EPT API to support it. However
> + * it's a legitimate request for TDX guest.
> + */
> + return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, age_gfn_range, true);
> }
>
> static bool test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter, @@ -1537,7
> +1557,8 @@ static bool test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
>
> bool kvm_tdp_mmu_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range
> *range) {
> - return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, test_age_gfn);
> + /* The first TDX generation doesn't support A bit. */
> + return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, test_age_gfn, true);
> }
>
> static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter, @@ -1582,8
> +1603,11 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct
> kvm_gfn_range *range)
> * No need to handle the remote TLB flush under RCU protection, the
> * target SPTE _must_ be a leaf SPTE, i.e. cannot result in freeing a
> * shadow page. See the WARN on pfn_changed in
> __handle_changed_spte().
> + *
> + * .change_pte() callback should not happen for private page, because
> + * for now TDX private pages are pinned during VM's life time.
> */
> - return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, set_spte_gfn);
> + return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, set_spte_gfn, true);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -1637,6 +1661,14 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_wrprot_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
>
> lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>
> + /*
> + * Because first TDX generation doesn't support write protecting private
> + * mappings and kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm) = false, it's a bug
> + * to reach here for guest TD.
> + */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm)))
> + return false;
> +
> for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, true)
> spte_set |= wrprot_gfn_range(kvm, root, slot->base_gfn,
> slot->base_gfn + slot->npages, min_level); @@ -1902,6
> +1934,14 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
>
> lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>
> + /*
> + * First TDX generation doesn't support clearing dirty bit,
> + * since there's no secure EPT API to support it. It is a
> + * bug to reach here for TDX guest.
> + */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm)))
> + return false;
> +

It might not be a good choice to intercept everywhere in kvm_mmu just as tdx
doesn't support it. I'm thinking maybe we could do the check in tdx.c, which is
much simpler. For example:

@@ -2592,6 +2605,12 @@ static void tdx_handle_changed_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock);

if (change->new.is_present) {
+ /* Only flags change. This isn't supported currently. */
+ KVM_BUG_ON(change->old.is_present, kvm);

Then we can have kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported completely removed.

2022-12-09 00:22:26

by Vishal Annapurve

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v10 062/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX

> +int __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> + bool map_private)
> +{
> + gfn_t start = *startp;
> + int attr;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + attr = map_private ? KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE : KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED;
> + start = start & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> + end = end & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> +
> + /*
> + * To make the following kvm_vm_set_mem_attr() success within spinlock
> + * without memory allocation.
> + */
> + ret = kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(kvm, start, end);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + write_lock(&kvm-> mmu_lock);
> + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> + gfn_t s = start;
> +
> + ret = kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(kvm, &s, end, map_private);
> + if (!ret) {
> + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, end), kvm);

This will result in no exits to userspace during memory conversion requests from
guests. And as a result, userspace will not be able to explicitly back/unback
shared/private memory during conversions leading to double allocation of memory.

Is this an intended behavior for memory conversion with TDX VMs as per earlier
discussion?

> + } else if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
> + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, s), kvm);
> + start = s;
> + }
> + } else {
> + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> + write_unlock(&kvm-> mmu_lock);
> +
> + if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
> + if (map_private)

2022-12-09 19:58:16

by Ackerley Tng

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure


In tdx_vm_init, it is possible to have a double-reclaim, which
eventually causes a host crash. I have a selftest that reliably
reproduces this, and I believe the problem is that withiin
tdx_vm_free(), we don't reset kvm->tdcs = NULL and kvm->tdr.added to
false.

> +int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + cpumask_var_t packages;
> + int ret, i;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + ret = tdx_keyid_alloc();
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + kvm_tdx->hkid = ret;
> +
> + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdr);
> + if (ret)
> + goto free_hkid;
> +
> + kvm_tdx->tdcs = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages, sizeof(*kvm_tdx->tdcs),
> + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs)
> + goto free_tdr;
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + if (ret)
> + goto free_tdcs;
> + }
> +
> + if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&packages, GFP_KERNEL)) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_tdcs;
> + }
> + cpus_read_lock();
> + /*
> + * Need at least one CPU of the package to be online in order to
> + * program all packages for host key id. Check it.
> + */
> + for_each_present_cpu(i)
> + cpumask_set_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
> + for_each_online_cpu(i)
> + cpumask_clear_cpu(topology_physical_package_id(i), packages);
> + if (!cpumask_empty(packages)) {
> + ret = -EIO;
> + /*
> + * Because it's hard for human operator to figure out the
> + * reason, warn it.
> + */
> + pr_warn("All packages need to have online CPU to create TD. Online CPU
> and retry.\n");
> + goto free_packages;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Acquire global lock to avoid TDX_OPERAND_BUSY:
> + * TDH.MNG.CREATE and other APIs try to lock the global Key Owner
> + * Table (KOT) to track the assigned TDX private HKID. It doesn't spin
> + * to acquire the lock, returns TDX_OPERAND_BUSY instead, and let the
> + * caller to handle the contention. This is because of time limitation
> + * usable inside the TDX module and OS/VMM knows better about process
> + * scheduling.
> + *
> + * APIs to acquire the lock of KOT:
> + * TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID, TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE, and
> + * TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_lock);
> + err = tdh_mng_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->hkid);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_lock);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_CREATE, err, NULL);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto free_packages;
> + }
> + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdr);
> +
> + for_each_online_cpu(i) {
> + int pkg = topology_physical_package_id(i);
> +
> + if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(pkg, packages))
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * Program the memory controller in the package with an
> + * encryption key associated to a TDX private host key id
> + * assigned to this TDR. Concurrent operations on same memory
> + * controller results in TDX_OPERAND_BUSY. Avoid this race by
> + * mutex.
> + */
> + mutex_lock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]);
> + ret = smp_call_on_cpu(i, tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config,
> + &kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true);
> + mutex_unlock(&tdx_mng_key_config_lock[pkg]);
> + if (ret)
> + break;
> + }
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> + if (ret)
> + goto teardown;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + err = tdh_mng_addcx(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].pa);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, err, NULL);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto teardown;
> + }
> + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a
> dedicated
> + * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD.
> + */
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * The sequence for freeing resources from a partially initialized TD
> + * varies based on where in the initialization flow failure occurred.
> + * Simply use the full teardown and destroy, which naturally play nice
> + * with partial initialization.
> + */
> +teardown:
> + tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
> + tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> + return ret;

If there is some error that causes an exit through teardown,
tdx_vm_free() will be called, which causes the resources to be
freed. However, tdx_vm_free() is called a second time when the selftest
(or qemu) exits, which causes a second reclaim to be performed.

> +
> +free_packages:
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + free_cpumask_var(packages);
> +free_tdcs:
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++) {
> + if (!kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va)
> + continue;
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdcs[i].va);
> + }
> + kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
> + kvm_tdx->tdcs = NULL;
> +free_tdr:
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdr.va) {
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.added = false;
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.va = 0;
> + kvm_tdx->tdr.pa = 0;
> + }
> +free_hkid:
> + if (kvm_tdx->hkid != -1)
> + tdx_hkid_free(kvm_tdx);
> + return ret;
> +}

The second reclaim is performed because kvm_tdx->tdcs is still set, and
kvm_tdx->tdr.added is still set, so the second two if blocks in
tdx_vm_free() are executed.

> +void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + int i;
> +
> + /* Can't reclaim or free TD pages if teardown failed. */
> + if (is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx))
> + return;
> +
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdcs) {
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++)
> + tdx_reclaim_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> + kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * TDX module maps TDR with TDX global HKID. TDX module may access TDR
> + * while operating on TD (Especially reclaiming TDCS). Cache flush with
> + * TDX global HKID is needed.
> + */
> + if (kvm_tdx->tdr.added &&
> + tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va, kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, true,
> + tdx_global_keyid))
> + return;
> +
> + free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
> +}

Here's the fix that stopped the crash I was observing

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 2e7916fb72a7..41d1ff1510c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdcs_nr_pages; i++)
tdx_reclaim_td_page(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
kfree(kvm_tdx->tdcs);
+ kvm_tdx->tdcs = NULL;
}

/*
@@ -418,6 +419,9 @@ void tdx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
return;

free_page(kvm_tdx->tdr.va);
+ kvm_tdx->tdr.added = false;
+ kvm_tdx->tdr.va = 0;
+ kvm_tdx->tdr.pa = 0;
}

static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)

2022-12-14 11:25:02

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 046/108] KVM: Add flags to struct kvm_gfn_range

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> kvm_unmap_gfn_range() needs to know the reason of the callback for TDX.
> mmu notifier, set memattr ioctl or restrictedmem notifier. Based on the
> reason, TDX changes the behavior. For mmu notifier, it's the operation on
> shared memory slot to zap shared PTE. For set memattr, private<->shared
> conversion, zap the original PTE. For restrictedmem, it's a hint that TDX
> can ignore.

Could you elaborate why restricted memfd notifier can be ignored? IIUC if
userspace punch a hole, the pages within the hole will be de-allocated. So why
can such notifier be ignored?

Btw, I think this patch should be just merged to the patch which consumes those
flags (checked it is next patch). It's easier to review when putting them
together.

>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/kvm_host.h | 8 +++++++-
> virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 ++++-
> 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index 839d98d56632..b658803ea2c7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -247,12 +247,18 @@ int kvm_async_pf_wakeup_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
>
> #if defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER) || defined(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM)
> +#define KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_RESTRICTED_MEM BIT(0)
> +#define KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_SET_MEM_ATTR BIT(1)
> struct kvm_gfn_range {
> struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> gfn_t start;
> gfn_t end;
> - pte_t pte;
> + union {
> + pte_t pte;
> + int attr;
> + };

attribute is u64 in Chao's series.

> bool may_block;
> + unsigned int flags;
> };

2022-12-14 11:29:05

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 098/108] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:23 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> +bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
> +{
> + switch (index) {
> + case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
> + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
> + case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
> + case MSR_MTRRcap:
> + case 0x200 ... 0x26f:
> + /* IA32_MTRR_PHYS{BASE, MASK}, IA32_MTRR_FIX*_* */
> + case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
> + case MSR_MTRRdefType:
> + case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
> + case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
> + case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
> + case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:

To me putting KVM para-virt MSRs and hardware MSRs together isn't good idea.
You can introduce separate helpers for them.

> + case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
> + case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
> + case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
> + case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
> + case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
> + case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
> + case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
> + case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
> + /* MSR_IA32_MCx_{CTL, STATUS, ADDR, MISC, CTL2} */
> + return true;
> + case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff:
> + /*
> + * x2APIC registers that are virtualized by the CPU can't be
> + * emulated, KVM doesn't have access to the virtual APIC page.
> + */
> + switch (index) {
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR + APIC_ISR_NR):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR + APIC_ISR_NR):
> + case X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR) ... X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR + APIC_ISR_NR):
> + return false;
> + default:
> + return true;
> + }
> + case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
> + case MSR_EFER:
> + return !write;
> + default:
> + return false;
> + }
> +}

2022-12-14 11:39:35

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 047/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>
> TDX supports only write-back(WB) memory type for private memory
> architecturally so that (virtualized) memory type change doesn't make sense
> for private memory. Also currently, page migration isn't supported for TDX
> yet. (TDX architecturally supports page migration. it's KVM and kernel
> implementation issue.)
>
> Regarding memory type change (mtrr virtualization and lapic page mapping
> change), pages are zapped by kvm_zap_gfn_range(). On the next KVM page
> fault, the SPTE entry with a new memory type for the page is populated.
> Regarding page migration, pages are zapped by the mmu notifier. On the next
> KVM page fault, the new migrated page is populated. Don't zap private
> pages on unmapping for those two cases.
>
> When deleting/moving a KVM memory slot, zap private pages. Typically
> tearing down VM. Don't invalidate private page tables. i.e. zap only leaf
> SPTEs for KVM mmu that has a shared bit mask. The existing
> kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots() depends on role.invalid with read-lock
> of mmu_lock so that other vcpu can operate on KVM mmu concurrently. It
> marks the root page table invalid and zaps SPTEs of the root page
> tables. The TDX module doesn't allow to unlink a protected root page table
> from the hardware and then allocate a new one for it. i.e. replacing a
> protected root page table. Instead, zap only leaf SPTEs for KVM mmu with a
> shared bit mask set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 24 ++++++++---
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 5 ++-
> 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index faf69774c7ce..0237e143299c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -1577,8 +1577,38 @@ bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
> if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
> flush = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_zap_rmap);
>
> - if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm))
> - flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush);
> + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> + bool zap_private;
> +
> + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot)) {
> + if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_RESTRICTED_MEM)
> + /*
> + * For private slot, the callback is triggered
> + * via falloc. Mode can be allocation or punch
^
fallocate(), please?

> + * hole. Because the private-shared conversion
> + * is done via
> + * KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG/UNREG_REGION, we can
> + * ignore the request from restrictedmem.
> + */
> + return flush;

Sorry why "private-shared conversion is done via KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG" results
in "we can ignore the requres from restrictedmem"?

If we punch a hole, the pages are de-allocated, correct?

> + else if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_SET_MEM_ATTR) {
> + if (range->attr == KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED)
> + zap_private = true;
> + else {
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(range->attr != KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE);
> + zap_private = false;
> + }
> + } else
> + /*
> + * kvm_unmap_gfn_range() is called via mmu
> + * notifier. For now page migration for private
> + * page isn't supported yet, don't zap private
> + * pages.
> + */
> + zap_private = false;

Page migration is not the only reason that KVM will receive the MMU notifer --
just say something like "for now all private pages are pinned during VM's life
time".


> + }
> + flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush, zap_private);
> + }
>
> return flush;
> }
> @@ -6066,11 +6096,48 @@ static bool kvm_has_zapped_obsolete_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
> return unlikely(!list_empty_careful(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages));
> }
>
> +static void kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> +{
> + bool flush = false;
> +
> + write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * Zapping non-leaf SPTEs, a.k.a. not-last SPTEs, isn't required, worst
> + * case scenario we'll have unused shadow pages lying around until they
> + * are recycled due to age or when the VM is destroyed.
> + */
> + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> + struct kvm_gfn_range range = {
> + .slot = slot,
> + .start = slot->base_gfn,
> + .end = slot->base_gfn + slot->npages,
> + .may_block = false,
> + };
> +
> + /*
> + * this handles both private gfn and shared gfn.
> + * All private page should be zapped on memslot deletion.
> + */
> + flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &range, flush, true);
> + } else {
> + flush = slot_handle_level(kvm, slot, __kvm_zap_rmap, PG_LEVEL_4K,
> + KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL, true);
> + }
> + if (flush)
> + kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
> +
> + write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> +}
> +
> static void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_pages_in_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
> struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node)
> {
> - kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
> + if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
> + kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(kvm, slot);
> + else
> + kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
> }

A comment would be nice here.

>
> int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> @@ -6173,8 +6240,18 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
>
> if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++)
> + /*
> + * zap_private = true. Zap both private/shared pages.
> + *
> + * kvm_zap_gfn_range() is used when PAT memory type was

Is it PAT or MTRR, or both (thus just memory type)?

> + * changed. Later on the next kvm page fault, populate
> + * it with updated spte entry.
> + * Because only WB is supported for private pages, don't
> + * care of private pages.
> + */

Then why bother zapping private? If I read correctly, the changelog says "don't
zap private"?

> flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, i, gfn_start,
> - gfn_end, true, flush);
> + gfn_end, true, flush,
> + true);
> }
>

Btw, as you mentioned in the changelog, private memory always has WB memory
type, thus cannot be virtualized. Is it better to modify update_mtrr() to just
return early if the gfn range is purely private?

IMHO the handling of MTRR/PAT virtualization for TDX guest deserves dedicated
patch(es) to put them together so it's easier to review. Now the relevant parts
spread in multiple independent patches (MSR handling, vt_get_mt_mask(), etc).

2022-12-14 12:02:14

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 105/108] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:23 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> +static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
> +{
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
> + if (is_mmio)
> + return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> + return  MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> + }
> +
> + return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
> +}

So you are returning WB for _ALL_ guest memory, including shared. Wouldn't this
break MTRR handling for shared memory? For instance, IIUC we can still support
assigning a device to a TDX guest while the VT-d doesn't support coherent
memory, in which case guest's MTRR/PAT are honored. I think this should also
apply to TDX guest's shared memory?

2022-12-15 20:02:41

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 011/108] KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module

On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 12:00:47PM +0200,
Zhi Wang <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 29 Oct 2022 23:22:12 -0700
> [email protected] wrote:
>
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > A VMM interacts with the TDX module using a new instruction
> > (SEAMCALL). A TDX VMM uses SEAMCALLs where a VMX VMM would have
> > directly interacted with VMX instructions. For instance, a TDX VMM
> > does not have full access to the VM control structure corresponding
> > to VMX VMCS. Instead, a VMM induces the TDX module to act on behalf
> > via SEAMCALLs.
> >
> > Export __seamcall and define C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs for
> > readability. Some SEAMCALL APIs donates pages to TDX module or guest
> > TD. The pages are encrypted with TDX private host key id set in high
>
> It seems a little bit confusing here.
>
> I guess you are talking about the host pages donated to TDX module will
> be encrypted with TDX module global key id, which is used to
> encrypted the pages only used by TDX module. For pages donated to the
> TD guest, the pages are encrypted with TD guest prviate key id?

Basically yes. Only TDR is encrypted with the global key id.


> It might be better that you can talk about the actual reaason instead of
> the key id stuff. For example Some SEMCALL APIs will zap or write the
> pages donated by VMM via MOVDIR64B, which requires the VMM to flush the
> cachelines.

How about the followings?

Some SEAMCALL APIs donates host pages to TDX module or guest TD and the
donated pages are encrypted. Some of such SEAMCALLs flush cache lines
(typically by movdir64b instruction), some don't. Those that doesn't
clear cache lines require the VMM to flush the cache lines to avoid cache
line alias.

--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-15 20:12:51

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 12:36:59PM +0200,
Zhi Wang <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 29 Oct 2022 23:22:17 -0700
> [email protected] wrote:
>
> > From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> >
> > As the first step to create TDX guest, create/destroy VM struct.
> > Assign TDX private Host Key ID (HKID) to the TDX guest for memory
> > encryption and allocate extra pages for the TDX guest. On
> > destruction, free allocated pages, and HKID.
> >
> > Before tearing down private page tables, TDX requires some resources
> > of the guest TD to be destroyed (i.e. keyID must have been reclaimed,
> > etc). Add flush_shadow_all_private callback before tearing down
> > private page tables for it.
> >
> > Add a second kvm_x86_ops hook in kvm_arch_destroy_vm() to support
> > TDX's destruction path, which needs to first put the VM into a
> > teardown state, then free per-vCPU resources, and finally free per-VM
> > resources.
> >
> > Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 +
> > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 34 ++-
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 411
> > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h |
> > 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 11 +
> > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +
> > 7 files changed, 467 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> > b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h index 8a5c5ae70bc5..3a29a6b31ee8
> > 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> > @@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ KVM_X86_OP(has_emulated_msr)
> > KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_after_set_cpuid)
> > KVM_X86_OP(is_vm_type_supported)
> > KVM_X86_OP(vm_init)
> > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(flush_shadow_all_private)
> > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_destroy)
> > +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(vm_free)
> > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_precreate)
> > KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_create)
> > KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_free)
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 2a41a93a80f3..2870155ce6fb
> > 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -1472,7 +1472,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> > bool (*is_vm_type_supported)(unsigned long vm_type);
> > unsigned int vm_size;
> > int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
> > + void (*flush_shadow_all_private)(struct kvm *kvm);
> > void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
> > + void (*vm_free)(struct kvm *kvm);
> >
> > /* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */
> > int (*vcpu_precreate)(struct kvm *kvm);
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > index 0900ff2f2390..d01a946a18cf 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > @@ -29,18 +29,44 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +static void vt_hardware_unsetup(void)
> > +{
> > + tdx_hardware_unsetup();
> > + vmx_hardware_unsetup();
> > +}
> > +
> > static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> > {
> > if (is_td(kvm))
> > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Not ready to create
> > guest TD yet. */
> > + return tdx_vm_init(kvm);
> >
> > return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
> > }
> >
> > +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td(kvm))
> > + return tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td(kvm))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + vmx_vm_destroy(kvm);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td(kvm))
> > + return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> > +}
> > +
> > struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> > .name = "kvm_intel",
> >
> > - .hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
> > + .hardware_unsetup = vt_hardware_unsetup,
> > .check_processor_compatibility =
> > vmx_check_processor_compatibility,
> > .hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
> > @@ -50,7 +76,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> > .is_vm_type_supported = vt_is_vm_type_supported,
> > .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
> > .vm_init = vt_vm_init,
> > - .vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
> > + .flush_shadow_all_private = vt_flush_shadow_all_private,
> > + .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
> > + .vm_free = vt_vm_free,
> >
> > .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
> > .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > index 530e72f85762..ec88dde0d300 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > @@ -32,6 +32,401 @@ struct tdx_capabilities {
> > /* Capabilities of KVM + the TDX module. */
> > static struct tdx_capabilities tdx_caps;
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Some TDX SEAMCALLs (TDH.MNG.CREATE, TDH.PHYMEM.CACHE.WB,
> > + * TDH.MNG.KEY.RECLAIMID, TDH.MNG.KEY.FREEID etc) tries to acquire a
> > global lock
> > + * internally in TDX module. If failed, TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is
> > returned without
> > + * spinning or waiting due to a constraint on execution time. It's
> > caller's
> > + * responsibility to avoid race (or retry on TDX_OPERAND_BUSY). Use
> > this mutex
> > + * to avoid race in TDX module because the kernel knows better about
> > scheduling.
> > + */
> > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(tdx_lock);
> > +static struct mutex *tdx_mng_key_config_lock;
> > +
> > +static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
> > +{
> > + return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> > +{
> > + return kvm_tdx->tdr.added;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline void tdx_hkid_free(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> > +{
> > + tdx_keyid_free(kvm_tdx->hkid);
> > + kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline bool is_hkid_assigned(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> > +{
> > + return kvm_tdx->hkid > 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void tdx_clear_page(unsigned long page)
> > +{
> > + const void *zero_page = (const void *)
> > __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
> > + unsigned long i;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Zeroing the page is only necessary for systems with
> > MKTME-i:
> > + * when re-assign one page from old keyid to a new keyid,
> > MOVDIR64B is
> > + * required to clear/write the page with new keyid to
> > prevent integrity
> > + * error when read on the page with new keyid.
> > + *
> > + * The cache line could be poisoned (even without MKTME-i),
> > clear the
> > + * poison bit.
> > + */
> > + for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE; i += 64)
> > + movdir64b((void *)(page + i), zero_page);
>
> In patch 11, the clflush is used on the movdir64b target. Should we
> also use the clflush here?
>
> I suppose the clflush is to prevent the unexpected cacheline writeback
> after the movdir64b.

No, clflush doesn't work. The cache with HKID set needs to be flushed and
(potential) poison needs to be cleared. In host OS/VMM, clflush flushes on cache
with HKID=0 (or HKID of MKTME). clflush doesn't clear poison.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-15 21:25:44

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On Fri, Dec 09, 2022 at 11:15:35AM -0800,
Ackerley Tng <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> In tdx_vm_init, it is possible to have a double-reclaim, which
> eventually causes a host crash. I have a selftest that reliably
> reproduces this, and I believe the problem is that withiin
> tdx_vm_free(), we don't reset kvm->tdcs = NULL and kvm->tdr.added to
> false.

Thanks for the fix. Did you use error injection to trigger the error path?

Thanks,
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-15 21:57:30

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 024/108] KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure

On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 02:46:22PM +0800,
Yuan Yao <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:22:25PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > The next step of TDX guest creation is to create vcpu. Allocate TDX vcpu
> > structures, initialize it. Allocate pages of TDX vcpu for the TDX module.
> >
> > In the case of the conventional case, cpuid is empty at the initialization.
> > and cpuid is configured after the vcpu initialization. Because TDX
> > supports only X2APIC mode, cpuid is forcibly initialized to support X2APIC
> > on the vcpu initialization.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 40 +++++++++--
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 8 +++
> > 3 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > index b4e4c6c677f6..c125b2e3e8b4 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > @@ -63,6 +63,38 @@ static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> > return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> > }
> >
> > +static int vt_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td(kvm))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + return vmx_vcpu_precreate(kvm);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int vt_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> > + return tdx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
> > +
> > + return vmx_vcpu_create(vcpu);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void vt_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> > + return tdx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
> > +
> > + return vmx_vcpu_free(vcpu);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void vt_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> > + return tdx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
> > +
> > + return vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
> > +}
> > +
> > static int vt_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> > {
> > if (!is_td(kvm))
> > @@ -89,10 +121,10 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> > .vm_destroy = vt_vm_destroy,
> > .vm_free = vt_vm_free,
> >
> > - .vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
> > - .vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
> > - .vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
> > - .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
> > + .vcpu_precreate = vt_vcpu_precreate,
> > + .vcpu_create = vt_vcpu_create,
> > + .vcpu_free = vt_vcpu_free,
> > + .vcpu_reset = vt_vcpu_reset,
> >
> > .prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
> > .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > index 54045e0576e7..0625c354b341 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > @@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ static __always_inline hpa_t set_hkid_to_hpa(hpa_t pa, u16 hkid)
> > return pa | ((hpa_t)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);
> > }
> >
> > +static inline bool is_td_vcpu_created(struct vcpu_tdx *tdx)
> > +{
> > + return tdx->tdvpr.added;
> > +}
> > +
> > static inline bool is_td_created(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx)
> > {
> > return kvm_tdx->tdr.added;
> > @@ -296,6 +301,139 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> > + int ret, i;
> > +
> > + /* TDX only supports x2APIC, which requires an in-kernel local APIC. */
> > + if (!vcpu->arch.apic)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
> > +
> > + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + tdx->tdvpx = kcalloc(tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages, sizeof(*tdx->tdvpx),
> > + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> > + if (!tdx->tdvpx) {
> > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto free_tdvpr;
> > + }
> > + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
> > + ret = tdx_alloc_td_page(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto free_tdvpx;
> > + }
> > +
> > + vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
> > +
> > + vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
> > + vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
> > +
> > + vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->tsc_offset;
> > + vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
> > + vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected =
> > + !(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_DEBUG);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +free_tdvpx:
> > + /* @i points at the TDVPX page that failed allocation. */
> > + for (--i; i >= 0; i--)
> > + free_page(tdx->tdvpx[i].va);
> > + kfree(tdx->tdvpx);
> > + tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
> > +free_tdvpr:
> > + free_page(tdx->tdvpr.va);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void tdx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + /* Can't reclaim or free pages if teardown failed. */
> > + if (is_hkid_assigned(to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm)))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (tdx->tdvpx) {
> > + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++)
> > + tdx_reclaim_td_page(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
> > + kfree(tdx->tdvpx);
> > + tdx->tdvpx = NULL;
> > + }
> > + tdx_reclaim_td_page(&tdx->tdvpr);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void tdx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
> > + struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
> > + struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
> > + u64 err;
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + /* TDX doesn't support INIT event. */
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(init_event))
> > + goto td_bugged;
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu_created(tdx)))
> > + goto td_bugged;
> > +
> > + err = tdh_vp_create(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, tdx->tdvpr.pa);
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_CREATE, err, NULL);
> > + goto td_bugged;
> > + }
> > + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpr);
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.tdvpx_nr_pages; i++) {
> > + err = tdh_vp_addcx(tdx->tdvpr.pa, tdx->tdvpx[i].pa);
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> > + pr_tdx_error(TDH_VP_ADDCX, err, NULL);
> > + goto td_bugged;
> > + }
> > + tdx_mark_td_page_added(&tdx->tdvpx[i]);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries) {
> > + /*
> > + * On cpu creation, cpuid entry is blank. Forcibly enable
> > + * X2APIC feature to allow X2APIC.
> > + */
> > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e;
> > +
> > + e = kvmalloc_array(1, sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>
> NULL checking is necessary for kvmalloc_array.

Fixed. Because vcpu_reset() function doesn't return error, this logic is
moved to tdx_vcpu_create().

Thanks,
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-15 22:59:53

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 046/108] KVM: Add flags to struct kvm_gfn_range

On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 10:51:31AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > kvm_unmap_gfn_range() needs to know the reason of the callback for TDX.
> > mmu notifier, set memattr ioctl or restrictedmem notifier. Based on the
> > reason, TDX changes the behavior. For mmu notifier, it's the operation on
> > shared memory slot to zap shared PTE. For set memattr, private<->shared
> > conversion, zap the original PTE. For restrictedmem, it's a hint that TDX
> > can ignore.
>
> Could you elaborate why restricted memfd notifier can be ignored? IIUC if
> userspace punch a hole, the pages within the hole will be de-allocated. So why
> can such notifier be ignored?

Because set-memory-attribute ioctl is expected to follow the callback from
restrictedmem. So set memory attributes can do de-allocation. I wanted to avoid
zapping twice.

With v9 UPM, the restrictedmem callback was triggered for both allocation and
punch-hole.
With v10 UPM, the callback is triggered only for punch-hole. With v10 callback
semantics, probably this can be cleaned up slightly.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-15 23:07:12

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 047/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:17:32AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> >
> > TDX supports only write-back(WB) memory type for private memory
> > architecturally so that (virtualized) memory type change doesn't make sense
> > for private memory. Also currently, page migration isn't supported for TDX
> > yet. (TDX architecturally supports page migration. it's KVM and kernel
> > implementation issue.)
> >
> > Regarding memory type change (mtrr virtualization and lapic page mapping
> > change), pages are zapped by kvm_zap_gfn_range(). On the next KVM page
> > fault, the SPTE entry with a new memory type for the page is populated.
> > Regarding page migration, pages are zapped by the mmu notifier. On the next
> > KVM page fault, the new migrated page is populated. Don't zap private
> > pages on unmapping for those two cases.
> >
> > When deleting/moving a KVM memory slot, zap private pages. Typically
> > tearing down VM. Don't invalidate private page tables. i.e. zap only leaf
> > SPTEs for KVM mmu that has a shared bit mask. The existing
> > kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots() depends on role.invalid with read-lock
> > of mmu_lock so that other vcpu can operate on KVM mmu concurrently. It
> > marks the root page table invalid and zaps SPTEs of the root page
> > tables. The TDX module doesn't allow to unlink a protected root page table
> > from the hardware and then allocate a new one for it. i.e. replacing a
> > protected root page table. Instead, zap only leaf SPTEs for KVM mmu with a
> > shared bit mask set.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 24 ++++++++---
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 5 ++-
> > 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > index faf69774c7ce..0237e143299c 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > @@ -1577,8 +1577,38 @@ bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
> > if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
> > flush = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_zap_rmap);
> >
> > - if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm))
> > - flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush);
> > + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> > + bool zap_private;
> > +
> > + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot)) {
> > + if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_RESTRICTED_MEM)
> > + /*
> > + * For private slot, the callback is triggered
> > + * via falloc. Mode can be allocation or punch
> ^
> fallocate(), please?
>
> > + * hole. Because the private-shared conversion
> > + * is done via
> > + * KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG/UNREG_REGION, we can
> > + * ignore the request from restrictedmem.
> > + */
> > + return flush;
>
> Sorry why "private-shared conversion is done via KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG" results
> in "we can ignore the requres from restrictedmem"?
>
> If we punch a hole, the pages are de-allocated, correct?

With v10 UPM, we can have zap_private = true always.

With v9 UPM, the callback is triggered both for allocation and punch-hole without
any further argument. With v10 UPM, the callback is triggered only for punching
hole.

>
> > + else if (range->flags & KVM_GFN_RANGE_FLAGS_SET_MEM_ATTR) {
> > + if (range->attr == KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED)
> > + zap_private = true;
> > + else {
> > + WARN_ON_ONCE(range->attr != KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE);
> > + zap_private = false;
> > + }
> > + } else
> > + /*
> > + * kvm_unmap_gfn_range() is called via mmu
> > + * notifier. For now page migration for private
> > + * page isn't supported yet, don't zap private
> > + * pages.
> > + */
> > + zap_private = false;
>
> Page migration is not the only reason that KVM will receive the MMU notifer --
> just say something like "for now all private pages are pinned during VM's life
> time".

Will update the comment.


>
>
> > + }
> > + flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush, zap_private);
> > + }
> >
> > return flush;
> > }
> > @@ -6066,11 +6096,48 @@ static bool kvm_has_zapped_obsolete_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
> > return unlikely(!list_empty_careful(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages));
> > }
> >
> > +static void kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> > +{
> > + bool flush = false;
> > +
> > + write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Zapping non-leaf SPTEs, a.k.a. not-last SPTEs, isn't required, worst
> > + * case scenario we'll have unused shadow pages lying around until they
> > + * are recycled due to age or when the VM is destroyed.
> > + */
> > + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> > + struct kvm_gfn_range range = {
> > + .slot = slot,
> > + .start = slot->base_gfn,
> > + .end = slot->base_gfn + slot->npages,
> > + .may_block = false,
> > + };
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * this handles both private gfn and shared gfn.
> > + * All private page should be zapped on memslot deletion.
> > + */
> > + flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &range, flush, true);
> > + } else {
> > + flush = slot_handle_level(kvm, slot, __kvm_zap_rmap, PG_LEVEL_4K,
> > + KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL, true);
> > + }
> > + if (flush)
> > + kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
> > +
> > + write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> > +}
> > +
> > static void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_pages_in_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
> > struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> > struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node)
> > {
> > - kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
> > + if (kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
> > + kvm_mmu_zap_memslot(kvm, slot);
> > + else
> > + kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
> > }
>
> A comment would be nice here.

Will add a comment.


> >
> > int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> > @@ -6173,8 +6240,18 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
> >
> > if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> > for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++)
> > + /*
> > + * zap_private = true. Zap both private/shared pages.
> > + *
> > + * kvm_zap_gfn_range() is used when PAT memory type was
>
> Is it PAT or MTRR, or both (thus just memory type)?

Both. Will update the comment.

>
> > + * changed. Later on the next kvm page fault, populate
> > + * it with updated spte entry.
> > + * Because only WB is supported for private pages, don't
> > + * care of private pages.
> > + */
>
> Then why bother zapping private? If I read correctly, the changelog says "don't
> zap private"?

Right. Will fix.


> > flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, i, gfn_start,
> > - gfn_end, true, flush);
> > + gfn_end, true, flush,
> > + true);
> > }
> >
>
> Btw, as you mentioned in the changelog, private memory always has WB memory
> type, thus cannot be virtualized. Is it better to modify update_mtrr() to just
> return early if the gfn range is purely private?

MTRR support in cpuid is fixed to 1, PAT in cpuid is native.
MTRR and PAT are supported on shared pages.


> IMHO the handling of MTRR/PAT virtualization for TDX guest deserves dedicated
> patch(es) to put them together so it's easier to review. Now the relevant parts
> spread in multiple independent patches (MSR handling, vt_get_mt_mask(), etc).

Ok, let me check it.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-15 23:30:40

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 046/108] KVM: Add flags to struct kvm_gfn_range

On Thu, 2022-12-15 at 14:10 -0800, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 10:51:31AM +0000,
> "Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > kvm_unmap_gfn_range() needs to know the reason of the callback for TDX.
> > > mmu notifier, set memattr ioctl or restrictedmem notifier. Based on the
> > > reason, TDX changes the behavior. For mmu notifier, it's the operation on
> > > shared memory slot to zap shared PTE. For set memattr, private<->shared
> > > conversion, zap the original PTE. For restrictedmem, it's a hint that TDX
> > > can ignore.
> >
> > Could you elaborate why restricted memfd notifier can be ignored? IIUC if
> > userspace punch a hole, the pages within the hole will be de-allocated. So why
> > can such notifier be ignored?
>
> Because set-memory-attribute ioctl is expected to follow the callback from
> restrictedmem. So set memory attributes can do de-allocation. I wanted to avoid
> zapping twice.

Even this is true, the punch hole can be done alone w/o being followed by
set_memory_attribute(), correct? Your explanation doesn't seem to be
reasonable?

At least, you need to explain the semantics of how to use "punch hole" and
set_memory_attributes() clearly in the changelog. Otherwise it's hard for
people to review.


2022-12-15 23:34:27

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 052/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs

On Mon, Dec 05, 2022 at 02:23:35PM +0000,
"Wang, Wei W" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sunday, October 30, 2022 2:23 PM, Yamahata, Isaku wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > Some KVM MMU operations (dirty page logging, page migration, aging page)
> > aren't supported for private GFNs (yet) with the first generation of TDX.
> > Silently return on unsupported TDX KVM MMU operations.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 3 ++
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 73
> > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++
> > 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index
> > 02e7b5cf3231..efc3b3f2dd12 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > @@ -6588,6 +6588,9 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct
> > kvm *kvm,
> > for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep) {
> > sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
> >
> > + /* Private page dirty logging is not supported yet. */
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(is_private_sptep(sptep), kvm);
> > +
> > /*
> > * We cannot do huge page mapping for indirect shadow pages,
> > * which are found on the last rmap (level = 1) when not using diff --git
> > a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c index
> > 0e053b96444a..4b207ce83ffe 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> > @@ -1469,7 +1469,8 @@ typedef bool (*tdp_handler_t)(struct kvm *kvm,
> > struct tdp_iter *iter,
> >
> > static __always_inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
> > struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
> > - tdp_handler_t handler)
> > + tdp_handler_t handler,
> > + bool only_shared)
> > {
> > struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
> > struct tdp_iter iter;
> > @@ -1480,9 +1481,23 @@ static __always_inline bool
> > kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
> > * into this helper allow blocking; it'd be dead, wasteful code.
> > */
> > for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, range->slot->as_id) {
> > + gfn_t start;
> > + gfn_t end;
> > +
> > + if (only_shared && is_private_sp(root))
> > + continue;
> > +
> > rcu_read_lock();
> >
> > - tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, range->start, range->end)
> > + /*
> > + * For TDX shared mapping, set GFN shared bit to the range,
> > + * so the handler() doesn't need to set it, to avoid duplicated
> > + * code in multiple handler()s.
> > + */
> > + start = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, range->start);
> > + end = kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, range->end);
> > +
> > + tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, start, end)
> > ret |= handler(kvm, &iter, range);
> >
> > rcu_read_unlock();
> > @@ -1526,7 +1541,12 @@ static bool age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct
> > tdp_iter *iter,
> >
> > bool kvm_tdp_mmu_age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range
> > *range) {
> > - return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, age_gfn_range);
> > + /*
> > + * First TDX generation doesn't support clearing A bit for private
> > + * mapping, since there's no secure EPT API to support it. However
> > + * it's a legitimate request for TDX guest.
> > + */
> > + return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, age_gfn_range, true);
> > }
> >
> > static bool test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter, @@ -1537,7
> > +1557,8 @@ static bool test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
> >
> > bool kvm_tdp_mmu_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range
> > *range) {
> > - return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, test_age_gfn);
> > + /* The first TDX generation doesn't support A bit. */
> > + return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, test_age_gfn, true);
> > }
> >
> > static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter, @@ -1582,8
> > +1603,11 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct
> > kvm_gfn_range *range)
> > * No need to handle the remote TLB flush under RCU protection, the
> > * target SPTE _must_ be a leaf SPTE, i.e. cannot result in freeing a
> > * shadow page. See the WARN on pfn_changed in
> > __handle_changed_spte().
> > + *
> > + * .change_pte() callback should not happen for private page, because
> > + * for now TDX private pages are pinned during VM's life time.
> > */
> > - return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, set_spte_gfn);
> > + return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, set_spte_gfn, true);
> > }
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -1637,6 +1661,14 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_wrprot_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
> >
> > lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> >
> > + /*
> > + * Because first TDX generation doesn't support write protecting private
> > + * mappings and kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm) = false, it's a bug
> > + * to reach here for guest TD.
> > + */
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm)))
> > + return false;
> > +
> > for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, true)
> > spte_set |= wrprot_gfn_range(kvm, root, slot->base_gfn,
> > slot->base_gfn + slot->npages, min_level); @@ -1902,6
> > +1934,14 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
> >
> > lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> >
> > + /*
> > + * First TDX generation doesn't support clearing dirty bit,
> > + * since there's no secure EPT API to support it. It is a
> > + * bug to reach here for TDX guest.
> > + */
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm)))
> > + return false;
> > +
>
> It might not be a good choice to intercept everywhere in kvm_mmu just as tdx
> doesn't support it. I'm thinking maybe we could do the check in tdx.c, which is
> much simpler. For example:
>
> @@ -2592,6 +2605,12 @@ static void tdx_handle_changed_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
> lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>
> if (change->new.is_present) {
> + /* Only flags change. This isn't supported currently. */
> + KVM_BUG_ON(change->old.is_present, kvm);
>
> Then we can have kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported completely removed.

Do you mean WARN_ON_ONCE()? If so, they can be removed from this patches because
the code should be blocked by "if (!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm))" at the
caller.

--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 00:09:44

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 047/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

On Thu, 2022-12-15 at 14:46 -0800, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> > Btw, as you mentioned in the changelog, private memory always has WB memory
> > type, thus cannot be virtualized.  Is it better to modify update_mtrr() to
> > just
> > return early if the gfn range is purely private?
>
> MTRR support in cpuid is fixed to 1, PAT in cpuid is native.
> MTRR and PAT are supported on shared pages.
>

But none of those are mentioned in the changelog or whatever. They are hidden
in the spec or in the later patches far away.

ALso, the handling of "load/save IA32_PAT" in VMEXIT/VMENTRY VMCS control is
different between TDX module and KVM. None of those are mentioned.

All those make the patch review so hard.

>
> > IMHO the handling of MTRR/PAT virtualization for TDX guest deserves
> > dedicated
> > patch(es) to put them together so it's easier to review.  Now the relevant
> > parts
> > spread in multiple independent patches (MSR handling, vt_get_mt_mask(),
> > etc).
>
> Ok, let me check it.

Yes. IMHO you should put all relevant parts together and make a clear changelog
to justify the patch(es).

2022-12-16 00:24:48

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 047/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

On Thu, 2022-12-15 at 14:46 -0800, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> > Sorry why "private-shared conversion is done via KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG"
> > results
> > in "we can ignore the requres from restrictedmem"?
> >
> > If we punch a hole, the pages are de-allocated, correct?
>
> With v10 UPM, we can have zap_private = true always.
>
> With v9 UPM, the callback is triggered both for allocation and punch-hole
> without
> any further argument.  With v10 UPM, the callback is triggered only for
> punching
> hole. 

I honestly don't quite understand "why v9 UPM the callback is triggered for
allocation" (assuming the "callback" here you mean the invaidate notifier).
Removing it seems to be right.

But, this is not the point. The point is you need to be clear about how to use
"punch hole" and/or set_memory_attributes().

Now my assumption is "punch hole" can be done alone w/o set_memory_attributes().
For instance, perhaps a (I guess valid) case is hot-removal of memory from TDX
guest, where you don't need to set_memory_attributes().

However it does seem that set_memory_attributes(shared) should (or must) be done
after "punch hole". And we need to document that clearly.

So it seems a more reasonable way is:

1) in "punch hole", you zap everything.
2) in set_memory_attribute() from private -> shared, you try to zap all private
pages anyway (it should be very quick if "punch hole" has been done), and you
can pr_warn_once() (or WARN()) if you found any private page still exists.

Did I miss anything?

But I am not sure about set_memory_attribute() from shared -> private. Should
we do fallocate() before that?


2022-12-16 00:33:44

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 056/108] KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD

On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 11:55:58PM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:22 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > TDX doesn't need APIC page depending on vapic and its callback is
> > WARN_ON_ONCE(is_tdx). To avoid unnecessary overhead and WARN_ON_ONCE(),
> > skip requesting KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD when TD.
> >
> > WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:696 vt_set_apic_access_page_addr+0x3c/0x50 [kvm_intel]
> > RIP: 0010:vt_set_apic_access_page_addr+0x3c/0x50 [kvm_intel]
> > Call Trace:
> > vcpu_enter_guest+0x145d/0x24d0 [kvm]
> > kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x25d/0xcc0 [kvm]
> > kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x414/0xa30 [kvm]
> > __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc0/0x100
> > do_syscall_64+0x39/0xc0
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 +++-
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > index 3868605462ed..5dadd0f9a10e 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > @@ -10487,7 +10487,9 @@ void kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range(struct kvm *kvm,
> > * Update it when it becomes invalid.
> > */
> > apic_address = gfn_to_hva(kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> > - if (start <= apic_address && apic_address < end)
> > + /* TDX doesn't need APIC page. */
> > + if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_TDX_VM &&
> > + start <= apic_address && apic_address < end)
> > kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD);
> > }
> >
>
> In patch "[PATCH v10 105/108] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU
> state", you have:
>
> +static void vt_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_td_vcpu(vcpu)))
> + return;
> +
> + vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(vcpu);
> +}
>
> If you drop the WARN_ON_ONCE() above, you can just drop this patch.
>
> For this particular case, I don't find it is quite necessary to change the
> common x86 code as done in this patch. In fact, SVM doesn't have a
> set_apic_access_page_addr() callback which is consistent with just return if VM
> is TD in vt_set_apic_access_page_addr().
>

Oh, yes. I will drop this patch with removing WARN_ON_ONCE().


> Also, I don't particularly like the idea of having a lot of "is_td(kvm)" in the
> common x86 code as if similar technology happens in the future, you will need to
> have another "is_td_similar_vm(kvm)" thing.

Currently KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES has such check in x86 kvm common code.


> If modifying common x86 code is necessary, then it would make more sense to
> introduce some common flag, and make TD guest set that flag.
>
> Btw, this patch just comes out of blue from the middle of a bunch of MMU
> patches. Shouldn't it be moved to "patches which handles interrupt related
> staff"?
>
> Btw2, by saying above, does it make sense to split patch "[PATCH v10 105/108]
> KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state" based on category such as
> MMU/interrupt, etc? Particularly, in that patch, some callbacks have WARN() or
> KVM_BUG_ON() against TD guest, but some don't. The logic behind those decisions
> highly depend on previous patches. To me, it makes more sense to just move
> logic related things together.

Ok, I'll split it up to cpu states/KVM MMU/interrupt parts.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 01:03:09

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 062/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX

On Fri, Dec 09, 2022 at 12:01:30AM +0000,
Vishal Annapurve <[email protected]> wrote:

> > +int __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> > + bool map_private)
> > +{
> > + gfn_t start = *startp;
> > + int attr;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (!kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +
> > + attr = map_private ? KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE : KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED;
> > + start = start & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> > + end = end & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * To make the following kvm_vm_set_mem_attr() success within spinlock
> > + * without memory allocation.
> > + */
> > + ret = kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(kvm, start, end);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + write_lock(&kvm-> mmu_lock);
> > + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
> > + gfn_t s = start;
> > +
> > + ret = kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(kvm, &s, end, map_private);
> > + if (!ret) {
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, end), kvm);
>
> This will result in no exits to userspace during memory conversion requests from
> guests. And as a result, userspace will not be able to explicitly back/unback
> shared/private memory during conversions leading to double allocation of memory.
>
> Is this an intended behavior for memory conversion with TDX VMs as per earlier
> discussion?

It was because UPM ioctl interface was not stable yet. With v10, it seems mostly
stable, I'll change the patch of "[PATCH v10 101/108] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV
map_gpa hypercall" to exit to user space.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 01:07:49

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 056/108] KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD

On Thu, 2022-12-15 at 16:11 -0800, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> > Btw2, by saying above, does it make sense to split patch "[PATCH v10
> > 105/108]
> > KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state" based on category
> > such as
> > MMU/interrupt, etc?  Particularly, in that patch, some callbacks have WARN()
> > or
> > KVM_BUG_ON() against TD guest, but some don't.  The logic behind those
> > decisions
> > highly depend on previous patches.  To me, it makes more sense to just move
> > logic related things together.
>
> Ok, I'll split it up to cpu states/KVM MMU/interrupt parts.

If I recall correctly, originally (long time ago before starting to upstream),
what we did was we have a patch to make all kvm_x86_ops callback KVM_BUG_ON()
for TDX guest, then we fix those KVM_BUG_ON() in later patches in separate
patches.

We don't need to do the exact same way, but this also seems reasonable to me.
For instance, at the beginning we can mark KVM_BUG_ON() for all callbacks which
reads/writes CPU states (which is reasonable anyway), and in later patches we
remove the KVM_BUG_ON() if needed when handling specific logic.

Simply my 2cents above. Just for your reference. My real comment is we should
put relevant parts together so it's easy to review.

2022-12-16 01:28:29

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 062/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX

On Wed, Nov 09, 2022 at 11:05:46PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > The TDX Guest-Hypervisor communication interface(GHCI) specification
> > defines MapGPA hypercall for guest TD to request the host VMM to map given
> > GPA range as private or shared.
> >
> > It means the guest TD uses the GPA as shared (or private). The GPA
> > won't be used as private (or shared). VMM should enforce GPA usage. VMM
> > doesn't have to map the GPA on the hypercall request.
> >
> > - Zap the aliased region.
> > If shared (or private) GPA is requested, zap private (or shared) GPA
> > (modulo shared bit).
> > - Record the request GPA is shared (or private) by kvm.mem_attr_array.
> > - Don't map GPA. The GPA is mapped on the next EPT violation.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 5 ++++
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 3 ++
> > 4 files changed, 103 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> > index e2a0dfbee56d..e1641fa5a862 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> > @@ -219,6 +219,11 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end);
> > int kvm_arch_write_log_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +int __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> > + bool map_private);
> > +int kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> > + bool map_private);
> > +
> > int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
> > void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > index 168c84c99de3..37b378bf60df 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > @@ -6778,6 +6778,66 @@ void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen)
> > }
> > }
> > +int __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> > + bool map_private)
> > +{
> > + gfn_t start = *startp;
> > + int attr;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (!kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm))
> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +
> > + attr = map_private ? KVM_MEM_ATTR_PRIVATE : KVM_MEM_ATTR_SHARED;
> > + start = start & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> > + end = end & ~kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * To make the following kvm_vm_set_mem_attr() success within spinlock
> > + * without memory allocation.
> > + */
> > + ret = kvm_vm_reserve_mem_attr(kvm, start, end);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> > + if (is_tdp_mmu_enabled(kvm)) {
>
> How about moving the condition test to the beginning of the function to make
> the code simpler?

Ok.


> > + gfn_t s = start;
> > +
> > + ret = kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(kvm, &s, end, map_private);
> > + if (!ret) {
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, end), kvm);
> > + } else if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vm_set_mem_attr(kvm, attr, start, s), kvm);
> > + start = s;
> > + }
> > + } else {
> > + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > + }
> > + write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> > +
> > + if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
> > + if (map_private)
> > + *startp = kvm_gfn_private(kvm, start);
> > + else
> > + *startp = kvm_gfn_shared(kvm, start);
> > + }
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_mmu_map_gpa);
> > +
> > +int kvm_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end,
> > + bool map_private)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
> > +
> > + if (!VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa) || !VALID_PAGE(mmu->private_root_hpa))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + return __kvm_mmu_map_gpa(vcpu->kvm, startp, end, map_private);
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_map_gpa);
> > +
> > static unsigned long
> > mmu_shrink_scan(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
> > {
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> > index 4b207ce83ffe..d3bab382ceaa 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
> > @@ -2156,6 +2156,41 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
> > return spte_set;
> > }
> > +int kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm,
> > + gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end, bool map_private)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
> > + gfn_t start = *startp;
> > + bool flush = false;
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(start & kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm), kvm);
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(end & kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm), kvm);
> > +
> > + kvm_mmu_invalidate_begin(kvm, start, end);
> > + for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
> > + for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, i) {
> > + if (is_private_sp(root) == map_private)
> > + continue;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * TODO: If necessary, return to the caller with -EAGAIN
> > + * instead of yield-and-resume within
> > + * tdp_mmu_zap_leafs().
> > + */
> > + flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, start, end,
> > + /*can_yield=*/true, flush,
> > + /*zap_private=*/is_private_sp(root));
> > + }
> > + }
> > + if (flush)
> > + kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_address(kvm, start, end - start);
> > + kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm, start, end);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > /*
> > * Return the level of the lowest level SPTE added to sptes.
> > * That SPTE may be non-present.
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> > index 695175c921a5..cb13bc1c3679 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
> > @@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
> > gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
> > int target_level, bool shared);
> > +int kvm_tdp_mmu_map_gpa(struct kvm *kvm,
> > + gfn_t *startp, gfn_t end, bool map_private);
>
> Sugguest to add some description about the function to avoid confusion,
> since the function name is quite generic but the usage is highly related to
> TDX.

Agreed that the name is too generic. Will rename it to kvm_tdp_mmu_map_private().

I can think of convert_private(), convert_gpa(), or any other suggestion?
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 01:37:10

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 077/108] KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 10:41:34AM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > Add a flag, KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCHED_GUEST, to skip saving/restoring DRs
> > irrespective of any other flags. TDX-SEAM unconditionally saves and
> > restores guest DRs and reset to architectural INIT state on TD exit.
> > So, KVM needs to save host DRs before TD enter without restoring guest DRs
> > and restore host DRs after TD exit.
> >
> > Opportunistically convert the KVM_DEBUGREG_* definitions to use BIT().
> >
> > Reported-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> > Co-developed-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 +++++++--
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 1 +
> > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 ++++++++---
> > 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > index fdb00d96e954..082e94f78c66 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -583,8 +583,13 @@ struct kvm_pmu {
> > struct kvm_pmu_ops;
> > enum {
> > - KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = 1,
> > - KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = 2,
> > + KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = BIT(0),
> > + KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = BIT(1),
> > + /*
> > + * Guest debug registers are saved/restored by hardware on exit from
> > + * or enter guest. KVM needn't switch them.
> > + */
> > + KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH = BIT(2),
> > };
> > struct kvm_mtrr_range {
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > index fc4de83a2df8..57767ef3353b 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > @@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > vcpu->arch.efer = EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX;
> > + vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs = KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH;
> > vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
> > vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = -1ul;
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > index 4d4b71c4cdb1..ad7b227b68dd 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > @@ -10779,7 +10779,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
> > wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
> > - if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
> > + if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & ~KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH)) {
> > set_debugreg(0, 7);
> > set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
> > set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
> > @@ -10822,6 +10822,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > */
> > if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
> > WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
> > + WARN_ON(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH);
> > static_call(kvm_x86_sync_dirty_debug_regs)(vcpu);
> > kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
> > kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
> > @@ -10834,8 +10835,12 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > * care about the messed up debug address registers. But if
> > * we have some of them active, restore the old state.
> > */
> > - if (hw_breakpoint_active())
> > - hw_breakpoint_restore();
> > + if (hw_breakpoint_active()) {
> > + if (!(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH))
> > + hw_breakpoint_restore();
> > + else
> > + set_debugreg(__this_cpu_read(cpu_dr7), 7);
>
> Why only restore dr7 when TD exit?
>
> According to the commit message, dr0~dr3 are also reset to architectural
> INIT value on TD exit.

Probably you're referring to the old version of the spec.
context switched: DR0-3, DR6, IA32_DS_AREA
reset on TD exit: RFLAGS, IA32_DEBUGCTL, DR7

I'll add a comment.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 01:48:17

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 098/108] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX

On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:22:02AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:23 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > +bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
> > +{
> > + switch (index) {
> > + case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
> > + case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
> > + case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
> > + case MSR_MTRRcap:
> > + case 0x200 ... 0x26f:
> > + /* IA32_MTRR_PHYS{BASE, MASK}, IA32_MTRR_FIX*_* */
> > + case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
> > + case MSR_MTRRdefType:
> > + case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
> > + case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
> > + case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
> > + case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
>
> To me putting KVM para-virt MSRs and hardware MSRs together isn't good idea.
> You can introduce separate helpers for them.

Makes sense. updated as follows.

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index ee8d395af849..b4132167e2bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1606,6 +1606,17 @@ void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
*error_code = 0;
}

+static bool tdx_is_emulated_kvm_msr(u32 index, bool write)
+{
+ switch (index) {
+ case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
+ case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
{
switch (index) {
@@ -1619,8 +1630,6 @@ bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
case MSR_MTRRdefType:
case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
- case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
- case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
@@ -1650,6 +1659,9 @@ bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write)
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
case MSR_EFER:
return !write;
+ case 0x4b564d00 ... 0x4b564dff:
+ /* KVM custom MSRs */
+ return tdx_is_emulated_kvm_msr(index, write);
default:
return false;
}
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 02:14:41

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 098/108] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX

On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 10:25:11PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On 10/30/2022 2:23 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> >
> > Implements set_msr/get_msr/has_emulated_msr methods for TDX to handle
> > hypercall from guest TD for paravirtualized rdmsr and wrmsr. The TDX
> > module virtualizes MSRs. For some MSRs, it injects #VE to the guest TD
> > upon RDMSR or WRMSR. The exact list of such MSRs are defined in the spec.
>
> How does KVM handle the case that the userland wants to get the TD MSR list?
>
> KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST will return the global KVM MSR list, which is
> different from the TD version.

Do you mean user space VMM (e.g. qemu) by "the userland"?
There are three classes of MSRs virtualization.
- non-configurable: TDX module directly virtualizes it. VMM can't configure.
the value set by KVM_SET_MSR_INDEX_LIST is ignored.
- configurable: TDX module directly virtualizes it. VMM can configure at the
VM creation time.
the value set by KVM_SET_MSR_INDEX_LIST is used.
- #VE
VMM handles the MSR hypercall by guest TD issues. The value set by
KVM_SET_MSR_INDEX_LIST is used.


> > Upon #VE, the guest TD may execute hypercalls,
> > TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.RDMSR> and TDG.VP.VMCALL<INSTRUCTION.WRMSR>,
> > which are defined in GHCI (Guest-Host Communication Interface) so that the
> > host VMM (e.g. KVM) can virtualizes
> can virtualize

Yes, will fix.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 04:22:01

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 106/108] Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)

On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 11:49:08AM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

> > +New KVM API, ioctl (sub)command, to manage TD VMs
> > +-------------------------------------------------
> > +Additional KVM API
> API -> APIs
> > are needed to control TD VMs. The operations on TD
> > +VMs are specific to TDX.
> > +
> > +- Piggyback and repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
> > +
> > + Although not all operation isn't memory encryption,
>
> How to understand it?
>
>
> > repupose to get

How about the followings?

New KVM API, ioctl (sub)command, to manage TD VMs
-------------------------------------------------
Additional KVM APIs are needed to control TD VMs. The operations on TD
VMs are specific to TDX.

- Piggyback and repurpose KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP

Although operations for TD VMs aren't necessarily related to memory
encryption, define sub operations of KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP for TDX specific
ioctls.

Pros:

- No major change in common x86 KVM code.
- Follows the SEV case.

Cons:

- The sub operations of KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP aren't necessarily memory
encryption, but operations on TD VMs.


--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 05:34:23

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 104/108] KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI

On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 11:17:44PM +0800,
Binbin Wu <[email protected]> wrote:

> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > index 4acba8d8cb27..d776d5d169d0 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> > @@ -286,6 +286,25 @@ static void vt_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
> > vmx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
> > }
> > +static void vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void vt_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
> > + /* TDX doesn't support INIT. Ignore INIT event */
> > + vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > + kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(vcpu);
> > +}
> > +
>
> Is it better to add WARN_ON_ONCE in the above two functions for TD case?

No because KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS ioctl can trigger those callback.

--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 05:35:35

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 105/108] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:43:14AM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:23 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > +static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
> > +{
> > + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
> > + if (is_mmio)
> > + return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> > + return  MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
> > +}
>
> So you are returning WB for _ALL_ guest memory, including shared. Wouldn't this
> break MTRR handling for shared memory? For instance, IIUC we can still support
> assigning a device to a TDX guest while the VT-d doesn't support coherent
> memory, in which case guest's MTRR/PAT are honored. I think this should also
> apply to TDX guest's shared memory?

You're right. So here is the updated change.
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -798,11 +798,8 @@ static int vt_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)

static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
{
- if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
- if (is_mmio)
- return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
- return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
- }
+ if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
+ return tdx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);

return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index ac47b20e4e91..f1842eb32d6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -568,7 +568,31 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
return 0;
}

+u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
+{
+ if (is_mmio)
+ return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
+ return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+
+ /* Guest CR0 is unknown. Assume CR0.CD = 0. */
+
+ /* TDX private GPA is always WB. */
+ if (gfn & kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm))
+ return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+
+ /*
+ * Because the definition of MTRR MSR is unaware of shared-bit,
+ * clear shared-bit.
+ */
+ gfn = kvm_gfn_private(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
+ return kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn) << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+}
+
int tdx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+
+
{
struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index 96f5546194d4..38fb888e1be9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
int trig_mode, int vector);
void tdx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
void tdx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
u64 *info1, u64 *info2, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code);
bool tdx_is_emulated_msr(u32 index, bool write);

--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2022-12-16 16:38:58

by Sean Christopherson

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 104/108] KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> The TDX module API doesn't provide API for VMM to inject INIT IPI and SIPI.
> Instead it defines the different protocols to boot application processors.
> Ignore INIT and SIPI events for the TDX guest.
>
> There are two options. 1) (silently) ignore INIT/SIPI request or 2) return
> error to guest TDs somehow. Given that TDX guest is paravirtualized to
> boot AP, the option 1 is chosen for simplicity.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---

...

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index 4acba8d8cb27..d776d5d169d0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -286,6 +286,25 @@ static void vt_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
> vmx_deliver_interrupt(apic, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
> }
>
> +static void vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
> +{
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> + return;
> +
> + kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vcpu_deliver_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
> + /* TDX doesn't support INIT. Ignore INIT event */
> + vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + kvm_vcpu_deliver_init(vcpu);
> +}
> +
> static void vt_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> @@ -627,7 +646,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
> .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
>
> - .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> + .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = vt_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> + .vcpu_deliver_init = vt_vcpu_deliver_init,

A simpler, and arguably more correct, appraoch would be to hook .apic_init_signal_blocked()
and have that return true for TDX. Waiting until delivery means the vCPU will get
spurious wake events, e.g. KVM will wake the vCPU to service the INIT, but then
ignore the INIT. Of course, sending the bogus INIT/SIPI in the first place
is a guest bug.

That would also prevent userspace from putting the vCPU into INIT/SIPI via
KVM_SET_MP_STATE.

Ideally, KVM would never mark INIT or SIPI pending in the first place, though I'm
not sure that's worth the effort.

2022-12-19 11:46:14

by Kai Huang

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 105/108] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

On Thu, 2022-12-15 at 21:26 -0800, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:43:14AM +0000,
> "Huang, Kai" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> > On Sat, 2022-10-29 at 23:23 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
> > > +static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
> > > +{
> > > + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
> > > + if (is_mmio)
> > > + return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> > > + return  MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
> > > +}
> >
> > So you are returning WB for _ALL_ guest memory, including shared. Wouldn't this
> > break MTRR handling for shared memory? For instance, IIUC we can still support
> > assigning a device to a TDX guest while the VT-d doesn't support coherent
> > memory, in which case guest's MTRR/PAT are honored. I think this should also
> > apply to TDX guest's shared memory?
>
> You're right. So here is the updated change.
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -798,11 +798,8 @@ static int vt_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
>
> static u8 vt_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
> {
> - if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu)) {
> - if (is_mmio)
> - return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> - return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> - }
> + if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> + return tdx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
>
> return vmx_get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn, is_mmio);
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index ac47b20e4e91..f1842eb32d6c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -568,7 +568,31 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +u8 tdx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
> +{
> + if (is_mmio)
> + return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> +
> + if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
> + return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
> +
> + /* Guest CR0 is unknown. Assume CR0.CD = 0. */

This comment is horrible. You need to explain why guest CR0.CD is irrelevant
here.

And the fact is for TDX guest, TDX module tells us the CR0.CD is always 0.

> +
> + /* TDX private GPA is always WB. */
> + if (gfn & kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm))
> + return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;

Dose the 'gfn' still have the shared bit set? I don't think so?

> +
> + /*
> + * Because the definition of MTRR MSR is unaware of shared-bit,
> + * clear shared-bit.
> + */
> + gfn = kvm_gfn_private(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
> + return kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn) << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
> +}

Overall, I think a better logic should be: 1) for private page, return WB (and
WARN_ON(is_mmio)), although this doesn't matter anyway as the SPTE won't be used
by CPU anyway. 2) Then for shared pages, we try to copy vmx_get_mt_mask() logic,
or use vmx_get_mt_mask() directly.

But since how KVM and TDX module virtualize MTRR/PAT is different, thus for now
I am not sure whether just using vmx_get_mt_mask() can work. For example, IIUC
for TDX guest KVM cannot know guest's PAT, but for VMX guest KVM traps MTRR/PAT
so it can know guest's memory type.

For now I am not even sure whether we can/should support device assignment w/o
VT-d snooping capability as for TDX guest KVM cannot know guest's PAT? Perhaps
we should just make sure this won't happen so we can always returns WB for
shared memory too for TDX guest.

2022-12-19 14:05:53

by Wang, Wei W

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: RE: [PATCH v10 052/108] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs

On Friday, December 16, 2022 7:21 AM, Yamahata, Isaku wrote:
> > > + /*
> > > + * First TDX generation doesn't support clearing dirty bit,
> > > + * since there's no secure EPT API to support it. It is a
> > > + * bug to reach here for TDX guest.
> > > + */
> > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm)))
> > > + return false;
> > > +
> >
> > It might not be a good choice to intercept everywhere in kvm_mmu just
> > as tdx doesn't support it. I'm thinking maybe we could do the check in
> > tdx.c, which is much simpler. For example:
> >
> > @@ -2592,6 +2605,12 @@ static void
> tdx_handle_changed_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
> > lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> >
> > if (change->new.is_present) {
> > + /* Only flags change. This isn't supported currently. */
> > + KVM_BUG_ON(change->old.is_present, kvm);
> >
> > Then we can have kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported completely removed.
>
> Do you mean WARN_ON_ONCE()? If so, they can be removed from this
> patches because the code should be blocked by "if
> (!kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported(kvm))" at the caller.
>

As you also mentioned in the comment "It is a bug to reach here", we could keep using KVM_BUG_ON. The suggestion is that we don't need to add such checks in all the callers as it is more complicated (and error-prone) to consider all of them.
Why not let callers run into tdx_handle_changed_private_spte to do the check (at this only place)? From what I understand, we don’t support an spte change with flags update only for this version. This would be much simpler.

2023-01-03 08:55:42

by Wang, Lei

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 000/108] KVM TDX basic feature support

On 10/30/2022 2:22 PM, [email protected] wrote:

> ** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
> TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability
> and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID
> (HKID) assigned to guest TD.
> The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
> - int seamrr_enabled()
> Check if required cpu feature (SEAM mode) is available. This only check CPU
> feature availability. At this point, the TDX module may not be ready for KVM
> to use.
> - int init_tdx(void);
> Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
> - const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
> Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX
> isn't initialized.
> - u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void);
> Return global key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
> - int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
> Allocate HKID for guest TD.
> - void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
> Free HKID for guest TD.

tdx_enable() is introduced by TDX host patch series and used in patch 5, should
it be added to this list too?

2023-01-03 18:30:06

by Ackerley Tng

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure


Happy to help!

Nope it wasn't any special technique, I was working on the selftests and
made a mistake configuring the TD while initializing it.

While setting up struct kvm_tdx_init_vm, I did not copy the entire
struct kvm_cpuid2.

This reliably reproduces the crash:

--------

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only

#include "kvm_util_base.h"
#include <processor.h>

static int tdx_ioctl(int fd, int ioctl_no, uint32_t flags, void *data)
{
struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;

memset(&tdx_cmd, 0x0, sizeof(tdx_cmd));
tdx_cmd.id = ioctl_no;
tdx_cmd.flags = flags;
tdx_cmd.data = (uint64_t)data;
return ioctl(fd, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &tdx_cmd);
}

#define XFEATURE_LBR 15
#define XFEATURE_XTILECFG 17
#define XFEATURE_XTILEDATA 18
#define XFEATURE_CET_U 11
#define XFEATURE_CET_S 12

#define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR (1 << XFEATURE_LBR)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_U (1 << XFEATURE_CET_U)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_S (1 << XFEATURE_CET_S)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_U | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_S)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILECFG (1 << XFEATURE_XTILECFG)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILEDATA (1 << XFEATURE_XTILEDATA)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE (XFEATURE_MASK_XTILECFG |
XFEATURE_MASK_XTILEDATA)

static void apply_tdx_restrictions(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid_data)
{
for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e = &cpuid_data->entries[i];

if (e->function == 0xd && e->index == 0) {
/*
* TDX module requires both XTILE_{CFG, DATA} to be set.
* Both bits are required for AMX to be functional.
*/
if ((e->eax & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) != XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) {
e->eax &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE;
}
}

if (e->function == 0xd && e->index == 1) {
/*
* TDX doesn't support LBR yet.
* Disable bits from the XCR0 register.
*/
e->ecx &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_LBR;

/*
* TDX modules requires both CET_{U, S} to be set even
* if only one is supported.
*/
if (e->ecx & XFEATURE_MASK_CET)
e->ecx |= XFEATURE_MASK_CET;
}
}
}

void initialize_td_bad(struct kvm_vm *vm)
{
const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid;
int rc;

/* No guest VMM controlled cpuid information yet. */
struct kvm_tdx_init_vm init_vm;

rc = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API);
TEST_ASSERT(rc, "TDX: KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API is not supported!");
rc = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP);
TEST_ASSERT(rc, "TDX: KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP is not supported!");

vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API,
KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS |
KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK);
vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP, 24);

/* Allocate and setup memory for the td guest. */
vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, 1, 0);

cpuid = kvm_get_supported_cpuid();
apply_tdx_restrictions((struct kvm_cpuid2 *) cpuid);

memset(&init_vm, 0, sizeof(init_vm));
init_vm.attributes = 0;

/*
* Should have been kvm_cpuid2_size(cpuid->nent) instead of
* sizeof(*cpuid)
*/
memcpy(&init_vm.cpuid, cpuid, sizeof(*cpuid));

rc = tdx_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, 0, &init_vm);
TEST_ASSERT(rc == 0, "KVM_TDX_INIT_VM failed: %d %d", rc, errno);
}

static int crash(void)
{
struct kvm_vm *vm;

/* Create a TD VM with no memory.*/
vm = ____vm_create(VM_MODE_DEFAULT, 0, KVM_X86_TDX_VM);

/* Allocate TD guest memory and initialize the TD.*/
initialize_td_bad(vm);

return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
/* Disable stdout buffering */
setbuf(stdout, NULL);

return crash();
}

2023-01-04 04:38:46

by Wang, Lei

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 016/108] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure

On 10/30/2022 2:22 PM, [email protected] wrote:> +static void
vt_hardware_unsetup(void)
> +{
> + tdx_hardware_unsetup();
> + vmx_hardware_unsetup();
> +}
> +
> static int vt_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> if (is_td(kvm))
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Not ready to create guest TD yet. */
> + return tdx_vm_init(kvm);
>
> return vmx_vm_init(kvm);
> }
>
> +static void vt_flush_shadow_all_private(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return tdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);
> +}

nit: there is no need to use the "return" keyword.

> +
> +static void vt_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return;
> +
> + vmx_vm_destroy(kvm);
> +}
> +
> +static void vt_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + if (is_td(kvm))
> + return tdx_vm_free(kvm);
> +}

ditto.

2023-01-04 08:45:49

by Wang, Lei

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 021/108] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

On 10/30/2022 2:22 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
>
> TDX requires additional parameters for TDX VM for confidential execution to
> protect its confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from
> any other software, including VMM. When creating guest TD VM before
> creating vcpu, the number of vcpu, TSC frequency (that is same among
> vcpus. and it can't be changed.) CPUIDs which is emulated by the TDX
> module. It means guest can trust those CPUIDs. and sha384 values for
> measurement.
>
> Add new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, to pass parameters for TDX guest. It
> assigns encryption key to the TDX guest for memory encryption. TDX
> encrypts memory per-guest bases. It assigns device model passes per-VM
> parameters for the TDX guest. The maximum number of vcpus, tsc frequency
> (TDX guest has fised VM-wide TSC frequency. not per-vcpu. The TDX guest
> can not change it.), attributes (production or debug), available extended
> features (which is reflected into guest XCR0, IA32_XSS MSR), cpuids, sha384
> measurements, and etc.
>
> This subcommand is called before creating vcpu and KVM_SET_CPUID2, i.e.
> cpuids configurations aren't available yet. So CPUIDs configuration values
> needs to be passed in struct kvm_init_vm. It's device model responsibility

I suppose this should be kvm_tdx_init_vm.

> to make this cpuid config for KVM_TDX_INIT_VM and KVM_SET_CPUID2.
>
> Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 31 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 22 ++
> tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++
> 5 files changed, 347 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> index cd304d323d33..05ac4bfc8f8a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> @@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
> #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +
> +/* -1 indicates CPUID leaf with no sub-leaves. */
> +#define TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ((u32)-1)
> struct tdx_cpuid_config {
> u32 leaf;
> u32 sub_leaf;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> index 2ad9666e02a5..26661879c031 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> @@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
> /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
> enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
> KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
> + KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
>
> KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
> };
> @@ -583,4 +584,34 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
> struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
> };
>
> +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
> + __u64 attributes;
> + __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
> + union {
> + /*
> + * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before
> + * KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed.
> + *
> + * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.
> + * The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent
> + * with this values.
> + * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256)
> + * = 8KB.
> + */
> + struct {
> + struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
> + /* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */
> + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[];
> + };
> + /*
> + * For future extensibility.
> + * The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB.
> + * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
> + */
> + __u64 reserved[2029];
> + };
> +};
> +
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index d77709a6da51..54045e0576e7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -284,6 +284,205 @@ static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)
> int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> +
> + kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
> +
> + /*
> + * This function initializes only KVM software construct. It doesn't
> + * initialize TDX stuff, e.g. TDCS, TDR, TDCX, HKID etc.
> + * It is handled by KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, __tdx_td_init().
> + */
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
> + struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
> + struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
> +
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
> + sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + /*
> + * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
> + * mem_enc_ioctl().
> + */
> + if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
> + if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (caps.nr_cpuid_configs < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs)
> + return -E2BIG;
> +
> + caps = (struct kvm_tdx_capabilities) {
> + .attrs_fixed0 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed0,
> + .attrs_fixed1 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed1,
> + .xfam_fixed0 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed0,
> + .xfam_fixed1 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed1,
> + .nr_cpuid_configs = tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs,
> + .padding = 0,
> + };
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(user_caps, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid_configs, &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs,
> + tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs *
> + sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}

tdx_dev_ioctl() is introduced in previous patch with the same code added here,
which means this is just a place change and it will confuse reviewers. Is it
neccesary to do so?

> +
> +/*
> + * cpuid entry lookup in TDX cpuid config way.
> + * The difference is how to specify index(subleaves).
> + * Specify index to TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF for CPUID leaf with no-subleaves.
> + */
> +static const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *tdx_find_cpuid_entry(const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
> + u32 function, u32 index)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + /* In TDX CPU CONFIG, TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF means index = 0. */
> + if (index == TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF)
> + index = 0;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < cpuid->nent; i++) {
> + const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e = &cpuid->entries[i];
> +
> + if (e->function == function &&
> + (e->index == index ||
> + !(e->flags & KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX)))
> + return e;
> + }
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static int setup_tdparams(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params,
> + struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm)

Indentation is broken here, please fix it.

> +{
> + const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid = &init_vm->cpuid;
> + const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
> + u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
> + u64 guest_supported_xss;
> + int max_pa;
> + int i;
> +
> + if (kvm->created_vcpus)
> + return -EBUSY;
> + td_params->max_vcpus = kvm->max_vcpus;
> + td_params->attributes = init_vm->attributes;
> + if (td_params->attributes & TDX_TD_ATTRIBUTE_PERFMON) {
> + /*
> + * TODO: save/restore PMU related registers around TDENTER.
> + * Once it's done, remove this guard.
> + */
> + pr_warn("TD doesn't support perfmon yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
> + "host perf registers properly.\n");
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs; i++) {
> + const struct tdx_cpuid_config *config = &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs[i];
> + const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry =
> + tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, config->leaf, config->sub_leaf);
> + struct tdx_cpuid_value *value = &td_params->cpuid_values[i];
> +
> + if (!entry)
> + continue;
> +
> + value->eax = entry->eax & config->eax;
> + value->ebx = entry->ebx & config->ebx;
> + value->ecx = entry->ecx & config->ecx;
> + value->edx = entry->edx & config->edx;
> + }
> +
> + max_pa = 36;
> + entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0x80000008, 0);
> + if (entry)
> + max_pa = entry->eax & 0xff;
> +
> + td_params->eptp_controls = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
> + /*
> + * No CPU supports 4-level && max_pa > 48.
> + * "5-level paging and 5-level EPT" section 4.1 4-level EPT
> + * "4-level EPT is limited to translating 48-bit guest-physical
> + * addresses."
> + * cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() check is just in case.
> + */
> + if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() && max_pa > 48) {
> + td_params->eptp_controls |= VMX_EPTP_PWL_5;
> + td_params->exec_controls |= TDX_EXEC_CONTROL_MAX_GPAW;
> + } else {
> + td_params->eptp_controls |= VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
> + }
> +
> + /* Setup td_params.xfam */
> + entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0xd, 0);
> + if (entry)
> + guest_supported_xcr0 = (entry->eax | ((u64)entry->edx << 32));
> + else
> + guest_supported_xcr0 = 0;
> + guest_supported_xcr0 &= kvm_caps.supported_xcr0;
> +
> + entry = tdx_find_cpuid_entry(cpuid, 0xd, 1);
> + if (entry)
> + guest_supported_xss = (entry->ecx | ((u64)entry->edx << 32));
> + else
> + guest_supported_xss = 0;
> + /* PT can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS support */
> + guest_supported_xss &= (kvm_caps.supported_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_PT);
> +
> + td_params->xfam = guest_supported_xcr0 | guest_supported_xss;
> + if (td_params->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_LBR) {
> + /*
> + * TODO: once KVM supports LBR(save/restore LBR related
> + * registers around TDENTER), remove this guard.
> + */
> + pr_warn("TD doesn't support LBR yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
> + "IA32_LBR_DEPTH properly.\n");
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +
> + if (td_params->xfam & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) {
> + /*
> + * TODO: once KVM supports AMX(save/restore AMX related
> + * registers around TDENTER), remove this guard.
> + */
> + pr_warn("TD doesn't support AMX yet. KVM needs to save/restore "
> + "IA32_XFD, IA32_XFD_ERR properly.\n");
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +
> + td_params->tsc_frequency =
> + TDX_TSC_KHZ_TO_25MHZ(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz);
> +
> +#define MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(dst, src) \
> + do { \
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dst) != sizeof(src)); \
> + memcpy((dst), (src), sizeof(dst)); \
> + } while (0)
> +
> + MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrconfigid, init_vm->mrconfigid);
> + MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrowner, init_vm->mrowner);
> + MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE(td_params->mrownerconfig, init_vm->mrownerconfig);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct td_params *td_params)
> +{
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + struct tdx_module_output out;
> cpumask_var_t packages;
> int ret, i;
> u64 err;
> @@ -390,10 +589,13 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> tdx_mark_td_page_added(&kvm_tdx->tdcs[i]);
> }
>
> - /*
> - * Note, TDH_MNG_INIT cannot be invoked here. TDH_MNG_INIT requires a dedicated
> - * ioctl() to define the configure CPUID values for the TD.
> - */
> + err = tdh_mng_init(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, __pa(td_params), &out);
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
> + pr_tdx_error(TDH_MNG_INIT, err, &out);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto teardown;
> + }
> +
> return 0;
>
> /*
> @@ -431,50 +633,65 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> return ret;
> }
>
> -int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
> +static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
> {
> - struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
> - struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
> - struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
> + struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> + struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm = NULL;
> + struct td_params *td_params = NULL;
> + void *entries_end;
> + int ret;
>
> - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
> - sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*init_vm) != 16 * 1024);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(*init_vm) - offsetof(typeof(*init_vm), entries)) /
> + sizeof(init_vm->entries[0]) < KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct td_params) != 1024);
>
> - if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
> - return -EFAULT;
> - if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
> + if (is_td_initialized(kvm))
> return -EINVAL;
> - /*
> - * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
> - * mem_enc_ioctl().
> - */
> - if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
> +
> + if (cmd->flags)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
> - if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
> - return -EFAULT;
> + init_vm = kzalloc(sizeof(*init_vm), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (copy_from_user(init_vm, (void __user *)cmd->data, sizeof(*init_vm))) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> - if (caps.nr_cpuid_configs < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs)
> - return -E2BIG;
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + if (init_vm->cpuid.padding)
> + goto out;
> + /* init_vm->entries shouldn't overrun. */
> + entries_end = init_vm->entries + init_vm->cpuid.nent;
> + if (entries_end > (void *)(init_vm + 1))
> + goto out;
> + /* Unused part must be zero. */
> + if (memchr_inv(entries_end, 0, (void *)(init_vm + 1) - entries_end))
> + goto out;
>
> - caps = (struct kvm_tdx_capabilities) {
> - .attrs_fixed0 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed0,
> - .attrs_fixed1 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed1,
> - .xfam_fixed0 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed0,
> - .xfam_fixed1 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed1,
> - .nr_cpuid_configs = tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs,
> - .padding = 0,
> - };
> + td_params = kzalloc(sizeof(struct td_params), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!td_params) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> - if (copy_to_user(user_caps, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
> - return -EFAULT;
> - if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid_configs, &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs,
> - tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs *
> - sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
> - return -EFAULT;
> + ret = setup_tdparams(kvm, td_params, init_vm);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
>
> - return 0;
> + ret = __tdx_td_init(kvm, td_params);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> + kvm_tdx->tsc_offset = td_tdcs_exec_read64(kvm_tdx, TD_TDCS_EXEC_TSC_OFFSET);
> + kvm_tdx->attributes = td_params->attributes;
> + kvm_tdx->xfam = td_params->xfam;
> +
> +out:
> + /* kfree() accepts NULL. */
> + kfree(init_vm);
> + kfree(td_params);
> + return ret;
> }
>
> int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> @@ -490,6 +707,9 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
>
> switch (tdx_cmd.id) {
> + case KVM_TDX_INIT_VM:
> + r = tdx_td_init(kvm, &tdx_cmd);
> + break;
> default:
> r = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> index 938314635b47..ff0ea9cad347 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> @@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
> struct tdx_td_page tdr;
> struct tdx_td_page *tdcs;
>
> + u64 attributes;
> + u64 xfam;
> int hkid;
> +
> + u64 tsc_offset;
> };
>
> struct vcpu_tdx {
> @@ -48,6 +52,11 @@ static inline struct vcpu_tdx *to_tdx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_tdx, vcpu);
> }
>
> +static inline bool is_td_initialized(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + return to_kvm_tdx(kvm)->hkid > 0;
> +}

There is a similar function, is_hkid_assigned(), which is previously defined. Do
you think redefining a new function here will bring code redundency?

> +
> static __always_inline void tdvps_vmcs_check(u32 field, u8 bits)
> {
> #define VMCS_ENC_ACCESS_TYPE_MASK 0x1UL
> @@ -148,6 +157,19 @@ TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, VMCS, vmcs);
> TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, STATE_NON_ARCH, state_non_arch);
> TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(8, MANAGEMENT, management);
>
> +static __always_inline u64 td_tdcs_exec_read64(struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx, u32 field)
> +{
> + struct tdx_module_output out;
> + u64 err;
> +
> + err = tdh_mng_rd(kvm_tdx->tdr.pa, TDCS_EXEC(field), &out);
> + if (unlikely(err)) {
> + pr_err("TDH_MNG_RD[EXEC.0x%x] failed: 0x%llx\n", field, err);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + return out.r8;
> +}
> +
> #else
> struct kvm_tdx {
> struct kvm kvm;
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> index 2ad9666e02a5..531a0033e530 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> @@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
> /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
> enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
> KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
> + KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
>
> KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
> };
> @@ -583,4 +584,36 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
> struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
> };
>
> +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
> + __u64 attributes;
> + __u32 max_vcpus;
> + __u32 padding;
> + __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> + __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
> + union {
> + /*
> + * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before
> + * KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed.
> + *
> + * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.
> + * The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent
> + * with this values.
> + * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256)
> + * = 8KB.
> + */
> + struct {
> + struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
> + /* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */
> + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[];
> + };
> + /*
> + * For future extensibility.
> + * The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB.
> + * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
> + */
> + __u64 reserved[2028];
> + };
> +};
> +
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */

2023-01-04 21:39:32

by Ackerley Tng

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 098/108] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX


I believe we should also have a handler for .msr_filter_changed.

Without an .msr_filter_changed handler, a host crash can occur if we
first set up a vcpu for the TD, and then set an MSR filter.

If we first set up a vcpu for the TD, and then set an MSR filter, upon
vcpu_enter_guest, the .msr_filter_changed handler (currently
vmx_msr_filter_changed()) will be invoked. to_vmx(vcpu) interprets the
containing struct of struct kvm_vcpu to be a struct vcpu_vmx instead of
a struct vcpu_tdx.

In my case, I was working on a selftest and the missing handler caused a
NULL dereference in vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() because
vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap is NULL.

2023-01-11 22:34:54

by Erdem Aktas

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:24 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

> +int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> +{
> + int r;
> +
> + if (!enable_ept) {
> + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + /* MOVDIR64B instruction is needed. */
> + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) {
> + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with MOVDIR64B supported ");
> + return -ENODEV;
> + }
> +
> + /* TDX requires VMX. */
> + r = vmxon_all();
> + if (!r)
> + r = tdx_module_setup();
> + vmxoff_all();

if few CPUs have VMX enabled, this will disable VMX in all of them.
Depending on what enabled VMX on those CPUs, would this not cause
kernel crashes/problems?

2023-01-12 03:17:59

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 021/108] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

On Wed, Jan 04, 2023 at 03:59:08PM +0800,
"Wang, Lei" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On 10/30/2022 2:22 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> > From: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
> >
> > TDX requires additional parameters for TDX VM for confidential execution to
> > protect its confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from
> > any other software, including VMM. When creating guest TD VM before
> > creating vcpu, the number of vcpu, TSC frequency (that is same among
> > vcpus. and it can't be changed.) CPUIDs which is emulated by the TDX
> > module. It means guest can trust those CPUIDs. and sha384 values for
> > measurement.
> >
> > Add new subcommand, KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, to pass parameters for TDX guest. It
> > assigns encryption key to the TDX guest for memory encryption. TDX
> > encrypts memory per-guest bases. It assigns device model passes per-VM
> > parameters for the TDX guest. The maximum number of vcpus, tsc frequency
> > (TDX guest has fised VM-wide TSC frequency. not per-vcpu. The TDX guest
> > can not change it.), attributes (production or debug), available extended
> > features (which is reflected into guest XCR0, IA32_XSS MSR), cpuids, sha384
> > measurements, and etc.
> >
> > This subcommand is called before creating vcpu and KVM_SET_CPUID2, i.e.
> > cpuids configurations aren't available yet. So CPUIDs configuration values
> > needs to be passed in struct kvm_init_vm. It's device model responsibility
>
> I suppose this should be kvm_tdx_init_vm.
>
> > to make this cpuid config for KVM_TDX_INIT_VM and KVM_SET_CPUID2.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 +
> > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 31 +++
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 22 ++
> > tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++
> > 5 files changed, 347 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> > index cd304d323d33..05ac4bfc8f8a 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
> > @@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
> > #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> > +
> > +/* -1 indicates CPUID leaf with no sub-leaves. */
> > +#define TDX_CPUID_NO_SUBLEAF ((u32)-1)
> > struct tdx_cpuid_config {
> > u32 leaf;
> > u32 sub_leaf;
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> > index 2ad9666e02a5..26661879c031 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> > @@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ struct kvm_pmu_event_filter {
> > /* Trust Domain eXtension sub-ioctl() commands. */
> > enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
> > KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES = 0,
> > + KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
> >
> > KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
> > };
> > @@ -583,4 +584,34 @@ struct kvm_tdx_capabilities {
> > struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config cpuid_configs[0];
> > };
> >
> > +struct kvm_tdx_init_vm {
> > + __u64 attributes;
> > + __u64 mrconfigid[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> > + __u64 mrowner[6]; /* sha384 digest */
> > + __u64 mrownerconfig[6]; /* sha348 digest */
> > + union {
> > + /*
> > + * KVM_TDX_INIT_VM is called before vcpu creation, thus before
> > + * KVM_SET_CPUID2. CPUID configurations needs to be passed.
> > + *
> > + * This configuration supersedes KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.
> > + * The user space VMM, e.g. qemu, should make them consistent
> > + * with this values.
> > + * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES(256)
> > + * = 8KB.
> > + */
> > + struct {
> > + struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
> > + /* 8KB with KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES. */
> > + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[];
> > + };
> > + /*
> > + * For future extensibility.
> > + * The size(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm) = 16KB.
> > + * This should be enough given sizeof(TD_PARAMS) = 1024
> > + */
> > + __u64 reserved[2029];
> > + };
> > +};
> > +
> > #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > index d77709a6da51..54045e0576e7 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> > @@ -284,6 +284,205 @@ static int tdx_do_tdh_mng_key_config(void *param)
> > int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> > {
> > struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
> > +
> > + kvm_tdx->hkid = -1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * This function initializes only KVM software construct. It doesn't
> > + * initialize TDX stuff, e.g. TDCS, TDR, TDCX, HKID etc.
> > + * It is handled by KVM_TDX_INIT_VM, __tdx_td_init().
> > + */
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int tdx_dev_ioctl(void __user *argp)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_tdx_capabilities __user *user_caps;
> > + struct kvm_tdx_capabilities caps;
> > + struct kvm_tdx_cmd cmd;
> > +
> > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cpuid_config) !=
> > + sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config));
> > +
> > + if (copy_from_user(&cmd, argp, sizeof(cmd)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > + if (cmd.flags || cmd.error || cmd.unused)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + /*
> > + * Currently only KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES is defined for system-scoped
> > + * mem_enc_ioctl().
> > + */
> > + if (cmd.id != KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + user_caps = (void __user *)cmd.data;
> > + if (copy_from_user(&caps, user_caps, sizeof(caps)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + if (caps.nr_cpuid_configs < tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs)
> > + return -E2BIG;
> > +
> > + caps = (struct kvm_tdx_capabilities) {
> > + .attrs_fixed0 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed0,
> > + .attrs_fixed1 = tdx_caps.attrs_fixed1,
> > + .xfam_fixed0 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed0,
> > + .xfam_fixed1 = tdx_caps.xfam_fixed1,
> > + .nr_cpuid_configs = tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs,
> > + .padding = 0,
> > + };
> > +
> > + if (copy_to_user(user_caps, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > + if (copy_to_user(user_caps->cpuid_configs, &tdx_caps.cpuid_configs,
> > + tdx_caps.nr_cpuid_configs *
> > + sizeof(struct tdx_cpuid_config)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> tdx_dev_ioctl() is introduced in previous patch with the same code added here,
> which means this is just a place change and it will confuse reviewers. Is it
> neccesary to do so?

Right. Somehow diff was also confused. I'll try to twist the previous patch to
introduce __tdx_td_init() with the previous patch.


...

> > +static inline bool is_td_initialized(struct kvm *kvm)
> > +{
> > + return to_kvm_tdx(kvm)->hkid > 0;
> > +}
>
> There is a similar function, is_hkid_assigned(), which is previously defined. Do
> you think redefining a new function here will bring code redundency?

I'll drop this function and replace it with is_hkid_assigned().
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2023-01-12 03:19:25

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 005/108] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

On Wed, Jan 11, 2023 at 02:02:58PM -0800,
Erdem Aktas <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 11:24 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
>
> > +int __init tdx_hardware_setup(struct kvm_x86_ops *x86_ops)
> > +{
> > + int r;
> > +
> > + if (!enable_ept) {
> > + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with EPT disabled\n");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* MOVDIR64B instruction is needed. */
> > + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) {
> > + pr_warn("Cannot enable TDX with MOVDIR64B supported ");
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* TDX requires VMX. */
> > + r = vmxon_all();
> > + if (!r)
> > + r = tdx_module_setup();
> > + vmxoff_all();
>
> if few CPUs have VMX enabled, this will disable VMX in all of them.
> Depending on what enabled VMX on those CPUs, would this not cause
> kernel crashes/problems?

Are you seeing any issues? or is this a question in theory?

In theory, you're right. In practice, unless we have other kernel components
that uses VMX, we don't have to worry. In fact, only KVM in the kernel tree
uses VMX.

The flow is as follows,
- VMX is off on all CPUs on start up.
NOTE: VMX is disabled on kexec or reboot.
- On loading kvm_intel.ko (or kernel boot if builtin), this function is called.
vmxon/off_all()
- VMX is enabled on all online CPUs when creating the first guest.
- VMX is disabled on all online CPUs when destroying the last guest.
- VMX is disabled on offlining CPU

Thanks,
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2023-01-12 10:28:58

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 098/108] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX

On Wed, Jan 04, 2023 at 01:20:13PM -0800,
Ackerley Tng <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> I believe we should also have a handler for .msr_filter_changed.
>
> Without an .msr_filter_changed handler, a host crash can occur if we
> first set up a vcpu for the TD, and then set an MSR filter.
>
> If we first set up a vcpu for the TD, and then set an MSR filter, upon
> vcpu_enter_guest, the .msr_filter_changed handler (currently
> vmx_msr_filter_changed()) will be invoked. to_vmx(vcpu) interprets the
> containing struct of struct kvm_vcpu to be a struct vcpu_vmx instead of
> a struct vcpu_tdx.
>
> In my case, I was working on a selftest and the missing handler caused a
> NULL dereference in vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() because
> vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap is NULL.

Nice catch. I'll fix it.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2023-01-12 17:20:06

by Isaku Yamahata

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 000/108] KVM TDX basic feature support

On Tue, Jan 03, 2023 at 04:26:59PM +0800,
"Wang, Lei" <[email protected]> wrote:

> On 10/30/2022 2:22 PM, [email protected] wrote:
>
> > ** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
> > TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability
> > and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID
> > (HKID) assigned to guest TD.
> > The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
> > - int seamrr_enabled()
> > Check if required cpu feature (SEAM mode) is available. This only check CPU
> > feature availability. At this point, the TDX module may not be ready for KVM
> > to use.
> > - int init_tdx(void);
> > Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
> > - const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
> > Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX
> > isn't initialized.
> > - u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void);
> > Return global key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
> > - int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
> > Allocate HKID for guest TD.
> > - void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
> > Free HKID for guest TD.
>
> tdx_enable() is introduced by TDX host patch series and used in patch 5, should
> it be added to this list too?

Thanks, I've updated the cover letter to catch up the host tdx patch series v10.
--
Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

2023-01-18 01:05:25

by Ackerley Tng

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 067/108] KVM: TDX: Add helper assembly function to TDX vcpu


> TDX defines an API to run TDX vcpu with its own ABI. Define an assembly
> helper function to run TDX vcpu to hide the special ABI so that C code can
> call it with function call ABI.

> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 157 insertions(+)

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> index 8477d8bdd69c..9066eea1ede5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
> #include <asm/asm.h>
> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
> #include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
> +#include <asm/errno.h>
> #include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
> #include <asm/percpu.h>
> @@ -31,6 +32,13 @@
> #define VCPU_R15 __VCPU_REGS_R15 * WORD_SIZE
> #endif

> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +#define TDENTER 0
> +#define EXIT_REASON_TDCALL 77
> +#define TDENTER_ERROR_BIT 63
> +#define seamcall .byte 0x66,0x0f,0x01,0xcf
> +#endif
> +
> .section .noinstr.text, "ax"

> /**
> @@ -350,3 +358,152 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff)
> pop %_ASM_BP
> RET
> SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_do_interrupt_nmi_irqoff)
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +
> +.pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax"
> +
> +/**
> + * __tdx_vcpu_run - Call SEAMCALL(TDENTER) to run a TD vcpu
> + * @tdvpr: physical address of TDVPR
> + * @regs: void * (to registers of TDVCPU)
> + * @gpr_mask: non-zero if guest registers need to be loaded prior to
> TDENTER
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * TD-Exit Reason
> + *
> + * Note: KVM doesn't support using XMM in its hypercalls, it's the HyperV
> + * code's responsibility to save/restore XMM registers on TDVMCALL.
> + */
> +SYM_FUNC_START(__tdx_vcpu_run)
> + push %rbp
> + mov %rsp, %rbp
> +
> + push %r15
> + push %r14
> + push %r13
> + push %r12
> + push %rbx
> +
> + /* Save @regs, which is needed after TDENTER to capture output. */
> + push %rsi
> +
> + /* Load @tdvpr to RCX */
> + mov %rdi, %rcx
> +
> + /* No need to load guest GPRs if the last exit wasn't a TDVMCALL. */
> + test %dx, %dx
> + je 1f
> +
> + /* Load @regs to RAX, which will be clobbered with $TDENTER anyways. */
> + mov %rsi, %rax
> +
> + mov VCPU_RBX(%rax), %rbx
> + mov VCPU_RDX(%rax), %rdx
> + mov VCPU_RBP(%rax), %rbp
> + mov VCPU_RSI(%rax), %rsi
> + mov VCPU_RDI(%rax), %rdi
> +
> + mov VCPU_R8 (%rax), %r8
> + mov VCPU_R9 (%rax), %r9
> + mov VCPU_R10(%rax), %r10
> + mov VCPU_R11(%rax), %r11
> + mov VCPU_R12(%rax), %r12
> + mov VCPU_R13(%rax), %r13
> + mov VCPU_R14(%rax), %r14
> + mov VCPU_R15(%rax), %r15
> +
> + /* Load TDENTER to RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */
> +1: mov $TDENTER, %rax
> +
> +2: seamcall
> +
> + /*
> + * Use same return value convention to tdxcall.S.
> + * TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID doesn't conflict with any TDX status code.
> + */
> + jnc 3f
> + mov $TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID, %rax
> + jmp 5f
> +3:
> +
> + /* Skip to the exit path if TDENTER failed. */
> + bt $TDENTER_ERROR_BIT, %rax
> + jc 5f
> +
> + /* Temporarily save the TD-Exit reason. */
> + push %rax
> +
> + /* check if TD-exit due to TDVMCALL */
> + cmp $EXIT_REASON_TDCALL, %ax
> +
> + /* Reload @regs to RAX. */
> + mov 8(%rsp), %rax
> +
> + /* Jump on non-TDVMCALL */
> + jne 4f
> +
> + /* Save all output from SEAMCALL(TDENTER) */
> + mov %rbx, VCPU_RBX(%rax)
> + mov %rbp, VCPU_RBP(%rax)
> + mov %rsi, VCPU_RSI(%rax)
> + mov %rdi, VCPU_RDI(%rax)
> + mov %r10, VCPU_R10(%rax)
> + mov %r11, VCPU_R11(%rax)
> + mov %r12, VCPU_R12(%rax)
> + mov %r13, VCPU_R13(%rax)
> + mov %r14, VCPU_R14(%rax)
> + mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%rax)
> +
> +4: mov %rcx, VCPU_RCX(%rax)
> + mov %rdx, VCPU_RDX(%rax)
> + mov %r8, VCPU_R8 (%rax)
> + mov %r9, VCPU_R9 (%rax)
> +
> + /*
> + * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
> + * speculative use of the guest's values.
> + */
> + xor %rbx, %rbx
> + xor %rcx, %rcx
> + xor %rdx, %rdx
> + xor %rsi, %rsi
> + xor %rdi, %rdi
> + xor %rbp, %rbp
> + xor %r8, %r8
> + xor %r9, %r9
> + xor %r10, %r10
> + xor %r11, %r11
> + xor %r12, %r12
> + xor %r13, %r13
> + xor %r14, %r14
> + xor %r15, %r15
> +
> + /* Restore the TD-Exit reason to RAX for return. */
> + pop %rax
> +
> + /* "POP" @regs. */
> +5: add $8, %rsp
> + pop %rbx
> + pop %r12
> + pop %r13
> + pop %r14
> + pop %r15
> +
> + pop %rbp
> + RET
> +
> +6: cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
> + je 1f
> + mov $TDX_SW_ERROR, %r12

While compiling the tree at
https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream, it seems like
compilation was failing because TDX_SW_ERROR was not defined. Perhaps
asm/tdx.h needs to be added.

> + orq %r12, %rax
> + jmp 5b
> +1: ud2
> + /* Use FAULT version to know what fault happened. */
> + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(2b, 6b)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_END(__tdx_vcpu_run)
> +
> +.popsection
> +
> +#endif
> --
> 2.25.1